Consumer credit law was a hot topic for legal scholars during the 1970s and 1980s, but its attraction waned in the next two decades, no doubt due in part to the dampening effect of the law and economics movement on government intervention and its advocacy. However, the last five years have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in consumer credit law. This is partly because recent market developments have given academics a range of interesting new issues to address and partly because the new generation of legal scholars is economically literate and has been able to draw successfully on developments in law and economics, behavioural economics, and other new theoretical perspectives to enrich the debate over the case for regulation. This essay surveys the recent literature on three topics – sub-prime lending, credit cards, and payday loans – with particular reference to the challenges developments in these areas pose for truth-in-lending laws and policies that, at least until very recently, had remained largely unchanged since the heyday of consumer credit law reform.

Keywords: consumer credit/truth-in-lending/sub-prime lending/credit cards/payday loans/law and economics/behavioural economics

1 Introduction

Consumer protection does not figure prominently among Michael Trebilcock’s current research interests, but he was a leading figure in the Australian and Canadian consumer movements during the 1960s and 1970s. His outstanding contribution in Australia was his co-authorship of the so-called Adelaide Law School Committee Report on the law relating to consumer credit and moneylending (the ‘ALSC Report’). The report was commissioned by the Standing Committee of State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General, and it proposed sweeping reforms, inspired partly by the US Consumer Credit Protection Act 1968 (the ‘Truth-in-Lending Act’) and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, both of which pre-dated the ALSC Report only by a matter of months. The ALSC Report was remarkably influential. It led initially to the enactment of new consumer credit laws in South Australia and ultimately to
the adoption of uniform legislation throughout Australia that is still in place.\textsuperscript{4}

Perhaps the most significant part of the \textit{ALSC} Report were the recommendations relating to truth in lending. Citing contemporary US literature, the committee said,

[\textit{t}]he case for disclosure of effective interest rates turns on the need for a consumer to be able to shop for credit comparatively. At present, interest charges in consumer credit transactions while disclosed as a total sum (\textit{i.e.}, dollars and cents disclosure), commonly are not also disclosed as a rate percentage, or if a rate percentage is disclosed, this is done in a variety of ways which makes comparison by the average consumer of the relative cost of credit being offered by competing sources of credit difficult, if not impossible.\textsuperscript{5}

The committee went on to recommend mandatory pre-contractual disclosure of credit cost information, including a standardized annual percentage rate (\textit{APR}), along the lines of the US model.\textsuperscript{6} The measure had two main objectives: first, as the above-quoted passage indicates, to facilitate comparison shopping for credit so that borrowers could choose rationally between competing creditors; and second, to inform prospective borrowers about the true cost of credit so that they could choose rationally between borrowing and paying cash. The second objective related to two concerns that were current at the time. The first was that lenders commonly quoted flat rates of interest. A flat rate is calculated on the assumption that the whole of the loan amount is outstanding for the entire repayment period. The typical consumer loan is repayable by installments, and the outstanding principal diminishes progressively with each repayment. This means that quoting a flat rate understates the true cost of credit. The second concern was that when quoting interest rates and charges, lenders commonly omitted additional charges, such as loan set-up fees and the like, on the basis that since these were not part of the lender’s return, they should not be treated as interest.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Consumer Credit Code}, enacted in template form by the \textit{Consumer Credit Act 1994} (Qld.) and imported into the other states and territories by adoption legislation enacted pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement (the ‘Australian Uniform Credit Laws Agreement’): see Anthony Duggan & Elizabeth Lanyon, \textit{Consumer Credit Law} (Sydney: Butterworths, 1999) at para. 1.2.6 [Duggan & Lanyon, \textit{Consumer}]. The \textit{Consumer Credit Code} reflects many of the ALSC Report’s recommendations and also the work of a later body, known as the Molomby Committee, which was a committee of the Law Council of Australia established to report on the feasibility of the ALSC Report’s recommendations: \textit{Report on Fair Consumer Credit Laws} (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1971). There are plans in train to replace the state and territory laws with a federal Consumer Credit Act, supported by a referral of power by the states to the Commonwealth.

\textsuperscript{5} ALSC Report, supra note 1 at 25.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. at 28.
From the borrower’s perspective, on the other hand, such charges are undeniably part of the cost of credit, and quoting interest rates or charges without taking them into account is potentially misleading. With these various considerations in mind, and in common with the US precedents, the ALSC Report recommended prescribed methods for APR calculations that assumed a progressively declining principal and took into account, as far as practicable, all relevant fees and charges.

Truth-in-lending initiatives were controversial, even at the time of the ALSC Report. The main objections were as follows: (1) By and large, consumers care more about dollars-and-cents disclosure of credit costs, because this is a better indication of what they can afford, and the benefits of APR disclosure will most likely be limited to well-educated, affluent borrowers. (2) There is no need for mandatory disclosure, because if a creditor’s prices are competitive, it will have an incentive to disclose them voluntarily. (3) Excessive emphasis on the APR may cause creditors to compete on this front alone and to cut back on other benefits under the contract (‘term substitution’). The counter-arguments included the following: (1) It does not matter whether consumers by and large are rate sensitive, so long as there is a sufficient margin of rate-sensitive consumers to influence prices. (2) Mandatory disclosure is necessary to solve a collective-action problem, namely that individual creditors will not comply on a voluntary basis if the disclosure would make their charges seem higher than the charges of other creditors who do not comply. (3) These benefits of truth in lending exceed the costs, including the costs of compliance and any potential costs due to term substitution and the like.

This debate was carried on quite vigorously in the academic literature during the decade or so that followed the enactment of the truth-in-lending laws. Scholars worried about both the timing and the content of the truth-in-lending disclosures. One concern was that the legislation requires disclosure in the loan document itself, which is too late for comparison shopping: by the time consumers get the information, they will already be committed to the deal, psychologically if not legally. Other concerns related to ways of simplifying the disclosures and making them more prominent. The growth in credit-card use during the 1980s prompted another debate over the potential cross-subsidization

7 See ibid. at 27–8 outlining the main objections.
effects of the truth-in-lending laws. Should credit-card issuers be free to charge joining and annual fees on top of financing charges? Opponents argued that these kinds of additional charges compromised the policy behind the truth-in-lending laws by making the APR less reliable as a measure of comparative credit cost. The counter-argument was that prohibiting these fees would give one class of card users a windfall at the expense of another. Many credit-card issuers give their customers a choice between paying the outstanding balance of the account in full on the due date or paying a lesser amount. Finance charges are payable if the customer takes the second option, but customers who take the first option get a free ride. In the absence of joining and annual fees, the card issuer will cover the cost of providing ‘free credit’ to the first class of card users by raising the finance charges for the second class of users.\(^{11}\)

At some point during the 1980s, scholarly interest in consumer credit law appeared to wane. Writing in 2001, Richard Hynes and Eric Posner noted that ‘the literature on the regulation of consumer credit is not as lively as it once was. Most contributions were written in the 1970s and early 1980s, and there has been little work in the 1990s other than work on personal bankruptcy.’\(^{12}\) This trend was reflected in law school curricula, from which courses on consumer credit law, once common, largely disappeared. The most likely explanation for this wave of disenchantment is the dominance of the law and economics movement during the period in question, which made it unfashionable in many circles to suggest that markets might fail or that legislative intervention was the solution if they did. A second possible explanation is that scholars simply got tired of debating the same old questions and ran out of new

incorporates a measure along these lines: see Duggan & Lanyon, *Consumer*, supra note 4 at para. 4.3.8.

\(^{11}\) In Australia, the credit laws originally prohibited credit-card joining and annual fees to preserve the integrity of the truth-in-lending regime. The current laws have removed the prohibition, with the aim of avoiding the cross-subsidization problem: Duggan & Lanyon, *ibid.* at para. 3.3.23. However, it has subsequently become common for credit-card issuers not to impose these fees, and this has resurrected the problem: Oren Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic’ (2004) 98 Nw.U.L.R. 1373 at s. 2.A.2; see further Pt. 3 infra.

ones to discuss. In any event, after a decade or more, consumer credit scholarship is on the rise again, and truth-in-lending, in particular, is once more in the limelight.

The new generation of legal scholars in the consumer credit field is for the most part schooled in law and economics, and so they are better equipped than many of their predecessors to engage with Chicago School opponents on their own terms and to stake out economically plausible policy positions on regulatory issues. The renewed interest in consumer credit law focuses in particular on three recent developments in consumer credit markets that have generated a host of new issues crying out for scholarly treatment. The first is the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States. The second is the relatively recent phenomenon of mass-marketed credit cards, coupled with significant rises in consumer bankruptcy rates. The third is the emergence of the so-called alternative consumer credit market, comprising payday lenders and the like who specialize in short-term loans for small amounts. In Parts II–IV below, I review some of the more recent literature, outlining the issues these developments have given rise to and identifying the implications for truth-in-lending policy and law reform. Both the subject matter of this paper (consumer credit) and the perspective (law and economics) testify to Michael Trebilcock’s profound influence on my own academic career.

II Sub-prime lending

Sub-prime lending is the practice of lending to borrowers whose credit ratings are not good enough to qualify them for loans at prime interest rates. The growth of the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States dates from the 1990s; according to Todd Zywicki and Joseph Adamson, the main factors were (1) interest-rate deregulation, which removed constraints on lenders’ ability to price loans based on individual borrower risk; (2) improved underwriting procedures, including the use of credit scoring, which – supposedly, at any rate – facilitated the assessment of risk; and (3) the growth of mortgage securitization, which increased the amount of capital available for home lending and allowed non-bank lenders to enter the home mortgage market.13

It has become common to associate the sub-prime mortgage market with abusive lending practices aimed at exploiting the borrower’s lack of sophistication. Examples include making unaffordable loans based on the estimated foreclosure value of the house rather than on the borrower’s capacity to repay (‘asset-backed lending’), charging excessive interest rates (‘rent-seeking’), and inducing a borrower to refinance a loan repeatedly to earn additional fees (‘loan-flipping’). Prior to the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the prevalence of these abuses led to calls for tighter anti-predatory-lending laws. Nevertheless, most commentators seem to agree that while predatory lending is a significant problem, not all sub-prime loans are predatory. There is a legitimate sub-prime market that has increased the availability of credit to lower- and middle-income borrowers, including minority groups who were excluded from the prime market because lenders stereotyped them as inherently poor credit risks. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that borrowers in the legitimate sub-prime market are not less sophisticated than prime borrowers and that they are equally capable of understanding their loans, provided they have access to the relevant information. The implication is that any response to the predatory lending problem must be sufficiently targeted so as not to discourage legitimate sub-prime lending. Mandatory suitability requirements, which require the lender to assess the borrower’s capacity to repay, may have this effect unless carefully targeted, because (1) they place too much responsibility on the lender, having regard to informational asymmetries in the mortgage market; (2) given that loan contracts, unlike contracts of insurance, are not contracts of the utmost good faith, such laws


14 See Engel & McCoy, ibid. at Pt. I. As Engel and McCoy explain (at 1263), asset-backed lending and loan-flipping go hand in hand: ‘predatory lenders manufacture these situations by making asset-based loans in the first place with payments that the borrowers cannot meet. When the borrowers default, as is sure to happen, the lenders offer them an opportunity to escape foreclosure by refinancing.’

15 For example, Engel & McCoy, ibid., argue for mandatory suitability standards, which would require a lender to consider the borrower’s ability to repay.


create uncertainty about the borrower’s obligation to disclose information that may be relevant to the lender’s assessment; and (3) more generally, such laws are frequently indeterminate on questions such as what the lender knew or could reasonably have discovered. Indeterminacy increases the risks to the lender and may lead to credit rationing, not just in the predatory lending market but in the legitimate sub-prime market as well. 18

Of course, the issue may now have been overtaken by events. The sub-prime mortgage crisis has brought home to lenders in the most dramatic possible way the perils of lending to uncreditworthy borrowers, and it is unlikely that lenders will be reverting en masse to this kind of business model any time soon. On the other hand, while the sub-prime mortgage crisis may have killed the predatory lending market, with luck its effects on legitimate sub-prime lending will not be permanent and, sooner or later, the market will recover. The following discussion proceeds on this assumption.

While, by definition, predatory lending is not a problem in the legitimate sub-prime market, borrowers are still at a disadvantage relative to borrowers in the prime market because comparison shopping is harder in the sub-prime market. This raises the concern that some sub-prime borrowers may have been paying more for their mortgages than if they had had better information about the available alternatives. This is the very kind of information failure that the truth-in-lending laws were enacted to address, but, as Patricia McCoy explains, these laws were enacted with the prime market in mind, and they take no account of the different pricing structure in the sub-prime market. 19 In the prime market, lenders use ‘average cost’ pricing to set interest charges; in other words, they do not differentiate between individual borrowers, and so, for any given product a particular lender may offer, all borrowers pay the same price. The result is to create a competitive environment in which lenders have an incentive to reveal their prices up front and in which it is relatively easy for borrowers to comparison shop between different lenders. The truth-in-lending laws facilitate comparison shopping by ensuring that lenders quote their prices on a standardized basis.

18 See Zwyicki & Adamson, ‘Subprime Lending,’ supra note 13 at s. III.C.3; cf. Engel & McCoy, ‘Three Markets,’ supra note 13. Recent amendments to the truth-in-lending laws prohibit a creditor from extending credit based on the value of collateral without regard to the consumer’s repayment ability, including the consumer’s current and reasonably expected income, current obligations, employment, assets other than collateral, and mortgage-related obligations: Federal Reserve Board, Truth in Lending (‘Regulation Z’), 12 CFR §§ 226.34 and 226.35 (30 July 2008, effective 1 October 2009).

19 McCoy, ‘Rethinking Disclosure,’ supra note 16.
Sub-prime lenders, on the other hand, rely on ‘risk-based’ pricing; in other words, they charge ‘different borrowers different prices for the same product, ostensibly based on their individual risk.’\(^{20}\) In a risk-based pricing system, the lender cannot determine the price of a loan until the borrower reveals information about his or her creditworthiness. Sub-prime lenders use the loan-application process to generate this information, and they charge substantial, non-refundable application fees. In other words, sub-prime borrowers are subject to a ‘pay to play’ regime.\(^ {21}\)

The truth-in-lending laws require disclosure of the APR, the amount financed, the finance charge, and other features of the loan.\(^{22}\) However, at least until enactment of the 2008 ‘Regulation Z’ amendments, discussed below, there was a serious timing problem. For fixed-rate loans other than refinancing loans, the disclosures were not required until three days after the loan application. This meant that the borrower had to pay the application fee to get the disclosures. To comparison shop, a borrower needs more than one price, but to obtain several prices the borrower would have to pay multiple application fees. Particularly given the lower- to middle-income status of the typical sub-prime borrower, it would almost certainly not be rational for her to incur this expense. This problem was compounded by the fact that the disclosures were no more than a ‘good-faith estimate.’ As a general rule, lenders were free to change the terms at any time until closing, and this made their truth-in-lending disclosures inherently unreliable.\(^{23}\) Nor could the sub-prime borrower safely rely on a lender’s advertised rates, because a lender was free to advertise its best rate without having to disclose that this rate might not be available to everyone. The truth-in-lending advertising laws were written with the prime market in mind, and they assumed homogeneous prices. In the sub-prime market, where prices are not homogeneous, the laws were positively harmful, because they encouraged lenders to advertise artificially low rates.\(^ {24}\)

---

20 Ibid. at 126.
21 Ibid. at 139–40.
23 McCoy, ‘Rethinking Disclosure,’ supra note 16 at s. II.B. For fixed-rate refinancing loans, the truth-in-lending disclosures were not required until closing; this made them effectively useless, because by that point the borrower is psychologically and financially committed to the deal: ibid. at 141. For most variable-rate loans, the truth-in-lending disclosures had to be given with the application form. This ameliorated the timing problem affecting the fixed-rate loan disclosure requirements but created an information overload problem instead: McCoy, ibid. at 133, describes the variable-rate disclosure requirements as ‘obscure,’ ‘profuse,’ and ‘bewildering.’
24 Ibid. at s. II.A.
The 2008 Regulation Z amendments address some of these concerns, most importantly by requiring creditors to give consumers transaction-specific cost disclosures within three days after the application and before any fees are charged.25 However, lenders remain free to change the quoted APR, subject only to providing a corrected disclosure statement three days before closing, and this means it is still unsafe for the borrower to rely on the initial disclosure.26 McCoy, by contrast, argues that lenders should be prohibited from altering price quotes except where (1) good-faith subsequent discoveries or events result in a downgrading of the borrower’s creditworthiness; (2) the property appraisal is lower than expected, so that the estimated loan-to-value ratio is adversely affected; or (3) the prevailing interest rate shifts after the application.27 McCoy also argues that a lender who advertises an APR for a sub-prime product should have to disclose the full range of APRs for the product and specify that borrowers with poor credit ratings will not qualify for the best price. However, while the new laws enact stricter rules for mortgage advertising, with particular reference to teaser rates, they do not go to the root of the problem McCoy identifies.28

Oren Bar-Gill proposes a roughly comparable set of solutions to McCoy’s, though his take on the problem is different from hers.29 McCoy’s analysis assumes that borrowers in the sub-prime market are rational and that the problem is one of information failure (lack of access to timely information about the cost of borrowing). Bar-Gill, arguing from a behavioural economics perspective, suggests that the problem is primarily one of imperfect borrower rationality. Many sub-prime borrowers made bad choices because of myopia (an undue focus

---


26 Regulation Z, supra note 18 at § .226.19(a)(2).

27 McCoy, ‘Rethinking Disclosure,’ supra note 16 at 152.


29 Bar-Gill, ‘Law, Economics,’ supra note 16.
on the short-term dimensions of the loan contract, with insufficient attention to the longer-term dimensions) or over-optimism (underestimation of the future cost of a deferred-cost contract and overestimation of future income prospects or refinancing opportunities). Sub-prime contracts, he goes on to say, have two key characteristics — (1) complex pricing structures and (2) a shifting of the costs from the front end to the back end of the payment schedule — and these are both rational supply-side responses to imperfect borrower rationality. Bar-Gill sees improved APR disclosure as a potential solution to the complexity problem because it reduces all elements of the cost of borrowing to a single, readily comprehensible measure. It is also potentially a solution to the cost-deferral problem, because, properly calculated, the APR captures both the short- and the long-term costs of the loan, and so it may act as an antidote to borrower myopia and over-optimism. Like McCoy, Bar-Gill proposes measures to ensure timely and reliable APR disclosure to sub-prime borrowers. He also proposes a requirement for including in the APR items that are currently excluded (e.g., title-insurance fees, appraisal fees, and credit-report fees) and factoring into the APR the probability of pre-payment (a key variable in assessing the longer-term cost of borrowing).30

III Credit cards

There has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in credit-card regulation, triggered in part by rising numbers of consumer bankruptcies and the prominence of credit-card over-indebtedness among the reported causes.31 The leading contribution is Oren Bar-Gill’s ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ which uses behavioural economics to construct a theory of credit-card pricing based on consumer misperception of risk.32 Building in part on Bar-Gill’s work, Ronald Mann has traced the development of the global credit-card market and identified a direct correlation between levels of credit-card penetration in different countries and consumer bankruptcy rates,33 while Angela Littwin has tested

30 Ibid. at Pt. VI. The 2008 Regulation Z amendments only partially implement Bar-Gill’s first proposal (see text at note 26 supra), and they do not address his other proposals at all.
31 The figure was 7.0 per 1,000 population in the United States prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.109-8, § 119, Stat. 23 (2005), compared to 4.00 per 1,000 population in Canada: see Anthony Duggan, ‘Consumer Bankruptcy in Canada and Australia: A Comparative Perspective’ [2006] Ann.Rev.Insolvency L. 856.
32 Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ supra note 11.
Bar-Gill’s theory empirically through interviews with low-income women about credit-card use. Among the conclusions these studies draw are that the truth-in-lending disclosure requirements for credit cards are based on a fundamental misconception about consumer decision making; that if disclosure laws are to work at all, they must be reformed to take account of how consumers behave in real life; and that, in any event, disclosure laws are not sufficient. The following is a short account of the main arguments.

A puzzling feature of the credit-card market on the supply side is that credit-card interest rates are very high relative to the costs faced by issuers, despite apparently intense competition. A puzzle on the demand side is that credit-card interest rates are very high relative to alternative sources of credit, yet credit cards are now the major form of consumer borrowing. According to Bar-Gill, the key to both puzzles lies in consumers’ systematic underestimation of their future borrowing. The problem is a function of both imperfect self-control and optimism bias. Imperfect self-control, in turn, has a number of features, including (1) incremental foolishness (credit cards facilitate piecemeal borrowing, and it is less forbidding to chalk up a large debt a little at a time than to borrow the whole amount all at once); (2) susceptibility to temptation (at the time of acquiring her card, the consumer may resolve not to borrow on it, but when the time comes to pay her monthly balance, the temptation to make only the minimum payment may prove irresistible); and (3) hyperbolic discounting, which underlies both (1) and (2) (the benefits of borrowing accrue in the short term, but the costs accrue only in the longer term, and consumers may overestimate the short-term benefits relative to the longer-term costs). Optimism bias means that at the time of acquiring the credit card, consumers may underestimate the risk of future hardships that may necessitate borrowing – for example, accident, illness, or unemployment.

If consumers systematically underestimate future borrowing but nevertheless are sensitive to short-term costs, the card issuer has an incentive to price its product accordingly. More particularly, the card issuer will want to charge high interest rates and large late fees and over-limit fees, but, by the same token, it will compensate by offering low, or zero, annual fees and transaction fees, as well as introductory short-term interest rates (‘teaser rates’). As Bar-Gill explains, this pricing structure distorts competition because instead of focusing on interest rates and fees, firms

35 Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ supra note 11 at s. II.A.1.
36 Ibid. at s. III.A.
37 Ibid. at s. III.B.
compete on the short-term perks (annual fees, transaction fees, teaser rates, benefits programs). It also leads to allocative inefficiencies (too many credit cards and excessive credit-card borrowing relative to consumers’ unrevealed preferences) and distributional inequities. 38

The truth-in-lending laws require initial disclosure of basic price information, including the APR, details of fees and charges, the method of determining account balances and calculating the finance charge for each billing cycle, the credit limit, and the rules governing payment. They also require certain disclosures in each billing-cycle statement, including opening and closing account balances, transaction details, details of payments made during the billing cycle, the finance charge for the billing cycle, the balance on which the finance charge was computed, and a statement of how the balance was determined. 39 The aims are to facilitate consumer choice between (1) competing credit cards; (2) credit-card and non-credit-card borrowing; and (3) cash and credit-card purchases. Earlier scholars were sceptical about the utility of the credit-card disclosure requirements because, absent a standardized approach to pricing, comparison between credit cards would be just too difficult for the average consumer, and also because the true cost of credit-card borrowing is a function not only of the variables the disclosure requirements address but also of how individual consumers time their purchases and repayments. 40 However, the behavioural economic analysis outlined above suggests a more fundamental set of concerns.

The problem is partly that, contrary to the assumption on which the legislation is based, the underestimation bias makes consumers insensitive to credit-card interest rates; but there is more to the story than that. As mentioned above, the first of the statutory goals is to facilitate consumer choice between competing credit cards. However, faced with a choice between a card with an X per cent APR and a $Y annual fee and a card with an APR of more than X per cent and no annual fee, the underestimation bias may lead consumers to prefer the second card, even though, measured objectively, the first card is a better deal. Assume, though, that, measured objectively, the two cards offer the same deal – in other words, the first card’s annual fee yields the same return to the lender as the second card’s interest-rate premium. Even under these conditions, the consumer may be worse off choosing the second card. The explanation has to do with the diminishing marginal utility of money. Assume that the consumer’s need to borrow does not arise until some time after she acquires the card. If she chooses the

38 See text at note 11 supra.
39 Truth in Lending Act, supra note 2 at § 1637.
40 See text at note 11 supra, and see generally Duggan & Lanyon, Consumer, supra note 4 at c. 3.
first card, she will pay the additional amount (the annual fee) up front, when she is still financially stable. But if she chooses the second card, she will not become liable for the additional amount (the interest premium) until she needs to borrow, at which point she is likely to value the additional amount more highly than she did before her financial situation deteriorated.\textsuperscript{41}

The second aim of the truth-in-lending laws is to facilitate consumer choice between credit-card and non-credit-card borrowing. This choice typically arises at the time the consumer decides to borrow, in other words, not to pay the monthly account balance in full. The truth-in-lending laws apparently assume that, at this point, the consumer has the option of borrowing from another source and using the proceeds to pay off the card. In practice, however, the transactions costs of switching may be prohibitive, so that the consumer is effectively locked in. In theory, the consumer should anticipate the risk of lock-in at the time of acquiring the card and factor it into her choice. On the other hand, if the underestimation bias is in play, the consumer will discount the costs of lock-in relative to the short-term benefits the card offers.\textsuperscript{42}

The third aim of the truth-in-lending laws is to facilitate consumer comparison between cash and credit-card purchases. This choice becomes relevant at the point of purchase. The legislation presupposes that the consumer will calculate the cost of borrowing and measure it against the cost of paying cash. However, to accurately measure the cost of credit-card borrowing, the consumer needs more than just the information the disclosure requirements address. She also needs to be aware of the point in the billing cycle at which the purchase is made and to know for sure how long it will be before she pays off the account in full. Furthermore, if she is subject to the underestimation bias, she may discount the likelihood that, if she uses the card, she will not pay the account balance in full when the next monthly statement arrives, and this may skew her choice in favour of using the card.

As Mann has pointed out, having regard to the behavioural biases outlined above, the current truth-in-lending disclosure requirements are ‘ineffective and largely a waste of money.’\textsuperscript{43} ‘Collectively, the system

\textsuperscript{41} Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ supra note 11 at s. IV.A.1. In fact, as Bar-Gill goes on to explain, the consumer’s welfare loss is likely to be greater than the analysis in the text implies. This is because the \textit{ex ante} probability that the consumer will pay interest is less than 1, and the second card issuer will need to increase its interest rate to compensate for the risk. In other words, it is inherently more likely that, measured objectively, the second credit card will be a worse deal than the first.

\textsuperscript{42} The argument in the text is an adaptation of Bar-Gill’s explanation for the appeal of teaser rates, ibid. at s. III.B.3.

\textsuperscript{43} Mann, \textit{Charging Ahead}, supra note 33 at 159.
produces complicated paper disclosures that are not comprehensible to
the typical consumer'; ‘[t]he information contained in the disclosures
is not particularly useful,’ and ‘consumers are unlikely even to read
the disclosures and most unlikely to act more intelligently if they do.’
To meet these objections, Mann and others propose a more robust set
of disclosures at the point of borrowing, namely the point at which the
consumer decides whether to pay the monthly account balance in full.
At present, the disclosure requirements for monthly statements of
account focus exclusively on ‘mechanical information’ necessary to
explain the account’s status. Under Mann’s proposals, the account state-
ment would also have to include ‘the date by which a cardholder would
pay her balance in full if she made no further purchases and continued
to make equal monthly payments in an amount equal to the last monthly
payment.’ In a variation on the same theme, Bar-Gill – inspired by the
success of mandatory warnings on cigarette packaging – has suggested
a statement along the following lines: ‘Debt Increasing – At current
repayment rate, it will take you 34 years to repay your debt and you will
end up paying 300% of the principal.’ Recently enacted reforms
include a disclosure requirement along these lines. Mann also proposes
point-of-sale disclosures to facilitate consumer choice between cash and
credit-card payment and to prevent consumers from inadvertently incurring
over-limit fees and the like. Beyond truth in lending, other
measures proposed to counter the underestimation bias include (1) strict-
er regulation of unsolicited credit-card offers; (2) unbundling the
payment and credit functions of credit cards, for example, by requiring
issuers to allow automatic payment of balances from the consumer’s
chequing account; and (3) subordinating credit-card debt in consumer

44 Ibid. These conclusions are supported by the findings of a 2007 study on the efficacy of
current credit-card disclosure requirements. The study found that consumers failed to
understand key disclosure items and lacked fundamental understanding of how credit-
card accounts work: Macro International, Design and Testing of Effective Truth in Lending
Disclosures (2007) at 52, quoted in Oren-Bar Gill & Elizabeth Warren, ‘Making Credit
45 Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 33 at 160.
46 Ibid. at 160–61.
47 Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ supra note 11 at note 194 and accompanying text.
48 U.S., Bill S. 414, Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 111th
Cong., 2009, s. 201. The new legislation (at Title I) also prohibits certain fees and
interest-rate and fee increases, and these measures may go some small way toward
countering the consumer behavioural biases Bar-Gill identifies. For reforms in
Canada see Credit Business Practices Regulations and amendments to Cost of Borrowing
49 Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 33 at 161–5.
bankruptcies.\textsuperscript{50} Items 1 and 2 above aim to limit the consumer’s exposure to temptation,\textsuperscript{51} while item 3 aims to encourage responsible lending.\textsuperscript{52}

IV Payday lending

Payday lending developed out of the cheque-cashing business in the early 1990s and is now a thriving industry with more storefronts in the United States than McDonald’s and Starbucks combined.\textsuperscript{53} Payday lenders specialize in short-term, single-payment loans for small amounts, ostensibly to help customers deal with temporary financial problems by tiding them over until the next payday. In a typical transaction, the consumer gives the lender a cheque, post-dated to the consumer’s next payday, in return for a cash advance that is less than the face value of the cheque. When the next payday arrives, the lender either collects on the loan by depositing the post-dated cheque or rolls over the original advance, taking a new post-dated cheque in exchange. The difference between the amount of the loan and the face value of the cheque covers the lender’s costs, including the risk of default, and the rest is profit. Given the small size and short duration of payday loans, interest rates are typically very high. For example, for a $200 loan for two weeks with a $30 fee, the APR is close to 400 per cent.\textsuperscript{54} Payday lenders frequently do not run formal credit checks, satisfying themselves instead with a few basic

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. at 207; Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ supra note 11 at Pt. V. Mann, ibid., also proposes, among other things, (1) banning credit-card marketing to minors and university/college students; (2) banning rewards programs; (3) setting mandatory minimum repayment levels; and (4) taxing defaulted credit-card debt. In relation to item 1, the recently enacted reforms restrict the issuance of credit cards to students and underage consumers but stop short of an outright ban: \textit{Credit Card Act}, supra note 48 at Title III. The reforms do not address Mann’s items 2–4.

\textsuperscript{51} Item 2 has echoes of Ulysses and the Sirens: Ulysses, knowing that he will be unable to resist the Siren’s song once he is within hearing range, instructs his crew to tie him to the mast so that he will not steer the ship toward them: Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ supra note 11 at note 7 and accompanying text. Likewise with item 2 above: the consumer, knowing that she will be unable to resist the borrowing urge when it comes time to pay her monthly account, constrains her choice up-front by opting into an automatic payment system.

\textsuperscript{52} Mann, \textit{Charging Ahead}, supra note 33 at c. 15; Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic,’ supra note 11 at s. V.B.2. Mann worries that item 3 may not be particularly effective, given that in most consumer bankruptcies there are no returns to creditors anyway; his solution is to propose a tax on defaulted credit-card debt as well.


pieces of information about the borrower, including proof of identification, evidence of income, and a current bank statement.\textsuperscript{55}

The size of payday loan interest rates has been an ongoing source of controversy. Some critics assume that they are symptomatic of lenders exploiting borrowers’ ignorance about credit costs and use this to argue that the industry should be outlawed. But this argument overlooks the fact that, while the APR may be high, the amount of the fee itself is not. Payday loans have the advantages of convenience and flexibility. They are quick, easy to access, and relatively stress free. It may be perfectly rational for a consumer to pay a fee of, say, $30 in return for these benefits. In any event, some borrowers may have no choice: if a consumer has a low income, is over the limit on her credit card, and does not qualify for other mainstream forms of credit, she may have nowhere else to go in an emergency except to a payday lender, even though she knows it will cost more than the other alternatives. Moreover, from the lender’s perspective, the higher charges are not necessarily unreasonable, having regard both to the costs of setting up the loan and to the risk of default.\textsuperscript{56}

On the other hand, consumers may be paying too much for the benefits a payday loan has to offer because of the lack of competition between payday lenders: research in the United States indicates that payday lenders almost uniformly charge the highest permissible rate in their jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{57} Ronald Mann and Jim Hawkins suggest a number of reasons for the absence of price competition, including (1) the likelihood that if a borrower needs money immediately, she will not take the time to comparison shop; (2) the high cost of comparison shopping relative to the amount of the typical payday loan; and (3) the strong advantage that the store nearest to a particular customer will have over other stores that are further away. The truth-in-lending laws are supposed to stimulate competition in consumer credit markets by facilitating comparison shopping, but the legislation presupposes that lack of information is the only serious obstacle to comparison shopping. In any event, the truth-in-lending laws do not do a particularly good job of informing the payday borrower. The main problem is the legislation’s emphasis on APR disclosure: the APR may be a good measure of relative credit cost for ordinary loans, but studies suggest that APR disclosure for payday loans is at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive.\textsuperscript{58} It is ineffective because, according to the research, payday-lending borrowers are more interested in the amount of the finance charge and typically do not understand APR disclosures. It is potentially counter-productive because, given that a

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. at 862–3.
\textsuperscript{56} See Ramsay, ‘Alternative Credit,’ supra note 12 at 359–62.
\textsuperscript{57} Mann & Hawkins, ‘Just Until Payday,’ supra note 54 at 882.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. at 903–5.
lender’s set-up costs typically do not vary depending on the size or the duration of the loan, the APR overstates the cost of credit for small, short-term loans; lenders may be discouraged from complying with the legislation by the requirement to disclose what appear to be extortionate APRs. Another defect in the legislation is that it does not require the disclosures until the point of contracting: this is too late to be useful, because by then the deal is done.

As a partial solution to these problems, Mann and Hawkins suggest ‘a simple disclosure regime, with which reputable lenders readily can comply.’ The law should require lenders to display prominently in their stores a sign indicating their charges, expressed as an amount per $100 borrowed. Measures along these lines have recently been enacted in some Canadian provinces. Manitoba goes further by requiring on the sign a clear warning that ‘payday loans are high cost loans.’ The aim, presumably, is to encourage consumers to search for non-payday lending alternatives and also to address the concern that, due to the underestimation bias, consumers may discount their risk of being unable to repay the loan when making the decision to borrow. In an attempt to address the disclosure timing problem, most provinces give the borrower a forty-eight-hour cooling-off period following the making of the advance.

For the reasons mentioned earlier, truth-in-lending initiatives are not likely to substantially increase price competition in the payday-lending market. For this reason, many jurisdictions impose interest-rate caps. One concern with interest-rate caps is that if the figure is set too low, it may drive firms out of the market, assuming the legislation is enforced; on the other hand, if the rate is set too high, it may force prices up, because, in the absence of competition, lenders will view it as an invitation to charge the maximum. Some critics favour low interest-rate caps as a form of prohibition on payday lending. However, this perspective arguably overlooks both the benefits of payday lending to low-income consumers and the risk that, in the absence of a payday-lending market, consumers may turn to other, even more costly sources

59 Ibid. at 905.
60 For a survey of Canadian provincial initiatives see Stephanie Ben-Ishai, ‘Regulating Payday Lenders in Canada: Drawing on American Lessons’ (2008) 23 B.F.L.R. 323 [Ben-Ishai, ‘Regulating’].
63 For details see Ben-Ishai, ‘Regulating,’ supra note 60.
64 Ibid. at Pt. C (Canada); Mann & Hawkins, ‘Just Until Payday,’ supra note 54 at 871–80 (United States).
of credit such as pawnshops, rent-to-own operators, and loan sharks. Lawmakers continue to wrestle with this dilemma, and, not surprisingly, the outcomes vary from one jurisdiction to another. For example, in Canada, Quebec has set an interest-rate cap of 35 per cent (APR); as a result, there are no payday lenders in the province. At the other extreme, Nova Scotia has set its maximum at $31 per $100 borrowed, preferring to rely on the competition the government says is present in the market as a means of keeping prices down, while Ontario is somewhere in the middle, with a maximum of $21 per $100 borrowed.

Critics of the payday-lending industry also target rollovers as a source of abuse. The concern is that while the charge for a single loan may not be high, the cumulative charges for repeated rollovers may be significant, and the consumer may end up paying hundreds of dollars in interest without achieving any reduction in the principal. Payday lenders have an incentive to promote rollovers, because set-up costs are lower for repeat loans than for initial loans. By the same token, the underestimation bias may cause a consumer, at the time of taking out a loan, to discount the risks that she will be unable to repay it, that she will need to roll the loan over, and that she may end up trapped in a debt cycle. Or the consumer, faced each payday with a choice of paying $30 to keep a $200 loan going for another pay period or repaying the whole amount, may focus too much on the $30 and give insufficient attention to the long-term accumulation of charges. With these concerns in mind, many jurisdictions prohibit rollovers. However, as Mann and Hawkins point out, prohibiting repeated loans from the same lender is pointless if, as is the case in most jurisdictions, the consumer remains free to cycle her borrowings between one lender and another. Furthermore, to the extent that the payday-lending business model depends on rollovers, a rollover prohibition may be tantamount to a prohibition on payday lending. Some jurisdictions have adopted the intermediate policy of limiting the number of successive rollovers and imposing a cooling-off period on the consumer once she reaches the prescribed number. This measure addresses the second of the two

66 Mann & Hawkins, ‘Just Until Payday,’ supra note 54 at 886–95.
68 Mann & Hawkins, ‘Just Until Payday,’ supra note 54 at 896.
71 Ibid. at 897–8.
72 Ibid. 895.
73 Ibid. at 898.
objections to prohibition raised above, but it overlooks the first one. Disclosure is the least intrusive policy option. For example, Michigan, while not prohibiting rollovers, requires payday lenders to display a large sign containing information of various sorts and also this warning: ‘you should use this service only to meet short-term cash needs.’ The measure is akin to mandatory warnings for cigarettes and certain medications such as sedatives, and the objective is to address the underestimation bias.

V Conclusion

Consumer credit law was a hot topic for legal scholars during the 1970s and 1980s, but its attraction waned in the next two decades, no doubt in part because of the dampening effect of the law and economics movement on government intervention and its advocacy. However, the last five years have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in consumer credit law. This is partly because recent market developments have given academics a range of interesting new issues to address and partly because the new generation of legal scholars is economically literate and has been able to draw successfully on developments in law and economics, behavioural economics, and other new theoretical perspectives to enrich the debate over the case for regulation. In this essay I have tried to convey the flavour of the new wave of consumer credit scholarship, though space constraints have precluded me from exploring the details or closely debating the merits of the various regulatory initiatives the literature promotes. Michael Trebilcock’s scholarly preoccupation over the past thirty-five years has been with ‘how to blend market ordering and state action so as to devise an institutional mix that will enhance human freedom, equality and self-realization opportunities.’ He would be gratified, I think, by how his old field of consumer credit law has developed in the years since he left it to apply his unique brand of ‘law-and-economics with soul’ to the subject areas that occupy him today.

74 For details see ibid. at 876.
76 Ibid.