INTRODUCTION

Perspectives on the Power and Science of Police

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Police Science and Literatures on “Police”

In U.S. law, the term “police” appears as a strange creature, endowed with the curious ability to refer to totally different things in different contexts—thus authorizing quite heterogeneous governing activities. In the field of property law, the “police power” authorizes such burdens on private capital as municipal expropriations of land and buildings and restrictions on the siting of private businesses through zoning requirements. Criminal lawyers, on their part, think of officers enforcing the criminal law when they hear the word “police.” Constitutional lawyers encounter both of these types of police—when examining police powers of search and seizure, for example, and when considering the restrictions on commercial speech authorized by recent court decisions upholding municipalities’ use of the police power in zoning ordinances. But neither of these uses of “police” is thought of as central to constitutional law.
Elsewhere in the scholarly world, intellectual historians of early-modern Europe are very familiar with yet another instance of “police”: Polizeiwissenschaft, that is, the “police science” that, centuries before uniformed police forces existed, explored the fields that later became public administration and municipal law. This intellectual history, little known in the English-speaking world (despite the efforts of Freund 1904; Small 1909; and Raeff 1983), was made known to a broad international audience of social and political theorists by Foucault and some of his collaborators in a tremendously influential volume published in 1991 (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991), a volume that sparked the large body of sociological and political-science literature known as “governmentality studies.”

Governmentality studies has had relatively little impact in the United States, and within the United States less impact on the legal academy than in social science circles. However, it is not at all coincidental that two eminent historians of U.S. law, who have both done a great deal to revive the subject of “police” within legal history, are both careful readers of Foucault and of the Foucault-inspired work produced by Pasquale Pasquino, Nikolas Rose, Mitchell Dean, and others. One of these historians is Bill Novak, who contributed to the revival of interest in “police” in his influential argument about the persistence, even at the height of laissez-faire, of a strong U.S. tradition authorizing coercive measures to build “the well-regulated community” (Novak 1996). The other is Chris Tomlins, who explored the contradictions between the regulatory logic of police and the rights-based logic of law in his influential work on the legal history of labor in the United States (Tomlins 1993).

Thus, the eighteenth-century meaning of “police”—as the regulatory power to take coercive measures to ensure the safety and the welfare of “the community”—became, in the 1990s, a topic for theoretical inquiries, via the work of historians with a theoretical bent. This took place most visibly within Foucault-inspired work, work that was in any case more alert to the theoretical importance of historical research than is generally the case among theoretical schools. Later in the 1990s, and reaching a crescendo in the first years of the twenty-first century, the term “police” came into prominence in yet another literature. Along a somewhat separate parallel path, some very recent theoretical work of a more or less neo-Marxist character has on its part revived the subject of “police” as part of a retheorization of “sovereignty.” Mitchell Dean’s contribution to this volume may help U.S.
readers (especially within the legal academy) become familiar with this lively and, in Europe, highly influential, post-9/11 literature, whose most cited works include Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (Hardt and Negri 2000) and Giorgio Agamben's works on sovereignty, “bare life,” and the state of exception (Agamben 1998, 2005). In chapter 7, Dean explores the argument made (rather a priori) by Hardt and Negri to the effect that the field of international relations has in recent years seen a disappearance of old-fashioned military actions in favor of quasi-police actions.

It is clear that recent developments in the United States have suddenly made this somewhat arcane and hyperbolically theoretical literature appear as highly relevant. Agamben's theorization of modern life as variations on the theme of the “camp,” with the concentration camp regarded not as an exception but as the foundation of law and sovereignty, seemed like one of those radical rants that Italian Marxists are famous for—until Guantánamo. Legal scholars as well as progressive Americans in every field are now attempting to understand the U.S. government’s insistence that Guantánamo inmates are not prisoners of war but something akin to that good old American category, outlaws. This is stimulating interest in the kind of political and legal theory that explores nonliberal systems and nonliberal rationales—e.g., the work of the German antiliberal thinker Carl Schmitt.

But whatever the future may hold for this exploration of theoretical resources useful for an understanding of new forms of legal and nonlegal coercion, it can be said that, in general, the literature that contrasts the logic of military struggle between sovereign nations to the policelike logic that would discount many states as “rogue” states in need of external paternal rule (explored by Levi and Hagan in chapter 8) has not made explicit the connections between “the international police power” of current UN armed actions and the “police” of eighteenth-century police regulations and police science—despite the interesting fact that Mitchell Dean's first book concerned itself centrally with “the police of the poor” (Dean 1991).

It is thus clear that if one is willing to cross disciplinary and theoretical boundaries, it is possible to draw new connections that show that it is not by a semantic accident that the word “police” has had such an interesting career, or, more accurately, set of careers. But it is perhaps less clear what should be done, intellectually, after having noted the hitherto hidden and often evanescent connections. Having brought together scholars from a variety of fields—mainly legal theory, legal history, political theory, and
sociolegal studies—who had in their respective work explored the importance of “police,” through the academic techniques of inviting people (most of whom did not know one another) to a workshop and asking them to produce papers, the question arose as to how to handle the one thing everyone noted, namely, the multivocality and ambiguity of the term “police.” Some of the authors included here decided to attempt to develop something like a unified theory of “police” (Farmer and Neocleous, mainly, and Dubber to some extent). Others chose to pursue a different kind of theoretical inquiry, one that documents the affinities, borrowings, and similarities that link uses of “police” that may appear to be totally independent—but more by way of finding what Wittgenstein famously called “family resemblances” than by way of setting the groundwork for a unified theory of police as such. Clearly, the decision to either seek a unified theory or avoid general theorizing in favor of documenting “family resemblances” has little to do with one’s substantive research into police matters and a great deal to do with one’s attitude toward the general crisis of theoretical work today—what not long ago used to be called the question of postmodernism.

Whether one seeks a unified theory, or whether one prefers to document similarities, adaptations, analogies, and metaphorical borrowings, however, our book highlights the fruitfulness of including within a single work not only different literatures on “police” but also studies of the large variety of governing activities authorized by the term “police.” By considering the various studies of “police” together, two fundamental theoretical points become clear:

1. Police and temporalities of governance. The policing work of constabularies is mainly devoted to finding offenders and getting them punished for specific deeds done in the past. This backward-looking logic famously distinguishes the criminal law from forward-looking exercises of the police power of the state (e.g., taking preventive public health measures or differentiating urban spaces through zoning law). But if the police power of the state—as exercised in fatherly measures to safeguard order and public health in advance—is linked to the enforcement of criminal laws by more than a semantic coincidence, as several of the chapters in this volume argue, then it becomes clear that “police” works as a sort of temporal-hinge word, allowing the governance of the past to be articulated with the governance of
the future. Prevention and punishment are very different as logics of governance; “police” is the middle term that links them.

2. Police and the inevitability of discretion. Blackstone’s famous definition of police as the fatherly concern to ensure the present order, future prosperity, and general well-being of the national household isolates the patriarchal element of police. This element has been linked, as far back as Aristotle, to a certain kind of wisdom—the practical wisdom that knows which concrete measures will work in the particular circumstances, in a way that defeats the high theorists who would seek strict definitions in advance. Legal writers constantly complain that the police power is undefined, residual, very broad, and so forth; but this innumerability of police powers is less strange if the knowledge dimension is considered. The patriarch’s prudential wisdom is precisely the ability to decide, in the particular instance, which specific measure will best promote prosperity, order, and well-being, without being bound by strict lawlike definitions.

The work of the officers entrusted with enforcing the criminal law is of course supposed to be governed strictly by the letter of the law—the opposite of the paternal, concrete, future-oriented prudence. But if we attend to the links between “police” in the sense of police force and “police” in the sense of police power we may be able to see the recurring problems of police discretion in a new light. Even when enforcing specific statutes, police forces still have some share in the discretionary logic of paternal prudence. Prevention has been part of police forces since their inception—Sir Robert Peel famously advocated prevention as the key purpose of police forces. And discretion is a necessary feature of all forms of governance that are oriented toward prevention and that do not limit themselves to punishing specified acts. Prevention and punishment being two contrasting modes of governance—as well as two different temporal orientations—it becomes clear that, yet again, “police” can be regarded as fulfilling a sort of “hinge” function. If police is the hinge between governing the past and governing the future, it is also, by the same token, a link between punishment and prevention.

If police articulates temporalities and modes of governing, it also works to articulate spaces of governing. Let us briefly outline these sites—socio-physical-legal spaces that may appear to be quite separate even though
they all feature some version of police—before concluding the introduction with an overview of the chapters.

**Police Power and Its Various Fields**

1. **The local/the urban.** In U.S. law, the “police power of the state” is exercised by the state in some respects—e.g., liquor regulation—but it is often delegated to municipalities. In fact, “the police power” is sometimes imagined as essentially local. And this is not a peculiarity of the U.S. political system: in late eighteenth-century England and Scotland, advocates of strict police regulations targeting vagrants, itinerant merchants, prostitutes, and other marginal urban populations also assumed that such regulations were within the province of local magistrates or municipal corporations. As time went on, the “police of the poor” tended to give way to regulatory efforts targeting urban spaces and activities more than identifiable groups of persons, and this tendency of course reached its zenith in the United States and Canada in the 1970s, when “status offenses” were declared unconstitutional, something that forced local governments to concentrate on using time, space, and activity as the vectors of urban regulation and urban order—not persons.

2. **The colony.** If governing local spaces, especially urban spaces, has been and remains a fundamental site of police, this book shows that police is nevertheless not essentially local. First of all, as Chris Tomlins’s concluding comments make clear and as Valverde’s contribution highlights, the government of colonies has also been carried out using police rationales and police strategies. Those charter colonies that were set up by royal governments in the Americas, and endowed with delegated paternal powers, were often subject to minute regulation and micromanagement of a police-like character. In addition, aboriginal peoples, whether living in the white settlements, on reservations, or in their ancestral lands, were also brought under the jurisdiction of various forms of quasi-paternal coercive powers—the police of Indians and the police of the (domestic) poor shared many substantive and formal similarities, and, of course, in the United States, slaves were subject to their own form of police.

3. **The factory.** Regulations imposed on workers (and on nonworkers, such as vagrants) by states, municipalities, and parishes, and by private factory
owners often took the form of police regulations. Very generally, one can see the persistence of “the police of the poor” in today’s complex rules for welfare recipients; but one can also see the survival of private police jurisdictions in the Byzantine regulations covering such matters as proper attire and proper workplace hair styles, regulations generally upheld by courts.

4. The national household. In the small German states of eighteenth-century police science it was perhaps easier to see the household-kingdom analogy than it is today, especially in today’s large federal states. Nevertheless, Blackstone’s famous definition of police as the internal ordering of the kingdom— contrasted with the outward-looking logic of warfare—is still relevant, even in states that (like the United States) claim that the police power is not federal. The recent invention of “homeland security” is perhaps an indication of this long-standing link between the household and the state, not only because of the name of the new institution, but because of the fundamentally preventive logic that enables its officers to govern certain “suspect” people and certain spaces (e.g., airports) in a highly despotic fashion, all in the name of ensuring security, of course.

5. The international. Adam Smith and other classical theorists regarded “police” as intrinsically national and contrasted it with both warfare and diplomacy. In recent times, however, we have seen the rise of the idea that international spaces too can be governed through police logics—or even police forces, as in the case of UN peacekeepers and UN-sponsored foreign police working in “failing” or postconflict states. As Levi and Hagan show, Teddy Roosevelt borrowed some ideas and techniques of governance from his work as New York City Police Commissioner when he came up with the doctrine of “the international police power.” And in recent years we have seen a veritable explosion of experiments in international police. It may be that, in the near future, it is the international that becomes the main venue or site for innovations in “police.” If that is the case, a good understanding of the history and varied effects of different, earlier police projects will be particularly important.

Police Historiography

The first three chapters take a broadly historical approach to an investigation of the concept of police. In chapter 1, Mark Neocleous explores the
theoretical foundations of police by revealing the broad and varied concept of police that was the subject of the old police science in pre-Enlightenment Europe and underlay social and institutional reforms not only on the Continent but—less familiarly—in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century London of Patrick Colquhoun and his Thames River Police. While Colquhoun’s police reforms today are regarded as the beginning of modern policing—and the creation of police as an institution of “law enforcement”—Neocleous instead exposes their roots in the police concept of the original police scientists. Countering the common tendency to associate police with restrictive, if not downright oppressive, state action, Neocleous stresses the affirmative aspect of police. In particular, he regards police as having been a means of fabricating order in general, and class order in particular, and having played a central role in the creation of the English working class. In his view, the policing of the poor was central to the project of crime control that is now generally associated with police work, as indigence—as an extreme form of poverty—was viewed as a major cause of crime.

This view of police as an institution that “has been central to the historically massive operation on the part of the state to consolidate the social power of capital and the wage form” allows Neocleous to put meat on the bones of the concept that provides it with a crucial critical edge. It is this critical ambition that, in Neocleous’s view, distinguishes the new police science from the old, whose practitioners functioned as expert facilitators of central policy making, regardless of whether a policy created, or oppressed, certain segments of its object population.

In the most explicitly historical chapter, Pasquale Pasquino uses two seventeenth-century works on the outskirts of the German police science tradition to capture the nature and scope of the police project. Through a close reading of *Biblische Policey* (Biblical Police) by Dietrich Reinkingk and *Teutscher Fürstenstaat* (German Prince State) by Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff, Pasquino reveals a vision of the early-modern police state that manages to retain theological foundations while making room for a police bureaucracy that executes the prince’s administrative decisions and maintaining a subtle balance among the various social and political estates of the period. In this theory of the state, earthly government—exemplified by the figure of the expert advisor, the bureaucrat—interprets, translates, and manifests
God's often cryptic commands within a clearly defined piece of earth delineated by borders—the territory.

This, then, is the paradox of police—at one and the same time, government asserts itself as an administrative machine for the ordering of populations and legitimates itself as the maximizer of the welfare of its objects. It's a paradox that, in small Lutheran principalities in premodern Germany, remains hidden under a veneer of theological allegory but shines through clear enough in Pasquino's careful analysis. As a result, Reinkingk's and Seckendorff's texts can appear as both descriptive and critical. They provide accounts of the operation of the administrative police state, but in exposing its imperfections—be they political or administrative—they also open up a new critical space that makes room for critique from within the paradigm of police itself.

After this excursion into the land and time of Polizeiwissenschaft, Mariana Valverde refocuses our attention on the realm of the common law, which long has denied any traces of the "police state" in its institutions and traditions of government. As Neocleous also noted, of course, the concept of police figured prominently in English and Scottish governance of the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries before police as a means of governing disappeared in name, but not in fact, with the rise of the modern police department. Valverde leaves the confines of British domestic government behind and traces the role of police in colonial and, more recently, postcolonial governance. In the end, she employs the concept of police to lay out nothing less than a critical constitutional history of the Canadian state, powerfully illustrating the richness of the concept for historical analyses of law and government even—and perhaps especially—in states that have erased the police power from its political vocabulary. In fact, much of the history of the police power in Canadian government is the history of its denial. The power given to the Canadian federal government by the "peace, order, and good government" (POGG) clause of the British North America Act—a clause often identified with a cultural preference for peace and order, in contrast to the U.S. quest for individual freedom in the pursuit of happiness—has strong affinities with the U.S. police power. While the so-called POGG powers are primarily emergency powers, this clause nonetheless has also been used to authorize routine regulatory activity in such fields as environmental risks and narcotic sales. Thus, in contrast to
standard Canadian legal textbooks, which locate the equivalent of the U.S. police power at the level of the Canadian provinces (including the functions delegated to municipalities by the provinces), Valverde argues that the police power is actually dispersed throughout the Canadian governmental structure. Without being named, it has been, in fact, deployed to govern at the national and imperial levels as well as domestically and locally.

Valverde shows that the logic of police has shaped, and continues to shape, not only the postcolonial relationship between England and Canada (revealed, for instance, by the long-standing practice of framing criminal offenses as violations of the Queen’s—or King’s—peace) but also the governing practices within Canada. As Valverde demonstrates, domestic Canadian governance of the Quebecois and of Canada’s aboriginal peoples through the Department of Indian Affairs mirrors England’s police-type governance of Canada the colony itself. Valverde thus challenges the common assumption that police power is local power. Police power is, above all, delegated power; the police power exercised by the Canadian government over aboriginal peoples does not represent the devolution of governmental power from England to the independent Canadian state, but a localized replication of imperial police power. The power of provinces and of municipalities to police their respective territories and populations is not the power of local self-government, but the local manifestation of central imperial police power. The distinction between local and central government is not qualitative, but quantitative only—the logic of police manifests itself in both.

Policing Crime

The next three chapters narrow the focus to the role of the power to police in criminal and quasi-criminal law. They also can be seen as shifting the emphasis from historical foundations to contemporary legal institutions and practices, without, however, abandoning a historical sensibility altogether; for the study of any legal or political relationship from the perspective of police always also implies a certain curiosity about origins and continuities even in the face of change and complexity. The new police science, by insisting on the continued relevance of long-denied rationales and methodologies of government, is both deeply historical and hopelessly anachronistic.
Its practitioners must have, in Neocleous’s words, “the courage of our anachronisms.”

Starting with the observation that the criminal law in the United States is regarded as a manifestation of the police power, Markus Dubber gives an account of the U.S. criminal process from the perspective of the rich concept of police as a rationality of governance whose historical foundation and significance was explored in the first three chapters of the book. Dubber places particular emphasis on the patriarchal posture of police governance, captured, for instance, in Blackstone’s influential late eighteenth-century definition of “public police and oeconomy” as “the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good manners: and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations” (Blackstone 1769, 162), which he believes can be traced back to the Greek conception of oikonomikos, the governance of the household by the householder.

In this light, the criminal process emerges as a means for representing and enforcing the state-householder’s authority vis-à-vis the constituents of the household defined by its (territorial) criminal jurisdiction. The Police Power Model of the criminal process thus stands in marked contrast to the Autonomy Model, which—even though it bears little resemblance to the criminal process in action—fulfills the key ideological function of bringing the criminal process in line with the fundamental principle of legitimacy in the modern democratic state: autonomy, or self-government.

Lindsay Farmer goes beyond Dubber’s reading of the criminal process as a manifestation of police power; he seeks a new paradigm for the critical analysis of criminal law. Farmer’s “jurisprudence of security” both recognizes and challenges the often-drawn distinction between the realms of police and of law, where the former is defined by difference and heteronomy and the latter by identity and autonomy. He arrives at his new paradigm by investigating the various—and not always consistent—conceptions of police that have appeared in police thought over the centuries and the accompanying attempts to differentiate between police and law. Rather than bringing the legitimacy constraints upon law to bear on prudential police governance, Farmer proposes to reformulate the legitimacy challenge posed by police in a state under the rule of law.
Following Adam Smith, Farmer calls for reuniting police and law within a broad conception of jurisprudence (which itself includes both *ius* and *prudentia*) in pursuit of security, where both jurisprudence and security, the means and the end, would require careful scrutiny. Insofar as security is—unlike police—not defined by its very indefinability and therefore may serve a function other than the evasion of principled constraint and critical analysis in the name of the pursuit of the undefined welfare of an undefined public, the project of giving meaning to the notoriously vague end of security bears the promise of constructive debate. It may emerge as the common ground where law theories of crime as an infliction of harm on persons and police theories of crime as an offense against the authority of the sovereign-householder can meet.

The police power not only has been cited as the source of all criminal law (insofar as *any* crime disturbs the sovereign’s peace and is inconsistent with “the domestic order” of the state, to quote Blackstone), it also has been said to generate its very own class of offenses, known as regulatory offenses, public welfare offenses, *mala prohibita*, or simply police offenses. Chief among these are traffic offenses, which are almost universally ignored by criminal law scholarship even though they occupy a considerable portion of police officers’ time, play a central role in the investigation and suppression of crime (notably drug crime), affect more persons on a daily basis than any other form of criminal regulation, and can result in sanctions of considerable severity (ranging from fines and license suspensions and public humiliation to jail and prison sentences and eventually—in the case of certain alcohol-related traffic offenses that result in a fatal accident—the death penalty [Christian 2000]).

In chapter 6, Alan Hunt undertakes a study of the regulation of traffic as an exercise of the power to police. Hunt documents how the enforcement of traffic regulation can be seen as part of the general project of civilization using the particular discourse of safety. The process of civilization can be seen as facilitating the modern state-householder’s ability to perform the complex task of policing its vast, diverse, and diffuse population. Civilization simplifies administration by subjecting the object of government to a gradual and almost imperceptible process of uniformization in the name of progress toward an elusive and ever-moving goal. To be effective, rather than counterproductive, this process cannot rely exclusively, or even primarily, on direct oppression and violence; in contrast to the extraordinary measures of
imprisonment, shaming, or even capital punishment, the vast bulk of traffic policing is accomplished through visual, aural, or verbal commands backed up with visible surveillance, the threat of sanctions, and, to the extent effective, mechanical devices such as traffic lights and cameras. Traffic criminal law thus illustrates a little-noticed, but crucially important, aspect of the paradigm of a jurisprudence of security. When, but only when, appropriate, traffic regulation is justified in terms of preventing harm to persons (most often fellow drivers, but also construction workers, pedestrians, and even police officers); otherwise it is carried on quietly, as one variant of the state project of police-through-civilization.

*Police on Earth*

Chapters 7 and 8 complete a move foreshadowed by Valverde’s discussion of police in colonial and postcolonial governance in chapter 3; they explore the usefulness of the police concept for the analysis of international rather than internal affairs. Various critical theorists—Schmitt, Agamben, and Hardt and Negri—have remarked that international military conflicts have been transformed from wars into police actions. Mitchell Dean investigates this claim through a close analysis of the rhetoric and reality of military interventions by the United Nations and the United States in the Balkans and Iraq. Dean concludes that speaking about international military interventions in terms of police is illuminating provided one carefully differentiates between law, war, police, peacekeeping, and the confounding neologism “policekeeping.” While the policization of war can imply the eradication of the distinction between combatants and civilians in a “total war” through the wholesale criminalization of the enemy, Dean warns against hyperbolic invocations of the police paradigm and draws attention to an altogether different image of police, “the use of carefully calibrated force and minimum violence to protect suffering humanity so that it might begin to build a civil society.” The rhetoric of police governance, after all, always also included the efficient pursuit of good order; even the Greek ὀικονόμος or the Roman dominus could be more or less competent in the management of his household’s welfare. Police is not sinister or illegitimate by definition, neither in domestic nor in international affairs. It is rather alegitimate, at least insofar
as it lies beyond the reach of the traditional legitimacy constraints placed on
government through law.

The role of police in the international realm is further developed by Ron Levi and John Hagan. Returning to the more explicitly historical-foundational approach illustrated by the first three chapters, Levi and Hagan bring to light a long-standing tradition of police talk in international affairs. Rather than an essentially domestic rationality of governance, police is revealed as a central component of Theodore Roosevelt’s approach to international relations. As New York City Police Commissioner, Roosevelt apparently grew frustrated with what he experienced as the constraints of law—and constitutional law in particular—on vigorous government in the name of the good police of its objects. Protections of the right to property, for instance, stood in the way of his efforts to clean up sweat shops, as rich landlords hired fancy lawyers to plead their constitutional case. As President, Roosevelt gave only halfhearted support to efforts to establish basic institutions of international law and justice and instead stressed the need for order maintenance not only domestically but internationally as well, with or without the grounding in some legalistic framework or other—if need be, any nation (and, most importantly, the most powerful nation on earth, the United States) must stand at the ready to provide global policing.

Roosevelt’s much-derided “Policeman of the Hemisphere” (and eventually of the world) thus is less a police officer in the narrow modern sense of police as law enforcement than a police commissioner in the traditional sense of police as communal welfare. Against this backdrop of the primacy of police over law in international relations, it comes as no surprise that U.S. foreign policy so far has not been able to accommodate the idea of an international criminal law, not to mention the institution of an international criminal court, which would dramatically manifest and personify meaningful legal constraints on the discretionary exercise of an international police power for the good police of the global community.

Police Old and New

This book combines contributions from scholars from several countries (Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, the United States) who
work in various disciplines (history, sociology, criminology, politics, law) with the common aim of testing the critical and analytic potential today of a long-submerged concept that once sustained a massive project of inquiry into the nature of government: the police. For now, police has proved its mettle. The concept has shown remarkable versatility and power of illumination in a wide range of contexts, from critical historiographies of the English working class, the theory of statehood in early modern Germany, and postcolonial constitutionalism in Canada to analyses of the operation of the modern criminal process in the United States, the use of “Anti-Social Behaviour Orders” in the United Kingdom, the enforcement of traffic regulations in the United Kingdom and Canada, and, eventually, attempts to make sense of the ever-evolving New World Order defined by police actions, UN police-keeping, and the Police Commissioner of the World.

Clearly much remains to be done. The analytic usefulness of police must be tested on other issues and in other fields. It may well turn out that the concept will shed more heat than light when it is pushed to do work at greater levels of detail. Undoubtedly questions about the definition of police, which appear throughout this hook and have plagued thought about police from the beginning, will continue to arise and trigger serious disagreements. The relationship between the Old and the New Police Science may need to be considered more carefully. Many, in fact, who appreciate the analytic usefulness of the concept of police may find the recovery of the project of a science of police more trouble than it's worth. But none of this matters for purposes of this book. An agenda for inquiry with great potential for research across disciplines and countries has been laid out and exemplified. Surely for the present it is enough to have shown that the New Police Science has a future. What that future will bring remains to be seen.

References


