Neighbourhood Policymaking and Political Discourses of Exclusion, Risk and Effect:

An Interpretive Policy Analysis of the Evolution of Place-Based Programs in the UK and Canada

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in Social Work

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Doctorate of Philosophy
Faculty of Social Work
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2017

Abstract

The impact of various forms of neighbourhood change on the social fabric of metropolitan areas is a major concern throughout affluent Western nations. In addressing spatially-concentrated problems, urban policy-making and development patterns have become increasingly similar across the advanced capitalist countries. There is a transnational movement among policy-makers toward the application of geographically targeted, neighbourhood-based interventions referred to as area-based, or place-based policies. In cities across Western Europe, Australia, the United States, and Canada, we see the emergence of a new policy language: new policy frames, or storylines, which function to discursively construct the individuals and communities that reside in technocratically-defined ‘disadvantaged’, ‘priority’ or ‘at-risk’ neighbourhoods.

Asking the question ‘why do certain ideas catch on in public policy’, this dissertation utilizes interpretive policy analysis (IPA) to understand how policy actors go about adopting transnational policy language, ideas and concepts – and how they enact them in their local contexts. This dissertation is focused on place-based policies and programs in the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. Divided into three stand-alone papers, the dissertation explores three different but conceptually analogous topics. In doing so, it
outlines the geographical and ideological origins of a place-based approach to local governance, and the means through which it has been established in local systems of governance.

In the absence of scholarly research on ‘how, why, where and with what effects’ place-based policies have been circulated, learned, reformulated, and mobilized, this dissertation seeks to develop an understanding of the adaptations in the modalities and rhetoric of political actors, institutions and policy regimes which have accompanied the enactment of place-based policies at various scales of governance. IPA links ‘high’ politics (i.e., elite political institutions and multinational organizations) with ‘low’ politics (i.e., local and community-level governance). It orders and relates discursive elements (subjects, objects, tropes, narratives) to processes of meaning-making, representation and action.

The IPA approach is used here to help account for the assemblage of policies, political discourses and regulatory tools that have produced new, place-based logics of ‘social exclusion’, 'risk' and 'neighbourhood effects' that are now widely understood as universal aspects of cities.
Acknowledgements

I would like to formally acknowledge all of the people that made this study possible. The past five years have been an exciting, intensive, rewarding and challenging all at once, and there are many people without whom this project would not have been realized.

First I am immensely grateful to my teacher, employer and thesis supervisor, Dr. David Hulchanski, for his unrelenting support and encouragement throughout this process. Thank you to committee members Dr. Daniel Zuberi and Dr. Scot Worley – your knowledge and expertise have been invaluable to me in the writing process, and I’m very grateful to you both.

Thank you to the incredible team of urban theory, planning, housing and policy scholars behind the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership (NCRP). Special mention must go to Dr. Emily Paradis, whose friendship, mentorship and support has been nothing short of life-changing. Special mention must also extend to Rob Howarth, the NCRP’s Collective Agency Working Group, and its partners -- Diane Dyson, Maureen Fair, Lynne Woolcott, Charlene Cook, Sean Meagher and Anne Gloger. Thank you all for the tireless work that you do to make this city a more equitable, just and livable place for us all.

Thank you to my co-instructors and colleagues on the front lines -- Raluca Behan, Gigi Goary, and Ruth Wilson. Thank you to the 43 people who participated in this study; and in particular, the 21 senior bureaucrats, analysts and elected officials who so generously found time in their hectic schedules to speak with me. Thank you to my colleagues and friends at the Wellesley Institute. And finally, I want to thank all of my (next-time-I-see-you-it-will-be-finished) friends and family who stuck by me. This work is dedicated to my tough-as-nails labour leader of a mom, Jan. Because it’s really the least I could do, particularly after those teenage years.
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CHAPTER ONE:

Introduction
Collective Problem

In the wake of post-welfarist reforms and the rescaling of national state social expenditures, cities across wealthy western nations are becoming increasingly segregated on the basis of socio-economic and ethno-cultural divisions (Bunting & Filion, 2010; Larner, 2006; Hulchanski, 2011; Marcuse & van Kempen, 2000). The effects of these trends are increasingly evident in urban environments – recent riots in Stockholm, London and Paris illustrate what can happen when poor households concentrate in ‘disadvantaged neighbourhoods;’ or neighbourhoods where social, educational, and job opportunities are limited. These riots may not be isolated local events, but rather signs of wider politico-structural problems that impact on local communities (Slater, 2013); calling attention to relations between publics and policy experts, and the complex constellations of power, values, meaning and practices that coalesce in ‘place’.

Politically, as part of what has been described as the ‘spatial turn’ in public policymaking (Darcy & Gwyther, 2012), the impact of place – or more explicitly, residential location – on the social and economic situation of households has become a key concern for urban social policy-makers in cities across Western Europe and the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States and Canada. Political understandings of marginality have expanded to include geographical elements. For example, assumptions made about particular neighbourhoods and diagnoses of city ills -- issues of poverty, crime, youth violence, and the emerging social isolation of racialized immigrants -- are discursively framed as place-specific problems requiring place-specific solutions (Bradford, 2005). ‘Place-based’, spatially-targeted policy interventions have emerged as an antidote to the ‘neighbourhood effects’ of underemployment, crime and a lack of appropriate social and community services (Sampson, 2005). Place-based policies have become, as Peck and Theodore (2010: 195) outline, “technocratically essentialized” and “codified” in order to “travel” between and amongst city governments. As part of this new transnationalism of policy concepts, urban policy-makers borrow and rework policy language, lessons and ‘best practices’ from other locales (ibid.).
The place-based neighbourhood policy-making approach, as it is defined here, first began in 1998 with New Labour’s national New Deal for Communities (NDC) policy in the UK. NDC Partnerships were given the complex target of “helping to turn around the poorest neighbourhoods” – seeking to tackle problems of ‘urban deprivation’, ‘social exclusion’ and ‘risk’ (i.e. youth at-risk) through the designation of Area Based Initiatives (ABIs) (Lawless. 2007; DETR, 1998: 1). ABIs were designed to produce ‘process outcomes’, notably ‘community engagement’ – facilitated through ‘partnership working’ (Lawless, 2007). Here in Canada, place-based policies have been adopted by governing bodies so rapidly that scholarly proponent, Neil Bradford, coined the phenomenon a product of the ‘social Silicon Valley’ (Bradford, 2005). The most significant roll-out of place-based policies and programs has occurred in the sub/urban neighbourhoods of Toronto. Following what the media coined in 2005 the “summer of the gun”, the City of Toronto, in partnership with the United Way, formed the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Taskforce (SNTF). The Taskforce recommended a ‘place-based’ approach to deal with what they identified as the problem of neighbourhood decline and concentrated poverty in the inner suburbs. What followed was the adoption of the City’s ‘Community Partnership Strategy’ (CPS) (2005). The CPS is part of the City’s ‘Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy,’ designed to increase investment in thirteen ‘priority neighbourhoods’ (i.e., thirteen census-tract neighbourhoods that exhibit high concentrations of poverty, underemployment, new immigrants, and a lack of social services and facilities) (Freiler, 2004). As in the UK, place-based policy interventions emphasize the importance of local conditions, and employ the concepts of ‘social exclusion’, ‘partnerships’, and ‘risk’ widely. Likewise, place-based policies borrow from scholarly studies which claim that living in ‘disadvantaged’ neighbourhoods produces negative ‘effects’ on residents’ life chances over and above the effects of structural and individual characteristics (ibid). Finally, in both the UK and Toronto, place-based policies target low-income neighbourhoods for social investment and increased policing and surveillance efforts. Corresponding community policing programs deploy officers into poor and racially diverse neighbourhoods on the basis of technocratic interpretations of risk, offering solutions that often do not reflect the needs of low-income residents and/or ethno-cultural communities.
Collective Approach

With special attention paid to place-based, geographically-targeted policies travelling from the UK to Toronto, my dissertation will explore social policy ‘in motion’. The goal is to highlight the transnational and translocal modalities of institutional relations, governmental hierarchies and policy networks that connect and interpenetrate seemingly ‘local’ policy regimes (McCann, 2008). In both London and Toronto, alongside new forms of place-based urban governance we see the emergence of a new policy language – new policy frames, or storylines, which function to discursively construct the individuals and communities that reside in these neighbourhoods.

My research methods utilize an explicitly interpretive approach to policy analysis, examining policy frames – or the taken-for-granted assumptional structures of policy research that derive from generative metaphors, such as ‘housing decay’ or the ‘war on poverty’ (Schon & Rein, 1994). Rooted in the deliberative democratic tradition, the IPA method begins with the insight that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved (Fischer, 2003).

IPA is ethnographic, informed by the constructivist-interpretivist approach. The method frames social realities as intersubjectively constructed, and research in the interpretive tradition is typically characterized by an empirical and normative prioritizing of the lived experience of people in institutional settings; with a focus on the meaning(s) of interactions, language, acts, events, and physical artifacts to multiple stakeholders, and a sensitivity to the historically-contingent, often-contested character of such meanings. IPA researchers emphasize the construction of ideas and interests in processes of institutional design and change.

Influenced by the ‘interpretative turn’ in the social sciences during the latter half of the 20th century, the IPA approach combines a spectrum of analytic inquiries, including phenomenology, hermeneutics, critical theory, symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, and
ethnomethodology – offering discourse, rhetoric, frame, fact-value, category, metaphor, and other analytic methods to the exploration of systems of meaning in the form of policy discourse (Hajer, 2005: 1). The methodology’s paradigmatic thinker is Foucault, who argues that discourses ‘make people’, construct social processes, and shape social change (Foucault, 1991). Broadly, IPA is concerned with frame analysis, a tool for analyzing the dynamic and interactive processes of meaning-making – or “framing” -- through which knowledge claims gain institutional credibility to become taken-for-granted assumptions (or “frames”) (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016; Schon & Rein, 1994; Yanow & Schwatz-Shea, 2006). Combining category and narrative analysis, frame analysis, as an analytic mode, borrows largely from the power-sensitive and process-oriented approach developed in Schon and Rein’s Frame Reflection (1994). In IPA, the interpretive frame is a conceptual category that represents set of taken-for-granted assumptions which shape understandings of reality, or “definitions of a situation” that have resulted from processes of meaning-making where individuals select and organize among raw experiential data in order to make it meaningful (Yanow & Schwatz-Shea, 2006).

Contemporary debates within IPA scholarship bring new analytic focus to the complex political and intersubjective dynamics involved in framing a policy problem. Just as politics may be understood as the struggle over competing ideas (Stone, 2002), the potentially multiple ways of framing a social problem may constitute “a contest over the framing of ideas” (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016: 97). Van Hulst and Yanow (2016: 97) point to the “under-theorized” concepts that describe the socio-political processes through which framing takes place. To establish a frame, actors engage in processes of storytelling; sense-making; and selecting, naming, and categorizing the circumstances surrounding an issue. Different policy actors will view the issues at stake through the lens of their own political ideologies, value systems and personal identities (ibid).

In the UK and Canada, place-based policies are delivered through a complex and multiscalar landscape of networked governance -- involving a variety of institutional and organizational decision-making apparatuses, bureaucracies, corporations and citizens (ibid). As a result, the framing of the social and economic problems that these policies are
trying to address becomes contingent upon the culture of the organization itself – and the relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006).

My thesis research centers around three key policy frames that are common to place-based policy strategies and documents in the UK and Canada. These frames will be analyzed using the IPA method. Three separate manuscripts will be produced, each relating to the discursive policy frames of: social exclusion, risk, and neighbourhood effects. Each of the papers will tackle different but conceptually analogous topics with the overarching aim to: 1) analyze the political, institutional and intersubjective histories, ideologies, beliefs, meanings, and ideas that underlie taken-for-granted assumptions about spatialized poverty and the communities, families and individuals who live in “disadvantaged” or “at-risk” neighbourhoods; 2) examine top-down, transnational and translocal policymaking processes across different scales of governance, and 3) advocate for alternative policy frameworks that go beyond technocratic and essentialized depictions of residents’ life chances in relation to their neighbourhoods and forefront the needs, perspectives, agencies and capacities of residents ‘in place.’

The first paper. Focusing on the political logic of ‘social exclusion’, the first paper in the series explores the role of Great Britain’s ‘strong neighbourhoods’ policies and area-based initiatives (ABIs) in shaping both the language and the application the City of Toronto’s 2005 Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS). In addition to identifying transfer agents (i.e., the actors and institutions involved), attention is paid to the structural and institutional contexts which influence the agency of policy actors in both Britain and Canada.

This paper will focus on the transnational discursive circulation (or policy transfer) of the political language of ‘social exclusion’ from the UK to Toronto. This paper draws from neo-Marxist, regulationist and Foucauldian critiques of urban governance. In particular, neo-Foucauldian writings on ‘governmentality’ and institutionalist critiques of Third
Way\textsuperscript{1} policy schemas will be used to elaborate: (1) a conceptual framework for the understanding of the production, application, and circulation of place-based policy models – both transnationally, as they become “technocratically essentialized and codified” in order to “travel” from the UK to Toronto (Peck & Theodore, 2010: 207), and translocally, across Toronto’s municipal governance networks; and (2) an analytic framework for the empirical application of IPA to policy frames of social exclusion and participation.

The second paper. Extending the analysis to the programmatic level, the second paper focuses on Toronto’s ‘hot spot’ community-based policing programs which target ‘high-risk’ neighbourhoods and their residents (particularly young Black males deemed to be ‘at-risk’). Developed alongside the city’s Strong Neighbourhood Strategy, the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) draws from similar discretionary proactive models from the US and UK. Following widespread public disapproval of TAVIS’ stop-and-search practices, the newest iteration of the city’s community policing program, called Furthering Our Community by Uniting Services (FOCUS) (2015), borrows directly from Glasgow, Scotland’s community-based ‘hub’ model.

Using data collected from 21 expert interviews, paper will explore targeted community policing programs that have been developed alongside place-based policies in Toronto. Toronto’s targeted community policing frameworks align with the discretionary proactive approach to community-based policing that is practiced in cities throughout the US and UK. While the first paper empirically examines the transnational circulation and transfer of place-based policy discourse, the second paper presents an analysis of the enactment these policies within and across a range of local institutional and regulatory contexts (Peck, 2015). The second paper constitutes the sustained exploration of Toronto’s community-based policing programs and practices, using primary and secondary research.

\textsuperscript{1} The term ‘Third Way’, used here, refers to UK social democratic proponent Tony Blair, who advocated for "social-ism" that “involves politics that recognized individuals as socially interdependent” (Freeden, 2004, p.198).

\textsuperscript{2} ‘Depoliticization’ is the attempt to reduce the formally political character of decision-making through shifting it to other arenas beyond the formal political system (Flinders and Buller, 2006).

\textsuperscript{3} In Toronto, under TAVIS, specialized teams of officers are deployed into ‘high crime’ neighbourhoods to document citizens in what are called ‘field information reports’ which are then entered into a massive
and interview data collected from semi-structured expert interviews with high-ranking police officials, policy-makers, decision-makers, journalists and community advocates.

*The third paper.* The third and final paper represents a more conceptual, exploratory analysis of the notional foundations of Toronto’s place-based policy frameworks; critically examining the ‘neighbourhood effects’ frame through a synthesis of relevant academic literature. The study articulates an alternative approach to understanding socio-spatial polarization and concentrated poverty – one that prioritizes that sorting effects of structural factors (e.g. labour and housing markets).

The paper is focused on the scholarly assumptions that underlie place-based policies in the UK and Canada. Beginning with William Julius Wilson’s 1987 *The Truly Disadvantaged*, a widespread ‘spatial turn’ has occurred across urban planning, public policy, sociology and social work disciplines involving an ideational understanding of the ‘neighbourhood effects’ of city ills (e.g., poverty, inequality, and crime). Since the 1990s there have been numerous studies seeking to account for neighbourhood-level variations of phenomena such as delinquency, violence and crime, routine activity patterns, and mutual trust on residents’ life chances – beyond the effects of structural and individual characteristics. The empirical validity of the neighbourhood effects research is called into question because it tends to ignore the structural drivers and selection processes that sort people into neighbourhoods. Also, neighbourhood boundaries are much more dynamic and permeable than the census tract (CT) boundaries that usually define priority neighbourhoods.

Toronto’s priority neighbourhoods policies are predicated upon a number of popular scholarly studies which claim that living in a low-income neighbourhood produces negative effects on residents’ life chances over and above the effects of structural and individual characteristics. Crime reduction is prioritized in order to meet the global city aspirations of policy-makers, or what Cochrane (2007) describes as a ‘growth first’ logic. Community policing programs like TAVIS are aimed at ‘engaging’ residents in surveillance and crime reporting activities in order to enhance ‘security and order’ in
their neighbourhoods; contributing to the political design and regulation of spatialized risk. In opposing the politicization and regulation of concentrated poverty and income inequality, I advocate, instead, for a shift in focus beyond the neighbourhood itself.

To be sure, a comprehensive understanding of the conditions of disadvantaged urban populations requires a focus on not only individuals and their neighbourhoods (as we see in popular neighbourhood effects literature), but also on the organizations that structure their lives, the systems in which those organizations are embedded, and the institutions that regulate both (Castells & Cardoso, 2005). As an alternative to these processes, this paper will recommend that urban researchers, policy scholars, urban designers and community workers conduct comparative research projects which work to counter place-based policies and their intrinsic assumptions about neighbourhood effects. When engaging in comparative work, researchers are forced to consider the ‘meta-level’ and gather rich empirical data that, over a period of time, and in accounting for a variety of geographic lived realities, will allow for alternative concept formation.

**Collective Meaning**

As outlined above, the thesis will consist of three separate manuscripts. Taken together, these manuscripts will form a cohesive body of work that supports three distinct research questions; guided, thematically, by one overarching research question:

1. What political ideas and political interests are foundational to discourses of ‘social exclusion’, ‘participation’ and ‘risk’ as they appear in targeted (place-based) neighbourhood policies and programs in both the United Kingdom and Canada?

Following Hajer (1993: 47), policy stories are significant as they are the ‘medium through which actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements.’ ‘Climate change’,
‘war on drugs’, ‘housing decay’ -- are all examples of policy stories, or policy narratives, that have been adopted by government and then ‘taken-for-granted’ by citizens (Jeffares, 2007: 2). Consistent with the IPA method, “[…] stories about lived experience do not merely describe the experience; they also participate in the creation of their subject (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006: 207).” In attempting to analyze the processes by which policy ideas, frames and storylines function to construct the individuals and communities they target, this research draws from Yanow and Schwartz-Shea’s interpretive methods of analyzing data.

Given the variety of subject matter and analytical explication required in linking three stand-alone topics, a methodology that combines empirical and meaning-focused analysis is a necessary analytical tool. IPA represents such an approach, focusing on knowledge claims, knowledge production, and the multiple ways in which context (historical, institutional, organizational, and cultural) shapes action in social or political life. It highlights acts rendered in textual form -- such as policy, or “documents that could themselves be considered actors in the situation, such as reports written by government planners for evaluative purposes (ibid: 204). In this way, the approach successfully links ‘high’ politics (i.e., elite political institutions and multinational organizations) with ‘low’ politics (i.e., local and community-level governance); and ordering and relating discursive elements (subjects, objects, tropes, narratives) to processes of meaning-making, representation and action (ibid).

IPA has only recently gained formal recognition as a research methodology following the 2006 publication of Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea’s Interpretation and Method textbook. The approach has emerged in response to the increasing cross- or interdisciplinarity of policy studies; bringing empirical rigour to the analysis of problems of meaning (and meaning-making) that “bear on action as well as understanding (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006: xii).” The method is rooted, in part, in a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis. Whereas critical theory seeks to account for the way that subjective knowers come to construct their worlds (Habermas, 1976), Foucault holds the subjects, themselves, to be creations of prevailing discursive practices – emphasizing the ways in
which discourses ‘make people’, construct social processes, and shape social change (Fischer, 2006).

Taken as a cohesive body of work, this research aims to develop an interpretive analysis of the discursive elements of place-based policy and targeted community policing policy, drawing empirical data from primary sources and in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Due to limitations of scope, and in view of the numerous parallels in governance structures, policy-making, policy language and political cultures, I focus on place-based policy and community policing frameworks in the UK and Canada. While they have many differences, London and Toronto are also comparable due to high levels of socio-spatial income polarization: both cities exhibit sizable income gaps between the poorest and wealthiest neighbourhoods.

**Collective Importance**

In the field of social work, the uncritical acceptance of political frames or ‘kinds’ of people focuses social workers’ attention narrowly on individuals and away from broader socio-structural relations (Chambon, 1999; Edelman, 1988). The subjects become reified. We objectify them and observe them as part of the seeable world. But researchers must remember that we have a part in constructing these interactions (Wilson, 2011). In policy, we must also engage with issues of power and politics. Where is power? Who is silenced? This is the contribution of critical theory to the interpretive method. Insomuch as power is contained within language, language itself can be a crucial exclusionary mechanism in democracy as it determines social classifications. And so, policy language constructs the ‘types’ of people that community-based programs are intended to serve. Claims made about certain types of people reflect not only the socio-political conditions under which they were produced, but also the actions, beliefs and preferences of the policy actors and officials who give life to these constructs (Fischer, 1993).

To date, some critical work on the shortcomings of Toronto’s approach to neighbourhood-based policy has emerged (Cowen, 2005; Cowen & Parlette, 2011), yet
there is a clear absence of research in the field of policy transfer and institutional knowledge sharing in Canada. Municipal efforts in Toronto represent the most significant funding and governmental commitment to place-based policy in Canada. It is necessary to examine the many challenges presented in attempting to integrate places and people in a policy framework. For instance, how does this policy process play out at the neighbourhood scale, and what are some potential problems that may have been overlooked in the policy development process? How can these policies best be tailored to meet the specific needs of the neighbourhoods they aim to improve? What new barriers emerge, and what are the limitations presented by constrained municipal budgets? If the language and methodology behind these policies borrow from the UK’s nationalized strategy, what measures have been undertaken to ensure a policy ‘fit’?

This research is of great importance to the advancement of the application of targeted social policy strategies in Toronto, both in the sense that a more complete ‘policy story’ will emerge, and in the production of a more in-depth, collective and community-oriented policy approach that addresses new strategies through which these policies may be tailored to the communities that they aim to support.

**Research Questions and Theoretical Foundations**

This section provides a summary of the key research questions, applied to all three papers, followed by a brief explanation of the theoretical underpinnings that guide the analysis and examination of each question.

Drawing from academic literature spanning geography, planning, political science, criminology and sociology, with a focus on contemporary critical urban theory, policy transfer, and urban social movement scholarship (Eick, 2003; 2006; Mayer, 2009; McCann & Ward, 2013; McLennan et al, 2014; Peck, 2011; 2015); literature on constructivist institutionalism (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006; Schmidt, 2008; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006), and place-based social policy (Bradford, 2005; Cowen & Parlette,
2011; Larner, 2006; Mitchell, 2004), all three papers represent a form of critical policy analysis that seeks to depict, through a top-down analytical framework, the various influences, interests, incentives, and constraints that guide deliberations, statements, policies and decisions about place-based policies, programs and practices in the UK (more broadly) and Toronto (more specifically).

**Research Questions**

1. What socio-political changes are attributed to the reframing of ‘poverty’ in both Britain and Canada towards a new focus on *social exclusion*?

In the 1990s, Britain’s neighbourhood renewal policies began to focus on new and emerging approaches to social policy, and in particular, concepts of the underclass, social capital and social exclusion. ‘Social exclusion’ as a political framework hit full stride under Tony Blair in the mid-1990s, when New Labour’s *National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal* set out to approach ‘complex neighbourhood problems’ such as ‘rising poverty, unemployment, educational failure and crime’ (NSNR, 1997). In tackling these problems, national departments such as the Social Exclusion Unit and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit. Toronto’s place-based policy initiatives parallel New Labour’s urban programs. Through policy interventions such as the Community Partnerships Investment Program and the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, the City has worked with the United Way of Greater Toronto to identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods, and target investments in these areas (City of Toronto, 2005). As in the UK, these place-based policy interventions emphasize the importance of local conditions, and employ the discourse of ‘social exclusion’ widely.

Politically ‘social exclusion’ is associated with the ‘third way’ between neoliberalism and the post-war welfare state (Perkins et al, 2004). Third Way social democratic proponent Tony Blair claimed that the concept, as part his New Labour government’s ‘social investment state’, broke from traditional socialism, referring to it as "social-ism" that that recognized individuals as socially interdependent (Freeden, 2004, p.198). This ‘third’
policy paradigm includes decentralization, local variation, volunteerism, and partnerships with the private sector (Jensen, 1997; MacGregor, 1999; Peck and Theodore, 2001). In 1994, the Blair government released *Social justice: strategies for national renewal* – the report that is said to have first given impetus to the application of social inclusion/exclusion to political systems of governance in the UK (Lister, 2003). Lister (2003) states that, in the report, “the emphasis was on economic opportunity in the name of social justice as well as of economic prosperity and the achievement of security through investment in and the redistribution of opportunities rather than just income” (Lister 2003, p. 429). Importantly, Lister connects the basic sentiments of the social investment paradigm to Jessop’s (1993) influential modeling of the post-Fordist ‘Schumpetarian workfare state’ in which “redistributive welfare rights take second place to a productivist reordering of social policy” (cited in Lister 2003, p.430).

Social exclusion, as a policy construct, can produce a particular attitude toward poverty; emphasizing the structural processes that prevent people from participating in ‘mainstream’ social life or that prevents access to employment, health and educational resources. Social policy focuses on promoting ‘social inclusion’ – and combatting ‘social exclusion’ -- rather than protecting rights and equality (Lister, 1998). My argument echoes Levitas (1998: 7) who writes, “it is clear that the concept of ‘social exclusion’ imagines a boundary, and focuses attention on those outside it rather than on the features of society which systematically generate widespread poverty and disadvantage.”

The first paper of the series draws from institutional critiques of the political discourse of social exclusion and policies associated with the ‘social investment state’ and ‘third way urbanism’ in Britain and Canada (Levitas, 2005; Béland, 2007; Darcy & Gwyther, 2012); with a focus on neo-Marxist critiques which frame third way social democracy (and, by extension, place-based policies) as the prevailing form of neoliberal economics combined with multi-culturalist liberal democracy, or what Žižek facetiously calls “capitalism with a human face” (Žižek, 2008: 4).
2. How might the language of *participation* refocus the roles and responsibilities of individual citizens living in priority neighbourhoods?

Volunteerism, civic participation and social capital are central aspects of a place-based policy. In a report written for the Canadian federal government, Torjman and Levitan-Reid (2003) observe that community-based approaches to solving pressing social and economic problems are not new. Voluntary action by citizens and organizations was alive and well long before government programs. What is new is the methodology that appears to be emerging at the local level – which is, as they say, “far more strategic than before” (ibid: 7).

In Toronto, funders, policy-makers and program designers have been exploring a range of approaches to revitalizing distressed neighbourhoods and to tackling other complex problems, such as unemployment and poverty. The Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (2005) emphasizes the need for local “partnerships” across a range of sectors including businesses, community and social services, and government agencies. “Participation” is framed as a means to reduce exclusion, strengthen community voice, and empower local actors. Participation, in practice, involves a great many task forces, reviews and advisory groups with memberships that bring together the government, business, voluntary organizations and the corporate sector. Moreover, a political emphasis on partnerships encourages the dispersion of policy-making, as many groups and people who have previously not been involved in government are included, and responsibility for service provision is devolved to local levels.

The first paper in the three-part thesis explores these new processes of inclusion from a critical interpretive perspective. Intrinsic to the ‘participation’ frame are ideas about cultural cohesion and voluntarism amongst those living in lower income neighbourhoods. I draw from academic literature which chronicles processes of depoliticization and suggests that the new language of community-based empowerment now implies that citizens bear the brunt of social service delivery in terms of cost & administrative

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2 ‘Depoliticization’ is the attempt to reduce the formally political character of decision-making through shifting it to other arenas beyond the formal political system (Flinders and Buller, 2006).
decision-making (Eick, 2008; Flinders and Buller, 2006; Mayer, 2010). As upper-level funding for services is cut, local services and programs are effectively transferred to the community sector or to neighbourhood groups.

3. What political ideas and political interests are foundational to discourses of ‘risk’ as they appear in Toronto’s community policing policies and strategies?

Critics of community-based policing initiatives point to a new political focus on ‘risk’, ‘disadvantage’ and ‘social exclusion’ – overlooking the structural roots of disadvantage (Cowen & Parlette, 2011). In turn, the solutions for these urban problems are said to be found within communities themselves – the language of ‘community empowerment’, and ‘control’ have come to denote a passing off of responsibility -- be it administrative or financial or, in many, cases both – to local communities, families and individuals.

The second paper in the study’s three-part series explores the devolution of policing services downward and outward from the state and the popular ascendancy of a new discourse of insecurity – a depiction of mounting urban unrest in inner-city communities deemed to be ‘at-risk’. Of particular concern are the disproportionate use of police powers targeting minority youth in poorer areas of the city with more diverse populations -- including ‘stop and search’ community policing practices in the UK, as well as the mass documentation of youth living in priority neighbourhoods in Toronto under TAVIS. ³ I focus on the social construction of ‘risk’ – and in particular, the political ideations of risk which underpin community policing policies in Toronto’s Priority Neighbourhoods. If these claims remain unchallenged by social movements and

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³ In Toronto, under TAVIS, specialized teams of officers are deployed into ‘high crime’ neighbourhoods to document citizens in what are called ‘field information reports’ which are then entered into a massive police database. Overall, black youth in Toronto are 3.2 times more likely to be documented than white youth (Toronto Star, July 4, 2012). In Britain, under Stop and Search programs police forces are up to 28 times more likely to use stop-and-search powers against black people than white people (Guardian UK, July 28, 2011).
countervailing public policies, social constructions of deservedness and entitlement result in an “other”—an underclass of marginalized and disadvantaged people who are widely viewed as undeserving and incapable. Marginalized people become alienated—labeled as being at-risk, and indeed, excluded—from society as well as from one another (Darcy & Gwyther, 2012).

Concern over stop and search programs like TAVIS is centered around the fact that racialized youth are disproportionately targeted and disproportionately policed, which then leads to the disproportionate involvement in the criminal justice system—perpetuating the cycle of poverty and criminality. At the scale of municipal policy-making, a history of distrust between youth living in priority neighbourhoods and the police brings into question the value of a community policing programs like TAVIS. While the language of the policing initiative aims to ‘empower’ and ‘mobilize’ the community around neighbourhood issues, it is necessary to call into question the effectiveness of such a strategy.

4. What are the policies that govern community policing in Toronto, and how are they implemented?

The second paper is not simply a critique of Toronto’s community policing practices. In order to understand the many issues at play, and the various histories, meanings, experiences and viewpoints that contribute to the development and enactment of the city’s policing policies, this research draws from critical urban renewal and urban social movement literature by way of Eick (2006; 2012), Mayer (2011), Slater (2013), and Cowen (2005; 2011) – scholars who provide critical commentary related to the extent to which the local state and its parallel organizations engage in a ‘post-welfarist’ policing of poorer urban communities under the auspices of place-based, community renewal efforts. However, much of this literature did not apply directly to the activities and practices of the institutions and decision-making bodies that impact the operations of the TPS and the day-to-day activities of police officers in Toronto. Instead, to understand the local
landscape of policing governance, and in line with an interpretive/discursive approach to institutional analysis (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006), I look to the language and discourse of policies, reports and directives in order to fathom both the making and enactment of community policing policies at the senior institutional and decision-making levels; to begin to account for the various institutional frameworks, histories, interests and relationships which guide these decision-making processes; and to understand how the these policies frame their social subjects – i.e., individuals residing in targeted neighbourhoods deemed to be ‘at risk’.

5. How do place-based policy frameworks and ideas about neighbourhood effects function to construct populations labeled as being ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘at-risk’?

When mobilizing city space as an arena for market-oriented city growth becomes the central goal of urban policy, urban forms of governance also become entrepreneurial (Eick, 2008). Such forms of governance target pro-growth strategies and include projects aimed at involving residents to enhance ‘security and order.’ Focusing on community surveillance, policing, and the regulation of risk, the third and final paper of the series explores the notion that co-ordinated support can become co-ordinated surveillance in neighbourhoods that have become targets of urban rehabilitation programs.

6. How can urban researchers, policy scholars, urban designers and community workers begin to work counter-steer urban policy projects away from the aim of market-oriented economic growth towards an egalitarian, community-driven framework?

Following Mayer (2003: 110), while place-based policies may appear as the fulfillment of earlier grassroots empowerment claims, they are actually part of a new mode of governance “that has emerged in and for neglected and disadvantaged neighbourhoods and communities.” These new policies presumably connect local participation, based on horizontal networks and reciprocity, with such positive results as economic growth and democratic intensity in distressed, excluded, ‘priority’ areas (ibid).
References to ‘the public’ and invitations to ‘participate’ have become part of a trend Mayer (2003: 108) describes as the “dissolving of social and political perspectives into economic ones;” where new, targeted programs for neighbourhood revitalization denote local governments’ discovery of the potential of community-based organizations for helping them solve their fiscal as well as legitimation problems. Some of the strategies that worked very effectively within the Fordist city, against the Keynesian state – such as self-reliance and cultural expression -- are now embraced by the post-welfarist social investment state as part of what’s commonly referred to as the ‘creative city agenda’. Radical and creative ideas that were unique to social movements such as ‘right to the city’ have been “hijacked” to produce new forms of economic development and to facilitate gentrification and displacement; effectively shifting urban social movements and their strategies from protest to program in order to put their alternative practice onto a more stable footing (Mayer, 2011).

My third paper borrows from relevant academic literature which critiques the pervasiveness of Sampson et al.’s (2002) neighbourhood effects framework (Slater, 2013; Manley et al, 2013); scholarly critiques of the socio-political construction of socio-spatial ‘risk’ (Mayer, 2011; Eick, 2008); and contemporary urban social movement literature (Eick, 2006; Mayer, 2009; Uitermark, 2012) to outline the various strategies that social movement activists may use to counter-steer market-oriented processes of urban restructuring and refute claims that living in a ‘disadvantaged’ neighbourhood produces negative ‘effects’ which negatively impact on individuals’ life chances.

Methodology

Study Design

IPA is ethnographic, informed by the constructivist-interpretivist approach. The approach frames social realities as intersubjectively constructed. Research processes in
the interpretive tradition are typically characterized by an empirical and normative prioritizing of the lived experience of people in research settings, including a focus on the meaning(s) of interactions, language, acts, events, and physical artifacts to multiple stakeholders, and a sensitivity to the historically-contingent, often-contested character of such meanings. Interpretive researchers see themselves as co-constructors and co-interpreters of the meaning(s) of events along with study participants, reflecting on their own roles in shaping those interpretations. To echo Yanow (2000: 27), the purpose of IPA is twofold: “to identify groups of people who might share understandings of policy ideas and language that would be different from other groups’ understandings; and to identify the artifacts through which these understandings are expressed, communicated, and interpreted.” The ‘data’ of IPA are the words, symbolic objects, and acts of policy-relevant actors along with policy texts, plus the meanings these artifacts have for them. What is ‘collected’ are the researcher-analyst’s observations and interpretations (taped, noted, or both) and copies of relevant documents (ibid).

**Study Methods**

This research constitutes the sustained exploration of my research questions, supported by primary and secondary research, interpretive policy analysis/critical discourse analysis, critical policy analysis, and interview data. Using a variety of data sources, the intention is to intensively explore and understand what happens within the cases. Critical discourse analysis will be used to investigate the processes of social construction, as expressed in discursive practices.

The methodological approach consists of three main components: *Phase 1*, a critical discourse analysis that aims to highlight the discursive circulation of UK-based policy models to the City of Toronto (i.e., examining the ways and means by which local actors appropriate globally circulating policy discourses and frames); *Phase 2*, an analysis of interview data derived from a series of interviews with key policy actors/government employees who have a direct connection to the formulation or implementation of community policing policies in Toronto (applied to Paper Two); and *Phase 3*, a
conceptual review of alternative and community-driven approaches to neighbourhood strategies that draws from new urban social movement literature.

1.1.1 PHASE 1: TEXT ANALYSIS

This portion of the research examines the language and policy frames of policy documents in both London and Toronto using an interpretive discourse analysis. Here I examine how the discourse and rhetoric of place-based policy in Toronto has emerged through transnational and intra-territorial policy networks. In doing this, a multiperspectival framework will be used that is based on an analytical distinction between discursive practices (the object of empirical analysis) and broader societal developments (the background for analysis) (Hajer, 2006). Textual analysis will, in its limited scope, compare and linkages between place-based policy documents in the UK and Canada.

My analysis of texts will be guided by three primary lines of inquiry: 1) how the ‘neighbourhood problem’ was conceptualized in political and temporal contexts in both London (UK) and Toronto; (2) how political discourses of neighbourhood-specific problems identify objects and strategies for governance; and (3) the extent to which these discursive links represent a ‘policy transfer’ from the UK to Canada. I draw on two types of policy texts: official sources (policy and legislation produced by federal, provincial, municipal agencies), and semiofficial sources (political speeches and records of governmental proceedings).

As outlined above, the key policy frames to be analyzed were: social exclusion, risk and neighbourhood effects. In the first paper, these frames are explored in relation to the transnationalism of targeted neighbourhood improvement policies -- or place-based policies -- as they are constructed in both the UK and Toronto.

In Figure 1, a model is presented in which different dimensions of discursive policy transfer are outlined. Consistent with this model, I have limited the dimensions of discursive policy circulation in political-administrative institutions to ‘discourse’,
‘behaviour’ and ‘structure’. These three functional components can be both input towards the City of Toronto (input of UK-oriented discourse) as well as output from the City of Toronto (in terms of the absorption and implementation of UK discourse, for example). Additionally, one could classify ‘discourse’ and ‘behaviour’ under the wider concept of ‘practice.’

**Figure 1: Dimensions of Discursive Policy Transfer**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Circulation of:</th>
<th>Input from the UK to the City of Toronto</th>
<th>Output from the City of Toronto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>UK-oriented discourse</td>
<td>Absorption and implementation of UK policy discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour</td>
<td>Pro-active behaviour (e.g. lobbying)</td>
<td>Absorption and implementation of funding/partnership methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Policy preparing methodology</td>
<td>Implementing bodies (e.g. the Social Development Policy Unit at the City of Toronto; SNTF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that not all of the dimensions described above will be examined to the same extent, as the main research focus is on discursive practices: the emphasis will thus be on discourse, especially as output from the UK. Additionally, some attention will be paid to the behaviour of policy actors (Fischer, 2003). As related to the City of Toronto’s place-based program itself, however, structure will be addressed at the stage of policy implementation.

**1.1.2 PHASE 2: INTERVIEWS**

Part of the second paper of my three-part thesis, *Phase 2* involves the transcription and analysis of interview data derived from a series of in-depth, semi-structured expert interviews (N=21) with key actors who have a direct connection to the formulation or
implementation of community policing policy in Toronto – including Deputy Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers with the Ministry of Community Safety and Corrections Services, senior policy officials, police officers, TPSB members, policing scholars, youth workers, advocates and policy watch dog groups, influence, interpret and enact policy. For this secondary phase of the research, the practices of various actors across three levels of governance (national, provincial and municipal) and the implementation of community policing policy across translocal networks (i.e. how policies are funded, supported, and implemented ‘on the ground’) were studied.

Study participants were selected based on two separate sets of criteria: (1) their involvement in the development, funding, and implementation of TAVIS; (2) their rooted perspective on targeted policing in Toronto’s neighbourhoods (e.g. community activists and civilian watch dog groups).

All interviews were semi-structured, in that I prepared a set of questions that I altered depending on the participant’s role implementing, influencing, or enforcing policing policy. In all cases, I let the interviewee guide the interview. The goal was to understand the specific institutional and social context of policy formation and implementation processes rather than affirming facts related to the development of a given policy. I engaged with local state actors’ personal understandings of community policing policies; gaining insight into the embedded practices of police officers who patrol Toronto’s ‘hot spot’ neighbourhoods on the basis of institutionally-defined ‘risk’.

In analyzing police practices, it is crucial to acknowledge and reflexively account for the experiential distance that exists between myself – a White, Canadian-born doctoral student – and the people of predominantly Black and South Asian descent that have been most affected by persistent police presence in their communities. I lack first-hand experience. With this in mind, the goal was not to provide a situated account of community policing practices; rather, the aim was to contribute my own skills and knowledge base as a social policy analyst to study the tri-level political and institutional processes that have contributed both to the design and delivery of a program like TAVIS.
By accounting for the various channels of top-down decision-making, and conducting and analyzing in-depth interviews with influential key informants (including two Deputy Ministers, the former chair of the TPSB, current TPSB officials and high-ranking police officers), the aim was to shed light on the actions, beliefs, histories and practices of the people involved in implementing TAVIS. From a policy perspective, the goal was to understand how community policing policies function to construct, reify and criminalize the experiences of racial minorities living in heavily policed, “hot spot” neighbourhoods.

In-depth interview materials from interviews with senior police officials, decision-makers and policy analysts were analyzed alongside in-depth interview material from local activists, academics, community members and journalists in order to produce a nuanced understanding of the different ways in which these groups understood, experienced and interpreted community policing policies in Toronto. With IPA, the tensions that emerge out of the differing and divergent meanings, feelings and perspectives and accounts expressed throughout the interview materials require an analyst to reflect not only on “what” policies mean, but “how” they mean – through what processes they are communicated, who their intended audiences are, and what context-specific meanings their “readers” make of policy artifacts (Yanow, 2002). In doing so, they consider the actions of decision-makers and implementing agencies to be potentially as central to communicating policy meaning as the legislation itself (ibid).

Finally, it should be noted that Paper Two does not represent an explicitly interpretive methodological approach to the analysis of text and interview data. In some cases, Critical Policy Analysis was used to distinguish between the meaning and the enactment and/or ground-level application of the policy. Consistent with Ball (2002), a critical policy analyst is focused on the task rather than theoretical purism or conceptual niceties, and applies those concepts and interpretive devices in their work in order to achieve the best possibility of insight and understanding.
DATA ANALYSIS

In this design, data analysis involves an iterative process between reviewing policies and firsthand accounts of their meaning in practice (i.e. interview data). Thus, I analyzed relevant policies within the context of transcripts from interviews, which were coded and organized into categories (Yanow, 2000). All qualitative data collected from interviews were transcribed in full and analyzed alongside preliminary data analyses and analytical memos (memos were written at the conclusion of every interview in order to ensure reflection and reflexivity in the research).

Data were managed using the qualitative software program NVivo9. Data analysis and interpretation resulted in overarching themes and recommendations for policy and service renewal. The triangulation of data involved the use of multiple indicators in operationalizing the complex concepts of policy transfer and policy frame analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO:

Neighbourhood Politics, Policymaking the Discourse of Exclusion: Developing an Interpretive Account of Place-Based Policy Ideas in London (UK) and Toronto
ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the transnationalism of targeted neighbourhood improvement policies (or ‘place-based’ policies) as they are constructed in both the United Kingdom and Toronto. Focusing on the discourse and rhetoric of place-based policies, the question of whether these local policies are in fact global – both in the sense that they are developed and disseminated transnationally, and because they aim to localize the ‘problems’ of sociospatial polarization associated with neoliberalism and global city formation – will be explored. In examining this question, the role of targeted neighbourhood improvement policies in London (UK) in shaping Toronto’s place-based approach will be examined. The methodological challenge here is to develop an adequate conceptualization of policy discourse ‘in motion’-- or the transnational circulation of neighbourhood policy discourses of ‘social exclusion’ and ‘participation’.
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Introduction

The impact of various forms of neighbourhood change on the social fabric of metropolitan areas is of rising concern throughout affluent Western nations. Cities are becoming increasingly divided on the basis of socio-economic and ethno-cultural trends (Bunting & Filion, 2010; Larner, 2006; Peck & Theodore, 2015). The effects of these trends are increasingly evident in urban environments – recent riots in Stockholm, London and Paris illustrate what can happen when poor households concentrate in disadvantaged neighbourhoods; or neighbourhoods where social, educational, and job opportunities are limited. These riots may not be isolated local events, but rather signs of wider politico-structural problems that impact on local communities.

In addressing spatially-concentrated problems and challenges, urban development patterns have become progressively more similar across the advanced capitalist countries as forms of urban governance have converged (Mayer, 2011). More specifically, there has been a transnational movement amongst policy-makers toward the application of geographically targeted, neighbourhood-based interventions, called ‘place-based’ policies. In cities across the UK, Western Europe, Australia, the United States and Canada, political understandings of marginality have expanded to include geographical elements. For example, assumptions made about particular neighbourhoods and diagnoses of city ills – issues of poverty, crime, youth violence, and the emerging social isolation of racialized immigrants -- are predominantly framed as place-specific problems requiring place-specific solutions (Bradford, 2005). Due to limitations of scope, and in view of the numerous parallels in governance structures, policy-making, policy discourse, and political dogmata, this article will focus on area-based and place-based policies in London, U.K. and Toronto, Canada.

While they have many differences, London and Toronto are comparable due to high levels of socio-spatial income polarization: both cities exhibit sizable income gaps between the poorest and wealthiest neighbourhoods. Moreover, place-based policies in both the U.K. and Canada are associated with New Labour’s ‘social investment state,’
which materialized with social democratic proponent Tony Blair’s Third Way urbanism – or what the former U.K. Prime Minister has referred to as “social-ism that recognized individuals as socially interdependent (Freeden, 2005: 198).” This ‘third’ policy paradigm employs state-led strategies of decentralization, local variation, volunteerism, and partnerships with the private sector (Peck and Theodore, 2001). Place-based, ‘strong neighbourhoods’ policies emerging from the Third Way paradigm aim to combat ‘social exclusion’ rather than ‘poverty’ (Lister, 1998; Mayer, 2011): focusing on the individual or neighbourhood-based processes that prevent people from participating in mainstream social life or that prevent access to employment, health and educational resources rather than the structural factors that give way to socio-spatial polarization and economic inequality.

Place-based policies, as they are referred to here, first appeared in 1998 with New Labour’s national New Deal for Communities (NDC) strategy in the UK. NDC Partnerships were given the complex target of “helping to turn around the poorest neighbourhoods” – seeking to combat the ‘wicked problems’ of urban deprivation through with the roll-out of Area Based Initiatives (ABIs) (Lawless. 2010; DETR, 1998: 1). ABIs were designed to produce process outcomes – notably social inclusion and community engagement – facilitated through ‘partnership working’ (Lawless, 2007). Within the City of Toronto, place-based policy (re)emerged\(^4\) in 2005 with the City’s ‘Community Partnership Strategy’ (CPS). The CPS is part of the City’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, designed to increase investment in thirteen ‘priority neighbourhoods’ (i.e., thirteen census-tract neighbourhoods that exhibit high concentrations of poverty, underemployment, new immigrants, and a lack of social services and facilities) (City of Toronto, SNTF, 2005). Toronto’s place-based policy initiatives parallel New Labour’s urban programs. Through policy interventions such as the Community Partnerships Investment Program (CPIP) (2004) and the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS) (2005), the City has worked with the United Way of Greater Toronto to identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods, and target investments in these

\(^4\) A spatially targeted, prescriptive policy approach to addressing “urban ills” in Toronto had first come about in the 1950s (Cowen, 2005), emerging at the forefront of city politics in Marvyn Novick’s 1979 *Metro Suburbs in Transition* report.
areas (ibid). As in the UK, these place-based policy interventions emphasize the importance of local conditions, and employ political discourses of social exclusion and participation widely.

In both London and Toronto, alongside new forms of place-based urban governance we see the emergence of a new policy language – new policy frames, or storylines, which function to discursively construct the individuals and communities that live in these neighbourhoods. This paper reviews the transnationalism of targeted neighbourhood improvement policies, or place-based policies, as they are constructed in both London and Toronto. It outlines the geographical and ideological origins of the popular approach to ‘local’ policymaking and governance, and the means through which it has been established in political systems of governance. Focussing on the discourse and rhetoric of place-based policies in Toronto, the question of whether these localized policies are in fact global, in the sense that they are developed and disseminated transnationally, will be examined. The aim is to highlight the discursive constructs -- the frames and stories – that are deliberatively and collaboratively generated through new models of global (or network) governance in order to explore public policy ‘in motion’ (Peck, 2003; McCann, 2011).

The methodological challenge here is to develop an adequate conceptualization of neighbourhood policy frames as they travel across transnational and translocal modes of institutional relations, bureaucratic hierarchies and policy networks that connect and interpenetrate local policy regimes (Brenner et al., 2010; McCann & Ward, 2013). Consistent with McCann and Ward’s (2013)’policy assemblage, mobilities and mutations’ approach to policy transfer research, the distinction between what has come to be seen as a more limited rational-formalist tradition of work on policy transfer which is rooted in political science, and social-constructivist approaches (Peck, 2011: 774 as cited in McCann & Ward, 2013: 3), and an emerging, multiperspectival body of policy transfer research on ‘how, why, where and with what effects policies are mobilised, circulated, learned, reformulated and reassembled’ (McCann & Ward, 2013: 3) is echoed here. In addition to identifying transfer agents (i.e., the actors and institutions involved), attention
will be paid to how these broader contexts influence the agency of various policy actors (ibid). Accordingly, the Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA) method will be used to explore the assemblage of neighbourhood policies, political discourses, and technocratic measurements that have produced logics of ‘social exclusion’ and civic ‘participation’ that are now widely understood as universal, and knowable, aspects of western cities (Springer et al., 2016). Rooted in the deliberative democratic tradition, IPA begins with the insight that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant actions, beliefs, histories and practices of the people involved (Bevir & Rhodes 2006; 2010).

**Purpose**

In asking the question ‘why do certain ideas catch on in public policy?’ the goal here is to understand how policy actors go about adopting neighbourhood policy models, looking to the role of Labour-initiated ABIs in shaping Toronto’s place-based policy approach in design, discourse, method and execution (Jeffares, 2007).

Neo-Marxist/ regulationist and Foucauldian critiques of urban governance – and in particular, neo-Foucauldian writings on ‘governmentality’ and institutionalist critiques of Third Way policy schemas – will provide the theoretical grounds from which to elaborate: (1) a conceptual framework for the understanding of the production, application, and circulation of place-based policy and discourse from London to Toronto (2) a case vignette in which IPA is used to examine policy frames of ‘social exclusion’ and ‘participation’ within the various contexts that they have been adopted and enacted at the municipal scale in Toronto. Both of these frames are associated with Third Way social democracy (or what Žižek facetiously calls “capitalism with a human face”), which combines neoliberal economics with multi-culturalist liberal democracy (Zizek 2008: 4). Section Five summarizes the implications of the work, and suggests a direction for future research.
Outline

This paper is divided into five sections. Section one examines place-based and area-based policy models in Canada and the UK; briefly outlining their respective histories, methodologies and applications. Section two provides a summary of contemporary neo-Marxist and regulationist critiques of urban neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2003; Larner, 2007; Mayer & Künkèl, 2012; Sakızlioğlu & Uitermark, 2014) which have stressed the move away from the redistributive policies characteristic of the postwar era (as, for example, the provision of local social services and public housing) towards more targeted forms of governance and an extension of market rule into formerly nonmonetarized aspects of social life. Section three outlines the various processes through which ideas circulate in public policy, drawing from academic work across geography, planning, sociology, and political science. The literature aids in the exploration of sociospatial policy mobility as it relates to place-based policy models pursued in both the UK and Canada. This section also provides examples of direct and indirect policies ‘in motion’ across institutional boundaries. The approach is associated with more traditional transfer scholarship (Peck, 2001; Peck & Tickell 2002; 2003) that has, as Jamie Peck (2015: 165) describes in later work, understood neoliberalization as a ‘processual abstraction, not as an empirical template […] anchored at the urban scale [while] significantly exceed[ing] this scale.’ In Section 4, however, the IPA method will be used to expand this empirical framework through a case vignette which examines policy frames ‘social exclusion’ and ‘participation’ of place-based/area-based policy documents in both London and Toronto. This analysis, within its limited scope, will compare the contextual and territorial specificities (with distinct social, political and material realities) that influence how, why and for whom place-based policy is enacted in the UK and Canada (ibid).

The Importance of Policy Frames

Consistent with IPA, policy frames are the taken-for-granted assumptional structures of policy research that derive from generative metaphors, such as ‘housing decay’ or the
‘war on poverty’ (Schon & Rein, 1994). Policy frames are important as they are the medium through which actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements (Hajer, 1993: 47). Policy-makers, regulators, and other political actors tell stories to convey their interpretation of a given policy issue or social problem. Storytelling is a tool of interpretation and persuasion in the policy-making process (Bruner, 2002). Influenced by the ‘interpretative turn’ in the social sciences during the latter half of the 20th century, the IPA approach combines a spectrum of analytic inquiries, including phenomenology, critical theory, symbolic interactionism, hermeneutics, pragmatism, and ethnomethodology; offering discourse, rhetoric, frame, fact-value, category, metaphor, and other analytic methods to the exploration of systems of meaning in the form of policy discourse (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2006: 1). The methodology’s paradigmatic thinker is Foucault, who argues that, contained within the language of policy is the power to both effect and enact social change (Foucault, 1991). Insomuch as power is contained within language, language itself can be a crucial exclusionary mechanism in democracy as it determines social classifications. And so, policy language constructs the ‘types’ of people that community-based programs are intended to serve. Claims made about certain types of people reflect not only the socio-political conditions under which they were produced, but also the beliefs and preferences of the policy actors and officials who give life to these constructs.

In the field of social work, the uncritical acceptance of political frames, and assumptions about certain types of people (e.g. youth ‘at-risk’), focusses social workers’ attention narrowly on individuals and away from broader socio-structural relations (Chambon, 1999; Edelman, 1988). The subjects become reified. We objectify them and observe them as part of the seeable world. But researchers must remember that we have a part in constructing these interactions (Wilson, 2011). In policy, we must also engage with issues of power and politics. Where is power? Who is silenced? This is the contribution of critical theory to the interpretive method. With this in mind, further research is needed to understand what may be done (by community groups, policy actors and funders) to ensure that place-based policies are solidly based – and solidly connected – to the needs
and perspectives of local people and communities. In order to address the needs of the urban poor, these policies must move beyond their spatially selective nature and begin to expand beyond the constructs of ‘place’ so that they extend universally across all neighbourhoods, addressing the underlying structural causes of poverty and social ‘exclusion’ and focus on the ‘mainstreaming’ of funding and partners over the long term (Lupton, 2003). That is, perhaps, the only way that a neighbourhoods approach may eventually meet the planning and service needs of underserved populations. As Wiseman (2006: 95) has argued, while place-based policies ‘may lead to real improvements in community networks, infrastructure and capacity,’ they are no substitute for ‘inclusive and redistributive taxation, income security, service delivery and labour market policies.’

In order to analyze and interpret place-based policy documents, it becomes necessary to examine the many challenges presented in attempting to integrate places and people in a policy framework. For instance, how does this policy process play out at the neighbourhood scale, and what are some potential problems that may have been overlooked in the policy development process? In the context of Toronto, how might these policies best be tailored to meet the specific needs of the neighbourhoods they aim to improve -- what new barriers emerge? What are the limitations presented by constrained municipal budgets? If the language and methodologies that reinforce these municipal policies borrow from the United Kingdom’s nationalized strategy, what measures have been undertaken to ensure a policy ‘fit’?

1 An Overview of Place-Based Policy, its Applications and Critiques

1.1 Place-Based Policy in Canada

The place of cities in Canada’s governance scheme is evolving. In an era of federal and provincial retrenchment, where is government intervention and investment to come from? Who is to mediate competing interests? Responsibility is often passed off to municipal
governments, amplifying the limits within their legislative and fiscal frameworks (Brenner, 1998). As a response to this devolution of responsibility, spatially-concentrated problems are no longer dealt with through traditional, top-down policy prescriptions (Bradford, 2005). Instead, many provincial governments have adopted ‘place-sensitive’ approaches (ibid). That is, as federal and provincial bodies devolve power to municipalities, cash-strapped municipalities target their limited funds for social programs to neighbourhoods ‘in need’ – creating a place-based governance structure that requires intergovernmental participation and multiple funding sources from both public and private sectors.

As cities and city regions emerge as multicultural centres of economic and cultural innovation, these centres are becoming increasingly linked to national and international networks rather than to their provincial hinterlands (Cameron & Simeon, 2002). Bradford (2005) speaks to these issues in his 2005 report, *Place-based Public Policy: Towards a New Urban and Community Agenda for Canada* -- advocating for public policy that reflects intergovernmental coordination. He further calls for a recognition of the importance of urban Canada and the role that each of the three levels of government have in relation to spending, taxing, regulating, and owning property (ibid). Yet, he notes that there is little systematic coordination or regularized contact among the different three levels -- calling for a place-based policy approach in which ‘local knowledge can inform the decisions taken at the upper levels of government;’ delivering solutions to the place-specific problems of cities and communities (ibid: 34). The promotion of social inclusion, civic participation, and social capital are major components of this approach.

### 1.2 Renewing the importance of ‘place’ in Toronto

The enactment of place-based policy in the Toronto region is not a new phenomenon. Targeted policies were common practice in the suburban municipalities since the 1950s (Cowen & Parlette, 2011). In 1979, the Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto released ‘Metro’s Suburbs in Transition’, which showed that” poverty, isolation, and distress existed in Metro’s suburbs” (Freiler, 2004:1) and not just in the inner city as had
been assumed. The report laid out a framework and policy agenda for change that called on the Metro Toronto government to assume responsibility for the social development needs of new suburban communities (Cowen, 2005). ‘Neighbourhoods Under Stress’, the 1983 follow-up report of the Joint Task Force on Neighbourhood Support Services, resulted in a new core funding program for neighbourhood agencies, jointly sponsored by the Metro government, the provincial government, and United Way of Greater Toronto (Freiler, 2004).

The ‘second coming’ of a citywide focus on neighbourhood revitalization came on the heels of the provincial Conservative ‘Common Sense Revolution’ (CSR) (1995-2002) and the consolidation of a competitive city framework. The CSR initiated wide-scale cuts to welfare and housing services, devolved fiscal and administrative responsibility for social programs from provincial to municipal governments, and amalgamated Metro Toronto with its nearby municipalities into one ‘mega city’. An increase in territorial competition for dwindling resources gave rise to a competitive city framework which celebrated local entrepreneurialism, place management, and developer-led investment in the city’s core (Kipfer & Saberi, 2014). Meanwhile, less desirable, inner suburban neighbourhoods became places where place-based interventions were needed as an antidote to the ‘neighbourhood effects’ of underemployment, crime and a lack of appropriate social and community services (Sampson et al., 2002).

Following what the media coined in 2005 the ‘summer of the gun’, the City of Toronto, in partnership with the United Way, formed the Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Taskforce (SNTF). The Taskforce recommended a place-based approach to dealing with what they identified as problem of neighbourhood decline and concentrated poverty in the inner suburbs. Place-based policies were enacted across a range of policy and program areas, including children and youth services, recreation, policing, employment, culture and arts, public housing, and community safety. These policies were framed as initiatives to support ‘social inclusion’ and build ‘strong neighbourhoods’ in order to restore Toronto’s reputation as a great ‘city of neighbourhoods’ (City of Toronto, SNTF, 2005).
A successive series of reports drew attention to new problems of poverty and social exclusion in emerging away from the city core – poverty and social exclusion in the inner suburbs. The City Summit Alliance, the TD Bank, the United Way, the Toronto Community Foundation, and David Hulchanski’s (2007; 2010) ‘Three Cities’ reports all present a picture of a region divided by income and race. Cycles of declining prosperity, population loss, rising crime, crumbling infrastructure, deteriorating public services, immigrant poverty, and youth at-risk came to be viewed as a threat to the city’s economic productivity and reputation as a multicultural, diverse and welcoming place. In response, the neighbourhood was promoted as a site for citizen engagement and improved governmental accountability (Gough et al., 2006).

The political roots of place-based policies are associated with New Labour’s Third Way agenda, which established the direction of former Prime Minister Tony Blair in the UK, involving the ‘rise of civil society’ (Hall, 2003; 2011). The Third Way is discursively crafted as an alternative to the Keynesian welfare state and neoliberal ideology associated with Thatcher and Reagan. This ‘third’ policy paradigm includes decentralization, local variation, volunteerism, and partnerships with the private sector (Jewson & MacGregor, 1997; Peck and Theodore, 2015). Hall (2003: 14) positions Blair’s New Labour project between Thatcherism, the 'neo-liberal variant of classic Conservatism' that preceded it, and the 'anti-statist stance of American-style neo-liberalism' with which it coexists. From this view, the emergence of third way policy schemas – targeted at the level and scale of the neighbourhood – represent the transition from government to rescaled, neoliberal forms of urban governance; whereby multiple public and private partners work interdependently to fulfill the decision-making role of the state (Hall, 2003; Rhodes, 1994).

1.3 Regeneration in the UK

The UK was among the first European states to implement measures to address ‘urban decay’ and ‘social deprivation’. In the 1960s, earmarked funds to assist the integration of
ethnic minorities, followed by the small-area Community Development projects (modeled after the US ‘War on Poverty’) and the longer-term Urban Programme sought to stimulate community and voluntary sector engagement as well as making advances towards commercial development (Mangen, 2004). From the late 1960s onwards there were also specific interventions in area-based urban regeneration through the creation of ‘general improvement areas’ in 1969, and ‘housing action areas’ in 1974 (ibid). A white paper on inner cities, issued by the Labour government in 1977, was influenced by the result of pilot studies and led to the reform of the Urban Programme, with a greater concern for economic regeneration and with a “greater capital-intensive focus” (ibid: 33). As part of this strategy, a new model of inner-city partnership between the public and private sectors was to be operationalized in seven cities. As Mangen (ibid) recounts, these policies were criticized by commentators at the time as being rushed in their implementation in order to demonstrate impacts in the very short term on the basis of small initial public expenditures.

Beginning in 1979 under Thatcher, new inner-city policies were developed by the Conservative government. Some of the policy basis set by Labour was retained – including ‘partnership’, growing prioritization of economic-led regeneration, pressures to demonstrate outcomes, and a concern for safety and crime control – but in radicalized form (ibid). By 1988, City Action Teams composed of high-ranking city servants were established in order to stimulate inner-city entrepreneurialism in local areas deemed deprived, mostly with a high presence of ethnic minorities.5

1.4 A ‘New Deal’ for Deprived Communities

When Labour came into office in 1997, there were at least two novel features: the party campaigned under a new name, New Labour, and advocated a new philosophy: the Third Way (Herd, 2004). As part of Tony Blair’s party platform, Blair portrayed himself as one of a new generation of leaders who were “strong on ideas but indifferent to ideology; whose instinct is to judge government not on grand designs, but by practical results” (The

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5 Thatcher’s victory speech after her third election, in 1987, specifically named ‘those inner cities’ as the object of the government’s early attention.
This has led commentators to speculate on the nature of the New Labour project: to question how much policy really is new, how much belongs to either the Old Left or the New Right, and where new ideas are coming from (Driver and Martell, 1998; Powell, 1999). To be sure, Conservative budgetary commitments to urban policy were to a large extent respected by the Blair government, as too was the espousal of the principles of ‘new public management’, extensive ‘partnerships’, and the contract culture (Mangen 2004). However, new funding for projects was increased, particularly new projects relating to New Labour’s ‘new deal’ on unemployment and other manifestations of ‘deprivation’ (Jacobs & Dutton, 2000). In what followed, the evolution of urban policy was to be critically linked to issues of social exclusion – a concept close to overarching EU policies, but one which conformed to Blair’s third way agenda (ibid).

The UK officially adopted a social exclusion approach in 1997. The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) was launched as a multi-sectoral way to try to combat crime, poverty, housing, and health issues (SEU, 1998). It aimed at stopping people from "falling through the cracks" in social services, and reintegrating those who had already fallen behind. The creation of the SEU facilitated the further expansion of neighbourhood targeting through ABIs, coupled with a re-investment into small-scale inner-city initiatives (Amin et al., 2000). The Unit published a National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (1998), stressing the need for improved coordination at the highest (cabinet level) (ibid). The ensuing New Deal for Communities – a major new programme – therefore aimed to streamline ‘local strategic partnerships’ through enhanced local-area management and to mainstream policy, integrating it with other ‘New Deal’ interventions with area-based targets extending to education, health, urban security and employment (Mangen, 2004). Moreover, the recommendations from the 1999 report of the government-appointed Urban Task Force led to the establishment of urban generation companies, charged with the task of securing close collaboration with public and private sectors in order to strengthen ‘Local Strategic Partnerships’ (LSPs) and Local Area Agreements (LAAs) (ibid.). LAAs are recognized by strategic stakeholders as the key driver of service provision at the local level. As a parallel to the SEU, the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit was created to narrow the gap between deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the
A localist agenda came to London in 1999, following the Ed Miliband-led Labour Party’s *London Government Act*. The Act established the Greater London Authority (GLA). The GLA consisted of a Mayor and Assembly, and afforded greater local autonomy to a new metropolitan tier of government which replaced central departments and appointed boards and borough joint arrangements that had provided city-wide services since the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986 (DCLG, 2012; Turver, 2006: 4). The GLA had three stated purposes: to promote local economic development, social development, and improve the environment. In 2005, following Labour’s general election manifesto, the powers and responsibilities of the London Mayor and Assembly that had been created with the GLA were revised – affording additional strategic powers over housing, health, climate change, waste, culture and planning to then-Mayor Ken Livingstone (House of Commons 2006).

Importantly, with respect to city planning, the Mayor was granted a direct say over local development plans and could select planning applications which he deemed of ‘strategic importance’ (ibid). After Livingstone’s neoconservative successor, Boris Johnson, was elected to Mayoral office in 2008, Johnson used these powers to slash the quota of ‘affordable’ housing from 20% to 12% in London’s Islington and Camden boroughs in order to promote private investment (*Guardian UK*, Jan. 29, 2014). A similar level of decision-making power is granted to Toronto’s Mayor. In 2011, a new Conservative Mayor, Rob Ford, brought with him an aggressive form of ‘roll-back neoliberal’ practice that resulted in ‘aggressive privatisation, selective fiscal constraint, anti-labour measures and racialised law and order;’ intensifying a growing socio-spatial divide between an ‘elitist’ downtown and a suburban ‘Ford nation’ (Kipfer & Saberi, 2014:130).

### 1.5 The Limits of a Place-Based Approach

Critical work interprets targeted urban policy as territorialism in the context of state rescaling (Brenner, 2004; Mayer, 2011) and neoliberal governance (Wiseman, 2006; Smyth, 2008; Sakızlioğlu & Uitermark, 2014). These authors, citing various different
examples, argue that place-based policies gloss over structural inequalities and injustices with seemingly non-political discourses surrounding notions of community development and social capital. From Smyth’s view (2008: 269), place-based policies represent a ‘multilayered but localized institutional structure’ and frame social exclusion as a threat to economic competitiveness while reinforcing existing socioeconomic conditions. As a result, these policies contribute to the consolidation of decentralized, territorially customized state spatial configurations (ibid: 69). Likewise, Wiseman (2006), drawing from the Australian context, questions the extent to which community strengthening contributes to positive long-term change in social, environmental and economic outcomes. He examines whether place-based policies are a core element of dominant public policy, or a shift away from it (ibid.). While Wiseman (ibid: 94) acknowledges that local initiatives may ‘lead to real improvements in community networks, infrastructure and capacity,’ he emphasizes that they are no substitute for ‘inclusive and redistributive taxation, income security, service delivery and labour market policies.’ Similarly, Smyth (2008) argues that investing in place is no substitute for investment in people. The author warns of the dangers of ‘pathologising communities’ based on politics of blaming the victims; facilitating attacks on income supports, and emphasizing security and order at the expense of equality and social justice (ibid: 4).

Volunteerism, civic participation and social capital are all central aspects of place-based governance schemes. In their report commissioned by the Canadian federal government, Torjman and Levitan-Reid (2003) observe that place-based approaches to solving pressing social and economic problems are not new. Voluntary action by citizens and organizations was alive and well long before government programs. What is new is the methodology that appears to be emerging at the local level – which is, as they say, ‘far more strategic than before (ibid: 7).’ References to “the public” and invitations to ‘participate’ have become part of a trend Mayer (2003: 108) describes as the ‘dissolving of social and political perspectives into economic ones;’ where new, targeted programs for neighbourhood revitalization denote local governments’ discovery of the potential of community-based organizations for helping them solve their fiscal as well as legitimation problems. Some of the urban and community development strategies that worked very
effectively within the Fordist city – such as self-reliance and cultural expression – have been coopted by the post-Fordist ‘social investment state’ agenda. To echo Mayer (2011, as cited in Carriere, 2016), radical and creative ideas that were unique to social movements such as Right to the City\textsuperscript{6} have been ‘hijacked’ to produce new forms of entrepreneurial urbanism linked to gentrification and displacement; effectively shifting urban social movements and their strategies from ‘protest to program.’

Further critiques pose that complex socio-spatial problems are framed as a function of \textit{neighbourhood effects} – a concept developed in Chicago by Robert J. Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson et al, 2002) which ties individuals’ life chances to the neighbourhoods that they live in on the basis of neighbourhood-level variations of phenomena such as delinquency, violence and crime, mutual trust, and routine activity patterns. Manley et al (2013: 6) dispute the neighbourhood effects framework, arguing that the ‘very notion of a neighbourhood effect is an instrument of accusation,’ and neighbourhood effects literature has ‘failed to engage with the wider socio-economic processes that occur outside the neighbourhood.’ Using the example of educational dropout rates for youth in low-SES neighbourhoods, they reject the theory that the ‘effects’ of high spatial concentrations of low status individuals determines high incidence drop outs; rather, structural factors such as the ‘necessity of working to provide financial support to the wider household’ must be at the forefront of neighbourhood analyses (ibid.).

As much of the research which supports place-based policy models draw from traditional neighbourhood effects literature, the language of social exclusion/ inclusion and participation has been cast as mere rhetoric used to gloss over practices of capitalist business as usual (Scanlon, 2004). Advocating for the reclamation of the radical potential of the language of ‘community’ and ‘society’, of social justice and solidarity, Scanlon views place-based initiatives as panaceas for deeply rooted structural inequalities and injustice. It follows that place-based solutions can be seen to reduce socio-economic

\textsuperscript{6} A number of popular movements across the globe have been incorporated David Harvey’s conception of the “right to the city” -- including the US-based Right to the City Alliance.
problems in Toronto’s inner suburbs to a function of neighbourhood effects, rather systemic trends associated with housing and labour markets and racial discrimination. In Toronto, place-based policy language is silent on state rescaling and the financial impacts of processes of devolution and amalgamation, over-policing in inner suburban communities, and cuts to spending on housing and welfare programs.

1.6 Rescaled urban social policy, governance and targeted interventions

In the context of rescaling and globalization, research on public policy and governance requires analysis in “what the state is actually doing – why, where and with what political, social and economic implications” (Peck, 2003: 222). An examination of neoliberal public policy requires analysis on how neoliberal expansion and statecraft actually works (Peck, 2003; 2004). This requires mapping policy developments, and focusing on intersections between processes of global and local policy spheres.

Processes of globalization are coupled with the dismantling and devolution of the welfare state, as the local state become more concerned with promoting growth and competitiveness, other policy areas become subordinate to economic priorities. As Mayer (2006: 297) has argued, this phenomenon is more pronounced in ‘global cities’; where urban politics becomes subordinate to the functions of the city as a financial command centre. As such, social policy and community development become imbedded with policies to promote international economic competition between cities. The erosion of the welfare state only accentuates new forms of marginality associated with the shift to the post-fordist global economy (ibid: 298). Others warn that social policy has shifted from its welfare orientation to more punitive measure of social control with the introduction of workfare and the expansion of penalization (Eick, 2011). With devolution and decentralization, the local state shifts from a state-centric form of government to governance, as the local state becomes dependent on partnerships and networks with non-state actors, including private and voluntary sectors. Correspondingly, the role of the local state shifts from a redistributive or managerial local arm of the welfare state, and instead takes on the role of moderator, managing intersecting areas of interest.
1.7 Comparing Canada and the UK

It is important to stress the many differences between Canadian and British systems of governance. Apart from obvious differences in size and wealth, which raise different logistical and implementation issues even when ideologies are shared, at least three significant differences can be highlighted: the historical purpose and contemporary ambition of neighbourhood ‘renewal’; political and institutional differences; as well as a significant divergence in the level of intergovernmental collaboration on place-based policy initiatives – in particular, the level of involvement that urban planning/city planning departments have in supporting place and area-based initiatives (i.e. in establishing the physical infrastructure needed to support processes of renewal).

First, the historical purpose and contemporary ambition of place-based policies differ in each country. At the root of the UK’s place-based approach is the concept of urban regeneration. The term ‘urban regeneration’ is employed here as a normative concept rooted in early 1990s British urban policy (Imrie et al., 2009). Put simply, urban regeneration is an integrated perspective on the problems and potentials of cities. Couch et al (2003: 2) describe it as being ‘concerned with the re-growth of economic activity where it has been lost; the restoration of social function where there has been dysfunction, or social inclusion where there has been exclusion.’ In the case of London, regeneration must be understood within broad, national state policy programmes and forms of welfare restructuring and state rescaling. Contrastingly, in the case of Toronto, the local state directs urban renewal activities.

Another difference is found in the significantly greater level of influence that London’s spatial policies carry; that is, the city’s urban policy initiatives bear great significance not just in Britain, but internationally as well. As one of the world’s great economic centres, London’s financial services and sectors, as well as other sectors such as architecture and the media, compete with a very small number of other first-string ‘global’ cities (such as New York and Tokyo). The growth of international financial and service flows has had
parallel effects on major cities oriented to the world market (Sassen, 2002). A kind of ‘transnational interdependence’ has emerged, whereby financial centers such as New York, Tokyo, and London become platforms for global operations. Comparatively, Toronto has transformed relatively quickly from a national urban centre to what most consider a second or third-tier global city (Young & Keil, 2014). Urban growth and development is essential in the city’s efforts to upgrade its locality in the international competition for investors. While London is a hub of international trade and finance, Toronto is generally associated with the commercial spaces of its downtown central businesses district and its inner city neighbourhoods.

Toronto and the UK are also difficult to compare vis-à-vis political and institutional differences, as the UK has a nationalized neighbourhoods strategy, which is clearly delineated through set departments. In Toronto, sectoral boundaries appear more porous than those in London, due to more inter-sectoral dependency amongst the three levels of bureaucracy in Canada, inter-sectoral working and greater movement of individuals between and within sectors during their careers (Larner & Laurie, 2010).

There is also a sizable funding difference. In 1998, Blair announced an £800 million New Deal for Communities which grew to £2 billion (or $3.4 billion CAN), the next year. Over a 10-year period, 39 of the United Kingdom's troubled neighbourhoods received approximately $85 million each (Toronto Star, Jan. 26, 2010). Toronto’s place-based efforts lack federal investment. While Britain's campaign has been driven by the richest level of government, Toronto's has been driven by the poorest (ibid). According to City of Toronto figures, under the municipally-led Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (2005), the city’s 13 Priority Neighbourhoods had received $87 million in total – from all levels of government, community agencies and private sector partners – as of 2009 (ibid). In 2014, the City’s follow-up strategy, Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (TSNS2020) is limited to $3 million in yearly capital funding grants for community and

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7 With the election of Stephen Harper’s federal Conservative government in 2004, the previous Liberal government’s commitments to urban housing and community development infrastructure under the New Deal for Cities (2004) were greatly reduced. Federal revenue transfers to municipalities were confined to the hard infrastructure aspects of urban development, and did not extend to social need.
cultural infrastructure (e.g., community hubs, cultural spots, community meeting spaces in libraries, sports pads, and youth recreation facilities) to 2017, totaling only $12 million spread across all 31 of the city’s newly-established ‘Neighbourhood Improvement areas’.

2 Systems of Inter-jurisdictional Policy Transfer

The travel of policy ideas across countries is a widely acknowledged phenomenon (Mukhtarov, 2012). Contemporary approaches to the study of policy modalities highlight concepts such as ‘policy transfer’, ‘discursive circulation’, ‘lesson drawing’, and ‘policy diffusion’ (ibid.). This section will describe place-based neighbourhood improvement policies within the their local, national, and transnational policy contexts.

2.1 Charting the Entrepreneurial State

To explore place-based entrepreneurialism, a ‘varied and amorphous’ political-economic phenomenon (Venugopal, 2015), in transnational terms is to attempt to dissect the complex intersections between processes of economic globalization and localized policy spheres. To approach such a task, one must begin with the question of how neoliberal expansion actually works. For example, Mitchell (2006: 166) examines processes of market-oriented policy expansion in Canada, focussing on the ways in which a relatively minor federal immigration programme of the 1980s operated recursively to ‘reinforce the ideology and material effects of a much broader social and political agenda of neoliberalism.’ She makes two claims: the first being that, neoliberalism as a global system is deeply bound to the socio-cultural norms of a given society. Her second claim is that, in order to understand how and why neoliberal rhetoric and policy are able to expand, it is necessary to examine hegemonic formation at the micro-scale. Drawing from Hall’s (1988: 47) work on Thatcher’s rise to power, local institutions are said to have ‘prepared the ground, and were the trenches and fortifications, from which the counteroffensive to the reigning consensus of the liberal welfare state was launched (ibid: 47).’ Following the transition to New Labour, local institutions became the delivery agents for Third Way policies emerging at the neighbourhood scale.
As outlined above, place-based policies in the UK are borne out of New Labour’s National Strategy of Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR), beginning in 2001 and continuing into 2010. Writing on the shift from Thatcherism to New Labour in the UK, Hall (2003: 20) categorizes the policy shift as one of the ‘softer, more muted and consensual transitions to neoliberalism;’ describing the local scale as the site where neoliberal impulses ‘coexist in a hybrid relationship with various forms of social democracy and residual welfare-statism.’ This stems from what Rhodes (1994:5) describes as the 'hollowing-out' of the state,’ a process that created the structural opportunities for policy transfer to occur. He lists four key interrelated trends that facilitate the reach of this process in the UK:

(1) privatization and limiting the scope and forms of public intervention;
(2) the loss of functions by central government departments to alternative service delivery systems;
(3) the loss of functions from the British government to EU institutions;
(4) the emergence of limits to the discretion of public servants through a public management that emphasizes managerial accountability and clearer political control created by a sharp distinction between politics and administration. (ibid.)

Global trends toward regionalization and devolution have increased the pervasiveness of self-organizing, interorganizational networks: creating new, cross-sectoral opportunities through which policy transfer may occur. In times of uncertainty, policy-makers operating within these networks will look to the ‘quick fix’ solution to public policy problems that policy transfer – or in this case, the mobilization of social policy ideas -- can provide (Peck, 2015).

Many scholars interested in the intersections of economy and society interpret the rapid growth of the philosophy and practices of neoliberalism over the past two decades as the starting point of their analyses (Mitchell, 2006:166). They link the worldwide growth of neoliberal and/ or urban entrepreneurial rhetoric, practices and policies to macro-shifts in the nature of capitalism, especially the global restructuring of production systems, de-territorialization of finance and general ‘flexibility’ of ‘new systems of accumulation’ (Larner, 2006; McCann & Ward, 2013; Mitchell, 2006; Peck, 2015). To echo Larner
(2006:164), the neoliberal project has been about more than merely ‘liberating’ market forces; it has also been concerned with the construction of new institutional forms and regulatory conventions designed to secure the extension, maintenance and reproduction of ‘market rule’. Both Larner (2006) and Mitchell (2006) observe this process as much being more complex than the notion of ‘deregulation’ implies, since it involves the multiscalar development of new forms of statecraft and governmental practice: ‘some concerned with extensions of the neoliberal market-building project itself (trade policy and financial regulation) and others concerned with managing the consequences and contradictions of marketization in areas like penal and social policy (Mitchell, 2006: 165).’ The task of mapping these complex shifts in institutional production and intrajurisdictional policy transfer involves the identification of institutional mechanisms and networks of knowledge sharing through which policy prototypes are circulated (Peck, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2015).

2.2 Articulating a Transnational Social Policy Agenda

Much of the policy transfer literature relating to Britain examines Workfare policies transposed from Clinton’s New Democrats to Blair’s New Labour government in the mid-to-late nineties (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2002; Bevir, 2003; Herd, 2004). These policies see a shift to social contracts with welfare to work programs. Elsewhere, the workfarist agenda, -- complete with a roll-out of its specific policies and programs - has been shown to diffuse at a rapid space (Herd, 2004). Policy development is becomes increasingly ‘relativized’ and ‘transnationalized’, along with the expert networks and practice communities that serve and sustain them (Peck & Theodore, 2010). Drawing from this more traditional policy transfer scholarship, ‘fast’ social policies become technocratically essentialized and codified in order to ‘travel,’ but they exist in a perpetual state of transformation whenever, and wherever, they ‘touch down’ and later ‘tread down’ (ibid). Social policies are packaged, and later ‘co-formed’ in cities across the globe.

Between 2013-2016, studies have emerged to challenge literature on the “fast transfer” of policy prescriptions. For instance, examining the ‘slow circulation’ of Bus Rapid Transit
(BRT) policies in South Africa, Wood (2015: 570) builds upon urban policy modalities literature (McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck, 2003; 2011; Theodore and Peck, 2012) that critique the rapid transfer of “pre-fabricated best-practice” policies – focusing her analysis, instead, on the “gradual, creeping” process of BRT policy circulation both to and across South Africa. Wood considers the way in which “[…] best practice flows through a more subtle and consistent method of persuasion (ibid).”

As stated above, this paper will adopt a methodological approach to policy transfer in line with McCann and Ward’s (2013) ‘policy assemblage, mobilities and mutations’ approach. The approach requires analysts to attend to broader contexts which influence the agency of various political actors. Section 3.3., below, presents examples of direct and indirect policies ‘in motion’ as they exist in their specific institutional contexts. This approach is associated with more traditional transfer scholarship (Peck, 2001; Peck & Tickell 2002; 2003) that has, as Jamie Peck (2015: 165) describes in later work, understood neoliberalization as a ‘processual abstraction, not as an empirical template […] anchored at the urban scale [while] significantly exceed[ing] this scale.’ In Section 4, however, the IPA method will be used to expand this empirical framework, accounting for contextual and territorial specificities (with distinct social, political and material realities) that influence how, why and for whom place-based policy is enacted (ibid). This task is much more complicated; it involves an examination of the agency of local policy actors’ adaptation, dissemination, and actualization of place-based policies. This brings about the local problem of policy ‘fit.’ Since key concepts have been defined in international epistemic communities, the difficulty is not in defining concepts, which are used by intellectually close individuals, but in their different national implementation.

2.3 Evidence of Direct and Indirect Forms of Policy Transfer: The London-Toronto Example

This paper takes the position that local, place-based policies are in fact global - both because they attempt to localize globalizing issues, and because they are transnational
policies disseminating ‘in motion.’ In making this claim, a policy transfer/ policy learning linkage between the UK and Toronto must be established. In doing this, however, it is first necessary to acknowledge the prevalence of policy transfer literature within public policy, critical geography and political science scholarship (Benson & Jordan, 2011). Although definitions and methodologies vary, policy transfer is generally understood as “a process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system” is used in the development of similar features in another (Dolowitz, 2000: 3, as quoted in Benson & Jordon, 2011: 366).

Policy transfer, as a concept, has become increasingly common currency in the public policy literature (Wood, 2015). In theory, policy transfer – or lesson drawing -- can range from the simple copying of a particular programme to more abstract inspiration as either programmatic practice, or a policy idea in one area that stimulates change in an entirely different one. However, in practice it becomes difficult to identify a complete and exact exchange between the UK and Canada because of the differences identified in Section 2.7. Instead, there are degrees of transfer across a range of levels ranging from abstract rhetoric and ideology to the concrete details of implementation (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Peck and Theodore, 2001; Theodore and Peck, 2011).

To show how policy lessons transfer, Rose (1993: 30) has established a typology of lesson-drawing processes, namely: copying; adaptation; hybridization; synthesis; and, inspiration. For Rose, copying merely involves “enacting more or less intact a program already in effect in another jurisdiction (ibid).” In adaptation, adjustments need to be made to the policy or programme to overcome contextual differences. Elements of programmes from two different places can also be combined to produce a hybrid approach. Synthesis, in contrast, involves drawing lessons on elements of different programmes and combining them to produce a new programme. Finally, lesson drawing can provide inspiration for programmes in one context by providing ideas for solving particular problems in alternative contexts (Benson, 2010: 7). To use Peter Hall's (1993: 4) terminology, the outputs from processes of policy transfer can include: first order change in the precise settings of the policy instruments used to attain policy goals.
(marginal adjustments to the status quo); second order change to the policy instruments themselves such as the development of new institutions and delivery systems; and third order change to the actual goals that guide policy in a particular field (negative ideology, ideas, attitudes and concepts).

The flow of ideas and practices is incredibly difficult to chart given the myriad of informal routes through which policy knowledge is diffused. Nevertheless, an examination of the connections which facilitate transfer between countries emphasises the politicised nature of the process (Herd, 2004). Peck and Theodore (2001) describe policy transfer as it takes place on at least three different levels of interaction: the level of the welfare regime (representing the legacy of historical, political and economic settlements); the level of contemporary political ambition (reflecting current relations between capital and labour and what is perceived to be achievable); and the level of institutions and programmes (signifying the concrete manifestations of historical and contemporary negotiations). Developing this framework shows that, rather than being based on non-ideological ‘best-practice’, transfer results from direct and indirect politically strategic choices at these different levels of interaction (ibid.).

As it follows, the examples below provide an empirical basis to support the claim that neighbourhood policies have been transferred in various ways across states (moving from the UK to Canada). These examples represent both direct and indirect levels of interaction.

First, as part of what can be viewed as a direct policy transfer, Canada has adopted Third Way policy frames and methodologies by seeking the help of key bureaucratic advisers from the UK. In 2004, Members of the UK-based think tank, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF), attended the 2004 Provincial-Territorial Charette on Municipal Performance and its Measurement and assumed an advisory role. In the Report on Proceedings of the proceedings, members of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) stated that IPAC was working with members of the JRF to produce a ‘municipal performance measurement strategy’ based on UK methodology (IPAC, 2004).
At the time, the members of IPAC included the Senior Policy Analyst at the Social Policy Division of Finance Canada, as well as the Director of Strategic & Corporate Policy at the City of Toronto [a key division responsible for developing and enacting Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS) (2005) and 13 Priority Neighbourhoods (2005) policies].

Following the Charette, the Ontario Municipal CAO’s Benchmarking Initiative (OMBI) was established. The OMBI was a collaboration between 15 Ontario municipalities aiming to collect and compare local performance statistics in order to measure and evaluate municipal policies. Following the Charette, the City of Toronto enacted service review and performance measures in 23 service areas. These performance measures directly informed the selection of Toronto’s 13 Priority Neighbourhoods.

The second, indirect linkage involves the first iteration of the Neighbourhood Well-being Index (NWI) (2010) tool at the City of Toronto. The NWI is a community asset mapping tool designed to grow and support the SNS. As principal developer, Harvey Low, acknowledged in a City Council meeting (held on May 17, 2010 at Toronto City Hall), one of the software programs used in its development was Instant.Atlas\(^8\), a UK-based mapping tool used to create community performance indicators. The NWI is similar in functionality to a number of indices developed under the UK-based Neighbourhood Statistic Model (NSM). The NSM was part of a nationally coordinated plan to both facilitate and measure community engagement and the performance of local authorities. Among the resulting indices and measurement tools were the Index of Multiple Deprivation for London, and the Index of Relative Disadvantage for London. These tools operate through a supply/demand model. Supply-side service level information (including children’s services, senior services, youth services, immigrant settlement services, housing, employment, unemployment services and unemployment counseling, schools, etc.) is matched up to the demand side (i.e. ‘priority populations’). Indicators document

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\(^8\) The NWI differs from UK-based indices, in that community organizations can use the data to choose their own priorities.
and demonstrate need and risk. ‘Problem’, ‘priority’, ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘at risk’ areas are enclosed in particular communities and within particular geographic boundaries that are removed from areas accepted as ‘good neighbourhoods’.

The final example of an indirect policy transfer is found in the OECD’s 2005 Territorial Review of Toronto. Many policy transfer scholars have pointed to the increasing prevalence of multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the OECD to target practitioner expertise amongst ‘middle managers’ in government, seeking to consolidate new orthodoxies (like place-based policy) (Larner, 2006). The report recommended that the city adopt of a place-based strategy in order to foster ‘creativity’ at the local scale (OECD, 2005). These recommendations led city bureaucrats to secure a partnership between the City of Toronto and the City of London (UK). Actors from collaborating divisions produced ‘Imagine a Toronto: Strategies for a Creative City’ (2005). The project’s leadership team was comprised of representatives from provincial and municipal levels of government (including the Special Advisor to the Premier on the Future of the GTA and Creative Cities, members of the provincial Ministry of Innovation and the Ministry of Culture, and a number of City of Toronto staff from various departments), as well as the non-profit and private sector. The report stressed that, ‘as a creative city, Toronto must seize the present opportunity to deliver social and economic benefits and assume its place among the world’s truly great cities (Creative Cities Toronto, 2005).’

**Summary**

The examples above fit with Larner and Laurie’s (2010) description of the ways in which practical programming knowledges and street-level expertise have assumed greater significance in policymaking processes, extending across transnational domains. First, multilateral agencies like the World Bank and OECD are paying increased attention to practitioner expertise, seeking to consolidate new orthodoxies, in part, by enabling new forms of networking among ‘middle managers’ (ibid.). The 2004 Charette on Municipal Performance and its Measurement, as well as the OECD’s Territorial Review of Toronto,
both involve collaboration and networking amongst mid-level bureaucrats across governmental, not-for-profit, and private sectors. Moreover, new arenas for policy exchange, such as international conferences, place a premium on the circulation of legitimated forms of practice-knowledge. The ideological emphasis on ‘what works,’ which has been a feature both of Third Way discourse and post-financial crisis pragmatism (ibid), can be seen as a way in which practical experience is symbolically privileged over more theoretical knowledge. A deepening reliance on technocratic forms of policy development and delivery is a widely observed feature of late-neoliberalism (Cowen & Parlette, 2011).

The language and discourse of place-based policy can be categorized as a vocabulary (‘participation’, ‘joined-up governance’, ‘economic well-being’, ‘exclusion’ and so forth) which is endowed with the performative power to bring into being the very realities it claims to describe. As it follows, the relationship between discourses and other elements of social practices is dialectical – discourse internalizes and is internalized such that economic and social processes are ‘knowledge driven’ (and therefore ‘discourse driven’) (Fairclough, 2003). Before shifting to an examination of the discursive circulation of policy frames, it is first necessary to provide an overview of the political roots of place and area-based policy discourse as it arose in the UK.

### 3 Understanding Policy Networks through Interpretive Discourse Analysis

Policy is made and reproduced through language (Foucault, 1991). Language is also a crucial exclusionary mechanism in democracy. For instance, as Laclau (2005) has argued, authority can be viewed as conditional insomuch as it is contained within the way that power is communicated. Wilson (2011: 120) observes that the political targeting of disadvantaged neighbourhoods may serve both to construct and to reinforce negative discourses that contribute to and perpetuate stigma; problematizing the behaviours of
residents and producing new ideas around civic responsibility within the bounds of the
neighbourhood. In order to provide resistance to the negative framing of individuals and
their communities, policy actors must become aware of the communicative processes that
occur within and around their work.

Given the disparate networks of actors involved in neighbourhood governance, the task at
hand is to identify key policy frames, or narratives. In order to do this, it becomes
necessary to study interpersonal communication through narrative analysis – ‘mapping
the architecture of communication (Yanow, 2002).’ Simplified, narrative analysis helps
us to access a variety of communications and analyze the communicational patterns that
are reconstructed through narratives. Following Geertz (1973), the aim of a semiotic
(meaning-focused) approach is to gain access to the conceptual world in which our
subjects live. An interpretive policy analyst does not set out to determine concepts a
priori – it is what happens in the field that matters (Yanow, 2005). For instance, a
governmental body may set a clear mandate. In linking this mandate to action, one must
consider the communication of meaning. What do policy concepts mean to the people
who are enacting them?

In order to gather this data, the analysis must rely on contextual meaning and sense-
making interpretation. Heidegger’s (1971) use of the hermeneutic circle is useful here, as
it describes the process of understanding a text hermeneutically. It refers to the idea that
‘neither the whole text nor any individual part can be understood without reference to one
another, and hence, it is a circle’ (Heidegger, 1971). The meaning of a text is located
within its historical, cultural, and literary context. There are multiple social realities and,
in turn, multiple interpretations of them (Heidegger, 1971; Fischer, 2004).

The meaning of a text can be found in the author’s intent, in the text itself, and in the
reading of the text (Yanow, 2000). At the macro (state) level, this same framework can be
applied to the state, which is comprised of contingent actions of specific individuals; of
diverse beliefs about the public sphere, about authority and power, which are constructed
differently in contending traditions (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010). Applying Foucault’s
discursive model to the construction of place-based policies, or targeted neighbourhood service delivery schemes, it is possible to uncover powerful definitions of truth about best cities and best practices that have come to shape these policies.

Discourses can be composed of a combination of other discourses articulated together in particular ways. So, for instance, an analysis of the political discourse of the Third Way (and by extension, the discourse of place-based policy models) can be viewed as a specific articulation of other discourses, including social democratic and ‘New Right’ (Thatcherite) political discourses. “The new is made out of a novel articulation of the old” (Fairclough, 2003: 127). And so, the migration of language and discourse is possible insomuch as discourses can be seen not just as a means of the world, but also as constituting nodal points in the dialectical relationship between language and other elements of the ‘social’ (ibid: 3).

3.1 Evidence of a Discursive Transfer

In contrast to Canada’s three-tiered governmental system, the UK’s political system remains both highly centralised and nationally uniform. This centralisation means that the governing party can often pass legislation regardless of substantial opposition. Furthermore, there is usually a national focus to problems, with local offices of national organisations delivering policies created by the centre (e.g. London’s LAAs). In contrast, the smaller, more informal, and more porous qualities of various divisions operating across the City of Toronto can create barriers to a strategy that requires cooperation amongst municipal departments.

The promulgation of place-based discourse and rhetoric is essential to the dissemination of targeted neighbourhood regeneration strategies. Just as Larner et al (2006) observe in their comparison of place-based policies in Auckland (NZ) and Manchester (UK), the smaller population of a city like Toronto may have important impacts for policy circulation in that sectoral boundaries are more permeable than those in London, due to
more inter-sectoral dependency (such as funding dependency). City of Toronto staff tend to experience greater movement between and within sectors during their careers. This could potentially promote knowledge transfer across municipal divisions (ibid); however, vast differences in size, funding, and levels of coordination between governing bodies in the UK and Canada play out in a multiplicity of ways when it comes to the design and enactment of social policy in each city.

3.2 Interpreting Third Way Policy Frame

An interpretive approach indicates how New Labour uses institutionalism and network theory to create an alternative to both Old Labour and the New Right. Following Bevir (2012), because the New Right failed to recognize that firms are social organizations, its policies encouraged an excessive individualism that privileged short-term concerns, created unnecessary economic volatility, and increased divisions within society. The Third Way begins with the core concept of British society’s ‘social nature’ and the importance of a community composed of mutual rights and obligations, and then suggests these considerations show social cohesion to be integral to economic prosperity (ibid: 68). The welfare state becomes the ‘social investment state’, which envisages a world of citizens linked together by a new social contract that brings reciprocal duties and responsibilities. Citizens ‘join the state in a cooperative enterprise aimed at producing an economically and socially vibrant nation (ibid).’ The state acts not as a safety-net but as an enabler.

As it follows, New Labour seeks to promote individual responsibility through cooperation. While developing the NSNR, it has trumpeted several big ideas framed through political rhetoric – ‘stakeholder society’, ‘social capital’, ‘social exclusion’, ‘social inclusion’, the ‘third sector’, and the ‘third way’ – to convey its distinctive response to the crisis of the state (ibid). Blair has said, “the modern welfare state is not founded on a paternalistic government giving out more benefits but on an enabling government that through work and education helps people to help themselves’ (Blair, New Britain, 1999: 302). The problem with this strategy, however, lies in New Labour’s
top-down approach to solving localized problems through the use of technocratically-defined notions of poverty, inclusion/exclusion, and deprivation that don’t accurately reflect the needs or experiences of its populace.

3.3 Place-Based Discourse ‘in motion’

The case study presented here will serve to address the central question of how place-based policy models are framed by various interest groups. The analysis will, in its limited scope, examine linkages between place-based policy documents in the UK and Canada (beginning with a discussion of policy frames enacted by New Labour in the 1990s). Next, the contribution of members of the UK-based think tank, The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF), to the formulation and establishment of policy (i.e. municipal benchmarks and indicators for social service measurement) in Canada, and Toronto specifically, will be looked at. UK-based documents include New Labour’s National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, Local Area Agreements (LAAs) for London (Government Office for London 2007), Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) for London, London's Poverty Profile (JRF, 2009) and targeted municipal strategies developed for various neighbourhoods. The language, themes and policy goals set out in these documents will be correlated with and compared to Canadian documents, including Toronto's 13 Priority Neighbourhoods Strategy (2005), and Toronto’s Community Partnerships Strategy (CPS) (2009).

3.4 Regulating ‘Place’

New Labour’s focus on neighbourhood renewal and regeneration has been heavily influenced by private think tanks – namely the JRF and the New Policy Institute. The JRF is a private policy think-tank and an endowed charity with the mandate to “understand the roots causes of social problems, to identify ways of overcoming them, and to show how
social needs can be met in practice” (Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the New Policy Institute, 2009). The JRF’s signature project is to monitor and map housing and neighbourhood conditions based on a range of quantifiable indicators. It has worked with the New Policy Institute, an independent policy think-tank, and the City Parochial Foundation, a London based poverty policy organization to develop “London’s Poverty Profile” (JRF and the New Policy Institute, 2009). The Profile uses a set of measureable indicators to test how London is both tackling poverty and inequality.

Central to the JRF’s 2009 report, ‘London’s Poverty Profile’, as well as London’s own LAA (City of London, 2009), are frames of social exclusion and participation. These documents target neighbourhoods for renewal via municipal performance measurement strategies and neighbourhood indicators. In accordance with the JRF (2009), neighbourhood indicators identify and target need, and provide practical insights into how local authorities can narrow the gap between more and less deprived areas. Progress is measured in areas of income, poverty, inequality, ethnicity, work and worklessness. Meanwhile, LAAs provide an independent assessment of the effectiveness of local public services including councils, health bodies, and police forces working in partnership to tackle social exclusion (Government Office for London, 2007).

The language presented in the UK policy documents outlined above is echoed in the City of Toronto’s place-based approach: targeting the ‘neighbourhood effects’ of poverty through the establishment of the 13 Priority Neighbourhoods (City of Toronto, 2005). Canadian literature touting the merits of place-based policy repeatedly cites the UK’s NSNR as an example of a successful model (Freiler, 2005; Bradford, 2004; 2005). The City of Toronto has largely emulated the approach of the UK through its establishment of the thirteen neighbourhoods. These areas have been targeted based on their performance rankings in the areas of education and social services, housing, planning, refuse collection, environmental health, and parks and open spaces (City of Toronto, 2005). The City’s commitment to neighbourhoods and to ‘strengthening communities’ aligns with the policy priority to reduce social exclusion. The scale of social exclusion is defined through an analysis of proximity of community infrastructure to socioeconomic need at
the neighbourhood level (conducted by City staff and the Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force). These policy documents employ very similar rhetoric to that of the UK’s NSNR, promoting the notion that a reduction of social exclusion will occur through multisectoral ‘partnership’, ‘participation’, and ‘cooperation’, and that this will reduce ‘social exclusion’, leading to the kinds of ‘service improvements’ and ‘municipal performance enhancements’ essential to the health of both citizens and the economy.

Through policy interventions such as the Community Partnerships Investment Program (CPIP) and the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS), the City has worked with the United Way of Greater Toronto to identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods, and target investments in these areas. As in the UK, these place-based policy interventions emphasize the importance of local conditions, and use the concepts of ‘social exclusion’ ‘participation’, and ‘economic revitalization’ widely. In the case of Toronto’s SNS, urban revitalization discursively involves three overlapping components: neighbourhood-based civic participation to foster social inclusion; a new kind of governance based on partnerships; and the targeting of funding and investments in community and social services and facilities. By way of these three components, neighbourhood revitalization is situated within a communitarian and inclusive discourse. This discourse emerges out of New Labour communitarian frames, whereby the need to renew community to counter the growing fragmentation of life at local, national and even global levels is emphasized (JRF, 2009).

3.5 Tackling the Neighbourhood Problem of Social Exclusion

In the 1990s, Britain’s neighbourhood renewal policies began to focus on new and emerging approaches to social policy, and in particular, concepts of the underclass, social capital and social exclusion. ‘Social exclusion’ as a political framework hit full stride under Tony Blair in the mid-1990s, when New Labour’s National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) set out to approach ‘complex neighbourhood problems’ such as ‘rising poverty, unemployment, educational failure and crime’ (NSNR,
In tackling these problems, national departments such as the Social Exclusion Unit and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit were established.

Toronto’s place-based policy initiatives parallel New Labour’s urban programs. Through policy interventions such as the Community Partnerships Investment Program (CPIP) (2004) and the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS) (2005), the City has worked with the United Way of Greater Toronto to identify priority neighbourhoods, and target investments in these areas (City of Toronto, 2005). As in the UK, these interventions emphasize the importance of local conditions, and employ the discourse of social exclusion widely.

Politically, social exclusion is associated with the ‘third way’ between neoliberalism and the post-war welfare state (Perkins et al, 2004). As outlined above, Third Way social democratic exponent Tony Blair claimed that the concept, as part of his New Labour government’s ‘social investment state’, broke from traditional socialism. The third paradigm includes decentralization, local variation, volunteerism, and partnerships with the private sector (MacGregor, 1999; Peck and Theodore, 2001). In 1994, the Blair government released Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal – the report that is said to have first given impetus to the application of social inclusion/exclusion to political systems of governance in the UK. Lister (2003: 429) points out that, in the report, ‘the emphasis was on economic opportunity in the name of social justice as well as of economic prosperity and the achievement of security through investment in and the redistribution of opportunities rather than just income.’ Importantly, he connects the basic sentiments of the social investment paradigm to Jessop’s (1993) influential modeling of the post-Fordist ‘Schumpetarian workfare state’ in which ‘redistributive welfare rights take second place to a productivist reordering of social policy (Lister, 2003: 430).’

Social exclusion, as a policy construct, can produce a particular attitude toward poverty; emphasizing the structural processes that prevent people from participating in

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9 Jessop’s Schumpetarian workfare state involves a subordination of social to economic policy, an erosion of the social wage and a change in focus from full employment to ‘full employability’, a loss of primacy of the national scale and the emergence of localized ‘governance’ as key policy mechanism.
‘mainstream’ social life or that prevent access to employment, health and educational resources. Social policy focuses on promoting social inclusion – and combatting social exclusion -- rather than protecting rights and equality (Lister, 1998). The argument presented here echoes Levitas (1998: 7) who writes, ‘it is clear that the concept of ‘social exclusion’ imagines a boundary, and focuses attention on those outside it rather than on the features of society which systematically generate widespread poverty and disadvantage.’

In both London and Toronto, targeted neighbourhood strategies aim to combat social exclusion through the promotion of partnerships, ‘bringing the community in’ to decision-making processes, and encouraging public participation and emphasizing community-based ‘control’ and ‘empowerment’ in neighbourhood initiatives. The language of social exclusion in Britain is ‘about income but is also about prospects and networks and life-changes (Blair, 1998).’ Cast as potential obstacles to competitive success, New Labour’s neighbourhood agenda set out to approach ‘complex problems’. The SEU and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit identified deprived areas, and matched funding and services to social need.

Toronto’s place-based policy initiatives parallel New Labour’s urban programs. Speaking to the recent implementation of Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy in 2006, Deputy Manager Sue Corke underscored the relationship between economic competitiveness and social inclusion:

*In order to be competitive, a community must be able to take advantage of all of its diversity and social richness. In order for a society to be cohesive and inclusive, there must be economic opportunities for all which will be enabled the more competitive the economy is* (Sue Corke, speaking at the Ninth Annual ICE Network Meeting, Friday, May 26, 2006.)

Through policy interventions like the SNS (2005) and the CPS (2005), the City of Toronto has worked with the Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force and the United Way of Greater Toronto to identify ‘high risk’ neighbourhoods, and target investments in these areas. As in the UK, these place-based policy interventions emphasize the importance of
local conditions, and employ the concept of ‘social exclusion’ widely. In the years following amalgamation, a series of reports emphasized a problem emerging away from the city core - the problem of poverty and social exclusion in the inner suburbs. The City Summit Alliance – a private sector group of ‘civic leaders’, the TD Bank, the United Way, and the Toronto Community Foundation’s annual report, *Vital Signs*, all present a picture of a region divided by class and race. These reports identified worrying trends located in the inner suburbs – cycles of declining prosperity, population loss, rising crime, crumbling infrastructure, deteriorating public services, immigrant poverty, and youth ‘at risk’.

The U.K. approach is distinct from Canada in that it has adopted a multi-pronged strategy with major initiatives to tackle unemployment and poverty; promote equal opportunities for all; support communities, particularly in deprived areas; and reintegrate marginalized, people including the homeless, who have experienced ‘extreme forms of social exclusion’ (SNTF 2005). Gough et al (2006: 191) assert that ‘social exclusion’ replaces the term ‘underclass’ – which became a discursive barrier to reform. Unlike the term ‘underclass’, which asserted that poverty and deviation were features of an underperforming class in society, the term ‘social exclusion’ acknowledges exclusion is socially produced. Therefore it is possible to promote inclusion through appropriate social policies. These social policies emphasize equality of opportunity, and a set of measures targeted on poor subjects and poor areas.

As a political antidote to social exclusion, policy language in both countries emphasizes the importance of ‘community empowerment’ as part of a drive to develop a bottom-up localism or self-activation, where weak localities (and hard-to-employ individuals) are asked to develop capacity to become competitive – a daunting task seen possible only through civic involvement and cross-sectoral ‘participation’ (Mayer, 2006). In both cases, the third sector (comprised of not-for profits and voluntary organizations) is identified as vehicle of community empowerment. Political enthusiasm for the third sector is based on the assumption that third sector organizations will be prepared to compete for contracts to deliver public services for government (ibid).
In establishing “[a] vision of a city where no one is advantaged by where they live” the SNS borrows from UK policy frames of ‘deprivation’ and ‘relative disadvantage’. As in the UK, the emphasis is deprivation driven, based on attributes of places rather than patterns of interaction and economic opportunities. Moreover, as in the UK, the overarching policy goal of the SNS emphasizes geographic disadvantage as an issue of social exclusion:

- “No one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live (Social Exclusion Unit, UK Cabinet Office, 2001).”
- “No one should be disadvantaged by where they live (Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhood Strategy, 2005).”

Both policies prescribe inclusive partnerships in order combat social exclusion, “bringing the community in” to decision-making processes, and encouraging public participation in targeted neighbourhood initiatives.

### 3.5.1 A language of change, or business as usual?

‘Participation’ is a means to reduce exclusion, strengthen community voice, and empower local actors. Participation, as a policy concept, infers that a great many task forces and advisory groups have been set up with memberships that bring together the government, business, voluntary organizations and the corporate sector. Focus on ‘participation’ also emphasizes the promotion of ‘social capital’ in the poorest areas. Building social capital is considered both a means and an outcome of anti-poverty policies (Gough et al., 2006: 193). Meanwhile, emphasis on partnerships encourages the dispersion of policy-making, as many groups and people who have previously not been involved in government are included. However this does not mean that the center has given up control. From Fairclough’s (2000) view, it is dispersal, but not a fragmentation. In so far as ‘partnership’ becomes a reality rather than just rhetoric, it demands a new form of control that necessarily involves language – shaping the culture, discourse and
language of the government bureaucrats rather than directly controlling what they do (ibid).

In the early years into London’s regeneration strategy (under the NSNR), participation came to be major a focus after the Social Exclusion Unit criticized the flagships of place-based community regeneration, the Urban Development Corporations, of spending too much money on physical infrastructure and failing to respond to local community needs - construction and building activities dominated inner-city policy (Imrie et al, 2009). By 1997, New Labour’s urban policies were instituting a number of policy measures to secure ‘partnerships in regeneration’, including the New Deal for Communities (1998) and Local Strategic Partnerships. The language of these policies espoused a belief that social and economic inequality can only be solved by partnerships between government and civil society.

In Toronto, we see the language of these policy aims reflected in the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS) (2005) that the City has pursued. The SNS emphasizes a need for local partnerships across a range of sectors including businesses, community and social services, and government agencies. Partnerships are indicative of Third Way language, and imply that everyone must work together and the government is not the only actor responsible: ‘the only way that our strategy for Toronto neighbourhoods can work is through the concerted efforts of all orders of government. But government investment is only part of the equation (2005: 7).’ Partnerships involving public, private and voluntary sector actors are encouraged to invest in neighbourhoods in ‘decline’. The use of inclusive language discursively frames residents as active participants in the creation of ‘strong’ neighbourhoods. ‘We’/‘our’ supports the idea of partnerships in the context of an inclusive, healthy, and economically competitive city; evoking the idea that the city’s neighbourhoods belong to a collective public. This choice of pronouns is tied to relationships of power. As Fairclough (2000: 35) explains, part of what distinguishes one political discourse from another is how collective identities are constructed – what lines are drawn within the body politic who is included and who is excluded. ‘We’ and ‘our’
can refer to an inclusive public between both the reader and the writer, while the exclusive refers to the writer or speaker (ibid.: 106).

In the case of the Official Plan and the Strong Neighbourhood Strategy, ‘we’ and ‘our’ are frequently used in relation to ‘neighbourhoods’. In the document, the inclusive pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’ are used in two main ways: to refer exclusively to the Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force, and to refer inclusively to the city as a collective whole. This ambivalent language implies that a collective city shares the same opinions, values and concerns about the state of Toronto’s neighbourhoods.

4 The Performative Power of Speech: The Spread of New Labour Rhetoric Throughout Canada’s ‘Social Silicon Valley’

This paper has been concerned with just a small part of a much larger project – critical discourse analysis as a form of interpretive policy research. As Fairclough (2003) and Bevir (2003) have argued, much of this research is now focused upon ‘new capitalism’ – contemporary transformations of capitalism, globalization, neo-liberalism, and so forth – because a better understanding of these changes and their effects, and of possibilities to inflect them in particular directions, or resist them and develop alternatives, is widely seen as crucial to improving the human condition (Fairclough 2003). But why a focus on language and critical discourse? One argument might be that, since these changes are transforming many aspects of social life, then they are necessarily transforming language as one element of social life that is dialectically interconnected with others. Moreover, as Fairclough (ibid: 205) argues, “the language element has in certain key respects become more salient, more important than it used to be, and in fact a crucial aspect of the social transformations which are going on – one cannot make sense of them without thinking about language.”

Mayer (2010) points out that the neoliberal strategy of mobilizing city space as arena for growth and market regulation is now reflected in local economic development policies
and community-based programs to assuage what is no longer called ‘poverty’, but rather ‘social exclusion.’ The language and discourse of place-based policy is a ‘new planetary vulgate’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001), categorized as a vocabulary (‘social exclusion’, ‘participation’, ‘joined-up governance’, ‘economic well-being’, and so forth) which is endowed with the performative power to bring into being the very realities it claims to describe. In this way, the relationship between discourses and other elements of social practices is a dialectical relationship – discourse internalizes and is internalized such that economic and social processes are ‘knowledge driven’ (and therefore ‘discourse driven’) (Fairclough, 2005). In the following examples of political speech, we see the vocabulary of our two discursive frames (participation and social exclusion) echoed time and time again. It is important to remember that, contained within the language of each speaker is the power to both effect and enact social change (Fischer, 2004).

We begin with Margaret Thatcher’s 1986 interview for the Manchester Evening News:

*But you know as I do and I must stress this, there is a limit to the Government's ability to bring a new vigour into an area. There is no substitute for local pride, initiative and enthusiasm. In Manchester and elsewhere private enterprise, pride and finance are bringing new hopes and your Chamber of Commerce is helping to channel and organize local business initiative. And I am very pleased to see the amount you are doing. You represent a true partnership between the efforts of government and the enterprise of business. And that's why I come to tell you and point out the things that government has been doing. To point out the things which you are doing, because it is the partnership which will create the wealth and health of the future.*

To echo Mangen (2004: 35), it can be argued that the urban policy rhetoric embraced by the Thatcher government was “redolent of participation, promoting the ‘community’ and its values.” Yet Thatcher’s preference for centrally-led innovations, shaped by a top-down agenda and implemented by appointed bodies, diminished the scope for effective public participation (ibid.). Moreover, the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ was much more focused on linkages between government and the private sector. With the emergence of Blair, we see a shift in focus to the third sector and the powers of the third sector to join government in regenerating urban areas, fighting crime, and combating social exclusion. The following is an excerpt from Tony Blair’s keynote speech at the NCVO Annual Conference on August 15, 2005:
In the second half of the century we learnt that government cannot achieve its aims without the energy and commitment of others - voluntary organizations, business, and, crucially, the wider public. That is why the Third Sector is such an important part of the Third Way... None of this threatens our separate identities. Co-operation does not mean losing distinctiveness. What I seek is a new dimension to our relationships — a real partnership between governments and peoples, which will engage our societies at every level. We need to work much more closely to fight organized crime and drugs. We can do much more to enrich each other’s experience in areas like health care and welfare [...] Every year thousands of new charities and self-help groups are founded, and thousands of social entrepreneurs achieve extraordinary things in difficult circumstances. I believe that the modern role of government is not to supplant this activity, to dominate it, or for that matter to ignore it.

Commenting on the regeneration of London, Peter Hall (cited in Imrie et al, 2009: 28) points out that one characterization of the public participation ethos is that the way in which New Labour has set it up in London and elsewhere is through decentralized forms, all the way down to local strategic partnerships, “but, in actual fact, all it seems to be is just another form of top-down centralism, and regeneration essentially is still being driven by the old centralist agendas.” Using the example of London, flagship projects in London’s ‘deprived’ areas, such as Canary Wharf, King’s Cross, and Paddington Central are prioritized in order to meet the global city aspirations of policy-makers, or what Cochrane (2007) describes as a ‘growth first’ logic. This underlying agenda is emphasized in Conservative leader David Cameron’s embrace of third sector rhetoric – emerging as part of his Big Society Agenda (an agenda which he promptly dropped following widespread public criticism).

Below is a passage from Cameron’s Big Society speech on July 13, 2010:

We will be different. Not just because we’ve learned from Labour’s failure. But because of a different approach, our philosophy. Where Labour may talk about social innovation – they still instinctively trust the state [...] and that’s what I want to talk about today: the power of social innovation. The power of society – of communities, individuals, social enterprises and yes, businesses – to bring about the social change we need to deliver the good society we want. There is nothing more vital. Yes, we face huge economic challenges as a country, but I think everyone would accept that the social challenges – rising crime, family breakdown, falling social mobility – are even greater. We’re the opposite- we’re instinctively skeptical of the state - skeptical of bureaucratic systems to deliver progress – and instead trust society. That’s why we’ve always been the party of the free market – of individuals being able to make their own choices and shape their own futures. And now more than ever, history is on our side.
Distinguishing Cameron’s Conservative government from New Labour, we see the same rhetoric coming forward surrounding ‘social innovation’ and change – a reduced role for government, an emphasis on ‘wicked’ social problems, and a recognition of immense economic challenges that must be overcome. In his speech, Cameron emphasized the need to restore the balance among the civic sector (Big Society), the public sector (the Big State) and the private sector (Big Business). In principle, Cameron wants to “revitalize volunteerism, democratic participation, local networks, social cooperation and citizen involvement” (ibid.). Just as Blair’s policy rhetoric had emphasized, his policies reject top down, government-defined definitions of the ‘problem’ and aim to change the role of government so it ‘supports, not supplants, civil society.’ He talks about making the ‘so-called Third sector the First sector.’ The performative power of Cameron’s rhetoric can be likened to Thatcher’s agenda. When Thatcher talked of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’, she had two big ideas – privatization, and a dramatic decrease in public expenditures.

Shifting focus to the performative power of policies, themselves, what did Big Society mean for place-based policies and ABIs in the UK? Cameron listed ‘devolution’ as one of New Labour's few important achievements (ibid.). In ‘deprived’ communities across the UK, Cameron devolved financial responsibility and administrative control of garbage collection, library services, charity services, and social service provision to local neighbourhood councils and the voluntary sector. Program budgets for social services were slashed. As one charity leader commented, “within weeks of this government starting out it has destroyed its relationship with the voluntary sector through its dishonesty” (Guardian UK, July 24, 2010). Put into context, does this mean that, in the case of Toronto, a devolution of responsibility, coupled with small funding grants to local organizations and voluntary groups is simply a means of providing the bare-bones start-up capital so that these organizations may bear the brunt of responsibility for the provision of social services for our city’s poor? Given the history of transfer cuts to social policy in Canada, it is, in theory, a valid claim. However, given the dynamic and multi-tiered nature of the local scale, this analysis may be overly simplistic, and not
directly applicable to the specific conditions that led up to the development of place-based policy in Toronto.

While the City of Toronto’s adoption of UK place-based rhetoric and policy application cannot be tied to an overarching political strategy which aims to pass off, or devolve, responsibility for public services in priority neighbourhoods, it can’t be denied that the language of these policies mirror New Labour rhetoric. As this section has outlined, the discursive frames (‘social exclusion’, ‘participation’, and ‘economic growth’) employed are representative of very similar policy goals. Turning to the a speech given by MP John Godfrey on the ‘New Deal for Canada’s Cities’ (backed by then Mayor David Miller) we see the Third Way openly embraced as a policy direction:

*One thing that has struck me in my travels is the way public and private institutions are reconsidering their role as members of their communities. There is a recognition that we all have a responsibility to build the life of our cities. So, in light of the multi-faceted roles we play, the federal government has to examine its own contribution as a corporate citizen of your cities... and ask ourselves how we can best contribute to the quality of life in your community, which is directly linked to the ‘third way’ element of the New Deal.*

As it follows, in a speech championing Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy, Deputy City Manager Sue Corke explains why the emerging policy paradigm is working to break down administrative silos and promote ‘joined up’ governance:

*Lots of us experience frustration with what we have come to call siloed government. This is government which is organization-centric – in which programs and policies are invented without due regard for their impacts on the ground, the need for nimbleness and agility when life does not imitate art, and results in disempowered civil servants whose hands are tied.*

*The emerging paradigm which has the potential to enable connectedness of thinking, planning and delivering between and among programs and policies follows a place-based framework. There is a relationship between economic competitiveness and social cohesion. In order to be competitive, a community must be able to take advantage of all of its diversity and social richness. In order for a society to be cohesive and inclusive, there must be economic opportunities for all which will be enabled the more competitive the economy is*  (Corke, S. speaking at the Ninth Annual ICE Network Meeting, Friday, May 26, 2006.)
Here, we see a repetition of the New Right/ New Labour emphasis on the relationship between economic competitiveness and social cohesion. The final Canadian example comes from Neil Bradford, one of Canada’s leading experts on place-based policy. Attributing the spread of these policies to a kind of ‘social Silicon Valley’, Bradford advocates the need for an increase in joined-up governance focused on community initiatives, or a ‘solidarity network’ that “reduces dependency on the state”:

There is a growing concern about the capacity of the third sector to sustain a meaningful role in place-based policy and community development. While the sector is universally recognized as a critical partner in these processes, this attention is not matched by investments in the sector’s capacity for researching, networking, representation, and advocacy. This situation is not viable, and could threaten the whole agenda. We need ways of tracking innovations to meet social needs across a host of priorities, such as poverty, the environment, child development, budgeting, and so on. In a sprawling, decentralized federation like Canada, we need to think this issue through, and develop an institutional focus for such shared learning. [We] must find a place where the three levels of government and civil society actors and business community groups join together in a networked arrangement. We are at a moment now where there is a premium on new understanding and learning processes.

We have to get systematic about this. [We] Need to develop our social enterprises as they offer more self-sufficiency, a safety net and a solidarity network that reduces dependency on the state.

Bradford refers to ‘our’ social enterprises, evoking the idea that the city’s community-based infrastructures belong to a collective public. This choice of pronouns is tied to relationships of power. As Fairclough (2000: 35) explains, “part of what distinguishes one political discourse from another is how collective identities are constructed – what lines are drawn within the body politic who is included and who is excluded”. ‘We’ and ‘our’ can refer to an inclusive public between both the reader and the writer, while the exclusive refers to the writer or speaker.

In the case of Toronto’s SNS, ‘we’ and ‘our’ are frequently used to refer exclusively to the Task Force, and to refer inclusively to the city as a collective whole. This ambivalent language implies that a collective city shares the same opinions, values and concerns about the state of Toronto’s neighbourhoods. This language appears as inclusive and consensual and evokes a united vision.
Summary

Neighbourhoods discursively serve to soften the political language of the competitive and entrepreneurial city. Neighbourhoods are associated with ideals of inclusion and participation. In the speeches presented above, we see a contradictory rhetoric that champions, on the one hand, state-led enabling for neighbourhood-level processes in order to alleviate poverty and strengthen public services and social infrastructure; while at the same time advocating for a reduced ‘top-down’ presence in order that communities may ‘innovate’ and/or ‘help themselves’. As is apparent with the discourses and practices of new localism and place-based policy, there is a tendency to conflate localization with democracy and social inclusion. Place-based policy documents emphasize the importance of neighbourhoods and continue to uphold the myth of the “city of neighbourhoods,” yet in practice there is little space for local neighbourhood-based planning and policy. To date, there remains a lack of evidence that demonstrates that localization and decentralization will amount to more just or equitable outcomes for residents of Toronto’s low-income neighbourhoods.

5 Conclusion

As this paper has outlined, the neoliberal strategy of mobilizing city space as an arena for growth and market regulation is now reflected in local economic development policies and community-based programs to moderate what is no longer called ‘poverty’, but rather ‘social exclusion’ (Mayer, 2010). The language and discourse of place-based policy is a ‘new planetary vulgate’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001), categorized as a vocabulary (i.e. ‘social exclusion’, ‘participation’, ‘joined-up governance’, ‘economic well-being’, and so forth) which is endowed with the performative power to bring into being the very realities it claims to describe (Fairclough, 2005: 3). In this way, the relationship between discourses and other elements of social practices is a dialectical relationship – discourse internalizes and is internalized such that economic and social
processes are ‘knowledge driven’ (and therefore discourse driven) (Fairclough 2003).

The interpretive approach to political analysis adopted here emphasizes the constitutive role of beliefs and the role of contingency and agency in shaping political action. In the case of Toronto’s adoption of place-based policy in the New Labour tradition, it is hoped that this interpretivism could help bolster rival strands of social democracy that advocate a bottom–up approach to governance, stressing the importance of dialogue and participation, as opposed to expertise and prescription. The brand of place-based policy that is developed and enacted by Toronto’s municipal government seems to accept New Labour’s contention that particular network structures (e.g. principles of participation and partnership) possess inherent qualities (e.g. flexibility) that produce better outcomes (e.g. more customer-focused services). But was it the right fit for Toronto? Bearing in mind the great disparities in governance structures and funding mechanisms between London and Toronto, is a place-based approach the best policy mechanism through which to address a lack of services and infrastructure in our local communities?

A critical question is whether these local initiatives can adequately address the wider structural forces that lie behind the production and perpetuation of spatially concentrated poverty. In their review of various place-based policies adopted across Toronto between the period of 2005-2010, the Gardner et al. (2012) concluded that ‘comprehensive community initiatives can take years to have effect, that building solid and sustainable collaborations takes time and effort, and that addressing the foundations and complexities of poverty is a long-term challenge (Gardner et al, 2012).’ The authors worried that place-based policies ‘focus too narrowly on delivering programs to disadvantaged neighbourhoods without addressing the roots of social problems;’ for instance, enhancing access to health services for under-served populations is crucial, but will have limited overall impact without addressing the underlying socio-structural determinants associated with poverty and economic inequality (ibid).

Looking ahead, how might Toronto’s place-based policies be improved in order to ensure that the needs of ‘priority’ populations are met? Do neighbourhoods represent the
appropriate level for the organization of democratic participation? In many cases the causes of policy problems such as poverty, unemployment, crime and prostitution – even if these are felt at the level of neighbourhoods – are outside, sometimes far outside the neighbourhood (Wagenaar, 2010). Addressing them at the neighbourhood level might even obscure the wider causes of these problems and hinder efforts to solve them at the appropriate level (ibid). This devolution can be viewed as a tactical ploy by the state to simply transfer responsibilities for hard-to-solve social issues away from government and onto communities. This point again draws on the one of the fundamental concerns of the City of Toronto’s priority neighbourhood approach: community groups and organizations are redrawn as ‘partners’ to the local state, yet have limited flexibility and ability to challenge the practices of the state.

Place-based policies reveal, and rub up against, a major contradiction. The reason placed-based policies have sprung up is because of the failure of governments to take responsibility for social policy and for problems such as poverty and inequality (Gardener, 2010). These policies have moved to fill this gap, but without significant state investment and multi-level coordination, these targeted (and limited) interventions are not enough. An appropriate strategy to bridge this contradiction includes: proactively addressing gaps in social policy and provision, and thus helping to meet the needs of the most vulnerable and excluded; which highlights the needs to be met, and at the same time, demonstrates the value of comprehensive community-based initiatives as a means to address complex social problems such as poverty; which both highlights to governments what they should be doing and supporting, while also helping to mobilize community and popular pressure on governments to do just that (ibid.). These complex initiatives and the problems they are trying to solve are long-term projects. Government policy and funding must also take this longer view. Different state policies, strategies and directions need to be effectively aligned and coordinated, and strategies for the ‘third sector’ must prioritize collaborative and community-driven initiatives; allowing community groups and social organizations to actively participate in -- and oppose – the policy-making process.
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CHAPTER THREE

Policing Neighbourhoods ‘At-Risk’:
ABSTRACT

This paper constitutes an institutional analysis of Toronto’s community-based policing policies (1996 – present), supported by primary and secondary research, interpretive policy analysis/ critical discourse analysis, and interview data collected from 21 expert interviews with high-ranking police officials, policy and decision-makers. Drawing from contemporary critical urban theory and urban social movement scholarship (Eick, 2003; 2006; Mayer, 2009; McLennan et al, 2014), as well as emerging literature on constructivist (or discursive) institutionalism (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006; Schmidt, 2008), this critical policy analysis seeks to depict, through a top-down analytical framework, the various influences, interests, incentives, and constraints that guide deliberations, statements, policies and decisions about community policing in Toronto.

The approach belongs broadly within the tradition of critical social science – social science which is motivated by the aim of providing a scientific basis for a critical questioning of social life in moral and political terms (i.e., in terms of social justice and power) (Fairclough, 2000). Within a limited scope, I will attempt to link the micro analysis of policy texts to the macro analysis of how power relations work both within and across networks of practice.

The Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA) method will be used to illuminate the ways in which community policing policies have the potential to construct social subjects, generate meaning and knowledge, frame issues in relation to the problem of unsafe neighbourhoods deemed to be ‘at-risk’, pose solutions which aim to ‘empower’ residents of these neighbourhoods, and impact peoples’ lives (for better or worse). Rooted in the deliberative democratic tradition, the IPA method begins with the insight that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved (Rhodes, 2007).
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Introduction

A spate of killings of teenagers and children in Toronto in the last few years has sparked significant public anxiety and media attention. Such highly publicized and unfortunate events have also elicited increased government concern and policy measures focused on violent crime among young people ‘at-risk.’ Gun crimes are not a uniform problem around the city – they tend to be concentrated in Priority Neighbourhoods, now referred to as Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (NIAs). These crimes may not be isolated local events, but rather signs of wider socio-political failures that coalesce in racialized and low-income local neighbourhoods (van Ham & Manley, 2010).

In August of 2012, the Province of Ontario made a new funding commitment of $20 million as part of the Youth Action Plan (YAP). The YAP was aimed at the reduction of youth violence across Ontario, building on the research and recommendations put forward by McMurty and Curling’s (2008) Review of the Roots of Youth Violence report. The report found that the “roots” of youth violence are often found in poor, socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods and are influenced by risk factors such as social exclusion, low self-esteem, poverty, community design, barriers to education and lack of economic opportunity. More than 60 percent of the YAP’s $20 million per year in annual funding went to Toronto and the Toronto Police Services (TPS); with funding concentrated in the city’s priority neighbourhoods (or NIAs). A significant portion of this funding was directed to TPS Community Mobilization Support initiatives11 – including the controversial Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) – a police program which targets gang activity, drugs and weapons in select neighbourhoods. Developed and implemented in early 2006, TAVIS police practices align with a

10 Toronto’s 13 Priority Neighbourhoods were established in 2005 as part of the city’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS) on the basis of a neighbourhood deprivation index created by the Social Development, Finance and Administration Department (SDFA) division at the City of Toronto. In 2014, the strategy was updated – now referred to as the Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods 2020 Strategy (TSNS2020), and 31 Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (NIAs) were created using a new Neighbourhood Equity Index (NEI) tool. The NEI is strongly correlated to indicators measuring the suitability and affordability of housing, median property value, a count of homicides by neighbourhood since 2009, and the major crime rate (SDFA 2014).

11 On September 01, 2011, Chief Bill Blair amalgamated the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) and the Community Mobilization Unit. The newly formed unit became known as the Divisional Policing Support Unit (DPSU).
discretionary proactive model to target “hot spot” areas (i.e., neighbourhoods with high concentrations of poor and minority populations) and police these communities “at their discretion” due to “pressure from the administration to produce numbers and stats (contacts, tickets and arrests)” (Way & Patten, 2014: 12). The TAVIS model also incorporates operational strategies built on principles of “community mobilization” and “community engagement” (Siciliano, 2010).

In 2013, the Province promised to secure permanent funding for TAVIS, and to provide $5 million per year to support TAVIS’s community mobilization and community engagement initiatives to “encourage police and community groups to work together in disadvantaged communities” (MCYS, 2012). As part of TAVIS, specialized teams of officers were deployed into high crime neighbourhoods in Toronto’s inner suburbs (e.g. Jane-Finch, Scarborough Village and Kingston-Galloway census tract neighbourhoods) to document citizens in what are called “field information reports” which are then entered into a large police database. In a highly ethnically diverse city such as Toronto, “high crime neighbourhoods” often translate to low-income neighbourhoods that may have a high proportion of racial minorities.

The importance of international comparisons and historical contextualization is key to understanding Toronto’s community policing debate (Owusu-Bempah, 2014). Internationally, in the UK and the United States, “Stop and Search” and “Stop and Frisk” police practices have come under public scrutiny. In 2010, a European court ruled police stop and search policing programs to be unlawful under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, to stop and search people without needing any grounds for suspicion (Guardian UK, January 12, 2010). This ruling came out of concerns for privacy, protest, and race equality. In Toronto, the issue of race equality is especially applicable to TAVIS. Since the program’s inception in 2006, Black youth in Toronto have been found to be 3.2 times more likely to be documented than white youth (Toronto Star, July 4, 2012). While this figure points at a racial imbalance in police profiling, researching possible racial bias within the Canadian criminal justice system is difficult. With few exceptions, there is a “complete ban on the collection and release of all race-crime data” (Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011: 395). This ban not only includes crime statistics, but all data connected to
the processing of racial minorities through the criminal justice system. As a consequence, unlike the United States and Great Britain, Canadian researchers do not have regular access to official data on the race of people stopped and searched by the police (ibid).

At the macro scale, the concern over Stop and Search practices and community policing programs that target select low-income communities is centered around the fact that Black youth are disproportionately policed, which then leads to the disproportionate involvement in the criminal justice system, perpetuating the cycle of poverty and criminality. At the more local scale of municipal policy-making, a history of distrust between youth living in priority neighbourhoods and the police brings into question the value of community policing programs like TAVIS. Although interviewees reported problems surrounding targeted TPS policing practices occurring in the mid-1990s under the direction of Police Chief David Boothby, due to limitations of scope this paper will concentrate on recent community policing policies and initiatives that specifically target residents in Toronto’s low income neighbourhoods and/or correlate with high crime neighbourhoods identified by the Neighbourhood Equity Index (used to define the city’s 31 NIAs).

We begin in 1996, with the TPS’ adoption of ‘Community Action Policing’, and continue through to the present, focusing on the creation and dissolution of TAVIS in Toronto’s priority neighbourhoods, as well as the proposed changes to Toronto’s community policing frameworks to come with the Province’s new Strategy for a Safer Ontario (2015) and the Toronto-based roll-out of FOCUS (an acronym for “Furthering our Communities -- Uniting Services”). FOCUS is a new community safety and well-being strategy aimed at “risk intervention,” developed in partnership with United Way Toronto and the City of Toronto. Importantly, the program is modeled after Glasgow, Scotland’s Community Mobilization Strategy – introduced to Canada by Deputy Minister Dale McFee (refer to Section 4) (Russell & Taylor, 2014).

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12 A 1994 community inquiry into the policing of disadvantaged people in Toronto concluded that “...an absence of respect for human rights and dignity was demonstrated by police in an overwhelming number of incidents” (Ontario Legal Aid Plan, 1994).
The language of community policing policy and initiatives like TAVIS is often very positive, promising to ‘empower’ and ‘mobilize’ communities and neighbourhoods ‘at-risk’. It becomes necessary to look beyond the promising language of these programs and policies, and to call into question the effectiveness of these initiatives at the scale of implementation.

Critics of community-based policing initiatives point to a new political focus on risk, disadvantage and false promises of community empowerment that overlook the structural roots of poverty and systemic discrimination and focus, instead, on individual or family-level factors (McMurtry & Curling, 2008; Cowen & Parlette, 2011; Maclellan, 2013). In turn, the solutions for these urban problems are said to be found within communities, themselves. The policy language of ‘community empowerment’, and ‘engagement’ have come to denote a passing on of responsibility -- be it administrative or financial or, in many, cases both – to local communities, families and individuals.

Critical urban theorists underscore the spatial distribution of social classes and contemporary confrontations over ‘space profits’, or the profit-orientated revalorization of selected urban spaces. Eick (2003; 2006) and Mayer (2009) consider the new roles of place-based systems of empowerment and exclusion that have emerged in cities across Western Europe alongside transformations the governance of risk and security across western policy and policing regimes. Social problems are reimagined, and underpinned by the new centrality of ‘urban (in)security’ (Eick, 2006) which entails new regulatory tasks for policy-makers, civil society groups, and urban police forces. Police leadership and civic responsibility converge upon disadvantaged neighbourhoods and their residents, deemed to be at-risk -- creating a field for both individual involvement and insubordination in the name of responsibility and prevention (ibid).

This paper will constitute the sustained exploration of Toronto’s community-based policing policies, supported by primary and secondary research, interpretive policy analysis/ critical discourse analysis, and interview data collected from 21 expert interviews with high-ranking police officials, policy and decision-makers. Drawing from
contemporary critical urban theory and urban social movement scholarship (Eick, 2003; 2006; Mayer, 2009; McLennan et al, 2014), as well as emerging literature on constructivist (or discursive) institutionalism (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006; Schmidt, 2008), this critical policy analysis seeks to depict, through a top-down analytical framework, the various influences, interests, incentives, and constraints that guide deliberations, statements, policies and decisions about community policing in Toronto.

The approach belongs broadly within the tradition of ‘critical social science’ – social science which is motivated by the aim of providing a scientific basis for a critical questioning of social life in moral and political terms (i.e., in terms of social justice and power) (Fairclough, 2000). Within a limited scope, I will attempt to link the micro analysis of policy texts to the macro analysis of how power relations work both within and across networks of practice.

The Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA) method will be utilized to illuminate the ways in which community policing policies have the potential to construct social subjects, generate meaning and knowledge, frame issues in relation to the problem of unsafe neighbourhoods deemed to be at-risk, pose solutions which aim to ‘empower’ residents of these neighbourhoods, and impact peoples’ lives (for better or worse). Rooted in the deliberative democratic tradition, the IPA method begins with the insight that to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved (Rhodes, 2007).

### 1.1 Outline of the Research

Section 1 of the paper provides an introduction to the objectives of the research, and outlines key research questions as well as the theoretical and methodological approach. Next, Section 2 will review relevant community policing policies in Toronto from 1996 to the present. Section 3 will describe Toronto’s Community Policing Strategy in detail, using data collected from crime reporters and youth employment workers in Toronto’s priority neighbourhoods. Section 4 will draw from expert interview data to analyze the
provincially-driven changes proposed to Toronto’s community-based policing model as part of the new *Strategy for a Safer Ontario* (2015), foregrounding participants’ own statements, beliefs and opinions. Section 5 will constitute a more critical exploration of present-day challenges to policy-driven changes to policing practices, focusing on the ambiguity of police board powers in regulating TPS operations, and tensions surrounding the promise of privatization within select police ranks. Section 6 provides a brief illustrative case study of the Morris Justice Project model in the Bronx, NY. Morris Justice is a Participatory Action Research (PAR) designed to allow community members to act as policing policy “architects,” creating policy recommendations for police reforms that are brought to city council. The features of the model will provide a basis for the policy recommendations presented in Section 7.

### 1.2 Context

This research is timely. Over the past two years, the TPS has been under mounting public scrutiny aimed at the Service’s targeted community policing model, and a perceived lack of sufficient rationale to account for the carding practices that TAVIS officers were engaging in when dealing with residents in highly policed neighbourhoods. As a result of this mounting criticism, and the work of local advocates and advocacy groups, provincial funding for TAVIS was cut in the later stages of this study -- in mid-September 2015. The province has yet to reallocate the $5 million per annum funding that TAVIS has received since (2012); though a spokesperson for minister Yasir Naqvi of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSC) says it’s opting to develop “a new funding model that ends targeted grant programs like TAVIS – which can only be used for specific purposes, whether a local need exists or not” in order to foster a more “collaborative, community-based model of policing” that will "prioritize community-based crime prevention and youth empowerment” (Rankin, 2015: Oct 23).

13 Including Scot Wortley, Akwasi O.. desmond cole, Idil Burali, Neil Price, Chris Willaims and the members of CAPP, and groups like TPAC, the Urban Alliance on Race Relations, the African Canadian Legal Clinic, and many others.
Given the key role that provincial, municipal and organizational policy frameworks have played both in guiding and delivering community-based policing services in Ontario, and given the clear lack of research around the top-down decision-making processes behind policies that have an overwhelming impact on communities and individuals in Toronto’s NIAs, the choice was made to interview primarily senior policy-makers, senior police officials, provincial ministers and publicly-appointed officials who bear some direct responsibility for the design and delivery of community-based policing strategies within their department or organization. And so, among those interviewed were senior provincial policy strategists, senior Inspectors at the TPS, provincial Deputy Ministers and Assistant Deputy Ministers, past and present members of the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB), a former Toronto Mayor, and a chief official at the Ontario Human Rights Council (OHRC). The data collected paints a varied, layered and multifaceted picture of the state of targeted policing practices, the policies that guide them and the impacts that they have on the neighbourhoods, communities and individuals affected the most. In particular, as recent reports (Wortley, 2006; Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011; Rankin, 2010) have demonstrated, black youth living in NIAs have disproportionately been targeted as a consequence of the policing of risk.

The study begins in 1996, when the practice of targeted, Community Action Policing (CAP) was first implemented under the direction of Toronto Police Chief Julian Fantino. Three years after its implementation, CAP drew criticism from the Committee to Stop Targeted Policing (CSTP); made up of community members, activists and social and health agency workers who “came together in the summer of 1999 because of serious concerns about the effects of CAP policing” in Toronto’s low-income areas (CSTP, 2000). In 2000, the CSTP compiled a report, “Who’s the Target?”, making recommendations toward the development of a more solution-focused community policing strategy. Beginning with CAP and the establishment of the CSTP, key policy developments, programs and initiatives will be reviewed. They include Community Action Policing (1999), the Community Safety Plan (2004), the TAVIS (2006) and the Province’s new Strategy for a Safer Ontario (2015). Given that funding for TAVIS was dramatically reduced as of September, 2015, the paper ends with an analysis of the new
provincial strategy and what’s to come for community policing practices across Toronto’s ‘priority’ neighbourhoods.

As the research will attempt to illustrate, there are many potential benefits that come with the creation of a new, collaborative community policing model in Toronto. In particular, increased public faith in the TPS would likely lead to an increase in the reporting of crimes -- and by extension, the solving of crimes -- in high-risk neighbourhoods. In order to secure public faith in the TPS, the organization could work to inform their day-to-day community policing practices with the basic tenets of “procedural justice” and “policing by consent.” Both concepts are linked to the processes of policing rather than the outcomes; therefore the manner in which people are treated is paramount. If people are treated in way that they perceive as fair, they are more likely to accept the outcome of their interaction with an officer, even if it does not favour them (UK Home Office, 2012). As it follows, this report will recommend that the provincial Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, in partnership with the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB) and academic and community partners like CAPP and the CAPP Community Advisory Committee, invoke the principles of policing by consent (refer to Appendix A); whereby “the power of the police to fulfill their functions and duties is viewed as dependent on their ability to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws” (UK Home Office, 2012).14

1.3 Research Questions

This report will address five central research questions (to be addressed chronologically in the report). They are:

1. What political ideas and political interests are foundational to discourses of ‘risk’

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14 These principles can be traced as far back as 1829, as part of a long-standing philosophy of British policing known as Robert Peel’s 9 Principles of Policing. Sir Robert Peel, who at the time was Secretary of the Home, is generally credited to have created the “forerunner to the modern urban police department” (Manning, 2012: 5). Following the passage of the London Metropolitan Police Act of 1829. The 9 principles were set out in the ‘General Instructions’ that were issued to every new police officer across the UK (UK Home Office, 2012).
and ‘community engagement’ as they appear in Toronto’s community policing policies and strategies?

2. What are the policies that govern community policing in Toronto, and how are they implemented?

3. How does Toronto’s community policing strategy compare with international models in the US and UK, and what can be learned from these international examples?

4. How can the core principles of ‘policing by consent’ be integrated into Toronto’s community policing approach?

5. What strategies might help to improve key operational problems and challenges inherent to Toronto’s community policing model (such as the balance of police-board powers)?

1.4 Purpose: Policing By Consent – Designing a Democratic Community Model

*Old ideas need new clothing.* – David Crombie, NCRP Research Meeting, October 2012

The overarching aim of this report is to provide a critical framework through which to view the recent history of community policing policies, as well as an analysis of what’s to come following widespread civic outcry surrounding TAVIS and its carding practices; the sizable reduction of TAVIS’ annual budget; and recent bureaucratic promises to regulate the TPS and introduce more democratic and responsive practices. A secondary aim is to make useful, relevant, and feasible recommendations that may help to guide the successful implementation of community engagement and empowerment principles within the TPS (while remaining mindful of limitations of scope). In pursuit of this secondary aim, a review of Ontario’s existing community policing strategies and policies was conducted, beginning with the introduction of Toronto’s targeted Community Action Policing model in 1999.

Findings will center around the establishment of real, meaningful collaboration and/or community-led decision-practices amongst: 1) provincial officials, municipal officials,
the TPSB and the TPS, 2) the TPS and community-based advocates and organizations, and 3) local advocates and organizations that should serve as liaisons between the police and residents, especially youth of colour.

In Toronto, mounting public criticism over TAVIS’ aggressive carding tactics and a demand for justice resulted in a provincial MCSCS move to cut TAVIS funding down from $5 million a year to $2.63 million, effective January 2016, with the “ultimate aim to axe the program altogether” (Rankin, 2015: Oct 23). The recent $4.7 million increase to Toronto’s policing budget, along with the redirection of $2.63 million that has been cut from TAVIS could be used to lay the groundwork for this new community-based policing model. To do this, a dramatic shift would have to occur in the operational guidelines that direct TPS community policing practices.

At present, TPS community policing practices fall in line within a discretionary proactive policing approach; whereby the police generate ‘hot spot’ areas with high concentrations of poor and minority populations (i.e., priority neighbourhoods) and police these communities “at their discretion” due to “pressure from the administration to produce numbers or ‘stats’ (contacts, tickets and arrests)” (Way & Patten, 2014: 12). A shift to a more democratic, model would make the primary function of patrol officers service-oriented rather than discretionary. Moreover, the operational policies which guide police-citizen interactions when responding to citizens’ requests would be developed in close consultation with community groups; and qualitative and quantitative data would draw from Participatory Action Research projects like the Morris Justice Project, based in the Bronx. NYC. The legitimacy of the Morris Justice model was supported by a member of the TDSB, who, stated:

“[…] one of the things the board has looked at is the participatory action resource model. It was brought up by our advisors as we were struggling with what a community-designed, community engagement model would look like. They walked

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15 As Wilson (1968: 140) has outlined in his seminal text on policing operational roles are defined by the administrative framework, and “the defining characteristics of a patrolman's role this becomes the style or strategy of the department as a whole because it is reinforced by the attitudes and policies of the police administrator.”
us through a project in the Bronx called the Morris Justice Project. It’s a superb piece of community work. I was the champion behind it.

As it follows, drawing from the general principles of the policing by consent model, the interview data collected, and with the aim of moving beyond the hopeful pragmatism of new governance scholars\textsuperscript{16} who contend that the benefits of recent shifts in governance approaches (such as privatization, devolution, deregulation and decentralization) have created more opportunities for non-bureaucratic, collaborative stakeholder participation that ‘empowers’ marginalized constituents -- new community policing practices and policies will, instead, require an approach to community-based policing that:

- Actively facilitates joint partnerships between police and neighbourhood residents;
- Formally accounts for structural factors of socio-spatial poverty, inequality, housing affordability and precarious employment that impact peoples’ lives and contribute to decreased public safety in neighbourhoods;
- Allows for collaborative deliberation around which public safety problems call for increased policing, and the type of policing required;
- Incorporates regular stakeholder meetings in which officers and participants assess the quality and effectiveness of community policing strategies; and
- Leverages local residents’ experiences and input to contribute to large-scale changes to traditional community policing methods across Toronto (Fung & Wright, 2001).

Importantly, the reconceptualization of community policing proposed here is intended to account for the structural factors that create urban socio-spatial polarization and concentrations of low-income and minority populations. The formalized language of ‘risk’ should be recast to highlight the inherent risk posed by an unresponsive and under-regulated police force. What is needed is a truly participatory and citizen-centered approach to the delivery of community policing services across Toronto. Central to the concept of Policing By Consent are notions of deliberative democracy, community empowerment and community participation (Sklansky, 2008). A community should not be limited to being a consumer of police services but should be a co-producer of police services, playing a key role in the production process (Meng et al, 2014). In turn, police

\textsuperscript{16} See Archon Fung & Eric Olin Wright, ’Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance,’ in Deepening Democracy, Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso 2003) (explaining the phrase "empowered participatory governance").
services should obtain the support of community partners and the civilian board before implementing a community policing strategy.

1.5 Significance of the Study

To date, no critical scholarly research has produced a top-down, institutional analysis of Toronto’s community policing model. A few studies have examined carding practices, Disproportionate Minority Contact and Blacks’ experiences with the police in Canada (see James, 1998; Wortley & Tanner, 2004; Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011; Meng et al, 2014). A handful of studies have shed light on TPS race-based data collection from civilian interactions and the organizational mandate which does not require that such data be made readily available to the public (Wortley, 1999; Wortley, 2003; Owusu-Bempah, 2011). Additionally, while there is relatively little ‘ground-up’ qualitative or mixed-methods research which examines the impacts of community policing policies, these studies make up the bulk of the small body of existing research.

In 2014, Owusu-Bempah published a mixed-methods study documenting both the views and experiences of a sample of Black men recruited from four of Toronto’s ‘priority’ neighbourhoods, as well as the perspectives of a sample of Black male police officers who enforce the law. In 2011, Chapman-Nyaho and his colleagues conducted an analysis of qualitative interview data from program participants with the TPS ‘Youth in Policing Initiative’ (YIPI), a summer employment program for youth in marginalized Toronto communities, in order to study the community-level impact of programs targeting youth ‘at-risk’. James (1998) examined black youths’ perceptions of, and experiences with police, using data collected from semi-structured interviews with approximately 50 youth in Toronto (60% male, 40% female), from a variety of social classes and backgrounds. Finally, Neugebauer-Visano (1996) examined the experiences of 63 Black youths with the new TPS community policing model and attempts at police outreach to marginalized communities (findings indicated an overall “distrust”).

This research project was conducted in order to fulfill doctoral requirements at the
University of Toronto’s Faculty of Social Work; however, it does not adhere to the traditional logics of the discipline. In the field of social work, the uncritical, positivistic acceptance of political frames or ‘kinds’ of people focuses social workers’ attention narrowly on individuals and away from broader socio-structural relations (Chambon, 1999; Edelman, 1988; Murray, 2007). The subjects become reified. We objectify them and observe them as part of the seeable world. But researchers must remember that we have a part in constructing these interactions (Wilson, 2011). In policy, we must also engage with issues of power and politics. Where is power? Who is silenced? This is the contribution of critical theory to interpretive policy analysis.

Insomuch as power is contained within language, language itself can be a crucial exclusionary mechanism in democracy as it determines social classifications. Policy language constructs the “types” of people that community-based programs are intended to serve. Claims made about certain types of people reflect not only the socio-political (or socio-spatial) conditions under which they were produced, but also the actions, beliefs and preferences of the policy actors and officials who give life to these constructs (Fischer, 1993). If these claims remain unchallenged by social movements and countervailing public policies, social constructions of deservedness and entitlement result in an “other”—an underclass of marginalized and disadvantaged people who are widely viewed as undeserving and incapable. Marginalized people become alienated – labeled as being at-risk, and indeed, excluded -- from society as well as from one another (Darcy & Gwyther, 2012).

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This work is a not simply a critique of Toronto’s community policing practices. In order to frame an analysis which may serve to describe the current status of community-based policing in Toronto, no single perspective, theoretical or empirical, can be used to understand the many issues at play, and the various histories, meanings, experiences and viewpoints that contribute to the development and enactment of the city’s policing policies.
While the research draws from critical urban renewal and urban social movement literature by way of Volker Eick (2006; 2012), Margit Mayer (2002; 2012), Tom Slater (2013), and Deb Cowen (2005) – scholars who provide critical commentary related to the extent to which the local state and its parallel organizations engage in a ‘post-welfarist’ policing of poorer urban communities under the auspices of place-based, community renewal efforts -- much of this literature does not apply directly to the activities and practices of the institutions and decision-making bodies that impact the operations of the TPS and the day-to-day activities of police officers in Toronto. Instead, to understand the local landscape of policing governance, and in line with an interpretive/ discursive approach to institutional analysis (Bevir & Rhodes, 2006), I look to the language and discourse of policies, reports and directives in order to fathom both the making and enactment of community policing policies at the senior institutional and decision-making levels; to begin to account for the various institutional frameworks, histories, interests and relationships which guide these decision-making processes; and to understand how the these policies frame their social subjects (i.e., individuals residing in targeted neighbourhoods deemed to be ‘at risk’).

Importantly, in examining the theoretico-political role of policy discourse in constructing social subjects, this study will not be tied the Foucauldian conception of discourse as an extension of state power as it operates by rules of exclusion (Foucault 1977; 1980; 2003). Rather, what will be considered are the various ways in which state power itself is split from within (Zizek, 2000: 313), as contemporary policing policies are delivered through networks of institutional and organizational decision-making apparatuses. The enactment of these policies, then, becomes contingent upon the culture of the organization itself – and the relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003).

1.5.1 The Complexity of Multi-stakeholder Analysis: The Example of Privatization
To use the example of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario’s (AMO’s) recent proposal to privatize select policing functions within the TPS (see Section II) – this issue, alone, is multi-layered and multiperspectival, and, when viewed in the context of local plans for cutting police budgets, manages to escape deregulationist critiques which explore the devolution of policing services “downward and outward from the state” (Eick, 2006; Mayer, 2009). In the UK, critics of an increasingly privatized police force point to the dangers of an unregulated police force comprised of auxillary officers and citizen-led neighbourhood policing units -- called Neighbourhood Policing Teams and Safer Neighbourhood Teams – which deal with low level issues (e.g. anti-social behaviour). A number of researchers and journalists in the UK link the privatization of neighbourhood policing functions to mounting tensions between residents of London’s low-income sub/urban council estates and London’s Metropolitan Police Service leading up to the UK riots of 2011. In March of 2012 the Guardian quoted former Met commissioner Ian Blair in his response to the privatization of neighbourhood police units, private outsourcing and increased government cuts to policing budgets. According to Blair, these processes "signal(ed) a shift that allow(ed) the private sector to provide staff who carry out routine and repetitive tasks at cheaper rates" (Guardian, March 12, 2012). However, if the privatization of the London Met’s community policing functions has weakened the quality and accountability of the service, the policy lessons to be learned cannot be directly applied to Toronto-based proposals to privatize TPS policing functions.

While current negotiations surrounding TPS privatization may spark concerns regarding the quality of services and the erosion of officer training, current proposals for privatization (KPMG, 2011; AMO, 2015) make clear that privatization will only be considered for non-essential police services. In other words, the language of the proposals makes criticism of provincially directed plans to downsize somewhat difficult. Toronto’s approach to the privatization of policing services is said to be targeted to very specific and low-risk duties (such as intersection control) that prove particularly costly\textsuperscript{17} for Toronto’s taxpayers. In accordance with the 2015 AMO report, as well a 2012 report
on the “Economics of Policing,” commissioned by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, the intent is not to privatize core policing services, or to reduce the training requirements and salaries of police units involved in policing communities. Rather, the intention is to pass on select policing duties to health care professionals and/or social workers in select circumstances. The House of Commons 2012 report called for the “integration of staff from the health and policing sectors in certain circumstances” (House of Commons, 2013).

As one member of the TPSB commented in response to the question of impending privatization:

*The KPMG report that Dr. Mukherjee commissioned was the second phasing report of internal privatization. We’re going to go back to look at the service’s own assessment of where there could be savings. I think that we would be looking at basic mechanized oversight functions like intersection control. Anything that requires a certain level of skill and is aligned with traditional forms of policing [...] I don’t think that we’d be interested in privatizing it* (TPSB Official 1.)

Theoretically, if privatization was limited to these low-risk policing functions and provincial regulations prevented the privatization of core policing duties, any negative consequences to communities could be avoided. According to one TPSB official:

*To privatize community-based units is fraught with all sorts of challenges, so it would be better to retrain these existing officers with the right community-based infrastructure and hold them accountable through mechanisms that work; rather than privatizing those areas where we don’t think the police are doing particularly well because it doesn’t make sense from a labour management perspective* (TPSB Official 1.)

These conflicting perspectives highlight the complex, multi-layered nature of policing policy analysis in the Toronto context. Due to this complexity, this report will make recommendations that are not methodologically aligned with one particular theory, or one particular stakeholder’s position on police reform. Instead, recommendations will draw from the expert interview data collected as well as a selection of policy papers and reports in order to provide a more tractable strategy for community policing reform in Toronto.
To do this, the interpretive method will be used to explore and understand policing policies and events (including provincial policy, internal and divisional TPS guidelines, municipal ordinance, and TPSB policy). The ‘interpretive turn’ in policy analysis represents an ontological break from positivistic political analyses. Interpretive research is attuned to the multiplicity of meaning that underlie a policy document, as well as the political process of meaning-making enacted by political actors, themselves (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Matharu, 2012; Yanow 1996). IPA is often focused on the “mid-level theorizing of institutionalism” (Matharu, 2012: 1), which highlights the construction of multiple ideas and interests that steer the processes of institutional change and design (Blyth 2002; Hay 2006).

**Study Design**

IPA is ethnographic, informed by the constructivist-interpretivist approach. The approach frames social realities as intersubjectively constructed. Research processes in the interpretive tradition are characterized by an empirical and normative prioritizing of the lived experience of people in research settings, including a focus on the meaning(s) of interactions, language, acts, events, and physical artifacts to multiple stakeholders, and a sensitivity to the historically-contingent, often-contested character of such meanings (APSA, 2013).

This research will constitute the sustained exploration of the research questions, listed above -- supported by primary and secondary research, interpretive policy analysis/critical discourse analysis, interview data, and interview notes. Using a variety of data sources, the intention is to intensively explore and understand community policing policies and debates within Toronto. Critical discourse analysis will be used to investigate the processes of social construction, as expressed in discursive practices.
2 Community Policing Policy Timeline: 1996 - 2015

This policy review concentrates on recent community policing policies and initiatives that specifically target residents in Toronto’s low-income neighbourhoods and/or correlate with the City of Toronto’s 13 Priority Neighbourhoods (NIAs). And so, we begin in 1996, with the TPS’ adoption of Community Action Policing, and continue through to the present, focusing on the proposed changes to Toronto’s community policing frameworks under the Province’s new Strategy for a Safer Ontario (2015) and the TPS-directed roll-out of FOCUS (an acronym for ‘Furthering our Communities Uniting Services’); a new community safety and well-being strategy aiming to predict and prevent risk. FOCUS was developed in partnership between United Way Toronto, the City of Toronto and the TPS.

Table 1, below, provides a chronological list of key policies and reports. It must be noted that no of these policy, policy event or order of government ever work in isolation or happen independently of one another. As Yanow (2000:14) explains, “An interpretive approach to policy analysis, is one that focuses on the meanings of policies, on the values, feelings, or beliefs they express, and on the processes by which those meanings are communicated to an ‘read’ by various audiences.” To tease out the meaning that underpins a particular policy or strategy requires a close reading of policies as they communicate meaning. The examination of policy and interview text will reveal connects and disconnects of meaning between how a policy is intended to work and the multiple lived realities of those policies.

What follows is a chronological description of each policy or report and its connection to the development of Toronto’s targeted community policing approach.
Table 1. Community Policing Timeline: 1996 - 2015

- Toronto Police Community Contacts Policy (“Street Checks”) 1996 M
- Community Action Policing (CAP) 1999 M
- Who’s the Target? Committee to Stop Targeted Policing (2000) A
- Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force, A Call to Action (2005) M
- Community Contacts Policy (2014) M
- CAPP Report (2014) A
- Community Safety and Well-being Ontario (2015) P

F: Federal; P: Provincial; M: Municipal; A: Advocacy

2.1.1 The history of targeted policing in Toronto

The Toronto Police Community Contacts Policy (1996) marked the establishment of an investigative tool used by the Toronto Police Service (TPS) involving non-criminal police-citizen contacts as a means of gathering information CSTP, 200). Toronto Police described the process as being “necessary for ensuring public safety and as a valuable investigative tool” (ibid: 5). What followed was the formalization of targeted community policing in Community Action Policing (CAP) (1999) – initiated through a partnership between the City’s Policy and Finance Committee and the TPS. Guided by the recommendation of the Task Force on Community Safety, CAP was a $1.9 million program designed to increase police presence in (selected) Toronto neighbourhoods for eleven weeks in the summer of 1999 (ibid).

In accordance with the “Who’s the Target?” report, compiled in 2000 by the Committee to Stop Targeted Policing, CAP provided a “way of securing additional funds to pay
officers overtime during the summer months to increase police presence on the streets” (ibid).\(^{18}\) The program was designed as "targeted policing," focusing on "problem areas" as a response to concerns about "community safety" (ibid: 6). CAP was an experiment in targeted deployment practices – deploying specialized officers to neighbourhoods with high levels of crime, or ‘hot spots’ -- similar to those used in other cities in North America and Western Europe (including New York, Boston, Los Angeles, Berlin, and London (UK).

As one member of TPAC (Personal Interview TPAC2, 2015) recounts, when CAP was formed in 1999, spatially-targeted ‘stop and search’ practices began to occur:

\[
\text{[...]} \text{each division was provided with funds to create an additional shift four nights a week for six hours to focus on areas that they identified as ‘hot spots’ or ‘crime spots’. There was also a parks team that they developed to patrol parks in the downtown area. Three divisions got funds for two extra shifts. It was only meant to happen in the summer of 2002 and they started to stop people and talk to them and as I understand it that was the beginning of stop and search. Unofficially it had happened forever – and racist stops had been happening forever – but there it became codified. The next summer they expanded it, and then the summer after that – and that might be when it started to become TAVIS.}
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Following the creation of TAVIS, the police began to receive money from the province to take on roles that were once reserved for social workers, such as youth employment roles. From TPAC’s view (ibid), the expansion of community policing into social work is a bid to “justify a billion dollar budget.”

2.1.2 Establishing a place-based approach to poverty and crime prevention

Between 2002 and 2004, a series of published reports identified a worrying trend: the increasing concentration of poverty in Toronto’s inner suburbs, and a lack of community services and accessible public space in these suburbs. Both the United Way of Greater Toronto’s report \textit{Poverty by Postal Code} (2004) and the City of Toronto’s community agency survey report, \textit{Cracks in the Foundation} (2003) identified that community infrastructure and social services did not respond to demand in these areas. Similarly, the

\(^{18}\) Due to a number of festivals and events, summer months required specialized policing duties, which took officers away from their regular duties (Toronto Police Service, 2000: 4).
TD Bank, and the Toronto City Summit Alliance, an influential cross-sectoral civil society coalition, identified weakening community infrastructure and neighbourhood decline as key challenges for the entire Toronto region (Drummond et. al, 2002; TCSA, 2003). In the spring of 2004, Council responded to these reports, and elected to form a Strong Neighbourhoods Taskforce (SNTF) to explore how to strengthen neighbourhoods facing “challenges of poverty, underemployment, the settlement of immigrants, and lack of services” (City of Toronto, 2005, October 5). The Taskforce, led jointly by staff from the City of Toronto, the United Way of Greater Toronto, and the private sector proposed a broad, collaborative approach to improve “neighbourhood wellbeing.” The SNTF’s *A Call To Action* (2005) highlighted the need to invest in community services and facilities to strengthen “social infrastructure in the City’s poorest neighbourhoods” (SNTF, 2005). The SNTF used a supply-demand analysis based on the proximity of community infrastructure to socio-economic need to identify the areas in most need (SNTF, 2005: 19). It identified thirteen areas requiring targeted investment, including the neighbourhoods already identified through Community Safety Plan. Neighbourhoods were defined using census tracts, natural borders and demographic statistics. Thus began the City’s formal adoption of a ‘place-based’ strategy.

The City of Toronto’s place-based strategy initially targeted investment priorities in thirteen priority neighbourhoods (now called NIAs) deemed to be “at-risk” and “vulnerable” based on factors associated with the neighbourhood (including housing affordability, health outcomes, income levels and crime rates) (City of Toronto, 2005, October 5). The approach formally began with adoption of the Community Safety Plan (CSP) in 2004. The Plan identified youth violence as a primary concern for the wellbeing of the City – or as Mayor David Miller referred to it, “a method of prevention initiatives that will act as a catalyst for civic action to improve public safety” (ibid). The CSP identified neighbourhoods in the postwar suburbs experiencing increased levels of gun violence and criminal gang involvement, with poor access to service and facilities required to address these social challenges (ibid). The language of the Plan emphasized a coordinated investment in youth opportunities, along with increased targeted police presence in an attempt to “balance [crime] prevention with enforcement” (ibid).
The more localized work of the CSP, together with the formation of the Strong Neighbourhood Task Force, were both approved by Toronto City Council in March 2004. The CSP also identified specific neighbourhoods as key priorities—Malvern, Jane-Finch and Jamestown and Kingston-Galloway. A year later, Mayor Miller recommended that Lawrence Heights, Steeles-L’Amoureaux and Eglinton East-Kennedy Park be added to the CSP neighbourhoods. In the fall of 2005, Sue Corke, the City of Toronto Deputy City Manager successfully urged that the Policy and Finance Committee adopt the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (which was also impacted by the Community Safety Plan) in order to strengthen the 13 Priority Neighbourhoods identified by the above processes (Toronto Staff Report, Oct 5, 2005).

Table 2: 13 Priority Neighbourhoods, City of Toronto (2006)
2.1.3  **TAVIS and the ‘Summer of the Gun’**

In 2005, 52 of 78 of Toronto’s homicides (67%) were gun-related (compared with 27 of 64 (42%) in 2004) with most of the gun-related homicides occurring in a priority neighbourhood. The summer of 2005 was deemed the ‘Summer of the Gun,’ resulting in the implementation of the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) and the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS). The Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) was formed in 2006. The program was developed and run by the Toronto Police Service and, as of 2012, became fully funded (receiving approximately $5 million per annum) by the Province of Ontario. Part of the initiative includes three mobile units called in to be present in neighbourhoods where crime had “reached an unmanageable level” (*National Post*, July 11 2009). Described as ”intensive, violence reduction and community mobilization strategy intended to reduce crime and increase safety” in “high-risk neighbourhoods” (TPS, 2006). TAVIS worked in three steps: 1) targeted, intensive intervention and enforcement in a *high-risk neighbourhood*; 2) maintenance-level enforcement, increased police-community-social agency collaboration, and increased crime prevention activities; and 3) ‘normalized’ police services, where police act as a support to an empowered community (refer to Appendix B for a formal description of TAVIS’ activities and mandate). In 2013, TAVIS secured was meant to be permanent funding from the province; however, TAVIS was cancelled in the fall of 2015 following mounting community concern over the program’s emphasis on policing tactics (e.g. ‘carding’) and arrests that were disproportionately targeting young men of colour (see Section 3).

Alongside TAVIS, and in response to violence, guns and gangs, the Toronto Police Integrated Gun and Gang Task Force (IGGTF) was formed. Since it’s inception the IGGTF has been involved in numerous high-profile raids on suspected gang members. The IGGTF also works closely with TAVIS officers, who act as the “on-the-ground” presence of the IGGTF in priority neighbourhoods.
2.1.4 From Priority Neighbourhoods to Improvement Areas

In 2014, the City released the new Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (TSNS 2020). The new strategy came out of an internal report introducing an internally-generated Neighbourhood Equity Score to establish Neighbourhood Improvement Areas (NIAs). Specifically, 31 NIAs would replace the 13 Priority Neighbourhoods -- adding 16 additional neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods were chosen with the new “equity score” system based on 15 criteria -- including health, economics, political participation and education. An additional $12 million was earmarked by City Council, adding to the initial $13 million allocated in 2005. While not directly linked to policing, TSNS2020 has implications for neighbourhoods, financial resources, capacity building, youth development, and the establishment of local ‘hubs’ that will receive funding from the provincial Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services and act as sites for the roll-out of the new FOCUS community mobilization policing model (see Section 4).

2.1.5 Regulating Racial Bias in Carding Practice: 2012 – Present

In response to widespread public, academic and institutional outcry surrounding racially biased carding practices in Toronto’s high-immigrant, low-income neighbourhoods (or NIAs), the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB) released the new Community Contacts Policy in April of 2014; a move by the civilian Board to “reform police-community interactions.” The amendments to carding practices laid out in the report support the Board’s assertion that “policing must be carried out in a manner that fully respects and implements obligations under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Ontario Human Rights Code” (TPSB, 2006). (For a full description of the amendments to TPS carding practices, refer to Appendix C.)

A few months after the Community Contacts policy was announced, in November 2014, the Community Assessment of Police Practices (CAPP) survey was released at a TPSB meeting. The survey, accounting for 404 residents of Toronto’s Jane-Finch area, was compiled by policing scholars and advocates Neil Price and Chris Williams along with
the CAPP Community Advisory Committee and the assistance of 23 youth research assistants, and inspired by the Morris Justice Project of New York City. The study was spearheaded by the TPSB following the release of the Community Contacts policy, which introduced new parameters to the practice of police carding under TAVIS and required police to have a valid public safety reason for stopping individuals and collecting their information. The report found that few members of the public were aware of the new Community Contacts policy, or the formal procedures involved in carding. Findings also pointed to “widespread dissatisfaction” with the way that police interact with members of the community (CAPP, 2014). The level of community trust for the police in 31 Division was reported as low, as many participants believed that officers were profiling residents in the Jane-Finch area based on race, and others were of the opinion that officers regularly abused their power. Moreover, of the 137 people who said they had been carded, 85 per cent said they had not received receipts -- a requirement that had been a board policy since 2013 (ibid). Approximately 40% of the 404 participants stated that the relationship between police and the community remained poor following the implementation of the new Community Contacts Policy.

In November 2014, following the release of CAPP, the report’s findings were publicly denounced Chief Bill Blair as “inflammatory and reckless.”

2.1.6 Toward a New Model of Community Policing: The Strategy for a Safer Ontario

Following the September, 2015 move to phase out of TAVIS amid mounting public criticism of carding practices in select neighbourhoods, it is likely that a provincially-mandated restructuring of Toronto’s community policing model will come with the MSCS’s Strategy for a Safer Ontario 2015. On July 31, 2015, the Strategy was announced. According to a representative from Minister Naqvi’s office, the new program is “intended to help communities develop local solutions to improve public safety and overall community well-being (Personal Interview MCSCS2, 2015).” As part of the Strategy, it was confirmed that the Ministry intends to update the Police Services Act (1990). To do this, the Ministry intends to conduct a series of public consultations, seeking community feedback on how to “empower communities,” “enhance
accountability,” and “strengthen the civilian governance role of police services boards (ibid).”

The Strategy for a Safer Ontario was created in response to the Ministry’s Mandate Letter from Premier Kathleen Wynne, which outlines the Ministry’s priorities. Some areas specifically identified in the letter include the need to:

- Clarify police duties and powers of the Board;
- Develop a new strategic vision for community safety and policing;
- Work with stakeholders, municipalities and other ministers to control the rising cost of policing;
- Accelerate the development of a package of reforms to policing service delivery; and
- Maintain a strategic focus on community safety through a made-in-Ontario Community Safety and Well-Being Planning Strategy that builds on past work and complements other key government initiatives (ibid).

3 Targeting Risk and Operationalizing Engagement

The TPS is comprised of 5550 police officers in Toronto. There are seventeen police divisions, and each division employs roughly 250 officers. The service is the largest municipal police force in Canada, equal in size to the OPP. The TPS Community Safety Command encompasses 4000 police officers, 200 civilians and 17 police divisions. The divisions are organized geographically, with Central Field containing York, East York and Toronto and Area Field covering Etobicoke, North York and Scarborough (TPS, 2015) (refer to Appendix E: TPS Organizational Chart).

On September 01, 2011, former Police Chief Bill Blair amalgamated the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS), the Transit Patrol Unit and the Community Mobilization Unit and introduced a number of new projects to increase community and youth engagement such as the Youth in Policing Initiative (YIPI). The newly formed unit
became known as the Divisional Policing Support Unit (DPSU). On January 1, 2014, the Transit Patrol Unit (TPU) also amalgamated with the DPSU (TPS, 2015).

In accordance with TPS policy, the DPSU is “committed to providing an effective, efficient and economical support service to Service members in the practical application of Community Mobilization principles, as well as developing, enhancing and maintaining constructive community partnerships” (ibid). Community mobilization practices are described as the “processes through which individuals, groups, and organizations, including the police, plan, carry out and evaluate activities on a coordinated and sustained basis to reduce crime, enhance safety and address quality of life issues in the community (TPS, 2007).” Community members are invited to assist the police by participating in local divisional activities such as community barbeques, attending community-police liaison meetings to discuss local concerns, and most importantly reporting crimes or providing information that might help solve crimes (Siciliano, 2010).

Speaking on the practices that constitute community mobilization, one DPSU Inspector says that officers are expected to “play nice and talk and inform and go to committee meetings, sponsor sports leagues, attend workshops with seniors […] officers monitor trust levels and hand out coupons for drinks and snacks at participating convenience stores (Personal Interview, DPSU1, 2015).” Expounding on the link between the DPSU’s Community Mobilization practices and TAVIS, the Inspector explained:

[...] the DPSU has three parts: community mobilization, comprised of crime prevention, community engagement, youth strategy, and gang partnering projects. YIPI is part of it – we hire kids from at-risk neighbourhoods. The other part is TAVIS. They start here and go around designated neighbourhood areas across the city and they work with communities, and suppress crime. TAVIS is funded by a $5 million government grant from the province, which is annualized. There’s a contract with the province as to what kind of activities we will undertake. When TAVIS began, Chief Blair got funding from the province in response to shootings. He got funding to put extra police officers out in communities to engage suspicious people who are out at two in the morning running around […] and the mission is to get the guns off the street before they get used. Guns, drugs and all that (Personal Interview DPSU, 2015).
As stated, as part of its written mandate, TAVIS was intended to “reduce violence, improve safety and enhance the quality of life in Toronto,” particularly within neighbourhoods “at-risk” (TPS, 2011). Engagement with community members is said to be an essential precursor to “dealing with the root causes of crime” (ibid.). In practice, however, its primary role was to tackle gang activity and gun violence. Operating under the “community engagement” policy frame, TAVIS, working alongside the Gun and Gang Task Force, Urban Organized Crime Squad, Toronto Drug Squad, and Intelligence Services, routinely deploys rapid response units into select neighbourhoods at the discretion of the DPSU. Its ‘community component’ necessitated the collection of information (i.e., contact cards), the gathering of intelligence on organized criminal gangs operating in Toronto, and assisting squads and divisions with enforcement initiatives.19

As part of the strategy, ‘community’ is comprised of ‘suspects’ and ‘informants’ located in targeted neighbourhoods (Siciliano, 2010). Similarly, ‘relationship-building’ can be equated to ‘intelligence gathering’ practices, while ‘community mobilization’ involves rapid response units deployed in pockets of the city where violent crime is taking place (ibid).

3.1.1 TAVIS’ Discretionary Proactive Approach to Community Policing

Carding is based on proactive policing ideas that come from the UK (Personal Interview DPSU1, 2015.)

In 2008 former Chief Bill Blair referred to TAVIS as a ‘paradigm model of community policing’; however, as Siciliano (2010) outlines, there is a lack of evidence to support the notion that TAVIS is modeled on democratic, participatory approaches to policing. Rather, the program falls in line with the discretionary proactive model, where police generate ‘hot spot’ areas with high concentrations of poor and minority populations and police these communities at their discretion due to pressure from the administration to

19 Blair, TAVIS promotional video. (Toronto Police Services, 2008)
produce numbers or ‘stats’ (contacts, tickets and arrests) through stop-and-frisk practices (Way & Patten, 2014: 12).

In their study of police departments located in California and New York, Way and Patten (2014) observe that discretionary, proactive patrol practices differ from reactive (responding to calls for service) patrol as follows:

In the reactive approach, police officers wait for a citizen to dial 9-1-1, then respond to the caller’s concern, which may or may not be crime related. Rather than limiting police activity to citizen calls for service, the discretionary proactive approach requires that officers make contact with people they deem to be ‘suspicious’. Once the police make contact with a citizen, citizens must identify themselves, respond to questioning, and are sometimes frisked for weapons.

Programmatically, the TAVIS model represents a discretionary, proactive, intelligence-led means of building legitimacy for law enforcement vis-à-vis the targeting of poor, racialized communities – stopping, searching, questioning and documenting citizens in field information reports which are then entered into a large police database. A 2010 Toronto Star investigation (Rankin, 2010, August 2) found that TAVIS officers stop, question and document citizens at a higher rate than any other TPS officer. The aggressive documentation of these encounters in priority neighbourhoods, as Meng et al (2014) suggest, produces statistics that are seen to represent police efforts to battle crimes, and police stops and crimes are correlated. Moreover, given that the crime “hot spots” are located in neighbourhoods with high concentrations of visible minorities, these practices present a clear racial bias. Since the program’s inception in 2006, Black youth in Toronto have been found to be 3.2 times more likely to be documented than white youth (Rankin, 2012, July 4). These statistics mirror similar community policing programs across the U.S. and UK; for example, in 2012, a New York Civil Liberties Union report found that, in 33 of New York state precincts, Black and Latinos accounted for more than 90 percent of stop-and-frisks (Way & Patten, 2014:18).
3.1.1.1 Coercing ‘Engagement’

Under a discretionary proactive framework, the terms of ‘engagement’, when applied to policing practices, are dictated by officers and most often relate to an individual’s willingness to cooperate. Officers are required to identify suspicious people of their own volition, resulting in an overall weakening of civilian-informed democratic control over police activities (Way & Patten, 2014). Discretionary proactive policing also ties levels of community of engagement to the expansion of police control beyond institutional boundaries, where targeted community policing practices become entrenched in a wider array of community initiatives (e.g. community barbeques, youth mentoring and employment programs, etc.) (Siciliano, 2010). However, the community resentment that results from aggressive discretionary policing tactics may limit the level of genuine, democratic engagement that citizens are willing to invest in police initiatives.

Interview data has revealed great discrepancies between departmental language on community policing practices and the practices carried out on the ground. This suggests a need for improvement in the translation and dissemination of TPS directives. For example, while TPS literature describes TAVIS as a “normalized policing initiative provided as support to an engaged and empowered community,” many study participants describe TAVIS as a militarized unit. As one youth justice worker based in the highly-policing Alexandra Park neighbourhood remarked, TAVIS practices constituted “more of a harassment of the community as opposed to engagement” (Personal Interview YJW, 2015). Whereas the four Neighbourhood Resource Officers (NROs) assigned to the neighbourhood were described as “social and friendly” (ibid), TAVIS officers were viewed as “a military unit” (ibid). The arrival of TAVIS officers prompted what was referred to as a “code blue” by youth justice workers:

> Whenever TAVIS is around, we have to walk kids home from our programs. So, it’s kind of scary for young kids when you have to say ‘Hey, can we all walk home together because TAVIS is here?’ I was spending a significant amount of time above and beyond my working hours dealing with problems associated with TAVIS. I’ve been doing that since 2007 (ibid.)
Discontinuity between the language of departmental policies and the application of those policies is a problem not unique to Toronto. To echo Way & Patten (2014: 54), one of the major critiques about community policing in Seaside, NY, relates to ineffective policy translation between the administration and the line level officers, leading to “confusion and misunderstanding for officers regarding the goals of the program.” As they explain:

[... ] management decided to create public service areas inside of districts. Although dozens of officers were asked why the change had been made, no one really seemed to have a firm grasp on the administration’s rationale. Officers thought they were engaged in community policing activities, but without clear guidance and feedback from the administration, oftentimes the officers were left in the dark regarding desired actions and the department’s goals (ibid.)

In Toronto, TPS community and ‘strategic partnership’ initiatives generate a similar kind of ambiguity. For instance, the Youth in Policing Initiative (YIPI) — funded by the Provincial Government’s Ministry of Children and Youth Services, aims ‘to enhance police and community relations’, and ‘promote the TPS as an ‘employer of choice’ (Siciliano, 2010). Since 2006, YIPI has provided seasonal employment for 100 youths. To be eligible, youth must be ‘permanent residents’ of a Priority Neighbourhood. The police determine eligibility, and the boundary between ‘informants’ and ‘criminals’ is enforced via criminal background checks. As one youth worker recounts:

The YIPI program has been around for a few years now. They have started hiring more youth, but the concerning thing is – I heard this through a youth worker friend of mine [...] Apparently they do background checks on the young person and their families. They called the young person to say ‘you’re not going to be in the program because your dad had a charge X amount of years ago.’ This was before the kid was even born. Why are you telling this young person that their father had a criminal offence? The YIPI program is specifically for young people in the priority neighbourhoods, so what do you expect?

In an interview with Alok Mukherjee, former chair of the TPSB and an architect of the YIPI program, the rationale behind the background checks was attributed to the poor treatment that participating youth would likely receive had they not gone through a check:
This was the thinking – there are 5-7 police divisions in these neighbourhoods already have a very negative view of these kids. If we send kids who haven’t gone through a background check, those officers in those divisions will make their lives hell. So it was a tactical decision (Personal Interview TPSB1, 2015.)

The ability of police officers to act at their discretion is a recipe for the continued breach of citizens’ rights. Discretionary proactive policing tactics bring forward problems of race, class, and the surveillance of the poor. What’s more, these tactics undermine the constituent meaning of the language of engagement, and exacerbate police resentment within low-income communities. As DiMatteo (Now Toronto: April 15, 2015) writes, “TAVIS’ original mandate was never solely to be a rapid response unit. ‘Engagement with community members’ was supposed to be the core of its work, but somehow that got lost amidst the tallying of falling crime stats.”

3.1.1.2 The Social Consequences of Discretionary Policing

In Toronto, mounting public criticism over TAVIS’ aggressive carding tactics and a demand for justice resulted in a provincial MCSCS move to cut TAVIS funding down from $5 million a year to $2.63 million, effective January 2016, with the “ultimate aim to axe the program altogether” (Toronto Star, 2015, September 9). In October of 2015, MSCSC Minister Naqvi deemed the discretionary practice of carding illegal. Following the reduction of funding for TAVIS, the Province, the TPS and the Board are in the process of renegotiating an administrative framework that will determine the style of community policing and the strategy of the police service as a whole. Drawing from Wilson’s (1968: 140) seminal text on policing organization, this new strategy will come to be “reinforced by the attitudes and policies of the police administration” – that is, the beliefs and preferences of the people involved in defining practice. Research has shown that officers feel pressure to perform well on indicators that their administration values (Way and Patten, 2014). These administrative values, beliefs and preferences, in turn, are shaped by the cultural norms and practices of society as a whole.
It follows that, as a society, Canadians have been spectators to the long lineage of racially biased policing practices in the United States. In recent years, the rise of community policing programs in cities like Chicago, New York and Boston have become synonymous with “aggressive stop-and-frisk practices, off-the-books detention and interrogation, and the routine surveillance of social movement organizations, including those that have demanded greater police accountability, and the frequent killing of unarmed black youths” (Martin, 2015, September 7). In accordance with Martin (ibid), recent U.S. polls show that the “unending flow of video footage documenting police brutality is paralleled by declining levels of support for the police.” This declining support is “spreading from poor communities to wealthier and whiter ones” – producing a “conundrum that pure repression cannot easily resolve,” as dueling tensions between meeting popular demands for justice and continuing aggressive policing become increasingly evident (ibid).

In an interview with an MCSCS Standards Development Officer (Personal Interview MSCSC1, 2015), it was stated that the province is opting to divert more money into "working with local groups and prioritize community-based crime prevention and youth engagement.” This language mirrors the language of TAVIS. What remains to be seen is how TPS operations and practices will change, or whether TAVIS’ community practices will remain unaffected; protected by the glossy rhetoric of a newly rebranded provincial mandate – a mandate which emulates Glasgow, UK’s community-based policing model, dubbed a ‘public health’ model for reducing crime, disorder and violence in society.

4 The Next Era of Community Policing: Ontario’s Transition to Predictive Analytics

Policing is directly related to the financial markets. So we must find opportunities to protect the core business but use innovation to look at what we need to change to become more efficient (Personal Interview DM, 2015.)

The dramatic reduction of provincial funding for TAVIS has many stakeholders, policy advocates and community activists speculating about the reallocation of the $5 million
per annum budget. As one provincial policy official commented, “the funds being reallocated elsewhere is part of a hopeful agenda for folks at the ministry who thought that once TAVIS was cut, the government might reallocate those resources for more community-based interventions” (Personal Interview TPSB2, 2015). As it stands, no announcement has been made in the way of a formal plan for community policing, although it was confirmed that “there may be some announcement by the province in the very near future” (ibid).

Another official described the hopeful potential of a new, trial community policing strategy modeled after Glasgow’s multi-stakeholder, public health approach. The strategy was brought to Canada by Deputy Minister Dale McFee (former Chief of Police of Prince Albert, Sask.) and his Prince Albert-based research team. As one provincial analyst described (Personal Interview DPSU1, 2015), as of October 2015, the strategy is being tested in Rexdale -- Toronto’s 23 Division:

[…] if it turns out that the money can be reinvested into community engagement initiatives, I think the board and certainly the chief would be very excited to figure out what we can do that would make meaningful difference in those communities that have the most significant policing challenges. We’re not in a position to choose a particular locality, but I think that the Chief having come from 23 Division historically and given where the needs are, there would be a good argument for some of those divisions that have very obvious policing needs to be selected as priority targets for reinvestment in policy strategies around engagement.

Stephen Beckett, Assistant Deputy Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services also provided commentary regarding the policy and operational changes that the Ministry plans to pursue. He outlines an impending transition from a ‘community policing’ model to a ‘community safety and well-being’ model as part of the new Strategy for a Safer Ontario (2015):

We’re changing the broader framework from community policing to community safety and well-being. Community safety is one thing, but if it’s not a safety issue it’s really a well-being issue for both the individual and the community. The expectation is that the community would have a community safety and well-being
plan, and that plan would inform or build a strategy going forward on that basis. So this is much different from community policing. We’ve moved from a police-centered strategy, to one which treats the police as stakeholders and participants [...] part of a much bigger system that’s needed to improve community safety and wellbeing (Personal Interview ADM, 2015.)

According to Minister Beckett, the new, provincially-driven Strategy aims to “move on from the older professional models,” bringing “neighbourhood players together in order to solve neighbourhood problems (ibid).” This network of actors is said to include government and non-governmental actors, as well as local community groups. The Strategy involves a combination of multi-sectorial, multi-stakeholder partnerships, the use of predictive analytics to identify and address elevated risk, and the introduction of a ‘new professionalism’ in police-community relations. These components were compiled and adapted from two existing international approaches. They are:

1. Glasgow’s multi-sectorial, ‘public health’ approach to community policing, including:
   a) the Scottish Concordat’s Building Partnerships to Reduce Crime (BPRC) Enterprise Charter;
   b) the Glasgow Community Safety Services (G-Cass) multi-agency collaborative environment for analysis and systemic solutions; and
   c) South Glasgow’s roundtable process for identifying and addressing elevated ‘risk’ situations before they became incidents (called ‘predictive analytics’, or ‘situation tables’).

2. Stone and Travis’ (2011) work on the ‘New Professionalism’ of community policing – a policy report written for the US National Institute of Justice (NIJ) at the Harvard Kennedy School’s School of Criminal Justice Policy and Management. The authors developed a four-pronged approach to the improvement of traditional community policing models: accountability, legitimacy, innovation and national coherence (2011: 2).
Both models, along with their relevant application to the Strategy for a Safer Ontario, are described in detail below.

**4.1 Adopting the Glasgow Model**

In 2008, in the City of Prince Albert, Sask., Chief of Police Dale McFee (now a Deputy Minister) and his colleagues were in search of innovative solutions to spatially-concentrated crime. The city’s violence and crime counts were much higher than national and provincial averages, and police calls for service had doubled over the ten years, with a trend line “projecting this to double again in a span of less than 8 years” (McFee and Taylor, 2011). McFee and his team looked to the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police ISIS program which had reportedly “identified innovative and highly promising collaborative solutions that had been underway in Scotland for the past few years” in Glasgow, Scotland (ibid). A multi-agency delegation -- comprised of RCMP, members of the Saskatchewan Association of Chiefs of Police, the Prince Albert Community Mobilization Committee, and the Prince Albert Regional Intersectorial Committee (RIC) – travelled to Glasgow to study these practices. The team discovered that the two cities were closely comparable on 15 key indicators, including “dominance of alcohol as a contributing factor in crime and disorder,” to the “higher than average rates of suicide, domestic violence, teen pregnancy, HIV and Hep C, and truancy,” to “notably disturbing rates of unemployment,” with all of these factors over-represented within the most low-income, racialiazed sectors of both societies (ibid).

In Scotland, Glasgow’s Strathclyde Police, along with a network of participating agencies from across the social service sector, gave seminars and plenaries on their multi-sector approach to delivering community safety. According to the City of Prince Albert’s resulting report (BDRC, 2011), the team studied Glasgow’s “gang diversion programs, initiatives engaging the medical and dental communities in violence identification and reduction, and the general commitment of the Scots to a ‘Public Health’ model for reducing crime, disorder and violence in their society.”
Prince Albert’s team adopted two key components of Glasgow’s model. The first was the Scottish Concordat – a “signed commitment between the government of the country and the municipal authorities responsible for community life in its cities and towns” – which became the model for the Enterprise Charter that now defines Prince’s Albert’s Building Partnerships to Reduce Crime (BPRC) Enterprise Team, the group charged with the implementing the broader provincial strategy (Ibid).

The second component was GCSS (G-Cass), the Glasgow Community Safety Services – a multi-agency “collaborative environment for analysis and systemic solutions” (ibid). This was an experimental model operating in a high-risk neighbourhood in South Glasgow, where the local police Superintendent and her agency partners had piloted a daily roundtable process, called hubs, for “identifying and addressing elevated risk situations before they became incidents” (ibid). In Ontario, ‘hubs’ are referred to as “situation tables” (see 4.1.1 below).

Upon return, the study team combined the two models described above and created the Community Mobilization Prince Albert model of the Hub. In 2014, Prince Albert’s model was transferred to Ontario through processes of networked governance;\(^{20}\) transferring policy learnings and strategies via the Ontario Working Group on Collaborative Risk to create the OACP’s ‘Framework for Planning Community Safety and Well-being’, which created the framework for the largest urban application of the model, Focus Rexdale, delivered by the TPS (see Section 5.2).

4.1.1  Predicting Risk: The Situation Table

In an interview with Deputy Minister Dale Mcfee (former Prince Albert Chief of Police) explained that the Glasgow Model was chosen due to a crisis of “business” (Personal

\(^{20}\) “Networked governance”—or a move from “government” to “governance”—occurs when traditional bureaucracies and elected local authorities no longer take on key roles in social service delivery systems. Instead, a complex and decentralized network of non-governmental institutions, organizations, volunteer groups and private actors are now responsible for delivering social services to communities and their residents.
Interview DM, 2015). As he outlines, “Policing is directly related to the financial markets. So we must find opportunities to protect the core business but use innovation to look at what we need to change to become more efficient”. In Canada, police efficiency, from his view, is being stifled on account of an overwhelming focus on violence reduction despite the majority of police calls were related to individuals with mental health and addictions issues. He explains:

[...] where the police spend most of their time has nothing to do with violence. But when you actually focus on mental health and addictions then you’ll involve people in all sectors – pull the low hanging fruit out and focus on other things first and then you can focus on violence. The thing about just focusing on anti-violence and not mental health – if you focus on 10% of the issue, what is the maximum return can you have? If you do anti violence in isolation, you’re not tackling the whole problem.

DM McFee extended the financial analogy to point out that, from his view, policing is ‘directly related to the financial markets. So we must find opportunities to protect the core business but use innovation to look at what we need to change to become more efficient.’

In order to facilitate greater efficiency and lower the officer time spent on mental health and addictions calls, he says that “multi-sector lens” is needed in order to “figure out what’s going on in individuals family that leads to criminal activity” and “determine future risk.” To do this, “predictive analytics is the future.”

The main instrument through which to predict risk related to an individual is referred to as a situation table (called ‘hubs’ under Glagow’s model). A situation table is comprised of a multi-sector group of individuals who meet to decide on the best method of intervention for an individual who has come into contact with the police. According to ADM Beckett (Personal Interview ADM, 2015), the table could include “a representative from a mental health services agency, an addictions specialist, a housing service rep.” If it’s determined that there is an “acutely elevated risk to the individual or the community,” on that basis the group can “begin to start sharing information across agencies.” From there, an intervention plan is developed to try to establish which agency or group is best
suited to handling the individual’s case, and the police no longer become the first line of response. The goal is to “prevent an individual from coming into constant contact with the police” – a process which can waste police time and resources. The data emerging from a collection of situation tables is also used to inform the overarching Community Safety Model; helping to identify community-level needs and the ‘risk factors’ which contribute to spatially-concentrated violence.

4.1.2 The Community Safety Model

The Community Safety Model -- developed in Saskatchewan and adopted by the OACP, TPS and MSCSC -- is comprised of four layers: (1) Emergency response, (2) Mitigating Elevated Risk, (3) Reducing Identified Risks, and (4) Promoting and Maintaining Community Safety and Well-Being.

Table 2: Framework for Planning Community Safety and Well-being (OACP, 2014)

Three study participants provided a thorough description of the four-layered model – DM McFee, DM Beckett, and an Inspector with the DPSU. The description most relevant to Toronto was given by ADM Beckett, who outlines the relationship between ‘risk’, as it’s framed in a ‘situation table’, and intervention. The Minister also highlights the greatest distinguishing factor that the new approach offers – the ‘preventative’ policy piece,
suggesting that the province is now beginning to focus on the structural ‘roots’ of poverty (such as housing) (McMurtry and Curling, 2008). As he states:

*The model that’s presented in community safety and well-being has four layers. The first layer is traditional emergency response. The next level is interventional. It could be the situation table. In the Glasgow model, their approach was to work from the homicide backwards. They look at points in that person’s life where you could have intervened, and then we start building the model that allows for that. The third layer involves a level of responsibility. All data that emerges from a situation table is collected in deidentified data to establish trends – so all of the risk factors – addiction, truancy, mental health issues, are identified for particular cases. In many cases, a person might have 5 or 6 risk factors. So those are recorded, and then a deidentified database creates a risk profile for that neighbourhood or community – so the center of responsibility would identify those factors and develop programs that would deal with those risk factors. For example, if housing was the biggest risk factor then an affordable housing organization would be contacted. As you go to the highest levels, that’s a preventative approach. So that is establishing policies that get ahead of the risk factors. So the data that’s collected that’s the preventative piece. And building policy from that level. A preventative policy piece* (Personal Interview ADM, 2015.)

A ‘preventative policy piece’ comes in the form of a locally-developed community safety and well-being plan, and, according to DM McFee, that plan would “inform or build a strategy going forward on that basis” (ibid).

From Beckett’s perspective, this model is “much different from community policing” (ibid). The provincial strategy has allowed for a shift in values to occur within the MCSCS, as well as the administrative ranks of Toronto’s police forces (ibid). These values, as he says, entail a move from “a belief that the universe revolves around the police, to the police as a stakeholder, a participant and part of a much bigger system that’s needed to improve community safety and wellbeing.”

Whether or not these significant systemic shifts will occur remains to be seen. In order for police-community relations to become more democratic, and to begin to incorporate principles of ‘policing by consent’, a dramatic change in operational, day-to-day activities and a leveling of power between officers and civilians that has not yet been practiced; and indeed, many community activists are skeptical. In a particularly damning
critique of the new model, a member of a civilian police accountability coalition (Personal Interview TPAC2, 2015) suggested that the new model presents little in the way of hope, given the TPS’ history of prioritizing police safety over community well-being. Moreover, the model operates on the “[...] naïve belief that you can work with the police and that they will listen to your perspective and respect it. That’s just not true.”

Regarding the new language of ‘community safety and well-being’, the rhetoric is reduced to more of the same policy jargon -- framing ambiguous measures of ‘engagement’ as the panacea for problems of poverty and crime:

*The police know that they need to put something nice around this, and they use the language of social work and they know that people are ill. But what they’re unwilling to do anything about is the foundational or structural roots. They’re not going to call for a guaranteed income, they’re not going to call for a national housing strategy. They’re not going to call for gender equality. They don’t see it as their position – just as a lot of social workers don’t see it as their job to do that. So they’re not going to go there. So what they try to do is to frame things as a ‘kinder, gentler way of policing’. And it is kinder and gentler, except when push comes to shove and that person is a scary black person with a knife or a hammer or their justification is ‘suicide by cop’ (ibid.).*

As it stands, whether or not the province plans to direct police funding and resources to the social supports and services that address the structural roots of poverty that create crime ‘hot spots’ is left to be determined in 2016.

### 4.2 Establishing a ‘New Professionalism’ in Police-Community Relations

As Assistant Deputy Minister Beckett has outlined, in addition to borrowing predictive analytics frameworks and ‘situation tables’ from the UK, the *Strategy for a Safer Ontario* (2015) also borrows from Stone and Travis’ (2011) work on the ‘New Professionalism’ of community policing. The authors developed a four-pronged approach to the improvement of traditional community policing models: accountability, legitimacy, innovation and national coherence (ibid: 2). This ‘new professionalism’ is intended to help citizens understand individual police actions “as part of larger strategies,” and advocates for a much stronger operational commitment to community engagement and
participation so that citizens may “and assess the demands and requests that police make for more public money” in “keeping communities safe” (ibid.)

Applied to Ontario’s *Strategy*, professionalization measures will be incorporated into new ‘Community Wellbeing Plans’ – mandated in “either municipalities or police services or both” (ibid.). As Beckett explains:

*For us in Ontario we look at building a product that’s consistent across towns and cities. Accountability is another piece that provides value. Innovation. Legitimacy – meaning that the public sees that the services that are provided by the police or others are accountable to the community. Legitimacy is built through infrastructure* (Personal Interview ADM, 2015.)

The promise of increased legitimacy is redolent of the principles of ‘policing by consent’ that are advocated here, described in a brief case study in Section 6. While increased legitimacy in the form of police accountability to citizens sounds promising, the language of ‘new professionalism’ and ‘innovation’ falls in line with New Public Management (NPM) schemes – part of the sweeping of market-oriented public sector reforms perceived by some to be a global phenomenon (Bevir et al, 2003). As critics of the market-oriented approach to service delivery schemas, Bevir et al describe NPM as a horizontal mode of governance. Where state bureaucracies are hierarchical and concerned with the maintenance of public order, the primary goal of NPM is to “focus on management, not policy, and on performance appraisal and efficiency” (ibid: 1). NPM favours the “governance mode of markets,” the competition of public agencies with private enterprise, and the “disaggregation of departmental structures into service agencies” (Steurer, 2007: 9).

Critics such as Volker Eick, an urban geography researcher focused on post-welfarist reforms to urban security frameworks (or ‘the neoliberalization of policing and the policing of neoliberalization’), point to an increasingly devolved and privatized urban policing model emerging in cities such as London, Berlin and Los Angeles. Eick (2010: 13) asserts that the “most important goal of today’s urban policy” is to “mobilize city space as an arena of market-oriented economic growth protected by policing mechanisms
either in a state-led or a private form.” The commodification of urban spaces necessitates
the policing of these spaces – whether it be the devolution of policing services downward
and outward from the state to de facto private security forces and neighbourhood watch
groups. This may result in a fragmented, patchwork system of policing services, and a
reduction of coordinated police oversight.

In Toronto, the selective privatization of policing services is indeed part of the new
community policing strategy (refer to Section 6.3 for a discussion of privatized policing).

While Minister Beckett confirmed that a cost-savings would be paramount in rolling out
the strategy – commenting that “a transition to private security is part of the strategy” –
he maintains that “the goal is to establish […] public services by a for-profit privatized
company, but with some very strict oversight mechanisms and a very strong public
accountability infrastructure” (Personal Interview ADM, 2015). The successful
implementation of ‘strict oversight mechanisms’, however, is threatened by the history of
the TPS to disregard, or refuse to implement, operational directives from the TPSB -- its
civilian board. The issue of ambiguity around police-board powers is one of many
challenges to policy implementation posed by the internal structure of the TPS.

5 Challenging Reform: The Toronto Police Services’ Push-Back on
Carding Reform, Increased Board Powers, and Privatization

The TPSB is a Board that was really actively engaged in trying to address issues of
carding and it virtually got nothing done in spite of a lot of very hard work. So we don’t
really have in this province true civilization scrutiny over policing in a way that amounts
to significant accountability (Personal Interview OHRC, 2015.)

5.1 Carding Reform

The CAPP report -- compiled by policing scholars and advocates Neil Price and Chris
Williams, along with the CAPP Community Advisory Committee and the assistance of
23 youth research assistants, and inspired by the Morris Justice Project of New York City
-- was spearheaded by the TPSB following the release of the 2014 Community Contacts
policy, which introduced new parameters to the practice of police carding under TAVIS and required police to have a valid public safety reason for stopping individuals and collecting their information (see Section 3). Many groups praised this new policy as a progressive step toward improving police-citizen interactions in Toronto’s low-income neighbourhoods. In order to gauge the level of operational implementation of the new policy, the TPSB commissioned the CAPP survey in the highly-policed 31 Division, spanning six neighbourhoods in Toronto’s Jane-Finch area.

CAPP’s survey, conducted over the summer of 2014, collected data from 404 community members across 31 Division in order to “determine community satisfaction with policing during the June to August, 2014 time period, measure the impacts of the policy, and make recommendations for changes or improvements to the Community Contacts policy” (refer to Appendix D) (CAPP, 2014). Researchers canvassed high-traffic areas throughout six neighbourhoods in 31 Division, and disseminated the survey throughout Toronto Community Housing communities and via an online survey (ibid). CAPP’s Community Advisory Committee conducted two community forums in order to inform local community members about the research findings, and to “propose solutions that could improve police-community relations” (ibid).

The report found that few members of the public were aware of the new Community Contacts policy, or the formal procedures involved in carding. Findings also pointed to “widespread dissatisfaction” with the way that police interact with members of the community (CAPP, 2014). The level of community trust for the police in 31 Division was reported as low, as many participants believed that officers were profiling residents in the Jane-Finch area based on race, and others were of the opinion that officers regularly abused their power. Moreover, of the 137 people who said they had been carded, 85 per cent said they had not received receipts -- a requirement that had been a board policy since 2013 (ibid). Approximately 40% of the 404 participants stated that the relationship between police and the community remained poor following the implementation of the new Community Contacts Policy. CAPP’s recommendations to the TPS (refer to Appendix D) focused on: (1) suggested improvements to the implementation of the
Community Contacts Policy, and (2) new strategies through which to improve police-community relations in 31 Division.

Following the release of CAPP’s recommendations, Chief Blair called the survey “a report of advocacy” (*Toronto Star*, Nov. 13, 2014). Mike McCormack, president of the Toronto Police Association, said “acceptance of the survey results was further lowering police morale already damaged by negative media reports and problems with training officers on the new in-car computer Versadex system, among other things” (ibid). He went on to suggest that this report “does nothing to further police community relations” (ibid).

A lead author of the CAPP report provided commentary on the controversy surrounding the report (Personal Interview CAPP, 2015). He spoke of the failure of the TPS to effectively implement the Community Contacts policy, and of Chief Blair’s criticism:

> We did the analysis and presented it November 24 2014 and there were a number of troubling findings with respect to the policy. We found that it was essentially a ‘dead letter’ document, and police in 31 Division weren’t observing it in any meaningful way. The troubling practices were still going on. The intimidation, the ‘micro kettling’ of youth. So the police, represented by Chief Bill Blair decided to defend the status quo by attacking our report methodological grounds but also on our motivations. Blair famously referred to our report as an ‘advocacy report’. We didn’t meet his existing standards of objectivity.

Chief Blair’s criticism was said to be rooted in what he perceives as ‘unimplementable operational changes’ to the TPS:

> The reaction from the police was sort of predictable because the recommendations that we put forth would have required a significant change in police practices on a qualitative and quantitative level. You have a ban, for example, on the carding of minor which would have produced a very pronounced quantitative effect; but at a quantitative level it would be very difficult to circumscribe operational parameters to the changes that needed to take place (Personal Interview CAPP, 2015).

Following the rejection of the report’s findings, the TPSB struck a subcommittee in early 2015 consisting of members Chris Pringle, Marie Moliner, and lawyer Frank Addario.
The committee sought to review CAPP’s findings and discuss the possibility of implementation. As the CAPP author recounts:

_The subcommittee didn’t really go to far in terms of carrying out the recommendations. And, of course in early 2015 Blair announced that the TPS had suspended carding. There was some ambiguity there and it was unclear what a suspension meant because the officers were still stopping and questioning people, but the police notebook-to-database transition was still taking place. The carding practice became like carding circa 1975._

The author’s concern about these practices going ‘underground’ was echoed by the former chair of the TPSB at the time, Dr. Alok Mukherjee. Dr. Mukherjee was a participant in this study and, in speaking about Blair’s declaration around the ‘elimination’ of carding practices, voiced concern that discriminatory police practices may now go undetected:

_[…] this is why I did not want to get rid of the practice completely, because I feared that if I did that, the practice of carding would go underground. They will collect data that we don’t know about. I wanted carding data made public in a searchable database that is accessible to the board. That would allow us to bring in a social science researcher to extract the data and analyze it to see if there are any patterns. That would be a much more transparent and accountable process. But we’re not there. And now, they’re saying that in the time we have been working on the policy, the practice of carding has been eliminated._

The position of the TPS is that carding practices are necessary to ensuring public safety. In April of 2015, Mark Saunders succeeded Bill Blair as Toronto Police Chief. In the face of mounting public criticism on carding practices, Saunders defended carding as a key investigative tool which is necessary to the collection of intelligence and the suppression of gang activity (Globe and Mail, May 27, 2015). Saunders’ position was echoed in an interview with a senior TPS Inspector, who described the elimination of carding practices as a loss to ‘coordinated intelligence’ and the precursor to a recent surge in shootings:

_Carding is based on proactive policing ideas that come from the UK. If you’re going to pay for policing, you’re going to have paid officers who want to know what’s going on. The carding piece is the recording of the information – that’s the part we’ve got to get right. People don’t realize that we haven’t been carding for a year now. At least TAVIS guys aren’t. But they’re still going into a hallway tonight where there’s a drug deal going on, and they’ll arrest people. Body cameras now_
record that information versus carding. Now only your image is captured, your voice. The carding facilitated coordinated intelligence [...] So what you’re going to find is that the loss of that information has facilitated an increase in shootings recently (Personal Interview TPS1, 2015.)

While the TPS maintains that carding practices have been eliminated and replaced with body cameras that record officer-citizen interactions, critics maintain that the practice has continued, but is no longer recorded in police databases. From Dr. Mukherjee’s perspective, the board was stifled in its attempts to regulate unlawful carding practices, and to influence TPS operations. As he recounts:

[...] the board came under great criticism for not performing its governance role in carding. The board did something unprecedented that it had never done in its history. The board went out into the community and did extensive consultations. And brought in its own lawyer, spent huge sums of money -- and the lawyer, Frank Addario, produced a very good policy. And it was far more relevant than anything that existed anywhere else (Personal Interview TPSB1, 2015).

Dr. Mukherjee cites two key reasons for its inability to implement CAPP’s recommendations. The first is tied to the lack of a putative definition of ‘good safety practice’, while the second is attributed to the refusal of the police conform to a rights-based approach in their interactions with civilians:

The first reason was due to the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes good public safety practice. We were not saying ban carding, we were saying that it has an important public safety purpose when defined. And as an operational matter, the TPS must define its purpose. And secondly, police must provide the people that they speak to with a receipt. At first Chief Blair did not say anything when the policy was being drafted. But suddenly after it was approved, he refused to implement a rights-based approach – which was the foundation of the policy. Instead, he provided a definition of public safety that was so broad that the board rejected it – because with a definition that broad, police officers will keep on doing what they’re doing (ibid.)

Mukherjee also emphasized that the power of the Board to influence TPS operational practices was very limited. He described the difficulties that he and his fellow TPSB members faced in dealing with former Chief Bill Blair in a final attempt at regulating carding, resulting in an unprecedented mediation process between the Board and the Chief:
Understanding that the board could not order him – because these were not operational matters -- Frank Addario and I and Andy Pringle who’s now the Board chair spent a lot of time sitting down with him, arguing with him, asking him to tell us why carding has to happen because the credibility of the policy of the service [the Police Services Act] depends on it. And he said no. That’s when Mayor Tory called for a mediation. So we spent $100,000 dealing with a judge who had no background in policing, but he was a good labour relations mediator. We took a big hit on that. The public did not buy the mediated product. And it was not Blair who took the heat – it was the Board. The Board was not seen to have exercised its governance (ibid.)

The issue of ambiguity around police-board powers is at the center of this ongoing debate.

5.2 Limits to the Regulatory Authority of the Civilian Board

The primary role of the Board, in accordance with Section 31 of the Police Services Act, is “to establish, after consultation with the Chief of Police, overall objectives and priorities for the provision of police services (TPSB, 2006).” The Chief of Police is “responsible for administering the police service and overseeing its operation in accordance with the objectives, priorities and policies established by the Board (ibid).”

Distinguishing an "operational" matter that falls outside the Board's jurisdiction from general management and policy matters that fall within the Board's jurisdiction lies at the heart of the relationship between the Board and the Service (TPSB, 2006). Section 31(4) of the Police Services Act is intended to prevent direct Board interference in the actual policing function but not to prevent the Board from making decisions governing the structure and environment in which those policing functions occur (ibid). Herein lies a great deal of ambiguity regarding what ‘structure’ and ‘environment’ constitute.

Underlining the inability of the Board to influence operational decisions within the TPS, Dr. Mukherjee explained that, when he began his role as chair of the board 10 years ago, the same three problems existed. The first was the problem of racial profiling and difficulty dealing with citizens with mental health issues, the second involved budgetary
issues related to formidable staffing costs, and the third was the inherent ambiguity in police board powers to effect operational decisions or the decisions of the Police Chief (ibid). The persistence of these issues grew to become unendurable:

In a city like Toronto, firing the Chief is virtual impossible. And that’s a recipe for total paralysis [...] There’s a difference between the practice of governance, the political realities, and the ambiguity that the law creates. It was deeply frustrating and it is still frustrating. Part of my reason for leaving the Board is that I’ve taken this as far as I can. And now, the new Chief is also putting up objections that are similar to those of the old Chief. So maybe a new chair with a fresh outlook will have more successes (ibid.)

As for the new TPSB Chair, Andy Pringle -- Mayor Tory’s long-time friend and former Queen’s Park Chief of Staff -- Pringle currently faces criticism from police accountability group TPAC due to his liberal-conservative politics and his perceived lack of knowledge about the every-day challenges that communities of colour face (Personal Interview TPAC2, 2015).

5.3 Financial Constraints and the Question of Privatization

In April 2015, the Association of Municipalities Ontario (AMO) released its Policing Modernization Report, titled “Building a New Public Safety Model in Ontario.” As the report outlines, Ontarians pay the highest proportion of Canada’s policing costs. In 2011, Ontarians spent $320 per capita on policing – estimated to be at about $35 more than Albertans, $56 more than British Columbians, and $24 more than Quebecers (AMO, 2015: 5; Statistics Canada, 2012). Ontarians also pay the highest property taxes in the country, and property tax is the main source of revenue for policing costs (AMO, 2015). Property tax is a regressive tax, which means that it carries more significant impacts for low-income people than income or consumption taxes. Moreover, the ever-increasing costs of policing disproportionately affect municipal governments given that two-thirds of all officers are municipal employees (ibid). In Toronto, no effective control on wage settlements has been imposed on the Toronto Police Association, and the process of binding arbitration has routinely allowed the Toronto Police Association to exceed the rates of other police labour settlements. The last contract, in 2011, saw an 11.5 per cent rise over 4 years – making Toronto police the highest-paid in the country at a time when
wages in much of the city's public service were frozen (Now Magazine, Sept 4, 2014). Given that staffing accounts for over 90% of the city’s policing budget, the costs of delivering policing services are seen to be in need of considerable reduction.

The AMO report recommends the “modernization of policing services” -- calling for sweeping changes to the policing model in Ontario, including the privatization of non-essential services -- or the transferring of many functions performed by front-line officers “to civilians or other private sector security providers” (ibid).

Many local officials and police officers disagree on the need to cut back on the city’s police budget. One TPSB official (Personal Interview TPSB2, 2015) attests that the allotted community policing budget does not provide “enough funds to pay the people that we have for the work that needs to be done.”

5.3.1 The Privatization Debate: Lessons from the UK

The AMO report’s privatization proposal is not the first of its kind. In 2010, the TPSB made an agreement with the City to cut the police budget by 10% over the course of three years. Bill Blair and Dr. Mukherjee were tasked with the undertaking of a comprehensive review of police services in order to identify areas where budgetary reductions could be made. In 2011, the two men travelled to London alongside police chiefs from across Ontario to learn about the UK approach to privatization, and recent changes to London’s Metropolitan Police Services (MET).

In his description of the trip and its outcomes, Dr. Mukherjee revealed that, after seeing some of the privatization measures that had been implemented, the changes were discussed. The officers, from his view, were “threatened by what was happening,” and rejected the model. Mukherjee disagreed, and commissioned a KPMG report on modernizing policing in Toronto. The report, released on December 10, 215 ahead of a TPS board meeting, calls for a “temporary reduction on overtime pay and non-essential promotions” and provides a preliminary plan for outsourcing some non-essential jobs.
such as parking enforcement to private security firms -- estimated to produce an annual savings of $30 million (CP24, 2015: December 10). The report also raises the possibility of the civilianization of many roles; citing the example of San Francisco’s police department which recently hired 16 civilians to oversee property crimes (ibid).

While some TPSB members and provincial bureaucrats are in support of selective outsourcing and privatization, many officers and senior administrators with the TPS reject the proposal, citing the importance of a ‘coordinated police force’. Arguing on behalf of the maintenance of the force, one Inspector states:

*A private security guard or an auxiliary officer, their legal abilities are limited to what’s onsite and they don’t have accountability and training. The fact is, when things are serious and you need the police a security guard can only do so much […] The process and the rigour disappears with private forces. The TPS has a public mandate, and we are accountable to public concern* [Personal Interview TPS1, 2015.]

The Inspector also warns of a loss of accountability that may negatively affect ‘priority’ areas:

*When you start as a community officer within an auxiliary force like San Francisco or the community officers in London […] you are never going to rise to become the chief of London MET. You start and end as an auxiliary community officer. If you’re part of an auxiliary police force in a priority community, you’re not connected to the rest of the force. You have to figure things out yourself and make your own decisions.*

Concerns over a loss of police accountability are echoed by anti-police brutality advocates Mire and Rhodes (2015), who stress that “police agencies are public entities that can be held accountable,” while a private service may not. Writing on the most recent surge in police brutality in the US, they warn that the current state of public policing is characterized by violence wielded against poor minority groups—“and in a postindustrial milieu, as private security returns as a more acceptable social infrastructure, it may prove to be even less accountable to those on the margins.”
Commenting on the viability of privatization select measures, a TPSB member stressed that the Board will not be looking to privatize any jobs that “require a certain level of skill” and are “aligned with traditional forms of policing (Personal Interview TPSB2, 2015).” Applied to community policing, they advocate, instead, for a refocusing of the skills of well-trained officers: “retraining these existing officers with the right community-based knowledge and holding them accountable through mechanisms that work; rather than privatizing those areas where we don’t think the police are doing particularly well.” The importance of having well-trained officers in high-risk neighbourhoods, they add, is essential to repairing police-community relations in those areas.

5.4 Summary

It is clear that a new approach to community policing requires significant government investment. A redirection of the $5 million per annum TAVIS budget would be a start; however, in order for police services to partner more actively with communities labeled as ‘high-risk’, one TPSB member says it may take a “wholesale whiteboard approach” to rethinking how community policing were to take place in those neighbourhoods – and the conversation has yet be had (Personal Interview TPSB2, 2015).

A central aim of this study, as stated in Section 1, is to provide a set of preliminary recommendations for the redirection of TAVIS funds toward a new, community-based policing model that aligns with the principles of ‘policing by consent’. These theoretical principles are carried forward, empirically, by the Morris Justice Model of Participatory Action Research in Community Policing in the Bronx, NYC.

6 Case Study: The Morris Justice Model of Participatory Action Research in Community Policing

6.1 Policing by Consent
In September of 2015, I attended the Toronto premiere of “The Hard Stop,” a UK documentary based on the political controversy that followed the unprovoked shooting of a young black man named Mark Duggan at the hands of police officers during a routine traffic stop in the suburbs of London. The death of Mr. Duggan infamously kicked off mass rioting and looting across the UK in the summer of 2011. After the film, I posed questions to the small group of Mr. Duggan’s friends and family who were in attendance. I asked them what they thought about London’s community policing model, since community-level tensions between residents and officers patrolling London’s “most deprived” neighbourhoods have often been linked to the riots. I also suggested that the recent privatization of neighbourhood policing functions may exacerbate lingering tensions, and decrease the quality and accountability of the service.

The answers I received were, firstly, that they did not agree that London’s policing problem stemmed from the targeted policing of low-income communities. Nor did they think that the problem would necessarily be exacerbated by the consistent and sizable cuts to social services and public infrastructure that have come down from UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative administration and its ‘Big Society’ agenda, and the concomitant transition to a privatized community policing functions across London. Instead, they told me that the problem was rooted in a long history of racial tension that had first come to a boiling point in 1985, during a riot that took place on the Broadwater Farm Housing Estate in Tottenham, North London. They told me that council estates across Britain were in need of officers, and that police officers would be welcomed into their communities if they agreed to abide by the principles of the ‘policing by consent’ model.

To reiterate, the principles of policing by consent refer to a long-standing philosophy of British policing, known as Robert Peel’s 9 Principles of Policing (refer to Appendix A).

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21 In response to the death of a local black woman who died of heart failure during a police search of her home, a riot broke out. Forty or fifty rioters surrounded officer Keith Blakelock, and murdered him with a machete. This was the first time that an officer had been killed in a riot in Britain since 1833, and what resulted was an apparent breakdown of relations between the police and black communities in several cities across Britain.
The principles, which were first set out in the ‘General Instructions’ that were issued to every new police officer from 1829, dictated that “the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force,” and to always endeavor to “seek and preserve public favour” before acting in order to retain public support (UK Home Office, 2012).

To be sure, in the aftermath of the TPS’ highly-publicized carding debate, public support for Toronto’s community police force is is down. In order to build back public favour and support, it is proposed here that the TPSB and the TPS outsource a new model of community policing to a group of consultants who deal with the police the most – i.e., an organized group of youth from priority neighbourhoods, youth workers, and staff from community organizations and ethno-cultural associations. Such a group could be contracted by the TPS to research and design a new community engagement model, borrowing from the Morris Justice PAR model described below.

6.1.1 Participatory Action Research in Community Policing: Learning from the Morris Justice Model

In 2013, as a TPSB member recounts (Participant Interview TPSB2, 2015), a participatory action research model (PAR) inspired by the Morris Justice Project was presented to members of by TPSB by the Board’s advisors in 2013. The Board member describes championed the model at the time, calling it “akin to policing by consent” and a “superb piece of community work:”

[…] it was brought up by our advisors as we were struggling with what a community-designed, community engagement model would look like. They walked us through a project in the Bronx called the Morris Justice Project. It’s a superb piece of community work – very place-based, very local, and we did not get it to work in Toronto the way I was hoping it would – I was the champion behind it. I like it so much that I often look at their manifesto. They did a community-based survey and put it together in terms of what they expected their police service delivery to look like.
While the model was never officially adopted by the board, one TPSB member said that there was ‘openness’ among board members to redefine and redevelop community policing initiatives.

Morris Justice is a community of critical social science researchers and residents of the Bronx -- an NYC ‘hot spot’ neighbourhood that “experienced a disproportionate amount of aggressive and discriminatory policing in the name of ‘community safety’ (Morris Justice, 2015).” It is “an in-depth investigation into the lived experience of NYPD's hot spot and stop and frisk practices, and the community's vision of community safety (ibid).” The project’s PAR model is premised on principles of social and community action research in which academics and community agencies work in full, non-hierarchical collaboration with residents to understand and transform the operational practices of the NYPD (Greenwood et al, 1993). The method emphasizes co-learning, co-construction and co-mapping in order to generate collective action plans and strategies that reflect the needs and desires of the communities most affected by targeted police practices.

The Morris Justice Project began in 2011, sparked by the outrage felt by neighbourhood mothers in the Morris Avenue section of the South Bronx, brought on by the NYPD's treatment of their sons (ibid). The mothers came together and contacted researchers from the John Jay College, Public Science Project, and Pace University Law Center that “were interested in studying and challenging unjust policing” (ibid). The team was formed, and shortly after additional community members were recruited for the collaborative research team (see: Morris Justice Recruitment Material, Appendix G).

The central purpose for the research team was to gain an “in-depth understanding” of the neighbourhood’s experiences with police so that the group may advocate on behalf of residents and fight for increased police accountability at a civic level (ibid). The team conducted interviews and focus groups and surveys with residents of all ages across the neighbourhood, collecting data on three topics: 1. Perceptions of home and neighborhood 2. Personal experiences with police 3. Attitudes towards police (ibid). The project also
includes a critical mapping component (see Appendix 1), using NYPD hot spot data and mapping tools to represent the disproportionate impact of hot spot policing.

The “action” component of the research has led Morris Justice members to act as plaintiffs in the class-action suit, Ligon et al v. City of New York, which challenges the NYPD’s aggressive patrolling of private apartment buildings (ibid). Morris justice members also act as part of the Communities United for Police Reform Coalition, in support of the Community Safety Act. In June 2014, New York’s City Council passed two of the Coalition’s bills. This was the first formal step towards policy change and, more broadly, bringing greater oversight and accountability to the NYPD and its operational practices.

**Summary**

The mothers that founded the Morris Justice Project began the fight to improve racially biased and unjust hot spot and ‘stop and frisk’ policing practices in the streets of their own neighbourhood. By connecting to the right community stakeholders and social science researchers who had access to the knowledge, skills, and social networks that would allow to the project to grow, the project is now beginning to influence policy decisions and police practice at the city level.

Before such a project can succeed in Toronto, many ambiguities and ineffective modes of governance and policy-making must first be remedied. As a senior official with the OHRC says (Personal Interview OHRC, 2015) policies must “penetrate deeply” into actually affecting police work, “so that you can go beyond the talk and begin to change decisions and programs.”

7 **Key Considerations and their Implications for Police Practice Reform in Toronto**
Following the review and interpretive analysis of policy materials and interview data, four key considerations pertaining to the ongoing community policing debate emerge from the analysis.

First, provincial, municipal and organizational policy frameworks all emphasize the centrality of TPS-directed community engagement in high-risk, low-income neighbourhoods. Current TPS strategies and programs designed to influence the empowerment of youth in low-income neighbourhoods such as TAVIS, the Youth in Policing Initiative (YIPI) and FOCUS Rexdale should be thoroughly reviewed by a working group comprised of regulators, social science researchers and community partners. Importantly, community partners must be guaranteed a meaningful and permanent role, both in directing and the evaluating these policies (e.g. as part of a bi-annual review).

By extension, strategies embedded with principles of democratic regulatory justice and ‘policing by consent’ should guide the design of new community-based policing strategies. An example is found in the Morris Justice Project: a Participatory Action Research (PAR) project in the south Bronx which allows community members to act as policing policy “architects,” creating policy recommendations for police reforms that are brought to city council.

As a first step, the Province of Ontario, the City of Toronto and Toronto Police Services could create new positions for ‘community liaisons’ who can act as mediators between officers and civilians. These liaisons should not be employees of the TPS; thus providing an objective point-of-contact for residents on issues of community safety and promote effective the communication/translation of needs and priorities to both officers and decision-makers.

Secondly, predictive analytical tools used to assess “risk” could begin to forefront employment (in addition to social factors such as housing and mental health) as a key
driver of individual and community-level risk, more thoroughly accounting for the structural factors which lead to place-based poverty.

TPS community policing data must also be made available to social science researchers and members of the public. This data should include all information collected in every police stop or police-citizen encounter (e.g. neighbourhood, ethnicity, reason for the stop, etc.) An appropriate policy response would dictate that every person stopped by the police receive a receipt detailing all identifying and descriptive information that will be included in their record. In the event that the information is recorded by means of a body camera, all files should be uploaded to the central database and be made available to formal, regulatory bodies operating independently of the TPS through more transparent, open and accessible systems of data retention and processing of requests for information.

Thirdly, formal proposals to privatize select policing services should incorporate a thorough review of the challenges inherent to the UK from which these proposals borrow. The AMO’s 2015 Policing Modernization Report seeks to introduce the selective privatization of policing services in Toronto. In 2011, Alok Muhkerjee, the former Chair of the Toronto Police Services Board, and Chief of Police Bill Blair travelled to London together to study the UK approach to privatized community-based policing, thought to be at the forefront of cost-saving innovations. The visit resulted in a KPMG report, presented to the TPS and the City in December 2015, which provided detailed recommendations toward the selective privatization of TPS services.

As it follows, it is recommended here that an additional report be commissioned by the TPSB to examine the community-level impacts of privatization measures in the UK through a PAR assessment of residents, activists and rights-based advocacy groups.

As a fourth and final contribution, policies governing police training and police-led community service provision should be effectively coordinated and implemented, and the authority of the Chief of Police in guiding the implementation process should be clearly defined in relation to that of the TPSB or a provincial regulating authority. At present,
Section 31(4) of the *Police Services Act* is intended to “prevent direct Board interference” in policing service delivery but not to prevent the Board from making decisions governing the “structure and environment in which those policing functions occur.” Multiple research participants emphasize the ambiguity that exists around the authority of the TPSB, the inability of the Board to override the decisions of the Chief, and the need for clarity and policy reform.

### 7.1.1 Implications

The implications of the four key research contributions identified above are varied and complex; however, for the purposes of this study they will be seen to contribute to the broad conceptual framework of policing by consent. More specifically, formal take-up of these four key considerations would help to foster both an organizational culture, and a set of operational practices, that represent a new standard of policing by consent in Toronto.

Used here, policing by consent aligns with Tyler and Jackson’s (2012) theoretical model of social regulation, procedural justice and legitimacy. According to this model, a balanced, just and effective set of policing policies must “win the hearts and minds of individuals through legitimate use of power (Jackson et al., 2012: 4).” This “process-based” model of policing holds that, through the actions and practices of the police and criminal courts, justice institutions can “demonstrate impartial service to the law, as well as fair, respectful and even-handed wielding of power (ibid).”

There is much evidence to suggest that policies and action plans that create a sense of legitimacy and procedural justice amongst residents and communities lead to greater rates of compliance with the law, and greater cooperation officers based on a sense of shared values and/ or a common understanding of the moral underpinnings of the law (Myhil & Bradford, 2011; Jackson et al., 2012).
In order to generate effective, flexible and responsive set of policing policies and practices within Toronto, PAR methods (such as those employed by the Morris Justice Project) could be combined with data collection methods drawn from the interpretive approach to policy analysis (IPA). Going beyond the co-construction of policies and strategies, IPA accounts for the actions, beliefs, preferences and personal histories of the people involved. With regards to TPS officers, questions may focus on what officers want, why, and what events may have led them to this perspective. How do they view their role in relation to the larger organization? How do they see their role in relation to the residents they serve? How would they prefer to their jobs? What histories and events have led to the culture of the organization, as it is now, and what needs to change?

The combination of PAR with IPA data collection methods, and subsequent distribution of this data to community residents and interest groups may build a common foundation that connects the wants and needs of officers to those of the residents they serve -- establishing common connections that can be leveraged to create more responsive action plans and policies. In turn, similar data could be collected among residents and communities most targeted by police in order to generate a more in-depth, multiperspectival and subjective understanding of community need (and, by extension, risk factors).

**Looking Ahead: From Policing Risk to Policing by Consent?**

*We’re going to have a society of dangers, with, on the one side, those who are in danger, and on the other, those who are dangerous […] It is on this shadow, this phantom, this fear that the authorities would try to get a grip […]* (Foucault, 1996: 270).

As this paper has attempted to illustrate, there are many potential benefits that come with a genuinely collaborative and community driven re-working of community policing model in Toronto – particularly in the way of increased trust and willingness to cooperate
with officers on the part of individuals and community stakeholders (e.g. youth workers, social service workers, multi-service community-based organizations).

On one hand, increased public faith in the TPS would likely lead to a decrease in discriminatory practices; particularly racially discriminatory ‘stop and search’ practices, carding practices and incarceration rates. Moreover, real, formally-facilitated community input into the redirection of community policing funds may work allocate additional funds to the improvement of social service that more effectively address issues of spatialized poverty and wealth-based inequalities that plague Toronto’s inner suburbs – such as employment and housing supports. On the other hand, in terms of benefits for the police, an increase in public faith in police services may lead to more crimes reported and solved in low-income neighbourhoods and improved crime statistics.

This paper has attempted to demonstrate that, in order to secure public faith in the TPS, the organization must first work to inform their day-to-day operational practices with the basic tenets of policing by consent. At a procedural level, police officers must develop a sense of justice and anti-discriminatory practice in police-citizen encounters – and this should be guided by policy that comes from the organization, itself. In order to do this, a shift away from the administrative preoccupation with predicting and accounting for spatialized risk must first occur. As an alternative to the risk framework, it is proposed here that individuals and communities be afforded the chance, through a reordering of community policing governance strategies, policies and practices, to reframe discourses of risk and make meaningful and impactful contributions to the development and enactment of policing practices within their communities and neighbourhoods. One possible solution could be tied to a reconstitution of risk assessments so that the metrics account for and prioritize structural indicators such as employment, housing and health over individual and family-level indicators.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Policing by Consent

Statement from the UK Home Office, 10 December, 2012

We have received a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for the following:

Could you please confirm precisely what the Home Secretary meant by the statement ‘policing by consent’, with a practical example to demonstrate if possible.

We released the following information on: 03 December 2012

When saying ‘policing by consent’, the Home Secretary was referring to a long standing philosophy of British policing, known as the Robert Peel’s 9 Principles of Policing. However, there is no evidence of any link to Robert Peel and it was likely devised by the first Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis (Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne). The principles which were set out in the ‘General Instructions’ that were issued to every new police officer from 1829 were:

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.

9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

Essentially, as explained by the notable police historian Charles Reith in his ‘New Study of Police History’ in 1956, it was a philosophy of policing ‘unique in history and throughout the world because it derived not from fear but almost exclusively from public co-operation with the police, induced by them designedly by behaviour which secures and maintains for them the approval, respect and affection of the public’.

It should be noted that it refers to the power of the police coming from the common consent of the public, as opposed to the power of the state. It does not mean the consent of an individual. No individual can chose to withdraw his or her consent from the police, or from a law.
Appendix B. TAVIS Program Description and Mandate

TAVIS is a Service-wide anti-violence crime strategy that is supported by every Command in the Service.

TAVIS is a community mobilization strategy that includes:

(i) targeted, intensive intervention and enforcement in a high-risk neighbourhood;
(ii) maintenance-level enforcement, increased police-community-social agency collaboration, and increased crime prevention activities; and
(iii) ‘normalized’ police services, where police act as a support to an empowered community.

The goals and objectives of TAVIS are:

• to reduce violence;
• increase safety in the community;
• improve the quality of life for members of the high-risk communities;
• reduce the number of offenders engaged in violent crime;
• reduce the opportunity to commit crime within neighbourhoods identified as being at-risk
• reduce victimization by violent crime; increase the capacity of the community to work independently of the police to
• reduce crime; and
• improve community safety

The components of TAVIS include:

• TAVIS Rapid Response Teams;
• Each division’s TAVIS Plan;
• Neighbourhood TAVIS Initiative;
• Community Mobilization; and
• Additional Officers in the Entertainment District.

Appendix C: TAVIS Engagement Materials
Poster in Jane-Finch neighbourhood to advertise the arrival of TAVIS patrols (Source: Toronto Police Services, 2015).

The Jane-Finch TAVIS Community BBQ

Tuesday June 16, 2009
5 to 7 p.m.
Driftwood Community Centre
4401 Jane Street

This summer 43 more police officers will be patrolling the Jane-Finch area on foot and bicycle.

This community BBQ will give you an opportunity to meet the police officers and welcome them to your neighbourhood.
Appendix D: TPSB Community Contacts Policy (2014)

Toronto Police Services Community Contacts Policy  
Approved April 24, 2014


In this policy, “Contacts” are non-detention, non-arrest interactions between Service and community members that involve the eliciting and/or recording of personal information. This policy is not intended to prohibit or guide informal greetings or conversations. “CommunitySafety Notes” (“CSNs”) are investigative records of information that will be generated by some contacts.

The objectives of this policy are to:

a. Improve police-community interactions and eliminate the collection, retention, use and disclosure of irrelevant personal information;
b. Identify the circumstances in which it is appropriate to initiate a Contact or create a CSN;
c. Eliminate discrimination from Contacts;
d. Collect, retain, use and disclose information only to:
  e. Ensure accountability in the initiation of Contacts and the creation of CSNs, and fulfill policing duties under s. 42 of the Police Services Act;
   f. Improve community confidence in the Service’s ability to provide non-biased policing;
g. Enhance awareness of human rights and civil liberties under the Charter, the Code and Board policies;
h. Ensure the provision of effective training on how to conduct Contacts in a way that promotes community trust; and
i. Ensure effective oversight of Contacts by the Board through periodic, independent evaluation and public reporting of Contact-related data.

It is therefore, the policy of the Toronto Police Services Board that:

1. The Chief of Police will establish procedures regarding Contacts that:
   a. Minimize the potential negative effects of Contacts on the community;
   b. Reflect the goal of police legitimacy by ensuring Contacts are conducted in the spirit of trust building with the community and are directed toward effective policing;
   c. Ensure compliance with the Charter generally and, in particular, the protection against arbitrary detention and the s. 15 right to equal treatment under the law;
d. Ensure compliance with the Code generally and, in particular, the freedom
from discrimination based on race, place of origin, age, colour, ethnic origin,
gender identity or gender expression; and

e. Ensure compliance with the Municipal Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act (“MFIPPA”) generally and in particular, with Part II
of MFIPPA.

Definition of Public Safety Purpose

1. Service members may only initiate and record Contacts that serve a valid
public safety purpose.
2. The Chief will include in procedures a definition of public safety purpose that
is consistent with this policy. The procedure will acknowledge the potential
negative impact of Contacts on the community and prohibit the collection,
retention, use or disclosure of irrelevant information.
3. Until the Chief prepares a policy-compliant definition of public safety
purpose, the following applies:

Valid public safety purposes justifying the initiation or recording of Contacts are:

a. Investigating a specific offence or a series of offences;
b. Preventing a specific offence; and
c. Ensuring the community member who is the subject of the Contact is not at
risk.

Purposes that do not justify the initiation, continuation or recording of Contacts are:

a. Gathering personal information for use in unspecified future investigation;
b. Investigating an unsupported suspicion;
c. Prolonging an interaction in the hope of acquiring the reasonable suspicion
necessary to detain;
d. Meeting a quota or performance target; and
e. Raising awareness of police presence in the community.
Appendix E: CAPP Questionnaire, Experiences with Police

The following questionnaire is extracted from the CAPP (2014) Report, Section A p.2-6:

We are interested in hearing about your positive and negative experiences with the police in this area.

1) Have you ever been stopped by the police in 31 Division?
2) How many times have you been stopped?
3) How old were you the first time you were stopped and questioned by the police?
4) What was the experience like for you? Check all the boxes that apply:
   ■ I was asked to show ID in or just outside my apartment building.
   ■ I had a nice conversation with police.
   ■ I was asked to show ID in or just outside my friend or family member’s apartment building.
   ■ An officer did something nice for my family member (or friends).
   ■ I was told “I fit the description”
   ■ An officer showed me respect
   ■ I was spoken to disrespectfully £ I was surrounded and intimidated by police
   ■ My property was taken by police and never returned.
   ■ The police accused me of being in a gang or asked me if I was a gang member

5) What have you experienced BECAUSE of being stopped and questioned by the police?
   ■ I felt depressed
   ■ I felt anxious about the incident
   ■ I was not hired because of my record
   ■ I felt I needed to do something to change the way the police do their job
   ■ I’ve changed my walking route to avoid police
   ■ I avoid going out at certain times because of police
   ■ I feel like I am constantly being watched by police
   ■ Other? Please provide details.

6) Have you been stopped by the police SINCE JUNE 2014?

6.1 Do you believe the police had a valid public safety reason for stopping and questioning you?
6.2 Did the police provide a reason for stopping you?
6.3) Do you believe that the police stopped you to gather information even though they were not investigating a specific crime?
6.4) Do you think police prolonged their contact with you because they hoped to get information that would justify formal questioning?
6.5) Did you receive a receipt from the police officer with the officer’s name, badge number and reason for
6.6) In many cases, people who are approached informally by police have a right to leave without answering questions. Did you feel that you had a right to leave when you were stopped and questioned?

7) Do you think police sometimes stop individuals in order to meet a quota or performance target?

8) How often do you think police stop and question individuals just to show police presence in your community?

9) Have you ever decided not to call the police for help because you thought they might make the problem worse?

10) If YES, please explain why you thought calling the police might make the problem worse?
Appendix F: CAPP Community Engagement Recommendations

The following recommendations are extracted from the CAPP (2014) Report, pp.64-65:

Recommendations concerning improved community engagement:

5. Develop a policy compliance checklist that can be reviewed and published quarterly. The TPSB should create and administer an accessible evaluation tool in the form of a checklist or mini-survey that could be administered on a quarterly basis. Results from this evaluation would provide the TPSB and the public with a regular “snapshot” concerning Toronto Police Service compliance with set policy. This tool could take the form of a 10 question online survey administered by community agencies. While extensive research projects like CAPP are essential in assessing police-community relations over the long-term, it is also important to have more timely research initiatives which respond rapidly to community concerns about policing.

6. Create a robust and sustained community engagement strategy with emphasis on improved communications Considering the low levels of public knowledge about the details of the policy, a variety of communication strategies should be developed (using conventional media, social media and other avenues) to bolster public awareness. Form community-level partnerships with organizations working on police assessment and accountability issues.

7. Commit to the ongoing funding of independent community-based research projects Well-executed research initiatives on community experiences with carding (and related police practices) are one of the main means by which to determine the effectiveness of the Community Contacts Policy.

8. Develop an accountability strategy that boosts community confidence in the policy Given that accountability is emphasized in the policy (sections 18a and 18b), periodic updates on disciplinary outcomes in response to policy non-compliance should be shared with the public.

9. Initiate and sustain public education initiatives focused on police issues TPSB should commit to providing regular and sustained community forums that offer community members an opportunity to educate themselves about relevant policing issues. These forums should be proactive rather than reactive and should seek to involve a broad spectrum of community stakeholders.

10. Develop community-level “info clinics” which support those interested in accessing their personal information from police databases Large numbers of citizens who have been carded are unaware of the nature of the information that has been collected in connection with their names. Accordingly, information clinics dealing with the process of filing access requests with the Toronto Police Service should be conducted on a regular basis in various parts of the city.
Appendix G: DPSU Organizational Chart

See: http://www.tpsb.ca/CIOR%20TPS%20Organizational%20Structure%20Review.pdf
Appendix H: Morris Justice Project Community Recruitment Material

POLLING FOR COMMUNITY JUSTICE

What do you think about policing in this community?

We are a group of youth and adult researchers and lawyers from the community, the CUNY Graduate Center, and Pace University Law School. We are launching a community research project on this block about policing practices and community experiences of policing.

New York City needs your community’s expertise to make policing practices better for all.

Come join our research team!

Open to any resident of this block age 16 or older who is interested in thinking about policing in the community. 6-week project, paid @ $10/hour.

Keep your eyes out for a flyer announcing an upcoming informational meeting! Or contact us at: info@publicscienceproject.org 212.817.1900
Appendix I: Morris Justice Critical Mapping Tool

The ‘critical mapping’ component of the Morris Justice Project uses NYPD hot spot data and mapping tools to represent the disproportionate impact of hot spot policing.
CHAPTER FOUR

Beyond Neighbourhood Effects:
Developing an Alternative Understanding of Socio-Spatial Dynamics and ‘Risk’ in Toronto
ABSTRACT

As part of what has been described as the ‘spatial turn’ in public policymaking, the impact of place – or more explicitly, residential location – on the social and economic situation of households has become a key concern for policymakers across North America, the UK and Western Europe, New Zealand and Australia over recent decades. In Canada, the language of place-based policy has been adopted by governing bodies so rapidly that Neil Bradford coined the phenomenon a product of the “social Silicon Valley” (Bradford, 2005). Canada’s place-based policies are predicated upon a number of popular scholarly studies which claim that living in a ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘at-risk’ neighbourhood produces negative effects on residents’ life chances over and above the effects of structural and individual characteristics. Drawing from an emerging body of critical urban scholarship (Casey, 2015; Mayer, 2011; Manley et al., 2013; Slater, 2013; van Ham et al., 2015), the empirical validity of effects research will be called into question, firstly, because neighbourhood effects research tends to ignore the structural drivers and selection processes that sort people into neighbourhoods (such as housing and employment markets and the social inequities they produce). Neighbourhood boundaries are also much more dynamic and permeable than the census tract (CT) boundaries that define priority neighbourhoods (Swaroop & Morenoff, 2004).

In opposing the neighbourhoods effects thesis and its conceptual association between individual’s neighbourhood of residence to their life chances, this paper will advocate for a shift in focus beyond the neighbourhood itself. As an alternative to the neighbourhood effects thesis, a comprehensive understanding of the conditions of disadvantaged urban populations requires a focus on not only individuals and their neighbourhoods, but also on the organizations that structure their lives, the systems in which those organizations are embedded, and the institutions that regulate both (Matthews, 2012).
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1 Introduction

As part of what has been described as the “spatial turn” in public policymaking, the impact of place – or more explicitly, residential location – on the social and economic situation of households has become a key concern for policymakers across North America, the UK and Western Europe, New Zealand and Australia over recent decades. In Canada, the language of place-based policy has been adopted by governing bodies so rapidly that Neil Bradford coined the phenomenon a product of the “social Silicon Valley” (Bradford, 2005). These policies are predicated upon a number of popular scholarly studies which claim that living in a ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘at-risk’ neighbourhood produces negative effects on residents’ life chances over and above the effects of structural and individual characteristics. Of these many studies [critiqued by Slater (2013) as a “cottage industry” of neighbourhood effects research], the most ubiquitous was conducted in Chicago in 2002, by Robert J. Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson et al., 2002). The study tied individuals’ life chances to the neighbourhoods that they live on the basis of ‘neighbourhood effects’ – or neighbourhood-level variations of phenomena such as delinquency, violence and crime, routine activity patterns, and mutual trust (Carriere, 2016).

Volunteerism, civic participation and social capital are all central aspects of place-based governance schemes. In their report commissioned by the Canadian federal government, Torjman and Levitan-Reid (2003) observe that place-based approaches to solving pressing social and economic problems are not new. While voluntary action by citizens and organizations was “alive and well long before government programs,” what is new is the methodology that appears to be emerging at the local level – which is, as they say, “far more strategic than before (ibid: 7).” References to ‘the public’ and invitations to ‘participate’ have become part of a trend Mayer (2003: 108) describes as the “dissolving of social and political perspectives into economic ones;” where new, targeted programs for neighbourhood revitalization denote local governments’ discovery of the potential of community-based organizations for helping them solve their fiscal as well as legitimation problems. Some of the urban and community development strategies that worked very
effectively within the Fordist city – such as self-reliance and cultural expression – have been coopted by the post-Fordist ‘social investment state’ agenda. To echo Mayer (2015), radical and creative ideas that were unique to social movements such as Right to the City\textsuperscript{22} have been “hijacked” to produce new forms of entrepreneurial urbanism linked to gentrification and displacement; effectively shifting urban social movements and their strategies from “protest to program” (Mayer, 2009 as cited in Carriere, 2016).

Following Uitermark (2012: 2551), in the 1980s and 1990s, urban governments in Europe co-opted a great number of moderate activists through targeted neighbourhoods policies that emphasized “partnerships” and similar participatory schemes, effectively dividing radical and moderate activists while imposing government constraints on groups operating within the urban movement. Likewise, current enthusiasms for “social innovation” and “social enterprise” urge governments, corporations, organizations and residents to harness private money for public good in ways that effectively discount any prospect of increased democratic control and public investment as a means to address the collective challenges that neighbourhoods and their residents face (ibid). With their message that efficiencies, collaboration, private investment, and resident-led ‘empowerment’ act as a panacea for problems of ‘risk’ and ‘disadvantage’ that are associated with the neighbourhood. Compensating for wide-scale reductions in government funding for basic services and infrastructure (associated with the global transition to a post-Fordist economy), place-based models ostensibly support an austerity agenda, rather than bringing citizens together to challenge it. In doing so, they diminish the power of people to make significant changes to the systems and structures that affect their daily lives (Carriere, 2016).

In Toronto, these broad concerns are connected to a local shift toward networked governance (or a shift from “government to governance”), whereby traditional bureaucracies and elected local authorities no longer take on key roles in social service delivery systems. Beginning in the early 2000s, networked governance emerged in the

\textsuperscript{22} A number of popular movements across the globe have been incorporated David Harvey’s conception of the “right to the city” – including the US-based Right to the City Alliance.
Toronto region in the form of complex and fragmented networks of non-governmental institutions, organizations, volunteer groups and private actors responsible for delivering social services to communities and their residents. In 2005, new, place-based policies were developed to coordinate intersecting public, private and community sector interests across sectoral siloes. ‘Strong Neighbourhoods’ and ‘Priority Neighbourhoods’ policies aimed to advance urban renewal, social development and community safety agendas in high-risk neighbourhoods (MAH, 2006). These were established alongside the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) -- a controversial, community-based policing program designed to target ‘hot spot’ neighbourhoods with high concentrations of socially and economically marginalized groups.

1.1 Purpose

From an optimistic lens, formal, technocratically-driven policies that function to devolve power down to local governments and away from the state have increased the horizontality of decision-making processes at the local level; presenting new opportunities to bring together diverse resources and actors in order to achieve gains that might not otherwise be possible (ibid).

From a more critical vantage point, as this paper will argue, place-based policies bring systemic challenges involving a lack of secure and long-term funding for the supports needed to sustain social service provision. Moreover, the empirical foundations of Toronto’s Priority Neighbourhood policies (now called ‘Neighbourhood Improvement Areas’) are rooted in neighbourhood effects research -- and, by extension, the assumption that an individual’s neighbourhood of residence will affect their ability to flourish across all aspects of their lives.

Drawing from an emerging body of critical urban scholarship (Casey, 2015; Mayer, 2011; Manley et al., 2013; Slater, 2013; van Ham and Manley, 2013; van Ham et al., 2015), the empirical validity of effects research will be called into question, firstly, because neighbourhood effects research tends to ignore the structural drivers and selection processes that sort people into neighbourhoods (such as housing and
employment markets and the social inequities they produce). Neighbourhood boundaries are also much more dynamic and permeable than the census tract (CT) boundaries that define priority neighbourhoods (Swaroop & Morenoff, 2004).

This paper will set out to tackle two central questions:

1. How do place-based policy frameworks and ideas about neighbourhood effects function to construct populations labeled as being “at-risk”?
2. How can urban researchers, policy scholars, urban designers and community workers begin to work counter-steer urban policy projects, policies and processes away from the aims of market-oriented economic growth toward a more democratic, resident-focused agenda?

1.2 Context

In the context of state rescaling and globalization, research on public policy and governance requires in-depth, multiscalar analysis to examine what the state is actually doing at the neighbourhood scale – why, where and with what political, social and economic implications (Peck, 2003: 222). An in-depth examination of the means, mechanisms and outcomes of place-based public policy requires that researchers map policy developments in their transnational, national and translocal contexts.

Beginning in the early 1990s, an extensive body of critical urban, sociological and policy research examines various aspects of economic globalization that have given way to devolution and the dismantling of the welfare state in cities across the world. Accordingly, as the local state becomes more concerned with promoting growth and competitiveness, other policy areas become subordinate to economic priorities. Mayer (2006) links this phenomenon to “global cities” where urban politics has become subordinate to the functions of the city as an economic command centre. As local decision-makers prioritize the creation of strategic regional and transnational economic networks (Sassen, 2001), social policy and community development become imbedded
with policies to promote international economic competition between cities. These trends are associated with new forms of marginality that have emerged alongside the global shift to a post-Fordist economy and manifest spatially in neighbourhoods where low-income, working poor, immigrant and ethno-racial groups concentrate (Mayer, 2006; Hulchanski, 2010). Similar work holds that, within these global (or aspiring) cities, social policy has shifted from its welfare orientation to more punitive measure of social control with the introduction of “workfare” and the expansion of penalization (Eick, 2011; Lightman et al., 2005; Peck, 2003; 2014; Peck & Theodore, 2015).

Place-based policies rest on the dominant assertion that ‘place matters’ in the age of globalization (Bradford, 2003; 2005). This assertion emphasizes the idea that economic innovation occurs within cities, and cities are the places where globalization’s flows intersect (Bradford, 2005; Florida, 2002). The approach holds that poor neighbourhoods and their residents are at risk of missing the opportunities that the age of globalization offers urban places (Bradford, 2005: 2). By extension, place-based policies are crafted as solutions to help ensure that all urban places benefit from global economic growth.

Proponents of place-based policy schemes draw attention to the social dynamics of urban economic innovation. In Toronto, representatives across multiple government divisions, corporate bodies, non-governmental organizations, think tanks universities have championed place-based policies as an urban governance strategy through which to evade the fiscal consequences of polarized income and precarious employment which diminishing a city’s human-capital pool and require additional housing, health, social service and policing resources (Gertler & Wolf, 2004). These groups emphasize the need to combine local and regional political and economic capacities to address neighbourhood-based risk and social exclusion and foster ‘innovative’ and ‘inclusive’ cities (Bradford, 2011; Gertler & Wolf, 2004; OECD, 2006). Toronto’s place-based policies also draw upon a large body of academic research on neighbourhood effects; and particularly the work of Robert J. Sampson and his colleagues in Chicago (1989; 1997; 2002; 2008).
Beginning with Sampson and Groves’ seminal study in 1989, which set out to measure the effect of social disorder on crime in Chicago neighbourhoods, a subsequent series of reports have examined the effects of social ties, social control, and neighbourhood-level disorganization – focusing on the perceived inability of “disorganized communities” to combat crime through the lens of social disorganization theory (Ramirez, 2011 as cited in Carriere, 2016). Limited social ties were correlated with residents’ inability to exert informal social control on others in the neighbourhood. This finding was later described by Sampson and Earls (1997) as collective efficacy, or “the ability of the collective to intervene in order to combat neighborhood problems such as crime (Ramirez, 2011: 7).”

Advocating for a place-based approach, arm’s-length bodies such as Toronto’s Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force (SNTF) have determined that concentrated poverty has multiplying neighbourhood effects in sub/urban areas particularly when there are clusters of high poverty neighbourhoods beside each other (Bradford, 2002; Freiler, 2004). These effects include increased crime and ‘anti-social behaviour,’ and limited employment prospects for youth. The SNTF’s 2004 report, ‘Why Strong Neighbourhoods Matter: Implications for Policy and Practice’ would come to define the City’s place-based policy framework (resulting in the creation of the 13 Priority Neighbourhoods in 2005). The report’s problem descriptions and policy recommendations are clearly rooted in neighbourhood effects research:

> [...] the social environment multiplies the constraints on progress for individuals already experiencing difficulty (Beauvais and Jenson, 2003; Bradford, 2002). High concentration poverty neighbourhoods are also presumed to lead to social and economic polarization, divisions among people along racial and other lines, and a threat to community and national social cohesion. It is feared that concentrated poverty will lead to increased crime, racial tensions, anti-social behaviour, and health problems among individuals living in these neighbourhoods. The effects on children’s development and future life prospects are particularly worrying (Freiler, 2004: 3.)

In opposing the neighbourhoods effects thesis and its conceptual association between individual’s neighbourhood of residence to their life chances, this paper will advocate for a shift in focus beyond the neighbourhood itself. A comprehensive understanding of the
conditions of disadvantaged urban populations requires a focus on not only individuals and their neighbourhoods, but also on the organizations that structure their lives, the systems in which those organizations are embedded, and the institutions that regulate both (Castells & Cardoso, 2005 as cited in Carriere, 2016). Researchers, decision-makers and policy-makers must examine a neighbourhood’s outward links in order to develop a more strategic spatial approach that acknowledges the city within its region-wide economy (Matthews, 2012). This work must also account for important individual and community-level dynamics, needs and capacities -- including individuals’ daily routines, life circumstances, and conceptions of their own neighbourhoods (Carriere, 2016).

1.3 Study Design

Beginning in the 1970s, this conceptual paper chronicles the politicization of spatialized forms of risk in Toronto. I argue that political ideas about neighbourhood-level risk now imply that, firstly, residents of low-income communities are defined by technocratic assumptions tying residential location to social, economic and behavioral outcomes. Secondly, due to the devolution of social service provisioning to local private-public partnerships, community organizations bear the brunt of responsibility for improving their own disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Eick, 2006; Flinders and Buller, 2006; Mayer, 2010). In doing so, I draw from academic literature spanning geography, planning, political science, and sociology, with a focus on the political construction of neighbourhoods and individuals at-risk (Cowen & Parlette, 2011; Mayer, 2011; Eick, 2006; Wilson, 2011); the rescaling of urban politics (Brenner, 2008; Purcell 2006; Peck, 011; Paddison & McCann, 2014); and place-based social policy (Larner 2006; Mitchell 2004; Bradford 2003; 2005).

Applied to Toronto’s 13 Priority Neighbourhoods and targeted community policing programs such as the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS), the “at-risk” or “disadvantaged neighbourhood” ethos is regulated through patchwork forms of networked governance. This is not a dispersal of power, but rather, a fragmentation – a form of top-down centralism applied at the level of the neighbourhood. Crime reduction is prioritized in order to meet the global city aspirations of policy-makers, or what
Cochrane (2007) describes as a “growth first” logic. Programs like TAVIS are aimed at “engaging” residents in surveillance and crime reporting activities in order to enhance security and order in their neighbourhoods (TAVIS, 2015); contributing to the political design and regulation of spatialized risk.

As an alternative to these processes, this report will recommend that urban researchers, policy scholars, urban designers and community advocates conduct comparative research projects which work to counter the neighbourhood effects thesis. As Mayer (2015) posits, when engaging in comparative work, researchers are forced to consider the “meta-level” and gather rich empirical data that, when you look at enough countries and cities, will allow for alternative concept formation (for concept formation, she argues, the analysis of multiple sites is essential).

New social movement strategists can also counter-steer policy developments if they can call on well-defined analytical tools and frameworks that can be leveraged to refute place-based strategies – demonstrating, through well-established empirical evidence, that increased marginalization and polarization will result if current strategies go unchallenged (ibid).

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Interpretivists often focus on the language of ‘self”, but critical theory allows us to inform that language with ideas regarding power and community. Post-structuralists like Laclau (2000) have drawn focus to political logics which reflect relations of power and exclusion that are evident in practice and the creation of a practice. Following Laclau, policy may function to create identities by excluding something that is different. Division is created by those things that are constructed as being equivalent with one another. This equivalence is deemed through the negation of something else. Levitas (1998) uses the example of ‘social exclusion” -- a popular policy narrative that accompanies place-based policy models in countries like Britain, Canada, Australia, and Germany. As he writes (Levitas, 1998), “it is clear that the concept of ‘social exclusion’
imagines a boundary, and focuses attention on those outside it rather than on the features of society which systematically generate widespread poverty and disadvantage.”

In accordance with Fairclough (2002; 2003), texts as elements of social and political events have causal effects – they bring about changes in our knowledge, our beliefs, attitudes, values, actions, social relations, and so forth. He argues that these causal effects are mediated by meaning-making. Different interpreters may determine whether particular texts actually have certain effects (Fairclough, 2003). Contemporary social science has been widely influenced by social constructivism and the ideation that (social) world is socially constructed through language and discourse. It is important to distinguish that, consistent with Fairclough’s (2003) analytical approach, what is being adopted here is only a moderate version of the claim that the social world is textually constructed. We may “textually construe” the social world in particular ways, but whether our representations have the effect of changing its construction depends on various contextual factors – what exists now, where power is located, and so forth (ibid: 9).

As Foucault (1991) has emphasized, contained within the language of policy is the power to both effect and enact social change. Similarly, Wilson (2011) argues that social classifications are used to maintain inequality. Insomuch as power is contained within language, language itself can be a crucial exclusionary mechanism in democracy as it determines social classifications. Authority is contained within the way power is communicated (Hajer, 2011), and, by extension, policy language constructs the “types” of people that government programs are intended to serve. Formal claims made about certain types of people reflect not only the socio-political conditions under which they were produced, but also the relative beliefs and preferences of the policy actors and officials who give life to these constructs (ibid).

It follows that “risk” as a policy construct may serve both to target and to construct a population on behalf of specific assumptions, beliefs, and shared truths that are perpetuated within an organization. Chapman et al. (2011: 81) examine how
institutionally-sponsored programs such as the TAVIS-run “Youth in Policing” (YIPI) (2008) initiative construct youth as being “at-risk” on the basis of socio-economic and socio-spatial and racial characteristics. The program, with its focus on “attitudes, behaviour, and opportunity,” worked to advance the institutional interests of the Toronto Police Service (TPS) without the organization having to confront or adjust any of its own practices and assumptions; promoting a brand of social reform that “never questions structural and systemic inequalities (ibid.)”

Returning to Fairclough (2003), the analysis of policy discourse involves an analysis of the domain of “statements”: of texts, and of utterances as constituent elements of texts. The aim is to identify and dissect the formal rules that underpin bodies of texts and utterances (ibid). If one were to apply Fairclough’s discursive model to the analysis of place-based policies and programs, it is possible that they may uncover powerful definitions about “truth” and “best practices” applied to marginalized groups.

2 The Discourse of Deviance: Constructing Populations “At-Risk”

*The deviant is one to whom the label has successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label* (Becker 1963: 9.)

Risk, according to Rothstein et al. (2006: 92), “[…] is increasingly emerging as a key organizing concept for regulatory regimes and extended governance systems within a wide range of policy domains and organizational settings.” Risk is no longer the exclusive reserve of scientists and technocrats, it is fast becoming the “lingua franca” of business, and even of general public policy (ibid). Rose (1996: 328) makes a similar argument, stating that it is “[…] as if we are seeing the emergence of a range of rationalities and techniques that seek to govern without governing society, to govern through regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous actors in the context of their particular commitments to families and communities.” Similarly, Curran (2010: 7) reports evidence shows that concerns regarding delinquent youth have existed throughout Canada’s history including concerns about youth gang riots in Toronto as far back as 1875. The author considers the ways in which the category of youth “at-risk” has been
constructed through moralistic and individualized discourses that frame youth as a societal danger and blame them for social problems and insecurities (ibid.). The “problematizing” of youth informs state and public reactions, which in turn affects the forms of governance youth experience (including the allocation of social services and/or funding for youth-based programming).

Within a post-Fordist policy framework, responsibilization strategies are fostered, albeit indirectly, through non-state agencies (e.g. social services agencies) to bring about desired pro-social changes on behalf of the individual. To examine the nexus between “risk” and political systems of policymaking and governance in greater detail is to ask how the formalized language of risk functions to construct residents of Toronto’s Priority neighbourhoods. Risk, as a political concept, has become an important component in the grid of governmental intelligibility, through which individuals are differentiated as members of classes of person. Tait (1995) posits that risk is employed as a medium through which youth can be “governed at a distance” within domains such as the school and the family. For instance, the “risk family” was a common feature of debates over child and youth welfare in Britain throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s (ibid). The greater the difficulties demonstrated by the youth, the larger the number of issues that need attention within the family (versus the state) (Palmo & Palmo, 1989).

Within the realm of policymaking, the family is often identified as primary contributor to youth crime rates. David McCallum (1993: 131) cites British Home Office research which identified four of the five main factors for a child’s “descent into crime” as being family related. McCallum argues that this categorization serves the political purpose of allocating responsibility for youth unrest to the private sphere – a sphere beyond the reach of direct government (Tait, 1995). However, he notes that insisting upon such a rigorous division between the public and the private is to ignore the role of the family as an effective site for the governance of children. On the contrary, McCallum (1991: 131) suggests that the contemporary family is “a product of policies designed to reform

As Hamman (2009) argues, neoliberal subjects are constituted as thoroughly responsible for themselves and themselves alone because they are subjectified as thoroughly autonomous and free actors in relation to free economic markets.
domestic life,” and that the domestic sphere became one of the most important and practical settings for “instilling the capacities and attitudes required of a modern population.” The responsibilization of the family is of, as Kelly (p.468) contends, “a different order to the narrative of traditional family values which structures the political rhetorics of the New Right.” As a feature of neighbourhoods policy, for instance, there are increasingly sophisticated attempts to differentiate among youthful populations via the identification of risky behaviours and various factors which put young people at-risk (Social Inclusion Unit, 2008).

The technocratic identification, measurement and calculation of risk is conducted under the guise of rendering uncertain realities both knowable and conceptually applicable to post-Fordist frameworks of “disadvantage” – as opposed to “poverty”, which is associated with Fordist-era interventions. Under a neoliberal framework, modes of intervention include regulatory projects which promise to minimize associated societal harm and promote “social inclusion” (Hayes et al, 2009). Such projects, as Levitas (1998) has argued, focus attention on those outside of the norm – directing public attention away from the features of society which systematically generate widespread poverty and precarious employment.

2.1 Establishing ‘Risk’ as a New Synonym for Concentrated Poverty

As part of his work on race and racism in Britain, John Solomos (1993) chronicled the history of the local politics of racial inequality in Britain and the changing context of state intervention; focusing on the role of conflict and controversy in the shaping of local policy agendas as well as the impacts of processes of racialization on the British policy debate concerning the interrelationships between class and race through the late 60s and into the late 1980s. Solomos (1993:124) claims that growing fears about the “increasing alienation of young blacks from the mainstream of British society” were regularly expressed in the media and policy documents, and became a “constant refrain” in both scholarly and policy writings on the subject.
By the early 1970s, evidence of high levels of unemployment, low levels of attainment in schools and homelessness among black youth had accumulated substantially (Solomos, 1993). Both at the local and national level, black political activists were discussing issues such as employment, education, education and policing in relation to young blacks – questioning the perceived political failure to “tackle the root causes of racism and racial inequality (ibid: 124).” The consequences of this perceived failure were described in Rex and Tomlinson (1979) in their empirical analysis of the political economy of race and class in London. The authors (Rex & Tomlinson, 1979) cite evidence from black communities across the city showing that young blacks were being politically categorized as a “problem group” by the police, and that they were therefore more likely to be questioned or arrested. It was argued that police attitudes and behaviours were fuelling popular narratives about the involvement of young blacks in crime, and serving to drive a wedge between black communities and the police (Solomos, 1993).

Similarly, in a study conducted by Hall et al. (1978), the political framing of black communities across Britain as ‘social problems” was examined. The authors argue that the inner city crisis of early 1970s London, referred to as “urban decay”, was a political one -- a crisis at the level of the British state -- a crisis of hegemony. One of the UK state’s solutions was to mobilize a “moral panic” focusing on the idea of “mugging” as a crime problem to be racialized against minorities (ibid). Mugging as a political phenomenon became associated with black youth:

"[...] a social group which suffered the most direct impact of the cycle of poverty, unemployment and social alienation which afflicted inner city areas; and suffering from the added disadvantage of belonging to a racial group with a “weak” culture and high levels of social problems, such as broken families and lack of achievement in schools (Hall et al., 1978)."

Politically, as Solomos (1993: 131) outlines, the disparate responses to the growth of “permanent black communities” and “delinquent youth” in many inner city areas coincided with growing concern about inner city problems that correlate with institutional definitions of risk; including the impact of “deprivation” on the residents of localities
with a combination of problems arising out the rising levels of crime and violence in concentrated areas; the emergence of racial inequality as an aspect of the social conditions of inner city areas; and the emergence of “ghetto” areas with distinct cultural values and attitudes towards the police. In the UK, in the mid-1990s, a nationalized policy strategy designed to target the most deprived inner city neighbourhoods was introduced – the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) (2005).

In Canada, there is much evidence to show that similar levels of alarm regarding deprived areas and youth at-risk have existed throughout Canada’s history, including concerns about youth gang riots in Toronto as far back as 1875. Since the 1970s, however, social democratic aspects of Canadian welfare provision have undergone dramatic restructuring (Lightman et al, 2005), resulting in a shift in focus away from the needs of youth and toward the prevention of crime and management of risk (Curran, 2010). This shift was accompanied by a number of technocratic policy tools to assess risk; including outcome measures and evaluations that must be submitted by youth-serving social service agencies to their funders.

By the late 1990s, after neoliberal processes of economic restructuring and deinstitutionalization facilitated the devolution of responsibility for social services – both administrative and financial – to local tiers of government, municipal departments in Vancouver, Winnipeg, and, most notably, Toronto, developed targeted, place-based social investment frameworks that mirrored the UK’s NSNR. In Toronto, thirteen neighbourhoods on the urban periphery that housed the majority of the city’s racialized poor were deemed to be in immediate need of physical and social infrastructure investment.

The City of Toronto’s 13 Priority Neighbourhoods strategy came on the heels of 2005’s “Summer of the Gun”. The majority of 2005’s victims of this two-month spike in gun violence were young black men in and around working class suburban public housing complexes and private apartment towers where the majority of Toronto’s people of colour reside (Siciliano, 2010). In response to an increase in shooting deaths, mainstream
media portrayed this spike in violent crime in the city’s inner suburban neighbourhoods as an inevitable outcome of concentrations of racialized poverty (ibid). By extension, the problem of “suburban decline” became a synecdoche for what otherwise might be considered “overtly racist, gendered or classed interpretations of this perceived inevitability” (ibid: 8). These casual assumptions were often premised on a pervasive body of academic research examining the social consequences of the interplays between increasing income polarization and spatial concentrations of a growing immigrant underclass in North American cities – as well an abundant body of policy literature (from the UK, Germany, Australia, the US and Canada) that aimed to tackle the effects of these problems ‘in place’.

2.2 Targeting Risk, Race and Place in Toronto’s Post-War Suburbs

Commenting on place-based community policing efforts in Toronto following the Summer of the Gun, Siciliano (2010: 20) views place-based policies and policing programs like TAVIS as the result of the reification of racialized poverty from its broader social context; framing violence as an “inevitable effect of concentrated poverty.” The targeting of race and place, she says, is premised on “systems of classification that sort people by colour, class, and other visible and social attributes, producing kinds of people and places that in a certain sense, did not exist before” (ibid.).

Siciliano’s work draws from Cowen’s (2005) elaborations on targeted policy prescriptions in the post-welfare state. In Toronto, as Cowen argues, the political rationale which drives targeting is underscored by the construction of an outside “other”. Place-based policies present technocratic solutions to crime and poverty first emerged in the late 1970s in Toronto’s post-war suburban municipalities to address a growing population of new immigrant groups (ibid). These new forms of place-based, spatialized targeting depended on “articulations of post-war suburban life, literally built around the private family in private space” that problematized racialized and gendered identities in the city’s suburbs by “measure[ing], identify[ying] and bound[ing] [these identities] for specialized government” (ibid: 350). Cowen’s sentiments are echoed by Uitermark
(2012: 254), who finds that, just as cities are “spaces that support innovations in politics,” they also become “sites for the innovation of techniques to monitor subjects and maintain social order.”

Returning to Siciliano, from her view, the socio-political underpinnings of Toronto’s place-based policies prescribe technocratic solutions to dynamic neighbourhood processes. As she writes:

Social processes through which “problem areas” are discursively constructed are not simply scientific and descriptive, but fundamentally diagnostic and prescriptive. Spatial correlations between crime and poverty that gave us the “problem” of the “inner suburbs” confirmed what we thought we already knew, identified potential problems we hadn’t yet seen, and conditioned responses to the problems so identified (Siciliano, 2010: 19).

Academic and policy interest in the social effects of spatially-concentrated poverty is often traced to the publication of William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged (1987), with roots in a much longer history that includes the “garden city”, ‘social hygiene”, and slum clearance movements of the early twentieth century (Darcy & Gwyther, 2012: 250). Wilson’s (1987) work came in response to the specific consequences of deindustrialisation and the flight of jobs and workers from many U.S. inner cities in the 1980s (Darcy & Gwyther, 2012). He focused on the “concentration effects” in the residual populations, leading to isolation of the urban poor from the institutions and opportunities of the urban center (ibid). Rejecting the notion of cultural causation of poverty, he argues that local conditions and the social practices of residents of poor areas cannot be understood as separate from of the macro social and economic forces which shape them (ibid).

Applied to Toronto’s model of community policing, the importance of the macro context, and the contribution of structural factors such as poverty, income polarization, and the increasing prevalence of precarious and low-paid work must be factored into formal interpretations of concentrated disadvantage and risk. However, the call to tie technocratic conceptions of risk to their politico-structural roots is by no means new. In
2008, McMurtry and Curling’s report on the “Roots of Youth Violence” in Ontario introduced a number of reforms to the public sector aimed at addressing the structural ‘roots’ of youth crime – including racialized poverty, access to employment, and the lack of a coordinated national housing strategy. Although a number of subsequent policies make reference to the report’s recommendations – including, most recently, the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Community Service’s (MSCS) New Strategy for a Safer Ontario (2015), they have not been enacted through formal legislation, policies or programs.

2.3 Spatialized Risk as a Threat to Prosperity

*The most important goal of today’s urban policy is to mobilize city space as an arena of market-oriented economic growth protected by policing mechanisms either in a state-led or a private form* (Eick, 2010: 13.)

From their inception, Toronto’s place-based policies focused on issues of crime and youth violence. Upon election in 2003, Mayor David Miller declared community safety and combating youth violence a priority concern for the wellbeing of Toronto. Miller launched the *Making a Safe City Safer Mandate* to balance “enforcement with prevention” (City of Toronto, 2004, Feb 17). The mandate included a Community Safety Plan (CSP) (2004), and the Mayor’s Panel on Community Safety and a Community Safety Secretariat. The panel focused on solutions to gun-related violence. Miller appointed former Ontario Chief Justice Roy McMurtry to lead the group in developing public policy recommendations to address gun-related violence (resulting in 2008’s Roots of Youth Violence report). With the approval of the CSP in 2004, the City moved to target specific, at-risk neighbourhoods. The CSP sought to balance “enforcement with prevention”, promoting “empowering” community partnerships and relationships between community agencies, businesses, faith groups, service clubs, and the TPS (City of Toronto, 2004). Subsequent prevention programs and services were largely focused on at-risk youth who were thought to be excluded from full participation in their local neighbourhoods and communities (Public Safety Canada, 2008). In 2005, a new focus on enforcement resulted in the creation of the TAVIS.
In the spring of 2004, the SNTF formed upon request from Council to explore how to strengthen neighbourhoods facing “challenges of poverty, underemployment, the settlement of immigrants, and lack of services” (City of Toronto, 2005). The SNTF’s goal was to generate a framework for strategic social investment that would “assess specific needs in neighbourhoods across Toronto where investments most needed to be made, and how residents, neighbourhood groups and governments might find solutions to neighbourhood issues and challenges” (SNTF, 2005). The taskforce developed a social indicator system to measure newly-defined vulnerability levels across the city by spatially identifying concentrations of social attributes. To do this, a series of research of research reports\(^\text{24}\) were commissioned to provide background rationale for “targeted social investment”, and to “recommend the types of social indicators that could be used, and propos a method for evaluating policy outcomes” (Siciliano, 2010: 62). These reports drew conceptual and empirical inspiration from place-based policies developed in the United Kingdom — particularly the NSNR, and its Vulnerable Localities Index (VLI). Moreover, as outlined in Section One, the neighbourhood effects thesis contributed heavily to the SNTF’s place-based approach.

In developing the city’s Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS) (2005), the SNTF collaborated with the Toronto City Summit Alliance (TCSA), a cross-sectoral civil society coalition represented by business and private interests. During the 2002 Toronto City Summit, civic leaders discussed the challenges facing the Toronto region. Notably, TCSA side-stepped issues of social citizenship and justice in favor of economic considerations. Urban poverty was defined as the result of a lack of innovation and inclusion in a globally competitive city. Income disparity was framed as a “threat to prosperity” (TCSA, 2003: 5). In a TCSA report, titled “Strong Neighbourhoods:

Supporting a Call for Action,” the group describes a “tipping point” where poverty concentrations become difficult to reverse:

*Winnipeg’s North End, and Vancouver’s Downtown East Side provide ample proof of just how intractable and resistant to change concentrated disadvantage can be... The experience in Chicago shows that once neighbourhoods reach a ‘tipping point’ it is almost impossible to turn the cycle of decline and disinvestment around. What’s worse, it tends to spread* (TCSA, 2007: 2-3.)

A few years prior, a TD Bank report (2002) identified “deep pools of poverty” as one of the five major impediments that threaten the long-term economic performance and quality of life in the Toronto region.

From a critical vantage point, intersections of market-oriented policy with race and space are indicators of the extend to which the local state and its parallel organizations are engaging in the market-oriented, post-welfarist policing of poorer urban communities under the auspices of place-based, community development efforts (Eick, 2011). The commodification of urban spaces necessitates the policing of these spaces; whether it be through “stop and search” and “stop and frisk” community policing practices, or through the devolution of policing services downward and outward from the state to de facto private security forces and neighbourhood watch groups. The policy-driven targeting of spatialized forms of risk, along with the promotion of loosely-defined forms of participation and empowerment as a panacea to these problems, can be linked to the expansive influence of Sampson’s (2002) neighbourhood effects framework.

### 2.4 The Empirical Limitations of Neighbourhood Effects

There is a clear consensus that comprehensive community initiatives can take years to have effect, that building solid and sustainable collaborations takes time and effort, and that addressing the foundations and complexities of poverty is a long-term challenge (Gardner et al., 2010). Critics worry that place-based policies focus too narrowly on delivering programs to targeted neighbourhoods without addressing the roots of social
problems (e.g. enhancing access to health services for under-served populations is crucial, but will have limited overall impact without addressing the underlying social determinants of health inequalities). In their report on inner suburban poverty and the outcomes of Toronto’s Priority Neighbourhoods strategy, Cowen and Parlette (2011) point to the controversial use of neighbourhood effects concepts which serve to de-emphasize the broader context for neighbourhood change; placing the responsibility for poverty on the individuals who live in low-income neighbourhoods.

As Section One has outlined, neighbourhood effects literature emerges from the understanding that an individual’s life chances are attributed to where they live. From the mid-1990s to 2002, about 100 papers on neighbourhood effects were being published every year (Slater, 2013). To date, hundreds more studies have emerged following this initial observation, producing what Slater (2013) has critiqued as a “cottage industry” of neighbourhood effects.

Across wealthy western nations, place-based policies and area-based initiatives (ABIs) draw from neighbourhood effects studies which model the effects of neighbourhood-level measures of poverty on individual outcomes, rather than investigating the effects of structural factors such as labour market trends, income inequality and racial discrimination (Darcy & Gwyther, 2012). As Darcy and Gwyther (ibid: 249) outline, most empirical studies purport to be spatial investigations, yet analysis is limited to the effects of neighbourhood-level measures of poverty on individual outcomes, rather than investigating the effects of genuine spatial factors. Such studies can be subject to a number of flaws, including omitted variable bias, implied causality and ecological fallacy (ibid). To remedy these ecological and empirical flaws, the inclusion of situated local knowledge may help researchers to understand the dynamic relationships between spatial factors such as social and physical infrastructure and comparative location and spatial scales, and social, political and economic factors such as contemporary culture, local economy and governance, levels of public and private investment, housing market dynamics, employment dynamics and the historical implications of government policy on the neighbourhoods of interest.
It is necessary to account for more than the effects of poverty on individual outcomes. Researchers must also investigate the effects of structural factors such as labour market and welfare trends, income inequality and racial discrimination (Cowen & Parlette, 2011). Illustrative and discursive frames like “neighbourhood effects”, “social exclusion” and “risk” have been developed by social scientists to explain the apparent persistence of social disadvantage amongst poor households residing together in close spatial proximity (Darcy & Gwyther, 2009). However, the measurement of these constructs and the production of clear causal links between place and disadvantage has, by many accounts, proved elusive. For instance, Sutherland et al. (2013, as cited in Carriere, 2016) question the generalizability of collective efficacy studies conducted in the United States to cities with very different macro-level conditions. Contrasting political and economic contexts in the study of neighbourhood violence in Chicago (drawing from Sampson’s work) and Medellin, Colombia, the authors report “limitations in a focus on the neighbourhood scale, as members of more affluent classes tend to have social links that cut across geographic boundaries and are less restricted to the neighbourhood than members of less affluent classes” (ibid: 3). However, they find that the lack of available data on this issue precludes researchers from making any conclusive statements about this phenomenon (Carriere, 2016).

Comparable results were reported in Villarreal and Silva’s (2006) study of the effects of social cohesion and neighbourhood disorder on crime using data from a survey of neighbourhoods in Brazil. Findings from the study indicate higher levels of social cohesion in lower-income neighbourhoods -- refuting findings of the Chicago-based studies of Sampson and his colleagues (Carriere, 2016). The authors find that greater cohesion among neighbourhood residents is not significantly associated with lower levels of crime, but is significantly associated with a higher perceived risk of victimization (Villarreal and Silva, 2006 as cited in Carriere, 2016). This points to the limits of the neighbourhood effects thesis. In order to explain these discrepancies, they suggest that further analysis should extend beyond the neighbourhood scale to include meso and macro-level indicators. Their critique also points to the local, regional, and cultural
specificity of the dynamics of neighbourhood indicators, and the difficulties encountered by researchers attempting to apply U.S. models to non-U.S. cities.

### 2.4.1 The Limits of Neighbourhood Effects

Beginning in 2012, a small community of critical urban social geographers (Darcy & Gwyther, 2012; van Ham et al, 2012; Manley et al, 2013; Mclennan, 2013; Slater, 2013) have begun to question the legitimacy of the neighbourhood effects framework. For example, as part of their scholarly critique of the abundant neighbourhood effects literature, Manley et al (2013: 6; as cited in Carriere, 2016) suggest that the “very notion of a neighbourhood effect is an instrument of accusation,” and neighbourhood effects literature has failed to engage with the wider socio-economic processes that occur outside the neighbourhood. Using the example of educational dropout rates for youth in low-socioeconomic status neighbourhoods, they reject the theory that the effects of high spatial concentrations of low status individuals determines high incidence drop outs; rather, structural factors such as the “necessity of working to provide financial support to the wider household” must be at the forefront of neighbourhood analyses (ibid.).

In advancing the analysis of the social dynamics that exist within a neighbourhood “beyond neighbourhood effects,” Slater (2013) argues that the problem of understanding collective action and organization (and, by extension, collective efficacy) within neighbourhoods becomes one of understanding life chances via a theory of capital accumulation and class struggle in cities. His attention to the “interplays and outcomes of capitalist accumulation” lends to an understanding of the injustices inherent in state policies that allow markets to determine housing costs – giving way to the kind of spatial sorting which produces place-based concentrations of poverty (ibid.). Instead, he advocates for the advancement of research that more wholly accounts for the capitalist institutional arrangements that create poverty (i.e., accounting for “how and why” spaces are coveted by those who stand to be removed from them) (ibid).

It is clear that a new body of policy research must emerge that is both theoretically and
politically grounded in egalitarian, social-democratic frameworks; reframing
neighbourhood effects – with its tendency to dwell on the displacement of vulnerable
groups – and advancing, instead, a body of neighbourhood research that more wholly
accounts for the structural factors that give way to differential life chances and the social
inequalities they produce; and, most importantly, the contingent factors that reflect the
diverse and changing needs, experiences, perceptions and desires of residents themselves.
To echo van Ham et al. (2013), “neighbourhoods are not static entities.” On the contrary,
as Hulchanski (2007: 1) points out, “[a]lthough some neighbourhoods change in their
physical, social and demographic composition over time, others may change significantly
in the course of a few years.”

3 Constructing an Empirical Alternative: Examining the Spatial
Sorting Effects of Housing and Labour Markets

Social class, gender and ethnicity and education are often seen as the main drivers
of social mobility and occupational achievement (Sampson et al., 2002; van Ham &
Manley, 2015), yet the social effects of spatial variations of housing affordability
and job opportunities have not been sufficiently analyzed (Findley et al., 2009; van
Ham, 2012). While there is abundant literature that demonstrates the various
mechanisms through which concentrations of disadvantage are thought to affect
individuals (Galster, 2012), the effects of structural drivers such housing and
labour markets and ethno-cultural discrimination are widely overlooked (van Ham
& Manley, 2015). What is needed are large-scale, cross-national research projects
to challenge the status quo assumption in neighbourhood research that various
outcome of peoples’ lives are determined by their neighbourhood of residence.

To date, a number of individual studies have demonstrated that those who already
experience disadvantage based on socio-structural factors (e.g. discrimination,
gender, low-skill, language barriers, lack of affordable rental or social housing in

As Manley & van Ham (2015: 312) report, Galster (2012) identified 17 mechanisms through which such
concentrations of disadvantage are thought to affect individuals, grouped into four categories: geographical
distribution of resources and amenities; social interactive mechanisms in neighbourhood spaces; environmenental
factors within a neighbourhood (e.g. green space, health hazards in buildings); and institutional mechanisms
whereby (non)governmental service providers can exclude people or places from accessing their services.
higher-income areas) are most likely to choose to live in low-income
neighbourhoods – and not the other way around.

A recent body of scholarly literature (Maclennan et al., 2015; Paradis et al., 2014; Suttor, 2015; van Ham et al., 2012; van Ham & Manley, 2015) has examined the
socio-spatial sorting processes that occur alongside labour and housing market
trends in Canada, Australia and the EU – and the social effects of these processes.
For instance, van Ham et al. (2012) explore the links between neighbourhood
selection, housing choice and labour market inequality in Edinborough, Scotland,
finding that individuals who are less likely to achieve occupational mobility tend to
cluster together in lower-income neighbourhoods with a density of low-quality
housing. The results suggest that an individual’s life chances may affect where they
choose to live; meaning that factors associated with a person’s socio-economic
status predetermine their residential location, housing type and tenure.

Similarly, as part of their study which linked social mobility to housing tenure in
Scotland, van Ham and Manley (2015) explored the empirical relationships
between living in a deprived neighbourhood and occupational mobility for those in
different housing tenures. Geocoded housing tenure data was applied to the Scottish
Longitudinal Study (SLS) that coded occupational achievement using the
International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (ibid: 311). The
strongest negative effects were found for owner-occupiers living in deprived
neighbourhoods (ibid). A possible cause was attributed to the “different
neighbourhood selection measures for different housing tenures (ibid: 312).” In
terms of housing allocation, those at the top of the waiting lists were allocated to
the next available dwelling that matched their needs (ibid). On the other hand, those
who searched for housing on the owner-occupied market, and to a lesser extent the
private market, could choose the next available dwelling that matched their needs
(ibid). People who were determined to be less likely to achieve occupational
mobility were found to cluster together in deprived neighbourhoods. Again, this
suggests that an individual’s life chances affect where they choose to live – and
provides additional empirical evidence for the reconfiguration of place-based models, along with technocratically-constructed “wellbeing” and “deprivation” measures and indices (e.g. Toronto’s Neighbourhood Well-Being Indices and the UK’s Indices of Deprivation) used to determine neighbourhood-level disadvantage.

In addition to the spatial sorting effects of housing and labour markets, residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods may experience labour market discrimination based on stigma tied to beliefs about residents of high crime, high risk areas (ibid). In Toronto, the stigma associated with areas of high deprivation (e.g. Steeles L’Amoreaux and Jane-Finch neighbourhood census tracts) have been well-documented (Anucha et al., 2014). As part of a Reitz and Banerjee’s (2007) study on neighbourhood stigma and labour trends, the authors linked to job application discrimination based on postal codes appearing on resumes (ibid). The effects of these trends are linked to broad factors surrounding race, poverty and precariousness in Ontario (Block & Galabuzi, 2011). These trends coalesce in priority neighbourhoods (or NIAs).

### 3.4 Designing Policies Beyond the Neighbourhood Scale

A comprehensive strategy is needed to address the widening gap between low-income households that are increasingly concentrated in Toronto’s inner suburban neighbourhoods, and the middle-to-upper income households that are increasingly concentrated in the city’s core and outer suburbs (Hulchanski, 2007; 2011). The harmful socio-economic effects of these trends fall disproportionately on low-income and/or precariously employed residents; the most vulnerable of whom include immigrant and new immigrant communities, refugees, refugee claimants, and non-status persons (Paradis et al., 2014). A person who is unemployed, for instance, is more likely to choose to live in a more affordable, poorly-served or inaccessible neighbourhood with comparatively high rates of violent crime.
Implicit to research that counters the assumptions of neighbourhood effects is the caution that, if these trends continue, then spatial sorting, housing and neighbourhood decline and the filtering of households and household units will continue to deepen – resulting in what United Way Toronto-York Region (UWTYR) (2015) has called the “precarity penalty.” The precarity penalty involves the combination of precarious labour market trends, the chronic underfunding of community-based employment services and training programs, and an increasingly inaccessible housing market. These trends combine to produce a variety of harmful impacts that affect population health and well-being -- and coalesce in the city’s low-income, inner suburban neighbourhoods (UWTYR 2015).

Building upon scholarly research which highlights the spatial effects of housing and labour market trends, there is a role for senior orders of government, municipal divisions and local private and not-for-profit agencies that are involved both in supporting and enacting a diverse range of policies to address housing affordability, precarious labour market trends and their associated social ills.

To use the example of housing policy, Canada’s Federal Government has had a fluctuating interest in housing policies over the last two decades and there has been a long-term shift to less federal involvement (Maclennan et al., 2015). The Province, in response to federal withdrawal, has not sufficiently expanded their support for housing programs, their housing policy scope, or their bureaucratic capacity to cope with aging and declining social housing stock, homelessness, and, in the case of Toronto, and increasingly unaffordable urban housing market (ibid). Housing policy has become fragmented across different Ministerial and municipal portfolios and it is difficult to attain a comprehensive view of what is needed (i.e., to understand and evaluate the kind of housing market interventions that will reverse decline, socio-spatial sorting, filtering and affordability trends) (ibid). This is true at the city level, as well. Numerous individual and overlapping housing and neighbourhood policy frameworks, strategies, policies, legislations and by-laws, programs, and small-scale initiatives form a complex web of governmental interventions.
From a policy perspective, the dynamics of neighbourhood decline must be framed in direct relation to the dynamics of housing and labour market precarity and decline. Thus, bringing Toronto’s disadvantaged neighbourhoods on par with better-faring localities requires multi-sector cooperation in strategy and funding along with a programmatic approach to change (Maclennan, 2008).

To secure resources from senior governments, there is potential to build from existing policies to create a more flexible and responsive policy framework for neighbourhood improvement in Toronto. For instance, as local Tower Renewal partnership initiative reports (Stewart et al 2012; Stewart et al 2012b) have highlighted, the Provincial Growth Plan for a Greater Golden Horseshoe has produced a “Complete Communities” policy agenda which identifies all the elements required to address housing and neighbourhood decline through “an appropriate and accessible mix of jobs, local services, a full range of housing, and community infrastructure including affordable housing, schools, recreation and open space for their residents, and convenient access to public transportation” (Ontario Ministry of Infrastructure, Growth Secretariat, 2006). To ensure change, such an approach would require new benchmarks, standards of program delivery, methods of intersectoral, interdivisional, and interdepartmental collaboration, and deep capital subsidies that prioritize housing investment and renewal as a core driver of progress.

4 Looking Ahead: Re-examining Risk and Effect at the Spatial Scale

This paper has highlighted some distinctive processes of power, social connectivity, and resistance that can occur within Toronto’s inner suburban neighbourhoods, which have emerged as sites where race and poverty coincide with the spatial scale. Importantly, more research is needed to examine the ways that grounded and participatory approaches may contribute to the political conceptualization of urban social problems that coalesce at low levels of geography. As Ghosh (2014; as cited in Carriere, 2016) has argued,
neighbourhoods -- and, by extension, processes of neighbouring -- should be judged not only on their based on their criteria given and used by an actual community, rather than criteria imposed by social researchers seeking to model social networks in neighbourhoods labeled as being ‘at-risk’.26

In establishing a direction for future research, Slater’s (2013) call for a “new cottage industry” of neighbourhood effects research has been echoed here. Perhaps it is time to shift focus beyond the neighbourhood itself, and begin to examine its outward links in order to develop a more strategic spatial approach to deprivation which acknowledges the city, or region-wide economy (Carrier, 2016; Matthews, 2012). Neighbourhood research and policymaking will also benefit from a new direction that brings focus to the autonomous experiences of individuals in a post-Fordist climate of austerity and the widespread roll-back of state financing for social infrastructures and social services across Western nations, alongside the downloading of financial and administrative responsibilities for these services to local organizations (Carriere, 2016). Moving away from a more traditional approach to understanding the capacities of at-risk individuals to circumvent harmful neighbourhood effects, it is now time for policy-makers, researchers, community agencies and advocates, and social movements strategists to craft a new set of analytical tools and frameworks that can be used to refute traditional assumptions about low-income neighbourhoods and their residents (Mayer, 2015); demonstrating, through well-established empirical evidence, that increased marginalization and polarization will result if current strategies go unchallenged.

26 Similarly, van Eick (2012: 3009) argues that a scholarly focus on “narratives of dissociation” may be overlooking the positive neighbourly relationships people in “deprived” neighbourhoods are actually maintaining (i.e., respecting a neighbour’s privacy should not be interpreted as an effect of social dysfunction). From this view, resident relationships in poor neighbourhoods are subject to an evaluative double standard; one which does not recognize or account for the dynamic complexities inherent to social relationships and behaviours (Carriere, 2016).
Bibliography


CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion
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1 Introduction

In pursuit of an adequate summary of the three papers that comprise my dissertation, this concluding chapter has three central aims. The first section will provide a summary of the major findings that emerge from each paper. Taken together, the papers are conceptually analogous -- representing a collective, top-down, interpretive analysis of the various influences, interests, incentives, and constraints that guide deliberations, statements, policies and decisions about place-based policies and place-based community policing practices in Toronto. However, given the breadth and scope of each individual topic, each paper will be summarized within its own unique context.

The next Section will present and discuss overarching research imperatives, or knowledge gaps, not visible when each of the three manuscripts is considered individually. Finally, Section Three will describe, in detail, the three papers’ combined contribution to the field of urban social policy scholarship in the Canadian context, and articulate an agenda for future research.

2 Summary of Major Findings

The interpretive approach to policy analysis employed, in varying capacities, across all three papers emphasizes the constitutive role of beliefs and the role of contingency and agency in shaping political action, policy-making and organizational practices. In all three, an interpretive analysis of politics, policies, decisions and practices was crafted with the aim to: 1) reveal market-oriented goals that has contribute to place-based policy prescriptions and the language of ‘social exclusion’, ‘participation’, and ‘risk’; 2) examine the various outcomes and community-level impacts of these policies, and 3) draw attention to alternative processes of social democracy that advocate a bottom–up
approach to governance -- stressing the importance of dialogue and participation, as opposed to expertise and prescription.

The post-Fordist strategy of mobilizing city space as an arena for growth and market regulation (Mayer, 2010) is reflected in the making and of enactment place-based strategies, alongside their local economic development policies and community-based programs that frame spatially-concentrated poverty as a neighbourhood problem -- a problem that is no longer called “poverty,” but rather, “social exclusion.” On that account, Paper One has attempted to illustrate how the neighbourhood policy frames of social exclusion and participation were developed under New Labour’s social investment state, and disseminated transnationally, travelling to Toronto via networks of elite policy actors. Paper Two examines the local enactment of targeted community policing policies that have emerged alongside place-based programs, showing how these policies distill across local institutional contexts, and through the organizational architecture of Toronto Police Services – resulting in the over-policing of priority neighbourhoods.

Finally, making use of the critical geography and social movement literature that has informed all three papers (Eick, 2006; Mayer, 2009; 2012; Uitermark, 2012), Paper Three provides a conceptual alternative to place-based schemas; drawing on contemporary urban social movement literature to outline the various strategies that social movement activists may use to counter-steer market-oriented processes of urban restructuring and refute claims that living in a disadvantaged neighbourhood produces “effects” which negatively impact individuals’ life chances.

What follows is a brief summary of the key findings of each individual paper.

1. Neighbourhood Politics, Policymaking and Discourses of ‘Exclusion’: Developing an Interpretive Account of Place-Based Policy Ideas in London (UK) and Toronto

Within its limited scope, Paper One examined Toronto’s recent (2005-) adoption of place-based policy in the New Labour tradition, reviewing the “high data” of
transnational Third Way and place-based discourse – or the discourse itself, as it is included in official sources such as policy documents, policy statements, speeches, and newspaper articles in both London and Toronto. Focusing on the discourse and rhetoric of place-based policies, the question of whether these seemingly local policies are in fact global – both in the sense that they are developed and disseminated transnationally, and because they aim to localize the problems of sociospatial polarization associated with a market-oriented political climate and global city formation – was explored in relation to the relative meanings attached to the policy frames of social exclusion and participation.

To determine the relative meaning of a policy frame one must attend to the ways in which it is defined, understood and interpreted by the political institutions, organizations and individual actors who regulate policy. The brand of place-based policy that is regulated by Toronto’s municipal government has adopted certain meanings inherent to the UK’s Strong Neighbourhoods approach; for instance, place-based policies in both the UK and Canada are associated with New Labour’s social investment state, which materialized with social democratic proponent Tony Blair’s Third Way urbanism – or what the former UK Prime Minister has referred to as "social-ism that recognized individuals as socially interdependent" (Freeden, 2005: 198). This ‘third’ policy paradigm employs state-led strategies of decentralization, local variation, volunteerism, and partnerships with the private sector (Jewson & MacGregor, 1997; Peck and Theodore, 2001). Strong Neighbourhoods (or place-based) policies emerging from the Third Way paradigm aim to combat “social exclusion,” rather than poverty (Lister, 1998); focusing on the individual or neighbourhood-based processes that prevent people from participating in mainstream social life or that prevent access to employment, health and educational resources rather than the structural factors that give way to socio-spatial polarization and economic inequality.

While acknowledging the great disparities in governance structures and funding mechanisms between London and Toronto, an interpretive approach to policy analysis has allowed me to highlight the constitutive role of beliefs and the role of contingency and agency that shaped Toronto’s adoption of place-based policy in the New Labour
tradition. In both London and Toronto, targeted neighbourhood strategies aim to combat social exclusion through the promotion of partnerships, “bringing the community in” to decision-making processes, and encouraging public participation and emphasizing community-based participation, control and empowerment in neighbourhood initiatives. The language of social exclusion in Britain is “about income but is also about prospects and networks and life-changes” (Blair, 1998). Cast as potential obstacles to competitive success, New Labour’s neighbourhood agenda set out to approach complex problems that were manifest at the spatial scale. Departments such as the Social Exclusion Unit and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit aimed to identify disadvantaged areas, and match funding and services to social need. Toronto’s place-based policy initiatives were found to parallel New Labour’s urban programs. Through policy interventions like the Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy (SNS) and the Community Partnerships Strategy (CPS), the City of Toronto worked with the Strong Neighbourhoods Task Force and the United Way of Greater Toronto to identify high-risk neighbourhoods, and target investments in these areas. As in the UK, these place-based policy interventions emphasize the importance of local conditions, and employ the discourse of social exclusion widely.

The U.K. approach is distinct from Canada in that it has adopted a multi-pronged strategy with major initiatives to tackle unemployment and poverty; promote equal opportunities for all; support communities, particularly in disadvantaged areas, and reintegrate marginalized people who have experienced “extreme forms of social exclusion” (Freiler, 2004). In establishing “[a] vision of a city where no one is advantaged by where they live” the SNS borrows from UK policy frames of exclusion, deprivation and disadvantage. As in the UK, the emphasis is deprivation-driven, based on attributes of places rather than patterns of interaction and economic opportunities. Moreover, as in the UK, the overarching policy goal of the SNS emphasizes geographic disadvantage as an issue of social exclusion and inclusion. Both policy frameworks prescribe inclusive partnerships in order combat social exclusion, “bringing the community in” to decision-making processes, and encouraging public participation in targeted neighbourhood initiatives.
Likewise, participation is portrayed as a means to reduce exclusion, strengthen community voice, and empower local actors. Participation, as a policy concept, infers that a great many task forces and advisory groups have been set up with memberships that bring together the government, business, voluntary organizations and the corporate sector. A focus on participation also emphasizes the importance of social capital in the poorest areas. Building social capital is considered both a means and an outcome of anti-poverty policies (Gough et al., 2006: 193). Meanwhile, emphasis on partnerships encourages the dispersion of policy-making, as many groups and people who have previously not been involved in government are included. However this does not mean that the center has given up control. In so far as partnership becomes a reality rather than just rhetoric, it demands a new form of control that necessarily involves language – shaping the culture, discourse and language of the government bureaucrats rather than directly controlling what they do.

Looking ahead, this research questions whether or not place-based policy frameworks were the right fit for Toronto. Bearing in mind the great disparities in governance structures and funding mechanisms between London and Toronto, is a place-based approach the best policy mechanism through which to address a lack of services and infrastructure in our local communities? A critical question is whether these local initiatives can adequately address the wider structural forces that lie behind the production and perpetuation of spatially concentrated poverty. A more reliable, comprehensive set of targeted community programs will likely take years to have effect, since building solid and sustainable collaborations takes time and effort, and addressing the foundations and complexities of poverty is a long-term challenge (Gardener et al., 2010:11). The worry is that place-based policies focus too narrowly on delivering programs to disadvantaged neighbourhoods without addressing the roots of social problems; for instance, enhancing access to health services for under-served populations is crucial, but will have limited overall impact without addressing the underlying socio-structural determinants associated with poverty and economic inequality.

As Paper Two has attempted to illustrate, there are many potential benefits that come with a genuinely collaborative and community driven re-working of community policing model in Toronto – particularly in the way of increased trust and willingness to cooperate with officers on the part of individuals and community stakeholders (e.g. youth workers, social service workers, multi-service community-based organizations).

On the one hand, increased public faith in the TPS would likely lead to a decrease in discriminatory practices; particularly racially discriminatory ‘stop and search’ practices, carding practices and incarceration rates. Moreover, formal community input into the redirection of community policing funds may work allocate additional funds to the improvement of social service that more effectively address issues of spatialized poverty and wealth-based inequalities that plague Toronto’s inner suburbs – such as employment and housing supports. On the other hand, in terms of benefits for the police, an increase in public faith in police services may lead to more crimes reported and solved in low-income neighbourhoods and improved crime statistics.

As the paper outlines, in order to secure public faith in the TPS, the organization must first work to inform their day-to-day operational practices with the basic tenets of policing “by consent.” At a procedural level, police officers must develop a sense of justice and anti-discriminatory practice in police-citizen encounters – and this should be guided by policy that comes from the organization, itself. In order to do this, a shift away from the administrative preoccupation with predicting and accounting for spatialized risk must first occur. As an alternative to the risk framework, it is proposed that individuals and communities be afforded the chance, through a reordering of community policing governance strategies, policies and practices, to actively and collaboratively work to reframe discourses of risk and make meaningful and impactful contributions to the development and enactment of policing practices within their communities and neighbourhoods. One possible solution could be tied to a reframing of a reframing of risk assessments (e.g. the UK’s Relative Deprivation Indices and Toronto’s Neighbourhood Wellbeing Index) so that the metrics account emphasize structural poverty and unemployment over individual and/ or family-level indicators of risk.
3. Beyond Neighbourhood Effects: Developing an Alternative Understanding of the Linkages Between Concentrated Poverty and ‘Risk’

This final, conceptual paper highlights some distinctive processes of power, social connectivity, and resistance that can occur within the at-risk neighbourhoods spread across Toronto’s inner suburbs, which have emerged as sites where race and poverty coincide with the spatial scale (i.e., housing). In Canada, place-based policies are predicated upon a number of popular scholarly studies which claim that living in a disadvantaged, at-risk neighbourhood produces negative effects on residents’ life chances over and above the effects of structural and individual characteristics. Of these many studies [critiqued by Slater (2013) as a “cottage industry of neighbourhood effects research”], the most ubiquitous was conducted in 2002 in Chicago, by Robert J. Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson et al, 2002). The study linked individuals’ life chances to the neighbourhoods in which they live on the basis of neighbourhood effects – or neighbourhood-level variations of phenomena such as delinquency, mutual trust, routine activity patterns, and violence and crime (Carriere, 2016).

In establishing a direction for future research, Slater’s (2013) call for a ‘new cottage industry’ of neighbourhood effects research is echoed. The paper signals the need for a shift in empirical focus beyond the neighbourhood itself, so that scholars may begin to examine its outward links in order to develop a more strategic spatial approach to deprivation that acknowledges the city, or region-wide economy (Matthews, 2012). For instance, countering the recurrent framing of ethnoracially diverse neighbourhoods in Western European cities as “deprived” or “socially dysfunctional,” van Eijk (2012: 3009, as cited in Carriere, 2016) puts forward the notion that “perceptions of diversity or disorder do not matter much when neighbour relations evolve around chance encounters and norms of good neighbouring.” The persistent idea that people living in low-income neighbourhoods fail to form relationships with their fellow residents, and are therefore in need of more social cohesion, is contested. Instead, researchers should make an effort to refine these claims, and consider that, perhaps, more distant neighbourly relations do not constitute a lack of social cohesion, or a “fragmentation of the neighbourhood (ibid, as
Rather, scholarly focus on “narratives of dissociation” may be overlooking the positive neighbourly relationships people in at-risk neighbourhoods are actually maintaining (i.e., respecting a neighbour’s privacy should not be interpreted as an effect of social dysfunction). From this view, local relationships in poor neighbourhoods are subject to an evaluative double standard that must be remedied (Carriere, 2016).

Neighbourhood research and policymaking will also benefit from a new direction that brings focus to the autonomous experiences of individuals in a post-Fordist climate of austerity and the widespread roll-back of state financing for social infrastructures and social services across Western nations, alongside the downloading of financial and administrative responsibilities for these services to local organizations. Moving away from a more traditional approach to understanding the capacities of neighbours to remain resilient under place-specific effects, the paper calls for increased attention to the goals, strengths, assets and intentions that underscore collaboration in and across neighbourhoods (ibid).

3 Study Limitations

The most glaring analytical limitations emerge from Paper One. First, in drawing linkages between policies that have been “transferred” from the UK to Canada, this paper has focused largely on policies emerging out of the New Labour’s National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal; and thus its UK focus is limited to the late 1990s and early 2000s when area-based policies (ABIs) were first enacted (and does not extend beyond 2006). Further study would require an evolved empirical analysis – accounting for new ABIs have instituted under the Greater London Authority.

In addition to the inclusion of more recent policy material, further analyses could include new scholarly work that critiques the empirical basis that traditional policy transfer/modality studies tend to draw from. Between 2013-2016, new studies have emerged to challenge literature on the ‘fast transfer’ of policy prescriptions. For instance, examining the ‘slow circulation’ of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) policies in South Africa, Wood (2015: 
570) builds upon urban policy modalities literature (McCann and Ward, 2001; Peck, 2011; Theodore and Peck, 2012) that critique the rapid transfer of “pre-fabricated best-practice” policies – focusing her analysis, instead, on the “gradual, creeping” process of BRT policy circulation both to and across South Africa. Wood considers the way in which “[…] best practice flows through a more subtle and consistent method of persuasion (ibid).” With this in mind, the limitations of my analysis of the fast transfer of place-based language, policy frames and best practices are revealed. To improve the analysis, the importance of temporality in understanding practices of policy circulation should be taken into account (ibid).

Next, Paper Two is limited in its discussion of the lack of available race-based data and carding data that the police provide to social science researchers and members of the public. The reason behind this is that, to date, no critical scholarly research has produced a top-down, institutional analysis of Toronto’s community policing model. However, a few studies have examined carding practices, Disproportionate Minority Contact and Blacks’ experiences with the police in Canada (see James, 1998; Wortley & Tanner, 2004; Wortley & Owusu-Bempah, 2011; Meng et al, 2014). A handful of studies have shed light on TPS race-based data collection from civilian interactions and the organizational mandate which does not require that such data be made readily available to the public (Wortley, 2003; Owusu-Bempah, 2011).

In analyzing police practices, it is also important to acknowledge and reflexively account for the distance that exists between myself – a White, Canadian-born doctoral student – and the people that have been most affected by persistent police presence in their communities. I lack first-hand experience. With this in mind, my goal was not to provide a situated account of community policing practices; rather, the aim was to contribute my own skills and knowledge base as a social policy analyst to study the tri-level political and institutional processes that have contributed both to the design and delivery of a program like TAVIS. By accounting for the various channels of decision-making, and engaging in in-depth interviews with influential key informants (including two Deputy Ministers, the former chair of the TPSB, current TPSB officials and high-ranking police
officers), I hoped to shed light on the actions, beliefs, histories and practices of the people involved in implementing TAVIS. As a policy analyst, I also wanted to understand what could be done about discriminatory policing in Toronto – what was possible, and through what means. What was to come? How did these plans connect to the officers on the ground within heavily policed, “hot spot” neighbourhoods? If community agencies and residents were being invited to participate in municipal consultations on a new, post-TAVIS policing model, to what extent would those consultations actually affect programmatic outcomes?

Although the research process did produce answers to many of these questions, I was often reminded of the static nature of police practice reform in Toronto -- and the long history that has seen the hope of real change repeatedly come to a halt due to the power of the Chief of Police to veto recommendations concerning operational reform, granted by the Police Services Act. While recent debates on police reform have resulted in the 2015 ban on carding practices, to date, no legislative or regulatory changes have been proposed that affect the Act.

A draft version of Paper Two has been circulated to all study participants, and participant feedback has been recorded and used to make edits to the initial draft. Special attention was given to feedback provided by individuals representing community advocacy groups, policing activists and crime reporters. Pending the dissertation committee’s approval of the draft, the report will be circulated to various groups; including TPAC, crime reporters with the Toronto Star, and local community groups involved in anti-Black racism and police reform efforts.

The third paper is a conceptual paper, and so its limitations are numerous in view of its lack of detailed empirical evidence and data to support an alternative model which may be used to counter more traditional conceptions of neighbourhood effects. As the paper has outlined, although neighbourhood effects have long been of interest to policy makers and academics, research into the issue has tended to draw on conventional empirical and case study methods -- modeling the effects of neighbourhood level measures of poverty
on individual outcomes, rather than investigating the effects of structural factors such as labour market trends, income inequality and racial discrimination. As such, studies seeking to measure the social effects of a neighbourhood on its residents can be subject to a number of flaws that include omitted variable bias, implied causality and ecological fallacy. Alternatively, neighbourhood studies should incorporate the situated local knowledge of residents to understand the dynamics between spatial factors such as social and physical infrastructure, comparative location and spatial scales, development history and contemporary culture, local economy and governance, levels of public and private investment, and the outcomes of shifting policies and political agendas.

The final paper also describes the potential for new social movements strategists and community activists to align their resources toward leveraging new, well-defined analytical tools and frameworks to ‘counter-steer’ policy; yet no concrete solutions can be offered at this stage. Nonetheless, the collection and analysis of existing studies, and the identification of empirical bodies of evidence that can be used to support a more democratic, flexible and responsive methodological framework represents a worthwhile contribution to an emerging field of study. Conceptual papers help to ground subsequent studies in what has been done, and where research is lacking. The hope is that a knowledge base will continue to grow, leading to the design and delivery of more flexible and responsive policies and programs tailored to the needs of people living in areas of the city where housing is cheap but quality is poor, transit access is limited, services are sparse, and health outcomes are comparatively worse than wealthier neighbourhoods.

4 Implications for Social Work

In the field of social work, the uncritical acceptance of political frames or “types” of people focuses social workers’ attention narrowly on individuals and away from broader socio-structural relations (Chambon, 1999; Edelman, 1988). The subjects become reified. We objectify them and observe them as part of the seeable world. But researchers must remember that we have a part in constructing these interactions (Wilson, 2011). In
policy, we must also engage with issues of power and politics. Where is power? Who is silenced? This is the contribution of critical theory to the interpretive method.

With this in mind, further research is needed to understand what may be done -- by politicians, policy actors and officials, researchers, private sector funders, community groups, and advocates -- to ensure that place-based policies and community policing strategies are solidly base, and solidly connected, to the needs and perspectives of local people and communities. In order to address the needs of the urban poor, these policies must move beyond their spatially selective nature and begin to expand beyond the constructs of ‘place’ so that they extend universally across neighbourhoods boundaries, addressing the underlying structural causes of poverty and social exclusion. That is, perhaps, the only way that a neighbourhoods approach may eventually meet the planning and service needs of underserved, insufficiently housed, precariously employed and spatially concentrated individuals.

5 Recommendations

1. Neighbourhood Politics, Policymaking and Discourses of ‘Exclusion’: Developing an Interpretive Account of Place-Based Policy Ideas in London (UK) and Toronto

Place-based policies reveal – and rub up against – a major contradiction. The reason these policies have sprung up is because of the failure of governments to take responsibility for social policy and for problems such as poverty and inequality (Gardner et al., 2010). Place-based policies have moved to fill this gap, but without significant state investment and multi-level coordination, these targeted (and limited) interventions are not enough.

In Toronto, an appropriate strategy to bridge this contradiction would involve a complex balance of mobilized public interests groups to put pressure on governments, and a cross-sectoral, multidivisional push to address gaps in social policy and service provision. Place-based policies and the problems they are trying to solve are long-term projects (ibid). And so, it is recommended that government policy and funding frameworks must
also take this longer view. Different state policies, strategies and directions need to be effectively aligned and coordinated, and strategies for the non-profit and community-based sectors need to prioritize local knowledge.


Following the review and interpretive analysis of policy materials and interview data, four key contributions have been put forward regarding an appropriate “way forward” through ongoing community policing debates in Toronto.

First, provincial, municipal and organizational policy frameworks all emphasize the centrality of TPS-directed community engagement in high-risk, low-income neighbourhoods. Current TPS strategies and programs designed to influence the empowerment of youth in low-income neighbourhoods such as TAVIS, the Youth in Policing Initiative (YIPI) and FOCUS Rexdale should be thoroughly reviewed by a working group comprised of regulators, social science researchers and community partners. Importantly, community partners must be guaranteed a meaningful and permanent role, both in directing and the evaluating these policies (e.g. as part of a bi-annual review).

By extension, strategies embedded with principles of democratic regulatory justice and ‘policing by consent’ should guide the design of new community-based policing strategies. An example is found in the Morris Justice Project: a Participatory Action Research (PAR) project in the south Bronx which allows community members to act as policing policy “architects,” creating policy recommendations for police reforms that are brought to city council.

As a first step, the Province of Ontario, the City of Toronto and Toronto Police Services could creating new positions for ‘community liaisons’ who can act as mediators between officers and civilians. These liaisons should not be employees of the TPS; thus providing an objective point-of-contact for residents on issues of community safety and promote
effective the communication/ translation of needs and priorities to both officers and decision-makers.

Secondly, predictive analytical tools used to assess “risk” could begin to forefront poverty as a key driver of individual and community-level risk.

TPS community policing data must also be made available to social science researchers and members of the public. This data should include all information collected in every police stop or police-citizen encounter (e.g. neighbourhood, ethnicity, reason for the stop, etc.) An appropriate policy response would dictate that every person stopped by the police receive a receipt detailing all identifying and descriptive information that will be included in their record. In the event that the information is recorded by means of a body camera, all files should be uploaded to the central database and be made available to formal, regulatory bodies operating independently of the TPS through more transparent, open and accessible systems of data retention and processing of requests for information.

Thirdly, formal proposals to privatize select policing services should incorporate a thorough review of the challenges inherent to the UK from which these proposals borrow. The AMO’s 2015 Policing Modernization Report seeks to introduce the selective privatization of policing services in Toronto. In 2011, Alok Mukherjee, the former Chair of the Toronto Police Services Board, and Chief of Police Bill Blair travelled to London together to study the UK approach to privatized community-based policing, thought to be at the forefront of cost-saving innovations. The visit resulted in a KPMG report, presented to the TPS and the City in December 2015, which provided detailed recommendations toward the selective privatization of TPS services.

As it follows, it is recommended here that an additional report be commissioned by the TPSB to examine the community-level impacts of privatization measures in the UK through a PAR assessment of residents, activists and rights-based advocacy groups.
As a fourth and final contribution, policies governing police training and police-led community service provision should be effectively coordinated and implemented, and the authority of the Chief of Police in guiding the implementation process should be clearly defined in relation to that of the TPSB or a provincial regulating authority. At present, Section 31(4) of the Police Services Act is intended to “prevent direct Board interference” in policing service delivery but not to prevent the Board from making decisions governing the “structure and environment in which those policing functions occur.” Multiple research participants emphasize the ambiguity that exists around the authority of the TPSB, the inability of the Board to override the decisions of the Chief, and the need for clarity and policy reform.

Implications

The implications of the four key research contributions identified above are varied and complex; however, for the purposes of this study they will be seen to contribute to the broad conceptual framework of policing by consent. More specifically, formal take-up of these four key considerations would help to foster both an organizational culture, and a set of operational practices, that represent a new standard of policing by consent in Toronto.

Used here, policing by consent aligns with Tyler and Jackson’s (2012) theoretical model of social regulation, procedural justice and legitimacy. According to this model, a balanced, just and effective set of policing policies must “win the hearts and minds of individuals through legitimate use of power (Jackson et al., 2012: 4).” This “process-based” model of policing holds that, through the actions and practices of the police and criminal courts, justice institutions can “demonstrate impartial service to the law, as well as fair, respectful and even-handed wielding of power (ibid).”

There is much evidence to suggest that policies and action plans that create a sense of legitimacy and procedural justice amongst residents and communities lead to greater rates of compliance with the law, and greater cooperation officers based on a sense of shared
values and/or a common understanding of the moral underpinnings of the law (Myhil & Bradford, 2011; Jackson et al., 2012).

In order to generate effective, flexible and responsive set of policing policies and practices within Toronto, PAR methods (such as those employed by the Morris Justice Project) could be combined with data collection methods drawn from the interpretive approach to policy analysis (IPA). Going beyond the co-construction of policies and strategies, IPA accounts for the actions, beliefs, preferences and personal histories of the people involved. With regards to TPS officers, questions may focus on what officers want, why, and what events may have led them to this perspective. How do they view their role in relation to the larger organization? How do they see their role in relation to the residents they serve? How would they prefer to their jobs? What histories and events have led to the culture of the organization, as it is now, and what needs to change?

The combination of PAR with IPA data collection methods, and subsequent distribution of this data to community residents and interest groups may build a common foundation that connects the wants and needs of officers to those of the residents they serve -- establishing common connections that can be leveraged to create more responsive action plans and policies. In turn, similar data could be collected among residents and communities most targeted by police in order to generate a more in-depth, multiperspectival and subjective understanding of community need (and, by extension, risk factors).

3. Beyond ‘Neighbourhood Effects’: Developing an Alternative Understanding of the Linkages Between Concentrated Poverty and ‘Risk’

Applied to Toronto’s Priority Neighbourhoods (now called ‘Neighbourhood Improvement Areas’) and the targeted community policing programs such as the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy (TAVIS), the at-risk, disadvantaged neighbourhood ethos is regulated through patchwork forms of networked governance. This is not a dispersal of power, but rather, a fragmentation – a form of top-down centralism applied at the level of the neighbourhood. Crime reduction is prioritized in order to meet the global
city aspirations of policy-makers, or what Cochrane (2007) describes as a “growth first” logic. Programs like TAVIS are aimed at “engaging” residents in surveillance and crime reporting activities in order to enhance security and order in their neighbourhoods; contributing to the political design and regulation of spatialized risk.

As an alternative to these processes, Paper Three recommends that urban researchers, policy scholars, urban designers and community workers conduct comparative research projects which work to counter the neighbourhood effects thesis. As Mayer (2015, as cited in Carriere, 2016) posits, when engaging in comparative work, researchers are forced to consider the ‘meta-level’ and gather rich empirical data that, when you look at enough countries and cities, will allow for alternative concept formation (for concept formation, she argues, the analysis of multiple sites is essential). It is also suggested that new social movement strategists can work to counter-steer policy developments if they can call on well-defined analytical tools and frameworks that can be leverage to refute place-based strategies (i.e. demonstrating through well-established empirical evidence that increased marginalization and polarization will result if current strategies go unchallenged).
Bibliography


