Colonization and the Church in High Medieval Sardinia

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Centre for Medieval Studies
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Abstract

This thesis investigates the role that the Church played in the political, spiritual and economic colonization of Sardinia in the high Middle Ages. By using Robert Bartlett’s conception of the European “center” and “periphery,” it shows that Sardinia represents an unusual case of a territory that was culturally both central and peripheral. Within this ambiguous cultural setting, and using papal letters, political treaties, chronicles, monastic documents, and onomastic evidence, the thesis examines the way Pisa, Genoa and the Roman pontiffs used Rome’s spiritual and cultural authority to strengthen their own political and economic claims in Sardinia. Specifically, by focusing on the archbishop of Pisa and the bishops and archbishops of Sardinia, it shows that the personnel of the Church, which are not commonly considered agents of colonization in Sardinia, were in reality fundamental to bringing Sardinian society closer to being a political and cultural extension of the Italian mainland. It also, however, investigates the ways in which local Sardinian rulers at times strongly resisted ecclesiastical pressures to conform to the norms of Rome, or used the spiritual prestige and cultural tools offered by the Roman Church to negotiate political advantages for themselves. In this way, the thesis finds that foreign cultural colonization in Sardinia was at times less effective than is generally assumed, and that in certain situations the personnel of the Sardinian Church could offer the means for resistance to foreign colonization. Finally, the thesis draws comparisons between Sardinia and other examples
of political, economic and spiritual colonization within Europe, to show how Sardinia is both part of a wider medieval European pattern, and simultaneously a unique case in the study of medieval colonization.
Acknowledgments

This thesis is not at all what I had expected to write when I began doing preparatory research, some four years ago, on church sanctuary in late medieval England. Throughout the repeated changes of focus that took me from fourteenth- and fifteenth-century English sanctuary practices to colonization in high medieval Sardinia, my two co-supervisors, Mark Meyerson and Joseph Goering, displayed awesome flexibility and amazing patience. The combination of their unfailing support, wise cautions, and suggestions led me to a topic I have found fascinating. Their encouragement and understanding was just as constant through the trials of balancing new and full-time motherhood with the research and writing of this thesis, and their careful feedback led me to improve both my thesis and myself as a scholar. I am deeply grateful to them: I could not have wished for better supervisors.

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Archbishops and Bishops in Sardinia: 1200 – 1260s
Chapter One. Introduction: Sardinia from Antiquity to the Middle Ages

This thesis will explore how the Sardinian Church interacted with attempts by various powers to “colonize” Sardinia politically and culturally between the 1060s and the 1250s. Such efforts were chiefly carried out by the urban communes of Pisa and Genoa, although important roles were also played by the Hohenstaufen emperors and the papacy. Each of these political units took a different approach to the problem of how to enlarge its own influence over the politically divided island, but the institutions, traditions, and cultural tools offered by the Western Church were indispensable to all of them. Using Robert Bartlett’s interpretation of a continent-wide process of “Europeanization” via “colonization,” this thesis will place the case of Sardinia in an international context to show how each entity used the Church in Sardinia to further its own political and economic interests, and how these methods compare with methods used elsewhere in Europe. It will also consider the responses of Sardinia’s indigenous rulers to these attempts at cultural and political control, assessing both the advantages and disadvantages that such attempts at colonization could bring to local sovereigns.

It must be noted that using a term like “colonization” risks creating ambiguity and misunderstandings, thanks to the plethora of definitions that have been proposed for it, and the even greater lack of definitions that typifies its use in many historical studies. Great care must therefore be taken to establish precisely what this term, and attendant terms such as “control” and “settlement,” will be taken to mean here. An analysis of all such terms will follow later in the Introduction, along with a discussion of their


applicability to the Middle Ages. For now, let it simply be said that in this thesis, “colonization” will signify the process by which the immediate or gradual establishment of political control, the introduction of settlers, and a certain transformation of society are achieved by one power in a subject kingdom. “Colonialism,” instead, will be understood as the establishment and maintenance of a politically-controlled colony, and, in particular, the set of ideas that made this possible. In Sardinia, Pisan colonialism did occur in some places as the outcome of a long colonization process, but the majority of this study is concerned with colonization, rather than colonialism.

Conducting an exploration of Church and colonization in medieval Sardinia, and doing so from an extra-Sardinian point of view, is important for a number of reasons. Not only is it an attempt to address the scarcity of studies on Sardinia in English-language historiography, but Sardinian historiography has tended to limit its view to Sardinia itself or, at most, to Sardinia’s colonizers. These were principally Pisa and Genoa before 1323, and Catalonia/Aragon after 1323. This thesis represents the first time that Sardinia is being analyzed from a wider perspective, one which makes it possible to see how the island fits into the Europe-wide pattern of medieval expansion and colonization that Bartlett has described. In aid of establishing such a perspective, the theoretical framework employed here will use the concepts of colonization and Europeanization to understand the colonial interactions of foreign powers, the Sardinian Church, and Sardinian society in the Middle Ages. Furthermore, Sardinia holds a particular value for the study of medieval European colonization, thanks to its ambiguous, and unusual, cultural position between periphery and centre. While most studies of colonization following Bartlett’s The Making of Europe have analyzed European cultures within a binary framework of either center or periphery, Sardinia provides an example of a colonized land that was both center and periphery, as will be explained later.

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The interpretative value of this cultural ambiguity can best be seen by looking at a predominantly cultural body like the Church, and it is for this reason that the thesis focuses on specifically ecclesiastical roles in the processes of political and cultural colonization that were led by Pisa and Genoa in Sardinia. This is the first time that such a study is being carried out. There is no shortage of analyses of the nature and impact of the colonizations of medieval Sardinia, but these have invariably focused on the economic and demographic aspects of the question.\(^4\) Indeed, the study of colonization in Sardinia has mirrored the same pursuit in English, where colonization has traditionally been explained in a multi-disciplinary framework that combines the studies of demography and settlement, of the physical environment, and of the economy.\(^5\) Economic history has been particularly important for setting the terms in which medieval colonization is discussed and explained, encouraging a focus on the interactions between physical environment, technology, agrarian production, and the final political and economic consequences of these efforts.\(^6\) For Sardinia, Marco Tangheroni (1946-2005) and John Day (1924-2003) were the pioneers of this approach, producing ground-breaking results and acquiring a large number of followers.\(^7\) John Day, in particular, identified Sardinia’s economy as a “colonial” one, in which Sardinia participated as an unequal partner with foreign merchants, providing cheap raw materials that enriched the Pisans and


Genoese. Most recently, Corrado Zedda has taken up the use of the term colonization to describe Pisa’s political relationship with Sardinia, judging it problematic but unavoidable. Yet none of these authors considers the cultural and/or ecclesiastical methods and impacts of foreign colonization in Sardinia.

Because the present thesis departs from this tradition, and instead focuses on the cultural- ecclesiastical-political authority of the Church as an instrument of colonization, questions of demographics and economics will be left on the sidelines. Instead, the thesis will concentrate on the ways bishops and archbishops in Sardinia, Pisa and Genoa took part in the political, demographic and cultural colonization of Sardinia. Unfortunately, the lack of surviving sources makes it impossible to include the lower secular clergy in this analysis. Meanwhile, although there is a relatively large body of surviving material regarding monasteries in Sardinia, any in-depth analysis of them lies well beyond the scope of this study. Monasteries will be brought in as supporting evidence, but will not be the primary subject of analyses. In its concentration on the upper secular clergy, this thesis will at times draw on the evidence and conclusions provided by economic and political historians like Tangheroni, Day and their followers, but it departs from the economic-historical tradition by focusing specifically on the personnel of the Church as an instrument of colonization in Sardinia, and thus offers a wholly new contribution to the understanding of medieval European colonization.

Because Sardinian history is nearly unknown to the English-speaking world, it is necessary to provide an overview of its early medieval institutional and cultural history before defining the theoretical framework that will be used in the thesis. Thus, the Introduction will be structured in three parts. First will come a synopsis of early-medieval Sardinian history, which will provide the cultural and institutional background for the following chapters. Second, a description will be made of the theoretical framework that will be employed in the thesis and of the international context in which Sardinia should be understood. Finally, the Introduction will briefly describe the sources to be used and will outline the general structure of the thesis.

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1.1 From Late Antiquity to the End of the Byzantine Age

Sardinia, along with Corsica, was organized as a Roman province in 227 BC, and its Christianization came early: at least by 314 AD its main city, Cagliari, had a bishop and a presbyter, who took part in the Council of Arles. By 483/484 the metropolitan bishop of Cagliari had four suffragans in Sardinia, and was also metropolitan for the bishops of Majorca, Minorca and Ibiza; all of the Sardinian bishops attended a meeting at Carthage. Sardinia could therefore be seen as a central node between Italy, Spain and north Africa; indeed, the island had long-standing close cultural links with Carthage, and North Africa in general. These led it to become the refuge of Fulgentius of Ruspe in 508/509 and 517/518, and the home of the remains of St. Augustine some time in the fifth or sixth century. Thus, although it was never as tightly tied to the Roman Empire as most parts of mainland Italy, and even sided with Carthage at one point against Rome, it could hardly be seen as peripheral, especially if compared to the German territories or Britain. As it became subsumed into the Roman Empire, its upper classes became Romanized, importing huge amounts of wares from northern Italy. Indeed, until the split between Constantinople and Rome as would-be capitals of the empire, Sardinia’s geographical, cultural and religious position placed it very near the centre of the Roman world.

Extremely little is known about Sardinia between late Antiquity and the eleventh century, but what is certain is that it was made part of the Byzantine Empire around 533 AD, along with the rest of Italy. This political orientation deeply affected Sardinian political and religious culture, giving Sardinia Greek features that would last for centuries. For the purposes of this thesis, the two most important effects of Byzantine influence are the political structure that it gave rise to, with four independent rulers called iudikes who exercised a public, non-feudal power in their kingdoms, and the Greek Orthodox traditions in Sardinia’s Church.

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10 Rowland, The Periphery in the Center, p. 89
13 Ferrandus Carthaginensis (dubium), Vita sancti Fulgentii, ed. G. G. Lapeyre (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), ch. 17, l. 2 (p. 87); ch. 19, l. 18 (p. 95).
15 There are speculations that Christianity existed only in the coastal towns in the early centuries of the Church, while the centre remained pagan. See Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, pp. 109-110.
1.1.1 The Four Judicates

From at least the late eleventh century to the mid-thirteenth century, Sardinia was divided into four independent polities, each of which called itself “iudicatus,” anglicized here to judicate. In the period being treated by this thesis their names had become relatively stable, as Cagliari, Gallura, Logudoro/Torres, and Arborea. It is difficult to specify precisely what the word *iudicatus* means and how it should be translated. Though it literally means “judge-ship”, these administrative units were clearly understood as something closer to a kingdom by contemporary political powers. The ruler of each judicate was known as a “judex,” or judge; the development and nature of the judex will be discussed below. Each judicate defended its borders, protected its own political and commercial interests and had its own laws, in some cases encoded in a *carta de logu*, or “charter of the kingdom.” The smallest, poorest and least documented of the four judicates was that of Gallura, in the north-east corner of the island. From the second half of the thirteenth century, however, when the indigenous dynasty had been replaced by a Pisan family, the colonized judicate came to be known as Terranova. For most of the period discussed in this thesis Gallura’s capital was at Civita, today’s Olbia, although the judex may have spent time also at Posada or Orosei. The judicial court was situated close to the chamberlain’s residence and to the church of S. Paolo, the city’s episcopal seat; this was an episcopal, and not an archiepiscopal, seat simply because Gallura lacked an archbishop. In Gallura, however, as in all four other judicates, and indeed as in the rest of medieval Europe, the judicial court was not fixed in the capital but travelled around the territory, particularly to administer justice.

A similar situation to Gallura’s is found in the Judicate of Arborea, found in the south-west of Sardinia. Arborea’s capital had moved at some point from its original location in Tharros, where it was exposed to attacks from the sea, to the more sheltered Oristano, where it remained for all of the high and late Middle

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16 Though whether this says more about the actual nature of the judicates or about the assumptions of contemporaries, based on their own political frameworks, is difficult or impossible to say. As will be noted below, Pope Leo IV called a Sardinian ruler “celsitudo vestra” and “sublimitas vestra” in AD 851: Rowland, *The Periphery in the Center*, p. 150. In the twelfth century, the *Liber Maiolichinus*, a Pisan chronicle, calls the judex of Logudoro *rex clarus, multum celebratus ab omni Sardorum populo*. *Liber Maiolichinus de Gestis Pisanorum Illustribus*, ed. Carlo Calisse et al. (Rome: Forzani e C. Tipografi del Senato, 1904), p. 14, ll. 197-198.


Ages. The city of Oristano was the home of the judex and the archdiocesan seat; it also housed various settlements of foreigners and the court of the archbishop. The Judicate of Cagliari, too, which was Sardinia’s southern-most judicate, located both its judicial and archiepiscopal power in its capital, S. Igia, until this was razed in 1253 by the Pisans. S. Igia was situated inland, and was largely surrounded by swamps: this made it easily defendable, but also limited its attraction to foreign merchants, who tended to settle nearer to the judicate’s most important port.

In the Judicate of Logudoro, in the north-western corner of Sardinia, a different geography of power developed. The judicial court, originally at the port town of Turris or Torres, moved inland to Ardara, while the archiepiscopal seat remained at the cathedral of S. Gavino in Torres, as did the most important Pisan and Genoese settlements. In this way the judicate’s main sources of authority and power were split geographically, a dichotomy that would in due course fracture into many centres of quasi-independent powers, especially in the aristocratically-founded cities of Bosa, Castelgenovese and Alghero, and the city of Sassari.

1.1.2 The Origin of the Judicates

Given the often-lamented scarcity of primary sources relating to early medieval Sardinian history, it is difficult to identify the origins of the judicates: indeed, the origins of the four judicates of Gallura, Logudoro, Arborea and Cagliari remain a debated topic in medieval Sardinian historiography. The most widely-accepted theory, however, continues to be that which Enrico Besta first elaborated in the early twentieth century: i.e., that the judicate was an evolution of the earlier Byzantine administrative structure, an evolution which took place after contacts with Byzantium disintegrated in the eighth and ninth centuries under the pressure of Arab attacks in the Mediterranean. As a province of Byzantium, Sardinia was ruled by a praeses, who was in charge of civil functions, and a dux, whom Gregory the Great called

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19 For a general discussion of the field, see Giuseppe Meloni, “L’origine dei Giudicati,” in Storia della Sardegna Vol 2: Dal Tardo Impero romano al 1350, ed. Manlio Brigaglia, Attilio Mastino and Gian Giacomo Ortu (Rome, Bari: Laterza, 2002), pp. 1-32. Felice Cherchi Paba provides the most startling hypothesis when he argues that Greek monasticism withdrew from Sardinia in the eighth century, ceding its properties to the Sardinian rulers; these then founded “theocratic republics.” Felice Cherchi Paba, La repubblica teocratica sarda, 727-1054 (Cagliari: Editrice Sarda Fossataro, 1971). Mohamed Mustafa Bazama, instead, suggests that the terms “judex” and “iudicatus” were direct translations of the Arabic Qadhi and Qadha, respectively, and that the entire system of government was copied from the Muslims during a period of peaceful Sard-Muslim relations. Mohamed Mustafa Bazama, Arabi e Sardi nel Medioevo (Cagliari: Editrice Democratica Sarda, 1988), pp. 91-94.

Among the external problems, the threat from the burgeoning Arab presence in the Mediterranean was key. The Muslim expansion in North Africa, the fall of Carthage and of the Byzantine exarchate of North Africa, and the Arab expansion into the Iberian peninsula exposed Sardinia to Arab incursions. These began in the early eighth century: there is evidence of attacks on Sardinia at least in 724, 726, 735, 753, 807, 810, 812, 813 and 815, and they probably continued with little pause until 1015, when a combined force of Pisans and Genoese defeated a major Muslim fleet off Sardinia. As was the case with all of Byzantium’s western provinces, the increasing Arab control of the Mediterranean Sea weakened links between Sardinia and Byzantium in the mid-seventh century. This is not to say that contact was wholly lost: Michael McCormick suggests that relations between Sardinia and Byzantium were renewed around 695, when the mint from Carthage was transferred to Sardinia for safety from Muslim raids. At the end of the ninth century there were Byzantines in Sardinia selling Christian slaves that they had captured from Muslims, and not only did the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (913-959) have a bodyguard of Sards, but a group of Sards is also recorded to have been present to sing a hymn of praise in his honour. Perhaps most important, there is evidence of trade continuing with Byzantium up until the

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25 IP, p. 379, doc. 26; McCormick, The Origins of the European Economy, p. 629; McCormick notes that the slaves were Christian, and that this instance seems to have been part of an ongoing phenomenon.

end of the tenth century.\textsuperscript{27} Still, such contact was growing ever more sporadic. The few remaining sources suggest that following the collapse of the African exarchate, the Byzantine army was no longer able to mount a meaningful resistance to Arab raids and invasions, and that in fact there was some fear in the West that Sardinia might become Muslim territory, as Sicily had. When the Lombard king Liutprand, for example, arranged to have the relics of St. Augustine transferred from Cagliari to Pavia, he was able to justify this by claiming that he wished to preserve them from the danger of desecration.

This period in Sardinian history has left so little documentation, both from the island itself and from its neighbours, that Italian historiography frequently assumes that the island was deeply isolated. Giorgio Farris, for example, calls Sardinia in this period “isolated and abandoned to itself, and unused to overseas traffic;” Francesco Artizzu and Alberto Boscolo speak of the island’s “Byzantine and isolationist past.”\textsuperscript{28} Andre Guillou, however, puts it better when he explains that although “Sardinia may seem isolated in the Mediterranean world,” its geographical position offered vital opportunities to seafarers, who in their visits and settlements left an “anthropological, ethnic and cultural” impact on the island.\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, despite the danger presented by the Arab control of the seas, it is likely that commercial links with Italy continued to function throughout the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries, even if at a much reduced level. In 820 a Frankish source, for example, mentions “eight merchants’ ships returning to Italy from Sardinia.”\textsuperscript{30} Furthermore, the Franks themselves had a special relationship with Sardinia: as the Byzantine military presence weakened, the Sards turned to the Franks for protection against the Arabs, since the Franks occupied Corsica and were already engaged in fighting off the Arab advance in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{31} Once again, therefore, Sardinia was not precisely at the periphery of Western Europe, but was intimately involved in one of early medieval Europe’s defining struggles, that against the Arab advance, and was an ally of the Frankish kingdom which, in Bartlett’s view, created the cultural and political kernel of what would later become Europe.


\textsuperscript{31} The links between Sardinia and the Franks have been studied primarily by Casula, who has highlighted the notable Frankish influence that this alliance had on the Sards. Francesco Casula, Scritti di paleografia e diplomatica (Padua: CEDAM, 1974), pp. 81-99, 127-135.
As Sardinia began to break free of control from Byzantium and join forces with its geographical neighbours, the figure of the judex of Sardinia established itself. Almost certainly, the judex originally had authority over all of Sardinia, just as the Byzantine praeses and dux had had. It is likely that the increasing importance of the judex’s role was influenced not only by his own greater personal power, but also by the growing might of the Sardinian army which, with its close ties to the Franks, had proven able not only to head off the Arab raids but had even grown strong enough to be able to lend aid to Rome. Yet just as it is impossible to trace the development of the position of “judex of Sardinia,” it is impossible to specify when and why this single position of “judex of Sardinia” split into the four judices of Cagliari, Arborea, Logudoro/Torres and Gallura. Two papal letters from the ninth century refer to the “judices of Sardinia” and “princes of Sardinia,” respectively, but there is no way of knowing whether this plural noun is meant to indicate several contemporaneous rulers, or several generations of a single dynasty. \(^{32}\)

Francesco Casula posits that Sardinia was already divided into four in the second half of the ninth century, but the first clear evidence of the four medieval judicates comes in 1073, when Pope Gregory VIII addresses a letter to the judices Mariano of Logudoro/Torres, Costantino of Gallura, Orzocco Torchitorio of Cagliari and Orzocco of Arborea. \(^{33}\)

If the date at which the single political unit of Sardinia broke up into four states is unknowable, however, something that can be traced is the continuing cultural influence of Byzantium on both Sardinian political consciousness, and the way this varied from place to place. Enrico Besta, in the early twentieth century, was the first to demonstrate the continuity of Byzantine political culture during Byzantium’s withdrawal from Sardinia, and even well afterward, and the evidence has continued to grow since then. \(^{34}\) A document of Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus from 930 AD lists, among the imperial functionaries, the archon of Sardinia, alongside the archontes of Amalfi and Gaeta, which were similarly territories allied to Byzantium. \(^{35}\) Of course at this point, given the evidence of the autonomous, king-like power of the rulers in Sardinia, their subjection to the very distant Byzantine imperial government can have been only nominal. Still, local elites in many places around Byzantine Italy continued to use Byzantine titles after

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\(^{35}\) PG, Vol. 112, col. 1276. For Sardinia, the honorific title prospatarious was also used: see Heinrich Gelzer, Die Genesis der byzantimschen Themenverfassung (Leipzig: Teubner, 1899), p. 93.
the strength of Byzantine power had faded, exploiting the power inherent in the title itself and the imperial political ideology that lay behind it. Similarly, the judices themselves continued to use the title “archon,” too, surely for the same reason.

For example, a seal matrix found at Tharros, the ancient capital of Arborea, and perhaps referring to an early eleventh-century judex, is inscribed in Greek letters with the name “Zerkis archon Arbor[eas],” while a tenth-century ruler of Cagliari called himself protospatharios and archon of Sardinia. Even in the twelfth century, when the four independent judicates were well-established and no dependence on Byzantium remained, the seals of Cagliari continued to describe the judex as “archon mereias Karaleos,” or archon of the district of Cagliari.

In comparison, Gianluca Raccagni shows that while Emperor Frederick I, in the twelfth century, would grant the title of exarch to the archbishops of Ravenna in a bid to secure their support, by this time such Byzantine titles had passed out of use among the lay nobility in the rest of Northern Italy. Sardinia’s preservation of Byzantine political titles long after formerly Byzantine territories on the Italian mainland had abandoned them suggests that Sardinian political culture, surely due to its literal geographical isolation and its relative lack of cultural exchange with Western Europe, had continued to develop within a Byzantine frame of reference, even after the Byzantine presence had melted away from the western Mediterranean. It is in any case clear, both from the Sardinian evidence itself and from comparison with the rest of post-Byzantine Italy, that these titles ceased early on to be an expression of political dependence on Byzantium, and became a way of legitimizing local power by making reference to the local dynasty’s respectable, lawful and hierarchical origin, as Turtas also intimates.

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40 Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 168.
1.1.3 The Byzantine Legacy

Greek influence can be seen not only in regnal titles or court languages, but most especially in the very character of the judex’s position. The judices called themselves “king,” and their governmental role was to “reign” (rennare in Sard), similarly to their geographical neighbors. Yet there were important differences between these king-judices and their counterparts in Western Europe, thanks to the judices’ institutional descent from the Byzantine traditions of public law and state. Most strikingly, the judex’s own heritable property was, in theory at least, strictly separate from the judicate as a whole, which was considered indivisible. In reality, it has to be admitted, the extended family of each judex played an important role in the administration of the judicate, such that the theoretically “public” functionaries were often related by blood to the judex, blurring the lines between public property and the judex’s private property. Nevertheless, a result of the public nature of the judicate is that Sardinia did not develop or adopt feudalism within judical borders. Indeed, each judicate may be argued to be more properly a “kingdom” than other independent Mediterranean territories, like Provence and Catalonia, which did base their socio-political structures on the general feudal model of Western Europe.41

The influence of Byzantium, however, was hardly limited to political theory: equally important was its impact on the Sardinian Church. If it is difficult to establish the character and origins of the judices, it is even more difficult to trace the development of the church in Sardinia, but certain aspects show a sustained relationship between Sardinia and the Greek Church. This is not to say that contacts were broken with Rome. Popes Leo IV and Nicholas I both seem to have had close relations with the Sards in the mid-ninth century.42 Following Turtas’ distinction between religious/cultural influence and ecclesiastical influence, it is possible to say that the Church in Sardinia may have been at least partially subject to the pope in Rome even during its Byzantine period.43 Throughout the seventh century, Sardinian bishops upheld Western positions during conflicts with the Greek Church, even if they wrote such declarations of faith in Greek.44 The Sardinian Church may nevertheless have been subjected to the patriarch at Constantinople in the eighth century, and certainly its religious/cultural links were with Byzantium. This can be seen in the the number of churches and place-names dedicated to Greek saints

43 Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 168. See also Rowland, The Periphery in the Center, pp. 145-146.
44 Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, pp. 149-154.
and angels, like the church dedicated to S. Nicola and built on a Byzantine cruciform plan, and the thriving Greek monasticism that existed in the eleventh century when the first Western monks began to arrive.

Byzantine influence can be seen not just in the structure and cultic foci of Sardinia’s Church, but also in Sardinian art and liturgy, as the work of mainly local historians shows. The architecture of Sardinia’s oldest churches follows Byzantine patterns, as do carvings and funerary monuments, whether these came directly from the eastern Mediterranean or from Byzantine Italy. As Roberto Coroneo has shown, these latter were of high quality, perhaps higher than comparable examples in continental Italy, and show not only copying but native interpretations of Byzantine trends. Thus, artistic culture both looked to the East and was alive enough to create a specifically Sardinian style. Sardinian liturgy also was heavily influenced by Greek Christianity, particularly in baptismal practices, sacred music, the use of dance during holy feasts, the tradition of blessing the house on Epiphany and Holy Saturday, Pentecost rites, and themes in sacred art.

These cultural links were also expressed in language. A large quantity of seal matrices found in the territory of Arborea suggest that in learned circles, Greek and Latin continued to be used alongside each other from the fifth to the eleventh centuries. S. Giorgio of Suelli, for example, a Sardinian saint who lived around the year 1000 AD, was educated “in Latin and Greek letters following the custom of his people,” even though he was the son of a serf. Similarly, names of Greek origin such as Georgia, Elena, Sophia and Anastasia continued to be used in Sardinia until the thirteenth century; in many cases, these

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45 Roberto Coroneo, Architettura romanica dalla metà del mille al primo ’300 (Nuoro: Ilisso, 1993), p. 223; see also Rowland, The Periphery in the Center, pp. 145-146. A few examples of Greek saints venerated in Sardinia are Anastasius, Andreas, angels in general, Barbara, Basil, Constantine, Elia, Helena, Nicholas, and Sophia.

46 See the Vita S. Theodori Studitae in PG, Vol. 99, col. 215, ch. 113, where a reference is also made to monks from Syracuse.

47 See Johnson, The Byzantine Churches of Sardinia; Raffaello Delogu, L’architettura del Medioevo in Sardegna (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1953); Coroneo, Architettura romanica.


50 For baptism, saints’ festivals and Epiphany see Giampaolo Caredda, Le tradizioni popolari della Sardegna (Nuoro: Archivio Fotografico Sardo, 1993), pp. 16-17, 132-133, 172; see also Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 135.

51 Pier Giorgio Ignazio Spanu, La Sardegna bizantina tra VI e VII secolo (Oristano: Editrice S’Alvure, 1998).

52 Cum [...] litteris latinis et grecis iuxta morem gentis sue, cited in Bacchisio Raimondo Motzo, Studi sui Bizantini in Sardegna (Cagliari: Deputazione di storia patria per la Sardegna, 1987), p. 149.
Greek names are found almost nowhere else in the West in the same period, including former Byzantine territories.\textsuperscript{53}

As this brief narration of Sardinia’s post-Roman development has shown, the island’s culture was a mixture of East and West, while, despite regular and sustained contacts with the Franks and Italians, its geographical position largely insulated it from the cultural and political developments that were taking place on the European continent. Furthermore, unlike Sicily, it was never successfully conquered by the Arabs, and thus was able to develop its own Christain cultures in relative isolation. As Sardinia began to face agents of Western European cultures intent on “Europeanizing” the island, these facets make Sardinia a rewarding case for the study of colonization and the expansion of Europe.

1.2 Theoretical aspects

Sardinia’s ambiguous cultural position between Byzantium and Rome, coupled with its central geographical position in the Western Mediterranean, made it a combination of centre and periphery, to use Bartlett’s words. Indeed, its very resistance to a clear-cut identification as “center” or “periphery” confounds the binary “either/or” that Cyrus Patell identifies with colonialism, a binarism that is also at the foundation of Bartlett’s “center/periphery” model.\textsuperscript{54} As a mixture of East, West and pre-Roman “Sard,” for lack of a better term, Sardinia seems to have combined cultural influences in the “and... and... and...” pattern that denies binarism.\textsuperscript{55} Its culture seems to have been made up not of a mixture of “purely” Byzantine elements joined to “purely” Western elements; rather, every aspect of society had a mixed cultural parentage. On one hand, as noted, its artisans looked to southern Italian models for inspiration, models which, while Byzantine in style, nonetheless show a direct link not with Byzantium itself, but with Italy. On the other hand, its judices reigned within political structures that were the children of the Byzantine administrative system, and exercised a type of power that was unusual in Western Europe. Its church had never been wholly independent of Rome, but its ecclesiastical traditions were almost all Greek, and its bearded priests looked different from mainland European priests. Even Sardinian personal names followed a tradition almost wholly untouched by the Germanic customs that were so influential


\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}
throughout central and northern Italy, France, and Spain, to say nothing of territories further north in Europe; at the same time, however, Sardinian names were not only Greek, but contained pre-Byzantine and at times pre-Roman elements.

Some of these traits might make Sardinia seem to have been as culturally peripheral as the Scandinavian territories or the Eastern European lands. Indeed, in 1173 Gregory VII could complain that the Sardinian judices were “more foreign to us than people who are at the edge of the world.” Yet whereas crusades could be later preached in other religiously peripheral areas, like Livonia and Prussia, Sardinia had been Christian since late Antiquity at least, and it undertook the task of its own Westernization with relative energy. Its judices invited Western monastic orders into their territories and began to import mainland Western European art and learning, in the form of foreign bishops. Finally, as noted, Sardinia had always been a land well known to Western Europeans, thanks both to its history as an integral part of the Roman Empire and to its importance as a stopping-point on Mediterranean trade routes. It was anything but unknown to Rome in the way that Scandinavia or Eastern Europe might be unknown, and in its historical engagement with Western Europe, particularly with the Franks, and in its entrenched Christianity Sardinia was also part of the European “center.” There was never, for example, the slightest breath of a crusade being called to forcibly westernize the Sards. When a papally-sanctioned invasion did occur, in 1323, mission and conversion were not among its real or declared reasons. Perhaps the best expression of Sardinia’s situation is the title of Robert Rowland’s summary of the island’s history, The Periphery in the Center.

This thesis will seek to interpret Sardinia’s colonization as just one part of a wider “Europeanizing” trend throughout Europe. The reasons for taking this perspective lie in the fact that many of the patterns of Sardinia’s colonization can be seen with especial clarity when they are compared with other situations that have been described, albeit with some controversy, as colonial. In particular, the territories east of modern Germany, such as Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia, had the same combination of “peripheral” culture, political fragmentation, and a Christian population, even if Christianity there had arrived only in the tenth century. Other European territories, like Ireland and Wales, could be compared to Sardinia for similar reasons, but only for a later period than the one being considered in this thesis. This is because they were the focus of a centrally-organized colonizing initiative, which in many ways resembles the Aragonese colonization of Sardinia after 1323; the uncoordinated movement of peasants, knights and

57 For Livonia and Prussia, see Bartlett, The Making of Europe, pp. 17-18.
clergy that colonized Eastern Europe, however, is most nearly like the Pisan and Genose colonization of Sardinia between the eleventh century and 1323, which is the focus of this thesis.

There are differences too, of course: Eastern Europe was mainly colonized by Germans, who were a relatively culturally compact group of people.58 Sardinia, instead, was fought over by two mutually antagonistic Italian communes, each of which used different methods to control and colonize it, and at times by the Holy Roman Emperor. The papacy was also a decisive element in the struggle, as it fought for its own direct lordship over Sardinia. It should be made clear here that although the Holy Roman Emperors and, in particular, the papacy were increasingly committed to establishing control of the island, they cannot properly be said to have been colonizing it. “Control,” on the part of the papacy as well as Pisa, Genoa and the Holy Roman Emperor, is being used here to mean the ability to ensure friendliness on the part of the subject kingdom, obedience to directives from the superior power, and the ability to influence the subject kingdom’s politics, perhaps through the presence of its own agents. A “controlling” power can also take some economic benefit for itself, whether in the form of favorable trade agreements, tribute payments, or taxes. It does not, however, necessarily have charge of the subject kingdom’s justice or governmental systems. In short, it describes the sort of relationship inherent in medieval lordship. In the case of Sardinia, both the Holy Roman Emperors and the popes were interested in establishing this kind of control by becoming lords of Sardinia as a whole; Pisa and Genoa aspired both to such lordly control over the individual judicates, and also to their colonization. Among other things, this competition between communes, emperor and papacy means that, whereas the German merchants and knights east of the Elbe were usually dealing only with the semi-European polities to be colonized, each hopeful colonizer or lord of Sardinia also had to confront other representatives of the European cultural center in its effort to establish itself as the dominant influence in peripheral Sardinia.

In seeking a comparative case for Sardinia, it might be supposed that Sicily would be an obvious choice. It is true that Sardinia and Sicily share an important peculiarity in their colonial history, which is the papacy’s direct interest in claiming lordship over the whole island. Furthermore, both Sicily and Sardinia were Italian islands being fought over by several powers in addition to the papacy, and both had a significant Roman and Byzantine history. Yet Sicily was very different, at least early in its life as part of

European culture, in an important respect: its Muslim past and continuing Muslim cultural influences. This characteristic made mission a useful ideological weapon in the armory of Christian European powers hoping to take advantage of its wealth and its strategically advantageous position in the Mediterranean.

In addition, Sicily’s famously diverse society was very different from Sardinia’s notably homogenous culture. To provide just one example, Sicilian charters, even after the Norman invasion, were issued in Latin, Greek and Arabic, and at times in combinations of more than one language.\(^{59}\) Sardinian charters, in contrast, apart from official seals and one well-known inscription, are in Sard or Latin, and in Sard much more often than in Latin. The prevalence of Sard in official documents issued by both the Sardinian Church and the judices from the eleventh through the fourteenth centuries, along with other evidence, indicates a culturally compact society in which the language of the learned elite was, and more importantly remained, the same as the language of the common people.\(^{60}\) In itself, this indicates that Sardinia was to some extent able to resist the kind of “cultural colonization” spear-headed by the reformist papacy, that would have devalued the vernacular language as a legitimate form of literary production, governmental communication and spiritual language, as it did in many other European lands.\(^{61}\) Indeed, the evidence so far suggests that there were not even significant Jewish populations on the island.\(^{62}\) In Sardinia, despite the political division of the island into four independent kingdoms, and despite different dialects, nevertheless a common language, a common remembered history, a common religion and common rite, and legendary memories of earlier political unity provided the potential for cultural cohesion that could emerge into reality when the Sards were faced with outside enemies.\(^{63}\) This

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60 Paolo Maninchedda, **Medioevo Latino e Volgare in Sardegna: Nuova edizione ampliata, riveduta e corretta** (Cagliari: CUEC, 2012), p. 112. Maninchedda also notes here the observation made by Benvenuto Terracini in 1931, that Sardinian documents tend to be written in Latin when they are official correspondence with other rulers and the pope, but in Sard when they are internal business.


63 A legend written down at earliest in the thirteenth century, and surviving only in a sixteenth-century version, continues to preserve the memory of the first judex of Logudoro, who had also been judex of Arborea. Whether this records historical fact or is pure legend is impossible to say, but it does show a lingering legendary memory of earlier political unity. See Giuseppe Meloni (ed.), **Il Condaghe di San Gavino** (Cagliari: CUEC, 2005). For the
fact had an enormous impact on the ways in which the Sards interacted with their colonizers, and despite
the differences in geography and culture, makes Sardinia more like parts of Eastern Europe as far as
colonization is concerned.

The value of such broad European comparisons applies not just to secular systems of colonization, but
also to the Church’s role as a colonizing agent, which is the focus of this thesis. Any discussion of the
Church’s role in secular colonizing efforts must be placed in the wider context of relations between the
Church and European states from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. Bishops, priests and religious
often filled bureaucratic positions in secular governments, where their education and culture made them
useful to rulers. This was true in England and Germany, in France and Scandinavia, and in most other
places as well.64 It was also true in the Northern Italian communes, as a long series of studies has shown.65
For example, clerics often held important roles in communal government, even while the communes
fought for independence from ecclesiastical control; indeed, monastic ministers could fall under secular
jurisdiction and live apart from their religious community for years. In contrast to this common pattern,
clerics in Sardinia did not hold official governmental positions, as Andrea Puglia shows.66 This is not to
say that they were not influential in secular government in an unofficial capacity, but it is a symptom of a

64 For England, see Peter Heath, Church and Realm 1272-1461: Conflict and Collaboration in an Age of Crises
(London: Fontana, 1988), Benjamin Thompson, “Prelates and Politics from Winchelsea to Warham,” in The
Fifteenth Century IV: Political Culture in Late Medieval Britain, ed. Linda Clark and Christine Carpenter
in Churchmen and Urban Government in Late Medieval Italy, c. 1200-c. 1450: Cases and Contexts, ed. Frances
Andrews (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), pp. 331-354. For Germany, see John Eldevik, “Bishops in the Medieval Empire:
New Perspectives on the Church, State and Episcopal Office,” History Compass 9/10 (2011), pp. 776-790. For
France, see John W. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the
Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). For Scandinavia, see Anders Winroth, The
Conversion of Scandinavia: Vikings, Merchants, and Missionaries in the Remaking of Northern Europe (New

65 Richard Trexler published a landmark essay on the topic, defining the field in 1978: Richard Trexler, “‘Honor
Among Thieves’. The Trust Function of the Urban Clergy in the Florentine Republic,” in Essays Presented to
good perspective on Church and State in Italy, see Andrews (ed.), Churchmen and Urban Government, especially
the Introduction; notes 8 and 9 of the Introduction provide a good list of the most relevant studies on the topic. See
also Frances Andrews, “Regular Observance and Communal Life: Siena and the employment of religious,” in Pope,
Church and City: Essays in Honour of Brenda M. Bolton, ed. Frances Andrews, Christoph Egger and Constance M.
Rousseau (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 357-383. Padua may be an exception to this general pattern in the north-Italian

66 Andrea Puglia, “Interactions between lay and ecclesiastical offices in Sardinia,” in Churchmen and Urban
governmental structure that was, in some respects, very different from the structures that are familiar from better-studied cases, including those noted above. This very difference may have influenced the ways in which bishops could be useful for colonizing powers. Thus, placing colonial Sardinia in the context of other colonizing processes that were similar, but whose churches were in some ways very different, will show the extent, and limits, of the value of Sardinian Church’s to would-be dominators. A review of the secondary literature on the colonization of Eastern Europe, and how this involved its Church(es), will now make it possible to see how situations that are comparable to Sardinia’s have been analyzed in different contexts. This, in turn, will suggest theoretical instruments that are likely to be useful for understanding Sardinia’s history.

1.2.1 Colonization: a term appropriate for the Middle Ages?

The first problem to be faced before any study of medieval colonization can be attempted, whether in Sardinia or anywhere else, is whether the term and concept of colonization is actually appropriate for the Middle Ages. It is one contention of this thesis that it is indeed appropriate, for reasons that will be explained below. Before using it to apply to medieval contexts, though, the concept of colonization must be detached from its frequent, and often unspoken, associations with modern colonialism and imperialism. This must be done with care, because if colonization is “reduced” so that it may describe medieval examples, the concept must also not become so vague that it applies to any invasion, or any spread of foreign culture beyond its original borders. In an effort to provide a non-period-specific, but still meaningful, definition of colonization, this thesis will look to Robin Frame’s work on the relations between medieval England and Ireland. Frame describes a colony as a settlement that is made up at least in part by colonizers, who alter the native customs, aristocracy and church, try to expropriate land from the native inhabitants, and attempt to create “a new society in the image of the one they had left.”67 Using Frame’s definition as a base, this thesis will see colonization as the partial settlement of a foreign land in which the intention, though not necessarily the principal drive, of the settlers is twofold: to change the culture of the settled land so that it aligns more closely with their home culture, and to achieve a certain political or economic leverage such that the fruits of the settled land can be used to benefit their homeland or cultural group.

Three basic elements are present in this definition: a shift of populations, a drive toward political domination, and an effort to change the culture so that it becomes increasingly similar to the colonizer’s

culture. In the case of Sardinia, as in the case of Eastern Europe, “settlement” is being understood as the immigration of people from all levels of society from the colonizing state to live in the subject state. For instance, aristocrats, monastic priors, merchants, monks, artisans, and serfs from northern Italy could all be found in Sardinia. This definition assumes that such settlers valued their own culture and their home state more highly than that of the colonized land. Thus, whether consciously or unconsciously, they were all part of the colonizing process. The definition also sees colonization as characterized by changes in the social structure of the colonized territory, through attempts to favor the settlers by legal or economic means, and to implant artistic, cultural and religious aspects of the home culture. After being transplanted, this home culture takes root in the colonized territory partly through the phenomenon that Homi Bhabha has termed “mimicry,” whereby colonized cultures copy the cultures, which they simultaneously desire and resent, that have colonized them. 68

Bhabha’s focus on the response of the indigenous society to such “cultural colonization,” which aims not just to exploit the land but to change the indigenous culture, finds a useful echo in another post-colonial theorist, Gauri Viswanathan, who shows that even when a member of a colonized society “converts” to the religious forms of his or her colonizers, this does not necessarily indicate a full support of the colonizing project. To the contrary, “conversion” can be a way of taking ownership of important new cultural-religious ideas and, by tempering them with elements of the indigenous culture, weakening them as tools of colonization. 69 Thus, Sardinian acceptance of new Western forms of religion should not, and will not, be seen solely as submission to a more forceful culture. The possibility should be kept in mind that such acceptance was a way of strengthening indigenous political/religious culture and international prestige.

In its affirmation of the usefulness of “colonization” for analyzing a medieval situation, this thesis aligns itself with a number of other scholars. Most prominent among these is Robert Bartlett, who in The Making of Europe convincingly maintains that the terms and ideas associated with colonization are fully applicable to a great number of situations in the medieval period. Indeed, Bartlett argues that subsequent colonization cannot be understood without being aware of the colonial pattern developed in the Middle Ages. 70 In addition, Bartlett argues that the cultural entity called “Europe” was created in large part by the extension of a single, Roman Christian rite, which accompanied the establishment of diocesan structures

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70 Bartlett, The Making of Europe, pp. 306-314. The perspectives taken in R. R. Davies, “Lordship or colony?” are also important to this thesis.
and Western monastic and mendicant orders, was based on a conviction of the superiority of the Roman Catholic rite, and was often made possible by the sword. In this, Bartlett’s ideas are foundational for the way this work prioritizes the cultural prejudices and intentions of the colonizers for an understanding of colonization. Bartlett’s insight into the relationship between individual conquests and colonizing phenomena, on one hand, and the overall creation of a generic “European” culture on the other, is what makes his book a foundational work for this thesis. Although this study, unlike Bartlett’s, is not concerned with the “making” of any very large cultural entity, Bartlett’s idea of the “center” and the “periphery” are core concepts to the analysis carried out here. For Bartlett, the center is, geographically speaking, the former Carolingian Empire and, culturally speaking, the source of feudal social and economic structures and Roman Christianity, among other typical aspects of medieval civilisation. In this way, he unites the geographical source of most immigrants and colonizers, which was Western Europe, with the spiritual source of Western Christianity, which was Rome. Sardinia, as will be seen, provides a complex case-study of a “central-peripheral” land being culturally and politically colonized by more “central” powers, by means of the Church.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that despite the wide success of Bartlett’s work and conclusions, both before and after the publication of *The Making of Europe* the concept of medieval colonization has been contested by a number of scholars, and indeed remains controversial to this day. In 1976 Sir Moses Finley, for example, argued that feudalism and colonization “are essentially incompatible,” and concluded that medieval colonization is therefore not a functional concept. He expanded upon this to state that colonization must entail a political dependence upon a central “home” power, thus excluding the medieval Crusader states in Palestine. It should also involve agriculture coming under the control of the colonizers, which rules out Venice’s medieval control over Crete, as well as Genoa’s trading posts throughout the Mediterranean, including those in Sardinia. One of his main points, underlying all of these arguments, was that “there can be no colonization without colonies”. Similar criticisms were made by J. H. Pryor in 1992. In Sardinia, Marco Tangheroni, an economic historian, argued that “an exclusively ‘colonial’ interpretation of Sardinia’s economic and social history...appear[s]

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too simplistic;” his judgment is clearly based on an understanding of “colonial” as indicating principally economic exploitation, on the lines of modern colonization.\textsuperscript{74}

Certainly, if by “colonization” is meant the early-modern and modern European drive to subject non-European peoples to the rule of a European nation-state, with the aspects of racism, oppression and economic exploitation that came into play, then colonization is most decidedly not a medieval phenomenon, and does not apply to Sardinia. One of the most common forms of modern colonialism, for example, is what Patrick Wolfe has described as “settler-colonialism,” in which the indigenous person, not the settler, becomes superfluous.\textsuperscript{75} This describes the cases of Australia, the United States and Canada, among others, but it would be difficult to maintain that it applies to medieval situations, in which the goal of colonizers was generally to convert and remake, not to displace, the native populations. Sardinia, for example, was profoundly different from colonial Africa, South America or North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even if it was peripheral in some respects from a mainland Italian or Catalan perspective, its colonizers never questioned that it was part of their own Christian world, with all the implications that this had. No foreign power, for example, tried to treat the Sardinians as the Spaniards would later treat the natives of South and Central America, or as England, France or Belgium would treat the natives of their African colonies.

Yet to define a historical behavior as exclusively “modern” obscures relevant and similar patterns that preceded the modern age, while a more chronologically flexible definition makes it possible to see interesting pre-modern aspects. Post-colonial studies since Moses Finley’s time, for instance, have shown repeatedly how useful the ideas and conceptualizations of modern colonialism can be to describe and explain medieval behaviours between religious and/or “ethnic” groups.\textsuperscript{76} Rather than defining colonization by its most recent form alone, what is more sensible, and also more useful, is to allow this term to apply to medieval trends that in their goals, processes and results were similar to modern colonization, even if their cultural context meant that their methods were necessarily different from those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.


\textsuperscript{75} Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event (London: Cassell, 1999), p. 3.

To begin with, it is important to point out that the colonialization, or as Robert Bartlett would put it, the “Europeanization,” of Sardinia must be understood as one example of a much vaster medieval phenomenon of military and cultural expansion. This medieval movement, which would develop into New World colonization after 1492, was characterized by individuals and groups from Western and Central Europe moving to other territories. In large part this was due to demographic pressures; as Livi-Bacci shows, the population of Europe expanded from a probable 30 million around the year 1000 AD to 74 million in 1340 AD. Political and social considerations also played a part, especially for peasants and landholders, as did an initiative of the Holy See to expand the borders of Christendom.

The main thrust of this colonizing expansion was directed at external frontiers and at the “periphery” of Western Europe. This is a phrase that, as Bartlett notes, must be used with caution, but a fairly straightforward example is the Germanic peoples expanding into the Slavic lands east of the Elbe. In some particularly interesting cases, the expansion was directed to territories that were not contiguous with the “homeland,” as in the case of the English in Ireland, or the colonization of the crusaders in the Holy Land and the creation of Frankish states in the eastern Mediterranean. Although Bartlett, like Christopher Lloyd and Jacob Metzer, scarcely mentions Sardinia, the island, like Norman Sicily or Venetian Crete, provides another example of such “non-contiguous” colonization. This aspect of “distant colonization” is important for an analysis of Sardinia. Bartlett points out that the need to cross water to reach the colonized territory had a dramatic impact on the way colonizing landholders interacted with their new lands. Landholders tended either to choose between their newly-acquired lands and their holdings back home, in which case their decisions either caused them to become part of a colonized society or remove their influence from the new territory altogether; or to become absentee landlords. The evidence will show that these patterns of behavior are easily visible in Sardinia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

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79 Ibid.


Finally, although much of this thesis rests upon the ideas of Europeanization developed most notably by Bartlett, his vision of colonization in medieval Europe must not be accepted acritically. In *The Conversion of Scandinavia*, Anders Winroth makes a pertinent criticism of Bartlett’s model of ecclesiastical/cultural colonization moving from the centre to the periphery, noting that Bartlett’s theory of the “colonization” of peripheral lands sees the expansion of Latin Christian culture as something that was largely imposed by foreign forces. Patrick Geary, too, notes that “in Bartlett’s account ... there is little room for agency from the periphery itself.”  

83 Winroth shows that in Scandinavia, Latin Christian culture was voluntarily imported by local rulers, under no obligation by more “central” powers, while Geary demonstrates that “the peripheries [had a role] in shaping themselves even in the process of their assimilation by the center.”  

84 Although Sardinia presents a very different situation from that of Scandinavia, the analyses of colonization from the perspective of the “colonized” carried out by Winroth and Geary will be used to consider the role of the local Sardinian rulers in either actively resisting, or more often actively importing, the cultures of Sardinia’s colonizers.

1.2.2 Colonization in Eastern Europe

This study does not purport to be a comparative one, but, as has been stated above, it is important to see the Sardinian situation from a Europe-wide perspective in order to see its elements of continuity with, and difference from, other medieval European colonizing processes. Due to the similarities between the colonization of Eastern Europe and Sardinia, the secondary literature on medieval Eastern Europe contains theoretical elements that will be of use in interpreting the Sardinian evidence from just such a new perspective. The following review of this literature, therefore, will find and weigh these relevant elements. It will also show more clearly why the term colonization, as defined above, can be used to apply to Sardinia, and how the definition proposed here can describe more than one process of medieval European colonization.

In the first place, scholarship on the large-scale movement of medieval Germanic peoples into Eastern Europe describes a situation that has convincingly been called colonization, and that in many ways strongly resembles the Pisan and Genoese interactions with the Sardinians. Like most of the Pisans and


Genoese, German merchants, nobles and peasants went eastwards either at the request of the Slavic rulers, or on their own initiative. In other words, they were not related to any organized military takeover by a united foreign power. As Jean W. Sedlar writes, “no evidence exists to suggest that the rulers of medieval Germany promoted this eastward expansion.” This was certainly not the case with any of Sardinia’s colonizers; Pisa and Genoa, for example, put great effort into protecting and expanding their influence in Sardinia. Yet Peter Gunst adds that “colonization...was supported by the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian kings, because they expected their income to increase by it.” This last could be said equally of the Sardinian judices in the eleventh century and much of the twelfth, since the trade that the Pisans and Genoese brought was an extremely important part of Sardinian economies. The northern Italians were not only imposed on Sardinia, but also sought by it.

Furthermore, a similar pattern of assimilation took place between natives and immigrants in both Eastern Europe and Sardinia. Sedlar points out that “foreign knights usually did not preserve their German identity for long ... urban migrants kept their German ethnic character longer ... because they retained commercial links with the homeland.” Moreover, the “large-scale colonization by German peasants,” together with other classes of immigrants, exported German laws, languages and customs, reinforced old Roman ecclesiastical influences, and eventually founded towns made up primarily or solely of German citizens. This is not to say that there were no clashes between local and immigrant populations, however, as Sedlar and Bartlett show. The long-term effect of this incoming population was the “Europeanization” of Eastern Europe, whereby not only did Slavic society acquire German laws, German words and German habits, but the use of the Roman rite was strengthened and emphasized by the large numbers of German worshippers. All of this presupposes that members from many different classes of the colonizing society valued their home culture more than the cultures of Eastern Europe, and desired to recreate at least partially that home culture among the Slavs. It also presupposes a certain amount of openness on the part of the colonized Slavs to the incoming German culture, and a cultural transformation by means not only of German imposition, but also of indigenous mimicry. At the same time, the predominance of German or German-origin individuals in Slavic bishoprics and monasteries ensured that,

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for much of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Roman Christianity was being organized and enforced by clergy who had no cultural affinity to non-Roman Slavic customs, no desire to see them continue, and instead an interest in encouraging more culturally familiar expressions of spirituality, such as Western monastic or eremitical orders.\footnote{Bartlett, \textit{The Making of Europe}, pp. 221-228; Paul Cazin, \textit{Poland} (New York: Hastings House, 1961), p. 19; Lisa Wolverton, \textit{Hastening Toward Prague: Power and Society in the Medieval Czech Lands} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), pp. 123-124.} Very similar phenomena to all of these will be shown in Sardinia, particularly for the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Like the question of whether the term “colonization” can properly describe any medieval situation, it is, of course, a matter for debate whether the German influence in Eastern Europe truly constituted colonization.\footnote{For example, in 1957 Walter Schlesinger wrote an influential article arguing that “colonization” was an inadequate and inappropriate term for relations between medieval German and Eastern European peoples. The effects of his thought are still felt today. See Walter Schlesinger, “Die geschichtliche Stellung der mittelalterlichen deutschen Ostbewegung,” \textit{Historische Zeitschrift} 183 (1957), pp. 517-542.} One voice that calls for caution with the idea of colonization in East Central Europe is that of Alfred Rieber. While accepting the word “colonization,” Rieber takes a generally post-colonial stance and warns against casting such colonization in ethnic terms. Rieber asserts that portraying Slavic-German interactions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as “one driven by a conscious, unmediated ethnic or pro-national antagonism” would be mistaken, because the colonization of Slavic lands “was not exclusively ‘German,’ but multinational.”\footnote{Rieber, \textit{The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands}, p. 42.} Furthermore, in a warning reminiscent of Homi Bhabha, he points out that there were tensions not only between town-living Germans and rural Poles, but also between the various German populations living in Eastern Europe.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} Bhabha reminds us that “singularities” like class or gender, and in Rieber’s case ethnic origin, cannot be seen as primary shapers of identity. He goes on to point out that the representations or claims of difference between groups of people must not be assumed to reflect real, and especially fixed, differences.\footnote{Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture}, pp. 2-3.} The lesson to take from both Rieber and Bhabha is that people’s identities in colonizing situations could be fluid, defined according to a variety of categories and changing with time. It would be a mistake to assume that they always identified themselves according to their “ethnic” background. As will be seen, these cautions against a simplistic vision of identities determined fully, or even mainly, by place of birth or genetic origin fully apply to Sardinia, where loyalties among Pisan and Genoese settlers in Sardinia, and also among indigenous Sardinians, could become extremely blurred. Using “colonization” to describe the
German settlement of Eastern Europe must be done with caution, therefore, and the same lesson must apply to the similar patterns of Pisan and Genoese settlement in Sardinia.

Yet avoiding the word “colonization” can cause misunderstandings and vagueness. Piotr Górecki notes that over the past fifty years the difficulty in defining precisely whether the German presence in Poland, Bohemia and Czechoslovakia constituted colonization or not has resulted in a general feeling that this presence was “at the same time absolutely monumental, not quite specifiable, and politically or ethically charged.” This description could be applied word-for-word to the historiography of medieval Sardinia, where there is a lack of direct discussion over whether the Pisans and Genoese were truly colonizers or not, although there is no dispute regarding their fundamental importance to the political, economic and cultural history of Sardinia, nor any disagreement regarding their self-serving political designs. As to the ethical weight of the colonizing missions to Sardinia, the historiography of the island is split between feelings of regret and indignation regarding Sardinia’s colonizers, and a triumphalist attitude that assumes that some amount of colonization was necessary to “modernize” Sardinia. An example of the former is Enrico Besta, who, despite having written over a century ago, has exerted considerable influence over Sardinian historiography up to the present day. Writing of the Pisans in Cagliari in 1217, for instance, Besta declares that “honor and rights were brazenly trampled upon.” In contrast, the Sardinian art historian Giorgio Farris writes that Sardinia “needed to subject itself at least initially and bend to the continental shrewdness [of the Pisans and Genoese] ... and endure certain necessary conditions.”

Certainly, even if the word “colonization” must be used with care, it has been shown to be effective and useful for studies both of East Central Europe, and for many similar contexts. Indeed, it has been used to describe the German move into Eastern Europe from at least the 1950s up to the present day. Following Blum and Kasimir Tymineiecki, for example, Jacek Kochanowicz equates “the spread of German law” in Eastern Europe with “colonization from the West,” seeing German expansion as a legal and economic,

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95 Piotr S. Górecki, "Medieval 'East Colonization',” p.27.
96 Besta, La Sardegna Medioevale, Vol. 1, p. 183. Besta is paraphrasing a primary document, which was written by a Sardinian judex, but does not question the accuracy or political aims of the statement.
98 Jerome Blum, “The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe,” The American Historical Review 62 (1957), pp. 807-836, quotes at pp. 812-813. The continuing use of the term colonization regarding Eastern Europe is especially noticeable in English-language historiography, perhaps because English lacks good alternatives to match the ideas that, in German for example, are expressed by Drang nach Osten (literally, an urge or desire for the East), Ostsiedlung (a settlement of the East) or Ostbewegung (a general shift toward the East).
and thus also social, phenomenon which can be defined as colonial. Recently, Jan Piskorski, a specialist of Eastern Europe, has made a strong case for the propriety of using the idea of colonization to explain the extension of cultural influence and political control, both peaceful and military, by one state or group of people over another in the Middle Ages. In arguing that “colonization processes not only took place, but intensified” during the Middle Ages, he points out that the term “colonia” was used by medieval writers themselves to describe expansionist settlements; indeed, that Aelfric of Eynsham defined a colony as *peregrinorum cultura*, which Piskorski translates as “the settlement of foreigners.” Piskorski’s reasoned and balanced arguments are being taken as a basis on which to assume that Germans in Eastern Europe were indeed involved in a colonizing process, and, consequently, that the Pisans and Genoese can be said to have been colonizing Sardinia.

In Eastern Europe, the Church was a fundamental, if contested, part of this colonization. The Slavic kingdoms were not conquered lands, even if monastic writing depicts them as empty wildernesses; as Jean Sedlar points out, German churchmen “were welcomed for their knowledge of Latin and employed as clerical staff for the royal courts.” The German bishops thus invited in, however, then used their ecclesiastical authority to give preference to other German churchmen, to the often fierce indignation of the Bohemian, Czech and Polish populations. Indeed, Sedlar argues that in the twelfth century the Czech clergy saw Germans primarily as “competitors for positions in the Church,” and Sarah Layfield has found that ideas of “unity, nationhood, and independence” were later developed and popularized especially by Polish churchmen, no doubt in response to the German “invasion” of the Polish church. German prelates were also active in bringing in lay settlers and organizing their new settlements along German lines, sometimes in alliance with the German emperor, as Jan Klapste has shown.

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102 Sedlar, *East Central Europe*, p. 408.


Wolverton, meanwhile, shows that Czech dioceses were officially suffragans of Mainz and as such were subject to the German Empire, although in reality they often aligned with the interests of the Czech rulers.\textsuperscript{107} A similar pattern will be seen in judicial Sardinia. In light of the evidence from Eastern Germany, therefore, it will be argued that bishops were an important part of the wider colonizing process that Pisa and Genoa were attempting to carry out. These similarities between the cases of Eastern Europe and Sardinia show how important a role the Church could play in colonizing processes across Europe, and will also help suggest fruitful ways for interpreting the often scant primary evidence from twelfth- and thirteenth-century Sardinia.

### 1.3 Documentary Sources

The analyses undertaken in this thesis will be mostly based upon a variety of edited primary sources from Sardinia, the Vatican City, Pisa, and Genoa. Almost all the secondary literature on judicial Sardinia is based on two vast collections of edited sources: Pasquale Tola’s \textit{Codex diplomaticus Sardiniae}, first published in 1861, and Diogene Scano’s \textit{Codice Diplomatico delle relazioni fra la Santa Sede e la Sardegna}, published in 1940-1941. Some of these documents, particularly those pertaining to relations between the judices and the papacy, have been recently re-edited by Mauro Sanna in \textit{Innocenzo III e la Sardegna} and \textit{Onorio III e la Sardegna},\textsuperscript{108} and the monastic account-books, or \textit{condaghes}, which provide almost the only information on Sardinian society, have all been re-edited in the past fifteen years.\textsuperscript{109} An ongoing project at the University of Cagliari, meanwhile, is uncovering some new archival sources in the Archivio di Stato di Pisa. Nevertheless, very few new materials have been found overall since the publication of Scano’s \textit{Codice Diplomatico}, and most of these are of minor importance for the present study. As far as Sardinian archives are concerned, the consensus is that there is very little likelihood of finding any more medieval documents at all. Sardinia’s troubled history of war, famine and poverty have destroyed most of its medieval documentation; studying the island means accepting its extreme paucity of documentary sources.

\textsuperscript{107}Wolverton, \textit{Hastening Toward Prague}, Chapter 4.


Even if the study of Sardinian history is in some ways hindered by the near impossibility of finding important new sources, it does represent a field full of possibilities for interpretation. The historiography on Sardinia has never sought to place Sardinia in a truly European context, nor has it availed itself of recent theories on either colonization or church and state relations. Because of this, even the sources edited by Tola, Scano and more recently Sanna represent an exciting opportunity to revise the ways in which they have been traditionally interpreted, and to enlarge their geographical and cultural relevance by studying them in relation to other European contexts.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis will be divided into three chapters. Chapter Two analyzes the importance of the Archbishop of Pisa’s papal legation in Sardinia for the relative success of Pisa’s colonizing efforts from the late eleventh to the early thirteenth century, and for the difficulties that Genoa had in matching Pisa’s influence on the island. Using Chapter Two’s historical narrative, Chapter Three examines how the political and ecclesiastical influence of Pisa was reflected in the cultural origins and actions of Sardinia’s bishops in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, comparing this, where appropriate, with the situation in Eastern Europe. This analysis is carried up to the 1260s in Chapter Four, which links the shifts in the provenance of Sardinia’s prelacy to the power struggles between Pisa and the Hohenstaufen on one hand, and the papacy and, usually, Genoa on the other.
Chapter Two. Pisa, Genoa and The Papal Legation in Sardinia

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the ways in which Pisa and the papacy used the Pisan archbishop’s papal legation in Sardinia to further their own interests on the island, and how this affected Genoa’s abilities to colonize Sardinia. It will argue that Pisa’s papal legation compounded its already-existing economic and political superiority and made it extremely difficult for Genoa to overcome Pisa’s early advantage until the end of the thirteenth century. As will be shown, Sardinia’s specific historical, institutional and geographical situation made a military invasion impractical for both cities. With arms not an option, the more subtle means of exerting control, which elsewhere in Europe usually were not employed until after a military invasion, were of primary importance. Thus, the greater political and economic strength that Pisa enjoyed in Sardinia until the end of the thirteenth century may be in large part attributed to its privilege of papal legation in Sardinia, which it enjoyed from ca. 1092 until 1105, and again from ca. 1132 until the middle of the thirteenth century. Having a Pisan or Genoese cleric become an archbishop or bishop in Sardinia was an important tool for both cities to achieve such control. The legation, therefore, gave Pisa a decisive advantage by opening up avenues to control archiepiscopal and episcopal seats in the Sardinian church. It also encouraged judices to make extensive land donations to the Opera of S. Maria and to Pisan monasteries, and gave the Pisan archbishop a papally-sanctioned position of authority not only over the Sardinian bishops, but over the Sardinian judices themselves. Since the papal legation was fundamental to Sardinia’s colonization and to its gradual Europeanization, it fully merits the space of this chapter to examine it in detail.

Although the protagonist in this history is Pisa, the legation had an effect on the entire ecclesiastical and political history of Sardinia between the late eleventh and early thirteenth centuries. This means that it also had a heavy impact on the Sardinian judices’ relations with Genoa. Because of this, while this chapter will focus on key episodes in the relationship between the Sardinian judicates and the archbishop of Pisa, it will seek to place these episodes in their historical context and show their relevance also to Genoa’s efforts to enlarge its influence on the island. At the same time, the analyses in this chapter, like those in the next two chapters, will focus on the judicates of Logudoro, Arborea and Cagliari. Although Gallura was colonized in much the same ways as the other three judicates, so little documentation has survived regarding its history that it is difficult to say much about it, although the discussion in both this and the following chapters will touch on particularly relevant points of its history.
The chapter will begin with a brief description of how Pisa and Genoa first came to claim a right to authority in Sardinia, and to develop that claim between 1015 and 1092, when Pope Urban II granted the legation in Sardinia to Pisa’s archbishop. It will then embark on a more detailed discussion of how Pisa acquired, lost, and then recovered the right to this legation in Sardinia between the end of the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth centuries, the duties and privileges the legation entailed, and what this meant for Pisa. Finally, it will analyze the importance of the legation for Pisa’s secular concerns on the island after the legation had been confirmed ad sedem, and throughout the twelfth century, comparing Pisa’s continuing success with Genoa’s frustrated struggle to gain parity with its rival in Sardinia. This last section will show that the archbishop often used his legatine authority to support Pisa’s colonizing ambitions, by upholding both its political authority and its economic interests. However, when the archbishops’ loyalties to the pope came into conflict with the ambitions of the commune, Pisa sometimes ceased to feel the benefit of the legation. The analysis will stop at the end of the twelfth century, when Pisa’s abuse of its legatine powers led Innocent III to curb those powers, turning the legation into a much more restricted and contested power in the thirteenth century.

2.2 Historical Background: The Expedition of 1015 and Pisa and Genoa’s first penetration in Sardinia

In the Introduction, a brief sketch was made of Sardinia’s history from the end of the Roman Empire to the eleventh century. It was shown that by the beginning of the eleventh century, Byzantium had long lost any effective control over Sardinian politics, and that the Sardinian judices had firmly established themselves as independent royalty. In the first decades of the eleventh century, this was the Sardinia that two up-and-coming cities, Pisa and Genoa, began to see as increasingly important to their own futures and to the future of Mediterranean trade as a whole. For one thing, although Sardinia was never conquered by Muslims, Muslim raiders had probably used Sardinia more than once as a base for attacks on Christian shipping. Certainly there were numerous attacks on Sardinia itself throughout the eighth and ninth centuries, and in 820 the Annales Regni Francorum recount that “eight ships of merchants returning from Sardinia to Italy were captured and sunk in the Italian Sea” by Muslim pirates. For another, Sardinia made a useful stopping-point for trade routes to the Iberian peninsula, North Africa, southern Italy, and

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1 In Italico mari octo naves negotiatorum de Sardinia ad Italiaem revertendum a piratis captae ac dimersae sunt. G. H. Pertz, Annales Regni Francorum, p. 153. The identification of piratae with Arabs is shown in the entry for 828, on p. 176 of the edition, when a fleet of Frankish nobles sails around Sardinia in search of “pirates;” when they find none, they sail straight to Africa “between Utica and Carthage” to find their prey. For other attacks on and near Sardinia, see McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, pp. 865, 866, 869, 872, 893, 900.
points further east. Both Pisa and Genoa were growing in power and importance at the turn of the eleventh century; Genoa may have had links with Sardinia since at least 862, and Pisa had been visiting Sardinia since at least 1003.  

In 1015, however, everything changed. In the previous one or two years, a Muslim commander named Mughahid had set up a base in Sardinia, from which “Saracens, coming in a ship to the city of Luna,” in modern Tuscany, “invade ... and with strength and in safety occupy it as far as the region’s borders, and the inhabitants’ wives are abused.” This may not have been the first time such attacks had occurred: the *Annales Pisanum* states that in 1005 “Pisa was captured by the Saracens,” although the twelfth-century *Annales* cannot be taken as a reliable record of events that had happened more than a hundred fifty years earlier. Following the attack on Luna, however, “Pope Benedict sent his legate, the bishop of Ostia, to the city of Pisa, [requesting] that it drive Mughahid out of Sardinia;” the Pisan chronicle that recounts this neglects to mention Genoa, but the Ligurian city was an equal partner in the venture to defeat Mughahid, and, if possible, rid the waters around Sardinia of Muslim ships once and for all.

On one hand, it should be stressed that despite this papally-sanctioned joint mission against Mughahid, relations between Christian and Muslim traders were not always, or even predominantly, conflictual. They traded with each other, shared knowledge, and allowed each other to take port during bad weather. With regard to Pisa specifically, large amounts of ceramics from the Islamic world made their way to Pisa between the tenth and twelfth centuries, along with people and new words that entered the Pisan dialect, all signs of relations that were not always bellicose. On the other hand, when it was in their interests, the

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7 Graziella Berti, “*Pisa and the Islamic World. Import of Ceramic Wares and Transfer of Technical Know-How,*” in *Il mare, la terra, il ferro: ricerche su Pisa medievale (secoli VII-XIII)*, ed. Graziella Berti, Catia Renzi Rizzo and
Pisans were not averse to making war on Muslims and claiming the credit of defending Christianity. Indeed, this mission against Mughahid was not an isolated incident. Rather, it is only one example of a wider phenomenon, whereby various Mediterranean Christian powers sporadically worked together in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries to drive out Muslim forces and secure the Mediterranean waters for their own ships. Thus, in 1015 the Annales Pisanum record that “the Pisans and Genoese made war with Mughahid in Sardinia, and by the grace of God defeated him.” It was an event that marked a turning-point in the history of the island’s politics, society and church, to say nothing of the fortunes of Pisa, Genoa, and the Muslims of Iberia.

Naturally, the mission had hardly been planned in order to gain rights to Sardinia, but both cities certainly tried to draw the greatest possible benefit from their victory. Each cast itself in the role of principal savior of the Sardinian people. A late twelfth-century Genoese annal would remember that “our ancestors subjugated the principal judicate of Cagliari, which was then the head of all Sardinia, and led the king of Sardinia, Mugahid by name, to the city of Genoa as a captive.” The Pisans are given no credit, and the fact that the Genoese are described as conquering the “head of all Sardinia” and the “king of Sardinia,” rather than a Muslim invader of Sardinia, clearly suggests that their victory ought to have given them the right of conquest over the island.

In contrast, a later Pisan poem relates colorfully that “the Sards were snatched safely away by their necks. Hence all their kingdoms are subject to the Pisans.” More accessible to the public eye, an inscription on the facade of the cathedral church in Pisa, placed in an easily visible position between the main door and


9 Fecerunt Pisani et Ianuenses bellum cum Mugieto in Sardineam, et gratia Dei vicerunt illum. Bernardo Maragone, Annales Pisani, p. 4, ll. 15-16. The year is given as 1016, but this is according to the Pisan calendar; by the Gregorian calendar it was 1015.

10 antiquitas nostra primum Calarense iudicatum, quod tunc erat tocius Sardinie, armis subiugavit, et regem Sardinie Musaitum nomine civitati Ianue captum adduxerunt. Obertus Cancellarius, “Annales Ianuenses,” MGH, SS 18, p. 72, l. 27.

the left side door, and dated to between 1064 and the 1140s, proclaimed, “in 1016 the Saracens perished without honor; for this Sardinia will forever be indebted to [Pisa].”\(^{12}\) An early fourteenth-century chronicle even claimed that Pope Benedict VIII had “confirmed the whole [of Sardinia] to the city of Pisa with the privilege and seal of Saint Peter” in return for “expelling Mughahid from Sardinia.”\(^{13}\) Naturally enough, neither city was content to enjoy this self-proclaimed right over Sardinia in moral terms alone, but tried to translate it into trading privileges and political advantages. Pisa’s success can be measured seventy years later, when Pope Urban II would still cite the fact that “the glorious nobility of the Pisans, on account of services rendered long ago, has made the Roman Church greatly indebted to it” as a reason to bestow ecclesiastical rights in Corsica on the city’s bishop.\(^{14}\) Genoa would still be arguing its case in the 1160s at the court of Frederick Barbarossa, though without much success, as will be seen later.

Since Pisa and Genoa would be the two most important colonizing forces in Sardinia for well over two hundred years, it is worth pausing to consider why they were so interested in Sardinia in the first place.

This is a matter that has caused some disagreement. Abulafia notes that both cities wanted access to Sardinia’s natural resources, and also proposes that each commune felt it needed to gain control of Sardinia in order to prevent its rival from using the island as a base from which to control the western Mediterranean.\(^{15}\) Indeed, he suggests that Pisa was actively driving toward a long-term goal of becoming the master of the Tyrrhenian triangle of Sardinia, Sicily and Tuscany; for this, Pisan control of Sardinia

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\(^{13}\) Bartholomaeus de S. Concordio claims that *Venerabilis Benedictus Papa ... totam [Sardiniam] cum Privilegio, & Vexillo S. Petri Pisanae Civitatis firmavit.* See the *Liber de Origine Civitatis Pisanae,* col. 167. Furthermore, the *Annales Pisanum* presents the Pisans as the rightful holders of Sardinia, and the Genoese as treacherous interlopers: *Pisani vero et Ianuenses reversi sunt Turrim, in quo insurrexerunt Ianuenses in Pisanos, et Pisani vicerunt illos et ieierunt eos de Sardinea.* Bernardo Maragone, *Annales Pisanii,* pp. 4, l. 22-p, 5, l. 1.


would clearly have been necessary. Meloni disagrees, however, arguing that in this early period neither city can be supposed to have had any idea of the great maritime power each would later become, and that therefore it is unrealistic to suppose that they had any plans to dominate the Mediterranean; such ambitions would only develop later. Rather, he suggests that Pisa’s and Genoa’s earliest interest in Sardinia was simply a product of their difficult conditions at home. Their geographical positions were not favorable to developing cities: the countryside surrounding Pisa was politically hostile, making it difficult to secure enough grain, while Genoa possessed only a thin strip of land along the Ligurian coast, land which was of little agricultural value. Sardinia, in contrast, was rich in grain and salt, even if its productive potential may have been relatively undeveloped.

While Meloni’s points are well taken, surely a major factor in the importance of Sardinia to both cities was, as Abulafia maintains, their mutual jealousy. In an island so close to home, and so important for any voyages further afield, every commercial and political gain made by one city surely spurred the other city on to match, outpace, and/or hinder its rival. Thus, it would be unsurprising if both cities originally had no intention of achieving full control of Sardinia as a whole or any of its judicates, but if these ambitions quickly developed as each city began to gain greater independence at home, more influence abroad, and a more bitter determination to outstrip the other city’s advances.

Whatever the reason for the cities’ interest in Sardinia, according to Meloni’s estimates their assessment of the island’s potential worth was not misjudged; nor was the energy they put into developing their presence there. By 1300, it is estimated that Pisa took half of its total income from its Sardinian trade; by 1313 one calculation suggests that Pisa earned 100,000 florins from Sardinia, for an expense of only 8,804 florins. Genoa seems never to have managed to exploit the island quite so successfully. Rowland argues that this was because Pisa’s early military and economic superiority had allowed it to gain greater influence in Sardinia as a whole or any of its judicates, but if these ambitions quickly developed as each city began to gain greater independence at home, more influence abroad, and a more bitter determination to outstrip the other city’s advances.

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16 David Abulafia, *The Two Italies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 125-126. Tangheroni, meanwhile, has recently proposed an explanation that focuses solely on Pisa’s precocious internal economic development, its growing identification of markets throughout Europe and its need to found colonies to support its role as supplier to those markets. Tangheroni, “La prima espansione di Pisa nel Mediterraneo.”

17 Meloni, “La Sardegna nel quadro della politica mediterranea di Pisa, Genova, Aragona,” in *Storia dei Sardi e della Sardegna*, Vol. 2, pp. 51-2. But see Robert Rowland’s criticism of modern authors who assume that Sardinia’s historical agricultural potential was as poor as that of the present day, noting that to do so “is to render the settlement history of the island incomprehensible.” Rowland, *The Periphery in the Center*, p. 8.


archaeological evidence of its early greatness. In the mid-tenth century it was important enough for Liutprand to call it the “head of the province of Tuscany,” while archaeological excavations have shown that the city was expanding quickly in the second half of the tenth century, and from the beginning of the eleventh century, precisely the period of the expedition against Mughahid, the city’s “sea quarter” was growing particularly fast.

Meloni plausibly imputes this overall strength partly to the Pisan citizens’ occasional ability to work as a unified force, in part to the city’s dominance over its nearest competitors, like Lucca, and in part to its proximity to the important Via Francigena, a major merchant route that gave it access to a great number of important European markets. With a strong Pisa having already established relationships with the judicial families, it could have been difficult for Genoa, so much weaker economically and politically than Pisa that Stephen Epstein has called it “practically nothing,” to break in, and even more difficult for it to gain the upper hand. In response to Pisa’s increasingly firm grip on the island, Genoa turned its focus to other ports, in Sicily, Egypt, Syria, Spain, Provence and Languedoc. This is not to say, however, that it lost sight of Sardinia. Sardinia’s grain, salt pans and silver mines were too attractive, and its ports were too strategically important, to ignore. Following the defeat of Mughahid, Genoa was already at war with Pisa in the 1060s, and it has been argued that Sardinia lay at the heart of the conflict. Genoa’s recurring efforts to carve out room for itself in the Sardinian trade fuelled many of the armed conflicts between the two cities in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

At the same time, even if Genoa and Pisa were more than willing to fight each other over Sardinia, neither tried to invade any of the judicates or Sardinia as a whole, relying instead on less obvious methods of control. Offers of loans, promises of military aid and protection, and no doubt subtle threats of military

\[20\] \textit{hoc est Pisam, quae est Tusciae provinciae caput.} Liutprandus Cremonensis, \textit{Liutprandi Cremonensis Episcopi Historia Gestorum Regum et Imperatorum sive Antapodosis}, PL vol. 136, col. 842C.


\[22\] Meloni, “La Sardegna nel quadro della politica mediterranea,” p. 58.


invasions were tools both communes used; alongside these methods, strengthening them and enforcing them, was the Genoese and Pisan exploitation of ecclesiastical positions and institutions. It might be wondered why Pisa, at least, did not simply invade and take by the island by force, as the Normans had recently done in Sicily. Certainly William of Malmesbury, in 1125, seems to have believed they had done so, equating the conquests of “Sicily by the Normans, Corsica and Sardinia by the Pisans, a great part of Asia and even Jerusalem itself by the Franks and Christians of all kinds from Europe.”

Genoa’s failure to invade may be explained by its weakness, since it was still far from the great power it would become and was not particularly active militarily. Pisa, however, had not refrained from attacking Bona, in North Africa, in 1034 and sacking Palermo in 1064 in search of wealth; its other major eleventh-century military exploits included the expedition to al-Mahdiya in 1087 and its part in the First Crusade from 1098-1100. This succession of engagements, added to Pisa’s impressive building projects of the following century, has led Marco Tangheroni to speak of a “golden age” of Pisan history, a period in which great projects of invasion might be considered.

Yet even for Pisa, Sardinia’s size and mountainous topography argued against a military conquest. A war of conquest to take the whole island would have taken more men and money than either Genoa or Pisa could have spared; even the conquest of a single judicate would have required that the victor commit the men and resources to protect its new possession against the other judices. Perhaps Sardinian cities could have been sacked, like Palermo, but this would probably have returned little profit to merchant-minded cities like Pisa and Genoa: despite its rich silver mines, Sardinia was cash-poor, and its material culture humble. Raiders would have found little other than agricultural produce and, perhaps, slaves, like

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27 Sed nostris diebus per Northmannos Siciliam, per Pisanos Corsicam et Sardiniam, per Francos et omnis generis ex Europa christianos magnum partem Asiae et ipsam Ierusalem [Saraceni] relinquere coacti sunt. Willelmus Malmesburiensis, Gesta regum Anglorum (Excerpta) (-1124), MGH, SS 10, p. 455.

28 For an analysis of the political motivations behind the expedition to Palermo in 1064 and al-Mahdiya in 1087, see Mauro Ronzani, Chiesa e ‘Civitas’ di Pisa nella seconda metà del secolo XI. Dell’avvento del vescovo Guido all’elevazione di Daiberto a metropolita di Corsica (1060-1092) (Pisa: GISEM-ETS, 1996), pp. 190-199 and 222-229.

29 Tangheroni, “Pisa e il Mediterraneo Occidentale,” p. 112.

30 Colombini, Dai cassinesi ai cistercensi, p. 53.
the Sardinian slaves who were in Genoa late in the twelfth century, the “Maria from the place of the Judicate of Arborea” who was a slave in Pisa in the thirteenth century, or those in fourteenth-century Mallorca. Considering the cost of military expeditions, both of these goods were probably obtained more profitably via trade. In sum, it is being argued here that friendly agreements with the judices were far cheaper to obtain and maintain.

Another important aspect holding potential Italian attackers back from invading was that Sardinia was Christian. Bona and Palermo had been under Arab control when Pisa attacked them, and therefore Pisa could both justify its actions and gain others’ support by portraying these raids as anti-Muslim. Indeed, a twelfth-century Pisan annal emphasized the holiness of the sack of Palermo by pointing out that the booty from Palermo had been used to build Pisa’s cathedral: “the Church of the blessed Virgin Mary of Pisa was constructed ... it is well known that these walls were raised with the treasure” of Palermo. In contrast, prior to the Great Schism of 1054, an attack on Christian Sardinia could not even be justified by its divergence from Rome; after 1054, the papacy began to take an even closer interest in the island than before, which must have been itself a deterrent to potential attackers.

When Byzantium and Rome did separate in 1054, the Sardinian judices were forced to make a choice between their Eastern Orthodox religious traditions and the rites of the Roman church, followed and enforced in all of Sardinia’s geographical neighbors. All four judices were eventually induced to choose Rome, but it took considerable pressure from the Roman popes to convince them. As part of the papal effort to bring Sardinia into the Roman fold, by the time of Gregory VII, at least, and perhaps earlier, the popes assumed authority for granting license to invade, or otherwise take some amount of control of, the island. Bruno Anatra claims that Gregory VII was already claiming a right of papal lordship over Sardinia, although Raimondo Turtas argues convincingly that Gregory recognized the Sardinian judices

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34 *Constructa est Ecclesia beate Marie Virginis Pisane Civitatis ... quo pretio muros constat hos esse levatos*. Bernardo Maragone, *Annales Pisani*, p. 5, ll. 11-23.

35 Gian Giacomo Ortu, following Turtas, *Storia della Chiesa*, asserts that the Sardinian Church had never been cut off from Rome; to the contrary, Ortu speaks of “Sardinia’s solid anchorage in the Western Church.” Gian Giacomo Ortu, *La Sardegna dei Giudici* (Nuoro: Edizioni Il Maestrale, 2005), p. 31; also Turtas, *Storia della Chiesa*, p. 190.
as sovereign rulers. Indeed, while Gregory might declare that Corsica “pertains to no mortals and to no power except that of the Roman church,” and that those who sought to conquer it were committing the “crime of sacrilege,” no such language is used regarding Sardinia. Nevertheless, the importance of the pope’s permission for invading Sardinia is suggested by Gregory VII himself in a letter of 1080, when he remarks that papal permission to invade Sardinia “has been frequently sought not only by the Normans and Tusci and Lombards, but also by certain peoples beyond the mountains.” In the next sentence, Gregory also makes clear that the only reason he has refused to grant this permission is that “you [Judex Orzocco of Cagliari] have shown your devotion to Saint Peter through his legate,” and promises that “if you wish to maintain this [devotion], as is fitting, not only will we refuse to grant permission to invade your land, but also, if anyone attempts this, he will be forbidden with secular and spiritual [restraints], and repulsed by us.”

Because of this, any effort to subjugate Sardinia without papal permission would have incurred severe censure from, if not the outright enmity of, the pope, with all the religious, military and political consequences this could have brought. This is something that Pisa would not have sought; as for Genoa, it has been noted that it did not have the strength even to consider such an invasion. Earlier it was hinted that throughout the eleventh century Pisa was gaining far more for itself by cultivating a close relationship with the papacy. Gregory VII, for example, first gave it the right to elect its own bishops, and then in 1077 granted its bishop the apostolic vicariate over Corsica, which allowed the bishop of Pisa to consecrate the Corsican bishops and reap “half of all revenue and the full amount of every fine issuing from court cases.” In 1092 this was followed by the gift of “the goods of those churches [of Corsica] to

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38 There are several lacunae in the text, but it is, unfortunately, the only surviving source. As transcribed, it reads: Cumque hoc non solum a Normannis et a Tuscis ac Longobardis sed etiam a quibusdam ultramontanis crebro ex nobis esset postulatum, nemini in ea re umquam assensum dare decrevimus ... Igitur quia devotionem beato Petro te habere in legato suo monstrasti, si eam, sicut oportet, servare volueris, *** non *** *** solum *** per nos nulli terram vestram vi ingrediendi licentia dabitur, sed etiam, si quis atemptaverit, *** et *** seculariter *** et *** spiritualiter prohibebitur *** a *** nobis *** ac *** repulsabitur. The letter, written October 5, 1080, was sent to Judex Orzocco of Cagliari and can be found in the MGH: Gregorius VII, Registrum epistularum, MGH, Epp. sel. II, 2; VIII:10, p. 529, line 27.

39 medietatem omnium redituum et totius pretii medietatem, quae de placitis adquiretur. Ibid, Epist. VI, 12, p. 415, line 4; also in PL, Vol. 151, col. 330-331.
rule, defend and the bad ones to destroy” and the right to “govern the dioceses of the island.” Pisa would not have wanted to lose that relationship by invading an island that it could hope to dominate by other means. In sum, the pope’s position of protector of Sardinia, which would in time develop into a claim of direct papal lordship over Sardinia, must have been a major factor in pushing Pisa in particular, but also Genoa, to use the church rather than the sword as an important tool in expanding their own influence over large parts of the island. In this way, they could add ecclesiastical authority to their already-existing fiscal and political power, thus infiltrating every category of authority in medieval Sardinia.

2.3 Pisa’s Acquisition of the Papal Legation in Sardinia

2.3.1 Pisa’s first foothold in the Sardinian Church

As mentioned above, Pisa seems to have had a stronger presence in Sardinia right from the beginning of its competition with Genoa over the island. Documentary evidence is too thin to allow an estimate of how large, how frequent, or how significant that presence was, but its strength was represented early on by Pisa’s involvement with the Sardinian Church, even before it acquired the papal legation in Sardinia. Indeed, this involvement with the Sardinian Church is surely one of the reasons it was granted the legation in the first place. Pisa’s power in Sardinia may not have quite reached the point of being able to provide a “Manfred the Pisan” who, according to later tradition, in 1050 “was the first judex of Gallura,” but in 1082 Judex Mariano de Lacon, of the judicate of Logudoro, was the first Sardinian ruler to donate a large grant of land to the Opera of the Cathedral of S. Maria Assunta of Pisa. This is an important precedent, as it would be followed by many, many more such grants by the judices of all four judicates, and requires a brief pause to explore its meaning.


41 Anno 1050, Manfredus Pisanus fuit primus Gallurae iudex, qui galli gallinacei insigne in armis deferebat, testes Landino. This is an assertion made Fara, De Chronographia Sardiniae libri duo, de rebus Sardois libri quattuor, p. 230. Rowland and Casula both treat the Pisan origins of this judex and his successors as fact: Francesco Cesare Casula and Lindsay L. Brook, eds., Genealogie medioevali di Sardegna (Cagliari: Due D Editrice Mediterranea, 1984), pp. 21, 181; Rowland, The Periphery in the Center, p. 154. However, Turtas dismisses it as legend: Storia della Chiesa, pp. 180, n. 4, 209, n. 115, noting also that Fara had studied in Pisa, where this tradition originated. Indeed, as noted earlier (see n. 12), in his writings Fara himself transcribed the inscription in the Cathedral of S. Maria of Pisa that proclaimed that “Sardinia will forever be indebted to [Pisa]:” thus, he was attentive to exaggerated claims of Pisa’s lordship over Sardinia.
The Opera of S. Maria, like the Opera of the Cathedral of S. Lorenzo in Genoa, was an economic organization devoted to raising money for the construction, upkeep and beautification of the city’s cathedral. Citizens of Pisa who wished to leave bequests to the cathedral made the donation to the Opera; so did foreign polities who wished to strengthen relations with the city. Yet although the cathedral Opere of Pisa and Genoa were dedicated to the cathedral buildings, they were not controlled by the canons or bishop. Rather, they were a separate institution, governed by operai who seem to have been laymen. Indeed, the development of a lay-administered organization devoted to the material building of the cathedral appears to have gone hand-in-hand with a growing perception of the cathedral itself as communal property, even as symbol of communal self-government, both in Pisa and Genoa. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, the operai would become officially independent of any archiepiscopal or ecclesiastical authority.42 A donation made to the Opera, therefore, went to a body that was half-way between church and state.

The implications of this have been little discussed for Sardinia. Artizzu notes laconically that judices favored donations to the Opere because they did not have a “strictly political character,” but this statement can certainly be amplified.43 The Opera’s independence from the commune, for example, probably allowed Judex Mariano of Logudoro to avoid entering the entanglements of communal politics when he made his gift, while its association with the cathedral dressed his grant in pious guise. For example, his 1082 donation charter justified his gift to the Opera by referring to Logudorese churches as “empty and naked of religion and ecclesiastical doctrine,” and to the Logudorese clergy as “living like laymen.” Thus, “with the counsel of the Roman legate, Guglielmo bishop of Populonia” he was giving the churches of S. Michele of Plaiano, S. Simplicio of Essala and S. Eugenia of Muscanio, as well as the “domus,” or agricultural estates, of the Churches of S. Maria of Sennori and S. Anastasia, and the tithes of the curatoria of Romania to the Church of S. Maria of Pisa “so that all these goods shall be under the

42 See Francesco Artizzu, L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa e la Sardegna (Padova: CEDAM, 1974), pp. 9-16, Ronzani, “Dall’edificatio ecclesiae all’Opera di S. Maria” and Valeria Polonio Felloni, “La cura della cattedrale e del porto nella Genova medievale,” in Opera: carattere e ruolo delle fabbriche cittadine, ed. Haines and Riccetti, pp. 117-135, particularly p. 123-124, where Felloni suggests that Genoa’s Opera was different in nature from that of Pisa until the 1180s, that until then it was less independent and more controlled by the canons of the cathedral, and that it had continued to be mainly a way of funding works on the cathedral.

43 Artizzu, L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa, p. 41 ff. Sergio Tognetti and Olivetta Schena, more recently, barely grapple with the complex dual nature of these donations at all, saying only that “behind the concessions to ecclesiastical entities of the two powerful marine republics there were political motivations ... the Sardinian rulers sought to preserve their autonomy by means of a difficult policy of balancing, sometimes backing the Ligurian city, sometimes backing the Tuscan one.” Sergio Tognetti and Olivetta Schena, La Sardegna Medievale nel Contesto Italiano e Mediterraneo (secc. XI-XV) (Milano: Monduzzi Editoriale, 2011), pp. 17-18. In contrast, a good recent study that considers this topic is Michelle Hobart, “Merchants, Monks, and Medieval Sardinian Architecture,” in Studies in the Archaeology of the Medieval Mediterranean, ed. James Schryver (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 93-114.
government of the aforesaid Church, its bishop and its canons, and not under some marquis or any other layperson.”

The wording, along with the involvement of the papal legate, thus proclaims that ecclesiastical reform was the motive behind this donation. Indeed, this explanation may seem valid enough for the three churches given to S. Maria of Pisa. The document’s explicit mention of the “empty and naked” churches implies that the donation would rectify the problem in some way, as if Mariano were expecting the Pisans actively to help carry out a reform. Perhaps by subtracting these churches from the jurisdiction of the Sardinian bishops, who may well have been hostile to the idea of changing their ways, Mariano hoped that the Pisans would take responsibility for placing Roman-tradition priests in the Logudorese churches. If not precisely this, then at least something of the sort must have been intended; otherwise there is no way to explain how the donation could have resulted in a reform of the Sardinian clergy.

Yet left unexplained in the donation grant, and undisputed in secondary literature, is how such a reform would be aided by donating to Pisa the agricultural estates of two Sardinian churches, while leaving the churches themselves under the jurisdiction of their local bishop. The quality of ecclesiastical services in S. Maria of Sennori or S. Anastasia could hardly benefit by losing the income of their lands. It would seem that Mariano was either sacrificing the wealth of these two churches in order to concentrate wealth around the other three churches, those donated to S. Maria of Pisa, in the hope of guaranteeing high-quality clerical service at least in these three; or else these church-less estates were not intended to contribute to ecclesiastical reform. In this latter case, the inclusion of large tracts of land that had been detached from their revenue-consuming churches may hint that this grant was principally a financial one to the city of Pisa. Finally, the stipulation that these lands must not come under the control of any marquis is intriguing. “Marquis” is a title that was not used in Sardinia until the fourteenth century under the Aragonese; thus, Mariano can only have been referring to one or more Pisan or Tuscan nobles who, he feared, might take control of his donation. Given Pisa’s historic dependence on the marquises of Tuscany, it is tempting to think that these are whom Mariano meant. This seems the more likely given that, just one

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44 The charter opens with the sentence: *Ego Marianus... videns ecclesias mei regni esse vacuas et nudas ecclesiastica doctrina atque religione et prospiciens [meam] patriam in nefandis peccatis iacentem propter negligentiam clericorum et propter vitam eorum similem laicorum ... do et subpono...*” It survives in the form of a copy made at the bottom of a charter from 1128, by which S. Maria of Pisa granted S. Michele of Plaiano to the Vallumbrosian Order. Enrico Besta, *Il Liber Iudicum Turritanorum, con altri documenti logudoresi* (Palermo: Tipografia The New Work, 1906), pp. 14 ff

45 Turtas relegates notice of this detail to a footnote, and suggests that the prohibition of nobles taking control of the donation was a papal one, a response to Pisa’s rapprochement with the excommunicated emperor Henry IV in 1081. Turtas, *Storia della Chiesa*, p. 206, n. 100. However, the specific mention of a “marquis” is suspicious, as if Mariano had a certain person or family in mind, rather than simply making a blanket, papally-requested prohibition on any and all Pisan laymen.
year earlier, in 1081, Pisa had won its independence from its subjection to the March of Tuscany. In other words, Mariano’s exception of “any marquis” both protected him from the interference of lay nobles and respected Pisa’s newly-won independence. This demonstrates clearly the usefulness of the Opera to a judex who wanted to curry favor with Pisa by making a gift that belonged unambiguously to the citizens, and who himself perhaps wished to avoid inviting foreign lay nobility into his realm.

Another aspect of the political usefulness of a donation to the Opera is suggested by the historical context of Mariano’s gift. Only two years prior to Mariano’s 1082 donation to S. Maria, Gregory VII, as noted earlier, had complimented the judex of Cagliari on avoiding an invasion by demonstrating his “devotion to Saint Peter.” This coincidence of events is not noted in Sardinian historiography, but surely the Logudorese donation to S. Maria of Pisa must be placed in the framework of Gregory’s pressures on the Sardinian church to demonstrate its loyalty to Rome. Pisa was one of the pope’s greatest allies, and was already collecting the signs of papal favor, as its 1077 vicariate in Corsica showed. By using reforming language to invite the Pisan church into Logudoro, therefore, it seems clear that Judex Mariano de Lacon was taking care to side visibly with one of the pope’s greatest allies, and to declare publicly that the church of Torres both needed and would have the reform that Gregory was demanding. The donation charter does not draw any connection between the grant and an attempt to escape invasion, and the lack of other primary documents from the time makes it difficult to probe the idea further. A wider perspective, however, can make it easier to see whether such an interpretation is possible. At the turn of the tenth century Poland’s first king, Bolesław Chrobry, sought to evade invasions by Poland’s non-imperial German neighbors by simultaneously importing Western religious culture and cultivating good relations with his powerful “European” neighbor, the Holy Roman Emperor. If Mariano’s donation was indeed a combination of a reforming measure and a gift to his most powerful outside power, then he may have been doing the same thing.

Turtas sees Mariano’s donation as simple obedience to papal wishes, with Pope Urban II directing the judex’s largess towards Pisa because of the Pisan Church’s fidelity and reforming zeal. This is no doubt a large part of the matter, but it is being argued here that Mariano’s choice of S. Maria of Pisa as beneficiary must also be taken as evidence of the great importance that Pisa already had in Logudoro. By

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46 In addition, the Opera was controlled by the cives as a body, not by nobles. For these developments in Pisa’s self-government, see Ronzani, “Dall’edificatio ecclesiae all’Opera di S. Maria”, p. 13, 15.
47 See above, at n. 40.
49 Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, pp. 204-206.
way of contrast, the *Opera* of S. Lorenzo of Genoa had to wait until 1108, twenty-six years later, to receive its first Sardinian donation. Both Pisa’s and Genoa’s military importance had been demonstrated in 1015, but Pisa’s mercantile presence was clearly growing faster than that of Genoa. Its artistic and cultural influence seems also to have been dominant from an early date, or at least to have made that impression on later writers. The *Condaghe di San Gavino*, a semi-legendary history of the first judex of Logudoro, remarks that this first judex, Comita, “sent to Pisa, and had eleven stone-masons and builders come, the finest and the best that could be found in Pisa” in order to build his great cathedral of San Gavino in Porto Torres.\(^50\) Architectural evidence indicates that an early version of the current building was, indeed, built in the Pisan style.\(^51\)

At the same time, the donation of 1082 is also surely a sign of Mariano’s genuine determination to join mainland religious currents, and bring himself and his judicate up-to-date. This was not a trivial goal. Anders Winroth has shown that rulers who oversaw the conversion of their lands to Christianity needed to demonstrate that they were leading the Christianization process, primarily because this allowed them to claim rights as head of church.\(^52\) Mariano of Logudoro, while not starting a conversion, was facing demands for a reform that would profoundly change the nature of the church in his realm. Thus, it is suggested here that he, like pagan rulers, needed to show that he was in control of the process, particularly if he wanted to continue to exercise the sort of rights over his Church that his ancestors had and that his fellow judices did, and which will be discussed shortly. Mariano’s goal of expanding his prestige through foreign contacts and ecclesiastical change was not uncommon, either. As shown above, King Bolesław of Poland had Europeanized Poland’s Church, while seeking to build up his prestige and solidify his political position as first king of Poland by representing himself as part of the “Ottonian family of kings,” as Bronislaw Geremek puts it.\(^53\) The dukes of Bohemia had acted in a similar way: they welcomed German bishops and simultaneously increased their prestige by demonstrating that they had access to the emperor’s favor; this policy eventually led them to be crowned kings of Bohemia.\(^54\) Mariano’s generous donation to S. Maria of Pisa allowed him to place himself culturally alongside great religious and political

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\(^{50}\) *mandait a Pisas, et feghit vener XI mastros de pedra et de muru, sos plus fines et megius qui potirunt acatate in Pisas.* Meloni, *Il Condaghe di San Gavino*, p. 11, ll. 26-8.


\(^{52}\) Winroth, *The Conversion of Scandinavia*, pp. 154, 156.


leaders and important allies of the papacy. It also created an image of him as a culturally prestigious and
generous ruler who looked more like one of the powerful foreigners from mainland Italy than one of the
practitioners of the Sardinian traditions that were being condemned by Gregory VII.\textsuperscript{55} In sum, the
friendship of a powerful, culturally “European” neighbor, like Pisa, could raise the prestige of a ruler on
the periphery, with important consequences for his ability to conduct foreign diplomacy and protect or
enlarge his domestic position.

2.3.2 The First Pisan Legate in Sardinia: Archbishop Daibert

Some time in the 1190s the first official recognition of Pisa’s strength in Sardinia came when its newly-
minted archbishop, Daibert, was given the title of papal legate in Sardinia. As mentioned earlier, this was
the last in a long list of papal privileges designed to reward the “glorious city of the Pisans” for its “many
labors and services, long past” with which “it has made the Holy Roman and Apostolic Church indebted
to it.”\textsuperscript{56} In 1091 or 1092 the bishops of Corsica had been placed directly under the bishop of Pisa, who
was elevated to the rank of archbishop, and after Corsica, Sardinia perhaps seemed the logical \textit{sequitur}
as a sign of papal favor to the Pisans.\textsuperscript{57} Since neither the original document nor a copy of the grant of the
legation has survived, the precise year in which the legation was granted is unknown; later evidence
affirms that Urban II awarded the legation to an anonymous archbishop of Pisa, who must have been
Daibert, given the years of Urban’s reign.\textsuperscript{58} The accepted theory in Italian historiography is that he must
have been given the legation some time around 1091 or 1092, but this cannot be correct. The argument is
based on a letter written by a certain “John ... unworthy monk in Gallura,” who was prior of a monastery
of the Order of St. Victor of Marseilles.\textsuperscript{59} The letter has been dated to between 1092 and 1098,\textsuperscript{60} and has
always been translated thus: “the lord pope sent his legate in Sardinia, and thus the archbishop of Pisa, a

\textsuperscript{55} Bartlett, \textit{The Making of Europe}, p. 230 speaks of foreign influences being favored in royal courts throughout
Europe.

\textsuperscript{56} See above, at n. 14.

\textsuperscript{57} Meloni, “La Sardegna nel quadro della politica mediterranea,” p. 59.

\textsuperscript{58} In 1138 Innocent II, in confirming the legation to the archbishop of Pisa, describes the legation in Sardinia as
\textit{legationem quoque Sardiniae a praedecessore nostro Papa Urbano praedecessoribus tuis concessam}. The
document can be found in Pasquale Tola, ed., \textit{Codice Diplomatico della Sardegna} Vol. 1 (hereafter CDS) (Turin:
49.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Joannes ... indignus monachus vester apud Galluri.} CDS, pp. 162-163, doc. 18.

\textsuperscript{60} This is based on the fact that it speaks of the archbishop of Pisa going to Sardinia: Pisa did not become an
archdiocese until 1092, and from 1098 until his death Daibert was in the Holy Land.
man of great wisdom, went to Torres,” indicating that the archbishop is the legate.61 This is, however, based on an error in transcription, and in any case cannot be grammatically correct. A correct translation would read “the lord pope sent his legate in Sardinia, [who] together with the archbishop of Pisa, a most wise man, went to Torres.”62 Thus, even after the bishop of Pisa was elevated to an archbishop in 1092, the legation in Sardinia belonged to someone else for some period of time.

Even if Daibert was not legate at the time of the Council of Torres, the letter written by Prior John is no less interesting, since it demonstrates the authoritative involvement of Pisa in Sardinia’s church even before Pisa’s archbishop enjoyed the power of the legation. The letter is the only record of a dispute between Pope Urban II and Judex Torchitorio of Gallura, who was, according to Prior John, a “cursed and foul tyrant ... as hard ... as diamond.”63 Neither the dates nor the subject of the conflict are recorded; it has been suggested that he had allied himself with Henry IV in the Investiture Controversy against the pope, but nothing of the sort can be proven by the document.64 Whatever it was, it caused the pope to “anathematize Judex Torchitorio, and his whole land, so that no Christian might give him counsel, nor the kiss of peace, and no Christian might greet him.”65 Yet Torchitorio, “arrogant and exiled, persevered in his error, and refused to return to the bosom of the holy church.”66 The pope, therefore, as related above,

61 This is the translation offered by Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 209. His bases it on the transcription given in CDS, pp. 162-163, doc. 18: misit dominus papa legatum suum aput Sardiniae, et iam archiepiscopum pisano viro prudentissimo benit aput Turris. This reading of the document is found in all secondary literature on medieval Sardinia, including the prestigious Treccani encyclopedia, and dates back at least to 1724, when it was published in Edmond Martène and Ursinus Durand, eds., Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum, Vol. 1 (Paris: Montalant, 1724), col. 522.

62 Transcribed correctly, the sentence reads misit domnus pape legatum suum aput Sardinia etiam archiepiscopo pisano viro prudentissimo venit aput Turris. The legatum suum and the archiepiscopo pisano cannot, grammatically, be the same person. A correct transcription and a reproduction of the document itself can be found in Michel Lauwers, “Réforme, romanisation, colonization? Les moines de Saint-Victor de Marseille en Sardaigne,” in La réforme "grégorienne" dans le Midi (milieu XIe - début XIIIe siècle), ed. Michelle Fournié, Daniel Le Blévec and Florian Mazel (Toulouse: Privat, 2013), pp. 41-79, Appendix 1, pp. 291-292. The following discussion will be based upon this version.

63 iste maledictus et impurissimus tyrannus ... obduratus ... sicut lapis adamantinus. Lauwers, “Réforme, romanisation, colonization?,” p. 292.

64 Tola reports this suggestion made by Martène and Durand in Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum; see CDS, p. 163, fn. 1. Colombini accepts this argument and employs it acritically: Colombini, Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi, p. 57. The monk does call Torchitorio “illo eretico,” but this is not necessarily a reflection of errant beliefs; by this time Gregory VII had defined a heretic as anyone who disagreed with the Roman Church: “Ereticum esse constat qui Romane ecclesie non concordat.” Gregorius VII, Registrum Epistularum, MGH, Epp. sel. II, 2; Epist. VII, 24, p. 504, l. 26.


66 Et ipse superbus et profugus semper in errore suo perseuerat, et ad gremium sancte ecclesie reuertere nollet. Lauwers, “Réforme, romanisation, colonization?,” p. 292. Colombini suggests it probably took place either in 1093
sent his legate and the archbishop of Pisa to Turris in Logudoro, where the anonymous legate “called the archbishops and bishops of Sardinia to come to a holy synod;” the assembled prelates “called together with one voice “anathema, anathema!” and the legate confirmed this, and by apostolic command the bishops and all the princes of Sardinia damned and condemned him together in council.”

Particularly significant for understanding the relationship between papal reform and Pisan colonization is precisely the fact that the pope did not send his legate alone to organize a response to Torchitorio’s rebelliousness, but also sent the archbishop of Pisa, who did not yet have any formal authority in Sardinia. The implications of this are clearer if it is kept in mind that Torchitorio and his whole judicate had already been anathematized by the pope prior to the legate’s and Daibert’s arrival. Theoretically, there was no need for it to be repeated, nor could legatine or archiepiscopal authority, by themselves, have given any greater weight to an excommunication issued by the pope. The fact that Urban II sent his legate and Daibert together to Sardinia shows that he expected them to be able to add something to his interdict that he himself could not provide. Since the legate embodied papal authority, this “extra factor” may be conjectured to have been provided by the archbishop of Pisa, who could represent Pisa’s economic and cultural importance on the island, its contacts with the Sardinian rulers, and perhaps even Pisan families who may have already settled in Sardinia. From this view, Pisa’s failure to mount any sort of military action against Sardinia, discussed above, reveals itself to have been of the greatest importance for its long-term power in Sardinia. Had Pisa sought to invade the island, the judices would have seen it as a threat, and would have been wary of accepting the ecclesiastical authority of its archbishop. Although this is a contrary-to-fact supposition in Sardinia, the case of roughly contemporary Poland shows how a military threat could affect ecclesiastical relations. In the late tenth century, Duke Mieszko of Poland chose to receive baptism from Bohemia, rather than the archbishop of Magdeburg, precisely because he

or 1097, but gives no reasoning to support this assertion. Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, p. 57. The year 1097 would make little sense, because at that point Daibert was preparing to leave Italy for the Holy Land.

67 vocavit archiepiscopos et episcopos Sardinie ut venirent ad sanctum sinodum ... clamabant una voce omnes: “i nacematiza, anacematiza!”[sic] Et confirmavit legatus et episcopi cum consilio omnes principes Sardinie precepta apostolica maledixerunt et condepnaverunt eum. Lauwers, “Réforme, romanisation, colonization?,” p. 292.

68 See Corrado Zedda’s hypothesis that Pisan noble families had begun to entrench themselves in Gallura, at least, since the eleventh or tenth century. Zedda, *L’ultima illusione mediterranea*, p. 82. Jean-Michel Poisson suggests very reasonably that an advantage to using Daibert as representative of the pope was Daibert’s personality as “a man of action, authoritarian, ambitious and also greedy.” Yet this still does not explain why Daibert should be included in a legatine mission in which he himself was not the legate; surely it would have been simpler to make Daibert the legate, if the pope was mainly interested in utilizing Daibert’s personality to represent Rome. See Jean-Michel Poisson, “Église et État à la conquête de la Sardaigne,” in *Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l’enseignement supérieur public* (Poitiers, 14e congrès, 1983), p. 121.
felt the pressure of German imperial expansionism coming from the west. In other words, his answer to Magdeburg’s pretensions of authority, which were part of the Empire’s attempts to interfere in Poland, was to turn elsewhere for his baptism. 69 The judices’s acceptance of Daibert as an ecclesiastical leader, and the pope’s choice of Daibert as a natural aid to the legate’s authority, suggest that unlike Mieszko, the judices did not see this archbishop’s authority as carrying the risk of future military invasions. Rather, Daibert represented both ecclesiastical authority and his city’s secular importance in Sardinia, one that no other secular power had at the time, and an importance that the judices do not seem to have feared. Thus, a team consisting of the papal legate and the archbishop of Pisa would create a powerful unit that combined papal authority and the economic and political power that was most relevant to the judices, that of Pisa.

This hypothesis is further supported by the combined episcopal and judicial council that the legate called, a council that may have been an essential part of Urban’s strategy against Torchitorio, but that the pope may have feared was beyond the effective power of his legate to realize. Since Torchitorio’s obstinacy had made it clear that papal authority by itself was not enough to bring the judex to terms with the Church, Urban seems to have decided to enlist the support of Torchitorio’s fellow judices, as well as all the most influential prelates in Sardinia. From this perspective, the goal of the synod at Torres may have been to involve Torchitorio’s peers and relatives in “naming and shaming” him, and to publicly isolate him from people whose good opinion and cooperation perhaps seemed more important to him than that of the far-away pope. 70 Yet summoning all of the Sardinian potentates, both lay and ecclesiastical, and uniting them publicly and ceremoniously on the side of Rome against their brother judex may have been seen as beyond the effective power of a legate. It might not, however, have been beyond the power of the representative of Pisa. Indeed, it may be wondered if Daibert’s particular effectiveness in Sardinia during the conflict with Torchitorio is what led Urban II later to make him papal legate on the island.

Another aspect of this synod is the fact that it involved the other three judices in Gregory VII’s reforming movement. This is important from many points of view, and can best be understood with Bartlett’s vision of a Europeanizing movement that spread largely by means of the Church. The judex of Cagliari had already demonstrated his loyalty to Rome, as Gregory VII’s letter of 1080 makes clear; Mariano of

69 Jean W. Sedlar, *East Central Europe in the Middle Ages*, p. 150.

70 All four ruling houses of Sardinia were related to each other and frequently intermarried, a fact that was repeatedly criticized by the popes: by Alexander II in 1065, Urban II in 1090, and Innocent III in 1200. See Casula and Brook, *Genealogie medioevali di Sardegna*, passim; IP, pp. 392-3, docs. 1, 5; and Dionigi Scano, ed., *Codice Diplomatico delle Relazioni fra la Santa Sede e la Sardegna*, Vol. 1 (hereafter CDR) (Cagliari: Arti Grafiche B.C.T., 1940-1941), p. 6, doc. 4.
Logudoro was almost certainly making a similar statement with his 1082 donation of land to S. Maria of Pisa. Arborea’s response to Gregory VII is unknown. The papacy, however, remained unsatisfied with these political shows of attachment to Rome, and at some point in this period extracted a promise from Torchitorio’s contemporary, Judex Costantino of Cagliari, that he would “relinquish the dioceses and churches and priests who are to be ordained in honor of God and Saint Peter,” and would “deliver tithes and first-fruits from this day forward.” He also promised to renounce the “execrable customs” of his ancestors and “of the other princes of Sardinia;” these included the use of concubines, committing homicides, and marriages of consanguinity. Such charges, which have been interpreted as a sign of Sardinia’s Byzantine customs, are in reality almost identical to charges made against the Irish. The Irish, wrote St. Bernard, were “shameless in their customs, savage in their rites ... Christians in name, but pagans in fact, [who] ... do not give tithes or first-fruits, do not enter legitimate marriages.” The Christian Eastern Europeans, too, “confess Christ only in name, but deny him in their deeds,” and thus were equated culturally with “wild people.” This is not necessarily to say that the Sards were not truly guilty of the sins that Costantino renounced; it does suggest, though, that the rhetoric used against the Sards was not unusual, and that the attitude with which Gregory VII and later popes approached Sardinian canonical deviance was similar to that with which they approached other “peripheral” cultures. From these perspectives, the presence of both judices and prelates at the synod in Torres, under the leadership of a papal legate and Daibert of Pisa, can be seen as part of a papal design to insist on the authority of Rome in ecclesiastical matters, and the centrality of the Roman Christian, and thus “European,” culture.

In this way, too, Pisa’s closeness with the papacy allowed it to bolster its military and economic strength in Sardinia with an ecclesiastical and cultural prestige. This reinforcing process was boosted when, at

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71 episcopatus et ecclesias ac presbyteros in honorem Dei et B. Petri canonice ordinandos relinquo. Decimas etiam ac primitias ab hac die in antea me fideliter redditurum promitto. The letter is found in CDS, p. 164, doc. 20.

72 Ego in Dei nomine Constantinus rex et judex Sardiniae ...omnes pessimas consuetudines antecessorum meorum, et aliorum principum Sardiniae, scilicet concubinarum, homicidii, consanguinitatis ... relinquo et refuto. CDS, p. 164, doc. 20.


75 Bartlett, The Making of Europe, p. 23

76 Before this, Gregory VII had made wide use of the “faithful laity” to reform erring clerics, and H. E. J. Cowdrey notes that the practice was already well-established in Central Italy even before Gregory’s time. It may, however, have been a novelty in Sardinia. See H. E. J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085 (Oxford: OUP, 1998), pp. 278-79.
some unspecified time after the synod in Torres, Urban II granted the legation to Archbishop Daibert. As papal legate, Daibert had the right to represent the pope directly on the island. Since the original document granting him the legation has not survived, however, it is difficult to determine the precise breadth of his powers. From the thirteenth century on, archbishop-legates like Daibert would be known as *legati nati* and were strictly limited in what they could and could not do, to the extent that the title became little more than honorific, but earlier their status was far more ambiguous. They were lower in status than a cardinal *legatus a latere*, but did have the authority to carry out visitations, call synods and arbitrate in ecclesiastical disputes.\(^7\)

Unfortunately, there is no documentary evidence regarding the official boundaries to the power of the archbishop of Pisa as a legate. Yet if Pisa’s legation was like most early legations, and its archbishop had authority only over Sardinia’s Church and not over Sardinia’s secular rulers, then the behavior of the Pisan archbishops through the twelfth century shows them stretching and sometimes breaking whatever boundaries had been set on their authority, apparently with impunity, until the beginning of the thirteenth century. Over the course of the twelfth century the archbishop-legates took it upon themselves not only to attend to strictly ecclesiastical affairs but also to admonish and counsel the judices, demand personal homage from the judices on nominal behalf of the pope, decide disputes between clerics and laymen, and even to take part in secular justice.\(^7\) It ought to be noted that at this early date, before the legation had become attached *ad sedem* of the Pisan archdiocese, there is no reason to assume that Daibert was representing the interests of Pisa in Sardinia; his primary or sole concern may well have been to do the work that Urban II had entrusted to him.\(^7\) At the same time, as Artizzu notes, an archbishop-legate was not only an ecclesiastical authority, but also represented his city’s government to local rulers.\(^8\) Thus, this

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\(^7\) I. S. Robinson, *The Papacy, 1073-1198: Continuity and Innovation* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), p. 171; Blake R. Beattie, *Angelus Pacis: The Legation of Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, 1326-1334* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 65-71; on p. 71 Beattie notes that *legati a latere* had the right to put on full papal dress while on a mission, and even in the eleventh century were seen by Gregory VII as “part of the body of the pope.”

\(^7\) Some time in the 1120s or 1130s, for example, Archbishop Roger held a court at which he judged a case between two laymen and five monasteries. Paolo Merci, ed., *Il Condaghe di San Nicola di Trullas* (hereafter CSNT), (Nuoro: Ilisso, 2001), pp. 122-123, doc. 163. At the end of the twelfth century, Archbishop Ubaldo settled a conflict between the aggressive judex of Cagliari and the judex of Logudoro; in this case, no clerics or ecclesiastical bodies were involved at all. This is found in a letter of Innocent III, written in 1203. See Mauro G. Sanna, ed., *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna* (Cagliari: Centro di Studi Filologici Sardi, CUEC, 2003), pp. 36-38, doc. 29.

\(^7\) See Michel Matzke, *Daibert von Pisa. Zwischen Pisa, Papst und ersten Kreuzzug* (Sigmaringen: J. Thorbecke, 1998) for an in-depth analysis of Daibert’s character. Daibert was certainly close to Urban II and took close part in Urban’s planning of the First Crusade, among other things. Turtas suggests that Urban II chose to send Daibert because he was the “most prestigious ecclesiastical personality in central Italy at the time... the pope probably also intended to satisfy the expectations of the city of Pisa – to whom ... the pope still felt indebted.” Turtas, *Storia della Chiesa*, pp. 209-210.

\(^8\) Artizzu, *L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa*, p. 44.
ecclesiastical honor, which is the first definite mark of Pisa’s already existing authority in Sardinia, is also the first official recognition of the way Pisan interests in Sardinia and the city’s ecclesiastical authority had already begun to intertwine.

2.3.3 The Legation Lost and Found, and Pisa’s Continuing Growth in Sardinia

When Daibert died in 1105, it might have seemed that Pisa had lost its ecclesiastical authority in Sardinia. It lost its status as archdiocese, which seems to have been granted only to Daibert, not to his seat,\textsuperscript{81} and the position of legate in Sardinia was thereafter given to other prelates from other cities. From 1110 to 1118 it belonged to Berardo, bishop of Marsi; in 1119 to Peter, cardinal deacon of St. Susannah; and from 1120 to 1132 to Roger, bishop of Volterra.\textsuperscript{82} Turtas suggests unconvincingly that Daibert’s legation had been given \textit{ad sedem} from the beginning, and that Pisa lost it after 1105 because Daibert’s long absence on the First Crusade, starting in 1098, had made him singularly useless as a legate in Sardinia.\textsuperscript{83} It is true that later, in 1138, when Innocent II would decide to confer the legation \textit{ad sedem} to Archbishop Baldwin of Pisa, he would call it the “legation ... [conferred] by our predecessor Pope Urban upon your predecessors,” with the plural “predecessors” making it seem that Daibert had not been the only previous Pisan archbishop-legate in Sardinia.\textsuperscript{84} Yet it seems more likely that Innocent II’s wording in 1138 was either voluntarily or involuntarily inaccurate.\textsuperscript{85} It requires a stretch of the imagination to suppose that

\textsuperscript{81} This detail has escaped numerous Sardinian scholars: Petrucci, for example, speaks of “the archbishop of Pisa, Pietro,” and Turtas makes no note of Pisa’s loss of the archbishopric. It is attested in the \textit{Liber de Origine Civitatis Pisanae}, col. 169, which affirms that in 1119 Pope Gelasius II \textit{concessit et dedit Archiepiscopum Pisanae civitati, quia usque tunc tantum Episcopus erat, excepto Daiberto.}

\textsuperscript{82} Turtas, \textit{Storia della Chiesa}, p. 246.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{84} Innocent’s charter to Archbishop Baldwin in 1138 describes the legation to Sardinia as \textit{legationem quoque Sardiniae a praedecessore nostro Papa Urbano praedecessoribus tuis concessam}. It is on this phrase that Turtas bases his interpretation. The document can be found in CDS, p. 212, doc. 47 and \textit{PL}, Vol. 179, cols. 361-362.

\textsuperscript{85} Considering the number of legates in Sardinia who were not archbishops of Pisa at the beginning of the twelfth century, it is clear that Daibert’s successors did \textit{not} have the legation. It even seems possible that Daibert himself was legate in Sardinia only temporarily, perhaps to carry out a specific diplomatic or reforming mission for the pope, and that the position was not a permanent one, since in 1097 he was acting as papal legate to King Alfons of Castile. See Matzke, \textit{Daibert von Pisa}, pp. 83-84; on the nature of legations see Kristen R. Rennie, \textit{The Foundations of Medieval Papal Legation} (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Thus, it is not impossible that Innocent II had deliberately changed history in 1138 in order to justify his gift to Pisa, since he was seeking to broker an extremely delicate peace between Pisa and Genoa; his claim to be respecting Urban II’s precedent might have avoided accusations of discrimination by Genoa. Furthermore, the possibility of a forgery being produced by Pisa to show that Urban had granted the legation \textit{ad sedem} should not be ruled out. A forgery to support a very
Urban II’s successor, Paschal II, would have refused to confirm a legation *ad sedem* after Daibert’s death simply because Daibert had been active on a crusade that was the brainchild of Paschal’s own predecessor. Refusing to confirm the honor might be justified by some enmity either between Paschal II and Pisa’s new archbishop, or between the Paschal II and Pisa, but, as will be seen below, the papacy’s relations with Pietro Moriconi, Daibert’s successor, were good; so were those with Pisa at the beginning of the twelfth century.\(^{86}\)

Thus, Pisa’s claim to ecclesiastical authority in Sardinia did not depend only on the papal legation, and this can be seen in precisely those years in which the legation was held by other figures. In this period, it can be seen that, if the legation was a determining factor in Pisa’s overall success in Sardinia, it was not the only factor, especially early on; Pisa’s fame and fortune had not been created only on the basis of its archbishop. The importance of Pisa’s military strength appears in 1103, when Judex Costantino of Cagliari died, and his brother Turbino usurped the throne from Costantino’s son, Mariano Torchitorio, with the help of Pisans living in Cagliari. Clearly, enough Pisans were there, and were well enough armed, to have a decisive effect on the politics of the judicate, and they had clearly done so expecting certain rewards. Indeed, they are an example of what Jean-Michel Poisson describes as men sent to Sardinia by Pisa, instructed to give military aid to the judices and to honor them, but at the same time to act as representatives of Pisa and advance its interests.\(^{87}\) To thank them, and in order that “the Pisan people shall be friendly to me and to my kingdom,” Turbino exempted these “dearest Pisan friends” from the “winter and summer taxes and the tax on salt.”\(^{88}\) At the same time, he also granted four agricultural estates to the *Opera* of S. Maria of Pisa in a document that underlines the useful political ambiguity of donations to Pisa’s cathedral. In the opening words of the charter, Turbino declares that he has been “swayed by love and by the petitions of the Pisans,” introducing from the beginning the dual sacred-secular nature of a gift to the *Opera*. The rest of the charter continues in the same vein. Turbino first lists the usual reasons for an ecclesiastical donation, in this case “love of the omnipotent God and of his ever-

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\(^{88}\) This grant, made in May 1103 (1104 in the Pisan calendar), proclaimed that *Ego Turbini, omnipotentis Dei gratia Judex Kalaratianus, dono, concedo et in perpetuum trado Pisanis carissimis amicis nostris Toloneum de hyberno et de aestate de sale, ut habeant benedictum a Deo et a nobis. Ita tamen ut populus Pisanus sit amicus mihi et regno meo, et non offendat studiose neque me, neque regnum meum.* The document is found in CDS, p. 177, doc. 1.
virgin mother, and of all the saints, and the remedy and salvation of my soul, and that of my wife and my children, and of all my relatives,” and then stipulates that the grant should “be used to complete and finish the works (opera) [of the cathedral], and once these works are finished, it shall support the canons.”

Like Judex Mariano of Logudoro in 1082, Turbino cautions that “neither archbishop, nor bishop, nor canon, nor any person great or small shall dare to give these estates to anyone in fief or in benefice,” perhaps wishing to ensure that his politically ambiguous gift would not become the property of a secular or ecclesiastical power who might challenge his authority. Following this, however, Turbino once again mentions that this gift is intended to ensure “that the Pisan people shall be friendly to me and to my kingdom, and shall be careful not to offend me or my kingdom.”

Similarly to Mariano of Logudoro in 1082, therefore, Turbino used the cathedral church of Pisa simultaneously to link himself to an important reforming church, display his largesse and increase his prestige, and emphasize his friendship with Pisa. All three of these things were important for a usurper to solidify his power, and as noted earlier, the same pattern can be seen in new or aspiring rulers in Poland and Bohemia. From the Pisan point of view, this grant gave its cathedral a secure source of income and a way to establish a direct landowning presence on the island, although later, at least, such estates might be supervised by local Sardinians rather than by Pisans. While the commune itself did not officially benefit by the donation, and although the cathedral would not be clearly identified as a symbol of the commune itself until the 1160s, the cathedral had been the city’s own project from the moment it was funded by the

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89 It is to be noted that the use of the word opera here indicates that at this date the Opera was seen not as an institution or legal entity, but simply as specific works being carried out on the fabric of the cathedral building. This is not wholly surprising, given that the cathedral was still being built at the time; it would be finished in 1116. At the same time, Mauro Ronzani notes that during its construction, the lay organization responsible for building the cathedral won for the city of Pisa the first recognition of the citizens’ autonomy from the archbishop, and that as builders of the cathedral church the citizens became in a way the legitimate representatives of the archbishop in his absence. Therefore, even if the Opera was not the full-scale organization it would later become, a donation to it in this early period still had important secular meanings for the citizens of Pisa. Ronzani, “Dall’edificatio ecclesiae all’Opera di S. Maria,” pp. 7, 19-21.

90 Notum sit omnibus Xpi fidelibus quod ego Turbini omnipotentis Dei gratia Iudex Calaritanus, pisanorum precibus et amore inflexus, pro amore omnipotentis Dei et eius genitricis semper virginis, et omnium sanctorum, et pro remedio et salute anime mee, et coniugis mee, et filiorum meorum, et omnium parentum meorum ... voluntarie motus, ut in regno meo ad opera Sancte Marie donarem quatuor donicalgias que ad perfectionem et confirmationem ejus opere perpetuo deservirent, et finita opera deserviant canonicis qui nunc sunt et inde fuerint, ad honorem Dei, et honorem ejusdem Virginis Marie... Ita tamen ut populus Pisanus sit amicus mihi, et in regno meo, et non offendant me neque regnum meum studiose. This grant was made at the same time as the trade concessions, in May 1103, and is in CDS, p. 178, doc. 2.

91 In 1187 the Opera’s administrator in Sardinia was named Arzocco; he was a member of the Opera, but his name shows unmistakeably Sardinian origins. He answered to Bernardo Aghentine, who was the Operario of the Opera in Pisa. See CDS, p. 260, doc. 123.
raid in Palermo. Contributing financially to its completion was clearly a gift to the Pisans as a body, and not just to the cathedral canons.

At the time of Turbino’s donations, Daibert was still archbishop of Pisa, and thus still officially legate in Sardinia. Since 1098, however, he had been almost uninterruptedly in the Holy Land, and it may be assumed that his authority on the island was only an abstract notion and can hardly be held responsible for donations to Pisa’s cathedral Opera. In this case, therefore, the enlargement of Pisa’s direct presence in Sardinia must be attributed to its political and military power, which were clearly important for Turbino. Furthermore, two years after Daibert’s death, in 1107, the Opera of S. Maria was once again beneficiary of a generous donation from Cagliari. This time it was Mariano Torchitorio, Turbino’s previously ousted nephew, who had “recovered my kingdom and my life with great honor and victory... with the services and powerful aid that was supplied of the most noble and strong citizens of the city of Pisa.” To show his gratitude, Mariano donated “four curtes which are called domnicaliae,” or agricultural estates, as well as “one pound of excellent gold to the aforesaid church of Saint Mary... similarly every year I shall send one ship, at my expense and arrangement, laden with good salt to Saint Mary.” There is no explicit mention of any feudal relationship being established, and the beneficiary is of course the church, rather than the city, of Pisa, but the promise to send an annual quantity of gold and salt looks suspiciously like a feudal tribute. As will be shown below, there is actually some reason to think that Mariano’s “gifts” were indeed the informal recognition, or creation, of a feudal-type relationship with Pisa. As a whole, therefore, the episode is evidence that even without the concrete authority of a papal legation, Pisa’s mercantile and military strength were also able to strengthen the city’s ecclesiastical and political authority.

Nevertheless, Pisa’s close connection with the papacy was still fundamental to its authority in Sardinia, even in these years without the legation. In 1114, Pisa’s ecclesiastical authority can be seen feeding back into a reinforcement of the city’s political authority when it led Sardinian forces on the Balearic Crusade, a mission that “the patria of Genoa, alone, refused” to join, with important consequences, as will be seen

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92 Boucheron, “È possibile un investimento disinteressato?,” pp. 27-42.

93 Pro regno meo et vita quam recuperavi cum grandi honore atque victoria ... et michi subvenientibus et fortissime adjutorium praebentibus nobilissimi et fortissimi cives jam dictae civitas pisane. CDS, p. 181, doc. 6. See also CDS, p. 197, doc. 25. See also Artizzu, L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa, pp. 52-54.

94 Dono cedo ac trado omnipotenti Deo et ecclesiae sanctae Mariae Pisani archiepiscopatus, id sunt quatuor curtes quae domnicaliae vocantur ... Insuper etiam promitto et concedo prefatae ecclesiae sanctae Mariae libram unam auri optimi [...] similiter navem unam cum meas expensas atque conductiones de bono sale honustam mittam. CDS, p. 181-182, doc. 6.
later. In 1114, “on the order of the Lord Pope Paschal II,” the Pisan army sailed out of the mouth of the Arno to liberate the Christians under the “high authority” of Bishop Pietro of Pisa, while the Pisan military commanders had “a cross, and the insignia of the army of Rome” bestowed upon them by Paschal II. En route, the fleet stopped first in Gallura, where they took on provisions that were presumably provided by the judex of Gallura, and then in Logudoro, where “Durbinio, he who formerly ruled the kingdom of Cagliari, joined the Pisans, as did Saltaro son of Judex Costantino” of Logudoro. This “Durbinio” was none other than Turbino, the uncle of Judex Mariano, who had usurped the throne around 1104 with the help of the Pisans; along with him came “also the bishop of Cagliari,” Guglielmo, who judging from his name may not have been Sardinian himself, as will be seen in the next chapter. As for Saltaro, Judex Costantino’s wife “was a widow and had two sons by her former husband:” Saltaro is assumed to have been one of these sons. Thus, he could not inherit the throne, and perhaps from Judex Costantino’s point of view was an expendable, but suitably prestigious, representative of Logudoro’s ruling house. In short, the good relations between Pisa’s bishop and the papacy made it possible for Bishop Pietro to command both the archbishop of Cagliari and members of the Sardinian royal houses despite his lack of the legation.

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95 Auxilium bello Ianuensis sola negavit patria. Liber Maiolichinus, p. 12, ll. 135-136. See also Meloni, “La Sardegna nel quadro della politica mediterranea,” p. 66.

96 iussu Domini pape Pascali II, perrexit Maioricam cum trecentis navibus, in die Sancti Sixti exivit de fauce Arni. This is the version given by the Annales Pisani for the year 1114: Bernardo Maragone, Annales Pisani, p. 8, ll. 6-7. The Liber Maiolichinus gives an even greater role to Archbishop Peter, claiming that Petre Dei presul... die Domini... hortaris populos celestis signa salutis sumere; quique daret, qui sumeret ipse fuisti primus. Liber Maiolichinus, p. 7, ll. 39-47.

97 Pisanus exercitus in trecentis navibus ad Christianos liberandos... de Arni faucibus exivit. This account is in the Liber de origine civitatis pisanae, col. 102.

98 papa... nomine Paschalis... pontifici tribuendo crucem, romanaque signa militie ducibus... Hancque potestatem Pisano tribuit altam pontifici. Liber Maiolichinus, p. 8, ll. 72-75; p. 9, ll. 80-81. The account given in the Liber de origine civitatis pisanae shows Archbishop Peter playing a leading role throughout the whole campaign. See Liber de origine civitatis pisanae, cols. 101-104.

99 The Liber Maiolichinus records that the Pisans stopped at the port of S. Reparata in Gallura, after having passed by the port of Longone (modern Longosardo): adveniunt Longona rates, linquantque lebetes, et retinent portum dictum de nomine sancte quam Reparata vocant... hosque sinus exire parent. Liber Maiolichinus, p. 14, ll. 191-194.

100 Istit Durbinius Pisanis associatur, qui quondam regnum censebat Calaritanum, et Constantino Saltarum judice natus. Ibid., pp. 14-15, ll. 202-204. The archbishop of Cagliari, in the Liber Maiolichinus, is portrayed as holding a hortatory role similar to that of Archbishop Pietro of Pisa: Tum Petrus antistes populos hortatus... hoc et Boso pater, presul quoque Caralitanus. Ibid., p. 64, ll. 1575-1590. His name is provided by Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 820.

How far this Sardinian participation was fully voluntary, and how far it was a sign of Pisa’s power over the judices, is impossible to say. On one hand, the judices had every reason to wish for the expedition’s victory, and every reason to contribute to its success, since it was intended to strike another blow at Muslim naval power in the Mediterranean, and Sardinia had suffered from Muslim invasions and raids for centuries. Thus, they might easily have wanted to join it independently of Pisan coercion. Also, as Heywood rightly stresses, the relationship between Pisa and Logudoro, for one, was not yet one of full vassalage: the Pisan accounts dignify Logudoro’s judex with the title “king” – indeed, “an illustrious king, greatly celebrated by all the Sardinian people” – and do not suggest any limitation to his power. Evidence from Logudoro indicates that the judices, too, wished to present themselves as sovereign lords: Judex Costantino, who ruled Logudoro during the Balearic Crusade, in one place styled himself “emperor of the kingdom of Torres.” Nowhere is there any indication that he was seen, or saw himself, as subject to any other power.

On the other hand, arguing in favor of Pisan pressure as a strong motive is the fact that not all four judices took part: none of the sources record contributions from Arborea, although for some reason this has not been discussed by scholars. Significantly, Arborea was also politically detached from Pisa; in contrast to Cagliari, Logudoro and Gallura, the Opera of S. Maria had little or no property there and Arborean foreign policy would soon be leaning more toward Genoa than toward Pisa. As noted above, Genoa had also abstained from the Crusade; it cannot be coincidence that Arborea both held back from the Pisan-commanded Crusade, and was also the sole judicate to later favor Genoese above Pisans in its ports and markets, to the point of entering military alliances with Genoa against Pisa. In other words, if Arborea held back, then participation with Pisa in the Balearics may have implied the recognition or creation of some relationship with Pisa that the judex of Arborea did not want.

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Such a reading of the meaning of judicial participation in the Balearic Crusade is lent weight by similar cases in Eastern Europe. Although there is no proof that Bishop Pietro Moriconi had anything other than warrior spirituality in mind when he led the crusade, nor that he was thinking of his city’s political well-being when he stopped in Sardinia to collect support, an example from Poland shows that secular political aspirations and spiritual zeal might easily be united in a crusading bishop. Innocent III’s delegate for raising Polish support for the Fourth Crusade was a bishop who was both such an energetic reformer that he had managed to secure immunity for the Polish Church from Poland’s rulers, and so politically ambitious that in 1215 he sought to become “the informal hegemon of all of Poland.” Thus, his desire for reform did not preclude a desire for worldly power. Likewise, although Bishop Pietro Moriconi’s leadership of the Crusade could have been simply a representation of the Church’s blessing of the mission, an incident a few years later suggests otherwise. In 1120 he, “together with his canons, was the leader of the ... Pisans in their fleets” against the Genoese, indicating that also when he led the Pisans during the Balearic Crusade he may have been representing not only the Church, but also specifically the city of Pisa. If so, the Polish example shows that he would not have been alone in using a crusade as an opportunity to strengthen his spiritual and political authority over Sardinia’s Church and rulers.

As far as the judices’ participation is concerned, their cooperation finds a parallel in the Polabian Crusade into northern Slavic territory, organized in 1147 by an unnamed papal legate, the archbishop of Magdeburg, Duke Henry the Lion, and Margraves Albert the Bear and Conrad of Meissen. All of these figures, with the possible exception of the papal legate, were engaged in a long-running, and ultimately successful, effort to extend their own rule east of the Elbe, toward Poland, in a colonizing expansion that allowed this eastern territory to be brought under the ecclesiastical control of Latin dioceses. Yet just like the Sardinian judices and clergy, Polish contingents of nobles and prelates joined the crusade under the political and spiritual authority of their German would-be colonizers. In his study of Polish crusading, Mikołaj Gladysz has concluded that the Poles who participated in this crusade with their German neighbors were motivated by two main considerations: the need to fortify friendly relations with the expansionist Saxons, and an authentic belief in the crusading ideals. Similarly, Polish and Czech nobles

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going on the Third Crusade joined the ranks of Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, who also wished to strengthen imperial authority in East Central Europe; one Polish duke even took his vows together with the Emperor. These men, in other words, were displaying their support of their people’s political and ecclesiastical would-be colonizers, and choosing a crusade as an appropriate occasion on which to do so. The recurring motif of cooperation between colonizers and the potentially colonized on a crusade points to the special value that a crusade could have as an opportunity for stronger and weaker forces to fight together and, perhaps, negotiate their relationships with each other. As Chapter Three will show, there are hints that not all Sards supported their rulers’ closeness to Pisa. A crusade, however, as a holy war, provided a legitimate occasion for the three participating judices to cooperate with the Pisans, and in turn legitimized their more general support of the Pisan presence in Sardinia.

The suspicion, therefore, is that participation in the Balearic Crusade somehow implied a vassal status with regard to Pisa. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that all three Sardinian judices who did take part in it had already made, or would soon make, donations to the Opera of S. Maria of Pisa; these, it will now be argued, may also have implied the recognition of a quasi-vassal status. The donations of Logudoro and Cagliari have already been discussed, and in 1115 or 1116, only one year after the expedition set out, Judex Ithoccor of Gallura swore to be “faithful from this hour on to the church of S. Maria of Pisa and to the Commune.” His vow was a response to Pisa’s pressures to make peace with his sister, from whom he had usurped the throne, and who had fled to Pisa for aid in 1113. In addition to confirming his sister’s grants to Pisa, Ithoccor promised also to give “four agricultural estates to the aforesaid church of Pisa, such as shall please its representative, and one pound of good gold, or its equivalent, every year.” This latter, interestingly, is almost precisely the same promise that Judex Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari had made ten years before. The only difference between the two is that Ithocor was not required to send salt to Pisa, but considering that Gallura did not have anything like Cagliari’s rich salt-pans, this is not surprising.

Furthermore, in this period the city of Pisa and the archbishop of Pisa were not yet distinct political entities. Because of this lack of distinction between archbishop and city, the cathedral, as the home of the archbishop, was already a legally effective symbol of Pisa, if not yet of an independent commune. As

111 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
113 Ego Judex Ithocor de Galluri ab hac ora in antea fidelis ero ecclesie sancte Marie de Pisa et Communi ... et IIII curtes dabo prenominate ecclesie de Pisa tales que placeant misso suo, et per unamquamque annum unam libram boni auri, vel valens. CDS, p. 192, doc. 20. The four promised estates were duly transferred to Pisan ownership the following year, in the form of four churches and their lands: see CDS, pp. 195-196, doc. 23. See also Artizzu, L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa, p. 58
Gabriella Rossetti notes, for example, swearing fealty to the cathedral of Pisa gave a vassal access to the city’s tribunal and Pisan law. It also gave him a patron, the archbishop, who was obliged to represent him in that legal system. Indeed, this peculiarity is responsible for the many oaths of loyalty to Pisa’s cathedral and archbishop made in the first half of the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, the close similarities between the grants made by Ithoccor of Gallura and Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari, the fact that Ithoccor’s gifts accompanied his explicit vow of fealty to Pisa, and the fact that his vow of fealty was made both to the city and to the cathedral of Pisa, make it seem all the more likely that Mariano Torchitorio’s grant in 1107 was also the recognition of a feudal relationship. Ithoccor’s and Mariano Torchitorio’s annual gifts to the cathedral can be taken as evidence that they were recognizing a status as some sort of vassal of Pisa, even if the lack of feudalism on the island may have prevented them from understanding vassalage in the same way that the Pisans did. Furthermore, taking on vassalage to a city and an archbishop that were clearly aligned with the papacy must surely have lent this political relationship religious significance and legitimacy. The political, commercial and military benefits of vassalage to Pisa, therefore, were enriched by the spiritual prestige that it must have brought.

Considering this, what appears to be a striking contrast between the two documents can be seen to hide another similarity. Pisa had to make Judex Ithoccor promise not to kill or have killed “anyone sent by S. Maria,” whereas Judex Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari praised the “most noble and most wise Pisans” who had occasioned his donation.\textsuperscript{115} These details, despite their opposite characters, point to a consistent colonizing strategy being used by Pisa in both Cagliari and Gallura: the manipulation of contests for a throne. Pisa gained vassals, while the insecure occupants of the throne strengthened their political authority through the prestige of their ecclesiastical ties with Pisa and, by extension, Rome. In Cagliari, individual Pisans helped the judex regain his throne, and in return demanded his homage to their cathedral; in Gallura, Pisa acted as a peace broker between feuding claimants to a judicial throne, and obtained judicial homage to the city’s cathedral, symbol of Pisa’s combined ecclesiastical and secular government, as part of the peace-making process. As its fleet sailed for the Balearics in 1114, Pisa’s choice to bring its fleet, with its prestigious archbishop at its head, to a Galluran port and demand supplies may well have been part of this strategy, a show of force designed to hasten Ithoccor’s capitulation.


\textsuperscript{115} et nullum missum sancte Marie occidam vel occidere faciam, neque capiam vel capere faciam, et si aliquis fecerit justitiam inde faciam. This is included in Ithoccor’s charter of 1115/1116 in CDS, p. 192, doc. 20. Mariano Torchitorio, instead, names the nobilissimi et prudentissimi cives pisani in his grant, in CDS, pp. 181-182, doc. 6.
With these things in mind, it is being argued here that Mariano Torchitorio’s choice to send both Cagliari’s archbishop and his own uncle to the Balearics under the command of Archbishop Pietro of Pisa was a sign not of Cagliari’s independent and disinterested cooperation, but a recognition of Pisa’s military and ecclesiastical authority, and Mariano Torchitorio’s desire to strengthen ties with the city. The same is true for the judex of Logudoro, whose decision to send his step-son on the mission was surely a strong gesture of good-will toward Pisa. At the same time, these attitudes of “submission” may have been ambiguous enough to allow the judices and their nobles to feel that they were not accepting Pisa’s outright dominion. Both the Sards and Pisans were, officially, merely participating in a crusade called by their common spiritual lord, the pope, and working to defeat a common enemy. Participation in the Balearic Crusade may have allowed the judices to strengthen ties of friendship with Pisa while keeping their own dignity. Indeed, it gave them a chance to participate in a high-profile undertaking with important leaders from Italy and Iberia, like Ramon Berenguer III and the Count of Empúries. In turn, they may have hoped that this participation in an international enterprise would raise their political importance to the level of their Italian and Iberian neighbors, and thereby increase their own prestige both at home and in their interactions with foreign powers.

In the end, the mission to the Balearics was only partially successful. By 1115 the Christian army had conquered both Ibiza and Majorca, enslaved the inhabitants and taken the spoils of Majorca city; by 1116 it had left, confident that it had obliterated the threat of Balearic piracy that had plagued Western Mediterranean shipping. In contrast to the Crusades in the Holy Land, therefore, it seems that there was either no interest in, or no consensus on, setting up a permanent occupation of the Balearics. This, in fact, led to the crusade’s final failure: Majorca fell back under Muslim control in 1116, the same year the crusaders left. Nevertheless, during the crusade itself the judices must have felt they were participating in a successful mission against the mutual enemies of Sardinia, Pisa, and all Christendom. This experience, and the fact that it took place under the command of the Pisan archbishop, probably allowed Pisa to cement its claim to the loyalty of the judices and clergy not only of Gallura, but also of Logudoro and Cagliari.

From this point on, papal policy took a hand in strengthening Pisa even further. In 1122 Roger, bishop of Volterra and legate to Sardinia, was elevated to the archdiocese of Pisa, and brought the legation back to Pisa with him. Probably before 1135 Innocent II had confirmed the papal legation in Sardinia ad sedem

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116 Busch, Medieval Mediterranean Ports, p. 211.
117 Roger was at one time identified as a member of a great Pisan family, but more recently has been shown to be the son of the count of Crema, near Milan. See Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, “Ruggero, vescovo di Volterra e
to Roger’s successor. In 1138 Innocent II “concede[d] two dioceses in the judicate of Gallura, namely that of Galtelli and that of Civita, and the diocese of Populonia, to you and to your successors, and through you to the Pisan Church ... and we adorn you with the honor of primate over the province of Torres.” In practical terms, these rights and privileges both empowered the archbishop of Pisa to meddle in a wide variety of Sardinian affairs, and opened a way for Pisan prelates to infiltrate the upper clergy in Sardinia. This, in turn, gave them a voice in judicial politics, including alliances with foreign powers like Pisa, and, crucially, decisions regarding land donations to Pisa. The importance of the legation for the ambitions of the Commune of Pisa is shown by the fact that, by 1197 at least, the Commune required new consuls to swear a solemn oath not to endanger “the primacy or the legation in Sardinia” by any action or word. Thus, by taking on the role of protector of Sardinia, and by cultivating good relations with the papacy and with at least three of the four judices, by the 1130s Pisa had clearly gained the upper hand in Sardinia.

2.3.4 Genoa’s Struggle to Compete with Pisa’s Legation

As mentioned earlier, someone living as far away from Sardinia as William of Malmesbury knew only that Pisa was involved with Sardinia; he does not mention Genoa. Nevertheless, the fact that Pisa had won both ecclesiastical dominance and political influence in Sardinia does not mean that Genoa had disappeared from the scene. It is true that until the mid-twelfth century Sardinia was of secondary interest for Genoa, which, as mentioned earlier, was gaining influence over points in north Africa, the Holy Land,

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118 Turtas notes that Archbishop Uberto insisted that his title was “Romane sedis legatus in perpetuum” in 1135, and that this does not make sense unless the legation had already been confirmed ad sedem. Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 248.

119 in Galluriensi judicatu duos episcopatus, Galtellinensem videlicet et Civitensem, et Populoniensem episcopatum, tibi tuisque successoribus, et per vos Ecclesiae Pisanae concedimus ... vosque primatus honore super Turritanam provinciam decoramus. The bull is found in CDS, p. 212, doc. 49.


121 See above, at n. 27.
Sicily, Provence and Spain. Still, it never lost interest in Sardinia. According to Boscolo, the Genoese effort to establish a permanent presence on the island was in full drive by 1107, when Judex Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari – the same who owed his throne to the Pisans – gave six *domnicaliae* “to S. Lorenzo, which is the episcopate of the city of Genoa,” and followed it with the church of S. Giovanni of Arsemini. This much is commonly noted in secondary literature, but there are a number of other details that are rarely mentioned by scholars, yet which give an insight into the status of Genoa in Cagliari. Mariano Torchitorio cited the same reasons that motivated his donation to Pisa: “for the great service and help which the citizens of the above-mentioned city performed for me ... who with six armed ships ... came to my service.” He also promised the same “one pound of gold to the aforesaid Church of S. Lorenzo every year” that he had promised to S. Maria of Pisa, and, intriguingly, “every tribute that, in the region of Cagliari, the men of the abovementioned diocese were accustomed to give.” From this, it appears that Genoa, like Pisa, was aiding a claimant to the throne in return for donations to its cathedral, since, like S. Maria of Pisa, S. Lorenzo was the great symbol of the city itself. It may be assumed that it was no mistake that both Genoa and Pisa joined Mariano Torchitorio’s cause: each city must have seen the other’s involvement as a potential threat. From Mariano’s point of view, meanwhile, meting out identical rewards to both Pisa and Genoa may have seemed a good way to play them against each other and, by giving them identical rights in Cagliari, prevent either one from achieving real control.

Yet there are also differences between Mariano’s responses to his Pisan and his Genoese helpers, differences that have not before been discussed or analyzed. These are that, for one, Mariano Torchitorio makes no note of wishing to retain the friendship of Genoa for himself and his judicate, as he does with

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125 *pro magno servitio et adjutorio, quod in me exercuerunt cives supradictae civitatis ... qui cum sex galeis armatis ... in meo servitio venerunt.* CDS, pp. 178-179, doc. 3.

126 *et libram unam de auro ad supradictam ecclesiam s. Laurentii per unumquemque annum, et omne tributum quod soliti erant dare in partibus Callari homines supradicti episcopatus.* *Ibid.*

127 Valeria Felloni notes that to Genoa, the cathedral’s presence and its ability to garner donations was more important for the way it represented the city on the international stage than for its actual property holding. Felloni, “La cura della cattedrale e del porto nella Genova medievale,” pp. 119-120.
Pisa. Nor does he comment on the nobility of his Genoese helpers, or make any note of any personal relationship or experiences in common with them. Finally, the six estates being granted to Genoa are carefully specified to be “mine, which seem to belong to me by right of my relatives.”128 Nothing of the sort is said of Mariano Torchitorio’s donation to Pisa. This suggests that Pisa’s donation came from public land, the land belonging, according to Sardinian custom, to the judicate itself, and therefore requiring the assent of nobility in order to be alienated.129 Indeed, the list of witnesses to the donation to S. Maria of Pisa includes seven members of the royal family, or “domnicelli;” five of the judex’s administrative officials; and at least four nobles without specific bureaucratic functions, as well as two bishops.130 The donation to S. Lorenzo of Genoa, quite differently, is witnessed only by six members of the royal family and the beneficiaries themselves. In other words, Cagliari’s nobility must have agreed that Pisa’s friendship was worth making such a generous donation from public land. In contrast, the fact that Genoa’s donation is Mariano’s personal land means that the judex could alienate it without his subjects’ assent.131 Added to the fact that no wish is expressed for Genoa’s future friendship, it seems to show that despite the careful similarities between the two donations, the estates given to Pisa were going to a power which both the judex and nobility of Cagliari recognized to be a vital ally; Genoa, meanwhile, was being personally thanked by the judex, but its real importance to the judicate as a whole was far less. From these two documents, therefore, it would appear that Genoa sought to use the same colonizing techniques that Pisa was using, but without the same level of success.

In light of the analysis of the importance of the Balearic Crusade for Pisa’s colonization of Sardinia, and of the fact that Genoa had not taken part in the crusade, it is not surprising to learn that from soon after the end of the Balearic Crusade until 1133 Genoa put a considerable amount of military and diplomatic energy into trying to destroy Pisa’s predominance on the island.132 As early as 1116, perhaps in response to Pisa’s quickly-growing collection of trade exemptions and land donations, and perhaps in response to Pisa’s increased moral dominance after the Balearic Crusade, the bishop of Genoa imposed a tax on all

128 sex donicalias meas, quae mihi ex jure parentum meorum pertinere videntur. CDS, pp. 178-179, doc. 3.
129 Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” pp. 102, 104.
130 CDS, pp. 181-182, doc. 6.
131 The witnesses to the donation to Pisa comprise seven of the judex’s family members, who “consented and witnessed” (consensi et testis sum) the donation, as well as five administrators, a number of (presumably noble) Sards who were not officials, a bishop and the archbishop of Cagliari. In contrast, the donation to Genoa is witnessed only by six family members, who are merely “witnesses” (testis) and four non-Sards, presumably his Genoese comrades-in-arms. See CDS, p. 179, doc. 3 and p. 182, doc. 6.
salt from Sardinia in 1116, as well as a tax on skins, in particular deer skins.\(^{133}\) Economic measures were soon joined by military ones: in 1118 “war began between the Pisans and Genoese,”\(^{134}\) in 1119, according to the Pisans, “the Genoese, moved by envy of the honor and the many temporal and spiritual exaltations of the Pisans, immediately started a war.”\(^{135}\) In 1123, it seems clearer that the matter at stake was Sardinia: the Annals of Genoa report that “seven Genoese galleys ... triumphed over twenty-two Pisan ships, coming from Sardinia and laden with great wealth.”\(^{136}\)

In 1131 Genoa took its efforts to supersede Pisa in Sardinia to the island itself, via a treaty with the judex of Arborea. Even after the Balearic Crusade, Arborea had continued to hold itself apart from the Pisa-friendly trend developing in the other three judices, and in 1131 Judex Comita II of Arborea signed an alliance with Genoa to conquer the judicate of Logudoro, whose judex was heavily involved with Pisa and, as will be shown shortly, had recently sworn fealty to the archbishop of Pisa.\(^{137}\) The treaty begins with the words “May fortune follow the Genoese and Comita, Judex of Arborea, on sea and on land, and may the sword of the enemy remain far from them:” the “enemy,” clearly, being not only Logudoro but also Pisa. In return, Comita granted the following remarkable list of goods and properties to the Cathedral of S. Lorenzo and the Commune of Genoa: the church of S. Pietro di Claro and all its extensive property, half the silver in his judicate’s rich mines, and a quarter of the silver-mines in Logudoro if Comita could conquer it.\(^{138}\) This alliance, which is the first witness to any Genoese presence in that judicate, seems to have been acted upon. In 1132, the Annals of Genoa note, “the Genoese equipped sixteen galleys, which pursued Pisan galleys in Corsican and Sardinian waters and captured one Pisan galley at Cagliari.”\(^{139}\)

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\(^{133}\) Jacques Heers, “Pisani e Genovesi nella Sardegna medioevale: vita politica e sociale (X-XV secolo),” in Storia dei Sardi e della Sardegna, Vol. 2, p. 232; although David Abulafia suggests that the Genoese tax on salt from Sardinia was simply a sign of the great quantity of Sardinian salt that was reaching Genoa, as opposed to salt from other salt-producing areas of Italy: Abulafia, The Two Italies, p. 72. Rowland, The Periphery in the Center, pp. 157-158, 168 provides a concise view of what goods Sardinia was exporting to which destinations, while Colombini, Dai censis ai cistercensi, p. 69, writes at some length about the Pisan trade exemptions.

\(^{134}\) inceptum est bellum inter Pisanos et Ianuenses. Bernardo Maragone, Annales Pisani, p. 8, l. 19.

\(^{135}\) Ianuenses invidia moti de honore & de tanta temporali & spirituali exaltatione Pisanorum, guerram subito incoeperunt. Liber de origine civitatis Pisanae, col. 169.

\(^{136}\) in ipso consulatu galee 7 Ianuensium huiaismodi in plagia de Castaneto supra Pisanos victoriam habuerunt naves 22 ex magna pecunia ponderatas de Sardinia venientes. Cafarus de Caschifellone, Annales Ianuenses (a. 1099-1163), MGH, SS 18, p. 16.

\(^{137}\) See below, at n. 162.

\(^{138}\) Bene sit Ianuensisibus et Comite iudici Arvorensi in mari et in terra, gladiusque hostis prorsus sit ab eis. This treaty exists in two separate versions, both of which can be found at CD5, pp. 207-208, doc. 41, especially n. 4. See also Francesco Artizzu, La Sardegna pisana e genovese (Sassari: Chiarella, 1985), pp. 94-96, and Olivetta Schena, “La presenza genovese,” p. 20.

\(^{139}\) Martin Hall and Jonathan Phillips, eds., Caffaro, Genoa and the Twelfth-Century Crusades (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p. 64.
Worth noting about the 1131 alliance between Arborea and Genoa is Comita’s equation of Genoa’s cathedral and Genoa’s commune, a phenomenon that has already been noted in Judex Ithoccor of Gallura’s vow of fealty to Pisa’s cathedral and commune in 1116, and his donation of a church in return for military favors, mirrored by Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari’s donation of a church to Genoa in 1107. Like many others, this document has not been analyzed in any depth elsewhere. Yet these details are an early sign of the value that ecclesiastical property and churches held for both Italian communes in their long-standing struggle for greater influence in Sardinia. This aspect is certainly worth considering, given the frequency of church donations to Genoa and Pisa. By 1131 it is not credible that Comita needed to prove his fidelity to Rome by granting churches to a trusted ecclesiastical authority, as Mariano de Lacon of Logudoro had done in 1082. Did Genoa value church donations above agricultural estates, or was it Judex Comita who benefited by donating a church, since he could thus avoid losing the income that public secular land contributed to the judicate’s coffers? Both may be true. Certainly a church donation must have been financially easier for Comita to make than a donation of secular land. Yet the generosity of his promises to Genoa show him anxious to please his ally, and so there must have been something that Genoa found attractive about the church of S. Pietro di Claro. A church donation would have given Genoa access to the tithes due to the church, and S. Pietro di Claro was certainly well-endowed with productive land, but it may also have given the bishop (soon to be archbishop) of Genoa an ecclesiastical foothold in Sardinia, a way to impose his authority on Sardinian soil, and thus, perhaps, a way to begin to compete with the archbishop of Pisa. Indeed, the main difference between Pisa and Genoa by this point was obviously the fact that Genoa did not have the papal legation that Pisa had enjoyed since 1122, and its continuing disadvantage in Sardinia highlights how fundamental this papal authority was for Pisa’s dominance of the island; this will be analyzed below.

Not until 1133, however, when it was given ecclesiastical and feudal rights in Corsica, would Genoa start to be able to compete on the same level as Pisa. In that year, perhaps the same in which Pisa received the legation ad sedem, Innocent II raised Genoa’s bishop to the level of archbishop and created a new province for him that included the northern dioceses of Corsica “so that the detestable quarrel and discord

140 See above, at nn. 127-133.
141 Valeria Felloni points out that from 1101 on, whatever financial concessions and privileges the Genoese managed to obtain throughout the Mediterranean were directed to the Cathedral of S. Lorenzo, the construction of which was started around the end of the eleventh century but not completed until the end of the twelfth. Felloni, “La cura della cattedrale e del porto nella Genova medievale,” pp. 118-119.
142 See above, at n. 120.
between the glorious city of Genoa and Pisa may grow quiet.” Genoa now had three northern Corsican dioceses that had previously been subject to the archbishop of Pisa, and by giving them to Genoa at the same time that Pisa gained Sardinia, Innocent II hoped to create a functional compromise between Pisan and Genoese ambitions in the Tyrrhenian Sea. He also conferred the whole of Corsica upon Genoa as a papal fief. Instead of settling the differences between Pisa and Genoa, however, Stephen Epstein charges that it was precisely Genoa’s newly raised status that put the city in a position to challenge Pisa in Sardinia even more. Already in 1136 Genoa received a bull from Innocent II confirming and protecting the rights of S. Lorenzo to its possessions in Sardinia, as if to declare the city’s intention not to budge from the island. Interestingly, these possessions seem to have consisted only of “six agricultural complexes in the judicate of Cagliari,” presumably the same that Mariano Torchitorio II had given in 1108; missing is the church of S. Pietro di Claro in Arborea that was part of Comita II’s pact in 1131. Later, toward the end of the twelfth century, Genoa’s foothold in Corsica would allow the city to extend its control also over northern Sardinia.

It has been shown here that Genoa’s methods of extending control were not dissimilar from Pisa’s in the early twelfth century. Tom Scott has argued that, in general, Genoa was uninterested in creating a “territorial empire” governed centrally by the Commune; rather, it used the church and its aristocratic families indirectly to promote its interests overseas. In Sardinia, says Scott, Genoa was happy to allow its Doria and Spinola families to build their own “private fiefdoms” under the judices. This may be true, but it must also be pointed out that in the twelfth century Pisa, too, did not seek to directly “own” any of the Sardinian judicates. This would only happen in the thirteenth century, as Chapter Four will show, and

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145 Innocent II required Genoa *pro pensione libram aurì singulis annis persolvat* in 1133. *IP*, p. 476, doc. 44. See also Gino Benvenuti, *Le Repubbliche marinare*, p. 46.

146 Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 46.

147 CDS, p. 211, doc. 47. Perhaps Genoa had had to renounce the alliance with Comita, along with all or some of its accompanying Arborean territory, as part of Innocent’s arbitration in 1133. Strengthening the hypothesis that Genoa’s treaty with Comita was not honored is R. S. Lopez’ observation that little Sardinian silver ever arrived in Genoa; since Arborea’s mines were among the richest in Europe, this could be evidence that Genoa did not manage to enforce its rights. Roberto S. Lopez, “Contributo alla storia delle miniere argentifere di Sardegna,” *Studi Economico-Giuridici*, 24 (1936), pp. 1-20, esp. pp. 18-20.


thirteenth-century evidence cannot be taken as proof that such overt control was the city’s intention from the beginning. In the early twelfth century Pisa limited itself to using indirect methods, like arbitration and informal military aid, to obtain symbols of political vassalage to its cathedral. Genoa tried to do the same: its participation in the campaign of Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari mirrors that of Pisa, while the donation of lands and the symbolic pound of gold that Genoa received in Cagliari in 1107 suggests that the commune hoped to achieve the same quasi-feudal relationship that Pisa seems to have been establishing with several judices. Both Pisa and Genoa, therefore, tried to exploit political instability or quarrels between judices in Sardinia to achieve some sort of quasi-lordship over one or more of the judicates; both had great families who settled in Sardinia, became integrated with the indigenous nobility, and maintained only irregular contacts with their home city.\textsuperscript{150} The evidence analyzed here suggests that there was little or no difference between Genoa’s and Pisa’s colonizing intentions in Sardinia in the twelfth century.

Scott may be mistaking Genoa’s realistic options for its desires. Lacking the strength of Pisa’s international reputation and the authority of Archbishop Daibert, Bishop Pietro Moriconi, and the legation that was attached to Pisa from 1122, Genoa may have simply been doing the best it could with the resources it had. Certainly the Sardo-Genoese nobility had only limited value for the commune, since these noble families, with their own fortunes to seek, did not necessarily place the welfare of their city of origin at the heart of all their doings.\textsuperscript{151} The Genoese church, furthermore, was simply unable to function like the Pisan church. It could negotiate a limited number of donations to S. Lorenzo, but lacked any authority to rival that of Pisa’s archbishop-legate. It could not call synods that subjected judices and archbishops to its authority, as Daibert had done even before he was legate, nor could it influence the Church in Sardinia, as the next chapter will discuss. Thus, if Genoa failed to extend its direct influence over any judicates, this cannot be used as proof that it did not wish to do so.

\textsuperscript{150} See the evidence presented in Alessandro Soddu, ed., \textit{I Malaspina e la Sardegna: Documenti e testi dei secoli XII-XIV} (Cagliari: CUEC, 2005).

\textsuperscript{151} A case in point is Logudoro: the Ligurian families of Malaspina and Doria were firmly entrenched in this north-western judicate at least by the mid-1100s, and possibly by the beginning of the twelfth century, but Logudoro remained a firm ally of Pisa for nearly the entire century, and Genoa seems to have drawn little benefit from these families’ presence. The Doria, it is true, supported Genoa in its conflicts with Pisa in the 1160s and 1170s. but the value to Genoa of these noble Ligurian families may have been precisely as likely allies in case of conflict, rather than as permanent agents for Genoa’s interests. Soddu, ed., \textit{I Malaspina e la Sardegna}, pp. xviii – xxi.
2.4 Mediating Between Pisan and Papal Interests: The Intervention of Pisa’s Archbishop-Legate in Sardinian Affairs

From the 1130s, Pisa’s archbishops enjoyed a permanent legation in Sardinia; until roughly 1200, their exercise of this position was restricted little, if at all, by the papacy. A detailed examination of the ways in which the actions of the archbishop-legates intersected with Pisan communal designs, the ambitions of individual Pisan families in Sardinia, and the politics of Rome, is essential to appreciate the complexity of the relations between Sardinia and her various would-be dominators. It is also key to understanding how Pisa managed to create and maintain its position of supremacy throughout the twelfth century, despite Genoa’s best efforts to displace it. This final section of the chapter, therefore, will analyze the approaches taken by successive archbishops of Pisa and the ways in which they intervened in Sardinian affairs to further the policies of Pisa and/or the pope.

2.4.1 Promoting Pisa and Rome Simultaneously: The Archbishop-Legate between 1131 and 1145

For almost the entire twelfth century, no conflict between Pisa and Rome grew severe enough to endanger Pisa’s jealously-guarded legation and primacy in Sardinia, and the pope seems to have interfered little with the Pisan archbishops’ actions as legates. With their hands nearly unfettered, the archbishop-legates were free to turn ecclesiastical situations in Sardinia to the advantage of themselves, the pope, and very frequently Pisa. There would be great danger in assuming that any given archbishop of Pisa was necessarily supportive of the commune’s politics, or even that he was Pisan, with all the connections of family and patronage that that implies. Still, a recurring pattern does seem to be evident throughout the twelfth century whereby archbishops pursued actions and judged conflicts in a way that favored both papal and Pisan interests.

Archbishop Roger of Pisa, previously of Volterra, is the first example of this. As briefly noted above, he was the first Pisan archbishop-legate since Daibert, and his reign also coincided with some remarkable developments in relations between Logudoro and Pisa. According to the only surviving Sardinian

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152 An example does survive of a twelfth-century pope overriding a legatine decision of the archbishop of Pisa. Some time between 1123 and 1132, Archbishop Roger of Pisa decreed that two churches that were being claimed by the monastery of S. Pietro of Nurki actually belonged to the bishop of Ampurias. This decision was confirmed by Pope Innocent II after 1130, but at some point after 1139 Innocent II changed his mind and declared that the churches belonged to the monastery. Nevertheless, since Archbishop Roger died in 1132, Innocent II’s overturning of his decision certainly did not undermine Roger’s authority during his lifetime, and probably had no impact on the authority of Roger’s successors, either. See IP, pp. 436-7, docs. 1-3.
chronicle from the judicial period, the thirteenth-century *Libellus Judicum Turritanorum*, Judex Gonnario’s father had died when Gonnario, the heir, was still a minor. “For fear that his father’s enemies might kill him,” Gonnario’s guardian, “a good and faithful noble ... of the same land, called Ithoccor Gambellas,” smuggled him away to Pisa, where he lived with a Pisan named Mossen Ebriando for at least four years, and possibly six, “until he was seventeen years old. And, being of the age at which he could conduct his own affairs, one day the aforesaid Mossen Ebriando presented him to the consuls of the commune of Pisa.” The consuls may have vowed at this point to protect Gonnario, his heirs and his kingdom. Then, after Mossen “married him to one of his daughters,” around 1131 Gonnario “decided to come to Sardinia, and so he came, with four well-armed galleys, together with his father-in-law and other leading men of Pisa, and landed at the port of Torres with triumph, and meeting great good-will, and so they [the Sards] accepted him as Judex and lord of Logudoro.”

Pisa’s support had important consequences. Gonnario clearly had close links with Pisa, both cultural, from having lived there, and personal, from being linked by marriage to a leading Pisan family. On March 6, 1131, shortly after returning to Sardinia, Gonnario made an impressive donation to S. Maria of Pisa. The list of gifts comprised two extremely rich and extensive properties, including their considerable livestock and servants, and “half of the mountain that is called Argentei:” this last has been identified as modern Argentiera, so called because of its rich silver mines. As with Turbino of Cagliari in 1103 and Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari in 1107, Gonnario II of Logudoro did not reward only those men who had accompanied him to claim his throne, but rewarded the entire city of Pisa through its cathedral.

153 *pro dubidu qui no lu boquiren sos inimigos de su babu. Libellus Judicum Turritanorum*, p. 47.
154 *unu lieru benevolente et fidele ... de sa terra matessi, clamada Itocor Cambellas. Libellus Judicum Turritanorum*, p. 47.
155 *et essende de edade et habilidade qui podiait faguer bene sos fatos suos, unu die, su dictu Mossen Ebriando, lu presentait a sos Senores de sa Comunidade de Pisas. Libellus Judicum Turritanorum*, p. 48.
156 Artizzu, *L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa*, p. 65
158 Colombini has calculated that Gonnario cannot have returned earlier than 1130/1131. Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, pp. 153-155.
159 CDS, p. 206, doc. 40; see also Rowland, *The Periphery in the Centre*, p. 159; Ian Blanchard, *Mining, Metallurgy and Minting in the Middle Ages* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2001), p. 579. Considering that in 1132 Comita Spanu would promise to give half the silver in his judicate to Pisa, and that in 1131 Genoa required half the silver in Arborea’s mines and a quarter of the silver in the Logudorese mines, it may be supposed that in giving half of this mountain, Gonnario was responding to a conventional Pisan demand for half of a certain amount of silver veins. See also below, n. 161.
Moreover, this document makes clear for the first time the relationship between donations to S. Maria of Pisa and some sort of political subjection, which has been argued for previously in this chapter. On the charter of Gonnario’s donation, a later note has been added to record that, presumably in 1131 at the same time that Gonnario made his donation, he also “swore fealty to S. Maria of the archdiocese of the City of Pisa, and to Lord Roger, Pisan archbishop of the city of Pisa, and to his successors, and [swore] to do justice to the Pisan people according to the custom of the Sardinian lands.”160 His vow would be echoed one year later, in Roger’s last year of life, by Judex Comita Spanu of Gallura who, in a near-exact repetition of Gonnario’s oath, promised “fealty [...] to Lord Roger archbishop of Pisa and to his successors for the salvation of my and my family’s souls, and to the Pisan consuls;” the oath also promised ten pounds of gold a year to Pisa, along with half the silver in the mountains of his judicate.161

Gonnario’s oath and that of Comita Spanu are important, in part because their implications have not been carefully analyzed in previous work, and a number of aspects that are significant for the history of colonization in Sardinia have been overlooked. As papal legate, Roger could demand Gonnario’s fealty in his role as representative of the pope. This is, at least, the argument that a later archbishop of Pisa would make, when challenged by the pope: that such vows of fealty were legitimate because they were made to the archbishop as legate, not to the archbishop as private man.162 If Turtas is correct and Pisa had enjoyed the legation continuously since 1192, Gonnario’s vow of fealty to Roger in 1131 could be seen as a vow to the Church and Rome. Certainly it has been presented in secondary literature as the first in a succession of vows to Pisa’s archbishop-legate, with the stress on the archbishop’s dual identity as prelate and papal representative.

Yet it is clear that after Daibert’s death, the legation did not again belong to Pisa until 1133 at the earliest, and 1138 at the latest. Roger was legate, but he had already been so before being raised to the archdiocese of Pisa: he held his legation ad personam. This means that when, in 1131, Gonnario vowed fealty not only to Roger but also to his successors, he was creating a relationship with Roger’s successors as

160 juravit fidelitatem sancte Marie Archiepiscopatus Pisane Civitatis, et domino Rogerio Pisano Archiepiscopo pisane Civitatis, ejusque successoribus, et justitiam facere pisano popolo secundum usum Sardinee terre. This information is added at the end of a donation charter by a number of Pisans: the donation charter is signed by Judex Gonnario, but the information about his vow of fealty is witnessed only by Pisans. The entire document in in CDS, p. 206-7, doc. 40; Artizzu, L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa, p. 59.

161 fidelitate [...] pro mea meorumque salvatione dominio Rogerio Pisano archiepiscopo ejusque successoribus, consulibus quoque Pisanorum. Enrico Besta, “Per la Storia del Giudicato di Gallura,” Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, 42 (1906-1907), pp. 125-133, at pp. 132-137. The circumstances of Comita Spanu’s oath are a mystery, since no documentation has survived from the oath itself: for this reason it will not be analyzed in any detail here.

162 See below, at n. 246. See also Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 98-102, doc. 88.
archbishops, not as legates. In other words, Gonnario was promising loyalty to the city of Pisa in general, and to its archbishop in particular; not to the pope through his legate. Yet, paradoxically, it may well have been Roger’s position as legate that gave him the authority to extract such a promise from Gonnario. Thus, Roger is the first clear example of a Pisan archbishop-legate advancing his city’s colonizing ambitions in Sardinia, and may be the first example of the specific use of legatine authority to do so. In sum, Gonnario’s relationship with Pisa shows the range of interconnected kinds of power and authority that Pisa was by now able to employ. Its long history with Logudoro gave it a political authority that made it a natural safe-haven for the young Gonnario; its naval power allowed it to earn his gratitude; its archbishop-legate was able to command his open vow of loyalty to Pisa’s archdiocesan seat.

In the analysis so far, Gonnario’s self-determination as ruler has not been considered. It is difficult to do so, given the lack of documentation, but one detail from his vow of fealty does provide an insight. This is his promise to “do justice to the Pisan people according to the custom of the Sardinian lands.” This has escaped comment in most works, but should be seen in the context of the Europe-wide principle of “personality of the law,” whereby each individual was subject to a particular code of law that depended on his ethnicity. As Robert Bartlett shows, across Europe the protection of a people’s own law code was seen as a privilege. In thirteenth-century Hungary, for example, German settlers were given the right not to “stand to judgment before any judge ... except their own particular judge;” the same was true of Germans in Silesia in 1175 and in twelfth-century Prague. Twelfth-century Poland shows the same pattern: in 1175 a ducal charter promised that the German settlers at Lubiaz “shall forever be free from every Polish law, without exception.” Gonnario could have granted the Pisans the right to be judged according to their own law in Logudoro; the fact that he specified that he would only enforce Sardinian law indicates that he was trying to balance the political necessity of fealty to Pisa with a determination to preserve his effective sovereignty. Furthermore, it must be remembered that swearing fealty to Pisa’s cathedral brought certain benefits, most importantly the right to use Pisan law. Thus, while Gonnario refused to allow Pisans in his judicate to use Pisan law, he gained access to it himself, and thus presumably had the choice of two legal systems by which to try cases involving Pisans. In sum, what has traditionally been seen as Pisa’s political “conquest” of Logudoro may also be seen, at least in part, as the judices’ intelligent use of a difficult situation to their own advantage.

163 Apart from William Heywood, who interpreted it as a privilege being granted to the Pisans; in his words, Gonnario’s intention was “to invest them with all the legal rights of native-born Sardinians.” Heywood, A History of Pisa, p. 144.


Archbishop Roger died in 1132 and was succeeded by Uberto Lanfranchi, a member of one of Pisa’s great families. Uberto was in turn succeeded by Baldwin in 1137, known as “da Pisa.” It has been claimed that Uberto, and especially Baldwin, greatly expanded the role of the papal legate in Sardinia, and as evidence of this, Petrucci and Turtas provide examples of judgments that these archbishops made as arbitrators of Sardinian conflicts, judgments that are, supposedly, strongly pro-Pisan.\textsuperscript{166} It is true that both of these archbishops strengthened Pisa’s authority in Sardinia, but they did so in a more subtle way than simply making pro-Pisan judgments, which is what Petrucci and Turtas have argued. Rather, their importance to Pisa’s colonization in Sardinia lay in the prestige and power of their position: in the fact that, within the boundaries of each judicate, they could licitly exercise an authority greater than that of the judex. In this way, the prestige of their papal legation allowed them, when they were representing Pisa, to act as effective feudal lords over each judex even before the judices had made themselves truly politically subject to Pisa. Furthermore, although it was by force of the papal legation that they enjoyed this power, the fact that both of these archbishops identified themselves closely with the city of Pisa means that the judices’s submission to this legatine power became effectively submission to the authority of the city of Pisa.

The first surviving example of this comes from 1134 or 1135, perhaps shortly after the confirmation of the legation \textit{ad sedem}, when Roger’s successor, Uberto Lanfranchi, presided over a council at the town of Ardara, again in Logudoro.\textsuperscript{167} Why he was in Sardinia is unknown; the only evidence of his presence on the island is the record of this council at Ardara, and the only recorded business at the council is the arbitration of a property dispute between the canons of the Cathedral of S. Gavino and the suffragan bishops of Torres, on one hand, and the archbishop of Torres and the monastery of S. Pietro of Nurc, on the other. Turtas argues that a council like the one at Ardara, which was attended by “archbishops, and bishops, and abbots, as well as clerics” is unlikely to have been called simply for the sake of arbitrating a property conflict, and that there must have been some more serious business to attend to.\textsuperscript{168} He suggests

\textsuperscript{166} Petrucci declares that “the authority that [the archbishops of Pisa] derived from the pontifical legation was often at the service of Pisa’s interests,” but among the examples of legatine activity in Sardinia he provides as illustration, several do not seem to promote Pisa’s political or material interests in any way. Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” p. 118, 124. Turtas does something similar, although less forcefully, in Turtas, \textit{Storia della Chiesa}, pp. 249-252.

\textsuperscript{167} The date is given as 1135 in secondary sources. The original record of the council is dated \textit{anno Domini millesimo centesimo tricesimo quinto, indicitione sexta}. If this date is being calculated according to the Pisan calendar, as seems likely, it may equate to 1134 according to the Gregorian calendar, unless the council was held between January 1 and March 24. However, it is unclear how either 1134 or 1135 could be in the sixth indiction.

\textsuperscript{168} According to the only surviving record of the council, written or dictated by Aubertus, \textit{S. Pisanæ ecclesie archiepiscopus Romanae sedis legatus in perpetuum}, his decisions \textit{facta sunt haec consilio et assensu archiepiscoporum, et episcoporum, atque abbatum, nec non clericorum in concilio apud Ardeam}. Joannes
that it may have been convened to implement the decrees of a great council held by Innocent II at Pisa from May 31 to June 6 of 1135.169

Equally, however, the council may have been an occasion for Uberto, recently elected as archbishop and perhaps even more recently granted the legation, to establish personally his legatine authority in Sardinia. As Kriston Rennie shows, the actions of calling and presiding over councils gave papal legates the opportunity to rise above their identity of mere papal messenger and take on that of “the pope’s chief arbiters and judges in all matters affecting the Roman Church.”170 Indeed, around 1140, Gratian would pronounce that “Provincial councils have no substance save in the presence of the Roman pontiff.” in other words, in the presence of a papal legate who not only represented, but in a sense embodied, the pope.171 Gratian was writing, of course, after Uberto had held the Council at Ardara, but it is reasonable to assume that the necessity of papal authority, or papal presence, was already current in 1134/5. The Sardinian sources are too scanty to show whether the archbishops of Pisa used councils for such a purpose in Sardinia, but examples from other places support the idea. In the early eleventh century, for example, the Duke of Poitiers held a council of bishops, as Warren Brown says, “to proclaim his own judicial authority.”172 The fact that Uberto’s council gathered more than one archbishop indicates that it was a council of at least two, and very probably all three archiepiscopal provinces.173 By calling such a pan-Sardinian council, Uberto was emphasizing his high authority on the island as the representative both of the pope, and, as Kriston Rennie argues, of the entire Roman Church.174

Uberto’s successor, Baldwin, also exercised his power in Sardinia actively, again in situations requiring arbitration, but this time also in secular situations that required an authority superseding that of the judices. Thus, if Uberto combined the authority of Pisa and Rome, Baldwin did so even more. He, like


170 Rennie, *The Foundations of Medieval Papal Legation*, p. 120.


173 As noted in the introduction, Gallura did not have an archbishop and therefore was not a province in its own right.

Uberto, was a native of Pisa; he was also a favorite of Innocent II. Innocent II was living in Pisa in exile when Uberto was elected, and consecrated him personally; on May 1, 1137 he also issued a bull which gave Baldwin “two episcopates in the judicate of Gallura, namely those of Galtelli and Civita, and [...] adorn you with the honor of primate over the province of Torres.”

There are three references to his presence in Sardinia, although only two of these can be dated. The undated reference shows him, like Uberto, holding a council at Ardara “together with all the bishops of Sardinia” to address a financial issue that was troubling relations between Sardinian bishops and Pisan citizens in Sardinia. The disagreement, at a very basic level, revolved around the problem of Pisan settlers introducing a kind of economic behavior that was new to Sardinia, and which left the Sardinian bishops at a disadvantage. Specifically, the Pisans seem to have been hiring estate officials who had been contracted to oversee the bishops’ agricultural holdings, before these officials had rendered the estate income to the same bishops. Possibly, the income from the estates was also making its way to the officials’ new Pisan employers, who were not giving it to the bishops. It is also possible that, in retaliation, the Sardinian bishops were ordering their parishioners not to trade with these, or perhaps any, Pisans. This is suggested by Baldwin’s care to specify in his ruling that “as long as any debt has been paid, anyone has permission to conduct business and sell to whatever Pisan he wishes.”

Here again, although both Petrucci and Turtas cite his judgment on the issue as an example of legatine power serving Pisan interests, it is not at all clear that it was prejudiced in favor of Pisan merchants. Pisan interests under Baldwin, as under Uberto, were being helped not by Baldwin’s specific judgments, but by the very fact that the archbishop of Pisa was the only figure powerful enough to call such councils and pronounce such judgments. In this way, the legation can be seen to have been a strong tool in aid of “cultural” colonization. In the Introduction, this “cultural” aspect was included in the working definition of

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175 Nos ... in Galluriensi judicatu duos episcopatus, Galtellinensem videlicet et Civitensem ... tibi tuisque successoribus, et per vos Ecclesiae Pisanae concedimus, et Metropolitano jure subjicimus, vosque Primatus honore super Turritanam provinciam decoramus. Legationem quoque Sardiniae a praedecessore nostro Papa Urbano praedecessoribus tuis concessam, tibi tuisque successoribus prae sentis scripti pagina roborum. In the same document, Innocent specifies that these two dioceses, together with the diocese of Populonia in mainland Italy, are intended pro bono pacis et recompensatione episcopatum, quos antiquo a praedecessoribus nostris Romanis Pontificibus Ecclesiae Pisanae concessos in insula Corsicae a praedecessore tuo bonae memorie fratre nostro archiepiscopo acce pimus; Innocent had given these dioceses to Genoa in 1133. CDS, p. 212, doc. 47.

176 This is Turtas’ interpretation, which is the most detailed available. It, together with the original text, can be found in Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, pp. 251-252.

177 postquam vero debitum solutum fuerit, habeat unusquisque licentiam cum quocumque Pisano voluerit negotium commutare et vendere. For the full record of the council at Ardara see Claudio Leonardi, “Per la tradizione dei concili di Ardara, Lateranensi I-II, e di Tolosa,” Bollettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano 75 (1963), pp. 57-70 at 64-65.

of colonization, and was defined as the attempt to re-make the society of a colonized land in the image of the colonizing society, implying that the colonizers valued their own culture more highly than that of the land they were colonizing. The judgments made by the archbishop-legates did not necessarily benefit individual Pisans or the wealth of the city, but without exception they did favor continental religious and economic culture, particularly as it was exemplified in Pisa.\textsuperscript{179} By favoring donations to continental monastic Orders, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, and by refusing to block the contested changes in economic practices that were bringing Sardinia’s practices closer to Pisa’s modes of exchange, Baldwin took a leading role in Europeanizing Sardinia.

Baldwin’s first datable appearance in Sardinia occurs in 1139, when he confirmed an episcopal donation to the Camaldolese that will be discussed in Chapter Three.\textsuperscript{180} His second was in 1145, when he took action to protect his vassal, Judex Gonnario II of Logudoro.\textsuperscript{181} It is here that, for the first time, a Pisan archbishop can be seen acting in an overtly political way in Sardinia, and engaging with secular politics that did not directly involve the Church. In 1144 Judex Comita of Arborea, the same who had signed a treaty in 1131 with Genoa to invade Logudoro, had renewed his attempts to conquer Gonnario’s judicate.\textsuperscript{182} Very little evidence survives regarding this incident, and there is no sign that Genoa was directly involved.\textsuperscript{183} It may be surmised, however, that an invasion by pro-Genoese Comita would be a threat not only to Pisa’s ally, but also to its markets in Logudoro. In November, 1144, therefore, “at the

\textsuperscript{179} One example is the popularity of the monastic Order of Camaldoli in Sardinia. The Order was not politically linked to Pisa, but it was particularly popular among Pisans, and the rich patronage that it found in Sardinia is in part a reflection of Pisa’s cultural prestige on the island. See Turtas, \textit{Storia della Chiesa}, p. 21.6 and Chapter Three. Furthermore, Marco Tangheroni notes Pisa’s precocity in developing a “capitalist” economy that, among other things, was based on credit, in Tangheroni, \textit{“La prima espansione di Pisa nel Mediterraneo.”}

\textsuperscript{180} The donation charter is found in CDS, p. 213, doc. 50, and is confirmed and signed by \textit{Ego Balduinus Pisanus archiepiscopus et Romanus Legatus}.

\textsuperscript{181} This is the Gonnario who had lived in Pisa for some years, and who had retaken his judicate with the help of Pisan ships and arms. As noted above, at n. 162, he had sworn fealty to Archbishop Roger and Roger’s successors; by these terms, he was now the vassal of Baldwin.

\textsuperscript{182} In 1131 Gonnario II of Logudoro was either just returning to Sardinia from exile in Pisa with the intention of laying claim to his patrimony, or else was in the thick of his battles against the De Athen nobles who did not want to see him on the throne. Comita of Arborea, therefore, was seizing upon a delicate moment for Gonnario and hoping to take advantage of his weak position. See above, at n. 159

\textsuperscript{183} Since 1133 Genoa had been at peace with Pisa, and considering that in 1146 it sent \textit{galeas 22, et golabios 6 [...] cum 100 militibus cum equis supra Sarracenos ad Minoricam et alia loca usque in Almarian}, perhaps it had had little interest in exposing itself on another front by renewing open hostilities with Pisa in 1144. Cafarus de Caschifellone, \textit{Annales Ianuenses}, MGH, SS 18, p. 20. However, according to the \textit{Liber de Origine Civitatis Pisanae}, col. 170, in 1144 \textit{incepta est guerra inter Pisanos et Lucenses}. This coincidence is not mentioned in secondary literature on the period, and there is no evidence of an alliance between Arborea and Lucca, but it seems more than possible that Comita of Arborea was taking advantage of Pisa’s military engagement with Lucca to attack Logudoro.
command and with the permission of the consuls in session and in the presence of Lord Baldwin, venerable archbishop,” the Pisan consuls swore to “help and save Judex Gonnario of Torres and his heirs and their kingdom and land.” Following this, Baldwin travelled to Sardinia and excommunicated Judex Comita of Arborea.

His political maneuver accomplished several things, only the first of which has been discussed elsewhere: it punished Comita for daring to plot war against Pisa; it ensured the survival of the valuable Logudorese port, a key market and source of raw materials for Pisa’s merchants, and it confirmed the dependence of the Logudorese judices on Pisa for their survival. Perhaps more importantly, it created a precedent for a Pisan archbishop to use his legatine powers to protect his political ally and vassal in Sardinia, and to punish Pisa’s political enemy. Other scholars have seen Baldwin as expanding the authority of the legation in Sardinia, but it is being argued here that it could better be seen as a change not so much in the strength, as in the quality of legatine authority. The politically-motivated excommunication of Comita of Arborea marks the turning point between an earlier exercise of legatine power to enlarge Pisa’s moral and cultural authority in Sardinia, and a more politically active use of the legation to favor vassals and punish enemies. The extreme conclusion of this process will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

One final example can show how the new, more openly political role of the archbishop-legate was perceived in Sardinia after Baldwin’s period as archbishop of Pisa. When the anti-Pisan Judex Comita of Arborea died shortly after his excommunication, his son, Judex Barisone II, came to the throne and began to enforce radically different policies. Perhaps his father’s excommunitation had made him fear antagonizing Pisa, since he began a Pisan-friendly policy that, possibly as late as 1162, induced him to refer to Archbishop Baldwin’s successor, Archbishop Villano Gaetani of Pisa, as “our greatest friend.” Perhaps even more importantly, at the very beginning of his reign, in 1146 or 1147, he choreographed a consecration ceremony for the Benedictine monastery of S. Maria di Bonarcado, the most important in

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184 iussu et licentia consulum in curia et presentia domini Balduini venerabilis archiepiscopi ... iuvare et salvare iudicem Gunnarium turritanum et heredes eius et regnum et terram illarum. Besta, Il Liber Iudicum Turritanorum, p. 16.

185 This is known thanks to a letter of St. Bernard to Pope Eugene III, in which Bernard confirms the rightness of the excommunication, and requests the pope to keep the excommunication “fixed and unshaken.” CDS, p. 215, doc. 55.

186 Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 250; Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” p. 118, sees this simply as the protection of Gonnario as a patron of the Cistercians.

187 noster [...] amicissimus. Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Colección de documentos inéditos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Vol. IV (Barcelona: D. José Eusebio Monfort, 1849), pp. 365-366, doc. 151. Scano suggests that this event should be dated to 1162 based on the fact that Archbishop Villano is known to have visited Sardinia in that year, though other estimates have placed the date as early as 1151 or anywhere between 1146 and 1162. Dionigi Scano, “Il giudice Barisone d’Arborea, intermediario fra il conte di Barcellona e il comune di Pisa,” Archivio Storico Sardo 22 (1941), pp. 247-256; see also Busch, Medieval Mediterranean Ports, pp. 220-221, n. 40.
Arborea, that brought together Archbishop Villano of Pisa and all four Sardinian judices. The new judex of Arborea accompanied the monastery’s consecration with two separate donations to it. An aspect that has not elsewhere been noted is that each of these was witnessed by a separate group; furthermore, of these two groups, one was clearly the “clerical” group, made up of two archbishops and four bishops, while the other was the “secular” group, comprising all four judices and their officials. Significantly, the archbishop was placed not among the group of clergy, as might be expected, but with the judices: indeed, whereas the bishops and archbishops are named as if they stood alone, the phrasing of the witness list seems to equate “Lord Villano archbishop of Pisa, who came ... with all his clergy” with “Judex Costantino of Cagliari, Judex Gonario of Logudoro, Judex Costantino of Gallura, with all their officials and with all the nobles of Sardinia.” No clearer statement could be made of the archbishop-legate’s joint spiritual and secular authority over Sardinia’s rulers.

2.4.2 Genoa and the coronation of the “King of Sardinia”

A testament to the importance of the papal legation for Pisa’s colonizing ambitions is given by Pisa’s greatest rivals on the island, the Genoese. Specifically, the very different way in which Genoa interacted with Sardinia throws into relief just how important the legation had become for Pisa’s success. Genoa’s role on the island in the first half of the twelfth century is difficult to trace, since, apart from documents such as the 1107 donation to S. Lorenzo made by Judex Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari, or Genoa’s 1131 treaty with Judex Comita of Arborea, there is almost no documentation of its presence. Yet in 1158 and 1162 two documents show that Genoa continued to be actively interested in expanding its control. It will be argued here that they also show how difficult it was for it to do so as long as the papal legation belonged to Pisa.

The first of these documents is a papal privilege of protection, issued to “Archdeacon Hugo, and Provost Oberto, and the other canons of the church of S. Lorenzo of Genoa” by Pope Alexander III in March.

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188 Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, pp. 103-116 provides a detailed discussion on the probable affiliation of S. Maria di Bonarcado. The monastery is usually assumed to have been Camaldolese, but Colombini shows good reasons why this cannot have been true until the end of the twelfth century.

1162 and covering “any possessions or goods that the same church owns justly and canonically.” After a long list of chapels in northern Italy, the cathedral’s Sardinian possessions are named. No in-depth study has been carried out on Genoa’s presence in Sardinia, and perhaps it is because of this that it has not heretofore been noticed that these properties continue to be limited to those donated by Judex Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari, in the 1107 grant analyzed earlier. Not even in Arborea, the judicate most friendly to Genoa, does S. Lorenzo own properties. It has been argued earlier in this chapter that, at the beginning of the twelfth century, when individuals from Genoa fought alongside Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari, Genoa was both interested in, and capable of, acquiring donations to its cathedral. It was also suggested that the nobility of Cagliari perceived Genoa as a less important ally than Pisa, but that Genoa’s interest in pursuing a colonizing approach similar to Pisa’s is evident. This impression is strengthened by Genoa’s treaty with Judex Comita of Arborea in 1131, in which Comita donated the Church of S. Pietro of Claro to the Cathedral of S. Lorenzo, even if this donation was never honored. Somewhere between 1131 and March of 1162, therefore, Genoa ceased either to be willing to attract such donations, or to be able to do so.

As noted earlier, Tom Scott believes that Genoa was uninterested in acquiring the kind of directly-governed colonies that Pisa created. It is a contention of this chapter that if Genoa did not replicate Pisa’s pattern of power in Sardinia, it is not because it did not wish to, but because it was unable to. The reason for this, as mentioned above, may be argued to be Pisa’s papal legation ad sedem. Genoa ceased to obtain donations to its cathedral after 1131, precisely the period in which Pisa gained the legation (probably by 1133, confirmed in 1138), and in which the judices of Logudoro and Gallura swore fealty both to Pisa and to its archbishop-legate (1131 and 1132, respectively). It is not being suggested here that the Pisan archbishop actively blocked any donations to S. Lorenzo. Given the presence of such a powerful figure, however, if a judex wished to make a politically-motivated donation to a cathedral, S. Lorenzo of Genoa could not compete with S. Maria of Pisa, home both of the papal legate and of the most powerful sea power in the Tyrrhenian. In other words, because Pisa had a permanent representative in Sardinia who, at least after Archbishop Baldwin, actively stood for both the city and the Church, Genoa’s cathedral, symbol of the city itself, ceased to be able to attract any Sardinian donations that might carry overtones of homage.

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190 Alexander Episcopus servus servorum Dei dilectis filiis Ugoni archidiacono et Oberto praeposito, ceterisque canonicis S. Laurentii ianuensis ecclesiae ... statuentes ut quaecumque possessiones, quaecumque bona, eadem ecclesia in praesentiarum iuste, et canonice possidet. CDS, pp. 223-224, doc. 69. Regarding Genoa’s Sardinian possessions, this bull is identical to one issued by Pope Adrian in 1158, found in CDS, p. 221, doc. 65.
The second document cited above supports this argument. In January of 1162 Pope Alexander III admonished the Genoese consuls for trying to “remove the land of Sardinia from the dominion and jurisdiction of St. Peter and ourselves.” It should be mentioned that the idea that Sardinia belonged to the Holy See was a relatively recent development, despite what some earlier scholars have asserted; it was in some measure a reaction to Frederick Barbarossa’s claims of imperial right to the island, and, like Barbarossa’s claims, created a potential new rival to Pisa’s and Genoa’s ambitions on the island. What is particularly worth noting, however, is that five months later, in May 1162, Alexander issued a confirmation to the Cathedral of S. Lorenzo of “lands, houses and rights which you have in the judicates of Arborea and Cagliari.” It may be recalled that in March of the same year, S. Lorenzo had owned property only in Cagliari: thus, it had clearly been busily negotiating some business with the Judex of Arborea in the months just before May. Furthermore, it has already been argued that donations to the Pisan or Genoese cathedral suggested a feudal relationship; the short time span between Alexander’s censure of the Genoese consuls in January, and S. Lorenzo’s property acquisition in May, suggests that Alexander’s annoyance could have been connected to a Genoese attempt to assert lordship in Arborea. The donation to S. Lorenzo shows that this attempt may have been meeting with success. Then, also in 1162, the Genoese “went around Corsica and Sardinia looking for Pisans, and [there was] ... a galley which came from Sardinia on the business of the legation... and they captured a Pisan consul named Bonnacorso on the galley.” Perhaps they happened upon the legate’s own ship by mistake, but in light of their recent diplomatic success with Arborea, it seems more probable that their success in Arborea had put them in a provocative mood, and that they attacked the legate’s galley intentionally.

If Genoa and Pisa both sought to use their cathedrals to extend their political power, however, this chapter is arguing that there was an important difference between any donation to S. Lorenzo and the many donations made to S. Maria. This is that, whereas donations to S. Maria belonged in some sense to the archbishop-legate, who had papally-granted authority over all of Sardinia, donations to S. Lorenzo went

191 decetero attendentes quomodo cives inter alias iniurias et obrobria que Romane ecclesie intulerunt terram Sardinie a domino et iurisdictione Sancti Petri et nostra alienare conantur, et in suum nequit redigere potestatem. The document is a letter written by the pope to the archbishop of Genoa, exhorting the latter to persuade the consuls of Genoa to desist from their efforts. CDS, p. 223, doc. 68.

192 F. Cherchi Paba is the most notable, in his assertion that Sardinia had legally belonged to the papacy since the early Middle Ages. See Cherchi Paba, La Repubblica teocratica sarda.

193 terras cassas et iura que in arboresi et karalitano iudicatibus habetis vobis et ecclesie vestre auctoritate apostolica confirmamus. CDS, pp. 224-225, doc. 70.

194 quatuor [naves] que per Corsicam et Sardineam Pisanos querendo iverunt, et ... galeam unam quae veniebat de Sardinea pro legatione ... et consulem unum Bonacursum nomine in galea ... ceperunt. Cafarus de Caschifellone, Annales Ianuenses, p. 33.
to an archbishop who had no right to act on the island. Likewise, judices who swore fealty to Pisa officially owed their homage, in most cases, to the archbishop and the cathedral. As the Pisan archbishop at the turn of the thirteenth century would try to argue, such vows were “received for the sake of the Apostolic See.”

Any such vow made to Genoa, however, was an undisguisable threat to the developing sense of papal lordship on the island. Thus, Pisa’s legation allowed it to function “under the radar,” as it were: it provided the city’s considerable presence in Sardinia with a licit appearance, and would have made it extremely difficult for the pope to censure its power on the island. Lacking the legation, any Genoese attempt to enlarge its own power in Sardinia could not be dressed up as anything other than secular colonization.

Indeed, the full meaning of the Genoese diplomacy of 1162 in Arborea would become apparent two years later as precisely this secular colonization. In 1164, Genoa provided a final proof that it was interested in achieving a power in Sardinia that was similar to Pisa’s, and that it saw the papal legation as fundamental to achieving this. It signed a series of treaties with Judex Barisone of Arborea in September, 1164. These treaties were part of one of twelfth-century Sardinia’s most spectacular political tangles: Barisone, who according to one of Barbarossa’s biographers was “extremely wealthy, desiring to move up to greater dignity,” carried on intense negotiations with Emperor Frederick Barbarossa via the Genoese “so that the emperor would give him all of Sardinia, and he should be king alone, and should hold the island of Sardinia from [the emperor].” This was only possible because Barbarossa had himself claimed lordship of the island, a claim so widely discussed at the time that it was even circulated in a French romance composed in the 1160s, which makes reference to Sardinia as “an island belonging to the emperor.”

Barbarossa’s claim was not generally supported by the other judices who, according to Barbarossa’s

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195 iuramentum fidelitatis pro Sede Apostolica ab ipsis iudicibus Sardinie. Sanna, ed., Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 98-102, doc. 88. This comes from a debate between the Archbishop of Pisa and Pope Innocent III; although the archbishop protested that all of his predecessors had received such vows without any objection from the papacy, Innocent decreed that such vows were illicit.


198 En i isle lempereor / En sardoigne en droit lonbardie / Qui bien avoit mestier daie. Penny Eley et al., eds., Partonopeus de Blois: An Electronic Edition (Sheffield: HriOnline, 2005), accessed 24 May 2014, http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/partonopeus, Manuscript G, Line 11213-11215. This reference has not been noticed by any other scholars of medieval Sardinia, as far as I am aware. The poem itself is set in a vaguely antique past, but as Penny Eley points out, a number of its episodes are fictionalized versions of contemporary events, with a particular focus on developments in the Holy Roman Empire. Penny Eley, Partonopeus de Blois: Romance in the Making (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), p. 58.
biographer, had “prostituted [themselves] to the benefits [offered by] Pisa and Genoa,” but here Barisone seems to have hoped to use Barbarossa’s claims for his own aggrandizement.\footnote{legatio [imperatoris] sine efficacia remanserit, conicient hi, quibus notum est, in quantis emolumentis Pisanis atque Ianuensibus insula Sardinia prostituta sit. Rahewinus Frisingensis, Gesta Friderici I. imperatoris, MGH, SS rer. Germ. 46, p. 247.}

The negotiations were initially successful, and in 1164, “on the third Monday of August in the Church of St. Sirus of Pavia, the emperor made [Barisone] king of Sardinia, and he promised and swore fealty to the same emperor.”\footnote{die Lune tertia mensis Augusti in ecclesia sancti Siri de Papia ipsum imperator instituit regem Sardinie promittentem et iurament ibidem imperatori fidelitatem. Acerbus Morena, Historia Frederici I: Recensio M (a. 1161-1164), MGH, SS rer. Germ. N.S. 7, p. 176.} Following this, say the Annales Pisani, Barisone “returned to Genoa, and the Genoese received him with honor, and there he remained until November 22nd, and there he prepared a great army ... for recovering his land and for subjugating all of Sardinia to his jurisdiction and power.”\footnote{Ianuam reversus est; quem Ianuenses cum honore receperunt, et ibi moratus est usque ad 10. Kal. Decembris, ibique preparavit magnum exercitum militum ... pro recuperanda terra et pro sue iurisdictioni et potestati subiuganda tota Sardinea. Bernardo Maragone, Annales Pisani, p. 33, ll. 16-20.} Genoa was clearly funding and manning the mission, since, again according to the Annales Pisani, “for this army and the expenses and vassals which he acquired, the Genoese fraudulently and deceitfully lent him thirty thousand pounds.”\footnote{pro quo exercitu, et expense, et fidelibus quos acquisivit, Ianuenses ultra XXX milia libras dolose et fraudulenter ei mutuo dederunt. Bernardo Maragone, Annales Pisani, p. 33, ll. 20-21.} In return for its support, Barisone signed a series of agreements on September 16, 1164 which give an insight into Genoa’s principal interests in the whole affair. Apart from promising to pay 100,000 pounds to recompense Genoa for its military expenses, and an annual sum of 400 marks of silver which would be paid not in cash, but in land,\footnote{pro uniuersis exercitibus expeditionibus ac querris quas commune Ianue deinceps fecerit dabo communi Ianue pro centum milibus libris ... et dabo singulis annis communi Ianue ad natale Domini quadrigentas marchas argenti pro quibus bene soluwendi assignabo et dabo consultibus et communi Ianue tot introitus in uno uel pluribus iudicatibus Sardine ut prelegentur. Genoa was clearly interested in establishing itself as a major, and direct, landholder in Sardinia. CDS, p. 227, doc. 75.} Barisone agreed to grant “two curia to the Opera of S. Lorenzo, which the consuls of Genoa will select out of all Sardinia [...] of which the archbishop of Genoa will have one, and the canons of Blessed Lorenzo will have the other, as the consuls of Genoa will decide.”\footnote{Et dabo operi Sancti Laurencii duas curiarias quas consules Ianue preelegerint in tota Sardinea ...ex quarum redditibus ipsa ecclesia construatur. qua expleta unam habeat archiepiscopus Ianue et alteram canonica Beati Laurentii, sicut consules communis Ianue ordinauerint. CDS, p. 227, doc. 75. Interesting is the assumption here that a donation to the Opera of S. Lorenzo will become property of the archbishop and canons, not of a separate lay-controlled organization.} He also promised to maintain a royal palace in Genoa, which he must visit every three or four years, in which place he would presumably take on a subject status to the commune. In addition, he granted free trade for all Genoese merchants, especially in salt, as well as hostels for the Genoese; the
word used for this last is “alberga,” which Du Cange has shown to imply the duty of hospitality due to one’s feudal lord. Genoa was also to have “the castle of Arculentu and Marmilla, and as much land in Oristano as suffices for Genoese merchants to keep one hundred houses honorably, and carry on their affairs.”

These items would bring Genoa’s position in Sardinia to mirror that of Pisa almost exactly. It would have a colony of merchants in a major port city, just as Pisa had a colony of Pisan merchants in the ports of Torres and Cagliari; it would also enjoy some sort of lordship over Judex Barisone. The Cathedral of S. Lorenzo would increase its landownership and begin to approach the wealth of S. Maria of Pisa. Genoa would acquire the free-trade privileges that Pisa had enjoyed for decades, and the direct ownership of land that would expand yearly by the value of four hundred silver marks. Its commune would even have direct control of two castles, something that not even Pisa would acquire until the thirteenth century.

Most crucially in these agreements, however, Barisone promised his support “if the Genoese wish to labor in order that their archbishop may obtain the primacy and legation of Sardinia.” Oddly enough, this detail has been scarcely noticed by secondary literature. Yet the extreme importance that Genoa attached to this last point is underlined by the fact that, although Barisone swore to support Genoa’s efforts to gain the legation alongside his other concessions in one all-encompassing vow, the Genoese made him swear the same thing again, on the same day, in a separate promise devoted solely to the project of acquiring the legation. The commune may have felt that, with the support of the king of all

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205 concedam quin Ianuenses libere et absolute contrahant mercationes suas cum omnibus Sardis cum quibus uoluerint ... ut de sale libere et absolute accipiendo ullam uim super impositam cum inferius promittam ... et dabo communi Ianuue in singulis iudicatibus Sardineec conventiones curias et albergarias in quibus Ianuenses et eorum negotiatores honorifice possint esse diuerti et commorari. CDS, p. 227, doc. 75. See the entry for “alberga” in DuCange, Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis.

206 Item dabo castrum Arculentu et Marmille et tantum terrae in Aureo Stagno quantum bene sufficiat Ianuensibus negotiatoribus ad mansiones centum ubi honorifice maneat, et negotiationes suas exerceant. CDS, pp. 227-228, doc. 75.

207 For example, the cancellation of salt-tax that Mariano Torchitorio of Cagliari had granted in 1107; as Chapter Three will show, Judex Mariano of Logudoro had also granted an exemption from trade duties to Pisa in 1082. See above, at n. 91, and Chapter Three, at n. 31.

208 etiam iuro quod si Ianuenses voluerint laborare, ut archiepiscopus eorum obtineat primatum et legationes Sardineec, bona fide inde sibi auxiliabor. CDS, pp. 227-232, doc. 75.

209 For example Petrucci, in his discussion of the “Barisone Affair,” as he terms it, lists the terms of Barisone’s treaties with Genoa but makes no mention of Genoa’s desire for the legation. Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” p. 128.

210 Ego Baresonus Dei gratia rex Sardinie ... iuro comuni Ianue ... quod si Ianuenses voluerint laborare ut archiepiscopus eorum obtineat primatum et legationem Sardineec bona fide et sine fraude inter sibi auxiliabor et conferam ut uiderint conuenire. CDS, pp. 231-2, doc. 79.
Sardinia behind it, and with Pisa’s Ghibelline politics creating a rift between Pisa and the papacy, the legation would soon be within Genoa’s reach. Added to the other promises that Genoa extracted from Barisone, it is clear that Genoa had every intention of directly colonizing Sardinia, and that it saw cathedral lands and the legation as crucial to this project.

Unfortunately for Barisone and Genoa, by April 1165 Pisa had persuaded Frederick to change his mind and grant “full and complete power and jurisdiction and the income from justice and everything that is and ever will be in Sardinia” to Pisa, in return for a large sum of money.\(^{211}\) Pisa immediately began to claim its lordship, calling Judex Barisone of Arborea “our vassal” and challenging Genoa’s right to press Barisone for repayment of his debts.\(^{212}\) This is not the place to provide a full account of Barisone’s attempt to become king of Sardinia, nor of the related struggles between Genoa and Pisa to acquire lordship over the island through Barbarossa, but the emperor’s turn to Pisa signalled the end of Barisone’s chance to become king, and of Genoa’s chance to become lord of the king of Sardinia.

Not only Barisone and Genoa but the pope, too, was displeased by Pisa’s investiture: Alexander III wrote in January 1167 to the archbishop of Genoa, asking him to persuade the Genoese consuls to somehow impede Pisa from seizing real power in Sardinia and claiming, again, that Sardinia rightfully lay under the “dominion and jurisdiction of St. Peter and ourselves.” As briefly mentioned before, this is an important sign of a shifting attitude on the part of the papacy. Until this period, popes had not used terms like *possessio, proprietas, dominium* or *patrimonium* to express their rights to the island, but from now on the words recur ever more often in papal documents, accompanied by clauses in which the popes safeguarded their own rights when confirming Sardinian property to others, like *salvo in omnibus iure et auctoritate Romane Ecclesie*.\(^{213}\)

In the end, neither commune succeeded in obtaining outright possession of Sardinia. Pisa’s attempt had, perhaps, been stopped by Alexander III. Genoa, meanwhile, had failed to obtain the legation or primacy for its archbishop, and when Judex Barisone was unable to conquer the whole island, Genoa too lost its opportunity to control the island. Genoa even had difficulty collecting its debts in Arborea and in asserting its possession of the castles of Arculentu and Marmella. As usual, it is nearly impossible to know what the Sardinian reaction to all these events was, but a hint is provided in a new succession of

\(^{211}\) *plenam omnemque potestatem atque iurisdictionem et districtum et totum quod in Sardinia est et quod futurum est*; the treaty between Pisa and Frederick Barbarossa is at CDS, pp. 232-233, n. 81.

\(^{212}\) *Cum Ianua civitas regem Baresonem nostrum vassallum vi teneat, qua ratione teneor nescio*. This charge was part of a Pisan criticism of Genoa’s methods of debt-collection, which included holding Barisone hostage. Obertus cancellarius, *Annales Ianuenses (a. 1164-1173)*, MGH, SS 18, p. 63.

treaties that was elaborated between Barisone and Genoa in 1172. As part of these, Barisone had to promise to make “the archbishop of Oristano, all the bishops of my kingdom, and all the prelates of the churches,” as well as “one hundred of the best and most noble men of my land” observe the terms of the contract, indicating that in those eight years neither the lay nobility nor the prelacy had been friendly to Genoa, and suggesting that they had not been passive observers, either.\textsuperscript{214} No more details are provided as to what that resistance might have consisted of, and the names and identities of the Arborean prelates for these years are unknown, making it impossible to know whether they were all Sardinian or not, but similar situations in colonized Eastern Europe show that native clergy could be eloquent in their denunciations of foreign colonization. Robert Bartlett cites the case of Jakub Swinka, the archbishop of Chiezno in Poland, who was so offended by the rapid demographic and cultural Germanization of Poland that he “only ever referred to them as ‘dog heads.’”\textsuperscript{215} As for Pisa and Genoa, the continuing battles between them led first Frederick, then the pope, to arrange peace treaties that tried to settle the matter by ordaining that “Sardinia should be divided in half, such that the Genoese have one half and the Pisans have the other half,”\textsuperscript{216} and that “however many donicalienses the Genoese have in Sardinia, the Pisans shall have just as much;” the same rule applied to “the goods of the churches, and the rights of the archepiscopate.”\textsuperscript{217} None of these treaties had any real success, however, and conflicts continued between Pisa and Genoa.

2.4.3 Conflict Between Pisa and the Papacy, and its Impact on Sardinia

Perhaps Genoa’s hope in 1164 of winning the legation and primacy in Sardinia seemed possible because of the faltering relationship between Ghibelline Pisa and the papacy. In the 1130s Saint Bernard had

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{et faciam iurare archiepiscopum de aureo stagno et episcopos omnes regni mei et prelatos ecclesiarum, et usque in centum de melioribus et nobilioribus hominibus terre mee in hunc modum.} CDS, pp. 240-242, doc. 98.


\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Sardinea per medium dividatur et ut medietatem Ianuenses habeant et alteram Pisani.} This treaty, arranged by Barbarossa’s legate in Italy in 1172, was signed by representatives of Genoa, Pisa and Lucca. CDS, pp. 242-243, doc. 99.

\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Tot et tales donicalienses habeant Ianuenses in Sardinea quot et quales haberent Pisani ... de rebus uero ecclesiarum, et rationes archiepiscopatus cuique salue sint, eo saluo quod supradictum est in suprascriptis capitulis.} This was a treaty drawn up 1169 by representatives of, again, Pisa, Genoa and Lucca. CDS, pp. 238-239, doc. 92.
described Pisa as “selected [by God] in place of Rome,” but the city had since then drawn away from the papacy and, as the conflict between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen emperors developed, aligned itself with the Ghibelline cause. At first, this did not affect Pisa’s archbishops’ legation or primacy in Sardinia, since at the beginning of the Guelf-Ghibelline quarrels the Pisan archbishop, Villano Villani (1146-1175), was a faithful supporter of Pope Alexander III against Barbarossa and against Alexander’s Avignonese rival. His Guelf sympathies put him at odds with the commune’s politics, to the extent that in 1167 he was exiled from Pisa, but his relationship with Alexander III never faltered.

The trust placed in him both by Alexander and by Alexander’s predecessors is evident in the number of diplomatic missions he was sent on to Sardinia. In 1151-2, for example, Pope Eugenius III wrote to Villano regarding a conflict between the bishop of Sulcis, Aimo, and the abbot of Montecassino, Rainaldo, and ordered him to “put a suitable end to this quarrel by judgment or conciliation.” Possibly in the same year, Villano also mediated between the archpriest of Turris and the monastery of S. Maria di Tergu. In 1163, under Alexander III, he was put in charge of resolving the “dispute between Abbot Fredolus of [St. Victor of] Marseilles and the archbishop of Cagliari [...] regarding the monastery of S. Saturno and certain of its possessions.” It may well be imagined that, given the disagreement between Villano’s politics and those of Pisa, Villano’s interventions in island affairs were carried out with the interests of the pope, not of Pisa, in mind. At the same time, Villano considered the cathedral of S. Maria

218 Assumitur Pisa in locum Romae, et de cunctis urbibus terrae ad apostolicae sedis culmen elegitur. This is taken from a letter written by St. Bernard to the Pisans, in which Bernard praises the city for its holiness and its hospitality to Pope Innocent II. Bernardus Claraevallensis, Epistola CXXX, in PL, Vol. 182, col. 285B.

219 It may not be irrelevant to note that, although Turtas says Villano was born in Pisa, his family was from Pistoia. Despite the seemingly excellent relations that he enjoyed with the citizens and commune of Pisa, and his own relation to the noble Pisan Gaetani family, he may have lacked the tight family links with Pisan families that were in large part responsible for deciding political loyalties in the Guelf-Ghibelline divide. See Raffaello Roncioni, “Istorie Pisane” in Archivio Storico Italiano: Periodico Trimestrale: Ossia Raccolta di Opere e Documenti Finora Inediti o Divenuti Rarissimi Risguardanti La Storia d’Italia, Vol. 6, Part 1 (1844), p. 392, and Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 248. On the importance of family loyalties to determining political sympathies in the Guelf-Ghibelline conflict, see Daniel Waley and Trevor Dean, The Italian City Republics (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 159-160.

220 See Heywood, A History of Pisa, pp. 126, 161, 163-4. However, as Heywood notes, he had plenty of sympathizers within the city; Alexander III had earlier enjoyed strong support in Pisa, where he had been a canon before being elected pope. Up until 1167 Villano had remained peacefully in a Ghibelline Pisa, carrying out his role as archbishop with the blessing of the Commune and citizens of Pisa.

221 per praesentia scripta fraternitati tuae mandamus quatenus praedictum fratrem nostrum ... ante tuam praesentiam evoces, et ... per judicesum vel concordiam eidem causae finem debitas, Domino auctore, imponas. CDS, p. 214, doc. 53; see also IP, pp. 415-416, doc. 2.


his, not Pisa’s, and within Pisa there was still a great deal of good will towards Villano. It is not impossible, therefore, that Villano would have continued to encourage the judices to honor S. Maria of Pisa with gifts.

When Villano died, he was succeeded by Ubaldo Lanfranchi (1176-1208), who was cut from very different cloth. For one thing, unlike Villano, Ubaldo was a native Pisan, one of the old family of Lanfranchi, with all the family connections and family interests within Pisa that this entailed. Perhaps as an incentive to continue Villano’s faithfulness to Rome, in 1176 Alexander III not only confirmed him as legate in Sardinia and as primate over Torres, but also “conceded the primacy over the provinces of Cagliari and Arborea, such that he may freely call the bishops to a council and correct their excesses and confirm them in apostolic doctrine and all other things, which belong to the right of primate.” Already in this privilege, however, there is a hint that Alexander III was wary of Ubaldo, since he specifically notes that as primate, Ubaldo “may not call the archbishops of Cagliari and Arborea to a council in Pisa unless the Roman pontiff is informed.” Certainly, throughout Ubaldo’s rule as archbishop he would show himself committed to enlarging his own importance and that of his city, and his loyalty to Pisa trumped his loyalty to the pope. Already in 1180, only five years after his confirmation as archbishop and four years after having been granted an enlarged primacy in Sardinia, Ubaldo had the judices swear an oath of loyalty to Pisa.

Although no open confrontation developed between Ubaldo and any pope prior to Innocent III, Pope Urban III (1185-1187) may not have been blind to the threat that was developing: Turtas suggests that even as early as 1186, only ten years after the primacy over Cagliari and Oristano had been given to

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226 provinciarum Calaritanae et Arborensis archiepiscopos ad concilium non vocet Pisas sine conscientia Romani pontificis. IP, p. 384, doc. 50. This raises the possibility that Ubaldo did have the right to summon the archbishop of Torres to Pisa without informing the pope, as Turtas has noted. Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 257.
Ubaldo, Urban III began to restrict the archbishop’s effective powers in Sardinia. His reasoning is based on a letter to the pope from Ubaldo, in which Ubaldo asks for advice in how to treat a number of misdemeanors among the Sardinian clergy. Since, as primate, he had the specific right to “correct [the clergy’s] transgressions and confirm them in apostolic doctrine,” Turtas thinks that his exercise of primatial powers may have raised strong protests from the Sardinian prelates, and that the pope had therefore decided to limit Ubaldo’s authority to the simple identification of problems, leaving it to the pope himself to mete out punishments or solutions. Arguing against Turtas, however, is the fact that even when Urban III interfered with Pisa’s secular affairs in Sardinia, among his reasons for doing so he made no reference to papal rights of jurisdiction on the island, as Alexander III had done in 1167; instead, he justified his intervention only by referring to his office “as father and pastor of the universal church.” If Urban felt that Ubaldo was a threat, it might be expected that the pope would emphasize Rome’s direct right to govern Sardinia. Thus, Rome may not have offered any meaningful resistance to Archbishop Ubaldo’s actions in Sardinia, at least until Pope Innocent III was elected, as will be shown below.

Archbishop Ubaldo became most active in the last decade of the twelfth century. In these years a half-Pisan, half-Sard judex, Marquis Guglielmo of Massa, had inherited the throne of Cagliari, and almost immediately had begun to try to extend his power over Arborea and Logudoro. By 1194 Pisans fighting with Guglielmo had “presumed to invade the fortress of Monte Goceano [in Logudoro] against [Guglielmo’s] own vow, and after having carried off all of its goods ... led the wife [of the judex of Logudoro] captive to Cagliari, where she died.” Pope Celestine excommunicated him, but this did not stop Guglielmo: at some point in or before 1198, he also invaded Arborea and “captured the noble man Pietro, judex of Arborea, and his young son and wickedly imprisoned them” and declared himself ruler. What is important about Guglielmo for the purposes of this discussion is that his family, the Massa, was politically aligned with Archbishop Ubaldo. At this point in the history of the Pisan legation, the

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229 *excessus eorum corrigendi et in doctrina apostolica confirmandi.* IP, p. 384, doc. 50.
231 *utpote patri et pastori universalis ecclesie.* CDS, pp. 263-264, doc. 127. This is a letter to Pisa and Genoa, written in 1188, by which Clement orders both cities to ratify a peace treaty that Clement himself had previously ordered to be drawn up by two cardinals.
233 *idem marchio, auctoritate quondam apostolice Sedis excommunicationis vinculo innodatus, nobilem virum Petrum, Arborensem iudicem, et filium eius parvulum cepisset et nequiter carcerali fecisset custodie mancipari ... eorum terra... per violentiam occupata.* This information is found in a letter of Innocent III, probably dating to 1198, and directed to three prelates in Sardinia; it can be found in Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 7-12, doc. 3.
archbishop-legate may be said to have ceased to represent the city as a whole, if indeed he ever had; now
Archbishop Ubaldo supported the Massa and the Gherardesca families and opposed the great Visconti
family. All three of these great Tuscan houses were expanding their presence in Sardinia, and Ubaldo’s
central role in the process is indicated in a letter of Innocent III from 1203, when Innocent III wrote to
Ubaldo and his suffragan bishops, rather than to the commune of Pisa, to inform them that Judex Comita
of Logudoro and his judicate were now under pontifical protection, and to command them to “restrain
your parishioners from molesting him and his land ... nor allow them to harrass him unduly, as far as you
are able.”

Beyond this, examples of Ubaldo’s active support of the Pisan and, specifically, Massa interests are rife.
When Guglielmo of Massa invaded the Judicate of Arborea, for example, Arborea’s archbishop, Justus
(1192-98), “fearing the anger of the same marquis and of the Pisans with him because he [the archbishop]
was of the Genoese nation, fled to other parts.” In his absence, “the marquis and his supporters
plundered some of the Church of Arborea, and [Archbishop Justus’] suffragans and clerics solemnly
bestowed the scepter of Arborea upon the said marquis, who was still branded with excommunication.”

Not only did Ubaldo apparently not object to church property being alienated to an excommunicated lay
magnate, but when Justus dared return and protest, the same canons tried to have the matter subjected to
Ubaldo qua papal legate, clearly feeling secure that he would rule in their favor. In itself, there was
nothing unusual about a legate judging such a case, and in other circumstances Justus could have
expected support from a legate. In Bohemia of the 1140s, for example, the dukes of Moravia had deprived
an indigenous bishop of his lands, not too differently from Guglielmo of Massa’s spoliation of the Church
of Oristano. In response, the papal legate in Bohemia spent two years negotiating to resolve the matter in
the bishop’s favor. In the Sardinian case, however, the Genoese archbishop of Oristano was just as
much a colonizer as Archbishop Ubaldo, and from Ubaldo’s point of view he was a rival colonizer, as
well. Justus had no illusions about Ubaldo’s impartiality in the affair, later claiming that Ubaldo had

234 Cum ergo [Comitem iudicem Turritani] ... sub protectione Sedis apostolice duximus admittendum, fraternitatem
vestram monenum ... parrochianos vestros ab ipsis et terre sue infestatione ... compescentes, nec permittentes eum
ab ipsis, quantum in vobis fuerit, indebite molestari. Ibid., pp. 34-35, doc. 27.
235 Ipse archiepiscopus, quia natione Ianuensi erat, iram ipsius marchionis et qui secum erant metuens Pisanorum,
ad partes alias declinavit. Ibid., pp. 7-12, doc. 3.
236 In cuius absentia marchio et fautores eius Arborense Ecclesiam spoliarunt in parte et suffraganei sui et clerici
dicto marchioni, tunc excommunicatione notato, Arboensis terre sceptrum sollemniter conesserunt. Ibid., pp. 7-12,
doc. 3.
237 See Berend et al., Central Europe in the High Middle Ages, pp. 181, 376.
“refused to admit lay witnesses of good reputation against ... [Justus’] adversary” in the trial, and that he, Justus, “feared that false witnesses would be brought against him.”

Archbishop Ubaldo’s collusion extended to Guglielmo of Massa’s invasion of Logudoro, too. Following Guglielmo’s invasion of the north-west judicate, “Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa came to Sardinia to bring the quarrelling parties to an agreement.” His ruling was that both Guglielmo of Massa and Costantino of Logudoro must renounce Logudoro’s Castle of Goceano and give it into his, Ubaldo’s, safe-keeping. Costantino also had to swear fealty to Archbishop Ubaldo and promise to “expel the Genoese merchants from his land, whenever the said archbishop ... should order it.” Guglielmo did, indeed, allow Ubaldo to take over Goceano – probably a safe enough action given his alliance with the archbishop – but “before peace could be reached, the same [judex of] Torres invaded the said castle, because he did not wish to give it to the archbishop who demanded it.” In response, Ubaldo excommunicated him, and “the said Judex Costantino ... died excommunicate.”

Ubaldo’s pursuit of secular interests via his legation, like his requirement that the judex of Logudoro banish all Genoese merchants from his lands, seems not to have met any criticism from Pope Celestine. To the contrary, according to the Libellus Iudicum Turritanorum, it was “the Holy Father of Rome” himself who “sent to the archbishop of Pisa to conduct the investigation,” although this may be questioned. Innocent III (1198 – 1216), however, was more concerned about Ubaldo’s use of his legation. Although he did confirm Ubaldo’s legation and primacy in 1198, he was to spend his pontificate

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238 [Justus] dicebat ... falsos contra se testes timuit introduci et memoratus Pisanus archiepiscopus laicos testes bone opinionis et fame contra Petrum, adversarium suum, admittere recusabat. Sanna, ed., Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 7-12, doc. 3. In the same document, which is a letter from Innocent III explaining the situation to another legate in Sardinia, Justus claims that Guglielmo of Massa tried to physically prevent him from reaching Rome to appeal to the pope, and thus to force him to submit to Ubaldo’s judgments.

239 Hubaldus Pisanus archiepiscopus in Sardiniam accessisset, ut discordantes ad concordiam revocaret. Ibid., pp. 36-38, doc. 29.

240 Constantino ... quam super fidelitate prestanta venerabili fratri nostro Hubaldo, Pisano archiepiscopo, et successoribus eius ... et expellendis de terra tua mercatoribus Iaunensibus, cum id ... dictus archiepiscopus vel certus ipsius nuntius vel eiusdem preciperent successores. Ibid., doc. 22.

241 Hubaldus Pisanus archiepiscopus in Sardiniam accessisset, ut discordantes ad concordiam revocaret, a Kallaritano iudice castrum ipsum et a iudice turritano quedam alia pignora in manu sua de partium voluntate recepit, set antequam procederetur ad pacem, idem turritanus castrum memoratum invasit, quod quia restituere noluit archiepiscopo repetenti. Ibid., pp. 36-38, doc. 29.

242 su dictu Juigue Guantine ... morisit iscomunigadu. Libellus Iudicum Turritanorum, p. 51. This is supported by a letter of Innocent III to his legate (not the Archbishop of Pisa) in Sardinia, dated to 1203, and to be found in Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 36-38, doc. 29.

243 su Santu Padre de roma et madait a su Archiepiscopo de Pisas a faguer sa pisquisà. Libellus Iudicum Turritanorum, p. 51. The Libellus goes on to explain that Ubaldo excommunicated the judex of Logudoro simply because “he understood that the said Judex Costantino had done evil to the Holy Roman Church.”
developing and strengthening papal claims to direct lordship of numerous territories, including Tuscany itself, and also Sardinia. Ubaldo’s practice of directing judicial fealty to himself and to Pisa clashed with Innocent’s papal lordship. As Innocent reproved Ubaldo in 1204, “your fraternity is not unaware that the island of Sardinia is the property and under the law of the Apostolic See, and its judices must and ought to perform vows of fealty to the Roman Church.”

In 1202 Innocent was able to annul the vow of fealty that Judex Comita had made to Ubaldo and to the Pisans, agreeing with Comita that he had been “compelled by necessity” and explaining that Ubaldo “must not extort a vow from you that is to the prejudice of the Roman Church in this way.” The pope also commanded Ubaldo several times to free Guglielmo of Massa from his vow of fealty to the archbishop-legate, so that Guglielmo could recognize Innocent III as his rightful lord. As Innocent complained in 1206, however, Ubaldo “ignored this with deaf ears, listenening less than is proper to what the Holy See ... reminded you: that in Sardinia no part of worldly jurisdiction or mundane things belongs to you.” If Ubaldo continued in his disobedience, threatened the pope, again in 1206, “we shall compel you to what we have ordered by removing Sardinia from your office of legation.” Through these papal censures, it is clear that instead of integrating papal and communal interests, as most of Ubaldo’s predecessors had done, and instead of aligning himself with the pope, as Villano Villani had done, Ubaldo placed the interests of Pisa first.

If Ubaldo Lanfranchi represented the culmination of a decades-long process by which the legation in Sardinia became ever more aligned with Pisan interests, he was also the beginning of the end of Pisa’s moral and ecclesiastical hegemony on the island. As Chapter Four will show, Innocent III would begin to limit the power of the Pisan archbishop-legate in the first years of the thirteenth century, and successive popes would continue to check his power in Sardinia until finally, in the 1230s, the legation would be denied to Pisa for the first time since the 1120s.

244 *Quod insula Sardinie iuris ac proprietatis apostolice Sedis existat et iudices eius Ecclesie Romane iuramentum fidelitatis debeant et soleant exhibere, tua fraternitas non ignorat.* Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 61-63, doc. 54.

245 *Dilectus filius ... prior Montis Christi ex parte tua quedam nobis proposuit tam de iuramento, quam super pace Pisanorum fecisti necessitate compulsus ... quam (super) fidelitate prestanda venerabili fratri nostro Hubaldo, Pisano archiepiscopo, et successoribus eius ... ipsi archiepiscopo nostris damus litteris in preceptis, ut ... nec in Ecclesie Romane preiudicium a te iuramentum huiusmodi debuerit extorqueri.* Ibid., pp. 93-94, doc. 78.

246 *tu hactenus mandatum apostolicium, surdis auribus, pertransisti minus quam decet attendens quod apostolica Sedes ita te ... evocavit quod in Sardinia nullam partem iurisdictionis mundane quantum ad temporalia tibi commisit.* Ibid., pp. 93-94, doc. 78.

247 *Alioquin, nisi feceris de necessitate virtutem, cum peccatum ydolatrie sit nolle obedire ... te ad id quod mandavimus per exemptionem Sardinie a tuo legationis officio compellemus.* Ibid., pp. 98-102, doc. 88.
2.5 Conclusions

This chapter has taken a perspective that is new to the historiography of Sardinia, and argued that Pisa’s acquisition of the legation in Sardinia from early on had a fundamental impact on the political and economic success in Sardinia of both Pisa and Genoa. To Pisa the legation gave the benefit of a combined moral and political authority over all four Sardinian rulers. The fact that Genoa held no such privilege, meanwhile, was a serious handicap for Genoese efforts to gain power and influence on the island. Genoa did manage to obtain a few donations to the Opera of S. Lorenzo, and throughout the century showed that it was interested in acquiring more. Yet although it sought to use the same military/political techniques for enlarging its own political influence on the island that Pisa was using, it could exercise no authority other than that of its secular government in its Sardinian affairs. The Genoese commune by itself could not hope to compete with the combined authority of the Pisan commune and a papal legate. Indeed, its eagerness to secure the legation for its own archbishop in 1164, just as it was seeking to establish political lordship over the island by installing Judex Barisone as both king of Sardinia and Genoa’s vassal, shows just how vital that position was for its attempt to dominate the island. Lacking the legation, Genoa turned to other methods instead: its bellicose alliance with Comita II of Arborea in 1131, attacks on Pisan ships trading with Sardinia, the same coronation of Barisone in 1164, and political and economic pressures that it continued to place on Barisone until his death, and on Barisone’s successor. Because these attempts at colonization had little or no ecclesiastical justification, however, they could be, and were, seen as a threat by a papacy developing the idea of papal lordship in Sardinia.

In contrast to Genoa’s difficulties, relatively good initial relations between Pisa and the popes, and the lack of an articulated claim of papal lordship over Sardinia, allowed the Pisan archbishops to use their authority to promote Pisan interests with little or no censure from Rome up until the middle of the twelfth century. Even during the worst years of Frederick Barbarossa’s conflict with the papacy, during which Pisa supported the emperor, the loyalty of Pisa’s archbishop to Rome ensured that Pisa never risked losing the legatine privilege. Furthermore, Pisa’s greatest landed wealth in Sardinia, and therefore one of its greatest sources of political and economic power, officially belonged to its cathedral. If S. Maria of Pisa was the symbol of the civic body, it was also the spiritual home of the archbishop-legate: thus, its landholding in Sardinia would have been difficult for any pope to criticize. Indeed, no direct challenge to Pisa’s legation was made until the turn of the thirteenth century. The more than one hundred years of ecclesiastical authority in Sardinia between Archbishop Daibert and Archbishop Ubaldo Lanfranchi, coupled with Pisa’s military strength, allowed Pisa to build up a position of great political potency on the island. This strength would stand it in good stead in the following century, when Innocent III and his successors would begin to reduce the effective powers of Pisa’s legation.
3.1 Introduction

Chapter Three will analyze the ways in which the three main contenders for lordship of Sardinia used the upper secular clergy in Sardinia to increase their own power and wealth on the island. In particular, it will evaluate the presence of foreigners in Sardinian episcopal sees, and seek to understand the role these foreigners played in furthering the ambitions of Pisa, Genoa, the pope, and the judices themselves. Chapter Two concluded that ecclesiastical authority was essential for foreign powers wishing to increase their own power, since a full-scale military invasion was impractical, and that the papal legation was fundamental to Pisa’s general success in the twelfth century. These conclusions will provide the foundation on which to build an understanding of the role that the positions of bishops, archbishops and canons played in the schemes of Pisa, Genoa and the papacy for control of Sardinia. Much of this analysis will be based on an examination of the relationship between Pisan and Genoese influence in Sardinia and the provenance of Sardinian bishops. Thus far, no such study has been carried out. Research on episcopal nominations has provided only chronologies and a single analytical article by Marco Tangheroni that discusses bishops in the fourteenth century. This chapter, therefore, will represent the first attempt to draw links between the Sardinian prelacy and foreign colonializing drives, and to explore the causes and effects of placing foreign or native bishops in Sardinian sees.

Most information for the high medieval period only begins to become available from the mid-eleventh century on, precisely the period in which Sardinia was entering decisively into the Western Church, and, simultaneously, starting to become a focus for both Pisan and Genoese expansionist interests. Even Cagliari, which had been the seat of the archbishop of all Sardinia before the island was divided into four provinces, has no datable information on its bishops between 850 and 1017.248 For this reason, and with only a few exceptions, the analysis undertaken here will not attempt to cover the eleventh century as the previous chapter did, but will focus on the twelfth century. Like Chapter Two it will begin with a short section of background information, before proceeding in chronological order. It will first undertake a

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detailed analysis of the archdiocese of Torres, coterminous with Logudoro, in the twelfth century; this will be followed by an examination of the evidence for Cagliari and Arborea. These will be briefer for reasons of space. Gallura will not be considered because the extreme scarcity of primary sources makes it difficult to draw any useful conclusions, while the choice of Logudoro as focus of the most detailed analysis for the 1100s is due to three factors. For one, there is a comparative wealth of primary and secondary literature regarding its clergy for this period. For another, it was the first judicate to have a documented Pisan bishop. Finally, its political-ecclesiastical relationship with Pisa may have developed before that of any other judicate, leading to a particular closeness between Pisa and the Church of Torres.

3.2 Background: The Colonizing Potential of Sardinian Bishoprics

Chapter Two has shown that Pisa’s nearly century-long legation in Sardinia was crucial to Pisan expansion because of the route it provided for asserting Pisan authority over the judices, for amassing landed possessions for the Cathedral of S. Maria, which belonged not only to the archbishop but also to the city, and for encouraging the judices to choose policies friendly to Pisa. It was also, however, important in another respect: it gave Pisa a way to insert her own men in the upper ranks of the church in Sardinia itself, creating a standing army, as it were, stationed in the field. Thus, this chapter will discuss how foreign bishops and archbishops helped bring the Sardinian judicates closer to Pisa by representing Pisa’s interests and fostering Pisan culture in Sardinia. Where evidence permits, it will also show how Genoa tried to strengthen its mercantile and political presence by securing ecclesiastical positions for its own men, although with nothing like Pisa’s success. Finally, it will try to discover the role played by the judices themselves and their nobles in the game of controlling the episcopal and archepiscopal sees.

It must be noted that having Pisans and Genoese in the judicial prelacy could be an advantage for Sardinian rulers. For one thing, mainland clerics were likely to be better educated and more cultured than Sardinian clerics, and would have connections with powerful mainland families. Assuming that they were active importers of continental ecclesiastical culture, and as such were in some sense “reformers,” they would also, surely, have helped the judices maintain good relations with the papacy. These benefits, like most aspects of the role the church played in colonial relations, have been little discussed, and the lack of detailed primary information about most foreign prelates in Sardinia makes it difficult to show just how these advantages were used, or how the judices felt about their foreign bishops.

249 Artizzu, L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa, p. 42.
Yet a comparative perspective makes it possible to see that other rulers in culturally and ecclesiastically peripheral areas found foreign clergy to be a great asset. Jean Sedlar shows that in Eastern Europe, the detachment of foreign clergy from local society meant that foreigners were extraneous to local politics and were therefore “more reliably loyal” to rulers.\(^{250}\) King Stephen I of Hungary, meanwhile, wrote a collection of advice for his son in the early eleventh century, in which he warned that “a country using only one language and having only one custom is weak and frail,” but “just as foreigners come from different lands and provinces, so too they bring different languages, customs, laws and weapons, which adorn any king and glorify his court, and terrify the arrogance of other powers.” In short, advised Stephen, “encourage them with a good will and keep them honestly, so that they who live elsewhere, may willingly stay with you.”\(^{251}\) As will be shown, a similar attitude seems to have been taken by some judices. In Sardinia, as elsewhere in Europe, rulers could surely see the cultural advantages of importing learned foreign clergy: the writers of judical documents were overwhelmingly clerics, especially bishops, indicating the cultural importance that they had in judical government.\(^{252}\) Judices may also have offered ecclesiastical positions to Pisan or Genoese clerics as a way of seeking or paying for favours from the commune, or from particular Italian families.

Bishoprics and archbishoprics were not only useful for foreign powers and the judices, but are particularly valuable for this study. A great advantage of focusing on the secular clergy in the process of political domination by an outside power, rather than on the laity, is that it makes it easier to use the concept of “colonization,” as discussed in the Introduction. In particular, the clergy shed light on the foreign acquisition of political control and the transformation of the colonized society as part of a colonizing process. Where the laity, and especially the upper-class laity, is concerned, the issue of who was a foreign dominator and who was a subjugated native becomes very quickly confused. Noble families founded dynasties in the “colonized” territory that assimilated with local society and intermarried with the local families. As Robert Bartlett has shown, this integration was particularly strong when sea journeys were necessary to reach colonized lands, as is the case with Sardinia, because the relations between colonizing aristocracies and the home culture tended to grow rather weak. After a few generations, as long as there

\(^{250}\) Sedlar, *East Central Europe*, p. 402.

\(^{251}\) *Sicut enim ex diversis partibus et provinciis ueniunt hospites, ita diuersas linguas et consuetudines, diuersaque documenta et arma secum ducunt, que omnia regiam ornant et magnificant aulam, et perterritant exterorum arroganciam, nam uniuis lingue uniuisque moris regnum imbecille et fragile est ... iubeo tibi ut bona volintate illos nutrias et honeste teneas, ut tecum libencius degant, quam alicubi habitent.* S. L. Endlicher, ed., *Rerum Hungaricarum monumenta Arpadiana* (St. Gall: Scheitlin & Zollikofer, 1849), pp. 805-806.

\(^{252}\) Alessandro Soddu has made a tally of the judicial charters written by named individuals, and finds that with few exceptions, they were all clerics. Alessandro Soddu, “Poteri pubblici e poteri signorili in Sardegna,” pp. 348-349.
were no differences of religion between the nobility of the colonizers and that of the colonized peoples, often there was little difference between the two.\footnote{Bartlett, \textit{The Making of Europe}, p. 59; for a situation in which the differences did persist, see Sally McKee, \textit{Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), esp. Chapter Three.}

It must be admitted that bishops, too, present complications as far as understanding colonization is concerned. A bishop in a colonized land, after all, was serving not only his \textit{patria}, assuming that he was doing so at all, but also the universal Church. In a way, therefore, while lay colonizers could be free to be single-minded about using Sardinia to improve their own wealth and that of their \textit{patria}, prelates were theoretically more constricted in their colonizing activity because they were supposed not only to be served by Sardinia, but also to serve their Sardinian flock, as Gregory I outlined in his \textit{Rule of Pastoral Care}. During the papal reforms of the eleventh century, the \textit{Rule} had been revalidated and used as a basis for the ideal reformed bishop of the eleventh and twelfth centuries; it devotes one of its four books to “how a right-living rector ought to teach and admonish his flock,” while another is concerned wholly with good preaching.\footnote{\textit{qualiter rector bene uiuens debeat docere et admonere subditos}. Gregorius Magnus, \textit{Regula pastoralis}, Clavis Patrum Latinorum (1712), part 3, prol., line 1; published by \textit{Library of Latin Texts Online – Series A} (LLTO – A) (Brepolis, 19/06/2014), at \texttt{http://www.brepolis.net/} On the revalidation of Gregory I’s ideals during the eleventh-century reform, see I. S. Robinson, \textit{Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest: The Polemical Literature of the Late Eleventh Century} (Manchester: MUP, 1978), pp. 22-24.} A bishop’s position entailed responsibilities to his diocese and the society in which he found himself. Although documentation does not survive regarding the actual fulfillment of episcopal pastoral duties in Sardinia, it would be not only overly cynical, but also unrealistic to assume that all Pisan or Genoese bishops saw Sardinia purely as a land to be exploited for their home cities, rather than a land also to be provided with conscientious pastoral care. Indeed, Timothy Reuter has argued that bishops’ interests were primarily concerned not with their places of origin, but with their dioceses, which provided them with both authority and resources, and which were, most of the time, their home. In Reuter’s view, it is wrong to view bishops mainly as aspects of a central political power, like a king or, in the case of Pisa and Genoa, a commune.\footnote{Timothy Reuter, “Ein Europa der Bischöfe. Das Zeitalter Burchards von Worms,” in \textit{Bischof Burchard von Worms, 1000-1025}, ed. Wilfried Hartmann (Mainz: Selbsverlag der Gesellschaft für Mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte, 2000), pp. 10-28.}

Additionally, it should be noted that foreign prelates in Sardinia did not import Italian settlers. This marks a difference with other non-military colonial situations in Europe. German prelates in Eastern Europe are an example of this difference, like Bishop Thomas of Wrocław in 1237 who worked actively to settle
German peasants on Slavic land. This divergence may, perhaps, be in large part ascribed to the political structure of Sardinia, which was not based upon the granting of fiefs. Bishop Thomas of Wroclaw could achieve German settlement by granting land to his knight “in consideration for his services ... to be settled according to German law in the same way that our adjoining villages ... are settled.” A twelfth-century bishop in Sardinia, however, could not grant a fief to a Pisan in the hope of seeing Pisan settlers increase the productivity of his land. Although it is not clear precisely what land bishops owned, and what rights they had over them, Sardinia certainly has nothing to compare with the Polish bishops who obtained privileges of immunity for their lands and were even able to issue their own coins. This is not to say that there were no Pisan settlers in Sardinia, but simply that they were not brought there in an organized fashion by prelates.

Nevertheless, compared with the laity, prelates have a unique value for the study of colonialism. Pisan or Genoese churchmen who took a position in Sardinia, or, for that matter, German prelates in Eastern European dioceses, were filling a role that would lose its relevance for their family when they died or were transferred to another position. A Pisan who was a bishop in Sardinia could have little long-term interest in establishing himself in local society, because he would have no legitimate offspring with which to begin a Sardinian family line, or to whom to leave Sardinian properties. Furthermore, starting from the late eleventh century, successive popes used the archbishop of Pisa to push through reforms in the Sardinian church and thereby to increase papal authority on an island that, at times, clung obstinately to its Byzantine-origin traditions. Sardinian bishops or archbishops who came from Pisa, therefore, came from an institutional context that was accustomed to seeing Sardinia as a land in need of reform, and, by

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258 Berend *et al.*, *Central Europe in the High Middle Ages*, p. 380.
259 John Day was the most vocal promoter of the idea of a true “colonization” of Sardinia, and saw it as a purely economic-demographic phenomenon. In his view, the arrival of Italians in Sardinia was due to their own capitalist desire to impose a colonial economy on the island; accordingly, individual merchants, not bishops, were the main protagonists behind the colonization of Sardinia that encouraged Italian settlers to move to the island. See John Day, *La Sardegna sotto la dominazione pisano-genovese* (Turin: UTET, 1986). Nevertheless, Sardinia never experienced the kind of mass migration that other territories, like Sicily or Eastern Europe, underwent.
260 The evidence regarding the survival of Orthodox customs that needed to be “reformed” is scanty and debated, but not necessarily to be rejected. Gregory VII, in 1080, ordered the archbishop of Cagliari to “make and compel all the clergy under your authority shave their beards.” Gregorius VII, *Registrum Epistularum*, MGH, Epp. sel. II, 2; Epist. VIII, 10, p. 529, l. 15. This cannot have had much effect, because 140 years later, in 1226, a pan-Sardinian synod still dealt with bearded clergy, and ordered that clerics should not wear beards. For the text, see Mauro Sanna, ed., *Onorio III e la Sardegna* (Cagliari: CUEC, 2013), pp. 179-191, Appendice documentaria, at p. 184. Even in 1335 a community of Orthodox hermits seems to have been still living in Capoterra, roughly 20 kilometers, or 12 miles, from Cagliari. See Graziano Milia, “La civiltà giudicale,” in *Storia dei Sardi e della Sardegna*, Vol. 2, pp. 201-202.
inference, civilizing, as discussed in Chapter Two.\textsuperscript{261} Thus, not only did Pisan prelates’ lack of (legitimate) progeny provide them with less need to integrate with Sardinian society, but they also may have had more ideological reasons to resist doing so.

Where Pisans and Genoese appear in the Sardinian church, therefore, it can be argued that their intentions, or the intentions of whoever arranged for them to arrive there, were more likely to be colonialist, at least in the medieval sense of re-creating “home” away from home rather than embracing a foreign culture, but perhaps also in the modern, exploitative sense. In support of this approach, Eastern Europe again provides a useful point of reference: here, in colonial circumstances very similar to Pisan Sardinia, German bishops tended to show marked favor to German clerics, frequently promoting them in place of Slavic clerics, and actively fostered German colonization of Eastern European land.\textsuperscript{262} From the point of view of Pisa and Genoa, therefore, church positions could be tools by which to fortify and represent the city’s political and moral authority over the Sardinian rulers, nobles, and ecclesiastical organizations. While the judices gained prestige through their cultured foreign bishops, the prelates themselves gained importance, the commune gained a voice in Sardinian politics, and the Pisan or Genoese merchants in Sardinia may have gained protectors.

It is, of course, dangerous to see the issue of Pisan penetration in solely ethnic terms. Indeed, the matter of defining and ascribing “ethnicity” is a fraught one, and care must be taken not to fall into the trap of “essentializing” what it meant to be Pisan, Sard, Genoese, or any other “ethnic” category. In other words, it should not be assumed that an ethnic label like “Pisan” corresponded to a fixed set of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that necessarily supported Pisa’s colonization of Sardinia. As Homi Bhabha puts it, the fact that a person or group of people has been marked out as different cannot be seen as evidence of “pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition.”\textsuperscript{263} Furthermore, in the absence of specific information about the origins, beliefs and attitudes of prelates in Sardinia, the only clue as to where they came from usually is their names, and the only evidence of their attitudes or beliefs is often their actions in founding or enriching monasteries, quarrelling with monasteries in their dioceses, or participating in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{261} The connection between foreign bishops, conversion or ecclesiastical reform, and colonization is made from a different perspective by Judith Herren, who notes that ninth-century Orthodox missionary work in East Central Europe “probably did more than anything else to transform [the Slavs] into Byzantine citizens.” Judith Herren, \textit{Margins and Metropolis: Authority Across the Byzantine Empire} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 17.
\bibitem{263} Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture}, p. 5.
\end{thebibliography}
judical politics. Yet even in the absence of detailed information about these churchmen, it is not impossible to draw conclusions about their ethnic identity. The key here is how “ethnicity” is defined. In this and the following chapter, ethnicity will be thought of in large part as Werner Sollors and Frederick Barth have described it: “the ethnic boundary that defines the group.” In Sollors’ and Barth’s thinking, ethnicity is defined by the border-markers that members of each ethnicity use to decide who is part of their own ethnicity, and who is not.\(^{264}\) It is particularly prone to surface in a group’s thinking when that group is confronted with a different group, and must define its own identity in order to survive as a culture. Thus, groups of people who have “relatively little cultural differentiation” and similar genes may still belong to different ethnicities, because they themselves have collectively defined themselves as different.\(^{265}\)

In Sardinia, the fact that a very distinctive indigenous naming tradition began to be invaded by names from north-Italian onomastic culture over the course of the twelfth-century suggests both that foreign individuals were arriving in Sardinia and appearing in its documentation, and that, from the mid-twelfth century on, Sards began to borrow from this foreign naming tradition when naming their children. In some cases, these may indicate the intermarriage of northern Italians and Sards. When both parents were “indigenous,” decisions not to name their child for the child’s ancestors, close family members, or local saints, but instead to choose a name brought in by Pisan and Genoese merchants and clergy, surely indicate also a cultural choice on the part of the family. They were moments in which the onomastic markers of Pisan or Genoese ethnicity were recognized and appropriated by Sards who wished to join that prestigious foreign ethnicity. Another possibility is that, if a bishop with a foreign name was a monk, his name may indicate his adult choice to take on a foreign monastic name; a choice to name himself after a foreign rather than a local saint may suggest an attachment to “European” spirituality. Other markers of Pisan or Genoese ethnicity were cultural practices, like the choice of patronizing one monastic Order rather than another. As this chapter will show, foreign names and foreign cultural practices often go hand-in-hand among bishops and archbishops in Sardinia. Sometimes, indeed perhaps often, such foreign names belonged to prelates who had been born in Pisa or Genoa. Nevertheless, it will be argued that the conjunction of foreign names and typically Pisan or Genoese practices among the prelacy, regardless of their place of birth, indicates bishops who were ethnically Pisan or Genoese.

Even if not all foreign-named bishops were necessarily born outside Sardinia, some certainly were. An important question, therefore, is why Sardinian ecclesiastical positions were valuable to outside powers.

\(^{264}\) Werner Sollors, “Who is Ethnic?” p. 192.
\(^{265}\) Ibid.
One reason, from at least the middle of the 1200s but perhaps earlier, was their role as judicial electors. In the thirteenth century, the concept of the ‘elected judex’ began to be emphasized by the Sardinian elite and the pope. The Libellus Judicum Turritanorum, a chronicle written some time between 1255 and 1287, recorded that “in ancient times this island of Sardinia ... was ruled and governed by judges, who were elected by the Holy Roman Church,” and that Logudoro’s supposed first judex, “a man called Andrea Tanca, was elected as judex and lord of Logudoro at the request of the prelates and nobles of the same Logudoro.”

The Libellus' description of another election, in the mid-twelfth century, follows the same pattern: “when Judex Barisone [of Logudoro] had gone, all the prelates and nobles of Logudoro came together and elected, in council, Prince Costantino, the first-born of Judex Barisone.” This and other examples show that while primogeniture was the de facto rule, confirmation by the populus or maioriales, that is, the nobility and prelates, was essential for any judex to be a legitimate ruler. Such claims were obviously to the advantage of the pope, especially as he began to take greater control over episcopal nominations in the thirteenth century, but as long as Pisan or Genoese clerics could hold Sardinian sees the elective concept was surely valuable for Pisa and Genoa, too.

There is no direct record detailing the procedures of such an election, and therefore no record of what took place or what role the bishops played, but the possible uses of such election-confirmations for Pisa are suggested by a similar European context, this time in Bohemia. There, a similar mixture of inheritance and election governed successions to the throne throughout the twelfth century. Also as in Sardinia, the clergy held an important role in these elections: in 1109 a serious electoral crisis developed when the bishop of Prague led part of the nobility in supporting a rival claimant to the throne. More importantly, in Bohemia this elective principle seems to have played into the hands of the region’s colonizers. The Bohemian King Sobeslav I, wishing to strengthen his son’s title to the throne, arranged for the German king Conrad to confirm his son’s succession, and even had his son formally receive Bohemia from Conrad as a fief.

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266 Antiguamente icusta isula de Sardinna ... fuit regidu et governadu per Juigues, quales fuerunt electos dea sa Santa Ecclesia Romana ... stetisit elegidu, pro Juigue et donnu de su Cabu de Logudoro, unu clamadu donna Andria Tanca, a requesta de sos Prelados et Lieros de su dictu Cabu de Logudoro. Libellus Judicum Turritanorum, p. 45.

267 Partidu su dictu Juigue Barisone, si congregaint totu sos Perlados et Lieros de Logudoro et elegisin, per consigiu, a domicellu Guantine, primogenitu de su dictu Juigue Barisone. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

268 Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” pp. 103-104. It has to be admitted that the idea of the elected judex may have been to some extent an invention in Sardinia, a response to the incursion of new mainland dynasties that will be discussed in Chapter Four. See ibid., pp. 133-136; Rowland, The Periphery in the Center. 162; and Zedda, L’Ultima Illusione Mediterranea, p. 76.

269 Berend et al., Central Europe in the High Middle Ages, p. 169.

270 Ibid., pp. 168-169.
rightful rulers of each judicate, their value to foreign powers interested in influencing Sardinian politics is obvious.

In addition to elections, there is plenty of evidence to show that throughout the twelfth century bishops played an essential role in deciding judicial politics. The lists of witnesses to each judicial charter of donation and each treaty of peace show that the approval of both lay nobility and bishops was necessary if a judex wished to make concessions to churches and monasteries, or make treaties with foreign powers such as Pisa and Genoa.271 As elsewhere in Europe, bishops were also often military men who accompanied their judex to war or held castles.272 With this in mind, it is easy to see why not only Pisa and Genoa, but also successive popes, might wish to see their own men become archbishops, bishops, and priors in strategic Sardinian locations.

There is no way, unfortunately, of knowing what percentage of Sardinian prelates were chosen by Pisa or Genoa at any one time, or whether particular dioceses were felt to be especially valuable for advancing each city’s claims. Nothing like a complete list of archbishops is available for any of the three archdioceses of Torres, Arborea and Cagliari, for the suffragan dioceses within them, or for the two dioceses in Gallura, which was not itself an archdiocese. In 2000 Raimondo Turtas, in his *Storia della Chiesa in Sardegna*, compiled a chronology based on all the datable references to bishops and archbishops in Sardinia, and more recently Massimiliano Vidili has completed a “documented” chronology of the archbishops of Logudoro from 1065 to 1298, and the archbishops of Arborea from 1200 to 1437.273 These sources represent the most reliable information to date on the names of bishops in each diocese and archdiocese, but the scarcity of primary documentation means that there are many years and, at times, decades for which the identity of bishops in particular sees is unknown. It is likewise frequently impossible to know the beginning and end dates for the rule of these prelates. Furthermore, there is no way of knowing what factors went into the choice of any one man to each position: whether

271 Both of these phenomena will be discussed in Chapter Four. See also Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale della Sardegna,” p. 103.

272 In 1263 the archbishop and bishops of Arborea were on the field of battle with their judex: see Chapter Four, at n. 293. For the situation elsewhere in Europe, see Daniel Gerrard, “Fighting Clergy, Church Councils and the Contexts of Law: the Cutting Edge of Orthodoxy or the Ambiguous Limits of Legitimacy?” in *Heresy and the Making of European Culture: Medieval and Modern Perspectives*, ed. Andrew Roach and James Simpson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 275-288; *idem*, “Chivalry, War and Clerical Identity: England and Normandy, c. 1056-1226” in *Ecclesia et Violentia: Violence Against the Church and Violence Within the Church in the Middle Ages*, ed. Radosław Kotecki and Jacek Maciejewski (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2014).

Pisan prelates were always the product of pressure from the commune, or whether judices or Sardinian cathedral chapters sometimes freely chose a Pisan or Genoese bishop for the sake of his learning, culture, political experience or holiness. Nevertheless, by looking at all the information available for all the dioceses and archdioceses in Sardinia, a number of interesting trends and phenomena can be identified.

3.3 The Political and Cultural Use of Sardinian Bishoprics in the Twelfth Century

3.3.1 The Arrival of Pisan Prelates in Logudoro

Some time between 1082 and 1112 the archdiocese of Torres received a Pisan bishop, a certain Guido da Pisa, who held the suffragan diocese of Bisarcio. It is probably no coincidence that it was in precisely 1082 that Judex Mariano I of Logudoro had made his landmark donation to the Opera of S. Maria di Pisa, including the abbey of S. Michele di Plaiano, seemingly in return for help in reforming the clergy of Logudoro. Nor is it likely to be coincidence that Bisarcio, Guido da Pisa’s new Logudorese diocese, enjoyed a special prestige within the judicate. Logudoro’s capital, Ardara, was only seven miles, or eleven kilometers, from the cathedral of of S. Antioco of Bisarcio, and probably because of this the bishops of Bisarcio traditionally enjoyed a close relationship with the judices of Logudoro from at least the late eleventh century on. Indeed, the writer of Mariano I’s 1082 donation charter was himself a “Costantino bishop of Bisarcio,” perhaps Guido’s direct predecessor.\textsuperscript{274} It is even probable that for a period that may have lasted from 1090, when the cathedral of Bisarcio burned down, to at least 1139, when there is evidence of a bishop calling himself “the bishop of Ardara,” the bishops of Bisarcio were based in Ardara’s own church.\textsuperscript{275} Later, the bishops of Bisarcio, in particular, would be called “the counsellor of the judices regarding the governance of the land and the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{276} Thus, the choice to place a Pisan bishop in Bisarcio at the turn of the twelfth century, when Logudoro was first beginning to tighten formal links with Pisa, was especially meaningful.


\textsuperscript{275} Marianus Ardarensis episcopus, who appears as a witness to a monastic donation in 1139. CDS, p. 213, doc. 50. See also Francesco Amadu, \textit{La Diocesi medioevale di Bisarcio}, ed. Giuseppe Meloni (Sassari: Carlo Delfino, 2003), pp. 19-20.

\textsuperscript{276} consigliante de los Juigues in sos ordinamentos de sa terra et de su regnu, quoted in Amadu, \textit{La Diocesi medioevale di Bisarcio}, p. 18.
Another detail casts light on the possible significance of Guido’s arrival in a Sardinian diocese, and this is the fact that only nine years before Mariano’s 1082 donation, in 1073, the Sardinian bishop of Bosa, Costantino di Castra, had consecrated Bosa’s cathedral to St. Peter.\textsuperscript{277} Considering the ecclesiastical/political context of Sardinia at the time, this cannot have been a casual choice. Gregory VII was in the midst of his efforts to bring Sardinia fully into the Roman Church, and in October of the same year, would write to all four judices to warn them that since “you have made yourselves more foreign to us than people who are at the edge of the world ... it is most necessary that you should think more carefully about the salvation of your souls, and recognize your mother the Roman Church.”\textsuperscript{278} Bishop Costantino di Castra’s choice of Rome’s own patron saint for his own cathedral has not been commented upon before, but it was surely a religio-political statement that Bosa, and the archdiocese of Torres, wished to belong to St. Peter’s Roman Church.

Furthermore, in the same letter Gregory VII advised the judices that he was sending them “our brother Costantino, archbishop of Torres, to whom you must carefully attend,”\textsuperscript{279} and in a letter written a few months later to the Judex of Cagliari, Gregory noted that Costantino di Castra had been “consecrated archbishop of Torres by us, this year, at Capua.”\textsuperscript{280} Costantino di Castra, previously bishop of Bosa, had therefore been raised to the archdiocesan seat only shortly after consecrating the cathedral of Bosa to St. Peter, and upon his consecration as archbishop was put to use as a papal agent to advise not only the judex of Logudoro, but also the judex of Cagliari, on how to reform the Sardinian Church to comply with Rome. When in 1082 Judex Mariano donated land to Pisa’s cathedral because he was “seeing the churches of [his] realm empty and naked of religion and ecclesiastical doctrine, and regarding [his] homeland lying in wicked sins on account of the negligence of the clergy and because their lives are like those of laymen,” and because he was concerned for “the salvation of [his] homeland,” he was clearly continuing the same reforming movement that Costantino di Castra had initiated a decade before.\textsuperscript{281}

\textsuperscript{277} An inscription in the cathedral reads: \textit{Ego Constantinus de Castra Episcopus, Pro Amore Dei, Hanc Ecclesiam Aedificare Feci.} Fara, \textit{De Chorographia Sardiniae, de rebus Sardois}, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{278} \textit{tantum, ut a nobis, plus quam gentes, quae sunt in fine mundi, vos extraneos fecistis ... unde multum vobis necessarium est ut de salute animarum vestrarum studiosius admodum cogitetis, et matrem vestram romanam Ecclesiam ... recognoscatis}. CDS, p. 156, doc. 10.

\textsuperscript{279} \textit{magna ex parte confratri nostro Constantinus turrensi archiepiscopo vobis referenda commisisimus}. CDS, p. 156, doc. 10.

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{archiepiscopum Constantinum turrensem hoc in anno a nobis Capuae consecratum tibi mandavimus}. CDS, p. 157, doc. 11. For the indentification of Archbishop Costantino of Torres with Bishop Costantino di Castra of Bosa, see Centro Sardo di Ricerche Socio-Religiose, \textit{L'Organizzazione della Chiesa in Sardegna 1971}, pp. 166-167.

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{videns ecclesias mei regni esse vacuas atque nudas ecclesiastica doctrina atque religione et prospeciens meam patriam in nefandis peccatis iacentem propter negligentiam clericorum et propter vitam eorum similem laicorum ... pro salute totius mee patrie}. Besta, \textit{Il liber judicum turritanorum}, pp. 14-15.
Placed within this context, Judex Mariano’s acceptance of Pisan Bishop Guido in the diocese most nearly connected to the political capital of Ardara shows a similar willingness to initiate ecclesiastical reform, and to be guided by a Pisan ecclesiastic in doing so.

Finally, the strong likelihood that Guido da Pisa was coming not only as a representative of the Roman Church, but also of the city of Pisa and the culture of northern Italy, and that his coming had not just spiritual, but also political and economic implications, is suggested by a grant made by the same Judex Mariano between 1080 and 1085. This, the so-called Privilege of Logudoro, gave an “exemption from trading taxes, in honor of all the men of Pisa” and the “promise that no Pisan shall be killed arbitrarily;” Mariano declared that he was making the charter “in honor of Bishop Gerard [of Pisa] and of Ugo Visconti and all the consuls of Pisa.” None of these measures can have furthered ecclesiastical reform. Clearly, Mariano was combining the church reform invoked by his 1082 grant to the Cathedral of S. Maria, on one hand, with the economic development and political alliance inherent in the Privilege of Logudoro, on the other, to strengthen the political, ecclesiastical and mercantile ties between Logudoro and Pisa. The nomination of Guido to the see of Bisarcio makes it evident that these ties brought him a Pisan bishop. Nothing is known of Guido da Pisa other than his name, and it would be incorrect to suggest that he was the first of a flood of Pisan prelates into the bishoprics of Logudoro. Still, the connection between his arrival, Logudoro’s church reform, and the trade exemptions for Pisans is already indicative of the relationship between foreign bishops in Sardinian sees and the power dynamics between the judices and the Italian communes.

The names of Guido’s near contemporaries support this idea. As was shown in Chapter Two, Logudoro was a focus of Pisan expansion in the early twelfth century, and indeed the Privilege of Logudoro in 1080-1085 had been actively sought by “ambassadors” from Pisa. Furthermore, in 1114, as Chapter Two showed, a member of the Logudorese royal family would sail with Pisan ships to fight in the Balearics. Guido da Pisa’s control of a diocesan seat in Logudoro in this period must have been particularly useful to the commune, and may be connected to the fact that by 1112 the archbishop of Torres bore the northern Italian name of Azzo. It cannot be proven that Azzo was Pisan; perhaps he came from some other area in northern Italy, but given the pro-Pisan politics of the judex of Logudoro it seems

282 ad onore de omnes homines de Pisas pro xu toloneu ci mi pecterunt ... in placitu de non occidere pisanu ingratis ... e dego feci-nde-lis carta pro honore de xu piscopum Gelardu e de Ocu Biscomte, e de omnes consolos de Pisas. Eduardo Blasco Ferrer, Linguistica sarda. Storia, metodi, problemi (Cagliari: Condagues, 2002), pp. 536-537.
283 mi petterum su toloneu, ligatarios. Blasco Ferrer, Linguistica sarda, pp. 536-537.
284 Saltaro, who sailed with the Pisans on the Balearic Crusade, was the son of Gonnario’s wife by her first husband; his heir was Gonnario. See Chapter Two, at n. 102, and Libellus Judicum Turritanorum, pp. 46-47.
highly unlikely that he was Genoese. His suffragan bishops, however, were probably mostly indigenous. The diocese of Sorres had two successive foreign bishops, it is true: a “Bishop Jacobus of Sorres” in 1112 and an “Albertus bishop of the Church of Sorres” in 1113, but the “Nicolaus, bishop of Ampurias,” was likely to have been Sardinian; of unclear ethnicity was the the “Petrus, bishop of Bisarcio,” the “Johannes bishop of Ottana” and the “Petrus bishop of the church of Bosa” in 1112, although this last was followed in the same year by a “Marinus” who was almost certainly foreign. At this early date, therefore, Pisan ecclesiastical influence in Logudoro was probably concentrated in the figure of the north-Italian Archbishop Azzo of Torres.

3.3.2 Archbishop Azzo of Torres, Western Monasticism, and the Cultural Colonization of Logudoro

How Archbishop Azzo acted to colonize Logudoro culturally can be seen in his participation in the founding or enriching of monasteries. He witnessed two foundations of Camaldolese monasteries made by Judex Costantino, two aristocratic foundations of Cassinese monasteries, and two aristocratic donations to the Cassinese. Although he did not make these foundations himself, he did make his own grants to Judex Costantino’s foundations in order to confirm them, and his presence as witness shows his active awareness of, and perhaps guidance in, the creation of all the acts of patronage. Two aspects of these donations and foundations are particularly important for understanding Azzo’s role in Logudoro. One is the fact that these particular foundations and donations mark the advent of Western monasticism in

[285] Jacobus Sorranus Episcopus, who witnessed Archbishop Azzo’s charter to SS. Trinità of Saccargia: Ginevra Zanetti I Camaldolesi in Sardegna (Cagliari: Editrice sarda Fossataro, 1974), pp. VII-XI, doc. 3; Albertus episcopus Soranae ecclesiae, who witnessed the de Athen donation of S. Nicola of Trullas to the Order of Camaldoli: CDS, pp. 189-191, doc. 17. Both names are foreign to the highly distinctive Sardinian onomastic tradition. For Sardinian naming patterns, see the excellent article on interactions between historical social change and onomastic change in medieval Sardinia by Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società,” pp. 175-252.


[290] Apart from the two royal foundations, both made to the Order of Camaldoli, both noble donations were made by the De Thori family to the monks of Montecassino. See Vidili, “La cronotassi documentata degli arcivescovi di Torres,” p. 85, including fn. 16.
Logudoro, in the form of the monasticism of Montecassino and the eremitical monasticism of Camaldoli. Moreover, although the Camaldolese had a presence in Arborea before 1110, the aristocratic Cassinese foundations in Lodudoro, made between 1113 and 1120, represented Montecassino’s first entrance in all of Sardinia. Thus, when Archbishop Azzo witnessed four monastic foundations, two Camaldolese and two Cassinese, he was an active participant in importing prestigious European spiritual movements to Logudoro, and helping Logudoro to become an ecclesiastical innovator in Sardinia. Indeed, he may have been the “prime mover” in this process.

Why, precisely, it was Cassinese and Camaldolese monasticism in particular that arrived under his rule is not wholly clear. Gabriele Colombini points out that conflicts between Montecassino and Pope Paschal II spurred Paschal to turn to the Orders of Camaldoli and Vallombrosa for support in the second decade of the twelfth century; upon receiving it, he publicly promoted them. Simultaneously, the Camaldolese began to obtain donations in Sardinia, although the Vallombrosans would not arrive on the island for another fifteen or twenty years. Gabriele Colombini, therefore, sees the arrival and success of the Camaldolese in Sardinia as a result of Camaldoli’s good relations with the papacy, and the judices’ attempts to ingratiate themselves with Rome by patronizing an Order favored by the pope. Yet he does not explain why, in this period of tension between Paschal and Montecassino, Montecassino too made its first entrance into Logudoro. Considering Pisa as a possible model for monastic patronage in Logudoro may help clarify this problem. For one thing, the eremitical Order of Camaldoli was not only favored by Paschal II, but was also heavily patronized in Pisa, and Fabio Di Pietro and Raoul Romano call the Camaldolese in Sardinia “traditionally tied to the politics of the Tuscan marine republic [Pisa].” As for the Cassinese, Herbert Bloch has shown that they acquired their first monasteries in Logudoro only a few years after they acquired the monastery of S. Silvestro in Pisa, and that the monks of Montecassino thought of the Order’s possessions in Pisa as linked to those in Sardinia. Thus, although no formal link between Pisan and Logudorese patronage can be proven, it may be suggested that Azzo was not only representing the interests and preferences of the papacy and Roman Christianity in general, but was also guiding monastic patronage in Logudoro toward the pattern of patronage found in Pisa.


293 Herbert Bloch, Monte Cassino in the Middle Ages, p. 474.
The second important aspect of Azzo’s participation in Logudorese monastic patronage has to do with the fact that, after Judex Costantino had founded his two Camaldolese monasteries, Azzo granted both of them unusual jurisdictional immunities in his confirmation charter. One of these foundations was the Abbey of the Santissima Trinità of Saccargia, which is well-known in Sardinian medieval studies for having enjoyed the most generous jurisdictional and financial exemptions of any Sardinian monastery; the other was S. Pietro of Scano, which also enjoyed uncommon levels of exemptions. Both were founded in 1112. It is important to note that the financial and jurisdictional exemptions made by Azzo’s confirmation charters are not matched by similar exemptions in Judex Costantino’s foundation charters for these two institutions. Indeed, as both Marco Tangheroni and Alessandro Soddu have pointed out, lay jurisdictional exemptions seem never to have been granted to monasteries in Sardinia, and ecclesiastical exemptions are extremely rare, making Sardinia an unusual context for Western monasticism. In short, at the same time that north-Italian Azzo was participating in the new Logudorese patronage of Montecassino and Camaldoli, to two of these monasteries he was also granting exemptions that were highly uncommon in Sardinia.

Considering this, it is worth examining the possibility that the uniqueness of Azzo’s exemptions in Sardinia, in conjunction with other evidence, is a symptom of a profound difference between Sardinian and continental Italian assumptions about the meaning of monastic foundation. For the purposes of this thesis, this is important for two reasons. On one hand, as the following discussion will show, it reveals an aspect of Sardinia’s ambiguous cultural identity as both periphery and center, even before undergoing Italian colonization. As the Introduction showed, Sardinia’s “centrality” was not only geographical but religious, given its long Christian past; it was “peripheral,” though, thanks to its centuries-long isolation from Western ecclesiastical, political and cultural developments. On the other hand, this difference in mindsets would remain little changed well into the fourteenth century, providing a rather uncommon case of only semi-successful cultural colonization on the part of the Pisans and other north-Italians. As a whole, then, the goals and attitudes of Archbishop Azzo, Judex Costantino, and Logudorese society, as seen in and after the foundation of Sardinia’s first two Camaldolese monasteries, will provide an unusual insight into the complex interactions between Church and Europeanization in a society that was itself both central and peripheral.

Key to understanding these different attitudes is the relationship that donors, founders, and prelates expected to have with monasteries. Barbara Rosenwein has shown how attitudes regarding monastic jurisdictional immunities shifted between the sixth and tenth centuries in Western Europe, ending in a widely accepted idea that monasteries should enjoy certain exemptions from the jurisdiction of both bishops and kings.\(^{295}\) Frequently these exemptions were given at the moment of a monastery’s founding, and usually the more prestigious a monastery, the more exemptions it enjoyed. Battle Abbey in England is an example; so is Cluny in France. It is true that in Sardinia, as in other areas, donations of land and servants to monasteries might exempt these servants of their customary dues to the “realm” or the judex. The *Condaghe* of S. Maria of Bonarcado records that Judex Costantino of Arborea ordered a number of serfs “and their sons and the grandsons of their grandsons to serve S. Maria of Bonarcado forever ... and [they] shall not be assigned to any other duties of the judicate, either by local officials or by regional governors.”\(^{296}\) In this respect, Sardinia’s similarity to other European lands, and particularly other peripheral lands, can be seen by looking at twelfth-century Poland. There, as Piotr Gorecki shows, peasants on a Cistercian estate in Silesia “shall not be required by anyone to pay anything, or to perform any service,” except to the abbot and monks.\(^{297}\) Thus far, therefore, Sardinia followed wider European customs regarding monastic exemptions, and complied with Roman Christian norms.

When it comes to jurisdictional exemptions, however, SS. Trinità of Saccargia and S. Pietro of Scano seem to be the only cases, out of all the foundations made in the twelfth century, that were given these.\(^{298}\) Even in the entry from the *Condaghe* of S. Maria of Bonarcado cited above, Judex Costantino follows his dedication of the serfs with a clarifying statement that has not been pointed out in previous studies: “they will serve there in perpetuity and shall be subject to God, to the judex of the realm and to the monks who serve at S. Maria of Bonarcado.”\(^{299}\) That this lack of jurisdictional immunity reflects the reality for


\(^{296}\) *poniollos ut serviant a sancta Maria de Bonarcatu et ipsos et fiios suos et nepotes nepotorum suorum usque in sempiternum ... n’a ateru serviçu de logu non si levent non per curadore et non per maiore de scolca.* CSMB, pp. 176-179, doc. 131. A similar privilege was conferred on a Cistercian house in Logudoro in 1205: see CDS, pp. 307-308, doc. 5.


\(^{298}\) 104 new monasteries are calculated to have been founded in Sardinia between 1100 and 1200; 60 of these were in Logudoro. See Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, pp. 191-197. For the singularity of Saccargia’s jurisdictional exemptions, and a comparison with the (usually financial) exemptions that other monastic foundation charters provided in twelfth-century Sardinia, see Soddu and De Santis, “Signorie monastiche nella Sardegna medievale,” pp. 355-360.

\(^{299}\) *Ive serviant usque in sempiternum et siant in manu de Deus et de iudice de logu et de monagos ki ant servire ad sancta Maria de Bonarcatu.* CSMB, pp. 178-179, doc. 131.
monasticism in Sardinia is further shown by the complete lack of any sign of monastic courts in Sardinia. This forms a stark contrast to a wide arc of lands, from England to Croatia, where the more important monasteries, as S. Maria of Bonarcado was, could easily expect to have jurisdictional rights over the inhabitants of their own lands. In this sense, therefore, Sardinia was even more peripheral than the “periphery” of East-Central Europe. The Sardinian condaghes consistently show priors and abbots taking their legal quarrels before the secular courts, despite the repeated papal bulls that cite their jurisdictional immunity. A prior of S. Maria of Bonarcado took a thief before the secular “regional court,” which would have been presided over by a secular official; a prior of S. Nicola of Trullas was called before the “court of the judex” and required to “produce witnesses, and [he] produced them: the priests who had confessed [the plaintiff].” This situation continued throughout the twelfth century, as can be seen by the fact that Innocent III, in 1204, firmly chastised the judex of Logudoro because “not only do you judge [clerics] yourself, but you have them judged by your subjects, and reduce them to such servitude that at the command of laymen they are forced to present testimony in civil causes before a secular judge.” Innocent also noted that not only Comita, but also “the other Sardinian judices” were guilty of these practices, indicating an approach to justice that existed throughout the island.

One simple and plausible explanation for this peculiarity and its long endurance, though one that has not been offered before, is Sardinia’s Byzantine ecclesiastical heritage. After all, the monastic immunities in continental Europe that have been so well described by Rosenwein came out of ecclesiastical developments between the sixth and tenth centuries, a period in which Sardinia’s main cultural contacts lay outside “Western” Europe. It is true that Sardinia was a close ally of the Franks against the Arabs, but

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302 *et osca certaruninde mecu ... in corona de iudice Gosantine de Laccon ... et iudicarunmi a testes; et ego batussilos: sos prebiteros ki li levaran penitentia*. CSNT, pp. 66-69, doc. 46.


304 *tam te quam alios Sardinie iudices*. Ibid.

305 Reacting against a previous historiographical trend, Turtas warns against “hyper-byzantinism,” or reading Byzantine influences into too wide a variety of Sardinian cultural aspects: Turtas, *Storia della Chiesa*, p. 172, n. 124. The warning is taken up and repeated by Ortu,*La Sardegna dei Giudici*, p. 31. In this case, however, looking to a Byzantine explanation seems fitting, as will be argued below.
this alliance does not seem to have Romanized the Sardinian Church.³⁰⁶ In 1113, to take just one example, the founders of the Camaldolese monastery of S. Nicola of Trullas, the noble de Athen family, still used the word “eremitas,” rather than “monachos,” to refer to the monks who were already living in the monastery. Similarly, they called the monastery itself an “eremu,” not a “monasteriu.”³⁰⁷ Whatever monks were living at S. Nicola of Trullas when the de Athen family donated it to Camaldoli, they clearly did not belong to a Western Order. If, then, as seems almost certain, Sardinia was little affected by religious currents on the mainland prior to the arrival of Western monasticism in the late eleventh century, and if its main ecclesiastical point of reference was Byzantium rather than Rome, then it would have inherited a legacy of ideas regarding monasticism that were very different from those of Western Europe. It might also have inherited a self-confidence in these ideas that made them difficult to eradicate, which may explain why Sardinian patronage customs continued to diverge from Western norms into the thirteenth century. The historical power and prestige of the Greek Orthodox Church may have given many Sardinians in the twelfth century the feeling that their own Greek-tradition religious customs were worth no less than those of the Italian churchmen, even if it had become politically expedient to favor the customs of the Roman Church. In this way, Sardinia was quite different from the lands of East Central Europe, none of which had long Christian pasts, and thus none of which could claim the religious self-assurance of a people who had long-established Christian traditions that had had the blessing of a prestigious Church.

Rather surprisingly, no study seems to have examined the effects of a Byzantine heritage on ideas of monastic foundations in other areas that had formerly been Byzantine, such as southern Italy or Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the kinds of ideas that Sardinia might have inherited may be inferred by surveying the interactions between church, state, and individuals in the Byzantine Empire. Most relevant to the question of jurisdictional exemptions is the question of what rights private lay and clerical individuals could expect to enjoy over a monastery that they had founded. Byzantine laymen and bishops very often founded their own monasteries, which they regarded as their private property, to be not only owned by

³⁰⁶ For Sardinia’s early medieval history, see the Introduction.

³⁰⁷ *dessos domnos heremitas ci vi sunt comodo in su eremu, et ibi habent esse avestara.* This is the original donation charter by which S. Nicola became a Camaldolese monastery in 1113, and is found in Eduardo Blasco Ferrer, ed., *Crestomazia Sarda dei primi secoli*, Vol. 1, *Officina Linguistica* 4:4 (Nuoro: Illisso, 2003), pp. 33-36. It is true that the Order of Camaldoli was itself an eremitical one, but this does not explain the use of the word “heremitas” for previous monks at S. Nicola who were not Camaldolese, and makes it likely that they were not of the Roman tradition. For later usage of the terms “monachos” and “monasteriu,” an example is a donation charter of Judex Barisone of Arborea in the late twelfth century, in CDS I, p. 253, doc. 111.
their families, but sometimes also administered by them. Even monasteries that were independent of a particular family nonetheless might be tied to a “lay administrator” who would “assist [the monks] in obtaining the temporary and perishable things of this life.” As a tenth-century testament shows, this lay administrator could be the lord of the monastic founder or even the emperor, which would tend to blur the distinction between “administration” and “ownership.” Similarly, Sardinian monastic condaghes show lay nobles who seem to have held roles similar to these Byzantine “lay administrators.” The condaghe of S. Nicola of Trullas, which had been founded by the de Athen family, records that the judex “entrusted [the prior] to Lord Pietro de Athen, who was regional governor, so that [he would ensure] that they would give [donated land to the prior].” Lord Pietro, a member of S. Nicola’s founding family, here had a duty to represent the monastery, as the judex recognized. The same condaghe speaks of a property exchange made by the prior, which was made “with the consent of Lord Presnaci de Marongiu, who was pupillu of the church.” The word “pupillu” carries the meanings of “owner” or “lord,” and the wording in the condaghe clearly shows that this Presnaci had certain rights over S. Nicola that allowed him to approve its property transactions. Both of these figures call to mind the relationship between Byzantine monasteries and their lay administrators.

If individual rights over monasteries in the East could be greater than in the West, however, so were hierarchical rights. In particular, bishops automatically had authority over monasteries unless special exemptions were made. In the case of Euthymios, a prestigious Byzantine monastic founder in the tenth century, the rights of the secular church to interfere in his monastery meant that he was denied burial in his own monastery, because “according to the patriarch, the metropolitans are not willing” to allow it. Likewise, in Sardinia bishops did not make jurisdictional exemptions, although they did at times make financial exemptions; the great number of papal bulls of protection for Sardinia’s monasteries suggest


311 See “Testament of Athanasios the Athonite for the Lavra Monastery,” *ibid*.

310 *donnu Petru de Athen, ci bi fuit curatore, in cuia manu ma posit iudice a daremila.* CSNT, pp. 76-79, doc. 65.


also that bishops habitually interfered in monasteries more than was acceptable to Western Orders. In particular, the recorded presence of an archbishop and two bishops in a secular court judging a monastic lawsuit points to a lack of distinction between lay and secular jurisdiction, and bishops’ systemic authority over monasteries, that seems more Byzantine than Western.  

Finally, land grants to monasteries in Byzantium were not necessarily irrevocable: secular authorities could, and did, reverse earlier donations. An eleventh-century emperor appropriated ecclesiastical property as he saw fit, and in 1367 the patriarch of Constantinople himself affirmed that “if the emperor wanted to take these villages [belonging to a monastery] using his own authority, he could do so; it was he who had donated them to the church and [...] he had the right to do with them whatever he liked.”

This right seems to grow out of a different concept of secular donation. Whereas eleventh-century reforms in Western Europe established that secular donations must be confirmed and repeated by a cleric of episcopal rank or higher, as indeed Archbishop Azzo of Torres did for Judex Costantino, the emperor of Byzantium had donated this land to the monastery by his imperial authority alone. Thus, he had the right to take the land back. In early twelfth-century Cagliari a judex can be seen doing precisely the same thing as a Byzantine emperor, and founding a monastery “from the hand of the judex,” much to his foreign archbishop’s annoyance. The foundation, incidentally, was never recognized by the pope.

Sardinia was not the only Western European land with a Byzantine past, but it was the only formerly Byzantine territory to combine geographical and cultural isolation from Western ecclesiastical and political developments, on one hand, with a centralized and organized political structure, on the other. Indeed, perhaps this may explain why the question of Byzantine attitudes toward monastic foundations has not been raised in studies of other formerly Byzantine territories. The lands in Eastern Europe that had been under Byzantine influence were markedly decentralized, and only began to acquire kings in the late tenth century. Thus, they were in no position to reproduce a Byzantine-style centralized government or its attitudes regarding other jurisdictional bodies. In previously Orthodox Croatia, for example, the Slavonian dukes had extensive jurisdictional rights, and surely it is because of this decentralized government that the king not only granted a full set of exemptions in the Western style to the Cistercian monastery in Zagreb.

314 CSNT pp. 134-135, doc. 182.
315 Thomas, Private Religious Foundations, pp. 82, 195.
but also the same jurisdictional rights that had previously belonged to the Slavonian dukes, along with the royal right to collect taxes on its own property.\textsuperscript{318} Byzantine continental Italy, for its part, was better connected to wider Western currents of spirituality than Sardinia was; Sicily, of course, had been conquered by the Arabs. Corsica had been colonized by Pisa earlier and more thoroughly than Sardinia, and if it had originally had structures similar to those in Sardinia, no evidence of this survives. Even in England, which was naturally never Orthodox but which is known for having had a relatively centralized government in the high and later middle ages, the Church’s basic right to apply its own law, in its own law-courts, to clerics was never questioned.\textsuperscript{319}

Sardinia alone had the conditions to recreate and sustain Byzantine-style states on a small scale, with all that this implies for attitudes regarding church-state relations, and the isolation to prevent these attitudes and political structures from being Westernized before the early twelfth century. The centralization of Sardinian political society can be seen not only in its justice system, but also in its complete lack of aristocratic castles until the decay of judicial power in the mid-thirteenth century. The only castles in twelfth-century Sardinia were those built and maintained by the judices, for the purposes of protecting roadways and defending borders.\textsuperscript{320} Elsewhere in Europe, jurisdictional franchises were also granted to cities, particularly those founded by nobles.\textsuperscript{321} It is true that the only existing Sardinian cities had been founded by foreign noble families, but jurisdictional franchises do not seem to have been granted to lay nobles or their cities, to judge by a 1254 petition to the judex made by the Italian Malaspina family for certain rights to be given to merchants in Bosa, a city that the Malaspina had founded.\textsuperscript{322} Furthermore, if there is any doubt that Byzantine attitudes could survive into the twelfth century, especially after Pisan clergy began to enter the prelacy and as continental families began to settle in Sardinia, it should be noted that even after Innocent III had chastized the judex of Logudoro in 1204 for extending civil law to clerics,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{318} Brigljević, “The Cistercian Monastery and the Medieval Urban Development of Zagreb,” p. 102.
  \item \textsuperscript{320} Alessandro Soddu, \textit{Incastellamento in Sardegna. L’esempio di Monteleone} (Raleigh, N.C.: Aonia edizioni, 2013), pp. 16-17.
  \item \textsuperscript{321} See the articles collected in Helen Cam, \textit{Liberties and Communities in Medieval England: Collected Studies in Local Administration and Topography} (London: Merlin Press, 1963).
  \item \textsuperscript{322} Soddu, \textit{I Malaspina e la Sardegna}, p. xxvii. David Abulafia, \textit{The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean} (Oxford: OUP, 2011), p. 275 notes that the Doria founded Alghero around 1102, and that cities did not truly exist in Sardinia before the Pisans and Genoese began to arrive in large numbers; this picture is supported by Soddu, \textit{I Malaspina e la Sardegna}, pp. xviii-xix, regarding the foundation of the city of Bosa by the Genoese Malaspina family.
\end{itemize}
priors and abbots continued to be taken to the judicial corona, or local court, for a wide range of disputes in the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{323}

With this brief survey, it is being suggested that the peculiarly Sardinian failure to extend secular jurisdictional or fiscal exemptions to new monastic foundations is an extension of the political model that Sardinia had inherited from Byzantium, in which the central government had an inherent right to interfere with monasteries and the Church in general. In this way, Sardinia’s long Christian history, which in a way made it part of the European Christian “center,” was also part of what made it peripheral to the same European culture. Likewise, its historical association with a prestigious Church, that of Byzantium, gave it the self-confidence to allow certain Greek customs to continue. Using this hypothesis, the exemptions extended by Archbishop Azzo to SS. Trinità of Saccargia and S. Pietro of Scano, and their relationship with Sardinia’s political culture, can be re-examined. On December 16, 1112 Azzo proclaimed that “at the petition of our most excellent ... lord(s), that is Costantino, king of the judicate of Torres and his wife, Lady Marcusa, the queen ... we grant and confirm these privileges,” and proceeded to bestow significant exemptions on Saccargia. After granting the “tithes and first fruits of all things both moveable and immoveable that the said church owns”\textsuperscript{324} and the assurance that “no bishop may lay interdict of the mass or any ecclesiastical office without the will and consent of the [monastery’s] rector,”\textsuperscript{325} Azzo states that “the same brothers are permitted to judge those subject to them, both monks and laymen, free and unfree, without any prohibition whatsoever of either ecclesiastical or secular power.”\textsuperscript{326} The document is witnessed by “King Costantino,” but it represents nevertheless the first known example in Sardinian history of a prelate setting limits on secular power and jurisdiction. Only three days earlier, on December 13, 1112, Azzo had bestowed similar privileges on S. Pietro of Scano, but without the jurisdictional rights, indicating that these were a truly exceptional gift on the part of the archbishop and judex.

Given this fact, a detail from the charter by which Judex Costantino founded S. Pietro of Scano becomes particularly significant. In this charter, Judex Costantino titled himself “by the grace of God emperor of

\textsuperscript{323} See the four monastic condaghes: the Condaghe di San Nicola di Trullas, the Condaghe di Santa Maria di Bonarcardo, the Condaghe di San Michele di Salvennor (all previously cited), and the Condaghe di San Pietro di Silki, the most recent edition of which is Alessandro Soddu and Giovanni Strinna, eds., \textit{Il condaghe di San Pietro di Silki} (Nuoro: Ilisso, 2014).

\textsuperscript{324} \textit{concedimus vobis decimas et primitias omnium rerum mobilium et immobilium ... quas prefata ecclesia nunc habet}. Zanetti, \textit{I Camaldolesi}, pp. VII-X, doc. III.

\textsuperscript{325} \textit{statuimus ut nullus presulum missam aut aliquod ecclesiasticum suprascriptę ecclesię interdicat officiium nisi cum voluntate et consenso rectoris eius}. \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{326} \textit{et liceat isisdem fratribus subjectos eorummonasterio iudicare tam monachos quam laicos liberos seu servos absque prohibitioine cuīslibet ecclesiastice seu secularis potestatis}. \textit{Ibid}.
the kingdom of Torres.”

This is one of only three known instances in which the title of “emperor” is used to describe a Sardinian judex, and is the only instance in which it is used by the judex himself as an official title. Although it has escaped comment in scholarship so far, it must surely be seen in conjunction with the exceptional ecclesiastical and secular privileges granted in precisely the same document to Saccargia. Costantino, it seems clear, was trying to present himself as more than a judex. Perhaps it is not surprising that it is the same Costantino whom the Pisan Liber Maiolichinus calls “an illustrious king,” or that, from a different point of view, later in the century he would be remembered for his “excesses;” something that has so far escaped scholars is that these “excesses” are presented in a literary context that suggests pride. Together, these details suggest a monarch who was seeking to build himself up to be greater than his predecessors or peers. It may be that he was behaving in part like one of the Norman kings of Sicily, who, argues Jeremy Johns, “appropriated whatever symbol enhanced his own monarchy,” whether these symbols were Latin, Byzantine or Muslim. The surviving evidence is not such that Costantino’s royal symbolism or imagery can be identified, however. What seems clear is that, as part of his effort to magnify his position, he departed from Sardinian tradition and created a franchise within his judicate. At his side, almost certainly advising him on how to behave in a kingly or imperial way, was his north-Italian archbishop, Azzo. Although these are the only two examples in which Azzo granted unusually ample exemptions, they are also the only two examples of any royal foundations during Azzo’s rule: in other words, Azzo granted unusual exemptions to one hundred percent of the known royal foundations made while he was archbishop. From this perspective, Azzo can be seen as actively Europeanizing the judicate of Logudoro, bringing its customs of monastic foundation into line with those

327 Ego C. Dei gratia imperator turrensis regni. Ibid., pp. III-IV, doc. I.


329 Constantinus ... rex clarus. Liber Maiolichinus, p. 14, ll. 197-198.

330 suorium excessuum: in a miracle story written at the end of the twelfth century, Judex Costantino is seen undergoing the punishments of purgatory. In his case, these consist of being “always exposed to the winds and deluges and cold; from the day of his death until now he remains in the constant dripping of his house.” Herbertus Turrium Sardiniae Archiepiscopus, De Miraculis, Liber III, cap. 39, found in PL Vol. 185, col. 1376D. For the implications of this punishment, see Mark Musa, ed., Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy: Verse Translation and Commentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), Vol. 2, pp. 38, 86.

of continental Western Europe, while the judex tried to profit from Azzo’s legal and cultural sophistication to increase his own power and prestige.

Whether this aspect of Azzo’s cultural colonization was successful in the long term is a different matter. For one thing, when Costantino called himself “emperor,” it is unclear whether he had a Western or a Byzantine imperial model in mind. Even highly-favoured Byzantine monasteries were sometimes granted exemptions by the patriarch, if not by the emperor: the patriarch of Byzantium, for example, granted a foundation charter to a prestigious eleventh-century monastery that guaranteed its freedom from both secular and ecclesiastical officials, from ecclesiastical taxes, and independence from patriarchal rights.332 Thus, the fact that Costantino does not seem to have granted any secular exemptions himself, and left all the privileges to his archbishop to make, might indicate that he was still functioning within a Byzantine-style political framework. His archbishop, though, clearly came at the matter from a Western perspective, and granted the same exemptions that might be granted anywhere else in the European “center.” For another thing, SS. Trinità of Saccargia and S. Pietro of Scano are not simply the first examples of a new tradition of monastic jurisdictional exemptions: they are the only examples. The new mode of granting jurisdictional exemptions seems both to have begun, and ended, in 1112. Later judices did not follow Costantino either in styling themselves emperor, or in allowing their archbishops to grant jurisdictional exemptions. Finally, even in 1204, after decades of pontifical bulls had bestowed jurisdictional exemptions upon all Vallumbrosian monasteries, for example,333 Innocent III wrote specifically to “priors of exempt churches [in Sardinia],” censoring them because they “disdain the ecclesiastical court and pursue even ecclesiastical cases before a secular judge.”334 Thus, it may be hypothesized that Costantino’s effort to present himself as a great ruler in touch with continental European culture, which allowed justice to be decentralized among feudal vassals, was unable to continue in the strongly centralized Sardinian political structure. In other words, the strength of Sardinia’s “central-peripheral” Christian tradition

332 Thomas and Hero, Byzantine monastic foundation documents, Vol. 1, pp. 143-144.

333 Regarding privileges that were extended to the entire Vallumbrosian Order, see Nicolangelo D’Acunto, “I Vallombrosani e l’episcopato nei secoli XII e XIII” in Papato e monachesimo “esente” nei secoli centrali del Medioevo, ed. Nicolangelo D’Acunto (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2003), pp. 41-64. In 1139, to take just one example, Innocent II granted the right subditos iudicandi to the Vallombrosan monastery of S. Michele of Plaiano, which Judex Mariano of Logudoro had given to Pisa in 1082, and which Pisa’s cathedral had given to Vallombrosa in 1128. IP, pp. 434-435, doc. 2.

334 Exemptarum ecclesiarum prelatis in Sardinia ... ecclesiasticum forum contempnitis et super causis ecclesiasticis etiam contenditis coram iudice seculari. Sanna, Innocenzi III e la Sardegna, pp. 64-65, doc. 56. DuCange shows that “prelatus” can mean abbot or prior, which makes far more sense than “bishop” in the context of this letter. Charles Du Cange et al., Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis (Nior: L. Favre, 1883-1887), available online at: http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/PRAELATUS. Regarding privileges that were extended to the entire Vallumbrosian Order, see Nicolangelo D’Acunto, “I Vallombrosani e l’episcopato nei secoli XII e XIII” in Papato e monachesimo “esente”, ed. D’Acunto, pp. 41-64.
withstood this particular aspect of cultural colonization, showing that Sardinia’s cultural colonization under Italian influence was far from total, and that Sardinia was not merely a passive “subject” of colonization.

In sum, at the beginning of the twelfth century four parallel trends can be seen developing in Logudoro: the appearance of northern-Italian, and sometimes explicitly Pisan, prelates in Logudoro; the contemporaneous development of political and economic links between Logudoro and Pisa; the donation of land to Pisa’s cathedral; and the progress of Logudoro’s ecclesiastical reform in partnership with the Pisan Church.

3.3.3 Indigenous Bishops in Logudoro: Conflict and Cooperation with Pisa

If Pisa was seeking to control the archdiocese of Torres directly through Azzo, these attempts seem to have ended for a time after his death. His successor was Sardinian, a certain Vitale Tola. From later evidence, it seems likely that the heartland of the great Tola family was in Logudoro, near its border with Gallura: Archbishop Vitale, therefore, may be supposed to have been the choice of Logudorese interests. If his predecessor, Archbishop Azzo, had indeed been seeking to Europeanize the Church of Logudoro, in part by granting the sort of jurisdictional exemptions and protections from episcopal interference that were not traditional in Sardinia, then the appearance of Vitale Tola as archbishop may have been a symptom of a reaction to this Europeanization, on the part of the Sardinian nobility and prelacy.

For an argument such as this, it would be extremely useful to be able to provide a picture of the suffragan bishops in this period. Unfortunately, the extremely patchy nature of the documentary record makes this impossible: all that can be said is that during Vitale Tola’s period as archbishop, the bishop of Ploaghe was a Sardinian, Costantino Berrica, who would become Vitale Tola’s own successor; the bishop of

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335 According to Francesco Floris and Sergio Serra, the Tola family has its roots in Ozieri, in central northern Sardinia, and were still there in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Floris and Serra seem to have overlooked Archbishop Vitale Tola, since they remark that evidence of the Tola family “date back to the fourteenth century.” Francesco Floris and Sergio Serra, Storia della Nobiltà in Sardegna (Cagliari: Edizioni della Torre, 2007), p. 337-8. See also Francesco Floris, Feudi e Feudatari in Sardegna (Cagliari: Edizioni Della Torre, 1996), p. 502.

Ampurias was the same Nicola, probably Sardinian, who had held the position in 1112, the bishop of Ottana was a Cassinese monk bearing the foreign name of Homodei, and the diocese of Bisarcio was still ruled by a man named Pietro, presumably the same who had been there in 1112; by his name he could be either Sardinian or foreign. Out of seven suffragan dioceses, therefore, there is information for only four; out of these four, just one bishop was certainly not indigenous and he, the Cassinese monk Homodei, cannot be linked to Pisa, although he can be supposed to have worked to Westernize the clergy in his diocese. No information about Archbishop Vitale survives, either, apart from his role as witness to a donation made by Prince Gonnario, future Judex Gonnario II of Logudoro, to the Benedictine Order of Montecassino in 1120.

The idea that Vitale Tola’s accession to the archiepiscopal see may have been part of a Sardinian reaction against over-zealous foreign archbishops could be supported by the fact that Tola’s successor was another Sardinian. This was Costantino Berrica, who before becoming archbishop had been a suffragan bishop in the province of Torres. In connection with the analysis developed above regarding jurisdictional immunities, his reign provides an interesting glimpse of the way power relations were developing between the ecclesiastical province of Torres and an ever-stronger Pisa, as seen through the control of properties in Sardinia. It also shows how Sardinian archbishops interacted with internal politics, and the role they may have had as peacemakers, similar to bishops elsewhere in Europe.

The first notice of Archbishop Berrica’s reign is small, but may say much about the interactions between the Sardinian Church and the Cathedral of S. Maria of Pisa in this period of growing Pisan political and ecclesiastical power on the island. It is Berrica’s name, alongside those of his suffragan bishops, on a

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7 Nicola’s name appears in 1112 on the foundation grant of SS. Trinita di Saccargia: Zanetti, I Camaldolesi, pp. IV-XI, docs. 2-3. It is also affixed to a donation grant in 1127, found in the Archivio di Stato di Pisa, Fondo Coletti; the information is provided in Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 849.

8 The Chronicon monasterii Casinensis reports that His porro diebus in Sardinia Homodei et Albertus episcopi ... ab hoc monasterio dati sunt. Chronica monasterii Casinensis, MGH, Liber IV, Cap. 80, p. 544; in 1127 his name appears on a donation charter cited above in n. 90. See Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 871.

9 In 1112 a Petrus gisarcensis episcopus witnesses two monastic foundations, as shown by Zanetti, I Camaldolesi, pp. IV-XI, docs. 2-3. In 1127 the bishop of Bisarcio is again Peter, as a donation charter from 1127 shows. See above, n. 90.

10 Vidili, “La cronotassi degli arcivescovi di Torres,” p. 88; see also Agostino Saba, Montecassino e la Sardegna: note storiche e codice diplomatico sardo-cassinese (Sora: P. C. Camastro, 1927), pp. 140-142, doc. 5.

11 Costantino Berrica may be assumed to have been indigenous both because of his typically Sardinian name “Costantino” and because, before becoming archbishop, he had been bishop of Ploaghe, and the only documented cases of promotion from one Sardinian see to another concern indigenous prelates. His surname, “Berrica,” does not appear in Mauro Maxia, Dizionario dei cognomi sardo-corsi: frequenze, fonti, etimologia (Cagliari: Condaghes, 2002), nor in Floris and Serra, Storia della nobiltà.
donation charter in which the canons of S. Maria of Pisa donated the Camaldolese abbey of S. Michele di Plaiano, theirs ever since Judex Mariano’s donation of 1082, to the Vallombrosan Order. From the most obvious perspective, the document is useful because it provides a snapshot of the bishops in Logudoro in 1127. The bishops who were possibly or probably Sardinian were Nicola, the bishop of Ampurias since at least 1112, and Pietro, bishop of Bisarcio also since at least 1112. Adam, the bishop of Castra, may have been foreign, although he may also have been indigenous; the bishop of Ottana was still the definitely foreign Cassinese monk named Homodei; Ploaghe was held by a clearly foreign Gualfredo, and Sorres, too, was held by a non-Sard named Bernardo. Thus, roughly half of the suffragan bishops were foreign, although not necessarily Pisan, and at least one was a monk. Archbishop Costantino Berrica, it seems, had to govern a very mixed prelacy.

From another perspective, this Pisan donation to Vallombrosa adds further evidence to the hypothesis that Pisa functioned as a sort of role-model for Logudoro as far as monastic patronage was concerned. Earlier, it was noted that, according to Colombini, Sardinian choices to found Camaldolese monasteries in the second decade of the twelfth century were a response to Paschal II’s promotion of Camaldoli and Vallombrosa. Yet if this were so, Vallombrosan foundations in Sardinia should have accompanied, or at least swiftly followed, the first Camaldolese foundations in 1112. Instead, the Vallombrosans did not begin to acquire Sardinian monasteries until after the Opera of S. Maria of Pisa had led the way by affiliating the Sardinian S. Michele of Plaiano to Vallombrosa. Indeed, it was in precisely the decade immediately following this Pisan-Sard donation that the first indigenous Sardinian foundation of a Vallombrosan monastery was made, S. Michele of Salvennor, as if the Logudorese were following the example of the canons of S. Maria of Pisa. All of this is, of course, circumstantial evidence. Nevertheless, added to the popularity of Montecassino in Sardinia in precisely the years in which the Cassinese were on bad terms with the pope, noted above, it does suggest that Pisa’s patterns of patronage had a more immediate impact on patronage choices in Logudoro than papal politics did.

342 The document can be found in IP, p. 434, doc. 1; also Enrico Besta, Il Liber Judicum Turritanorum, pp. 14-15, doc. 1. This first appearance of Berrica is scarcely mentioned in secondary literature.
343 Both appear on Judex Costantino’s foundation of S. Pietro of Scano and SS. Trinità of Saccargia in 1112, cited above at n. 42.
344 As late as 1338 the name “Adam” is suggested to be a sign of a Jewish minority living in Sardinia. Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società,” p. 228.
345 For the names on this document, see Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, pp. 849-877.
346 Colombini, Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi, pp. 194-197.
347 CSMS, pp. xiii-xiv.
The document gives two other insights into the colonizing relations between Pisa and Logudoro. In order to understand them, it should be remembered that the early twelfth century was a period of many new monastic foundations, and of frequent and generous donations to monasteries. It should also be noted that the relationships between bishops and the Western Orders were frequently troubled, a state that has been interpreted as due to the bishops’ resentment at the loss of their revenue caused by diocesan land passing into the hands of the monasteries. Nevertheless, there are not a few instances of bishops who themselves founded or donated to monasteries. To take just three examples that are roughly contemporary to Archbishop Berrica’s reign, “Bishop Johannes of Sorres” in Logudoro would make a donation of “four churches ... situated in the area called Sorres,” to the Camaldolese in 1134, a donation confirmed by “Azzo archbishop of Torres.” Soon afterward the pro-Pisan Archbishop Pietro of Canneto of Torres would donate two churches to a Cassinese monastery. Five years later, in 1139, the Camaldolese would receive yet another donation from “Ugo, unworthy bishop of the Church of S. Giovanni in the place called Ortilli;” this donation was witnessed first by the same pro-Pisan Archbishop of Torres, Pietro of Canneto, then by Pietro’s non-Sardinian successor, Archbishop Azzo of Torres, and by the Archbishop of Pisa.

In these donations can be seen the overwhelming popularity of Montecassino and Camalduli as foci of piety, as described previously. Particular motivations behind them are not mentioned. One factor that they all have in common, though, is that they were confirmed by an archbishop who was variously foreign and probably Pisan, strongly sympathetic to Pisa, and/or by the Pisan archbishop-legate. It cannot be proven that Pisa was a deciding factor in their donations, but the likelihood is strengthened by seeing that a similar pattern established itself in Eastern Europe. The Church of Bohemia, for example, was subject to the archbishop of Mainz in the Holy Roman Empire, similarly to the relationship between Logudoro and Pisa. In the late twelfth century a great Bohemian nobleman named Hroznata went on the Third Crusade under Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, similarly to the Sards who went on crusade under Bishop Pietro of Pisa, and upon his return founded a Premonstratensian monastery; as Lisa Wolverton shows, religious of German origin were over-represented in such monasteries. This combination of ecclesiastical and

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348 Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, p. 77.
349 *ego Johannes sorrensis episcopus ... site in loco qui dicitur Sorra ... damus ... ecclesias III ... Ego Azo archiepiscopus turritanus confirmo.* Zanetti, *I Camaldolesi*, pp. XI-XIII, doc. 4.
350 See below, at n. 117.
351 *Ugo licet indignus ecclesie s. Johannis episcopus site in loco qui dicitur Ortilli;* in CDS, p. 213, doc. 50. This donation will be discussed below in more detail.
political authority by a German power, and the foundation of “German” monasteries, has clear similarities to Sardinia’s situation. The “German-ness” of the Premonstratensians in Bohemia is shown further by the fact that one of the earliest Premonstratensian abbots was a native of Cologne, named Gotschalk, who brought a “convent of clerics together with an abbot” from German Waldsassen to man the first Bohemian Premonstratensian house in 1147.\footnote{Wolverton, \textit{Hastening Toward Prague}, p. 124.} He himself later became the first abbot of another house, at Milevsko. Womens’ houses, too, were filled with nuns from the diocese of Cologne.\footnote{Ibid., p. 124.}

As in Sardinia, moreover, such “German” foundations were also the product of prelates. Bishop Vitus of Płock, Bishop Ives Odrowaz, and the Bishop Henry Zdík of Olomouc, a Bohemian by birth, all founded houses for Premonstratensians, Cistercians and Hospitallers.\footnote{Berend \textit{et al.}, \textit{Central Europe in the High Middle Ages}, p. 355; Wolverton, \textit{Hastening Toward Prague}, p. 12.} Donating or founding monasteries that were linked to the colonizing population, therefore, was a common trait in Eastern Europe and Sardinia. How this benefited the bishops of Sardinia may be reasonably assumed to be their gain of spiritual merit, social prestige, ecclesiastical authority, and/or links with Pisa.\footnote{See Arnould-Jan Bijsterveld, \textit{Do ut Des: Gift Giving, Memoria, and Conflict Management in the Medieval Low Countries} (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007), esp. pp. 32-39.} Whether there was any direct benefit to Pisa is difficult to say, although the prestige it would gain by guiding the process of monastic foundations is not an aspect that should be dismissed. Unfortunately, however, the information on priors in these Sardinian monasteries is too scant to show whether they tended to be Pisan or not.

In addition, it has been argued above that indigenous Sardinian bishops might have expected to have a role in the administration of monasteries they had founded, as well as greater control over the monasteries in their dioceses than other bishops in the Roman Church might have had. The case of Archbishop Costantino Berrica’s confirmation in 1127 suggests that such expectations were beginning to be disappointed. Indeed, where S. Maria of Pisa was a beneficiary, patron bishops of Sardinia were starting to lose prestige and authority by means of earlier donations, rather than maintain or increase it. This can be seen in the fact that the donation act, in which the canons of S. Maria di Pisa gave the Sardinian church of S. Michele di Plaiano to the Order of Vallombrosa, was laid out with room only for the signatures of

\footnote{Henry Zdík was an enthusiastic importer of foreign ecclesiastical ideas in general, including crusading ideology. See Gladysz, \textit{The Forgotten Crusaders}, pp. 32-33.}

\footnote{Two classic studies on the subject, both focusing on France, are Stephen D. White, \textit{Custom, kinship, and gifts to saints: the laudatio parentum in western France, 1050-1150} (Chapel Hill; London: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), and Barbara Rosenwein, \textit{To Be the Neighbor of Saint Peter: the Social Meaning of Cluny’s Property, 909-1049} (Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press, 1989).}
the Pisan canons. The names of Costantino and his suffragans are added on as an afterthought in the margin.\textsuperscript{358} It strongly suggests that the canons of S. Maria of Pisa had not planned to ask for the approval of the clergy of Torres before disposing of their Sardinian property. Quite literally, it shows the marginality of the Sardinian clerics in the Pisan canons’ world-view. The bishops of Torres, however, obviously felt that it was important to insist upon their right to consent to this donation, and were somehow able to convince the canons of the fact.

At a deeper level than politics, this seems to be a negotiation between the opposing perspectives on episcopal rights over monasteries that were suggested above. It seems possible that the Sardinian prelates assumed that by granting property away, even to the lay-controlled Opera of S. Maria of Pisa, they were in some sense expanding their authority and prestige by taking on the role of patron and protector.\textsuperscript{359} Berrica’s and his bishops’ signatures certainly show that the prelates of Torres did not believe that their rights over the property had been totally alienated, but that Pisan property in Sardinia ought to fall at least partially under their jurisdiction. The fact that their input was not planned for by the canons of S. Maria of Pisa, however, makes it just as clear that as far as the canons were concerned, their properties in Sardinia were their own affair. Such a view has not before been suggested; indeed, this detail of the document has hardly been mentioned at all. At stake, though, were Pisa’s rights to carve out colonies in Sardinia, i.e., territories answerable only to Pisa; but also the prestige of the Sardinian clergy, and their rights to some sort of authority over the land in their dioceses.

Costantino Berrica’s successor, Pietro of Canneto (1134-1139), marks a turning-point in the history of Logudoro’s archbishops and their relationship with external colonization. His origin has never before been sought, but he was undoubtedly Sardinian; nevertheless, he seems to have been part of Pisa’s cultural colonization effort. Indeed, as will be seen, he is a good example of the care with which “ethnicity” must be approached, as discussed in the introduction to this chapter. Canneto, his place of origin, was a small settlement not far from Sassari in Logudoro;\textsuperscript{360} before becoming archbishop he appears in the Condaghe of S. Michele of Salvennor as “Lord Pietro of Canneto, bishop,” in the suffragan diocese of Ploaghe,\textsuperscript{361} and before that he had been in some way a man of standing in the judicate, possibly the “Lord Pietro of Canneto, prior of S. Gavino” who is referred to in an undated entry of the Condaghe

\textsuperscript{358} This peculiarity has been pointed out by Ettore Cau, “Peculiarità e anomalia,” pp. 353-354, n. 96.

\textsuperscript{359} See Barbara Rosenwein, \textit{Negotiating Space}, pp. 81-99.

\textsuperscript{360} Day, \textit{Villaggi abbandonati}, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{361} \textit{donnu Pedro de Canettu obispo}; he appears in a record of a property transaction in CSMS, p. 59, doc. 127.
of S. Nicola of Trullas.\[362\] He was, therefore, strongly rooted in Logudoro. Nonetheless, he seems to have been a part of Judex Gonnario’s project to further Europeanize Logudoro’s Church.\[363\]

Pietro of Canneto’s rule took place in a highly significant time. Chapter Two showed that it was in precisely these years, and perhaps as early as 1133, that Pisa had received the legation ad sedem, and in 1135 the new Pisan archbishop-legate, Uberto, was in Sardinia holding a council at Ardara. The only surviving documentation from this council concerns a dispute between none other than Logudoro’s new archbishop, Pietro of Canneto, and his suffragan bishops together with the canons of the archiepiscopal Cathedral of S. Gavino. It should also be remembered that Judex Gonnario probably had finished securing his judicate only in 1133; in 1131 he had sworn fealty to Archbishop Roger of Pisa, the predecessor of Archbishop Uberto, and at the same time had sworn fealty also to Roger’s successors. Chapter Two argued that, since Pisa did not have a legation ad sedem at the time of Gonnario’s vow, “Roger’s successors” could only mean future archbishops of Pisa, not future legates, and thus Gonnario’s vow of fealty implied fealty to Pisa. Therefore, when the see of Torres became vacant in 1133 or 1134, it is difficult to imagine that Gonnario would have desired, or dared, to allow anyone to fill it who was not favorably inclined toward Pisa.

In this context, the dispute between Archbishop Pietro of Canneto and the clergy of Torres becomes significant. According to the record of the council at Ardara, the canons of S. Gavino and the suffragan bishops of Torres complained that Archbishop Pietro had given two diocesan churches to the monks of S. Pietro of Nurki “without the assent of the canons of S. Gavino, and without the counsel of the bishops,” and that these monks, “having a charter of donation made by the judex, had taken possession of the said churches.”\[364\] Frustratingly, for this year only three bishops’ names can be reasonably suggested, and out

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362 *donnu Petru de Canneto, prior de Sanctu Gaviniu*. This Peter of Canneto is said to have lived when the archbishop was called Alberto. In Torres, the only known archbishop named Alberto lived in the 1170s, but a number of archbishops are unidentified in the 1110s and 1120s, making it not impossible that one of these unidentified archbishops was named Alberto, and that this *donnu Petru de Canneto* refers to Archbishop Peter, rather than to a different Peter in the 1170s. CSNT, p. 183, doc. 291; see also p. 41 regarding the difficulties of dating entries in the *condagh*, and p. 34 for Merci’s opinion that the two Peters are the same man.

363 As Colombini puts it, “Finally, the kingdom of Torres had a period of peace and Gonario could dedicate himself to his judicate ... thus, he concerned himself with justice and the Church.” Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, p. 155; see also pp. 156-158.

of these three, only one name indicates the bishop’s ethnicity. In both the dioceses of Bosa (1138)\textsuperscript{365} and Sorres (1134-1151)\textsuperscript{366} the bishops were named Giovanni, which could equally be Sardinian or foreign; only Ampurias was ruled by a prelate who was clearly foreign, Bono (1134).\textsuperscript{367} Furthermore, Sorres is the only diocese for which there is information for 1135 precisely. It is, in short, impossible to know the ethnicity of Archbishop Pietro’s opponents, and other interpretative approaches are necessary to try to make sense of the conflict. Turtas has seen this conflict as the first example of Sardinian canons exercising the rights that were emerging throughout Europe for cathedral chapters to approve alienations.\textsuperscript{368} Yet considering that canon law was only beginning to give chapters these rights in 1180, 1135 would be an extremely early date for a chapter to be insisting on them.\textsuperscript{369}

It seems more likely that the dispute should be seen in the light of the recent events in Logudoro itself. Earlier, this chapter argued that Judex Gonnario’s father, Judex Costantino, had sought to present himself as an imperial ruler, and that he had done so in part by approving jurisdictional exemptions for his two Camaldolese foundations, though whether he was following the pattern of Byzantine emperors or Western European emperors is unclear. It was also pointed out that the behavior of Costantino and his north-Italian archbishop, Azzo, ran contrary to Sardinian political culture; indeed, the fact that it was not imitated by the nobility of Logudoro suggests that Costantino’s behavior was not approved of. In addition, it was shown that after Archbishop Azzo, the next three archbishops of Torres were Sardinian, and that no more such jurisdictional exemptions were made. In 1133, however, the new Judex Gonnario arrived leading a Pisan force, accompanied by a Pisan bride, and having been imbued with Pisan culture for a number of years. Thus, when Archbishop Pietro of Canneto alienated two churches to a Cassinese monastery without the counsel of his clergy, his bishops and canons may have feared that the new judex was returning to his

\textsuperscript{365}\textsuperscript{} Giovanni, bishop of Sorres, appears in Pisa in 1138, together with the bishop of Galtelli and the bishop of Populonia (an Italian suffragan diocese of Pisa), witnessing the archbishop of Pisa’s mediation between two Pisan monasteries. If this can be suggested to show a more than casual relationship between the bishop of Sorres and the archbishop of Pisa, then Giovanni of Sorres may have been foreign himself, perhaps Pisan. Caturegli, Regesto della Chiesa di Pisa, p. 245, doc. 367.


\textsuperscript{367}\textsuperscript{} Saba, Montecassino e la Sardegna, pp. 153-155, doc. 12, where the document is tentatively dated to 1122, but see Turtas’ reasoning for dating it to 1134 in Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 861.

\textsuperscript{368}\textsuperscript{} Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, pp. 238-9.

father’s style of rule, with the cooperation of an archbishop who, given the political circumstances, must have been pro-Pisan.

If this is accepted, then it is not surprising that, at the council of Ardara, Archbishop Uberto of Pisa ruled in favor of the monastery, Archbishop Pietro and Judex Gonnario. Uberto decided that although “the monks acquired the aforesaid churches unjustly,” he would allow them to keep the two churches “saving the reverence of S. Gavino” such that “the prior of S. Pietro of Nurki will show reverence to S. Gavino. [And] he shall come to synods and ordinations as custom requires.”\(^370\) If the issue for the canons was not so much the loss of the financial income from these churches as the canons’ and bishops’ fear that they were about to lose prestige and power under the rule of a strongly European-minded judex and archbishop, then Archbishop-Legate Uberto’s decision seems highly appropriate.\(^371\)

3.3.4 Monastic Bishops in Logudoro and their Complex Matrix of Loyalties

Thus far, this chapter has focused on the identities of archbishops as either Sardinian or non-Sardinian / Pisan, and the way such ethnic identities influenced the ways these archbishops acted within Torres. At the same time, the behaviours of the archbishops of Torres, and particularly their treatment of foreign monastic foundations, were influenced not only by their ethnic identities, but at times by their own monastic loyalties. Following the indigenous and secular archbishop Pietro of Canneto (1134-1139), the archbishop of Torres from 1139-1146 was a Camaldolese monk bearing, once again, the northern Italian name of Azzo. The judex at the time was the same Gonnario who had spent several years living in Pisa, had retaken Logudoro with the help of the Pisans, and was married to a Pisan woman. It may be reasonably supposed that Gonnario’s approach to religion had been affected by these circumstances. Moreover, as earlier noted, the Camaldolese were highly regarded in Pisa for their piety. It may be, therefore, that Gonnario’s cultural sympathies with Pisa were part of the reason that a north-Italian Camaldolese monk was chosen to become the new archbishop: Archbishop Azzo may have been Pisan himself, and his monastic vows must have given him a cultural and spiritual prestige that was pleasing to


\(^371\) Uberto did also decree that the Church of S. Giorgio of Baraki should pay a census to the Cathedral of S. Gavino, but did not repeat this for the other church, S. Maria of Gennor. See Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova*, Vol. 21, col. 501.
Judex Gonnario, who was pious enough to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and, in his old age, become a monk at the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux.\footnote{Herbertus Turrium in Sardinia, \textit{Vita et Res Gestae S. Bernardi}, in \textit{PL}, Vol. 185, col. 462B-463A.}

Yet if it may be suggested that Gonnario had sought a Camaldolese archbishop to help him bring Logudoro closer to European standards, Archbishop Azzo’s loyalty to his Order turned out to be a two-edged sword. Azzo arbitrated an undated dispute between the Camaldolese monastery of S. Nicola di Trullas and Judex Gonnario, and decided, apparently instantly, in favor of S. Nicola. The case has not been discussed in secondary literature, but reveals a good deal upon close inspection. The judex began it by approaching “Rodulfo the priest on the mountain” to claim a piece of land that was claimed also by S. Nicola. Rodulfo’s relation with S. Nicola is not recorded, but he must have had some position of authority within its community. When confronted by the judex, he “did not want to dispute with him,” which presumably means that he did not wish to take the case to court. Any court he went to would of course be a lay court, or \textit{corona}; thus, it may be supposed that he feared that the \textit{corona}, presided over by members of Logudoro’s aristocracy, would support Judex Gonnario’s claim. Instead, he “went to the feast of S. Gavino and explained the dispute to the archbishop, to Lord Azzo, who was a monk of Camaldoli.” S. Gavino was the patron saint of the archiepiscopal cathedral in Torres, and his feast-day would have been a significant day on which to approach the archbishop. Azzo, seemingly immediately, told Gonnario “you behave badly and do wrong if you take [the land] from S. Nicola.” Gonnario, therefore, “who was a good man and loved his soul, left it to S. Nicola, regardless of whether it was ecclesiastical or lay property.”\footnote{\textit{Ego prebitero Rodulfo, ki certait mecu iudice Gunnari in su monte ... et ego non bi voli ‘n’ certare cun illu. Et osca falaince assa festa de sanctu Gaviniu et naraillu assu archipiscopu su certu: a donnu Athu, ci fuit monacu de Camaldula. Et isse naraitindeli a iudice ca: “Male fakes et peccatu, ki li lu levas a sSanctu Nichola”. Et isse, co donnu bonu et ca la amavat sa anima sua, benedisstililiu a Sanctu Nichola, o clerici esseret o laycu. CSNT, pp. 116-117, doc. 150.}

This last detail is telling: by admitting that the land might have been rightfully lay, Rodulfo indicates that Azzo’s decision was based not on the legal rights of the matter, but on the simple view that to take something that S. Nicola claimed for its own was morally wrong. Azzo’s decision in favor of a monastery of his own Order, and especially on a piece of property that even Rodulfo admitted might by rights have been lay land, therefore shows how a foreign bishop unconnected by blood or culture to the ruling family might have prioritized his monastic loyalties over those to the judex. Gonnario’s acceptance of the ruling is also significant. The fact that he opened the dispute in the first place suggests that he was, in principle, quite willing to confront a monastery over contested land. Still, he submitted to Azzo’s judgment not because he recognized that his claim was false, but because he did not wish to pursue a claim that had
been proclaimed morally suspect by his Camaldolese archbishop and that, perhaps, could be portrayed by this archbishop as simply an “enforcement of his own avarice.”

Archbishop Azzo’s loyalty to Camaldoli also affected the behavior of his suffragans. During his episcopate, the suffragan bishops in Torres who can be identified are named Giovanni, Mariano Thelle, Pietro Spanu, Giovanni and Ugo. Ugo is the only name that is clearly not Sardinian; it was also a name used frequently by Pisans but not by Genoese. Interestingly, it was none other than “Ugo, unworthy bishop” who donated a church to the Order of Camaldoli, with Azzo and Archbishop Baldwin of Pisa as witnesses. His donation had already been made under Archbishop Pietro of Canneto, but his decision to repeat the gesture with both Azzo and Archbishop-Legate Baldwin as witnesses is striking. If Bishop Ugo was indeed Pisan, then this donation must have been in part an expression of his own culture, a way of importing Pisan choices of patronage into Sardinia. Once the Camaldolese Azzo was archbishop, perhaps Ugo decided to use this donation to curry favor with his superior and, by asking Azzo to witness the deed, make himself noticed. The presence of Archbishop Baldwin is also significant, considering the energy he put into enlarging the authority and power of his seat, and Pisa in general, in Sardinia. Ugo presumably waited until Baldwin was present before (re)making his donation, thus staging a ceremony of cultural solidarity: a donation to Camaldoli presided over by a hierarchy of Pisans: Bishop Ugo, Camaldolese Archbishop Azzo, Archbishop-Legate Baldwin.

The next three known archbishops of Torres ruled in a period that saw Logudoro, traditionally pro-Pisan, begin to gravitate to Genoa in the late 1160s. There is little documentation regarding these archbishops’ activities, but all three were monks: Pietro (1153-70), of unknown order but perhaps Cistercian, was followed in 1170 by a Benedictine monk, perhaps Cassinese, named Alberto who had previously been a suffragan bishop under Pietro. Alberto may or may not have been Sardinian by birth; Bortolami suggests that his name is Pisan, but by this date the Pisan presence in Logudoro had begun to change.

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374 *sue avaritie executione*, as Archbishop Azzo’s foundation charters for S. Pietro of Scano and SS. Trinità of Saccargia call any attempt to take land away from the monasteries. Zanetti, *I Camaldolesi*, pp. IV-XI, docs. 2, 3.

375 In 1134 Giovanni, bishop of Sorres, also donated four churches to Camaldoli, a donation witnessed by an Azzo, archbishop of Torres, but according to Massimiliano Vidili this cannot be the Camaldolese Azzo who was archbishop from 1139-1146 – nor, for that matter, the Azzo who had been archbishop until 1120. Vidili, “La cronotassi degli arcivescovi di Torres,” p. 89.


377 *CDS*, p. 213, doc. 50.

378 Vidili notes that the document is drawn up in two sections: the first is witnessed by Archbishop Pietro of Canneto, and the second is confirmed by Archbishop Azzo and Archbishop-Legate Baldwin. Vidili, “La cronotassi degli arcivescovi di Torres,” p. 90, n. 32.

379 See Vidili, “La cronotassi degli arcivescovi di Torres,” p. 93, nn. 40, 41 for evidence regarding their Orders.
naming traditions among indigenous Sards.\textsuperscript{380} Even if he was Sardinian, his monastic vows clearly added an extra layer to the normal medieval web of loyalties to family, lord and peers that he would have had to navigate. Receiving a complaint from Montecassino, in 1170 “when [he] returned from continental Italy to Sardinia [he] petitioned [his] lord Judex Barisone de Lacon” and all his suffragan bishops to excuse the Cassinese monastery of S. Pietro of Nurki of the census that it was obliged to pay to the canons of S. Gavino.\textsuperscript{381} This was the census that Archbishop Uberto of Pisa had ordered it to pay the canons of S. Gavino in 1135. Even this late in the century, Bortolami asserts that the cathedral canonries were dominated by indigenous, or at least resident, noble families in Logudoro: Alberto’s decision, therefore, seems to have prized his monastic vows above any connections he might have had with the local families.\textsuperscript{382} At the same time, it should be noted that he was not seeking to impoverish the archdiocese, for his willingness to forfeit the Cassinese census came at the price of a collection of land and rights to labor that the two Cassinese monasteries had held, and now gave to him.\textsuperscript{383}

Then, in 1176, Alberto donated the church of S. Giorgio of Oliastreto to the hospital of S. Leonardo di Stagno in Pisa, an act that was both requested by the judex of Logudoro Barisone II, and followed by Barisone II’s creation of a leprosarium which he donated to the same S. Leonardo di Stagno. Petrucci asserts that Logudoro was moving toward a “more convinced affirmation” of Genoese primacy, but this donation seems to deny such a charge.\textsuperscript{384} Indeed, if it is compared to the appearance of the hospital movement in another colonial situation, it seems all the more likely to have been some part of Pisa’s expanding power. For example, a similar alignment between colonization, culturally “foreign” prelates, and donations to the hospital movement can be seen in Bohemia. The indigenous bishop of Olomouc (1126-1150), who was named Zdík by birth, changed his name to the Germanic name Henry when he was consecrated, indicating a cultural sympathy with Bohemia’s colonizers. Indeed, his change of name indicates a change of “ethnicity” as described in the introduction to this chapter; consistently with his chosen German identity he also worked hard to establish contacts in the Empire and, surely as part of this,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{380} Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società,” p. 206.
\item \textsuperscript{381} \textit{ego pusco torrai aue terra manna in Sardinia pettili boluntate assu donnu meu a iudike Barusone de Laccon}. Saba, \textit{Montecassino e la Sardegna}, pp. 198-200, doc. 35. Vidili, “La cronotassi degli arcivescovi di Torres,,” p. 93; Azzo’s only suffragan with a clearly foreign names was Goffredo; his suffragan names of no clear origin were Giorgio Maiule, Giovanni Sargu, and Zaccaria, and his clearly Sardinian suffragans were Comita de Martis and Giovanni Thelle. For these, see Turtas, \textit{Storia della Chiesa}, pp. 851-875.
\item \textsuperscript{382} Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società,” p. 212, n. 106.
\item \textsuperscript{383} Saba, \textit{Montecassino e la Sardegna}, pp. 198-200, doc. 35. The prior of Nurki gave to Archbishop Alberto the rights to the labor of five unfree men, and three tracts of land.
\item \textsuperscript{384} Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” p. 130. Petrucci does remark later, however, that Pisa was seeking to expand its influence in northern Sardinia in this period through new ecclesiastical foundations, including the Hospital of S. Leonardo. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 131.
\end{itemize}
encouraged donations to the Hospitallers. Similarly, in Pomerania, which lay on the present-day border between Poland and Germany, two centres to the Hospitallers had been founded by 1182; both of these were probably on the roads from Poland to the Baltic Sea, along which German merchants travelled. Thus, in East Central Europe hospital foundations were almost certainly linked to German colonization, and the same pattern seems clear in Logudoro.

Concerning Barisone II’s relations with Pisa, it is true that at some point he arranged a marriage between his daughter and a member of the Sardo-Genoese Doria family, and that ten years later, in 1186, he would make a pact with Genoa, which included generous political concessions. He promised, for example, to “protect and keep safe all the Genoese ... in my whole land and judicate” and to concede “freely, and without restrictions, all business transactions in the whole judicate and my own land to the Genoese ... without any tax or exaction.” Significantly, he also promised that “concerning all complaints that the Genoese shall make ... against anyone of my whole land... I will fulfill justice to him in good faith within twenty continuous days, and earlier if I can, according to the Roman laws and good customs.” In other words, he sacrificed the jurisdictional sovereignty that even Judex Gonnario, as closely allied to Pisa as he was, had kept intact in 1131. Genoa was not, however, the only object of his attention: Barisone broke with tradition and looked elsewhere than Italy or Sardinia for a bride. He “sent to Catalonia for a great lady, named Lady Drudda, and obtained her; she died on the way to Sardinia. He again sent to Catalonia for another woman called Lady Prunisinda,” and Prunisinda would become his queen. Nevertheless, despite his changing secular politics, the creation of Logudoro’s first leprosarium and its affiliation with a Pisan hospital clearly shows that, in 1176 at least, the judex’s religious-cultural point of reference was still Pisa.

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387 *Libellus Judicum Turritanorum*, p. 50.

388 *Ego Barusonus Dei gratia Turritanus iudex conuenio et promitto ... saluare et manutenere uniuersos Ianuenses et de distriuctu Ianue ... sanos ... in tota terra et iudicatu meo ... Uniuersas negociationes totius iudicatus et terre mee libere et expedite concedo Ianuensibus ... sine omni dricto [sic] et exactione*. The treaty can be found in CDS, p. 258, doc. 119.

389 *de uniuersis lamentationibus quas fecerint Ianuenses siue aliquis Ianuensis ... contra aliquem de tota terra et distriuctu meo, ego ei tenebor per bonam fidem iustitiam complere, infra dies xx continue, et antea si potero bona fide secundum leges romanas, et bonus usus*. *Ibid*.

390 *mandait a Cadalongia pro una grande femina, clamada Donna Drudda, et gasi la apisit; in benen a Sardinnia morisit. Torrait a mandare a Cadalongia per una atera femina clamada donna Prunisinda. Libellus Judicum Turritanorum*, p. 51.
Indeed, it may be argued that it was in precisely a situation such as this that Pisa’s legation in Sardinia, and its primacy over Logudoro, proved their worth. At least since 1138 Pisa’s archbishop had held primacy over the archdiocese of Torres, and some time between that date and 1200 this position of primacy came to be understood by the archbishops of Pisa as meaning that their “assent is required in elections of the metropolitans who are subject to [them] as primate.”391 Since no pope challenged this imagined right until 1200, when Innocent III declared it not to exist, it is likely that if the archbishops of Pisa chose to assert it, then for as many as sixty-two years the archdiocese of Torres could only elect archbishops who met with Pisa’s approval. Although this possibility has never before been raised, it seems likely that regardless of how the judex of Logudoro might begin to see Genoa as an ally in the 1180s, Pisa had a way of ensuring that the judicate’s ecclesiastical leadership was friendly to Pisa.

To test this hypothesis, Archbishop Alberto may be considered. His cultural sympathy to Pisa is evident in the wording of Barisone’s donation charter to S. Leonardo di Stagno, in which he mentions that he was making his two donations “having had the counsel and encouragement of Lord Villano of pious memory, archbishop of the Pisans and primate and legate of the Roman curia, and of lord Alberto now archbishop of Torres.”392 From a colonialist perspective, this paints a picture of an archbishop in Torres who was probably Pisan by birth or by culture colluding with the Pisan archbishop-legate to bring more Sardinian land into the hands of the Pisan hospital. After all, despite Villano’s differences of politics with Pisa’s ruling elite, he was held in great affection by most Pisans until roughly 1165 and the affection seems to have been mutual.393

At the same time, however, it is unlikely that Barisone II was a simpleton being defrauded of his lands: with this donation he was probably both reassuring Pisa, suspicious in the face of his recent moves toward Genoa, of his cultural affinity, and joining the Europe-wide “hospital movement” of the twelfth century. Furthermore, Stephen White argues that princes in France used monastic foundations “as a means of

391 *assensus tuus in metropolitanorum qui tibi subiacent ut primati esset electionibus requirendus*. This is Innocent III’s phrase, from a letter in which he explained to Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa that it was not, in fact, his right to approve of all archiepiscopal elections in Torres. It is highly unlikely that Ubaldo invented such a right himself; his claim to Innocent seems to have been based on the contention that his predecessors had acted in this way, since in order to refute him Innocent III had to unearth the original charter by which the primacy was conferred upon Pisa. See Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 16-18, doc. 7. Furthermore, when trying to prove a different right, Ubaldo made explicit reference to his predecessors’ behaviour, making it more likely that he took the same approach here. Reference to precedent was, of course, among the strongest legitimations in the Middle Ages. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-102, doc. 88.


enhancing their own prestige in the secular world and as a way of establishing, consolidating, and extending their own political power.”

The same seems to apply to Judex Barisone. By founding his own leprosarium, on one hand, and by donating it to the leprosarium of S. Leonardo di Stagno in Pisa, on the other, he was aligning himself culturally both with Pisa, and with all the major Italian cities north of Rome, every one of which had a leprosarium by the mid-twelfth century. In addition, he was joining a number of prestigious donors in northern Italy and Corsica who had already built their own hospitals and donated them to the same S. Leonardo di Stagno of Pisa that Barisone was endowing. It may not be a coincidence that it was the Pisan Gherardesca family, which had carried weight in Sardinia for decades, who built the first of these hospitals and affiliated it to the hospital of S. Leonardo di Stagno. In other words, Barisone might have been seeking to emulate the patronage choices of a great Pisan family that was important in his own land. In sum, Alberto is another example of how both Pisans and Sardinian judices could benefit from having foreign men overseeing the Sardinian dioceses. They were, it is true, channels by which Sardinian money and property could come under Pisa’s control, but they also provided the judices with a way to participate in European spirituality. In addition, they made it possible for the judices to increase their own prestige by imitating the great powers of Europe and, what is perhaps more relevant, the potent and nearby nobility of northern Italy and Corsica.

If Pisa may have influenced the elections of archbishops in Torres in this period, though, it is impossible to say whether it influenced the elections of the diocesan bishops. The names of the bishops at this point are of little help. Once Logudoro began to “diversify” politically and seek tighter links with Genoa and Catalonia, it becomes possible that the non-Sard names in Logudoro’s dioceses belonged to Hispanic or even Genoese men. If these names cannot be linked with certainty to a specific geographical origin, though, they do show a preponderance of foreigners in Logudoro’s dioceses. The bishop of Sorres from 1171-1178 was a Cistercian with the non-Sard name of Goffredo, and from 1181-1200 was a foreigner named Augerio: Goffredo was a name used in both Pisa and Genoa, as well as throughout Western Europe, and Augerio may have been a southern French name. The bishop of Bosa was also a Goffredo

394 White, Custom, Kinship, and Gifts to Saints, p. 30.
397 Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 854.
398 For Augerio, an example from Gascony is found by David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 79; an example of an Augerio from
in 1170, and probably Dionigi Raineri in 1176, again non-Sard;\(^\text{399}\) in Ottana Bishop Zaccaria might equally have been Sard or not.\(^\text{400}\) Only in Ampurias, where the bishop from 1170-1179 was a nobleman named Comita de Martis, and in Bisarcio where the bishop was Giovanni Thelle, were the bishops clearly indigenous.\(^\text{401}\) In 1170 the bishop of Ploaghe was the indigenous Costantino de Lelle, but by 1176 he was gone.\(^\text{402}\) Although not all dioceses are accounted for, the balance seems to have been against indigenous clergy; this, in turn, would make sense if the archdiocese was ruled by archbishops who identified themselves ethnically with Italy, or more generally Western Europe.\(^\text{403}\)

The existing reference to the Cistercian Bishop Goffredo of Sorres, although it gives no clue as to his provenance, does give a glimpse of another aspect of cultural colonization in Logudoro, namely, the arrival of Cistercianism. Yet as with the jurisdictional immunities discussed earlier, this too is an example of a “colonization” that was only partially successful. Judex Gonnario, in 1147, had been the first Sardinian to found a Cistercian abbey, and as will be shown, the Cistercian Bishop Goffredo would be followed by other Cistercian prelates in Logudoro. At the same time, even if a number of bishops and archbishops were Cistercian, their appearance seems not to have been matched by a swell of lay enthusiasm for their Order. After having been introduced to Sardinia under royal patronage, Cistercianism might have been expected to expand as Sardinia’s other four main Orders had, but instead it remained limited to two houses, one of which was moribund just fifty years after its foundation.\(^\text{404}\) Why this was true is a mystery, just like the unexplained popularity of Camaldoli and Vallombrosa. Colombini’s rather unconvincing explanations are that, for one thing, Cistercian spirituality was “too high for a society in which there had never been a cultured nobility like the French one, nor a merchant class like that of

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\(^\text{399}\) *domnu Guffredu episcope de Bosa.* Saba, *Montecassino e la Sardegna*, pp. 198-200, doc. 35; *Dominum Dionysium Raineri Episcopum Bosanense*. This is a record of Dionigi consecrating an altar to a popular local saint, and thus validating “indigenous” piety. Giampaolo Mele, “San Luissorio nella storia: culto e canti: origini, Medioevo, età spagnola” in *Santu Lussurgiu: dalle origini alla “Grande Guerra,”* Vol. 2, ed. Giampaolo Mele (Nuoro, Grafiche editoriali Solinas, 2005), pp. 3-43, at p. 14; Turtas, *Storia della Chiesa*, p. 866. The use of Raineri as a surname is striking, since otherwise it seems to have been solely a first name.

\(^\text{400}\) *domnu Sacharia episcope de Othan.* Saba, *Montecassino e la Sardegna*, pp. 198-200, doc. 35.

\(^\text{401}\) *domnu Comita De Martis episcope de Inpuriu [...] domnu Iuvanne Thelle episcope de Gisarclu. Ibid.*

\(^\text{402}\) *domnu Constantine de Lella episcope de Plovake.* CDS, p. 240, doc. 97; Turtas, *Storia della Chiesa*, p. 852.

\(^\text{403}\) See the full list of names in Turtas, “Cronotassi dei vescovi sardi” in *Storia della Chiesa*, pp. 848-879.

\(^\text{404}\) For Cistercianism in Sardinia, see Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, pp. 147-190.
peninsular Italy. For another, due to the prodigious generosity of the judices to the Orders that had arrived earlier, by the time the Cistercians arrived the judices had nothing more to give. This fails to take into account the evident possibility of granting pre-existing monasteries to the Cistercians, and thus patronizing a new and prestigious Order without subtracting any new land from judicial control. Although no better explanation for the Cistercians’ lack of success in Sardinia can be offered here, it is evident that the Order’s lack of popularity did not prevent Cistercians from being sought and elected as bishops, on one hand, but on the other hand was not reversed by their presence. In this case, bishops who, regardless of their place of birth, were culturally or “ethnically” foreign did not successfully manage to promote their own popular continental religious movement.

Archbishop Alberto has been seen collaborating with the Pisan archbishop and guiding his judex’s patronage toward a Pisan beneficiary, on one hand, and into Europe-wide patterns, on the other. His successor was somewhat different, however. He was just as representative of “central” European culture, but had no connections with Pisa that can be identified. He was Herbert (1181 – before 1196), a Spanish Cistercian who had previously been the abbot of Mores abbey in France. No documentation remains from Herbert’s rule to indicate what kind of archbishop he was. Still, in one sense Herbert must have been a prize for the archdiocese of Torres, for he not only belonged to the prestigious Cistercian movement, but in 1178, before becoming archbishop, he had met Judex Gonnario, the father of Judex Barisone (1153-1181) and grandfather of Barisone’s son, Judex Costantino (1191-1198) at Clairvaux, where Gonnario, wrote Herbert, “having continued for twenty-five years now, continually battles in the discipline of the Order he took up, and waits until his transformation shall come.” Thus, Herbert may have come not as, or not wholly as, a representative of a “higher” European culture to a culturally and spiritually backward land. Perhaps the fact that his first contact with Sardinia had been with a royal member of his own order conditioned him to regard his new flock as culturally European. Certainly it is interesting that he dedicated a whole chapter of his De Miraculis, an account of the miracles of the Cistercians, to Sardinia: as Colombini says, Sardinia in the twelfth century was clearly not so “exotic and isolated” that it could

Colombini, Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi, p. 185. By way of contrast with this assertion, Cistercianism spread quickly in other cultures far removed from the courtly French culture, such as Denmark. See Brian McGuire, The Cistercians in Denmark (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1982).

Colombini, Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi, p. 184.

That this was widely done in southern France is shown in Maximilian Sternberg, Cistercian Architecture and Medieval Society (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 95-96.

not appear in an instructive work, and Judex Costantino could be mentioned in the same way as any other ruler.\footnote{Colombini, \textit{Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi}, p. 150. See Herbertus Turrium in Sardinia, \textit{De Miraculis Libri Tres}, Liber III, cap. XXXI, PL, Vol. 185, col. 1375-1377. It is equally interesting that in his account, a description of the former archbishop Baldwin of Pisa, put into the mouth of a Sardinian priest, calls the archbishop \textit{tantae professionis monachus, et tantae perfectionis episcopus [...] quem nos autumabamus jam in coelo gaudere cum angelis.}}

To conclude, the monastic bishops of Torres between 1139 and 1196 cannot be said to have been representing straightforwardly any one political entity’s interests, whether Pisa, Genoa, or the judicate. Their competing loyalties to their Orders, their judex, and the culture of the wider Church seems to have ordered their loyalties along “institutional” lines, rather than, or in addition to, “ethnic” ones. If there is a common theme among them, it is their support of monastic interests within Logudoro. Perhaps this relative detachment from secular political drives, as well as their presumably higher level of education, made them particularly useful to the judices and can explain why every archbishop between 1139 and 1196 was a monk. Further evidence of this will be seen shortly, in reference to Arborea.

\subsection*{3.3.5 Foreign Attempts at Direct Control over Torres, and Sardinian Responses}

In 1196, after Guglielmo of Massa had attacked Logudoro and while he was conquering Arborea, a Pisan canon named Bandino appeared as archbishop of Torres. Bandino is an interesting figure, in part because he cannot be shown to have ever taken possession of his see. He had been elected by August, 1196, but in February 1197 he had not yet been consecrated and was still in Pisa.\footnote{Vidili, “La cronotassi degli arcivescovi di Torres,” p. 95.} In 1198, he was in Pisa again, or perhaps had never left it, and was working alongside Pisa’s archbishop, Ubaldo.\footnote{Artizzu, \textit{L’Opera di Santa Maria di Pisa e la Sardegna}, p. 68.} Indeed, his only effective relationship with his Sardinian archdiocese seems to have been that of incurring debts on a large scale, using his position as credit: he contracted so many debts “to certain people” that after his death, “in order to pay back the large sum of money ... the Church of Torres suffer[ed] no small damage.”\footnote{bone memorie Bandinus ... quibusdam quedam instrumenta concessit, per que non modicum compelleris solvere pecunie quantitatem, propter quod Turritana Ecclesia incurrît non modicum detrimentum. Sanna, \textit{Innocenzo III e la Sardegna}, p. 74, doc. 66.}

His relationship with the judex shows no more care. The judex was by now Costantino II of Logudoro, the son of Barisone and the grandson of Gonnario, and the same who had been excommunicated by
Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa for retaking the Castle of Goceano by force. In 1198 “the same judex of Torres, having been confined to the bed of illness, had Bandino archbishop of Torres ... and Augerio bishop of Sorres called to his presence, so that he could accept penance for his sins and receive the benefit of absolution.”\textsuperscript{413} Unfortunately for him, both Augerio and Bandino were either abroad and could not come in time, or did not make much effort to come quickly, since “before they had arrived, he went the way of all flesh.”\textsuperscript{414} The political situation was by this time difficult for Logudoro, since both Costantino and his successor had been “forced by necessity” to recognize Pisa’s Archbishop Ubaldo as their feudal lord and to obey “when the Commune of the city of Pisa shall order it.”\textsuperscript{415} The judicate was under the political and ecclesiastical power of Pisa, and the city even controlled, quite literally, the judicate’s access to the pope, since the route from Logudoro to Rome went via Pisa.\textsuperscript{416} In this moment of Pisan triumph, Bandino, it seems, embodies the ultimate exploitative colonialist: he used his diocese for the funds it could offer him, but there is no evidence that he attended to his pastoral duties there.

Despite the lack of documentation directly concerning Bandino, his rule is valuable in that it provides a rare view of a unified Sardinian reaction to Pisan episcopal colonization and an attempt to evade it. In 1200, after Bandino had died, the canons of Torres offended Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa by deciding to replace Bandino with a bishop coming from some other, unnamed diocese, without first seeking Ubaldo’s consent. In a letter to Innocent III, Ubaldo “informed [him] of the illicit transferral that was celebrated in the Church of Torres,” and complained that his rights as primate were being injured.\textsuperscript{417} Innocent did not hesitate to inform him that “the Holy Apostolic See reserves the [right of the] translation of bishops to itself alone,” and in any case “we did not see that any injury to your right was attempted.”\textsuperscript{418} Previously, it was argued that at some point between 1138 and 1200 the archbishops of Pisa came to believe and assert

\textsuperscript{413} idem iudex Turritanus in lecto egritudinis constitutus, ut penitentiam acciperet de commissis et absolutionis beneficium obtineret, bone memorie Bandinum Turritanum archiepiscopum ... et Augerium Surranum episcopum ad suam fecit presentiam evocari; this was Innocent III’s understanding of the matter in 1203, as he explained it to Biagio, his legate in Sardinia. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 36-38, doc. 29.

\textsuperscript{414} sed antequam obtatam eorum copiam habuisset, viam fuit universe carnis ingressus. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 36-38, doc. 29.

\textsuperscript{415} de iuramento ... quam fecisti necessitate compulsus ... quam super fidelitate prestanda venerabili fratri nostro Hubaldo, Pisano archiepiscopo, et successoribus eius, quotiens ab eis fueris requisitus ... cum id tibi Commune Pisanæ preceperit civitatis. This letter of Innocent III is directed to Costantino’s brother and successor, Comita, but provides a summary of earlier events. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 29-31, doc. 22.

\textsuperscript{416} This is a detail that Innocent III notes in passing, and since he is referring to Sardinian canons who are in an open conflict with the Archbishop of Pisa, it can be assumed that they would not have chosen to travel through Pisa unless there was no alternative. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 16-17, doc. 7.

\textsuperscript{417} nobis super postulatione in turritana Ecclesia celebrata significasti. This information is contained in Innocent’s reply to Uberto in 1200. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 16-17, doc. 7.

\textsuperscript{418} tamen translationes episcoporum sibi soli Sedes apostolica reservavit, non vidimus quod in electione ipsa quicquam in tui iuris preudicium fuerit attemptatum. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 16-17, doc. 7.
that they had the right to approve all episcopal elections in the province of Torres, and that this imagined right was not challenged until 1200. By 1200, however, the canons of Torres may have been pushed too far. Between 1196 and 1200, as Chapter Two showed, Logudoro had nearly been conquered by Guglielmo of Massa, its judex had died an excommunicate, and Pisa had shown itself more clearly than ever a would-be dominator rather than simply a “stronger friend.” Archbishop Bandino, arguably the most openly “colonizing” bishop the archdiocese had yet known, may have been the last straw. Furthermore, by this date it is permissible to hypothesize that the growth of capitular rights was having an effect on the behavior of the canons of S. Gavino.\(^{419}\) It is likely that this combination of factors pushed the canons of S. Gavino to act against Pisa’s archbishop-legate for the first time.

Throughout the chapter thus far, the existence of foreign prelates has been emphasized, and an attempt has been made to show how these foreign prelates interacted with Pisa’s drive to colonize Sardinia both politically and culturally. Their existence should not, however, be taken as evidence that indigenous Sards had almost disappeared from the bishoprics. This has also been shown throughout the above analyses, but bears emphasis. From the 1060s to 1200, out of fourteen identifiable archbishops of Torres, it is true that a full seven had foreign names, and the suffragan diocese of Sorres had five foreign names out of seven total known names, but in the diocese of Ploaghe just three out of ten names are definitely not Sardinian. This is the more significant given that in the only two cases in which an archbishop of Torres can be identified as having come from another diocese of Torres, that diocese is Ploaghe, suggesting that indigenous families with high social connections must have controlled the area and its diocesan elections. For the other dioceses, out of three identifiable bishops of Ampurias one was foreign; out of seven in Bosa just two were foreign, and these only at the end of the century; in Ottana there were two foreigners out of five bishops, in Castra one out of two, and in Bisarcio, the diocese most nearly connected to the judicial capital, no foreign names appear during the whole century. Bisarcio also, incidentally, is the only diocese in Torres that shows indigenous family ties influencing the choice of bishop: in 1139 Mariano Thelle, formerly a priest somewhere in Logudoro, was bishop; in 1170 the bishop was another Thelle, this time a Giovanni. In sum, the diocesan seats that show less penetration by foreigners are also those that seem to have been controlled by powerful native families.

Moreover, even where the names are not indigenous, a number of them belonged to monastic bishops who, as has been shown, had particularly complicated loyalties which made them less suitable for furthering the lordship of either a secular power, such as Pisa, or the power of a secular archbishop-legate. Thus, the analysis of Logudoro’s prelacy has shown that it was heavily influenced by Pisa’s ecclesiastical

\(^{419}\) See above, at nn. 121-122.
power, but was not controlled outright. Foreign bishops tended to favor the rights of European monastic orders, guided Sardinian patronage to follow Pisan examples or enrich Pisan institutions, and in at least one case alienated rights which Sardinian tradition did not concede. At the same time, they provided learning to the judice’s court, as well as cultural and political links with important spiritual movements in Europe.

3.4 The Archdiocese of Cagliari

Some of the trends that are evident in the archdiocese of Torres, such as a connection between foreign bishops and a drive to reform the church, and between foreign bishops and specific dioceses, are visible also in the archdiocese of Cagliari. In contrast to Torres, though, it is harder to show a link between foreign bishops and economic and political links to Pisa, for reasons that will be considered below. Limits of space make it impossible to discuss all these patterns in any detail, but a brief overview can be provided.

Cagliari provides even more striking evidence of an early foreign domination of the upper clergy than Torres does. Between 1059, when the first archiepiscopal name can be found, and 1126, almost every named archbishop bears a name that is alien to the very distinctive Sardinian naming tradition. An Alfredo in 1059 was followed by “Jacob of Cagliari,” who was probably foreign, and who helped his judex make the judicate’s first donation to a Western monastic order, the Order of St. Victor of Marseilles. After Jacob came non-Sardinian Lamberto, who declared himself the “conceiver and instructor, and according to God the counsellor” of the judex’s foundation of a Victorine monastery and his donation of eight churches to it. Then came a non-Sard “Ugo, by the grace of God archbishop and servant of the Church of Cagliari,” who confirmed previous donations to the monks of St. Victor and gave two more churches. Of Ugo’s three suffragan bishops, one was a non-Sardinian “Bishop Virgilio of

420 For a description of the Sardinian onomastic tradition, see once again Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società,” and esp. p. 212 for his comments on foreign names among the Sardinian episcopacy.
421 consentiente et laudante kalaritano Jacob. This is remembered in a confirmation document of 1089, found in CDS, pp. 160-161, doc. 16.
422 Ego Lambertus archiepiscopus huius rei inceptor et praeeceptor, ac secundum Dominum consiliator fui; this is part of his signature at the end of the judex’s foundation charter. CDS, pp. 161-162, doc. 17.
423 Ugo Dei gratia kalaritanae ecclesiae archiepiscopus et servus, found in his donation charter of 1090, in CDS, pp. 163-164, doc. 19. There is a possibility that Hugo was actually Sardinian; it is not a typically Sardinian name, but nevertheless may be the product of early medieval trading relations with Catalonia that brought an influx of Hispanic names into the Sardinian system. See Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società,” pp. 198-200.
Dolia” and the other was the equally non-Sardinian “Bishop Raimondo;” both of these appear on a donation to, once again, the Victorine monks. Raimondo’s name is probably Catalan, though, not Pisan or Genoese, and may be due to Cagliari’s history as Sardinia’s chief port and focus of international contacts.\footnote{Virgilius episcopus de Dolia, CDS, pp. 160-161, doc. 16; Ego Raimundus episcopus manu propria firmo, CDS, pp. 163-164, doc. 19. Raimondo does not state the name of his diocese, but it may be surmised that he was the bishop of Sulcis, because both of the documents cited here are witnessed by just two bishops, and one of them, Virgilius, is the same in both charters. In the first, Virgilius names his diocese, and is followed by an anonymous bishop of Sulcis; in the second, Virgilius does not name his diocese, and is followed by Raimondo. As will be seen in the following pages, Sulcis would become dominated by foreign names through the twelfth century.} Archbishop Ugo was followed by the foreign-named Gualfredo. One of Gualfredo’s suffragans was the foreign-sounding “Benedetto, by the grace of God bishop of Dolia,” who may have been a Cassinese monk; Benedetto both witnessed Judex Mariano Torchitorio’s large donation to S. Maria of Pisa, after Pisans had helped him retake his judicate, and “wrote, completed, and delivered” a donation of his own “which was made by me” to the monks of St. Victor.\footnote{Ego Benedictus episcopus gratia Dei Doliensis ecclesiae hanc offertionis cartam a me factam, manu mea propria eam conscripsi, et complevi, et dedi. The charter, dated to 1112, is in CDS, pp. 182-183, doc. 7; Mariano Torchitorio’s is at CDS I, pp. 181-182, doc. 6. See also Chapter Two, at nn. 93-94.} Thus, he may be an example of the cultural advantages that foreign bishops, particularly monastic ones, could bring to the Sardinian judices.

After Gualfredo came the equally non-Sardinian Archbishop Guglielmo, who joined the judex’s uncle Turbino to sail with Bishop Pietro Moriconi of Pisa on the Balearic Crusade. In 1118, he also complained about Judex Mariano Torchitorio’s approach to monastic foundation, which seems to have lain within the Byzantine-origin tradition that has been outlined above, and tried to correct it.\footnote{Zedda, “‘Amani judicess’ o ‘a manu judicess’?,” pp. 27-28.} Finally, Guglielmo donated the monastery of S. Saturnino to the Benedictine monastery of St. Victor in Marseilles, a monastery that was destined to become Cagliari’s greatest and richest.\footnote{The patron of this monastery was not the Saturninus of Tolosa, but a local saint from the fourth century. See Felice Putzu, Saturnino Martire Cagliaritano (sec. IV), ed. Carlo Pibiri (Selargius: Oratorio di Sant’Antonio Abate in Selargius, 2011).} In 1112 the suffragan diocese of Sulcis was held by a Victorine monk carrying the non-Sardinian name of Arnaldo, followed in 1122 by a non-Sard Cassinese monk named Alberto.\footnote{Alberto is mentioned in the Chronica monasterii Cassinensis, p. 544. Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società,” p. 206.}

As may be seen, therefore, the prelates of Cagliari almost all bore names evocative of mainland Europe, from an earlier date than they did in Torres, and many were active in patronizing Western monasticism. Yet missing from this picture is evidence that any of these prelates was Pisan, or any eleventh-century
document similar to the 1080-1085 Privilege of Logudoro or the 1082 grant of Logudorese churches to Pisa’s cathedral, both of which confirmed ecclesiastical, economic and political connections between Logudoro and Pisa. Cagliari’s first documented encounter with the Pisan Church did not come until the first Council of Ardara in the 1090s, presided over by the papal legate and attended by Archbishop Daibert of Pisa. Its first donation to the Cathedral of S. Maria was not made until 1104, and its first hint of submission to the Pisan Church was its participation in the Balearic Crusade of 1115-1116. Indeed, there may be reason to think that some of its bishops and archbishops were from southern France, rather than Italy. The only times they took part in monastic patronage, for example, it was directed to the Order of St. Victor of Marseilles, in southern France. This would be puzzling behavior in a Pisan bishop, or at least in one who was interested in facilitating his city’s economic growth. Not only did the Order of St. Victor have no connection to Pisa, but the Victorine monks were heavily involved in the salt trade, in which function they actually created competition for Pisan merchants. Indeed, the suffragan bishop of Sulcis in 1112 was himself a Victorine monk named Arnaldo.

If the bishops of Cagliari around the turn of the twelfth century may have been French rather than Pisan, it is important to ask why, particularly considering Pisa’s later importance in Cagliari. Certainly Pisa’s mercantile weight in the late eleventh century must have been just as great in Cagliari as in Logudoro, and perhaps even greater given the importance of Cagliari’s port. A comparison between the development of church reform in Torres and Cagliari may suggest an answer. Until probably the 1170s, Cagliari had been home to the island’s sole archbishop. It is almost certainly for this reason that, after the Great Schism, the reforming papal eye was trained particularly on Cagliari’s archdiocese: it needed Cagliari to use its historical authority as head of Sardinia’s Church to lead the other judicates to conform to Rome. Thus, in the 1160s and 1170s, the judices of Cagliari were under papal pressure to Westernize their Church, a pressure that was probably fiercer than that on the other judicates. Gregory VII’s letter to the judex of Cagliari in 1080, in which he declares that the judex’s loyalty to Rome had averted a potential invasion of all of Sardinia, suggests that Cagliari was in some sense being made responsible for the reform of the island as a whole. This idea is supported by the unbroken line of foreign names in Cagliari, which stands in contrast to the indigenous name of Logudoro’s only named archbishop prior to 1100, Costantino di Castro, ruling Torres in the 1070s. No records, unfortunately, survive from Arborea in this period, so no comparison is possible with that judicate, while Gallura never became an archdiocese. Still, if the post-

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430 *Arnaldus Sulciensis Ecclesiae episcopus* was a witness to the donation of Bishop Benedetto, cited above in n. 178.
Schism popes were seeking to reform Sardinia by means of foreign prelates, then Cagliari is exactly where these prelates might be expected to appear, and it is surely in this way that the sudden heavy influx of foreign-named archbishops should be understood.

Cagliari, therefore, needed to demonstrate a rapid and convincing reform effort in the 1160s, 1170s and 1180s. As Colombini shows, this is precisely the period in which the Order of St. Victor of Marseilles was at the peak of its power and prestige. St. Victor had monasteries in a wide arc of land stretching from Iberia to northern Italy, and in 1179 it received a new abbot who was both a cardinal and former papal legate. Thus, Colombini argues, for a late eleventh-century Mediterranean ruler seeking some form of reformed, powerful and prestigious Western monasticism to import, St. Victor was the obvious choice. In contrast, the Camaldolese and Vallombrosans, which Torres would import from 1112 on, would not begin to achieve their great prestige until the twelfth century. Additionally, the commercial power of Marseilles in the western and central Mediterranean, combined with the Victorines’ own trading activities, may have made the judices of Cagliari hope that the Victorine monks’ salt trading would bring Marseilles’ merchants to Cagliari. From this perspective, Marseilles must have seemed to offer to Cagliari combined church reform and commercial links to a powerful merchant city. In Cagliari’s case, seeking southern French bishops for its dioceses would make sense as a way of confirming spiritual and economic links with Marseilles.

This combination of reform and economic links is, of course, precisely what Pisa offered Logudoro. In the 1170s, Cagliari may not have turned to Pisa because it needed the sort of immediate and convincing proof of its reform efforts that could only be supplied by patronizing a monastic Order. Pisa did not yet have a monastery that could compare with St. Victor in terms of spiritual prestige. Logudoro, in contrast, seems to have felt less the need to establish Western monasticism early on, perhaps because it was under less papal pressure to lead Sardinian reforms. Thus, it could follow a more “relaxed,” secular path to reform, one that involved granting politically useful gifts to Pisa’s cathedral, inviting a Pisan bishop to rule one of its dioceses, and making trade agreements. This may explain why Western monasticism did not arrive in Logudoro until much later than in Cagliari. When it did so, the judicate was already influenced by Pisan spiritual models, and so Logudorese patrons looked to Camaldoli and Montecassino for monastic spirituality.

In sum, Cagliari and Logudoro seem to have followed nearly opposite paths. Cagliari had a French monastic presence early on, and a great number of foreign prelates, but no recorded ecclesiastical or

political links to Pisa. Logudoro, instead, had both ecclesiastical and political links with Pisa as early as 1082, but no Western monasticism until 1112, when a particularly Europe-oriented judex founded the first monasteries of a north-Italian Order that was much appreciated in Pisa. This difference between the two judicates’ relations with the Church of Pisa may explain why, once the archbishops of Pisa obtained the legation in Sardinia, they chose Logudoro’s capital of Ardara as their home in Sardinia, and as the base for all their Sardinian synods, rather than a site in the richer and more historically prestigious Cagliari. Cagliari’s pre-eminence as leader of Sardinian ecclesiastical reform, therefore, may have dissipated once Pisa was given legatine authority over Sardinia.

Without more documentary evidence, it cannot be said whether Cagliari began to seek north-Italian and/or Pisan bishops for its dioceses once Pisa’s ecclesiastical and mercantile importance for the island had become evident. It is not even clear whether the early predominance of foreign prelates continued. In 1126 the archbishop of Cagliari was Pietro, whose name could equally be Sardinian or foreign, and the next documented archbishop, who appears in 1141, had the traditionally Sardinian name of Costantino. As far as can be determined, though, he was followed by a continental Bonito, or Bonato, who was active in 1163, and after Bonito, as far as history knows, came Ricco in 1183. Ricco was almost certainly not a Sardinian, since for one thing his name was Roman, and for another he seems to have had a closer relationship than any other prelate in Sardinia with Innocent III during the political turmoil in Sardinia at the end of the twelfth century.

If the proportion of Sard to foreign archbishops is difficult to establish for the archdiocesan seat of Cagliari, it is clearer for Cagliari’s three suffragan dioceses, where foreign names easily outnumber the indigenous names. This is unsurprising, given the open-arms policy to foreign cultures that began with Cagliari’s Judex Costantino I in the 1090s, and which was continued by his successors with foreign alliances and marriages to non-Sards. Unsurprisingly, even if this outward-looking policy began with the judical family, over the course of the twelfth century it was taken up by the nobility of Cagliari, eventually transforming the whole culture of the judicate. The greater concentration of foreigners in


437 Ibid., p. 207.
Cagliari’s suffragan dioceses, therefore, may indicate that the indigenous nobles were either less determined to keep the positions for themselves, or else had become so “Europeanized” that the foreign episcopal names were actually provided by indigenous nobility who had abandoned Sardinian naming traditions. Only four to five names can be attested for each diocese during the twelfth century, but even so the consistency of foreign names is remarkable. In the diocese of Dolia, four names are available; at least three, and perhaps all four, of these are foreign. Likewise, in Sulcis, three, and perhaps four, out of five names are foreign; Sulcis was also important politically, to judge by the generous donations of land that successive judices made to its bishops. In the diocese of Suelli, however, the pattern is reversed, such that only one out of five names is definitely not Sardinian. Significantly, Suelli was also the poorest and most “backward” diocese of the judicate, covering a mountainous region that was populated by sheep and scattered lawless inhabitants who, according to contemporary sources, were apt to sweep down to raid the towns of Cagliari’s great plains. Although this fact has not been noted in any study to date, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Pisans, or toward the end of the century perhaps the Genoese, negotiated ecclesiastical positions in the two richer dioceses, those near the ports and close to contacts with Europe, for their own men, leaving the poorest and most troublesome diocese to the Sards.

If there are conclusions to be drawn from the preponderance of foreign names throughout Cagliari’s twelfth-century history, they are these: that foreign names do not necessarily indicate Pisans or Genoese. Likewise, even if Pisa’s early favor in the eyes of Rome gave the city a strong advantage, it did not nullify the influence of other interested foreign powers. The foreign archbishops of Cagliari prior to the 1090s, when Pisa’s Archbishop Daibert first became legate, are surely the fruit of papal pressure to join Latin Christendom, and may not be Italian at all.

3.5 The Archdiocese of Oristano (Arborea)

Arborea, in strong contrast with Cagliari but in line with its somewhat more isolationist politics in the first half of the twelfth century, had a preponderance of indigenous names filling the archdiocesan see of

438 Ibid., passim.
439 Petrucci, Re in Sardegna a Pisa cittadini, p. 35.
Oristano. There was, it is true, a prelate whom Judex Costantino I referred to as “my archbishop Homodei” in the early decades of the century, perhaps an effect of the judex’s momentarily Pisan-friendly stance, but he must be placed in the context of the Sardininan Teodor in 1118 and possibly Sardinian Petru in 1131, and in 1146/7 the Comita who was a member of the royal judical family of de Lacon (or de Martis). This last is, incidentally, the same family that provided one, or perhaps two successive, bishops of Ampurias in Torres, from 1170-79 and possibly in 1187.

At the same time, when this Archbishop Comita de Lacon appears alongside his three suffragan bishops in an important donation charter, there is a glimpse of the foreign elements that, under the authority of these indigenous archbishops, were present in the wider Arborean prelacy. Comita’s three suffragans were “Lord Paucapalea bishop of Santa Justa, Lord Alibrandino bishop of Terralba, [and] Lord Maurello bishop of Usellus;” of these names, Alibrandino and Paucapalea were almost certainly foreign. Considering the difference between Arborea’s foreign policies and those of its neighbouring judicates, this fact is extremely interesting. Alibrandino, intriguingly enough, may have been Pisan; certainly his name is not Genoese. Considering this, perhaps his presence ought to be seen in the context of Arborea’s recent political moves. In 1144, as described in Chapter Two, it had attacked Logudoro, for which Archbishop Baldwin of Pisa had excommunicated the judex, Comita. When Comita died shortly afterward he was succeeded by his son Barisone, who reversed his father’s pro-Genoese politics and opened his reign with the great ceremony of consecration for the monastery of S. Maria of Bonarcado, at which he arranged for the Archbishop of Pisa, Villano Gaetani, to stand with the four Sardinian judices present, as if to show that the Archbishop held political authority over them all. The presence of a Pisan bishop in one of Arborea’s three suffragan dioceses would be consistent with such an effort to move politically and ecclesiastically closer to Pisa.

To judge by secondary literature, meanwhile, the origins of Paucapalea are a complete mystery. It should not be, however: there was at the time a town in Piedmont called Pocapaglia, whose Latin name

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441 *archiepiscopo meo Homodei*; this is part of a charter by which Judex Costantino places the great monastery of S. Maria of Bonarcado under the authority of the Pisan abbey of S. Zeno. See CSMB, pp. 58-59, doc. 1.


445 This bishop shared his name with a famous decretist at Bologna writing in precisely the same period, whose name is famous for its oddity and about whose origins nothing is known. *The New Catholic Encyclopedia, Pau-Red*
was “Pauca pala;” there was also a noble Piedmontese family bearing the name “de Paucapalea” or “de Pocapaglia.” Bishop Paucapalea of S. Justa in Arborea, therefore, was probably northern Italian but unconnected to either Genoa or Pisa. Finally, Bishop Maurello was almost certainly Catalan. No study has ever pointed out the varied origins of these bishops, but they offer an important insight into Arborea’s cultural contacts with the outside world. The potential link between Arborea and both Pisa and Catalonia as early as 1146 is the more significant given that in the 1150s Judex Barisone II would take on the role of mediator between Count Berenguer of Barcelona and Pisa, and in 1157 would marry the “lady Agalbursa, my cherished and amiable wife, daughter of the former Ponze de Cervera” and sister of Count Berenguer. Given that Bishop Maurello was active just one year after Judex Comita died, this cultural link with Catalonia was probably not Barisone II’s innovation but had been cultivated at least by his father, if not even earlier. This diverse group of bishops also shows that even if Arborea was reserving its archbishopric for native Arboreans, it was hardly as isolationist as Bruno Anatra, for example, has claimed. Rather, it seems to have invited in varied cultural elements while maintaining indigenous control over the archiepiscopate as a whole.

After Archbishop Comita de Lacon in 1146, there is no evidence for the names of Oristano’s archbishops until 1185. This is rather frustrating, because the turbulent political situation of Arborea in the 1160s and 1170s, as Judex Barisone tried to become king of Sardinia and ended up deeply indebted to Genoa, would

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suggest an ideal situation for Genoese clerics to find their way into Arborea’s dioceses. Only the bishop of S. Justa’s name is known in 1164: he was named Ugo, and took part in Barisone’s negotiations with Genoa. His name points either to Pisa or to Catalonia, but considering his role in Barisone’s treaty with Genoa, he cannot have been Pisan. Hypothesizing Catalonia as his origin, however, makes good sense: by 1164 Arborea was awash with Catalans who had accompanied Agalbursa, the Catalan queen of Judex Barisone. The identity of Arborea’s other two suffragan bishops is unknown, but at some point during Barisone’s reign the great monastery of S. Maria of Bonarcado was ruled by a prior who called himself “Albert the Genoese:” his provenance was clearly important to his sense of identity, and probably even more important to the Sards around him. He is the only identifiably Genoese prior of the monastery, and so it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that he was an effect of Genoa’s growing political influence over Arborea.

In any case, the next documented archbishop is Ugo, perhaps around 1185. This was the year in which the beleaguered “King Barisone of Arborea and my wife Lady Agalbursa, queen of the land, with the will of God and of all his saints,” made an unprecedented donation to the Opera of S. Maria of Pisa. It must be admitted that, by this late in the twelfth century, Ugo’s foreign name is no longer certain evidence that he was not Sardinian. He may have simply been one of the increasing numbers of Sards who were adopting foreign names toward the end of the twelfth century. Nevertheless, considering Arborea’s political situation, it would be no surprise if this Ugo were indeed Pisan. Arborea, as Chapter Two noted, was heavily indebted to Genoa at this time, thanks to Barisone’s expensive attempts to become king of all Sardinia. Judging by a treaty between Pisa and Genoa in 1169, which stipulated that “the Pisans must not create any impediment” to Genoa receiving its repayment from Arborea, Pisa had almost certainly used...
the judicate’s financial troubles to negotiate an alliance which gave it the right to speak of the judex as “King Barisone, our vassal.”

Perhaps giving the archdiocese to a Pisan Ugo was another condition of Pisan support, and if so, the relationship between donating to the cathedral Opera and receiving a Pisan archbishop would mirror the pattern already seen in Logudoro at the beginning of the twelfth century. In 1185, furthermore, the names of the suffragan bishops who witnessed Barisone’s donation to S. Maria of Pisa include a “Lord Ugo, Bishop of S. Justa;” they also, however, contain two typically Sardinian names: Mariane Zorracki and Comita Pais.

Considering these two prelates named Ugo, one an archbishop and one a bishop, one more aspect ought to be considered, in relation to foreign colonization. In 1182 Barisone had donated a monastery to Montecassino in return for twelve monks “of whom three or four should be learned enough that, if necessary, they may be elected as archbishops and bishops, and be able to negotiate the business of our kingdom either in the Roman curia, or in the court of the emperor, or wherever should be necessary.”

The witnesses to this donation include Mariane Zorracki and Comita Pais, but not the Ugo, bishop of S. Justa, who would be a witness to Barisone’s donation to S. Maria three years later, as noted above. This Ugo, bishop of S. Justa, may therefore have been precisely one of these monks from Montecassino, part of an exchange of land for culture and learning. It is another glimpse of the willing importation of foreign prelates and European culture, and another warning not to assume that all prelates with non-Sardinian names were imposed by Pisa. Barisone’s donation implies that such learning may have been difficult to find among the indigenous nobility who continued to supply most of Arborea’s prelates. Indeed, to judge from Barisone’s specific mention of representation at the imperial court, he may have felt that the fiasco of his coronation and its lingering financial and political consequences were, at least in

only that Barisone was besieged by pressures from both cities, but also that he was able to play both cities against each other, gaining protection from Pisa against Genoa’s pressure for repayment of debts, and Genoa’s protection from Pisans who refused to honor their own debts or sought to limit Barisone’s exercise of his own law within Arborea.

regem Baresonem nostrum vassallum, Obertus cancellarius, Annales Ianuenses, p. 63. Cited also in Chapter Two, n. 212.

donnu Ugo piscobu de Sancta iusta. CDS, p. 254, doc. 113.

ex quibus tres vel quattuor ita sint litterati, ut, si necessarium fuerit, in archiepiscopos et episcopos possint elegi, et etiam regni nostri negotiation, sive in Romana curia, vel in curia Imperatoris, et ubique valeant tractare. CDS, p. 252, doc. 110.

Turtas believes that this Ugo is the same who was bishop of S. Justa in 1164, but since in 1182 Barisone was looking for new “archbishops or bishops,” and since his 1182 donation is missing the names of none other than an archbishop and a bishop, who was the previous Ugo of S. Justa, it seems quite possible that at least the see of S. Justa, and perhaps also the archdiocesan see, was vacant at the time. See Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 840.
part, the fault of his clergy, who perhaps were not sophisticated enough to have negotiated better terms for him. A document from 1255 would call Sardinian prelates so ignorant that they “do not know how to read or preach the word of God to the people;” even if the Bishop Ugo who accompanied Judex Barisone to Genoa was Catalan, it is possible that a lack of education was a problem in Arborea’s dioceses in the 1180s, too.\footnote{legere nesciunt net proponere populo verbum Dei. The letter is dated August 1, 1255 and was sent by Pope Alexander IV to the archbishop of Cagliari in circumstances that will be discussed in Chapter Four. M. Bourel de la Roncière, et al., eds., Les registres d’Alexandre IV Vol I (Paris: Thorin & Fils, 1895), p. 225, doc. 735.}

Whether they were educated or not, it is likely that native Arboreans did control most of the judicate’s sees, despite the three foreign names in 1146. Although there are so few names available for the judicate’s dioceses that no precise idea can be formed of the percentage of foreign to Sardinian bishops in the twelfth century, nevertheless in the diocese of S. Justa a maximum of two out of four known names are foreign; in Usellus either one or none of two names is non-Sardinian, and in Terralba only one out of three names is foreign. This lack of foreign prelates may have been one of Arborea’s strengths, in that the episcopacy had not been put into the hands of representatives of foreign powers, but Barisone clearly felt that it was also a weakness.

For all Barisone’s care, somewhere between 1192 and 1198, under the reign of Barisone’s son Pietro, Arborea fell under the leadership of Archbishop Justus. This was the Genoese prelate against whom, it seems, every hand was raised: his own canons, Archbishop Ubald of Pisa, Guglielmo of Massa, and Judex Costantino of Logudoro. Frustratingly, no relevant information survives regarding him other than his difficulties described in Chapter Two.\footnote{He does appear in three places in the condaghe of S. Maria of Bonarcado, once as a party to a property exchange, once as a witness of such an exchange, and once as a witness to the resolution of a conflict, but no details are provided regarding his actions, decisions or political leanings. CSMB, pp. 142-145, docs. 90, 91; pp. 144-147, doc. 93.} What is clear, however, is that the archdiocese of Oristano had followed a markedly different path from that travelled by Torres and Cagliari in the twelfth century, retaining its cultural independence to a far greater degree and reaching out to Catalonia. It might seem that this was of little use, since by 1200 Arborea was in a similar situation to that of Logudoro and Cagliari: political subjection to the Pisan Guglielmo of Massa, and ecclesiastical control by a Genoese archbishop, Justus, who clearly represented his native city’s political leanings. Nevertheless, as Chapter Four will show, the fact that this political subjection did not come until the end of the twelfth century had very important effects for the judicate’s long-term viability.
The reasons are all to do with the papacy and its changing interests in the island. Logudoro and Cagliari had sided openly with Pisa at the beginning of the twelfth century, when Pisa was on excellent terms with Rome. This, of course, must have accounted for much of the judices’ interest in alliances with Pisa, but it also meant that the papacy was disinclined to check Pisa’s growing ambitions in Sardinia and in those judicates specifically. To the contrary, the papacy strengthened these ambitions by granting Pisa’s archbishop first the legation in Sardinia, then the primacy over Logudoro, and finally the primacy over Cagliari and Arborea. Apart from the papacy, there was no other power that was both interested in challenging Pisa and strong enough to succeed. By turning to Genoa during Pisa’s period of papal favor, however, Arborea committed itself to a city that could be, and was, challenged and checked by Pisa’s stronger authority in Sardinia whenever it tried to assert itself on the island. Thus, until Barisone II’s imperial ambitions made him overreach himself, Genoa never had the chance to build up a very strong political hold in Arborea. When it finally did achieve significant political rights to Arborea in the 1160s and 1170s, Arborea simply turned to Pisa and, once again, Genoa’s ambitions were blocked by the Pisans.

This turn to Pisa in the 1180s might make it seem as if Arborea was finally setting itself on the path that Logudoro and Cagliari had been on since the beginning of the twelfth century. Indeed, it is around this time that the great Pisan Capraia family established itself in Arborea, which until now seems not to have had noble Italian families living within its borders. There was a vital difference, however: in the 1180s and 1190s, when Pisa began to exert its influence over Arborea, it was no longer favored by Rome. Indeed, only a few years after Pisa began to claim lordship over Arborea, Innocent III would assert papal lordship over every judicate and, for the first time, actively limit Pisa’s power in Sardinia. Thus, the fact that Arborea did not ally itself with Pisa until the late twelfth century, and that once again it had chosen as its ally a city under Rome’s disfavor, means that at the end of the twelfth century Pisa did not have either the time or the political space to develop the kind of pervasive authority in Arborea that it had had decades to mature in Logudoro and Cagliari. In short, when Genoa might have colonized Arborea it was stopped by Pisa, and when Pisa might have colonized Arborea it was blocked by the pope. Chapter Four will show that although Pisan power did continue to grow in Arborea in the thirteenth century, the increasing power of the pope kept Pisa from being much more than a contested political ally of Arborea.

### 3.6 Conclusions

Throughout the twelfth century, a number of different patterns can be identified across the three judicates that have been examined, even keeping in mind the incompleteness of the sources. Torres and Cagliari, the two ecclesiastical provinces most closely tied to Pisa, had a preponderance of foreign names among
their archbishops, although the balance between foreigner and indigenous Sardinian was more even in the suffragan dioceses. These foreign archbishops and bishops were sometimes the direct consequence of a political accord between the judicate and Pisa, and can be seen involving themselves in granting Sardinian land to foreign entities: the Opera of S. Maria of Pisa, Camaldoli, Montecassino, St. Victor of Marseilles, and others. To the judices they provided culture, education, political links and perhaps experienced ambassadors abroad. In contrast, Arborea kept itself relatively distanced from Pisa yet made repeated alliances with Genoa, while its archeepiscopal seat and suffragan dioceses were dominated by indigenous names until the last twenty years of the twelfth century. Given that Genoa was as eager to develop its presence in Sardinia as Pisa was, the most logical conclusion to draw is that Pisa used its archbishop-legate’s ecclesiastical authority to extend its political power over its allies in Logudoro and Cagliari in a way that Genoa did not, or could not, do with its ally Arborea. Thus, Pisa’s papal legation, in combination with Pisan political and economic pressures, could secure the highest and most influential positions in each judicate’s church for its own churchmen. The legation on its own was not enough, or Arborea too would have had foreign, and no doubt Pisan, archbishops. As Chapter Four will show, Pisa’s advantages would continue to have a residual effect in the thirteenth century, even after Innocent III and his successors so restricted the Pisan archbishop that the legation was little more than an empty title. The political, cultural, economic and spiritual prestige that Pisa enjoyed in the twelfth century allowed it to create a strong base of political links and, in the early thirteenth century, advantageous marriages with judical families that would allow it to continue to expand politically in the 1200s even without the force of the legation. Even so, as will now be shown, the loss of the papal legation did prove to be a serious weakness for Pisa despite its secular strengths.
Chapter Four. Sardinian Bishoprics between Rome, Pisa and Genoa in the Struggle for Thirteenth-Century Sardinia

4.1 Introduction

As should be clear by now, throughout the twelfth century Pisa and, to a much lesser extent, Genoa had exploited the higher ecclesiastical positions in Sardinia for the benefit of their own wealth, political power and prestige. Chapter Two emphasized the role that the papal legation had in strengthening Pisa’s political/moral authority on the island, and Chapter Three noted points at which the archbishop of Pisa and foreign-born bishops in Sardinia worked together to promote the interests of Pisa and the reformed Roman Church. Chapter Four will now examine the development of these trends in the very different conditions of the thirteenth century. Unlike Chapter Three, which surveyed the developments of three judicates for the entire twelfth century, Chapter Four will examine them from ca. 1200 only up to the late 1250s. This is because by that time, Cagliari and Logudoro had dissolved politically and fallen under the direct or indirect control of Pisa and Genoa. In the absence of a structured indigenous polity, which until then had provided organized responses to Genoese and Pisan attempts at domination, the question of Pisan or Genoese “colonization” takes on a very different hue in these former judicates. For the sake of thematic unity, therefore, their colonization will not be analyzed after their dissolution. As for Arborea, its analysis will be carried as far as the 1260s, when instead of disintegrating like its neighbours, it began to expand. This expansion would allow it to survive the thirteenth century intact, and indeed would lead Arborea to become the only judicate to continue to exist as a political unit until the early fifteenth century. Chapter Four will attempt to explain why Arborea, alone of the three judicates examined here, managed to maintain its independence. It is essential to analyse all three of these judicates, because the changed conditions of the thirteenth century affected the fates of Cagliari, Logudoro and Arborea in very different ways. A full understanding of the meaning that foreign and indigenous clergy might have in Sardinia, therefore, can only be achieved by considering all three. For the sake of consistency, Gallura will once again not be treated, except where it is important to understand the other judicates.

It should be noted that the following analysis will differ from that in Chapter Three in that it will necessarily provide political narratives for each judicate alongside its discussion of that judicate’s bishops and archbishops. In addition, it will differ from both Chapter Two and Chapter Three in that, as was explained in the Introduction, Cagliari will no longer be compared with Eastern Europe. Unlike Logudoro and Arborea, the judicate of Cagliari was conquered by the commune of Pisa in the early thirteenth
century and was never truly able to regain its independence in the late Middle Ages. In contrast, the lands of Eastern Europe enjoyed much greater political independence. This change in Cagliari’s political situation means that, for the thirteenth century, Eastern Europe provides a useful comparison only for Logudoro and Arborea. Finally, the chapter will follow a different order from that used in Chapter Three, since it will begin with the case of Cagliari, not Logudoro. It will then proceed to Logudoro and will finish with Arborea.

The choice to look at Cagliari first is determined by the fact that, in the 1200s, Cagliari is the earliest case to illustrate the central argument of this chapter. Briefly stated, this argument is that, even after Pisa effectively lost free exercise of its legation in the thirteenth century, the lingering effects of the city’s twelfth-century spiritual authority, as well as its primacy, continued to provide important support to Pisa’s efforts to retain its grip on the island in the 1200s. At the same time, the fact that the city made repeated and insistent attempts to regain both legation and primacy, when these were withheld outright by the pope, show that the loss of legatine and/or primatial power represented a serious weakness for Pisa. The events of the thirteenth century will show that, whereas the power of twelfth-century Pisa was able to help Pisans onto the thrones of two judicates, and that its role as rescuer of Arborea from financial servitude to Genoa brought it into the good graces of the Arborean royal family, the loss of its legation and primacy led it to lose completely its grip on one of its twelfth-century strongholds, Logudoro. Furthermore, Pisa’s loss of moral and spiritual authority meant that even in the judicates where it continued to enjoy political power, the papacy was able to maintain a counter-force of clergy who were loyal to Rome and usually hostile to Pisa.

Perhaps the most visible effect of Pisa’s loss of spiritual authority is the change in its methods for controlling Sardinia. As Chapter Two and Chapter Three have shown, twelfth-century Pisan efforts to colonize Sardinia were carried out in large part by means of the papal authority inherent in its legation. Once that papal authority became effectively divorced from the legation, Pisa had to find different ways of exerting its political will. One of these ways was to begin to rely on the primacy more than on the legation, but the primacy, of course, lacked the great prestige of the legation. Another way was to involve the commune militarily in Sardinian affairs as it had never done before. A third way was to secure marriages with judicial families that opened up the highest positions of Sardinian lay power to Pisans. Pisa’s first direct invasion of a Sardinian judicate came in Cagliari in 1215-1217, and was followed by the forced marriage of Cagliari’s female ruler to a Pisan noble, by the mobilization of Pisan-controlled Gallura against Arborea, and later by plans to invade Logudoro. It is true that Guglielmo of Massa had already set a trend of using military force against the indigenous judices, but he had been acting on his own initiative and most decidedly did not represent the wishes of the commune as a whole. Communal
invasions of Sardinian judicates were a thirteenth-century innovation. They should be seen in part as a reaction against papal efforts to assert lordship over Sardinia and in part as an attempt to recover the authority that been weakened when Pisa’s archbishop lost free use of his papal legation.

Genoa, for its part, continued to make military alliances with beleaguered judices, as it had done since 1131 at least. It also made itself a frequent ally of the pope, and in this way gained the kind of ecclesiastical power that had been out of its reach in the twelfth century. The combination of these strategies brought it cultural and political power in Logudoro and nearly allowed it to win full control of Cagliari, both of which judicates were strongholds or former strongholds of Pisan power. The split between the greater military and political weight of Pisa, due both to its armies and to the Sardo-Pisan judices, and the new ecclesiastical and “moral” weight of Genoa, due to its alliance with the papacy, kept the scales remarkably evenly balanced for much of the thirteenth century, such that neither commune was able to establish the kind of near-total preeminence that Pisa had enjoyed for so long in the twelfth century. In reality, the struggle between the two communes would last without a clear victor up until 1323, when Aragon invaded and changed the situation completely.

4.2 Background: the Beginning of Papal Competition with Pisa and Genoa

Chapter Two showed that Ubaldo Lanfranchi, the archbishop-legate of Pisa at the end of the twelfth century, used his office to pursue unmistakably Pisan interests more openly than any of his predecessors had done. It also noted that when Innocent III (1198-1216) came to the papal throne, Archbishop Ubaldo was suddenly faced with a more determined challenge to his power on the island than the archbishops of Pisa had ever known. Although Innocent III did confirm Ubaldo’s legation and primacy in 1198, he was to spend his pontificate developing and strengthening papal claims to direct lordship of numerous territories, including Tuscany itself, and also Sardinia. A pope intent on asserting direct papal lordship could not accept the vows of fealty that the judices of Sardinia had been making to the archbishops of Pisa and to the Cathedral of S. Maria, symbol of the commune, since at least the time of Archbishop Roger (1131 and 1132, respectively). Innocent’s repeated orders to Ubaldo to release the judices of their vows of fealty to him, and Ubaldo’s refusal to do so, show that Innocent III understood these vows to have been made not to the archbishop-legate as representative of the pope, but to the archbishop as representative of the city of Pisa. Thus, the archbishop-legate had used, or abused, his legatine power to secure the fealty of the judices to the secular power of Pisa. Indeed, perhaps it is in the years of Innocent
III and Ubaldo that the strong relationship between Pisa’s ecclesiastical activity in Sardinia, and its secular “colonizing” interests, can most clearly be seen.

Innocent’s response to Ubaldo set the tenor of relations between the papacy and Pisa for most of the thirteenth century. He began to challenge Ubaldo’s actions on the island directly, to nullify some of his legatine actions, and severely to restrict his authority in Sardinia. In 1202, for example, when Judex Comita of Logudoro appealed to Innocent III regarding the oath of loyalty that he had just been “compelled by necessity” to make to Ubaldo, Innocent excused him from it on the grounds that it was “to the prejudice of the Roman Church.”¹ He also wrote to Archbishop Ubaldo, warning him that “you must not make ... any command to [Judex Comita] before you have sought and received our permission.”² In 1203, he wrote to Ubaldo and Ubaldo’s suffragan bishops, informing them that Judex Comita of Logudoro, together with “his son Mariano and his land with all its possessions,” were now “under the protection of the Apostolic See,” and instructing them to “restrain your parishioners, through ecclesiastical censure, from harassing him and his land.”³

Furthermore, in 1202 Innocent appointed a trusted cardinal from the papal curia, Biagio, to the archbishopric of Turris. As far as the documentation can show, this is the first time in Sardinia’s history that a pope did such a thing, and it is indicative of Innocent’s determination to have closer control of the situation. If Biagio was not officially a papal legate, he was clearly intended to be a representative of the pope in Sardinia, and as such was a challenge to Archbishop Ubaldo as papal legate. Almost immediately there is evidence of friction between Ubaldo and Biagio, and of Innocent’s continued resolve to curb Ubaldo’s power: in 1203 Innocent wrote to Biagio emphasizing that only “by our authority, at certain times, may [Ubaldo] exercise the office of the legation in Sardinia ... as long as he is in the same province.” “But,” continued Innocent, “if he comes lacking the authority of the legation, or at any other time, you will not be required to obey him.”⁴ What this meant was explained more clearly thirty years later by Pope Gregory IX, who reminded the archbishop of Pisa that “it is the custom and practice that the

¹ fecisti necessitate compulsus ... in Ecclesie Romane preuiudicium. Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 29-31, doc. 22.
² non prius ei mandatum aliquod facias ... quam nostrre investigaveris et receperis beneplacitum voluntatis. Ibid., pp. 28-29, doc. 21; cf. pp. 29-31, doc. 22.
³ Marianum filium et terram ipsius cum omnibus bonis suis sub protectione Sedis apostolice duximus admittendum ... parrochianos vestros ab ipsius et terre sue infestatione per censuram ecclesiasticam...compescentes. Ibid., pp. 34-35, doc. 27.
⁴ certis temporibus auctoritate nostra legationis officium in Sardinia valeat exercere ... quamdui in eadem provincia fuerit [...] absenti autem vel alio tempore veniente non teneberis auctoritate legationis aliquatenus respondere. Ibid., pp. 64-65, doc. 55.
archbishop of Pisa may not travel to Sardinia, or exercise his legation there, except with a special license procured for this purpose from the Apostolic See.” Given the fraught relations between Pisa and Rome at the time of Innocent III, and indeed throughout much of the thirteenth century, this was tantamount to saying that Ubaldo could no longer use his legation to aid Pisa’s political interests. Finally, noted Innocent, “regarding the authority of the primacy in the province of Torres, this is no greater than the canonical sanctions concede to all primacies,” a remark that suggests that Ubaldo was still trying to exceed his proper authority. This last document set the tone for future papal instructions to disobey the Archbishop of Pisa in certain cases, as can be seen by a letter from Pope Innocent IV to the archbishop of Cagliari in 1248, instructing him not to “obey or in any way submit to the archbishop of Pisa, or to his successors, for the sake of the primacy or legation that the archbishop claims to have in Sardinia, until we give you other instructions.”

At this point, Innocent III’s plans to realize direct lordship of Sardinia created, from one perspective, yet another predatory power for the judices to try to evade, but from another perspective the papacy’s new competition with Pisa for lordship in Sardinia made it a potential protector against the force of the Pisans and Genoese. In this case, Eastern Europe offers a useful illustration of the value that the papacy could hold for local rulers seeking to avoid colonization. For example, the late tenth-century Polish Duke Mieszko, who would later become Poland’s first king, felt pressured by the archbishops of Magdeburg and the German emperors, both of whom wished to extend their spiritual and/or political control over Poland. In 990 or 991, therefore, Mieszko decided to give all of Poland to the Holy See. It is unclear precisely what kind of relationship was being established, whether feudal or not, but Poland’s new “prestigious but nonthreatening” connection with Rome was clearly seen as a protection against more immediate dangers from a nearby colonizing power. Likewise, in the thirteenth century Polish princes turned to Rome for support during a period of political fragmentation in Poland, and a few papal bulls and Polish documents from the time state that “Poland is directly subject to the Roman Church.”

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5 *sit moris, et consuetudinis approbatae, ut nequaquam archiepiscopus Pisanus in Sardiniam accederet, aut ibi legationis officium exerceret, nisi prius speciali super hoc a Sede Apostolica licentia impetrata.* Gregory IX’s letter is dated October 6, 1235. CDS, p. 346, doc. 56.


7 *archiepiscopo Pisano vel suis successoribus ratione primatie vel legationis, quas idem Archiepiscopus in Sardinia habere se asserit, obedire, seu in aliquo respondere, donec tibi aliiud duxerimus in iungendum, nullatenus tenearis.* CDR, pp. 106-107, doc. 164.

8 *Sedlar, East Central Europe*, p. 150.

Sardinia that was also experiencing political upheaval, the papacy can be seen taking on a similar protective role, greatly to its own benefit.

Moreover, by requiring Archbishop Ubaldo to ask papal permission before issuing any command to Judex Comita, or even visiting Sardinia as legate, Innocent was beginning to undercut the power of the archbishop-legate of Pisa in Sardinia. Although from one perspective the tensions between Innocent III and Archbishop Ubaldo stemmed from a disagreement over the meaning and definition of Pisa’s legatine powers, it should also be seen in a wider context. Pisa had remained actively Ghibelline through the end of the twelfth century, taking part in an expedition against Sicily organized by Frederick Barbarossa’s son, Henry VI, to Sicily in 1191.\(^\text{10}\) Weakening Pisa’s legatine power in Sardinia meant weakening an active ally of the Holy Roman Emperors.

It is probably no coincidence that the papacy was taking these aggressive actions against Pisan authority in Sardinia at a time when the Empire was in no position to defend Pisa’s, or its own, claims to the island. This is because when Emperor Henry VI died in 1197 he was succeeded by his three-year-old son, Frederick II. Frederick was crowned king of the Germans, but not emperor, and from 1198 on was under the guardianship of none other than Innocent III. The Empire’s weakness, therefore, must have made the early thirteenth century seem like an ideal opportunity for Rome to forestall any further growth of Ghibelline power in Sardinia. It remains noteworthy that, if these were Innocent III’s motivations, he chose to act by restricting the legation. Since Ubaldo was not just a papal legate but also a representative of Pisa, Innocent’s approach shows his clear understanding of, on one hand, the strength that Ubaldo’s authority as legate and primate gave to Pisa in its pursuit of its colonialist goals, and on the other hand, the challenge that Pisa’s colonial presence in Sardinia posed to papal lordship.

Innocent’s response to Ubaldo also shows how he was able to use Pisa’s over-reaching itself for the ends of the papacy. When Guglielmo of Massa excused himself from swearing fealty to the Holy See on the grounds that he had already sworn fealty to Archbishop Ubaldo,\(^\text{11}\) Innocent III wrote to Ubaldo repeatedly, in 1204, 1205 and 1206, demanding that he “write to the marquis [Guglielmo of Massa] and order him to concern himself ... with swearing fealty to us and the Roman Church,” and using the opportunity to emphasize that “the Judicate of Cagliari, like all of Sardinia ... pertains to the right and

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\(^\text{10}\) Benvenuti, *Le repubbliche marinare*, pp. 87-88.

\(^\text{11}\) Sanna, *Innocoenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 47-48, doc. 38.
property of St. Peter.”

Indeed, scolded Innocent, “the Apostolic See ... gave you no part of secular jurisdiction, nor any temporal rights.” As far as Rome was concerned, therefore, the archbishop of Pisa had no legitimate temporal claims to the island, and nor could Pisa, as a secular entity, claim any sort of lordship through its archbishop-legate. Although the legation still belonged to the See of Pisa, Innocent III had made Pisa’s legation almost useless for Pisa’s secular ambitions by restricting all legatine actions to the normal limits of a legatus natus, and by emphasizing the importance of having papal authority.

This was as far as Innocent could or would go for the time being, and even these restrictions may have been largely nullified by Innocent’s successor, Honorius III (1216-1227). After Honorius III, however, the popes would continue to work at diminishing Pisan power in Sardinia. Additionally, as the popes began to arrogate to themselves the right of nominating bishops and archbishops across Europe, and as the effective power of Pisa’s legation began to wane after 1200, so too did Pisa’s presence wane among the Sardinian clergy. In some cases, particularly when Genoa was closely allied with the papacy, Genoa’s ecclesiastical presence grew. This newly extended papal control over nominations to Sardinian bishoprics is extremely important, because it gave Rome a unique weapon to counter the colonizing policies of Pisa and, when necessary, also of Genoa. In Chapter Three, the argument was made that the clergy in the twelfth century could be particularly useful to Pisan and Genoese colonizing processes because they had little incentive to integrate with Sardinian culture, and instead had a specific mission to reform Sardinian religious customs. In the thirteenth century, it will be shown that the clergy in Sardinia could be effectively used also to block the colonization of a judicate.

This was particularly true when Pisa’s legation had lost its authority in Sardinia and when clerical nominations were in the hands of the pope. Pisa could invade and conquer a judicate by force, but nobody could invade and conquer a diocese whose bishop was faithful to Rome. A Pisan family could marry its way into a judicial throne and begin a new dynasty that was subject to Pisa, but dioceses had no dynasties

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12 *Eodem marchioni per litteras suas mandes ut ... fidelitatem nobis et Ecclesie Romane ... iurare procuret.* Ibid., pp. 61-63, doc. 54; *iudicatus Calaritanus ad ius et proprietatem beati Petri sicut et tota Sardinia, idem*, pp. 93-94, doc. 78; cf. pp. 79-80, doc. 73; pp. 98-102, doc. 88.

13 *apostolica Sedes ita te ... nullam partem iurisdictionis mundane quantum ad temporalia tibi commisit.* Ibid., pp. 93-94, doc. 78.

14 Turtas, *Storia della Chiesia*, pp. 262-263. Turtas is only partially right, as will be argued below: see nn. 79-83.

15 John Moor suggests that Innocent may have held back from more drastic measures against Pisa because he wanted Pisa’s support as he organized the Fourth Crusade. Moor, “Sardinia and the Papal State,” p. 169.

16 Although Honorius III may have refrained from publicizing or enforcing Innocent’s restrictions on the legation in 1218, by 1226 another check to Pisa’s ecclesiastical might in Sardinia was delivered by the decrees of the Synod of S. Justa, discussed below (n. 19), and in 1227 the new pope, Gregory IX, refused to confirm Pisa’s legation at all, as will be shown later; see nn. 175-188.
that Pisa could replace. Indeed, when pro-Pisan bishops died, often they were replaced by bishops faithful to Rome. Finally, minority reigns were a point of political weakness for a judicate, exposing the judicate to the machinations of Genoa and Pisa: a minority reign in the 1230s helped destroy Logudoro. A diocese, however, did not need to fear underaged bishops: usually, if not always, a bishop was a mature man.¹⁷

Thus, in the militarized situation of thirteenth-century Sardinian colonization, bishoprics began to represent an increasingly valuable tool for the papacy, while their importance waned for a Pisa nearly denuded of legatine powers.

Nevertheless, the fact that Innocent III placed restrictions on Pisa’s legation in Sardinia does not mean that Pisa accepted equably its loss of ecclesiastical authority over the Sardinian church; as will be seen, its archbishops continued to fight to retain or restore their position’s old honors, using the symbolic weapons of processions and visitations. Now, though, when Pisa sought to impose itself upon Sardinian dioceses it could be challenged not only by Genoa, but also by a much more powerful and usually inimical papacy. The effect of this sort of papal intervention can be seen in 1226, when a pan-Sardinian synod was called by a papal legate, Goffredo, at S. Justa in the judicate of Arborea.¹⁸ Listed after two decrees aimed at reducing secular influence over the election of bishops and cathedral canons (statutes one and two) came a particularly interesting pronouncement. This was statute three, which declared that “no cleric of the city of Pisa, its district or its area may be promoted to a canonry or the rule of a church or to any dignity in Sardinia, unless [he has] a special license from the lord pope or his legate, as long as ... the Pisans ... are rebellious against the Roman Church,”¹⁹ because “they do not pay attention to the fact that Sardinia pertains to the Roman Church.”²⁰ It does not mention Genoese prelates of any sort, an indication of the advantage that Genoa was already drawing from its closeness and obedience to the papacy. Throughout the thirteenth century the power struggle between the papacy and Pisa for influence in Sardinia would continue to play out, the increases in Pisa’s military and political presence being offset by the growth of papal control over archiepiscopal and episcopal nominations, and Genoa’s alliance with the pope allowing

¹⁷ See the discussion of ages for ordination to various ecclesiastical positions in R. N. Swanson, Church and Society in Late Medieval England (Oxford: OUP, 1989), pp. 41-43. A bishop could not be any younger than thirty years, the canonical age for ordination to the priesthood, and was usually considerably older, although naturally reality often differed from theory, and “under-age” bishops did get ordained.

¹⁸ Turtas states that this synod was called to implement the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, although there is no direct evidence in the surviving synod statutes to support this. Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 273.

¹⁹ nullus clericus de civitate Pisana, committatu vel districtu eiusdem possit in Sardinia ad canoniam vel regimen ecclesie sive ad aliquam dignitatem aliquatenus promoveri, nisi de domini pape vel eius legati licencia speciali, donec ... Pisani romane Ecclesie sint rebellies. The synodal statutes are printed in Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 177-191, Documentary Appendix; statute three can be found at p. 182. Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, pp. 263-4.

Genoese prelates to appear in Sardinian dioceses. In other words, Pisan control of the church was steadily on the wane even as its secular control grew stronger, and this loss of church control would prove to be a weak point for it in each judicate analysed here.

4.3 The Judicate of Cagliari, 1200 to 1258

4.3.1 Archbishop Ricco of Cagliari as a Papal Agent Against the Visconti of Gallura

The gradual and uneven transfer of ecclesiastical orientation from Pisa to Rome can be seen earliest, and most clearly, in Cagliari. Here, even before the beginning of the thirteenth century, the secular power of the new Pisan judex, Guglielmo of Massa, was offset by the ecclesiastical power of the archbishop of Cagliari, who was actively faithful to Rome. As noted in Chapters Two and Three, both Cagliari and, to a limited extent, Logudoro, which had been two of Pisa’s most faithful allies in Sardinia, began to turn toward Genoa between the 1160s and 1190s. Certainly Pisa had never had a total or even near-total control of the upper ecclesiastical positions in Sardinia, as Chapter Three showed. Nevertheless, it was a sign of changing times that from 1183 to 1217 the archdiocese of Cagliari was in the hands of Archbishop Ricco, who was a faithful agent of the popes against Pisa.21 Thus, when Guglielmo of Massa, Pisa’s client judex and Archbishop-legate Ubaldo’s ally, took the throne of Cagliari in 1187, his judicate’s archdiocese was already out of his control, and out of Pisa’s control, too.22 Considering Ricco’s date of consecration, he may have been a product of the disenchantment with Pisa felt by Guglielmo of Massa’s predecessor Judex Pietro, in the 1170s and 1180s. It might even be wondered if Ricco were Genoese, but for the fact that his name is typically Roman.23 This suggests that an explanation might be sought in Rome, and indeed in the same year that Ricco arrived in Cagliari, 1183, Pope Lucius III wrote to “the archbishop, our dearest sons the consuls, and the people of Genoa” to censure them because they “have arranged to divide the island of Sardinia, which pertains to the Roman Church ... with the Pisans and other peoples in a

21 Ricco’s origin is never stated, but from the moment conflicts developed between the Holy See and the archbishop of Pisa over Sardinia, Ricco consistently took the side of the papacy.

22 CDS, pp. 214-215, doc. 53.

23 Savio, Monumenta onomastica Romana, pp. 595-596.
strong grip," and to warn them, on pain of excommunication, not to do so. Thus, if Ricco came to Cagliari from Rome, this may have been one way in which Pope Lucius III hoped to neutralize the never-ending schemes of the Pisans and Genoese to colonize Sardinia.

It was only at the turn of the thirteenth century, however, that Ricco truly came into his own as a force against communal domination in Sardinia. In 1198, for example, the same year that Innocent III became pope, Innocent wrote to Ricco, rather than to the rightful legate Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa, instructing Ricco to investigate the conflict between Guglielmo of Massa and the Genoese Archbishop Justus of Arborea. Ricco was not the only one to become a representative of papal will in Sardinia; in 1202 Innocent III installed a cardinal, Biagio, in the archdiocesan see of Torres, where he seems to have acted as Innocent’s direct representative. Together, Ricco and Biagio represent a new phase in relations between the papacy, on one hand, and Pisa and Genoa, on the other, whereby the clergy in Sardinia increasingly became potential forces for papal politics. Indeed, in the early years of the thirteenth century, Innocent wrote repeatedly to both Ricco and Biagio with instructions for supporting papal and Genoese designs in a complex situation in Gallura, and for simultaneously defeating Pisan interests there. Although Gallura is not being examined here in detail, its political turmoil at the beginning of the 1200s is important to understand because of the impact it would have on the whole of Sardinia throughout the century.

The judex of Gallura had died shortly before the end of the twelfth century, leaving his daughter, Elena, the only heir. Before his death, Elena’s father had “placed [his wife] and his daughter and his land under the protection of our venerable brother Ubaldo, archbishop of Pisa.” This, at least, is what Innocent III was prepared to admit in 1200; by 1204, after having dealt further with Ubaldo, he had changed his account of the facts, saying now that the judex of Gallura had “left both his land and his daughter under the protection of the Holy See.” The Judex of Gallura’s request for ecclesiastical protection was presumably due to his foreboding that after his death, and in the absence of any male progeny, his wife and daughter would fall prey to hostile forces. As he had expected, a variety of parties immediately began

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24 insulam Sardiniam que ad Romanam ecclesiam pertinet ... cum pisanis et aliis gentibus in manu valida disposuisistis, et parati estis intrare, ut eam pro vestre voluntatis arbitrio dividere valeatis. CDS, p. 214, doc. 52, where it is erroneously dated to 1144; Enrico Besta reports the correct date in Besta, La Sardegna Medievale, p. 149.
25 Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 7-12, doc. 3.
26 CDR, p. 15, doc. XXI.
27 constituta ... tam matrem quam filiam et terram etiam sub tutela venerabilis fratris nostri Hubaldi Pisani archiepiscopi. Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 19-23, doc. 12.
28 Ibid., pp. 54-55, doc. 48.
to try to arrange a marriage with Elena with an eye to taking political control of Gallura: the Pisan Visconti family, Guglielmo of Massa and his brother-in-law Guglielmo Malaspina, 29 Judex Comita of Logudoro and his brother Ithoccor, 30 and Pope Innocent III himself on behalf of his cousin Trasimondo. 31

Through Trasimondo, Innocent was intending to entrench papal authority in Gallura and provide a base for future expansion of papal power throughout Sardinia. 32 As for Guglielmo of Massa, it may be assumed that he was chasing a vision of himself as ruler of all Sardinia. This can be deduced from the fact that, at some point after invading Arborea, Guglielmo of Massa had asked Innocent for “confirmation” of his right to rule in that judicate, and when this was not forthcoming he arranged a marriage between his daughter and the heir to the throne of Arborea in 1205 or 1206. He had also invaded Gallura, occupied it, and taken the heiress Elena captive along with her mother, while he tried to arrange a marriage between Elena and his brother-in-law. 33 The Visconti family, meanwhile, were traditional rivals of the Massa in Pisa and may have been hoping to thwart Guglielmo’s ambitions, and thereby also weaken the anti-Visconti party in Pisa. 34 Finally, even though Genoa did not field a candidate of its own for marriage to Elena, it was not uninvolved, as might be imagined given its hegemony in nearby Corsica and the inroads it had recently made into northern Sardinia, noted in Chapters Two and Three. 35 A letter sent by Innocent III to the podestà and council of Genoa in January, 1206 notified them that he had directed Trasimondo to “hurry to your city as fast as possible” in order to “discuss certain things with you [...] that will redound magnificently to your honor and success.” 36 From these words, it may be supposed that Genoa had agreed

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 19-23, doc. 12. The Malaspina family were originally from Liguria, where Genoa lies, but the intermarrying that made a “Genoese” Malaspina and a “Pisan” Massa brothers-in-law and allies shows the danger of assuming any great Sardo-Genoese or Sardo-Pisan noble family to have identified itself only with its “city of origin.”


33 All of these details are recounted by Innocent III in a letter of reproof to Guglielmo himself, found in Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 19-23, doc. 12. See also Zedda, *L’ultima illusione*, pp. 69-71.

34 Zedda argues that the Visconti must have been both present and important in Gallura for a long time if by 1206 they were able to present a case for Elena’s hand that was even stronger than Innocent III’s cousin. Certainly, as noted above, merchants and noble families of Pisa had been involved in Gallura since the early juridical period, probably earlier than the eleventh century. See Zedda, *L’Ultima Illusione*, pp. 81-2.

35 See Chapter Two, at nn. 145-148; Chapter Three, at nn. 140-142.

36 *ad civitatem vestram quantotius venire festinet ... talia faciemus tractari vobiscum que ... ad honorem et profectum vestrum magnifice redundabunt*. Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 118-119, doc. 109.
to support the claim of Innocent’s cousin in Gallura, perhaps in return for a papal promise of privileges in Gallura.

In this delicate situation, Archbishop Ricco of Cagliari was a key player; the control of the castles of Gallura, for example, was in his hands. In 1204 Innocent wrote to him ordering him that “since you hold the castles [of Gallura], do not dare to give them into the hands of anyone until we have given a husband to the [princess].” 37 It is a pity that Innocent does not specify whom he means by “anyone,” or explain how Ricco came to have this military control in Gallura, but even so it is clear that Ricco was a trusted servant in a land full of enemies. It also shows that he must have had military-strategic skills, since having responsibility for defending castles against active enemies must have required some knowledge of the functioning of armies and attacks. Furthermore, especially in an under-populated and rural kingdom like Gallura, these castles were not only fortresses but the centres of political life, so control of castles meant a power that was also extremely political. 38

Ricco was also told to consecrate “our dear son Magister, elected [bishop] of Galtelli” in Gallura. 39 With Magister, Innocent can be seen exploiting the rivalry between the Visconti and the Massa/Archbishop Ubaldо axis. Magister had been Archbishop Ubaldо’s choice for the diocese of Galtelli in Gallura, and despite the distrust between Innocent and Ubaldо, Innocent confirmed the choice. 40 In spite of any loyalty that Magister might be presumed to feel towards Archbishop Ubaldо of Pisa, by March, 1206 he had been “wickedly imprisoned by Pisans while setting out to travel to the Holy See, so that he should not come to our presence,” almost certainly in connection with his promotion of Innocent’s plans to marry Elena to Innocent’s own cousin. 41 To an extent the episode recalls Archbishop Justus of Arborea, whom, while

37 cum tu detineas castra eius, ea nulli prius assignare presumas, quam puelle ipsi providerimus in maritum. Ibid., pp. 54-55, doc. 48.


39 See Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 107-8, doc. 95. Poisson points out that Pisan and Genoese families did not begin to build castles in Sardinia until the thirteenth century; prior to this, castles were built only by the judices and thus were symbols only of the central royal power.

40 See Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 107-8, doc. 95. To add to the complexity of the situation, the Visconti were vassals of the archbishop, who in Ubaldо’s case was, of course, their political enemy. The Visconti’s centrality to Pisan government around the turn of the thirteenth century may have been responsible for the sudden crisis in relations between Pisa and Guglielmo of Massa from 1206, the year in which Lamberto’s marriage to Elena of Gallura gave a great boost to the Visconti fortunes both in Sardinia and in Pisa. This downturn in relations between Pisa and Guglielmo is shown by the various lawsuits against Guglielmo that suddenly sprang up in Pisa: see Ibid., pp. 135-138, doc. 125; pp. 145-146, doc. 137.

41 ad Sedem apostolicam proficiscens a Pisanis nequiter detinetur ne ad nostram possit presentiam pervenire. Ibid., p. 90, doc. *76 and pp. 93-94, doc. 78; Zedda, L’Ultima Illusione, pp. 75, 79. Magister’s fellow bishop in Gallura,
trying to reach Rome to appeal to the pope, “the judex of Logudoro captured and placed in a cramped prison.”\(^{42}\) Whereas Justus was almost certainly imprisoned for being Genoese and promoting Genoese interests, however, Magister was imprisoned by his own patron’s fellow-citizens for promoting papal interests. Innocent, therefore, was using individual Sardinian bishops and archbishops in a way that previous popes had not. Clearly this was both a cause of, and a response to, Pisa’s new direct approach to colonizing Sardinia through its great families. David Abulafia has dismissed the viability of papal claims to lordship in Sardinia, saying that “despite attempts by popes ... to insist that it was (at least in theory) their own property ... what mattered was who was there on the ground,” namely, the Pisans and Genoese.\(^{43}\) Yet what Abulafia does not take into account is that from Innocent III on, by means of the Sardinian clergy the papacy was also “there on the ground.” Where previous popes would have been likely to delegate the execution of their plans for Sardinia to the Pisan archbishop, Innocent III now wrote copiously to specific Sardinian prelates like Ricco and Magister, giving them precise instructions on what diplomatic and military actions to take.

Ricco’s enduring importance to Innocent is underlined in the same year, 1206, when the pope rejected Ricco’s petition to resign from his position. What it meant to be loyal to the pope in Pisan-controlled Sardinia is suggested not only by Ricco’s request to resign, but also by Innocent’s pointed reminder that leaving a clerical position was not licit “if anyone wishes to set aside his work out of cowardice, or in order to flee persecution.”\(^{44}\) It is not difficult to imagine what this persecution might have been: as Archbishop of Cagliari, Ricco must have been involved in Innocent’s project to make Guglielmo a vassal of the Holy See. It has been shown above that Guglielmo, whether ingenuously or not, continually evaded these papal demands with the excuse that he already owed fealty to Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa. Furthermore, even though he was not an official representative of the city of Pisa, and even though as Judex of Cagliari he must have been able to command the judicate’s own army, a large percentage of his followers seem to have been Pisans. Archbishop Justus of Arborea described the invasion of Arborea as

the bishop of Civita, was also involved: in 1204 Innocent called for the bishop of Civita to come to Rome as soon as possible in order to make all the necessary arrangements for Elena’s marriage. See Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 53-54, doc. 47.

\(^{42}\) *per iudicem Turritanum eum capi fecit et arcto carceri mancipari*. According to Innocent III, Guglielmo of Massa was the real culprit. See Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 7-12, doc. 3.


\(^{44}\) *si enim ex pusillanimitate fortassis, ut laborem deponat, vel persecutionem effugiat*. Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 80-90, doc. 74.
carried out by “the said marquis and the Pisans who were with him,” and Innocent III described Guglielmo’s invasion of Logudoro as having been accomplished simply “by Pisans.” The judicial court in Cagliari, therefore, was clearly dominated by Pisans; they must have created a difficult environment for an archbishop who was staunchly faithful to Rome, and who actively worked to frustrate Pisa’s expansion in Sardinia. At the same time, this new situation of an overwhelmingly Pisan court in Sardinia made Ricco’s fidelity to Rome all the more valuable to Innocent.

The difficulties that this political opposition between a Rome-oriented archbishop, on one hand, and Pisan judex and Pisan court, on the other, could create for the archbishop can be inferred from the only recorded example of Ricco disobeying a papal mandate. In 1207, Ricco disregarded papal orders when, by “turning a blind eye,” he “permitted the incestuous marriage, which we had forbidden, to be contracted between the daughter of the Marquis of Massa and Ugo de Bas [heir to the throne of Arborea].” This was a marriage that Guglielmo of Massa had been planning since at least 1200, in an effort to cement his control over Arborea; he had even written to Innocent III about it in 1205 or 1206, trying to convince the pope that despite a problem of consanguinity between the two parties, “if brought into effect” the marriage would be “greatly to the advantage of the Roman Church and all of Sardinia.” Considering Ricco’s seemingly customary obedience, his failure to stop a marriage that Innocent had prohibited, but which Guglielmo of Massa had shown himself to be strongly invested in, suggests that Ricco had for once bowed to pressure from the Pisans around him. Yet if this truly was the first time, it can well be seen why Ricco’s importance to Innocent III had been, and continued to be, so great. In sum, throughout Ricco’s career, it can be seen that his importance, like that of other prelates, was multi-faceted, issuing from his diplomatic, political and military/strategic skills.

45 *ipsius marchionis et qui secum erant ... Pisanorum. Ibid.*, pp. 7-12, doc. 3. Any suspicions that Justus was calling these followers Pisans simply because he was Genoese, and therefore prejudiced, is dispelled by Innocent’s letter to Biagio, in n. 46 below.


47 *incestuosam copulum a nobis inhibitam inter filiam marchionis de Massa et Hugonem de Basso conniventibus oculis contrahi permisisti*. This may have been the first time that Ricco had not obeyed papal orders, since Innocent, alluding to Matthew 6:22-23, laments that *putabamus quidem oculum tuum simplicem esse nullam tenebrarum partem habentem*. Innocent’s contrast between what he had “thought” about Ricco, and what Ricco’s disobedience now seemed to show, indicates that it was a surprise for the pope. Furthermore, it was not simply a stock Innocentian reproof, since to judge by Innocent III’s documents in the *PL* it is the only time he used this image in such a way. Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 125-126, doc. 115. By the time this took place, Innocent’s initiative to wring an oath of fealty from Guglielmo had been underway for at least four years: see *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48, doc. 38.


In spite of Innocent III’s best efforts, the project to marry Princess Elena of Gallura to the pope’s cousin Trasimondo failed. Before August of 1206, Princess Elena had defied the pope and married Lamberto Visconti; Innocent immediately imposed “the full sentences of excommunication and interdict ... on the ladies and the land of Gallura as well as Lamberto the Pisan.”\(^\text{50}\) The takeover of two judicates by rival Pisan families, the Visconti family in Gallura and the Massa in Cagliari, was fundamental to the new way that both Pisa and the papacy would try to colonize Sardinia. Now that enemy Pisan families were at the head of two of Sardinia’s four judicates, the city no longer represented a unified front in Sardinia; in addition, the commune had a convenient justification for interfering directly in the affairs of those judices who were also citizens of Pisa. At the same time, the consular alliances and enmities that now fuelled conflicts between Pisa, the Visconti judices, and the Massa judices offered the papacy new opportunities to assert its lordship. It could, and did, offer protection to both Massa and Visconti families, whenever the family’s rivals in Pisa began to threaten its independence. Finally, as has been seen with Archbishop Ricco and Bishop Magister, from roughly 1200 on the papacy began to intervene more directly in Sardinian politics by controlling its clergy more closely. This forms a striking contrast to the relative detachment of the twelfth-century popes, which, together with Pisa’s legation, had allowed a large Pisan presence to build up in the twelfth-century Sardinian clergy.

4.3.2 Judicessa Benedetta of Cagliari: between Pope and Pisa

Innocent III’s effective use of prelates in Cagliari to pursue papal interests was not replicated by his successor, as becomes clear in the years after Guglielmo of Massa died. By 1214 Guglielmo’s daughter, Benedetta, had succeeded him on the throne of Cagliari; in probably the same year she married Barisone II of Arborea, son of the former judex of Arborea whom Guglielmo of Massa had deposed in 1196-1198. From the beginning, her position was impossible. Through Archbishop Ricco, who was still archbishop of Cagliari, Innocent III was pressuring her to do what her father had finally done when he “recognize[d] that the land that he holds in Sardinia, he holds in fief from the Roman Church.”\(^\text{51}\) At the same time, the “consul of the Pisans, with many of the nobles who follow him, pressed [Benedetta] with many threats

\(^{50}\) *sententias excommunicationis et interdicti latas ... in dominas et terram Galluris necnon et Lambertum Pisanum*, as becomes clear in a letter from October, 1207, in which Innocent orders Ricco to renew these sentences. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126, doc. 115; also 122-124, doc. 113. See also Petrucci, *Re in Sardegna a Pisa cittadini*, p. 23 and Zedda, *L’Ultima Illusione Mediterranea*, p. 79. In 1208 Innocent lifted the sentence of excommunication from Lamberto, but not from Elena or her mother *donec ab eis nobis fuerit satisfactum*. Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 126-128, doc. 116.

and terrors, and with many persuasions of flattery,” to recognize the consul and city as her lord.\textsuperscript{52} Pisa also had other claims on her land: an earlier court case in Pisa, in which certain Pisans had prosecuted Guglielmo of Massa for unknown causes, had led some part of the judicate of Cagliari to be “ruled to be their possession by the [court’s] decree,”\textsuperscript{53} even though Innocent “denounced these rulings as worthless and void and prohibited any of the citizens from harassing the said judex.”\textsuperscript{54} Unable to escape these conflicting pressures, Benedetta acceded to both pope and Pisa. In 1215, under the direction of Archbishop Ricco, she and her husband swore to be “faithful and obedient to Blessed Peter, and to the Holy Apostolic Roman Church and to our lord Pope Innocent and to his catholic successors.”\textsuperscript{55} Simultaneously, she swore fealty “to [the consul] and to the commune of Pisa,” later emphasizing that this action had been done “without the counsel and will of the good men of [her] land.”\textsuperscript{56} Moreover, as Benedetta explained, “at the insistence of the same consul [of Pisa], [she] granted a certain hill with its possessions to the Pisans, where they later built for themselves an extremely strong fortification, to the damage and occupation not only of the judicate itself, but of all Sardinia.”

Benedetta’s estimation of the threat contained in this fortress was not wrong, for it was Pisa’s first “nucleus of direct dominion,” as Petrucci puts it.\textsuperscript{57} The fortress contained within itself a new city, called Castel di Castro, which was directly under the control of Pisa. Thus, for the first time, Pisan communal authority in Sardinia was not filtered through one of its noble families or through agreements with the judices. It must be admitted that this was not a creation \textit{ex nihilo}, since the Pisans had owned and governed a colony in the harbor just below this hill and fortress from 1185, but the erection of Pisan fortifications around their new city, and Benedetta’s direct grant of this land to the commune of Pisa, does represent a fundamental change in Sardinian history.\textsuperscript{58} Indeed, from the perspective of scholars such as R.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{ecce Pisanorum consul cum multis sibi sequacibus nobilibus multis minis et terroribus multisque adulationum persuasionibus ... institi mihi}. Sanna, \textit{Onorio III e la Sardegna}, pp. 25-31, doc. 13. For the complex relationship between the marquises and marchionesses of Massa, on one hand, and the city of Pisa, on the other, see Gioacchino Volpe, \textit{Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa} (Pisa: Tipografia Successori Fratelli Nistri, 1902), pp. 316-317.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{eorum possessionem ... per sententias adiudicata fuerant}. Sanna, \textit{Innocenzo III e la Sardegna}, pp. 145-146, doc. 137.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{sententias ipsas ... fecimus irritas et inanes ac inhiberi nichilominus civibus antedictis ne ... prefatum iudicem ... molestaren}. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 145-146, doc. 137.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{fideles et obedientes erimus Beato Petro, Sancteque apostolice Romane Ecclesie et domino nostro pape Innocentio suisque successoribus catholicis}. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 149-151, doc. 143.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{ut sine consilio et voluntate honorum terre mee virorum iuravi sibi et comuni Pisano ... fidelitatem atque investitur}. This is Benedetta’s account of the events to Pope Honorius III in 1217, found in Sanna, \textit{Onorio III e la Sardegna}, pp. 25-31, doc. 13.

\textsuperscript{57} Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” p. 135.

\textsuperscript{58} Sandro Petrucci, “Tra S. Igia e Castel di Castro di Cagliari: insediamenti, politica, società pisani nella
R. Davies, Castel di Castro might be called the first Pisan colony in Sardinia. Davies’ three aspects of colonization are political dependence on the mother state, foreign control of legislation and the court system, and social patronage that favors the colonizers. Castel di Castro, to judge by the only surviving version of its laws, fulfilled all three of these categories. Pisa had the “lordship” of Castel di Castro, and any seneschal had to be a “citizen of Pisa or burger of Castel di Castro, or born in the countryside or district of Pisa.” Sards could live within its walls, but only “a citizen of Pisa or any merchant from the district of Pisa or from the Port of Cagliari” could prosecute in the city’s courts, and members of the council could not be “fidele nor vassal of any lord or lady of Sardinia, or sworn [to] or temporarily benefited [by such a lord or lady].” Also by the wider definition not only of a colony, but of colonization as the recreation of the patria in a foreign land, the creation and legislation of Castel di Castro is the first explicit evidence of Pisa’s desire to export its own identity to Sardinia. Considering this, it seems telling that in 1220 Honorius III forbade the Pisans to build a church within Castel di Castro.

The precise sequence of events after this is unclear, but at some point between 1215 and 1217 “the podestà of the Pisans invaded Sardinia with a great army” and, according to Judicessa Benedetta, “violently usurped royal jurisdiction and lordship to himself, as if he were the natural lord and judex of

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60 These statutes, written in the Pisan dialect, date to 1317-1318, but the opening paragraph indicates that they are probably an emended version of previous statutes. Francesco Artizzu, ed., Gli ordinamenti pisani per il porto di Cagliari: Breve Portus Kallaretani (Rome: Il Centro di ricerca, 1979), p. 50, f. 4v.

61 la signoria del dicto Castello. Ibid., p. 50, f. 5r.

62 cittadino di Pisa u borghese di Castello di Castro, u nato in del contado u distrecto di Pisa. Ibid., p. 64, f. 18r.

63 da citadino di Pisa o da alcuno del distrecto di Pisa che sia mercante u vero del porto di Callari. Ibid., p. 51, f. 5v.

64 nullo sia fidele né vassallo d’alcuno signore u donna di Sardigna u iurato u per tempo beneficiato. Ibid., p. 52, f. 7r.

the land.”\textsuperscript{66} On one level this was an expression of the authority of the Pisan commune, but on another level the invasion was the effect of family politics: the podestà was none other than Ubaldo I Visconti, the brother of the Lamberto Visconti who had married Princess Elena of Gallura, and one of the Visconti enemies of Benedetta’s Massa family. Benedetta’s anxiety to justify her own right to rule Cagliari is expressed in the letter to Pope Honorius III in 1217, just cited, in which she emphasized her right to the throne both by birth and by election: “all the clergy and all the people of the land of Cagliari came together and, according to tradition, confirmed to me the judicate of Cagliari, which belonged to me by inheritance; and I took the royal scepter... from the hands of my venerable father and lord, the archbishop of Cagliari, with the assent and presence of his suffragan bishops, and of all the nobles of the land of Cagliari.”\textsuperscript{67} In spite of Honorius’ support, by 1220 Benedetta, by now a widow, had been forced, “unwilling and deeply protesting,” to marry Ubaldo’s brother, Lamberto Visconti of Gallura, who was widowed as well.\textsuperscript{68} From this point on, Cagliari was under the effective control of Ubaldo I.\textsuperscript{69}

The part played by the papacy and the clergy in this tangled affair is central. In the first place, ever since Lamberto had married Elena of Gallura under the nose, so to speak, of Innocent III, the papacy had been opposed to him and the Visconti family in general. Throughout Benedetta’s troubles, Honorius III supported her, in 1217 ordering the Pisans to “call the podestà and the army of [the Pisans] back from Sardinia immediately and force them to return to their own land,”\textsuperscript{70} and “to demolish the fortress [Castel di Castro] that they built ... against the orders of our predecessor Innocent III.”\textsuperscript{71} This had no effect, so in December 1217 Honorius instructed them to “give back whatever [land] they have occupied in Sardinia, and especially the fortress of Cagliari that the Pisans have newly built, to the Lord Pope himself.”\textsuperscript{72} Finally, he excommunicated all Pisans who “live in the fortress of Cagliari that was built by the Pisans,
and those who ... came to Sardinia with the army” of Ubaldo I Visconti to seize the judicate. 73 At this point, however, Pisa’s historical practice of planting men in Sardinia’s Church proved its worth. The archdiocese of Arborea was under the control of a certain Bernardo who had been installed around 1200, presumably under the influence of Guglielmo of Massa, to replace the ousted Genoese Justus. For Bernardo, it seems, civic ties were stronger than loyalty to the pope. In April, 1220, Honorius III castigated him because “you do not fear to plot with Ubaldo and Lamberto who are bound by the chain of excommunication, giving them favor and aid and daring to do injury to the Holy See, such that they may sell in deed, since they may not by law, the land of the judicate of Arborea which they have wickedly occupied.” 74 Some time before September of the same year, Honorius excommunicated the archbishop himself for having “given help and favor to Ubaldo and other excommunicated Pisans occupying Sardinia.” 75 It is noteworthy that at this point, Archbishop Bernardo was in Pisa itself, and would stay there until at least the following March. 76

Honorius’ attempts to curb the Visconti by direct orders were leading nowhere. In 1217, he had a promising opportunity to try a different tack. Archbishop Lotario of Pisa had died, leaving the archdiocese without a head. The chapter of S. Maria of Pisa had already “held the election of Lord Ildebrandino,” 77 who is an otherwise unknown cleric, but Honorius vetoed the chapter’s choice and instead nominated Vitale, a man whose prime quality in Honorius’ eyes, as Giuseppe Dell’Amico shows, was his seeming detachment from Pisa’s politics. 78 He then re-confirmed the “honors of the primacy in the provinces of Torres, Arborea and Cagliari, and the legation in Sardinia” on Vitale. Turtas claims that “this could not fool anyone: by now [the legation] was practically a dead title because it could only be activated by the explicit wish of the pope,” and that Honorius III “did nothing else than continue [the

73 *castrum Callari a Pisanis constructum inhabitant et hiis qui ... in Sardiniam cum exsercitu accesserunt. Ibid.*, pp. 45-46, doc. 20. See also Petrucci, *Re in Sardegna a Pisa cittadini*, pp. 30-31.

74 *Ubaldo et Lamberto, excommunicationis vinculo inmodatis, in apostolice Sedis iniuriam communicare presumens et favorem et auxilium exhibere machinari non metuis, ut de facto cum de iure non possint, vendant terram iudicatus Arboreae quam nequiter occuparunt. Sanna, *Onorio III e la Sardegna*, pp. 96-97, doc. 61.

75 *Ubaldo et aliis Pisanis Sardiniam occupantis excommunicatis a nobis prestitit auxilium et favorem. Ibid.*, pp. 104-105, doc. 70.

76 He claimed to be too ill to travel anywhere else, but Honorius had doubts regarding the truth of this excuse, since he directed the archbishop of Pisa to find out whether Archbishop Bernardo was lying. See *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115, doc. 85.


policies] of his predecessor” in Sardinia. Yet this does not entirely make sense: the fact that Honorius had both hand-picked Vitale as archbishop and confirmed the legation on him suggests that he hoped to provide himself with an ideal field-commander in his struggle with Pisa over Sardinia: a man loyal to the pope who was also capable of maneuvering inside Pisa, and was endowed with papal authority in Sardinia. It is true that Honorius repeated Innocent III in explaining that the Pisan “office of legation in Sardinia may only be exercised at certain times, with our authority [...] only as long as he is in the same province.” This caution, however, was sent only to the archbishop of Torres: when writing to all the other “archbishops, bishops, and noblemen of the judicates of Torres and Gallura, and other noblemen in Sardinia,” Honorius simply directed them to “attend devoutly to [Vitale’s] beneficial warnings, and humbly obey” him. This makes sense if Honorius expected Vitale to be representing Rome’s interests in Sardinia, and thus did not anticipate dealing with a disobedient legate whose limits ought to be made public.

Yet even after it became clear that Vitale would not be compliant with the pope’s wishes, and thus when the official limits to his power would have been important to invoke, it may be wondered whether these limits were fully known or understood by all the prelates in Sardinia, let alone all the laity. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that in roughly 1217 the Pisans in Cagliari thought that the archbishop of Torres, Biagio, was a papal legate when he went to Cagliari on papal business, although in the midst of a society that had known him for fifteen years he can hardly have pretended to be a legate, even if he had wished to. Thus, unless the pope had gone to some effort to publicize the names of his legates to both clerical and secular society, it may have been easy to mistake who was or was not a papal legate. If, then, as the analysis of Logudoro will suggest, the limits to Vitale’s authority were not fully understood, this may have allowed Pisa to exercise ecclesiastical power in Sardinia even without papal blessing.

This is important to consider because, with Vitale, Honorius’ strategy once again disappointed. Almost immediately following “the corporal assumption of the pallium,” Archbishop Vitale began to side openly with the Visconti, even where the rights claimed by the Holy See were being injured, though why he did

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79 Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 263.

80 in turritanae, Arborensis, & Callaritan. provinciis primatus, & in Sardinia legationis honores. This information is provided in two letters in which Pope Honorius III informs the Sardinian clergy that they will be expected to obey the archbishop of Pisa as primate and legate. Ughelli, ed., Italia Sacra, Vol. 3, cols. 424-425.

81 certis temporibus auctoritate nostra legationis officium in Sardinia valeat exercere ... quamdiu in eadem provincia fuert. In a letter to the archbishop of Torres in 1218. CDS, pp. 333-334, doc. 40.

82 eiusque salubribus monitis curetis devote, ac humiliter obedire. In a letter of 1218, found in CDS, p. 333, doc. 39.

83 The incident is recounted by the Judicessa Benedetta of Cagliari in 1217, in Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 25-31, doc. 13.
so is unknown. In 1218 he did nothing to prevent Ubaldo Visconti from forcing Benedetta of Massa to marry Ubaldo’s brother, Lamberto Visconti of Gallura. In 1220, when the podestarial election was due to be held in Pisa, Vitale was ordered by the pope to nominate “electors” who “would not elect the aforesaid deceiver,” Ubaldo, and who would instead replace Ubaldo with a new, anti-Visconti podestà. Instead, he did no such thing. Ubaldo was re-elected, and Honorius III wrote to Vitale bitterly, accusing him of being “not so much a useless member of the Church of God, as a rotten one, worthy of being cut off from [the Church],” and charging that Vitale had “sanctioned Ubaldo, that treacherous son of Belial and enemy of the Church of God, open in his iniquity, given over with his confederates and patrons to the carnal destruction of Satan on account of the grave violations committed against the Apostolic Sec.” Honorius’ experiment with Vitale may be seen as the final proof that papal authority in Sardinia could no longer pass through Pisa, as it had done in the twelfth century. From this point on papal efforts to control Sardinia would be focused on ecclesiastical positions on the island itself, the technique that Innocent III had pioneered.

Indeed, it must be admitted that along with trying to reclaim Pisa’s legation for his own use, from the beginning Honorius III tried to take control of episcopal elections in Sardinia, too. In 1217, the same year that the archdiocese of Pisa became vacant, the ever-faithful Archbishop Ricco of Cagliari died. Given the situation in Cagliari, its archdiocese was more important than ever for papal efforts to control the island. After Ricco’s death, the canons of Cagliari cathedral elected Torgotorio, bishop of Suelli, but Honorius refused to confirm the election, citing as his reason the fact that, “since someone tied to his church does not have freedom to move [to a new position] without our permission ... he could not be elected by any law, but rather requested.” Honorius sent two legates to investigate Torgotorio’s suitability; the next notice is that the chapter had changed its mind and was requesting as its archbishop Mariano, the bishop of Sulcis. Mariano does not seem to have been Honorius’ choice, since Honorius admitted that he was unable “to be certain of the merits of the chapter’s request,” and asked his legates to investigate the election in person and, in case of problems, to “provide for the governance of that Church [of Cagliari]


85 *ne praedictum eligerent reprobum*. Ibid.

86 *non tantum Ecclesiae Dei membrum inutile, verum etiam putridum, et ob hoc ab ea merito abscidendum ... filium Belial Ubalduin in iniquitate patentem, perfidum et Dei Ecclesiae inimicum, traditumque cum complicibus, et fautoribus suis propter multiplices et graves ejus excessus in Apostolicam sedem commissos in carnis interitum Sathanae, permisisti*. Ibid.

87 *cum sue alligatus Ecclesie liberum non habeat sine nostra permissione volatum ... eligi nullo iure potuerit sed potius postulari*. Sanna, *Onorio III e la Sardegna*, pp. 59-60, doc. 31.
either with the same bishop [Mariano], or with some other who is worthy.”

The politics of this debated election are obscure but, considering that Cagliari had recently been invaded by Pisan forces, well worth considering.

Torgotorio, as bishop of Suelli, ruled over a diocese that Chapter Three showed to have been dominated by Sards throughout the twelfth century; it was also the poorest of the judicate’s dioceses, the most difficult to travel through, the farthest from sea ports, and contained particularly unruly inhabitants. Suelli’s cathedral church, however, enjoyed a special relationship with the judges of Cagliari, to judge by the donation of an estate made by “my lord Judex Guglielmo the Marquis of Massa,” and the repeated donations that Benedetta and her husband Barisone of Arborea later made to it: two whole villages, an estate, and “a household on the estate of Sisini, as full servants,” followed by an expansion of the bishop’s jurisdictional rights over the donated villages. As Chapter Three showed, judges almost never gave away jurisdictional rights; such a gift to Suelli, therefore, indicates that Benedetta and Barisone held the bishop of Suelli or his cathedral in very high regard. Rather surprisingly, no such consistent patronage is recorded for Sulcis or Dolia in the same years, even though these dioceses were richer, more “civilized” and, culturally speaking, far more Pisan. A clue may be provided by a sanctuary that was incorporated into Suelli’s cathedral, dedicated to a local saint, S. Giorgio. S. Giorgio had himself been the Bishop of Suelli around the beginning of the twelfth century, and one of his miracles during his lifetime had been to “liberate the judex from great misery.” The story of the patron saint of a cathedral healing a judex is

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88 nec nobis ... de meritis postulationis capituli prefati constare ... eidem Ecclesie sive de eodem episcopo, sive de alio ad regimen eius idoneo ... providere. Ibid., pp. 84-85, doc. 50.

89 See Chapter Three at n. 193.

90 Arrigo Solmi, “Le Carte Volgari di Cagliari,” in Archivio storico italiano Vol. 35, Ser. 5 (1905), pp. 273-330, at pp. 300-304, doc. 14, dated 7 November, 1215; pp. 305-308, doc. 16, dated 12 March, 1217; p. 311, doc. 18, dated 20 April, 1217. The first two of these documents are summative records of earlier donations; thus, it cannot be known exactly when Guglielmo of Massa or Benedetta actually made the donations. The last document regards the expansion of jurisdictional rights, and seems to have been made at the same time the document was drawn up, in April, 1217.

91 With reference to the argument proposed in Chapter Three regarding the “Byzantine” character of Sardinian ecclesiastical donations, it may be remembered that both Guglielmo of Massa and Benedetta were at least partially products of a northern-Italian culture, while Barisone of Arborea, who had grown up at the court of Cagliari as a hostage, must have been strongly affected by the Pisan culture there. Their ideas of how to make appropriate ecclesiastical donations may have been shaped by the Massas’ Pisan background and continuing cultural contacts.

92 Benedetta did make a donation to Sulcis around 1216, just at the time that Pisa was invading her judicate; see CDS, p. 328, doc. 32. Perhaps the donation and the invasion are not unconnected: she may have been trying to garner ecclesiastical support against the Visconti of Pisa. If so, it does not seem to have worked, since the bishop of Sulcis at the time was the future pro-Visconti archbishop of Cagliari, Mariano. In any case, Sulcis did not enjoy the repeated donations that both Guglielmo of Massa and Benedetta made to Suelli.

found also in Logudoro, where the saint’s cathedral was the archiepiscopal cathedral in Torres; in both cases, it must have provided a strong validation of the judicial dynasty’s right to rule in its judicate.\textsuperscript{94} It is not wholly surprising, then, to find that in 1215, in the midst of Pisa’s challenges to judicial authority in Cagliari, S. Giorgio of Suelli again saved a judex of Cagliari, and that it was one who was particularly in need of validation: Barisone of Arborea, husband of Benedetta herself. As Benedetta’s donation charter put it, “God performed a miracle in Judex [Barisone] for the love and prayers of S. Giorgio, for God lifted an illness from Judex [Barisone].”\textsuperscript{95} The regular royal donations to the cathedral of Suelli and Giorgio’s healing of Benedetta’s husband must have strengthened the image of a special relationship between Suelli and the judices of Cagliari, perhaps in an effort to strengthen their prestige as rightful rulers of Cagliari and to weaken the force of Pisa’s claims of lordship over the judicate.

In addition, S. Giorgio was not only linked to Suelli and the judices of Cagliari; as a man he was also known to have been a product of Cagliari’s Greek-Latin cultural heritage, for he “had been educated in Latin and Greek letters according to the custom of his people.”\textsuperscript{96} If foreign clerics were already prone to prefer the forms of religion and culture that were familiar to them from continental Italy, surely the Greek-educated saint of an inland diocese must have been, for a Pisan or a Genoese, a good example of a totally uninteresting and backward ecclesiastical culture. It might be said that S. Giorgio of Suelli was a diocese of the periphery. With its usually Sardinian bishops, its Sardinian saint, and its links with the royal family, it seems almost to have been a repository of traditional Cagliaritan identity. It may be no accident that it was particularly favoured by the Massa family, who were the first judices in Sardinian history to have a strong incentive to prove their cultural right to rule Cagliari. After all, Benedetta’s feeling that she needed to refer to Sardinian customs in order to prove her right to rule has already been seen in her letter to Honorius III in 1217.

All of this may suggest that the election of Bishop Torgotorio as archbishop of Cagliari in 1217 was influenced by Benedetta’s preferences; her long relationship with Bishop Torgotorio is documented, and at the time she was in great need of earthly friends, perhaps like Bishop Torgotorio, and spiritual friends, like S. Giorgio, the special friend of the judices of Cagliari. The chapter’s change of heart in 1219, and its subsequent decision to make a “postulation” for Bishop Mariano of Sulcis, a diocese traditionally

\textsuperscript{94} Meloni, \textit{Il Condaghe di San Gavino}, passim.

\textsuperscript{95} Benedetta’s donation charter recounts the story of Giorgio’s miraculous aid to the legendary judex, before going on to explain how Giorgio had helped the current judex, her husband. \textit{miragula ki fegit deus in luigi Troodori, pro amantia et pregu de sanctu Jorgi, d’una pestilentia de ki llu iscapedi deus ad luigi per sanctu Jorgi}. Solmi, “Le Carte Volgari,” pp. 292-294, doc. XI.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{litteris latinis et grecis iuxta morem gentis suae imbutus fuisset}. Motzo, \textit{Studi sui Bizantini in Sardegna}, p. 149.
governed by foreigners, probably had everything to do with the political events of those years and the predatory Pisans who were occupying the judicate. Indeed, it may be wondered if these were among the causes of Pope Honorius’ above-mentioned hesitation to confirm Mariano, his request that the legates, “visiting the Church of Cagliari in person,” might see whether they “find the [election] harmonious and canonical,” and his directions that, if they were unconvinced, that they should select a new archbishop themselves, effectively overriding the process of capitular elections altogether. If these instructions suggest that he had suspicions about the reasons behind Mariano’s election, then he may have been correct: in 1221, “not fearing to join Ubaldo and Lamberto [Visconti] ... against the Apostolic See,” the new Archbishop Mariano of Cagliari “presumed to consecrate Canon Bandino of Pisa, a manifest supporter of the aforesaid Ubaldo and Lamberto ... to the diocese of Sulcis, against [the papal legate’s] prohibition.” It may fairly be said that under Archbishop Mariano, the province of Cagliari was beginning to slip out of papal control.

The first, but not the only, sign of this is precisely Archbishop Mariano’s consecration of Bishop Bandino. For one thing, Bandino’s new diocese, Sulcis, was not only traditionally associated with foreigners, but also politically important, as Chapter Three has shown. Indeed, Archbishop Mariano himself had been bishop there before being promoted to the archdiocese. Thus, Mariano’s choice to brave papal displeasure and install Bandino, a Visconti follower, in this strategically important diocese suggests that Bandino had qualities that were important to Pisa’s designs on Cagliari. Indeed, Bandino was such a threat to Honorius III’s policies that Honorius had his legate “publicly announce that the archbishop of Cagliari and Master Bandino, the bishop of Sulcis ... have been excommunicated.” For another, Bandino may have had a history with Sardinia. In 1206 Innocent III had mentioned a “Master Bandino, nuntius of our venerable brother Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa,” who represented the archbishop during his disputes with Innocent III regarding Sardinia. It seems possible, as Mauro Sanna has suggested, that the man who became Bishop Bandino of Sulcis in 1221 is the same man who had been Ubaldo’s nuntius. If so,

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97 *ad Caralitanam ecclesiam personaliter accedentes [...] si concordem eam inveneritis et canonicam.* Sanna, *Onorio III e la Sardegna*, pp. 84-85, doc. 50; see also above, at n. 88.

98 *Ubaldo et Lamberto ... civibus Pisanis adherere contra Sedem apostolicam non formidans ... Bandinum Pisanum canonicum, prefatorum Ubaldi et Lamberti manifestum fuitorem ... in Sulciensem episcopatum contra inhibitionem tuam consecrare presumpsit.* Ibid., p. 119, doc. 90.

99 *archiepiscopum Calaritanum et magistrum Bandinum dictum episcopum Sulciensem ... excommunicatos publice nuntius.* Ibid., pp. 120-122, doc. 91.

100 *magister Bacidinus nuntius venerabilis fratris nostri Hubaldi Pisani archiepiscopi.* Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 107-108, doc. 95; see also ibid., pp. 98-102, doc. 88. There was also the Bandino who was archbishop of Torres from 1196-1198, but he seems definitely to have died by 1198. See *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75, doc. 66, where Bandino is referred to as “bone memorie”.

his early sympathies with Archbishop Ubaldo Lanfranchi later translated into loyalty to the Visconti: what both of these had in common was their activism in expanding Pisa’s temporal power in Sardinia.

The second sign of Honorius’ weakening grip on the Church of Cagliari comes in 1222, when the pope reproved “Pisan clerics, who, to our disgust, have disdained to observe the sentences [of excommunication]” on “Ubaldo [I Visconti] and his brothers and certain other Pisan citizens.” Ubaldo and Lamberto Visconti were still living in Cagliari at this point; the Pisan clerics who had enough contact with them to disregard their state of excommunication must also have been living, and were perhaps beneficed, in Cagliari. Furthermore, among these “Pisan clerics” were both Pisan canons and the “prior of S. Nicola of Cagliari;” in other words, the prior of a Sardinian monastery was a Pisan who was faithful to the Visconti. Thus, accompanying the Visconti occupation of Cagliari a sort of “Pisanization” of the Church of Cagliari seems to have been achieved, and at least some of these Pisan clerics, by disregarding the papal excommunication of the Visconti faction, were prioritizing secular political interests above their loyalty to the pope. It is a commonplace in Sardinian historiography to speak of the “Catalanization” of the Sardinian Church after the Aragonese invasion of 1323, but in early thirteenth-century Cagliari the phenomenon seems to have been anticipated by the Pisans.

Neither Honorius III nor the Judicess Benedetta had given up, however. In 1224, a Pisan chronicle noted that “Messer Ubaldo Visconti podestà of Pisa ... had come back from Sardinia,” and his brother Lamberto Visconti, whose marriage with Benedetta had been annulled by Honorius III, was dead. Archbishop Mariano of Cagliari, too, seems to have been away. Benedetta took advantage of the lack of Visconti men to turn to the pope in 1224. Under the eye of Honorius’ legate Goffredo, who as a cardinal legate

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102 The letter is addressed to priori Sancti Nicholay Calleri et Sifredo, canonics Pisanis. Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 146-147, doc. 114.

103 As Chapter Three has shown, the lack of detailed documentation for the twelfth century makes it impossible to know whether the Church of Cagliari was dominated by Pisans to quite this extent prior to the Visconti occupation.


106 Benedetta’s vow of fealty, cited just below, was sworn “in the lower room of the palace of our venerable father, Archbishop Mariano of Cagliari in the city of S. Igia,” but Mariano himself is noticeably missing from the list of witnesses: indeed, no bishops of Cagliari at all seem to be present. The witnesses are: John, prior of Forlimpopoli; Benevento, rector of the church of S. Michael of Bologna; a cleric named Benedetto Cortese; Ranieri, cardinal deacon of S. Maria in Cosmidin; the (non-clerical, knightly) brother of the papal legate Goffredo, and another knight named Ranucio Fortiguerra. Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 168-169, doc. 130.
out-ranked archbishop-legates like the archbishop of Pisa,\textsuperscript{107} she “confess[ed] that my kingdom or judicate of Cagliari and all the land I have in Sardinia I hold from the church.”\textsuperscript{108} Her new oath of fealty included promises to pay the pope an annual census of 20 silver pounds, not to marry without “the special license and order of the church,” and to allow the judicate to revert to the Holy See if any judex died without an heir; notably, it also bound “all freemen of this land or continental Italians who hold a fief from [the judex] to swear fealty to the aforesaid church.”\textsuperscript{109} In other words, it forced every Pisan and Genoese landholder in Cagliari to become a vassal of the pope. The potential advantages for Benedetta are obvious. In her fraught situation, her promise to marry only with papal permission gave her explicit protection against any more forced marriages to her enemies. In addition, by placing the authority of the pope at the head of her judicate, the vow also may have seemed to offer a way of ensuring loyalty from her politically divided and multi-ethnic subjects. Unfortunately, if unsurprisingly, it also outraged the commune of Pisa and Benedetta’s Pisan subjects alike, who now banded together against her. Ubaldo I Visconti returned to Cagliari and imprisoned Benedetta, and despite protracted efforts by the papacy to divide the Pisan front and bring the downfall of the Visconti, Cagliari remained under Visconti control until Benedetta’s death in 1233.\textsuperscript{110}

In sum, it may be said that in Cagliari, the pope’s re-granting of a semi-functional legation to Pisa coincided with his failure to place pro-papal prelates in Cagliari’s archdiocesan and diocesan sees, with the “pisanization” of Cagliari’s clergy, and with Pisa’s military takeover of the judicate. It is not being suggested that any straightforward cause and effect relationship existed between these three factors, but comparison with other judicates will show that more successful papal management of episcopal elections coincided with reduced power on the part of Pisa.

\textbf{4.3.3 The End of the Judicate, between Pisa, “Papal” Clergy and Genoa}

Honorius III’s successors, in contrast to Honorius himself, would take a far more skeptical approach to Pisa and its archbishop. Likewise, they would take closer control of the clergy both in Cagliari and in other judicates. Although there is little documentation from Cagliari’s Church between the 1230s and

\textsuperscript{107} Robinson, \textit{The Papacy}, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{108} regno meo Kalaritano sive iudicatu ac tota terra quam habeo in Sardinia, […] omnia me confiteor ab ipsa Ecclesia possedisse. Sanna, \textit{Onorio III e la Sardegna}, pp. 168-169, doc. 130.

\textsuperscript{109} facient omnes liberos terre sive terremagnenses habentes feudum ab eis […] iurare fidelitatem ecclesie memorate. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 168-169, doc. 130.

\textsuperscript{110} Petrucci, \textit{Re in Sardegna, a Pisa cittadini}, pp. 37-40.
1750, it will now be shown that a papally-chosen archbishop of Cagliari would coincide, almost certainly not by chance, with Cagliari’s last and most determined effort to break free of Pisan control, and to align itself with Genoa.

Between 1233 and 1257-1258, Cagliari had only nominal judicial leadership from Benedetta’s son and grandson, and in reality was divided among four great Pisan families who had flocked to the region of Cagliari to take advantage of its political instability: the Visconti of Gallura, the Capraia, the Gherardesca and the Donoratico. The city and fortress of Castel di Castro remained under the authority of the commune. A question worth asking is what effect this political situation had on the Church of Cagliari, and whether the closer political control enjoyed by Pisa continued to compensate for the theoretical limits placed on the ecclesiastical authority of its archbishop-legate. Up until 1226 it is clear that either it did, or that these restrictions on its legation were not effective, as was suggested earlier. One of the decrees of the aforementioned Synod of S. Justa, which took place in 1226, declared that “we have learned through experience that Pisan clerics living in Sardinia and in Pisa favor the reprobate Ubaldo in every way they can; indeed, what is worse, we have consistently found them to be worse than the laity in attacking their holy mother, the Roman Church.” Furthermore, “they ponder day and night, more than the laity do, how they can subjugate Sardinia to the dominion of the city of Pisa, disregarding the fact that Sardinia pertains to the Roman Church.” Because of this, “we ordain that no cleric from the city of Pisa ... may be promoted to a canonry or cure of a church or any dignity whatsoever, unless by a special license from the lord pope or his legate.” Thus, it may be assumed that, before 1226, either Pisa’s secular influence had been able to secure Sardinian benefices for Pisan clergy, or that the Sardinian Church was not aware of the limits of Vitale’s legation, and therefore that Sardinian clerics were unable or unwilling to resist his authority.

By this period, unfortunately, an onomastic examination of all the clerical names of the diocese is not very useful to understand how effective the Synod of S. Justa’s decree was in limiting Pisa’s presence among the Sardinian clergy. The heavy and sustained immigration of foreign families into Cagliari over the previous century had changed the judicate’s culture and naming practices to such an extent that a Sard

111 experimento didicimus quod clerici Pisani, qui in Sardinia commorantur et eciam Pisis, reprobo Hubaldo favent modis omnibus quibus possunt, immo, quod deterius est, laicis deteriores ipsos cotidie invenimus, matrem suam sanctam Romanam Ecclesiam impugnando [sic]. Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 177-191, Documentary Appendix, at pp. 181-182.
112 die noctuque cogitant plus laicis qualitier dominio Pisane civitatis possint Sardiniam subiugare, non attendentes quod Sardinia ad Romanam Ecclesiam pertinet. Ibid.
113 ordinamus ut nullus clericus de civitate Pisana ... possit in Sardinia ad canoniam vel regimen ecclesie sive ad aliquam dignitatem aliquatenus promoveri, nisi de domini pape vel eius legati licencia speciali. Ibid.
name in the thirteenth century is no longer certain evidence of a Sardinian family, nor is a northern Italian name proof of foreign descent.\textsuperscript{114} This “Sardification” of names may be more typical of non-noble immigrants, as Bartlett has suggested with reference to the Frankish settlers in Outremer; Bartlett notes that poor or low-class settlers had little prestige to draw from their original names, and thus had more reason to take on new names in their new home.\textsuperscript{115} At the same time, the clear Pisan leanings of Archbishop Mariano of Cagliari, despite his Sardinian name, suggest that he may also have been of Pisan origins; he is also, given his position, likely to have been of noble rank. If, as Bortolami says, the “pisanization” of Sardinian names permeated the nobility too, then there is no way to draw a general picture of the ethnic make-up of the Cagliaritan church for the period following 1226. Still, enough information about the origins of some of the archbishops survives to make some conclusions possible.

Archbishop Mariano, elected under Honorius III but an abettor of the Visconti, as noted above, may have died by 1226. The next evidence regarding the archbishopric is a letter written by Gregory IX in 1233, followed by another in 1235, to an anonymous archbishop. Although his name is unknown, the letters depict this archbishop as a man deeply trusted by Gregory IX. In 1233 Gregory requested the archbishop of Cagliari to help the archbishop of Torres, whose suffragan bishops were disregarding his authority; the archbishop of Cagliari was to “compel those bishops with our authority, cessante appellatione,” in effect becoming a papal judge delegate.\textsuperscript{116} Again in 1235, one of the suffragan bishops of Logudoro, “having taken up the spirit of rebellion,” was refusing to obey the same archbishop of Torres,\textsuperscript{117} so Gregory requested the archbishop of Cagliari to intervene once again and add “your warning [...] compelling him if necessary with apostolic authority, appellatione remota.” In both cases, the “cessante appellatione” or “appellatione remota” clause made it impossible for the archbishop of Cagliari to be refused as a judge, and gave him full powers to enforce his sentence, a sign of the pope’s implicit trust in the archbishop’s judgment and loyalty.\textsuperscript{118} Gregory IX was no naïf; in 1217, during the conflict between Pisa and Pope Honorius III over Pisa’s invasion of Cagliari, he had been appointed as mediator between Pisa and


\textsuperscript{115} Bartlett, \textit{The Making of Europe}, pp. 44, 56.

\textsuperscript{116} auctoritate nostra, cessante appellatione, compellas, in a letter from Gregory IX on June 10, 1233, found in CDR, pp. 69-70, doc. 104.

\textsuperscript{117} spiritu rebellionis assumpto, in a letter of Gregory IX on October 1, 1235. CDR, pp. 74-75, doc. 112.

Gregory, therefore, knew very well the interests both cities had in Sardinia, and the lengths to which they would go in order to get what they wanted. Gregory IX was also the first pope not to confirm the legation to the archbishop of Pisa, as will be shown in the section on Logudoro: thus, if an archbishop in Pisan-controlled Cagliari was trusted by Gregory, he may be assumed to have obtained the see independently of Pisan influence. In other words, regardless of the political and military dominance that Pisa enjoyed by that time, and despite the right to a legation in Sardinia that the Pisan archbishop still claimed, it may be supposed that nominations to the archdiocese of Cagliari had returned to the hand of the papacy.

This impression is confirmed by the next archbishop of Cagliari, whose name and origin at least are both known. He was Leonardo of Rome, and held the archdiocesan see at least between 1237 and 1255; in other words, he had been nominated under Gregory IX. It is probably safe to say that, like his predecessor, he too had been nominated or chosen not only under, but by Gregory IX. For one thing, there is his origin in Rome. For another, he was present at the ceremony at which the judex of Arborea swore fealty to the pope in 1237, and in the list of witnesses, which is organized in order of their importance, “Lord Leonardo Archbishop of Cagliari” is listed before anyone else, even before the archbishop of Oristano. Considering that the document concerned the judex of Arborea, pride of place might be expected to be given to Arborea’s archbishop, especially since, as will be seen later, he was himself an important agent of papal policies in these years. Clearly, however, something made Leonardo even more important. Finally, in 1255, just before war broke out between Pisa and Genoa over control of Cagliari, Leonardo was Pope Alexander IV’s choice to become papal legate for Sardinia and Corsica, as a “man gifted with knowledge, with the honor of a good character, and with the wisdom of excellent advice.” Leonardo must, therefore, have been trusted by Gregory IX to pursue papal interests in Pisan-controlled Cagliari.

Precisely how he did this may be seen in 1250s, when Judex Chiano of Cagliari, Benedetta’s descendant, tried to gain independence from Pisa. Indeed, Cagliari’s bid for independence and Gregory IX’s decision to grant the legation to Cagliari’s archbishop may not be unrelated, a possibility that has not before been considered. As Petrucci notes, Pisa’s control over Cagliari had never been complete, not even

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120 *in presencia domini Leonardi Calaritani Archiepiscopi;* Leonardo is followed by *domini Trogodori Archiepiscopi Arborensis,* then by eight bishops, a prior, an abbot, a canon and a “clericus.” CDR, p. 87, doc. 136.
121 *virum utique scientia praeditum, morum honestate decorum, et consilii maturitate praeclarum,* as Gregory IX describes him in the letter by which he announces Leonardo’s legation to the Sardinian clergy. CDS, pp. 363-364, doc. 87.
its political control. The commune held the Castel di Castro, but as long as the position of judex of Cagliari survived, there was the possibility that the judex could provide a rallying-point for anti-Pisan feelings in Cagliari.¹²² In 1254, just a year before Archbishop Leonardo became legate, Judex Chiano sought to break free of Pisan control and assert himself as an independent ruler. He took Castel di Castro in 1254 with the help of other Sardinians and there, according to an act that he issued on September 23, 1254, he lived “in the house of Baudini Quapare.”¹²³

This document, and two others that follow it, show several things. For one, even though no evidence of a formal alliance with Genoa at the time has survived, it is clear that in 1254 Chiano already had a close relationship with the Ligurian city, because the 1254 document was sent to Genoa to be witnessed and copied.¹²⁴ This relationship with Genoa would be formalized two years later, in 1256, when Chiano made an anti-Pisan alliance with the Genoese, promising to “give the castle and fortifications of Castel di Cagliari, which is called “Castro,” to the commune of Genoa... to have and hold forever” if they were successful in expelling the Pisans from Cagliari.¹²⁵

For another, it gives an insight into the relationship between ethnicity, power and political choices in Cagliari’s church. The witnesses to Chiano’s 1254 act were “Messer Aldello, judge of the law; and lord Arlocco Matello, canon of S. Maria di Clusi; and lord Giorgio de Calagonis, chaplain of S. Maria di Clusi; and lord Costantino Thochy, chaplain of Quarto Iosso, and lord Orlando d’Ascorno, and Comita Savio, and Orlandino del Bagno.” The lay names are of foreign origin: d’Ascorno is Pisan and Savio is probably Genoese; there are too many places called “bagno” to locate the origin of Orlandino del Bagno precisely, but it is not a Sardinian form. The churchmen, however, all have Sardinian names, and were all employed locally.¹²⁶ Indeed, S. Maria di Clusi, home of two of these three clerics, was the most important

¹²² Petrucci, Re in Sardegna a Pisa cittadini, pp. 59-60. Petrucci bases his judgment on the Sard rebellion that happened in 1254, seen in CDS I, p. 363, doc. 86.

¹²³ in domo Baudini Quapare in qua predictus marchio habitabat. The document was his formal designation of his heirs, Guglielmo and Rainaldo; it is found in CDS I, p. 363, doc. 86.

¹²⁴ The surviving version of this document is, indeed, the Genoese copy, made ab autentico instrumento scripto et exemplato. CDS I, p. 363, doc. 86.

¹²⁵ tradet comuni Ianue ... in perpetuum habendum et tenendum castrum et fortias [sic] Castri Calari quod appellatur Castrum. The text of this treaty is to be found at CDS, pp. 364-365, doc. 88; cf. CDS, pp. 365-367, doc. 89.

¹²⁶ Arlocco is probably a misreading or misspelling of the very common Sardinian “Arzocco;” the name “Arlocco” seems not to have existed at the time. As for Giorgio de Calagonis, Calagonis was a settlement in Cagliari, and Giorgio was a Byzantine-origin name common in Sardinia, but unusual on the continent. Finally, Costantino was also an extremely common Sardinian name; Quarto Iosso, where his church lay, was a wealthy settlement near Castel di Castro. See Bortolami, “Antroponimia e società in Sardegna,” pp. 196-197; Coroneo, Architettura Romanica, p. 248.
church in the judicial capital, the city of S. Igia. Chiano’s heir, for example, wanted to “be buried near S. Maria di Clusi.”  

127 It housed a body of canons, and was frequently home to the archbishop of Cagliari; Barbara Fois asserts that the church was even larger, and certainly more important, than the city’s cathedral.  

128 Certainly, its clergy seem to have been intricately involved with the actions of the judicial family during its effort to break free from Pisa. The only two clerical witnesses to the will of Judex Chiano’s heir in 1256 were “Costantino archpriest of S. Maria di Clusi, [and] Comita, canon of S. Maria di Clusi,”  

129 and the only clerical witnesses to a document drawn up by the aged daughter of the first Massa judex, Guglielmo of Massa, in 1256 were “Giorgio di Murro priest of S. Maria di Clusi and Pietro Corso, priest of the same church.”  

130 In other words, of the seven clerical witnesses to the anti-Pisan judicial documents from this period, all had either Sard, or at least non-Pisan, names, and six were from the principal church in the judicial capital. It may be posited that, if the cathedral of S. Giorgio of Suelli was in some way a bastion of traditional Cagliaritan identity, then so too was S. Maria di Clusi.

Given the close involvement of the clergy of S. Maria di Clusi in the activities of Judex Chiano and his heirs as they sought to throw off Pisan dominion, and given the close relationship between the church of S. Maria di Clusi and the archbishop of Cagliari, it seems unlikely that Archbishop Leonardo of Cagliari was unaware of what Chiano was doing. It is true that he himself does not appear as a witness to any of Chiano’s documents, but what seems most important is not the absence of his name, but that in the midst of Judex Chiano’s efforts to defeat Pisa, with which the clerics of Leonardo’s “home” church were closely involved, Alexander IV made Leonardo legate.  

132 Leonardo certainly had a record of loyalty to Rome, but if the pope had felt in need of a proxy who was disengaged from an unreliable situation, he could have sent an ad hoc legatus missus, as Honorius III had done between 1217 and 1224.  

133 His

127 uolo et iubeo sepelliri apud ecclesiam Sancte Marie de Clusis. CDS, p. 367-368, doc. 90.


129 Constantino archipresbitero Sancte Marie de Clusis ... Comita canonico Sancte Marie de Clusi. In CDS, pp. 367-368, doc. 90.

130 Georgius de Murro presbiter Sancte Marie de Clusus et Petrus Corsus presbiter eiusdem ecclesie, found in CDS, p. 370, doc. 93.

131 Pietro Corso, just cited, bears a surname that means “from Corsica.” This could mean he was an indigenous Corsican, the Sardinian descendant of Corsicans, or perhaps even one of the Genoese who had settled and colonized Corsica.

132 The letter in which Alexander IV announces the new legation is dated 12 August, 1255, and can be found in CDS, pp. 363-364, doc. 87.

133 Honorius III had sent three chaplains and subdeacons, Ugo, Rolando and Bartolomeo, to investigate the election of the archdiocese of Cagliari in 1218 and to deal with the rebellious consecration of Canon Bandino to the diocese...
decision to give the more permanent powers of a *legatus natus* to Leonardo in precisely the moment when Cagliari and Leonardo’s own clergy were seeking finally to defeat Pisa makes it seem very possible that this legation was, to an extent, a way of strengthening the anti-Pisan cause. Furthermore, although there is no record of who the suffragan bishops were in these years, the combination of many anti-Pisan clergy with Sardinian names in S. Maria di Clusi, and Leonardo’s new legation, show that even in a Cagliari that was controlled by Pisan families and the Pisan commune, the Church could retain strong elements of resistance under a non-Pisan archbishop. This reversal of the clerical situation described by the Synod of S. Justa in 1226 is one indication of how the canonical restrictions now being enforced on Pisa’s legation had weakened the commune’s overall ability to control the judicate.

Ultimately, however, it was not enough. In 1256 war broke out once again between Pisa and Genoa over Cagliari. Judex Chiano was killed in October 1256, and by 1257 the Pisans had defeated the judicial-Genoese alliance. The Genoese were evicted from the entire region of Cagliari and, against the wishes of the pope, the Pisans “totally destroyed” the judicial capital of S. Igia, and “expelled the inhabitants, some of whom they sold, others of whom they dared to reduce to servitude.” To the Pisans, clearly, it was less important to obey the pope’s orders regarding S. Igia than to make the highly symbolic gesture of razing the judex’s capital city, and thereby to announce to the world the end of Cagliari as a judicate and the transfer of secular and archiepiscopal authority to Pisa’s Castel di Castro. At this point, the destroyed judicate was officially shared out between the Sardo-Pisan Guglielmo da Capraia, acting judex of Arborea; the Sardo-Pisan Giovanni Visconti, judex of Gallura; and the Pisan Ugolino and Gherardo di Donoratico; all of whom held the land from Pisa. The port city of Castel di Castro was ruled directly by the commune of Pisa.

From 1200 until the dissolution of the judicate, the loss of Pisa’s legatine authority, coupled with the accession of a Pisan dynasty to the judicial throne, had pushed the commune to take an ever more active

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134 *eam dextruxerunt totaliter, et habitatores ipsos exinde nihilominus expulerunt quorum aliquos vendere, quosdam vero in servitutem presumperunt redigere*. This is Alexander IV’s account of the affair, based, as he says, on information that the Genoese had given him; its accuracy, therefore, cannot be assured. See CDS, p. 379, doc. 101.

135 Guglielmo da Capraia of Arborea will be discussed further on in this chapter, where it will be shown that his alignment with Pisa was not absolute. See below, nn. 292-297.
military hand in expanding its influence in Cagliari. In response to papal claims of lordship, Pisa could justify its military action by pointing to the fact that Cagliari’s new Massa judices were Pisan citizens and were bound by vows of loyalty to the commune. This growth of Pisan secular power in Sardinia, however, went directly against the interests and commands of the pope, and as a result, Pisa’s ecclesiastical influence declined in Cagliari even as its secular influence increased. If the Visconti brothers were able to pressure Archbishop Mariano into nominating a Pisan canon to the see of Sulcis in 1221, by the 1250s the archbishop of Cagliari and papal legate in Sardinia was a Roman who probably helped Judex Chiano rebel against Pisa. Pisa’s military strength allowed it to rebuff the Genoese and strengthen its grip on Cagliari, but, although a lack of evidence makes it impossible to know the origins of most of the archbishops and bishops in the second half of the thirteenth century, immediately following Pisa’s conquest, in the 1260s, the new suffragan bishop of Dolia was Hungarian, not Pisan. A Hungarian bishop, or indeed any bishop not linked by family or origin to Pisa, Genoa or Sardinia, presumably would have no local loyalties: he can have been installed to represent the interests of no one but the pope. In this way, Pisa’s military success, made possible by rebelling against Rome, came at the cost of losing the spiritual and moral authority it had enjoyed in Cagliari in the twelfth century. What this process could mean in a context that lacked Pisan military control can be seen in Logudoro.

4.4 The Judicate of Logudoro and the Archdiocese of Torres: 1200 - 1259

4.4.1 Papal Politics and Logudoro’s Rapprochement with Genoa

The case of Logudoro will show that Pisa’s military and commercial strength and political diplomacy on their own were not enough to win a judicate. More specifically, it will show that in the absence of a Pisan judex who could legitimately be claimed to fall under Pisan military authority, as in Cagliari, or in the absence of a Sardinian judex who had decided to ally himself with Pisa, as will shortly be seen in Arborea, ecclesiastical power was essential. As Chapter Three showed, Logudoro had been one of Pisa’s first areas of strength in Sardinia in the eleventh century, and had remained an unwavering Pisan ally

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throughout most of the twelfth century. In the 1180s, however, Judex Barisone of Logudoro began to turn towards Genoa. Petrucci suggests that this change of policies was due to the fact that Genoa had recently taken possession of Bonifacio, in southern Corsica, and thus was now Logudoro’s next-door neighbor, with all the political and commercial implications that that status carried. This may be partly true, but does not fully explain why Logudoro would turn against its long-time ally, Pisa. For one thing, Genoa did not conquer Bonifacio until 1195, well after Logudoro had begun to seek its friendship. If there were fears that Pisa was becoming a threat, though, tightening relations with a nearby Genoese presence would make very good sense. Perhaps early signs of the Massa family’s expansionist ambitions in Cagliari provided such fears. In the thirteenth century, the judicate seems willingly to have chosen the pope as its feudal lord, and to have continued to seek links with Genoa.

Given Pisa’s long history of strength in Logudoro, the great number of Pisans living in the judicate and intermarried with Sards, and the Pisan overlordship that Judex Comita had been forced to recognize in 1198, it is hard to believe that Pisa could not have kept some sort of dominance over Logudoro if it had been able to continue to reinforce its commercial-political-military authority with the political-cultural-spiritual force of its legation. Without the legation, however, it had few ways to intervene as successive popes removed the Pisan presence from Logudoro’s clergy and replaced them with prelates who were loyal to Rome and, at times, were even Genoese. The result, despite large populations of Pisans and Sardo-Pisans living in Logudoro, was that the Church of Torres seems to have been dominated by clergy antagonistic to Pisa, and that Pisa was unable to convince or force the judices to submit to either the Pisan commune or the Pisan Church. The following analysis, therefore, will show how the effective loss of legatine authority in Sardinia deprived Pisa of any way of repairing its fortunes in what had once been its closest Sardinian ally.

Just as the archdiocese of Cagliari at the turn of the thirteenth century was ruled by Archbishop Ricco, who faithfully worked for papal policies, the archdiocese of Torres entered the thirteenth century with Innocent III’s hand-picked agent at its head, Archbishop Biagio. During Innocent’s campaign to marry Elena of Gallura to his cousin, Trasimondo, Biagio seems to have been everywhere, working tirelessly to bring Innocent’s plans to fruition. Some of his activity directly profited Logudoro, such as his investigations to see whether he could “grant the benefit of absolution” to the previous Judex Costantino,

138 David Abulafia, “Southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia,” p. 27.
139 See Vidili, La cronotassi, pp. 98-106 for a full record of Biagio’s activities.
who had died an excommunicate, “so that [Biagio] may give him an ecclesiastical burial.”¹⁴⁰ He also helped Judex Comita, brother and successor to the excommunicated Costantino, to escape from the clutches of Pisa. Innocent III had given Comita an excuse to evade his vow of fealty to Pisa, and perhaps in gratitude for this, or else seeking protection from further Pisan harassment, Comita seems not to have resisted swearing fealty to the pope. Before 1205 he had sworn “a vow of fidelity...to the Roman Church just as the other Sardinian judices have sworn,” in the hands of Archbishop Biagio.¹⁴¹

To judge by Benedetta of Cagliari’s first vow of fealty to Rome, made in 1215, around 1205 being the vassal of Rome did not yet imply the detailed restrictions that would be described in Benedetta’s later vow, that of 1224.¹⁴² It almost certainly consisted only of promising to be “faithful and obedient to Blessed Peter, the Holy Apostolic Roman Church and our lord Pope Innocent and his Catholic successors,” and to “help defend the Roman papacy and the regalia of Blessed Peter, and especially Sardinia, against every man.”¹⁴³ As far as Comita was concerned, this may have seemed like a license to oppose Pisa, and if necessary Genoa, whenever they presumed too much; it also gave him Innocent’s continued support against a Pisa that was inimical to the papacy. In a sense, this relationship of vassalage was more like an alliance against a common enemy, as can be seen in 1211 when Innocent wrote to Judex Comita warning him that the Pisans had just sent an armed fleet to Sicily, and that Comita should be “on your guard lest they should wish to plot against you or any of your people, since they envy and desire your peace and tranquility.”¹⁴⁴ Comita’s seemingly willing acceptance of fealty to Rome would certainly make sense in the wider European picture, as can be seen by considering another territory claimed by Innocent III as papal property: Poland. As Sedlar explains, Poland’s political fragmentation in the thirteenth century induced Polish princes to give great value to papal support, and voluntarily exchange fealty for papal protection.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, Poland’s alignment with Rome was one factor that encouraged its

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¹⁴⁰ *beneficium absolutionis impendas, sicque illi poteris sepulturam ecclesiasticam exhibere.* These were Innocent III’s instructions to Biagio, in Sanna, *Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 37-38, doc. 29.

¹⁴¹ *iuramento fidelitatis ... Ecclesie Romane iurare sicut iam alii iudices Sardinie iuraverunt.* *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80, doc. 73.


¹⁴³ *fideles et obedientes erimus Beato Petro, Sancteque apostolice Romane Ecclesie et domino nostro pape Innocentio suisque successoribus catholicis ... Papatum Romanum et regalia beati Petri et specialiter Sardiniam adiutores eis erimus ad retinendum et defendendum contra omnem hominem Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 149-151, doc. 143.


¹⁴⁵ Sedlar, *East Central Europe*, p. 150.
uneasy neighbour, Bohemia, to gravitate instead towards fealty to the German emperors. Comita’s acceptance of papal fealty in return for papal protection from Pisa and Pisa’s vassal in Cagliari, Guglielmo of Massa, are at one with this picture.

Furthermore, homage to Rome was quite compatible with the natural sequitur to declaring hostility to Pisa: affirming friendship with Genoa. This latter came some time before 1216, when Judex Comita, along with his son Mariano, swore that “we will be citizens of Genoa,” that “we will not receive Pisans or any other enemies of the city of Genoa,” and that “we will make no peace or treaty or agreement with the Pisans.” The judex also conceded the right “to extract salt from our land, which we have today and will acquire in the future, except from the Judicate of Torres, to the men of Genoa and of the district of Genoa and of the Castle of Bonifacio” in Corsica, “free from any tax or duty.” Surely in connection with this alliance, both Comita and Mariano seem to have granted away so many fiefs to Genoese men that they “reduced the realm to poverty.” Nevertheless, it is worth pointing that Comita’s exception of the whole judicate of Torres from this grant shows that the tax exemption was only valid in conquered territories of other judicates. This, in turn, suggests that by this point in his judicate’s history he was well aware of the danger of granting away too many financial exemptions, such as those his ancestor, Judex Mariano I, had given between 1080 and 1085. In sum, Archbishop Biagio’s aid to Judex Comita, papal protection from Pisan invasions, and the possibility of continuing a pro-Genoese policy show that there were clear political benefits to be drawn from being a vassal of the pope and from having a papal agent in charge of Torres.

147 *erimus cives Ianue.* CDS, pp. 326-328, doc. 30.
148 *Pisanis quoque et universis inimicis Ianuensis civitatis ... nullam receptaculum dabimus ... nullam pacem nec treuguam seu concordiam faciemus cum Pisanis.* CDS, pp. 326-328, doc. 30.
149 *... salem vero de terra nostra quam hodie habemus et de cetero acquisierimus hominibus Ianuense et del districtu Ianu et castri Bonifacii absque ulla dacita vel drietu extrahere concedemus excepto de iudicaatu turritano.* CDS, pp. 326-328, doc. 30.
150 *occasione promissionum ... nonnullis civibus Pisanis et Ianuensis ... ipsa provincia de venerit paupertatem.* This was a complaint made by Mariano’s heir, the Judicessa Adelasia, in 1236, according to a letter of Gregory IX: Lucien Auvray, ed., *Les registres de Gregoire IX*, Vol. 2 (Paris: Albert Fontemoing, 1907), doc. 3355. Since Adelasia’s Pisan husband is also named as a culprit in this letter, it seems reasonable to assume that the fiefs given to “Pisanis” were given by him; those given to the “Ianuensis” were granted by the Genoese-friendly Comita and Mariano.
151 It may, indeed, be doubted whether those exemptions were honoured any longer, considering the political relations between Logudoro and Pisa.
At the same time, even if Archbishop Biagio helped free Logudoro from Pisan dominion, he did not only represent a savior. In his efforts to make Elena of Gallura marry Innocent’s cousin, Biagio actively opposed Judex Comita’s plan to have “the noble lady Elena, daughter of the former judex of Gallura, be joined in matrimony with [his] brother, noble Ithoccor,”152 and requested Guglielmo of Massa, Comita’s enemy, to “ensure that the noble lady Elena ... does not marry suspect persons, especially Ithoccor, brother of the noble Comita, judex of Torres.”153 Such “fraternizing with the enemy” must have been rather difficult for Judex Comita to accept. In addition, Biagio began to go through the accounts of the archdiocese, seeking sources of income that were due but not being paid, including the undefined census that “the archbishops and bishops and other priors of churches and noblemen of the judicate ... owe to the Roman Church.”154 He “extract[ed] a census” from the Cassinese church of S. Maria of Tergu, which had always been exempt,155 and deprived “those people, who withhold or have in the past withheld the census owed to [the] Church, of the possessions conceded to them by the Church of Torres, as compensation for the census.”156 From the point of view of the clerics and monasteries of Logudoro, therefore, Biagio may have seemed to be replacing the heavy hand of Pisa with the heavy hand of Rome.

At this point, and interestingly given the context, an unusual glimpse can be caught of cathedral canons acting corporately against their archbishop. The first such occasion, which had occurred after the death of Archbishop Bandino four years earlier, was discussed in Chapter Three.157 In both cases, the archbishop could be seen as an exploitative representative of a foreign power; indeed, perhaps it was the canons’ experience of successfully uniting against Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa that gave them the initiative to do the same thing again in 1204. This time, however, the canons were acting corporately against the agent of

152 nobilis mulier Helena filia quondam iudicis Gallurensis, nobilem virum Ithocor, fratrem tuum ... matrimonialiter ... iungatur; thus Innocent described the situation to Comita in 1203, ordering him to prevent such a marriage from taking place and to acquiesce to Biagio’s warnings and decisions. Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. 46-47, doc. 37.
153 non permittas nobilem mulierem Helenam ... nubere persone suspecte, presertim Ithocor, fratri nobilis viri Comite iudicis Turritani, as Innocent III wrote to Guglielmo in 1203; in the same letter, he urged Guglielmo to abide by Biagio’s orders and decisions. Ibid., pp. 44-45, doc. 36.
154 archiepiscopis et episcopis et aliis ecclesiarum prelatis et nobilibus viris iudicibus ... de censu, quem Ecclesie romane debetis; in this letter of 1203, Innocent III commanded that this census be given to Biagio sine difficultate qualitbet. Ibid., pp. 42-43, doc. 33.
155 Casinense ecclesiam Sancte Marie de Thergo ... exigas censum ab ecclesia memorata; Innocent III warned Biagio to cease until he had discovered whether the church truly was exempt. Ibid., pp. 111-112, doc. 100; cf. ibid., pp. 130-131, doc. 120.
156 eos, qui census Ecclesie tue debitos subtraxerint amodo vel hactenus subtraxerunt, possessionibus sub censu eisdem ab Ecclesia turritana concessis iuxta legitimas spolies; thus wrote Innocent III in 1203, granting Biagio license to take these measures. Ibid., pp. 49, doc. 40.
157 Chapter Three, at nn. 170-172.
Pope Innocent III himself, and the outcome was quite different. When Biagio complained to the pope that the canons and archpriest “know nothing of the canons, but instead are foolish, and involve themselves in worldly affairs,” Innocent III gave him permission to “install regular canons, having suitably provided for the aforesaid [current] canons and archpriest elsewhere.”

It seems not entirely likely that Innocent should have authorized an entire cathedral chapter to be removed and replaced simply because the canons were behaving improperly. Canons who fell short of the Western Church’s ideals were not difficult to find. Indeed, the problem of canons living and behaving like laymen was part of the motivation for the Europe-wide promotion of the Augustinian Rule, aimed specifically at canons. Furthermore, most other examples of European prelates seeking to reform worldly chapters do not show the option of evicting the canons and replacing them being available, even where the behavior of the canons seems to have been worse than that of the canons of Torres. The tenth-century cathedral chapter in Verona, for example, refused to be reformed, but was too powerful to be coerced. Likewise, the eleventh-century Bishop Ivo of Chartres, after failing to reform his chapter, far from evicting them, had to content himself with installing regular canons in a parish church under his jurisdiction. Four hundred years later the reformer Jean Gerson was only able to impose a choice on his cathedral chapter, that of reforming themselves or foregoing their ecclesiastical income, but there was no suggestion of simply removing them from their positions. Finally, an early thirteenth-century example from York shows cathedral canons participating with their archbishop in a series of heavy exactions, unjust seizures and brawls, and evicting those of their fellow-canons who opposed them, but the papal legate who came to restore order simply reinstated the wrongfully evicted canons and does not seem to have deprived the culprits of their prebends.

Thus, Innocent’s drastic suggestion of replacing the whole chapter of S. Gavino of Torres may be evidence that the canons and archpriest were doing something more harmful in Innocent’s eyes than

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158 *nil canonicum sapiunt, sed desipiunt potius et mundanis illecebris se involvunt ... canonicas institutas regulares, archipresbytero et canonicis memoratis alibi congrue provisurus. Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna*, pp. 65-67, doc. 57.
simply “involving themselves in worldly affairs.” Considering the situation, and considering that at the
time Biagio was working to prevent Elena of Gallura from marrying a Logudorese prince, which would
have given Logudoro a valuable ally against its enemies, it may be that the canons’ involvement in
“worldly affairs” was, more precisely, their attempts to obstruct Biagio in his own, and thus the pope’s,
involvement in Sardinian affairs.

It is unfortunate that such notices of capitular actions are few and void of detail, but such as they are, they
do show that canons did not necessarily cooperate with the politics of colonizing prelates. The cathedral
canons were not the only ones to resist Biagio, either: Innocent censured the “archbishops, bishops and
other clerics in charge of churches” who, when Biagio “goes to different parts of Sardinia on our
business, deny him necessities ... although you ought to be as hospitable to him as to others, especially in
those parts of Sardinia where food cannot be bought.” Whether these were Pisan, Genoese or Sardinian
prelates is not stated, but all three could have had reason to resent Biagio’s activities and may have found
a common cause against him. Indeed, the Pisans of Cagliari resented Biagio so much that, said Benedetta
of Cagliari in 1217, they “wickedly inflicted him with injuries and threats of death when, in obedience to
the Holy See, he came to Cagliari.” Through these brief notices, it can be seen how the conflicting
interests of a colonizing Pisa, an expanding papacy, and the Logudorese who both needed and resented
papal power, played out through the interactions between Biagio and the clergy of Sardinia.

Over the next few decades, Logudoro’s alignment with Rome and Genoa against Pisa would become
more solid; at the same time, Pisan influences seem to have dissipated from the judicate’s Church and
been replaced by clergy who were faithful to Rome, and who were sometimes from Genoa. Some time
before 1217, the year that Archbishop Ricco of Cagliari died and the archiepiscopate of Pisa was vacant,
Biagio had died, and in 1218 Judex Comita followed him to the grave. Comita was succeeded by his son
Mariano II, who allied himself with Benedetta of Cagliari and in 1218 was “magnificently girding himself
for the violent expulsion of the excommunicates,” Lamberto and Ubaldo Visconti of Pisa. In 1219, for
example, he invaded Arborea along with Benedetta’s son, Judex Guglielmo II of Cagliari, since Arborea’s

164 quando... pro negotiis nostris ad diversas Sardinie partes accedit, necessaria ei ... denegatis, licet exhibere vos
debertis tam ipsi quam aliis hospitales, presertim cum in quibusdam Sardinie partibus victualia nequeant venalia
repperiri. Sanna, Innocenzo III e la Sardegna, pp. doc. 53.

165 in apostolice Sedis obsequio quondam ad Calarim venienti ... multas iniurias ac mortis minas nequerit intulerint.
Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 25-31, doc. 13.

166 magnifice se accingit ad predictorum excommunicatorum violentiam repellendam; this is stated in a papal letter in
which Honorius III asked the Milanese to help Mariano. Ibid., pp. 80-81, doc. 45. Mariano was married to the sister
of Benedetta, and in 1217, Benedetta had already requested Honorius III’s permission to make an alliance with the
judex of Logudoro: see ibid., pp. 25-31, doc. 13 and Rowland, The Periphery in the Center, p. 163.
judex, Pietro II, was seen as an ally of Ubaldo I Visconti. In 1230 Gregory IX (1227-1241) appointed his legate in Sardinia, Piacentino, to the archdiocese of Torres, making Logudoro once again, as in Biagio’s time, a base for papal authority in Sardinia. Piacentino may have held the see for less than one year, but there are reasons to think that Piacentino is the same person as Opizzo, attested as archbishop at the same time; if Piacentino and Opizzo are the same archbishop, then Piacentino/Opizzo may have ruled at least until 1238.

What makes this particularly interesting is the fact that the Liber Judicum Turritanorum speaks of “Lord Opizzo, the Genoese,” which would make Opizzo the first known Genoese prelate to obtain the archdiocesan seat of Torres. Starting in 1237, Genoa’s traditional support of the papacy against the Hohenstaufen was growing more solid, and it would become fervent in the 1240s. Thus, if Genoese Opizzo is the papal legate Piacentino, Genoa’s support of Gregory IX had allowed it finally, if temporarily, to achieve what it had been seeking since at least the 1160s: the papal legation in Sardinia. From the pope’s point of view, a Genoese archbishop might help counter Pisa, both because Genoa was generally Guelf, and because a Genoese prelate, unlike Archbishop Mariano of Cagliari in 1221, could be trusted not to fall under the influence of the Pisans. Even if the two names denote different people and Opizzo was not a legate, the fact remains that Genoa had managed to place a Genoese archbishop in Logudoro. This, despite the importance of the Genoese Doria in Logudoro, had been out of reach for Genoa throughout the twelfth century, due not only to Pisa’s political importance to the judicate but also, as Chapter Three has shown, to Pisa’s ecclesiastical authority in Sardinia. In this, therefore, can be seen just what the loss of the legation’s strength truly meant for Pisa and its ability to manipulate Sardinian politics to its own advantage.

4.4.2 The Pisan Papal Legation and the Clergy of Logudoro

In this period of the 1230s, proof would come of how much Pisa still needed its legation to be able to influence the politics of a judicate not under its control, and contrarily, of how difficult it had become for

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167 This can be gathered from the fact that out of the three other judices in Sardinia, Benedetta of Cagliari considered only Mariano of Logudoro as a possible ally. Gallura, of course, was controlled by her enemy Lamberto Visconti, and clearly the judex of Arborea was not a potential anti-Pisan ally, either. Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 25-31, doc. 13. As will be shown below, there is other evidence of Arborea’s affinity with Pisa.


169 donnu Aspisiu, genoesu. Liber Judicum Turritanorum, p. 53. Since the Liber was probably written between 1255 and 1287, Opizzo had been archbishop within living memory, and the claim that he was Genoese is likely to be true.

Pisa to use the sort of ecclesiastical politicking that had been its signature method throughout the twelfth century. When Judex Mariano II died in 1232, he was succeeded by his ten-year-old son Barisone III and Barisone’s unpopular regent, Orzocco de Serra. From 1233 to 1235 the judicate was shaken by rebellions that were stirred up in part by the Sardo-Genoese Doria, and in part by Sardinian, Sardo-Pisan, and Sardo-Genoese burgers of Sassari who were eager to establish communal independence. By the summer of 1235 the young Barisone III had been murdered, leaving no heir.

Interestingly, it was in precisely 1234, while Sassari and the countryside of Logudoro were in rebellion, that Archbishop Vitale of Pisa went to Rome to petition Gregory IX to have Pisa’s ancient honors of legation and primacy returned to him. The fact that he was asking to have it returned means that Gregory IX had not confirmed the Pisan honors when he became pope, becoming the first pope not to do so. Turtas argues that, by itself, Gregory’s refusal to confirm them did not end the privileges, since these were tied to the archiepiscopal see of Pisa. Nevertheless, the archbishop of Pisa’s request to the pope shows that he, at least, did not share Turtas’ certainty that the legation and primacy were still valid. This would be consistent with evidence that by the thirteenth century, and perhaps already by the twelfth, a papal legation did not automatically endure beyond the death of the pope who had granted it, and needed to be granted afresh by each new pope.

Not only did Vitale “urgently petition [Gregory] about the rights and honors on the island of Sardinia [...] so that nothing connected to these should be omitted,” he also took with him copies of the “privileges granted by [Gregory’s] predecessors, the Roman Pontiffs, to the Pisan Church,” in which it “is clearly evident that apostolic letters were given to Vitale in a certain


172 Petrucci declares that Orzocco was friendly to Pisa, thus aggravating the powerful Genoese elements of Logudoro, such as the Doria. Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” p. 135. Giuseppe Meloni, however, holds that the revolts, which started in Sassari and were fiercest there, were a reaction by supporters of Pisa against an accord that Orzocco de Serra signed with Genoa in 1233. He believes that these Pisan-friendly groups preferred Barisone III’s sister Adelasia, who was married to a Visconti. Meloni, “La Sardegna nel quadro delle la politica mediterranea,” p. 83.

173 CDS, p. 346, doc. 55.


176 See Christopher Brooks and Michael Lobban, eds., *Communities and Courts in Britain, 1150-1900* (London: Hambledon Press, 1997), p. 7, for an example of a twelfth-century legate whose mission ended automatically with the death of Pope Innocent II and was not renewed by Innocent’s successor. Walter Ullmann, though, argues that at least as late as the eleventh century legates’ missions were immune to the deaths of popes, since legates were officially representatives of the apostolic see, not of the pope himself. Walter Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages*, Revised Edition (London, New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 86.
form, addressed to the archbishops, bishops and clergy of the same island.”¹⁷⁷ Since the only ecclesiastical honors that Pisa held in Sardinia were the legation and the primacy, these apostolic letters were probably the formal letters that Honorius III had addressed to all the clergy of Sardinia, announcing Vitale’s authority as legate and primate, and enjoining them “humbly to obey” him. Vitale’s use of these documents here implies that he thought of them as evidence that he had some sort of right to both the primacy and legation.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, although Turtas explains Vitale’s “insistence” as a response to Gregory’s original refusal to confirm the legation, this surely cannot be the only reason. After all, Gregory’s refusal must have been made seven years before, when he became pope.¹⁷⁹ Giovanni Dell’Amico looks deeper and argues that the timing of Vitale’s request was connected to the death of Ubaldo I Visconti, long-time podestà of Pisa, and to the struggle for control of the commune that Ubaldo’s absence set off between factions in Pisa.¹⁸⁰ This may in part be true, but surely Vitale’s petition to have the legation and primacy in Sardinia should also be understood in the context of the developing situation in Sardinia itself. In particular, it should be understood as connected to the situation in Logudoro. Cagliari would not provide a convincing motive to desire the legation: it was already de facto ruled by Pisa, and the rebellion of Judex Chiano would not come for another twenty years. Gallura, for its part, had been ruled by the Pisan Visconti family since 1206, and the judex of Arborea, as will be shown shortly, was a Pisan ally. This is not to suggest that these judicates were unswervingly loyal to Pisa, or that the city felt complacent about its control. Nevertheless, Logudoro, with its pro-Genoese judex, its lack of vassalage to Pisa, its powerful Sardo-Genoese nobility, and its possibly Genoese archbishop, was the only judicate that represented both a danger and, with its political instability under Barisone III, an opportunity for Pisan interests.

Gregory IX seems to have been highly suspicious of Vitale’s motives. In July, 1235, he claimed that he could not give Vitale an immediate answer because he first had to consider “urgent requests, on the part of certain prelates of the same island, that full justice be done to them.”¹⁸¹ The phrase “urgent request”

¹⁷⁷ a nobis cum instantia postulaverit, super iuribus, et honoribus in insula Sardiniae a Romanis Pontificus praedecessoribus nostris ecclesiae Pisanae concessis, pro ut in eorum privilegiis nobis ostensis evidenter apparat, ad archiepiscopos, episcopos, et clerum eiusdem insulae sub certa forma litteras Apostolicas sibi dari, nihil de contingentibus omittendo. CDS, p. 346, doc. 55.
¹⁷⁸ See above, at n. 82.
¹⁷⁹ Turtas, Storia della Chiesa, p. 264.
¹⁸⁰ Giuseppe Dell'Amico, “Tra politica e pastorale,” p. 11. Unfortunately, Dell’Amico does not explain how a legatine or primatial visitation in Sardinia would have reinforced any particular party’s cause within Pisa.
¹⁸¹ quibusdam tamen pro praelatis aliquibus ipsius insulae instanter potentibus iustitiae sibi plenitudinem exhiberi. CDS, p. 346, doc. 55.
almost certainly refers to the “unresolved dispute regarding the primacy of Sardinia between the [archbishop of Torres] and other clergy of the area, on one hand, and ... the archbishop of Pisa, on the other,” which Gregory mentioned a few months later, in October of 1235. In short, the archbishop and clergy of Torres seem to have petitioned Gregory not to return the primacy to Archbishop Vitale of Pisa, and Gregory either took them seriously, or else used their petition as a useful justification for not returning the primacy to Pisa. Indeed, his feelings on the matter are expressed in the same letter of October, 1235, in which he describes Pisa’s primacy in Logudoro as being “to the great harm of the archbishop and bishops [of Torres]”.

From one perspective, this dispute over Pisa’s primacy shows that the restrictions on Pisa’s legation must have made its primacy in Sardinia more important, relative to the legation, than it had been in the twelfth century. It is true, of course, that Vitale had insisted that Gregory concede both of Pisa’s privileges, “omitting nothing connected to them,” which must mean that he wanted both the primacy and the legation. Nevertheless, the clergy of Logudoro do not seem to have asked Gregory to deny the legation to Vitale, as if it were no longer much of a threat. Their concern over his regaining the primacy, though, suggests that in the years before Gregory IX’s accession to the papal throne, Vitale had exercised his primatial authority with vigor. In other words, now that no archbishop of Pisa could exercise the legation without papal authorization, the less prestigious but also less restricted powers of the primacy may have become the main route by which Vitale sought to impose his, and Pisa’s, will on the Church of Sardinia. This would be consistent with evidence from 1263 in which another Pisan archbishop, challenged about his right to the legation in Sardinia, responded that “even if not as legate ... in any case we must be received [in Sardinia] as primate, and patriarch of all Sardinia;” for him too, therefore, the primacy was a more dependable tool of power. Gregory’s refusal to grant Vitale’s request is both a sign that he mistrusted Pisan activity in Sardinia, and that he realized that confirming the legation and primacy would in some way facilitate this activity.

Indeed, the importance of legatine or primatial control in Logudoro, where Pisa’s military or political force was not a realistic option, became clear when, in 1234, Archbishop Vitale of Pisa risked Gregory IX’s displeasure, went to Sardinia as legate and primate without papal permission, and carried out a

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184 si non tamquam legatus [...] tamen tamquam primas, et patriarcha totius Sardiniae debebamus admitter. From Archbishop Federico Visconti’s record of his visitation to Sardinia in 1263, found in CDS, pp. 380-383, doc. 103.
visitation of the province of Torres, among other places. At least between December 16th, 1234 and March 25th, 1235, as Gregory accused, Vitale “presumed to exercise the office of legate in Sardinia [...] without our special mandate, against ancient and approved custom.” The details of Vitale’s visitation of Sardinia are unknown, but he was in Oristano in 1235 and also visited Logudoro to impose his authority on the bishops of Torres. The sort of reception he received from most of these bishops can be inferred by the fact that, before his arrival, the archbishop of Torres and his suffragans decided “all together that if anyone, whether bishops or lesser clergy, should attempt to receive the archbishop [of Pisa] as primate against the prohibition of [the archbishop of Torres], they [the archbishop and suffragans] would inflict the sentence of excommunication.” Here is contained an image of the clergy of Torres, headed by an archbishop faithful to Rome, being able to form a near consensus on the importance of defying Pisan attempts to impose the city’s ecclesiastical authority. It is surely one of the effects of Vitale’s lack of the legation and primacy since 1227, coupled with the judicate’s political rapprochement with Genoa and the pope’s installation of his own legate as archbishop in 1230.

At the same time, this anti-Pisan “consensus” was not complete: following Archbishop Vitale’s visitation Gregory IX criticized the bishops of Bosa and of Ampurias because they had “dared both to receive the aforesaid archbishop of Pisa as primate, and to attend to him.” Given Pisa’s lack of direct ecclesiastical authority, these bishops may have been part of, or at least reflected the feelings of, the sizeable Pisan community living in Logudoro. Alternatively, they may be evidence of Vitale’s earlier, unofficial ability to use his legatine powers under Honorius III, when it was not widely publicized that his legation was limited in power; or else of his use of the primacy. Even as late as 1263, both legation and primacy could be used as a “justification, through instruments of a religious nature like preaching and sermons, of Pisan policies in Sardinia,” as Simonetta Sitzia puts it. Indeed, considering that he went to Logudoro in the

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190 Simonetta Sitzia, “*Congregavimus totum clerum et visitavimus eum*. Le visite pastorali in Sardegna, dal Medioevo all’Età moderna. Approcci metodologici per l’utilizzo delle fonti visitali sarde” (PhD diss., Università di
first place, Vitale must have had some hope of being able to impose his authority on the judicate’s clergy, and perhaps also its laity. What he hoped to accomplish among his supporters is not recorded, but it may perhaps be inferred by considering successive events.

At some point in 1235 the young Judex Barisone III was killed, and according to a letter of Gregory IX, before his own death Judex Mariano II, Barisone III’s father, had stipulated that, “if [Barisone] should die without children, one of his sisters, whom the men of the judicate should elect, should succeed him in the inheritance [of the crown].” Mariano had two daughters, as the Liber Judicum Turritanorum explains: one, Adelasia, “was the wife of Judex Ubaldo of Gallura, the brother of Judex Giovanni Visconti of Pisa.” This Judex Ubaldo was Ubaldo II Visconti, the son of Lamberto Visconti and Elena of Gallura, and not to be confused with his uncle, Ubaldo I, earlier podestà of Pisa. “The other princess,” continues the Liber, “was Benedetta, who was the wife of the Count of Empúries in Catalonia.” As Gregory IX explained the situation, “since Barisone was cruelly killed by certain traitors, leaving no legitimate son, the men of the said judicate, electing [Adelasia] as their lady, gave [her] their oaths of fealty;” this happened before October 10, 1235. Although Gregory IX described the legal truth, that Adelasia was the de jure judicessa of Logudoro, the Liber Judicum Turritanorum goes on to give a different interpretation of the judicial election that surely reflects the deeper truth of the situation: “After Judex Barisone had died ... all the prelates and nobility of Logudoro came together in council and gave the lordship to Judex Ubaldo of Gallura.” Adelasia, in other words, had been elected because the nobility of Logudoro hoped that her husband, Ubaldo, would provide the judicate with a strong and stable ruler. All in all, it was a situation eerily reminiscent of Cagliari in 1215, when Benedetta had inherited the throne, and to judge from a letter of Gregory IX, by 1236 it was evident that “the podestà, council and commune

Sassari, 2008-2009), p. 50. Sitzia is referring to the 1263 visitation of Archbishop Federico Visconti, but the circumstances of both visitations are very similar; almost certainly the motives were, too.

191 si absque liberis moreretur, altera sororum eidem in hereditate succederet, quam homines ejusdem provincie sibi ducerent eligendam. Les registres de Gregoire IX, doc. 3352; the document is erroneously dated to 24 August, 1236, but should be a year earlier. See also Mauro Sanna, “Introduzione” in Enrico Costa, Adelasia di Torres (Nuoro: Illisso, 2008).

192 sa prima fuit domicella Alasia, sa quale apisit pro mugere Juigue Baldu de Gallura, fradile de Juigue Juan Bisonte de Pisas. Libellus Judicum Turritanorum, p. 52.

193 sa atera fuit domicella Beneita, qui istetit mugere de su Conte de Ampurias in Cadalungia. Ibid., p. 52.

194 cumque idem Parasonus a quibusdam proditoris crudeliter interfectus fuerit, nullo sibi filio legitimo remanente, homines dicte provincie, te in suam dominam eligentis, fidelitatis juramenta tibi ... prestiterunt. Les registres de Gregoire IX, Vol. 2, doc. 3352. The document is dated 10 October, 1236, but this is based on the Pisan calendar and should be read as 1235.
of the Pisans” had the same intentions regarding “the province of Torres” that they had had for Cagliari, and “plan[ned] to invade the same province.”

It is not to be supposed that, when Archbishop Vitale organized his visitation of Logudoro in 1234, he had any idea that Barisone III would be assassinated the following year. Thus, it also cannot be imagined that he was seeking to influence a judicial election that he did not know would take place. Nevertheless, the facts that his visitation took place during one of Logudoro’s most turbulent periods, that he decided to come while a weak judex was on the throne, and that just two years later Pisa was preparing to invade the judicate, should be seen in conjunction with each other. Vitale was almost surely seeking to prepare the ground for some sort of Pisan expansion in the judicate; the precise form of which would later be determined by the murder of Barisone III and the election of his sister, Adelasia.

At the same time, the fact that Vitale had to defy the pope in order to carry out his visitation highlights his, and Pisa’s, great weakness in a judicate where the clergy were politically hostile. He faced an almost unanimously unfriendly Church in Logudoro, and was only received as primate by two bishops. Furthermore, even if these two Pisan-friendly bishops had managed to secure or retain sees in Torres in 1234-1235, by 1238 the rebellious bishop of Ampurias had been replaced by a man whom Gregory trusted to work “as diligently as you can” alongside his archbishop in pursuit of Gregory’s (unstated) aims. Archbishop Vitale, deprived of his legatine powers, could do nothing to prevent this. In broader terms, Vitale’s visitation of Torres shows two things. For one, the restrictions placed on Pisa’s legation had seriously weakened the city’s ability to influence nominations and elections in Sardinia. For another, by allowing clerical positions to become available to anti-Pisan clerics who petitioned the pope not to return the primacy to Pisa, Pisa’s loss of episcopal authority had also allowed the Sardinian church to become an active impediment to Pisa’s regaining that ecclesiastical influence. Thus, it may be supposed that Pisa’s political influence by itself was not enough to influence elections and nominations in a province whose archbishop, at least, was politically hostile. The pope, of course, did not have anything like absolute power over nominations, to judge by a papal complaint in 1255 that “many Sardinian churchmen ... manage to take possession of churches by means of secular power.” Still, the Sardinian petition to Gregory IX in 1234, asking that Pisa not regain its primacy, shows that papal, Sardinian,

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195 potestati, consilio et communi Pisanis .. provincia Turritana ....proponitis ipsam invadere. Ibid., doc. 3356.
196 quanto diligentius poteris. The same letter, urging diligence, is sent to the archbishop of Torres and the bishop of Ampurias, and apparently only to them. Ibid., doc. 4374, 4375.
197 nonnulli prelati Sardinie ... se procuraverunt intrudi per potentiam secularem. Thus wrote Alexander IV to the archbishop of Cagliari, urging him to correct the situation. MM. Bourel de la Roncière, J. de Loye and A. Coulon, eds., Les registres d’Alexandre IV, Vol. 1 (Paris: Thorin & Fils, 1895), doc. 735.
Genoese, or in any case non-Pisan influences were strong enough to keep the tide of clerical opinion, which had already been hostile to Pisa at the Synod of S. Justa in 1226, firmly against Pisa. This was certainly so in the province of Torres.

4.4.3 Logudoro as a Nexus Between Pope, Genoa, Pisa and the Hohenstaufen

Nevertheless, even if Pisa was unable to impose its ecclesiastical/political authority on Torres in 1234, when Adelasia came to the throne in 1235 she and her husband faced a difficult situation. Pisa was preparing to invade, the nobility of Logudoro were in a rebellious spirit, there was a danger that “the lordship of [Sassari]” would be lost “without hope of recovering it,”198 and the judicate’s accounts were in a bad state. Indeed, in 1236 Gregory IX quoted Adelasia as having complained that “her grandfather and her father ... and her husband Ubald, out of the great quantity of wealth in which the judicate had abounded ... had promised so many fiefs to numerous Genoese and Pisan citizens ... that the judicate was reduced to penury.”199 Why Comita and Mariano had alienated so many fiefs has already been suggested.

As for Ubald, his open-handedness may have been part of the general European phenomenon described by Bartlett, whereby colonizing aristocrats entrenched themselves in their new lordships by generously enfeoffing their followers.200 If Ubald was the son of indigenous Elena of Gallura, he was also the son of Lamberto Visconti of Pisa. He was thus only the second generation of Gallura’s new Visconti dynasty, and the first Visconti ruler in Logudoro, an anti-Visconti, anti-Pisan and recently rebellious realm. Ubald’s expensive enfeoffment suggests that he was facing serious hostility in Logudoro and was trying to settle supporters on Logudorese land as quickly as possible; so quickly, indeed, that within the space of one year he had strained the judicate’s finances almost beyond capacity.

As Mauro Sanna puts it, the pope seemed “once again the only credible ally, even if too far away.”201 In 1237, in the presence of the Camaldolese abbot and monks of S. Trinità di Saccargia, Adelasia

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198 ipsius ville dominium sine spe recuperationis ad alios transferetur; this, said Gregory IX, was the fear of Adelasia’s husband Ubald, after Adelasia was violently denied entrance to Sassari. See Les registres de Gregoire IX, Vol. 2, doc. 3349.

199 avus et pater ipsius ... ac etiam Ubaldus, vir ejus, de copia bonorum quibus habundabant ipsa provincia ... nonnullis civibus Januensisibus et Pisanis dare promiserint multa feuda ... ad tantam ipsa provincia devenerit paupertatem. Ibid., doc. 3355.


acknowledged that she “had, held, and possessed the judicate of Torres ... from the Roman Church,” and Ubaldo II promised that his claim to the judicate was only valid “by means of Lady Adelasia his wife.” As a sign of their good will, Adelasia and Ubaldo II gave the castle of Monte Acuto to the pope, who assigned it to the control of the bishop of Ampurias; this was the same, presumably, to whom Gregory would write trustingly in 1238, as noted above.

Ubaldo II evaded a similar oath for Gallura “because he had already made a vow of fidelity to the Pisans regarding the same judicate, since he was of the Pisans himself,” but he promised that if the pope would absolve him of this oath, he would be more than willing to recognize the papacy as his feudal lord. It may come as a surprise to see the son of Lamberto Visconti so compliant with papal wishes, but this was not a simple change of heart on Ubaldo II’s part. Rather, it was a response to an anti-Visconti atmosphere that was growing in Pisa, the result of Pisan resentment against the increasing debts that the commune was having to shoulder thanks to Visconti actions against the Massa, not to speak of the occasional city-wide interdicts, punishments for Visconti-led military campaigns, that came from the papacy. In any case, Ubaldo’s failure to swear fealty for Gallura did not spoil his relationship with Gregory IX, who put a great deal of effort into returning Logudoro, Arborea and Gallura to a viable economic status, almost certainly in the hope of making them better able to resist Pisan and Genoese financial pressures. The pope released Ubaldo from a debt of “two thousand Genoese pounds,” which was accruing interest at a rate of “fifteen pounds of the same money every week,” for example, and designed an accord by which “the judex of Arborea will return ... any stolen or seized wealth found in the judicate of Arborea that belongs to the judicate of Logudoro or Gallura,” and vice versa.

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202 *se habere, tenere, et possidere iudicatum Turritanum ... ab Ecclesia Romana*. The oath, one of four connected oaths taken at the same time, is found in CDS, pp. 347-348, doc. 58; the other three are in the same volume, at p. 347, doc. 57; p. 348, doc. 59; and pp. 348-349, doc. 60.

203 *pro domina Adelasia uxore sua*. CDS, p. 348, doc. 59. See also Petrucci, *Re in Sardegna a Pisa cittadini*, p. 49.

204 *Registres de Gregoire IX*, doc. 4456. See above, at n. 196.

205 *quia de ipso iudicatu fecerat iuramentum fidelitatis Pisanis, quam erat Pisis*. CDS, p. 349, doc. 61.


207 *duo militia librarum januensis monete ... et singulis hebdomadis exhibere quindecim libras ejusdem monete*. The debt had been made with Adelasia’s consent; the creditor seems to have been a mercenary. *Les registres de Gregoire IX*, Vol. 2, doc. 3353.

This financial support on the part of the papacy was not unique to Logudoro; it will be seen in Arborea, too, and was also a wider European phenomenon. In thirteenth-century Hungary, for example, Pope Honorius III issued the bull “Intellecto” to confirm the inalienability of Hungarian royal property, and thus helped successive Hungarian kings reclaim their predecessors’ donations. If Hungary was also, like the Sardinian judicates, a papal fief. In the case of Hungary, Honorius III’s support may well have been aimed at providing the king with the financial resources to modernize his army and, therefore, constitute a valuable addition to crusades. If so, then Hungary would resemble Logudoro in this aspect, for there can be little doubt that Rome’s financial support of Adelasia was aimed at strengthening the judices’ resistance to Pisan pretensions. Once again, therefore, papal intervention in a judicate not directly subject to Pisa made a material difference in its ability to avoid becoming politically colonized, while the pope’s control of the clergy of Torres allowed the judicate to resist ecclesiastical colonization.

Soon, however, a new political element was introduced. Despite Gregory IX’s efforts to restore Logudoro to economic and political stability, by 1238 Ubaldo II of Gallura had died, and Adelasia had to choose a new husband. At this point “the archbishop of Torres, named Opizzo, who was Genoese, and all the prelates and nobles of Logudoro, and the judex of Arborea, Judex Pietro, declared that the judicessa Lady Adelasia should marry some good Sard from Sardinia or some great lord from the continent, who could maintain the state of Logudoro.” The Doria, however, pressed her to marry Enzo, the illegitimate son of Gregory IX’s enemy, Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen. Emperor Frederick was in the region of Liguria at the time, where Genoa lay; this, added to the involvement of the Doria, strongly suggests that forces in Genoa were supporting Enzo’s suit, for reasons best known to themselves. Adelasia, “not heeding the advice” of her counsellors, or indeed of Gregory IX himself, “arranged her marriage to suit herself”

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212 See ibid., p. 53.

213 See CDR, p. 91, doc. 143, in which Gregory advises Adelasia to marry someone pleasing both to her and to the pope, and who could protect her land and rights with a “strong hand and outstretched arm.”

214 no curendesi de sos consigios, fetit su matrimoniu a plaquehere sou. Libellus Judicium Turritanorum, p. 53.
and married Enzo, to whom Emperor Frederick II granted the title of “rex Sardiniee.” Yet if she was hoping to have found a champion and an effective co-ruler, she was to be disappointed, for Enzo spent only a year in Sardinia and then left for the continent, where he fought for his father until he was captured and imprisoned in 1249. Adelasia, meanwhile, was excommunicated for having married against the wishes of her feudal lord the pope, and was not absolved until 1243.

The reign of Innocent IV, as Logudoro neared the end of its life as a judicate, saw the alignment of Genoa, Rome, and the Logudorese clergy against Pisa intensify. Pisa, of course, had been inimical to the papacy for most of the century thus far, in large part because of the city’s continuing support of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Innocent IV, however, had more cause than most popes to feel wary of the city, since by birth he was Sinibaldo Fieschi, a native of Genoa. This made Pisa simultaneously the traditional rival of Innocent IV’s patria Genoa, and the staunch ally of the papacy’s greatest enemy, the Hohenstaufen. In 1245, when Innocent IV convened a council at Lyons to depose Frederick, the conflict peaked: the pope and Genoa were allied on one side; Pisa and Frederick II were allied on the other. Sardinia, as a territory where all four of these entities had claims and supporters, became a battleground for the quarrel between emperor and pope. The presence of Hohenstaufen supporters in Logudoro is indicated in a papal letter of 1243, which speaks of not only Adelasia, but also of “the others in Sardinia who, by adhering to Enzo, brought on themselves the chains of excommunication.” Additionally, in 1249, Logudoro contained “brothers of the Teutonic Knights,” famously faithful to the emperor, who were “stubbornly disobedient to the Church and rebellious.” Supporters of Pisa could be found in all four judicates, since large resident populations of Pisans or descendents of Pisans could be found in every judicate, and Cagliari, Gallura and Arborea had official political links with the Pisan commune. As for

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219 CDR, p. 98, doc. 151.

220 fratres hospitalis Sanctae Mariae Teutonicorum [...] pertinaciter inobedientes Ecclesiae vel rebelles; this comes from a papal letter authorizing Archbishop Stephen of Torres to deprive them of their privileges and immunities if they continued to be rebellious. Élie Berger, ed., Les Registres d’Innocent IV, Vol. 2 (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1887), doc. 4747. The Teutonic Knights’ enduring loyalty to Frederick II is shown by David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor, (Oxford: OUP, 1988), passim. Nevertheless, see Nicholas Morton, The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land, 1190-1291 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2009), p. 105, for the claim that in 1249 the Teutonic Knights were at odds with the emperor.
Genoa, it probably hoped to exploit the resentment of the Cagliaritans to its advantage, and it also had finally built up a strong position with Logudoro, which had received a Genoese archbishop in 1230. Finally, the extent to which the papacy had become represented by the Sardinian clergy has already been discussed.

The ways all these forces met and interacted in Sardinia is surely best exemplified by the marriage between Enzo and Adelasia in 1238. Yet the clash of papal, Genoese, Pisan and Hohenstaufen interests can also be seen through the conspicuous role that Genoa began to play in the Church of Logudoro under Innocent IV. In 1249 the archdiocese of Torres received a Dominican archbishop, Stephen. Stephen had previously been provincial prior of Lombardy, where he would have had to develop a close relationship with Genoa; he was now made not only archbishop of Torres, but also papal legate in Sardinia. In the same year that he was nominated, Innocent IV wrote to him and suggested that “if you should be unable to enter your legation freely, or if you need to depart from it for any reason and escape to other regions, you may stay in Genoa or its district, or in Portovenere or in Bonifacio, and … exercise the legatine duties in Sardinia while staying there.”

Portovenere, it should be noted, was a Ligurian town, while Bonifacio in Corsica was controlled by Genoa. The enemies who would have tried to keep him out, therefore, may be imagined to have been Pisans and/or Hohenstaufen supporters.

Furthermore, in the same year that Stephen was made archbishop of Torres, a spate of letters from Innocent IV to Stephen and other Sardinian prelates gives an idea of the political struggle that was taking place not only in Logudoro, but within all three Sardinian provinces and Gallura. To the archbishops, bishops and abbots of Sardinia Innocent denounced the “many clerics and laymen who, obtaining ecclesiastical benefices and fiefs from you and your churches, supported and still dare to support Frederick ... and his sons.” To Stephen, he gave instructions to remove from the spiritual and temporal administration of their churches “both priests-in-charge and others of your legation who have been disobedient or rebellious to the Church” and to suspend those who were “undevoted and ungrateful in the matters of the Church.”

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221 terras tue legationis nequeas libere introire, vel si exinde te pro aliqua causa exire oportuerit, ac ad partes alias declinare, dummodo Janue seu in ejus districtu, vel apud Portum Veneris aut Bonifattii moram trahas, ac ... inibi existendo legationis officium in predicta Sardinia exercere. Les registres d’Innocent IV, Vol. 2, doc. 4734.

222 nonnulli clerici et laici a vobis et vestris ecclesiis feuda et ecclesiastica beneficia obtinentes adheserint et adhuc adhérerem presumaent Frederico quondam Imperatori et ejus filiis persecutoribus Ecclesie manifestis. Ibid., doc. 4731.

223 tam prelatos quam alios tue legationis qui fuerint inobedientes Ecclesie vel rebelles. Ibid., doc. 4736.

224 in negotiis Ecclesie indevotos et ingratos. Ibid., doc. 4739.
the cathedrals and other churches” of the island, “freely using your discretion.”225 In short, it is clear that Stephen had been dispatched to Sardinia, and to Logudoro in particular, to clean up a complicated situation of politically suspect clerics.

This evidence of politically unfaithful clergy should not suggest that the papacy had lost control of Sardinia’s Church before Stephen’s arrival: Leonardo of Rome was archbishop of Cagliari in these years, and as will shortly be seen, Arborea too was manned by an archbishop trusted by the pope. The presence of these pro-papal prelates cannot have been without effect in each judicate. Indeed, another letter from 1249 allows Stephen to promise pontifical protection for everyone in his legation, and to “firmly promise on our behalf, to all the priests of the churches, the secular princes, and others of your legation, that we and our brothers will not desert them ... nor will we make peace with Emperor Frederick as long as he or any of his sons are king or emperor.”226 It suggests that at least some of the judices, and many of the prelates, were depending on Rome to hold firm against Frederick and to triumph in the end. Since in many respects Frederick II meant Pisa, as far as Sardinia was concerned the promise of papal protection may be seen as evidence of fears that a victorious or pacified Frederick would translate into a strengthened Pisa claiming rights over Sardinia. Archbishop Opizzo and the “prelates” who had warned Adelasia away from Enzo, and Judex Pietro of Arborea who had done the same thing, might be among them. It may be wondered, if not answered, what side Adelasia had taken after her abandonment by Enzo.

4.4.4 The End of Logudoro and its Failure as a Papal Fief

The 1250s were the last decade of Logudoro as a unified judicate. Adelasia had no children by either of her marriages, and as it became clear to her contemporaries that she would die without heirs, it must have been obvious that when she died, the judicate would face the greatest crisis of authority that it had ever known. Not surprisingly, then, the 1250s are also the decade that most clearly show the pope using Genoese clergy to try to take control of the judicate’s governance. Although he was ultimately unsuccessful in maintaining Logudoro as a unified state under papal control, it is not unreasonable to suggest that papal nominations of anti-Pisan clergy to benefices in Torres are one of the main reasons that

225 *discretioni tue exercendi libere censuram ecclesiasticam in omnes tam cathedralium quam aliarum ecclesiarum. Ibid.,* doc. 4738.

226 *promittendi firmiter ex parte nostra omnibus prelatis ecclesiis arum et principibus secularibus ceterisque tue legationis quod nos et frates nostri eos ... nullatenus deseremus, nec cum Frederico quondam Imperatore pacem aliquatenus reformabimus, ita quod ipse vel aliquis filiorum ejus rex aut Imperator existat. Ibid.,* doc. 4746.
Adelasia’s first marriage to a Visconti, and second marriage to a Hohenstaufen, did not pull Logudoro back into a Pisan orbit.

The atmosphere in Logudoro at the end of Adelasia’s life may have been one of impending doom, but perhaps also one of hope for each of the various entities interested in taking control after her death. Not only did the judicessa “have no heir at all,” but even before her death in 1259 Adelasia seems to have lost her effectiveness as a ruler, and perhaps even to have withdrawn from active rule all together. The *Libellus iudicum Turritanorum* describes her as “staying in the Castle of Goceano, bereft of all her wealth and repenting of what she had done, as if she were in prison.” Its version of events should not be accepted unquestioningly, but its image of the situation is supported by the fact that, in 1252, seven years before her death, Innocent IV ordered Archbishop Stephen of Torres to “commit the land and temporal jurisdiction of the judicates of Torres and Gallura to persons who are worthy and devoted to the Roman Church.” This papal move suggests not only that there was a power vacuum in both judicates, but also that the pope felt he had a realistic chance of being able to take effective control of the situation. It also hints that the pope was well aware that, whenever Adelasia died, Logudoro would be subjected to a power struggle, and that he intended to anticipate this by providing a ruler before the throne could become empty.

This reasoning may also have spurred him to take extra care to ensure that the Church of Torres was manned by clergy loyal to Rome. Although Archbishop Stephen of Torres, Innocent’s papal legate, may have been gone by 1253, in 1253 itself Innocent IV instructed the prior of S. James in Genoese Bonifacio, Corsica, to “provide a prebend in the church of Bisarcio ... to Ugo, a cleric of the Church of S. Julita of the diocese of Genoa ... and make him a canon or brother [of the other canons there].” Then, in 1254, the last year of his pontificate, Innocent IV made a Genoese Benedictine monk, Guglielmo Guaratti, the bishop of Ampurias in Torres “by merit of his worthiness as well as for the sincere devotion which his brother, our dear son Johannes Guaratti, citizen of Genoa, is known to have

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227 non appo herede perunu, in the words attributed to her in the *Libellus Judicum Turritanorum*, p. 54.


Thus far, the fact that this new bishop was Genoese has escaped comment, as has the fact that the new bishop of Ampurias bore the same surname as Ansaldo Guaratti, the “legate of the commune of Genoa” who was ambassador to Judex Comita in 1216, when Comita reconfirmed his anti-Pisan treaty with Genoa. A connection between an individual’s or family’s long-term interest in Sardinia, and a nomination to a Sardinian diocese, was suggested earlier with regard to Bishop Bandino of Sulcis, in the archdiocese of Cagliari, in 1221. Bishop Guaratti of Ampurias provides the first concrete evidence of such links between a family’s diplomatic connections to Sardinia and receiving an episcopate, as a reward for faithful service: in Bandino’s case to the Visconti, in Guaratti’s case to the pope. Thus, Bishop Guaratti can be seen as a symptom of several different phenomena: Genoa’s persistent desire to colonize Logudoro; the Guaratti family’s consistent service to this cause, and their ability to benefit from it; the pope’s intention of staffing a loyal workforce among the clergy of Logudoro, ready to represent Rome through the difficult years to come after Adelasia’s death.

Despite Innocent IV’s efforts to maintain faithful clergy in Logudoro and provide effective government for it, Adelasia’s death in 1259 marked the end of the judicate, as well as its loss to the Holy See. Her Hohenstaufen husband Enzo was still alive, but he was also in prison and would remain there until his death; his theoretical right to the Logudorese throne stood no chance of being validated. With pro-papal and Genoese prelates in its Church and the great Sardo-Genoese families of Logudoro ready to assert themselves, the judicate broke into feuding Doria, Malaspina and Spinola lordships. In Logudoro, therefore, the thirteenth century followed a trajectory towards dissolution similar to what was seen in Cagliari, but with the important difference that it was not conquered by Pisa, but instead voluntarily drew close to the papacy and Genoa. Its clergy reflected the political conflicts that shook the judicate in the 1230s and 1240s. Certainly not all of its prelates were Guelf; it would be surprising if they were, considering the long history of Pisan settlement in Logudoro. Indeed, Archbishop Stephen’s instructions to bring back order and impose papal authority on the Church of Torres are a witness to the political divisions within it, as are the possibly pro-Pisan bishops during the legatine/primatial visitation of Archbishop Vitale of Pisa. Still, as in Cagliari, Pisa’s lack of ecclesiastical authority was impossible to recover by secular means, while even its military and political weight were not a substitute for the

232 _dilecti fratis Guillelmi Guaratti Ordinis Sancti Benedicti et ipsius probitatis merita necnon et sincera devotio quam dilectus filius Johannes Guaractus civis Januensis germanus eius ad nos et romanam ecclesiam habere dinoscit_. CDR, p. 120-121, doc. 102; see also CDR, p. 126, doc. 208. Innocent does not specify which diocese Guaratti is to be given, but from the second document cited here it is clear that Guaratti was assigned to Ampurias.

233 _Ansaldo Guaraco legato comunis Ianue_. CDS, pp. 326-328, doc. 30.

234 Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” p. 138-139. The Malaspina family, however, cannot be aligned principally with either Genoa or Pisa.
legation. In Logudoro, this meant that Pisa definitively lost any hope of dominating the judicate as it had dominated Cagliari and Gallura.

4.5 The Archdiocese of Oristano (Arborea): 1200 – 1260s

4.5.1 The Papacy’s Two-Pronged Response to a Pisa-Friendly Aborea: Judex Mariano II of Logudoro and the Archbishop of Oristano

Thus far, the case of Cagliari has shown that Pisa was able to dominate a judicate politically and militarily if the judicial dynasty was Pisan, by taking full advantage of the rights it had over its citizens; it has also shown that many of the clergy of Cagliari were nevertheless gradually drawn out of Pisa’s control. In the case of Logudoro, Pisa lacked a legal pretext to invade, had insufficient ties with the judicate’s royal family to control it, and by 1227 had lost its formal ecclesiastical influence in Sardinia. Its diplomatic and military strength by themselves were unable to regain its former power, and so Logudoro voluntarily passed into the Genoese and papal sphere. Pisa’s efforts to reclaim both the legation and primacy in Sardinia in 1234 suggest that this failure was in some large part due to the fact that the clergy of Logudoro were being both nominated and dominated by the pope. Despite these differences, both Cagliari and Logudoro dissolved in the 1250s. The history of Arborea will now show how a judicate could straddle the two extremes of political domination by Pisa and ecclesiastical domination by the pope. Although Pisa did enjoy political favor at the Arborean court in the thirteenth century, the Arborean judices were Sardo-Catalan, not Sardo-Pisan, and Pisa had no legal authority over them. In addition, the judices managed to balance a political recognition of papal lordship, and the pressures of their pro-papal prelacy, with their own openness to Pisa. It will be argued that this ability to balance Pisa and Rome may have partly been due to Arborea’s lack of large, powerful noble families of Tuscan or Ligurian origin. The result was that Arborea is the only judicate to have remained independent and intact into the fourteenth century.

Arborea’s survival as a political unit seems at first rather surprising, given Guglielmo of Massa’s complete conquest of Arborea in 1196-1198. It is true that Guglielmo of Massa had “violently taken the judicate of Arborea, occupying it and holding it, and held the [previous judex] Pietro in prison until, as it
is said, he went the way of all flesh.”

Already by 1199, however, a Costantino Spanu, the son of the judex of Gallura and related to the Arborean dynasty by marriage, was *de facto* ruler, no doubt by agreement with Guglielmo of Massa. By 1205, Guglielmo of Massa had worked out a compromise with another claimant to the Arborean throne, Ugo de Bas, a descendant of Judex Barisone II’s Catalan wife by her first marriage, whereby “Lord Ugo de Bas, judex of Arborea ... had half of the realm and the other half belonged to Lord Guglielmo, marquis [and] judex of Cagliari.” Guglielmo of Massa then cemented this arrangement by “giv[ing] [his] daughter to [Ugo] as a wife and as dowry bestow[ing] half of the judicate of Arborea upon him, but reserving all the fortifications for [him]self.” With this arrangement a new dynasty took hold of Arborea, that of the Catalan de Bas family, which would remain in power until the beginning of the fifteenth century. Ugo himself, though, was only able to enjoy power until he died in 1211. He left behind a young son, Pietro II, whose name suggests his father’s anxiety to emphasize a continuation with the previous dynasty.

Fortunately for the young Pietro II, events did not follow the pattern they would later take under Logudoro’s under-age judex, Barisone III, and he enjoyed a long life and reign. Early on, he took up a pro-Pisan attitude; indeed, it has already been noted that Judex Mariano II of Logudoro saw him as a Pisan sympathizer, and that the archbishop of Oristano, Bernardo, supported a Visconti occupation of Arborea in 1220. Also in 1220 Judex Pietro II gained a Visconti wife, the daughter of Ubaldo I Visconti, Benedetta of Cagliari’s nemesis. By 1224, however, Pietro II had lost both his pro-Pisan archbishop and his sovereignty. As will be shown, the two facts are almost surely linked, and both are almost certainly connected to the pope.

In the early 1220s, Honorius III was losing his grip on Cagliari, and Gallura had been out of papal hands since Lamberto Visconti married the princess Elena in 1206. The prospect of Arborea, too, joining the Visconti must have been extremely alarming. The following analysis will argue that, in answer to this

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236 Colombini, *Dai Cassinesi ai Cistercensi*, pp. 105-107, 115.

237 *donnu Hugo de Bassu iudice d’Arboree, c’aviat tandu su mesu dessu logu et ipsu ateru mesu fuit de donnu Guigelmu marcheshu, iudice de Plominus*. CSMB, pp. 148-151, doc. 99. A discussion of what co-rule may have involved can be found in CSMB, p. 278, n. 24.


239 Pietro I was Ugo de Bas’ predecessor, who was ousted by Guglielmo of Massa. He was the son of the unfortunate Judex Barisone, “rex Sardiniae,” who reigned from 1146-1186, and the father of the Barisone who married Benedetta of Cagliari in 1214.
threat, Honorius did not rely solely on ecclesiastical authority and archiepiscopal or episcopal nominations to prevent Arborea from becoming Pisa’s third conquest in Sardinia. Although the question has not been treated by scholars before, upon examination it seems likely that, in response to Pietro II’s pro-Pisan stance, Honorius orchestrated a two-pronged attack on Visconti influence in Arborea, bringing secular and ecclesiastical players together to create an anti-Visconti team that could control Arborea. In order to understand the relation between the pope’s secular and ecclesiastical approach, a brief analysis of the events of the 1220s will be necessary.

Honorius’ ecclesiastical agent was Archbishop Torgotorio de Muru of Oristano, who will be discussed shortly. For his secular agent, he seems to have chosen Judex Mariano II of Logudoro, the only Sardinian ruler who was both ethnically non-Pisan and politically anti-Pisan, and a man who had long had his sights set on conquering Arborean territory. It has already been noted that Mariano, together with his father Judex Comita, had signed a pact with Genoa in 1216; apart from trade agreements, this treaty had agreed that “if we are able to conquer and hold the part of Arborea which belonged to Ugo de Bas, [...] and if we conquer it thanks to Genoese soldiers who must pass through all of Sardinia, or cross any judicate of Sardinia, we will give half of all the acquired land to the commune.”

Three years after this pact, in 1219, Mariano did go to war with Pisa as part of his alliance with Benedetta of Cagliari, and with the blessing of Honorius III. No record survives to indicate where the fighting took place, but when Mariano, unvictorious, signed a peace treaty with Lamberto Visconti a year later, it was “enacted in Sardinia in the judicate of Arborea in the town called Noracalbo,” indicating that at least some of the action had taken place in Arborea. Certainly this would make sense, since Honorius’ excommunication of Archbishop Bernardo of Oristano shows that the Visconti had been occupying Arborea since some time before 1220. Mariano’s peace treaty with Lamberto Visconti violated the terms of his alliance with Genoa, and thus it may be assumed that his Genoese alliance was considered to be at an end.

Then, in 1224, something made Judex Mariano II renew his Genoese alliance. The treaty of 1224 is almost identical to that of 1216, but there are two important differences. Whereas the treaty of 1216 had spoken of “Comita, by the grace of God judex of Torres, and Mariano,” in 1224 Mariano was styling himself “Mariano, by the grace of God judex of Torres and Arborea.” Also, whereas the 1216 alliance

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240  si partem Arboree que fuit Ugonis de basso conquirere et habere poterimus ... et si pro militibus qui de Ianua ad nostrum servictium transfretabant totam Sardeam vel aliquud iudicatum Sardineae conquisierimus dabimus ... eidem comuni medietatem totius terre acquisite. CDS, pp. 326-329, doc. 30.


242  Nos Comita Dei gratia Judex turritanus et Maringnanus: CDS, p. 326-328, doc. 21; Nos Marianus Dei gratia iudex turritanus et Arborensis: CDS, pp. 337-338, doc. 44.
had only considered a conquest of Arborea, in 1224 Mariano was discussing the prospect of conquering “all of Sardinia, or any judicate of Sardinia.”\(^{243}\) The latter detail may reflect the political reality of Pisa’s near-total control in Sardinia at the time: Pisa held Gallura, Cagliari and Arborea, so to wage war against any judicate would mean waging war on all of them. Similarly, the defeat of any one judicate would mean the defeat of Pisa, and thus, possibly, the conquest of all the judicates. As for Mariano’s claim to be the judex of both Logudoro and Arborea, this seems to materialize out of nowhere. The idea of Logudoro and Arborea sharing a single ruler does appear in a legendary account of an early judex of Logudoro, but this account has been dated to the late thirteenth century.\(^{244}\) Certainly it does not seem to be a title that Mariano’s ancestors claimed or enjoyed. Yet in some way he made it a reality shortly thereafter and, probably within the year, was ruling Arborea jointly with the Judex of Arborea, Pietro II.

Although the Logudoro-Genoa treaty of 1224 says nothing about which events in 1223 or 1224 prompted it to be made, these may be hypothesized. 1223 is the year in which the pro-Visconti Archbishop Bernardo of Oristano died, to be replaced by Torgotorio de Muru, formerly bishop of Terralba in Arborea and an archbishop who, unlike his predecessor, proved steadfastly loyal to the pope.\(^{245}\) A year later, in 1224, the Visconti brothers departed from southern Sardinia and left it relatively unprotected. Finally, in 1224 Benedetta of Cagliari swore a more complete allegiance to Honorius III, perhaps giving him greater confidence to take action in the area of Cagliari-Arborea. Thus, in the space of two years Mariano II of Logudoro took on the title of “iudex Arboresis” and somehow acquired effective joint rule in Arborea, and Arborea also lost its pro-Pisan archbishop and gained a pro-papal archbishop instead. It seems probable that with the departure of the Visconti, and with the accession of a loyal archbishop to the archdiocesan see of Oristano, the pope scented an opportunity to take Arborea in hand, and that Judex Mariano II of Logudoro was his means to do so. Such a reading of the situation is supported by

\(^{243}\) _totam Sardinam, vel aliquod iudicatum Sardinee consquierimus_. CDS, pp. 337-338, doc. 44. There is a piquant irony here: whereas a century earlier Costantino I of Arborea had promised to give Genoa half of Logudoro if he could conquer it, now Comita and Mariano of Logudoro were promising the same thing regarding Arborea. Furthermore, just as Genoa had played on Barisone II of Arborea’s dreams of a Sardinia united under his sole kingship, the commune seems now to have been trying to do the same with Mariano II of Logudoro.

\(^{244}\) The _Condaghe di San Gavino_ claims that, in the past, “the nobles of Logudoro elected, according to the wishes of the Court of Rome, a good man named Lord Comita ... and similarly the Arboreans chose him as judex. And from that day forward he was called Judex Comita of both realms.” Meloni, _Il Condaghe di San Gavino_, p. 5, ll. 7-14. The argument made in the edition of the _Condaghe_ that this version of the legend dates from the turn of the fourteenth century makes sense. Yet the only documented time that the judices of Logudoro actually sought to press claims to lordship over Arborea was in the 1220s and 1230s. Thus, it seems more than possible that this element of the tradition, at least, dates from precisely this period, and that it was part of judical or ecclesiastical propaganda in support of Judex Mariano’s ambitions to rule Arborea.

\(^{245}\) Corrado Zedda corrects the date of Torgotorio’s election to 1223 instead of 1224, the date usually accepted. Zedda, “La Sardegna Giudicale e la Sede Apostolica nel Medioevo,” p. 360, n. 4.
comparing Arborea with thirteenth-century Poland, which, like Sardinia, was a fief of the Holy See. Innocent III decided to change the rules of ducal succession in Poland, returning them to Poland’s former “seniority” principle. This, in effect, led the ruling Duke Leszek of Cracow to be deposed and replaced by another duke; when this second duke was succeeded by an anti-Rome heir, the original Duke Leszek was replaced with Church support in return for his support of ecclesiastical reforms.246 It seems probable that a similar manipulation of succession politics was taking place in Arborea. Furthermore, a later letter of Gregory IX shows that Judex Pietro of Arborea was excommunicated around this time because he had “assisted [...] Ubaldo [I Visconti, podestà of Pisa], his father-in-law, in the invasion of the province of Cagliari;” this excommunication may have provided Rome with its pretext for granting joint rule to the judex of Logudoro.247

This general hypothesis is also supported by the fact that Honorius III is the only figure likely to have granted Mariano II the right to assume the title of “iudex Arborensis” in 1224. For one thing, he was Mariano II’s feudal lord; for another, there is no evidence that Mariano had connections to anyone else with the authority to give him such a right. Honorius’ granting this title, in turn, can only signify that he saw Judex Pietro II of Arborea as a determined enemy who was unlikely to be won over to Rome’s cause, and wished to encourage Mariano II to invade Arborea and prevent Judex Pietro II from collaborating further with Pisa.248 Interestingly, as will be seen below, in 1237 Gregory IX would finally agree to recognize Pietro II as sole ruler of Arborea,249 strong evidence that prior to 1237 the papacy had recognized some other claim to the throne as well as Pietro’s, and further support for the idea that the Holy See had granted the title to Mariano II in the first place. In sum, it may legitimately be supposed that Honorius III supported or even prompted Mariano II to invade Arborea in 1224, in return for Mariano’s promise to exert a pro-papal and anti-Visconti influence in Arborea, alongside Arborea’s new pro-papal Archbishop, Torgotorio de Muru. This might, in fact, explain why the pan-Sardinian reforming Synod of S. Justa was held in precisely 1226, after Judex Mariano II had taken part control of Arborea, and it is surely no accident that this synod was held in Arborea itself, where Judex Mariano II was probably to be

246 Berend, et al., Central Europe in the High Middle Ages, pp. 390-391.
247 adstiterat quondam Ubaldo, socero suo, in invasione Calaritanæ provinciæ; these are the words of Gregory IX, as he reminds Pietro of the cause of his excommunication and invokes him to seek absolution. Les Registres de Gregoire IX, Vol. 2, doc. 3422. Presumably, Gregory IX is referring to the Visconti reprisal to Benedetta of Cagliari’s 1224 oath of fealty to Rome. See also Mauro Sanna, “Introduzione” in Enrico Costa, Adelasia di Torres, p. 25.
248 This would also be consistent with his having encouraged Mariano to go to war with Pisa in 1218. See Sanna, Onorio III e la Sardegna, pp. 80-81, doc. 45, cited above at n. 166.
249 Petrucci, Re in Sardegna a Pisa cittadini, p. 50; see also below, at n. 258.
found. Thus, just as in Poland, Judex Mariano’s political affiliation with Rome did not only help the pope’s political control in Sardinia, but also favored the implementation of ecclesiastical reforms.

How much power Pietro II had in the years of Mariano II’s co-rule may be questioned. To judge from a donation he made to a Benedictine monastery in Oristano in January 1228, he remained active, but a document from a monastic register for the same year dates itself thus: “in the year of our lord 1228 [...] when Judex Mariano was reigning;” Judex Pietro is not mentioned, as if he were irrelevant. This is strikingly different from the way the earlier co-rule of Guglielmo of Massa and Ugo de Bas was expressed by the same monastic register: in 1205, recorded the register, “Lord Ugo de Bas, judex of Arborea ... had half of the realm and the other half belonged to the Lord Marquis Guglielmo, judex of Cagliari.” Furthermore, although Maurizio Virdis maintains that Pietro II had achieved independence by 1229, an Arborean document from 1229 has among its witnesses “Judex Mariano and Lord Torgotorio, archbishop of Arborea.” Mariano and pro-papal Archbishop Torgotorio de Muru are publicly working together, and there is still no mention of Judex Pietro.

Indeed, it may be questioned whether Pietro achieved sole rule at all before Mariano II of Logudoro died in 1232. After all, the Holy See did not recognize him as sole ruler until 1237, and it is difficult to imagine that, considering the consistent interest expressed by both Mariano II and Mariano’s father in conquering Arborea, Mariano II would have simply given up his power there unless he were under severe papal pressure to do so. Even Mariano II’s son, the unfortunate Barisone III, called himself “by the grace of God judex of Torres and Arborea,” although considering his weakness even in Logudoro, it can be assumed that for him this was mere theory. In sum, the lack of reference to Judex Pietro II in the years while Mariano was sharing power indicates that the Arboreans must have had the impression that Mariano was the sole ruler. Thus, he presumably must have been the stronger part of the judicial partnership in Arborea; if so, his pro-Genoa, pro-Rome, and anti-Pisa stance must have severely limited Judex Pietro from leading Arborea further into Pisa’s power. Indeed, despite Pisa’s early success in Arborea, the judicate never fell completely into Pisan hands. By coupling a loyal co-judex with a loyal

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250 *anno Domini MCCXXVIII ... regnante iudice Mariano*. CSMB, pp. 88-89, doc. 23.
251 *donnu Hugo de Bassu iudice d’Arboree, c’aviat tandu su mesu dessu logu et ipsu ateru mesu fuit de donnu Guigelmu marchesa, iudice de Plominus*. CSMB, pp. 148-151, doc. 99. See above, at n. 237.
252 CSMB, p. 280, n. 29; *iudice Mariano et donnu Trogodore arkipiscobu d’Arbarea*. Also CSMB, pp. 90-91, doc. 24.
253 *Barexonus Dei gratia Judex Turritanus et Arborensis*, in the only surviving document issued during his brief reign. CDS, pp. 343-345, doc. 52.
and active archbishop of Oristano, therefore, Honorius III’s strategy of promoting a secular invasion in order to contain a political threat seems to have worked well.

4.5.2 Archbishop Torgotorio as Papal Representative in Arborea

This strategy, nevertheless, was subject to all the inherent weaknesses of hereditary secular dynasties. When Judex Mariano II of Logudoro died, his ten-year-old heir was the product of biology, not papal choice. Indeed, Mariano’s son Barisone III had a weak and problematic minority government at home, and was eminently unsuitable to become a papal agent in Arborea as his father had been. The fact that Barisone III’s succession, by its very nature, destroyed the effectiveness of Honorius III’s joint secular-ecclesiastical solution to Arborea, highlights the peculiar value of clerical positions for any effort to gain real political control over a territory. This point was made in the introduction to this chapter, and can be seen clearly here. Arborea’s judicial dynasty had changed from the Sardinian de Lacon to the Catalan de Bas; its territory had been invaded by the Visconti and by Mariano II of Logudoro; its own ruler had inherited when he was very young. The archbishopric of Oristano, in contrast, faced none of these problems. It might have been held by a pro-Visconti archbishop prior to 1224, but upon his demise that archbishop could be replaced by a pro-papal archbishop, Torgotorio de Muru, without shedding a drop of blood or causing a crisis in governance. Where Barisone III of Logudoro was incapable of carrying on his father’s role in Arborea, the archbishopric of Oristano represented a political constant as long as elections and confirmations were under papal control. Thus, faced with the continuing Visconti strength in Cagliari and Gallura, and with Visconti encroachment in Arborea, Honorius III focused on Arborea’s prelates just as he was doing elsewhere on the island.

The successor to the pro-Visconti Archbishop Bernardo was, then, Torgotorio de Muru (1224-1244), whose typically Sardinian first and last name may, in Arborea at least, indicate someone who was indigenous; certainly he did not support Pisa. Honorius III’s trust in him can be seen in the fact that, almost as soon as he was consecrated, the pope granted him the authority to “grant the benefit of absolution” to “many of your diocese [who], on account of laying violent hands on clerics and other religious persons” had “fallen into excommunication,” but who for practical reasons could not journey to

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254 It will be argued later that Arborea experienced less Italianization of its nobility and of its naming patterns than Cagliari and Logudoro: thus, in thirteenth century Arborea, Sardinian names are likely to belong to ethnically Sardinian individuals.
Rome to seek absolution from the pope.\textsuperscript{255} Apart from the pope himself, the right to grant absolution from excommunication automatically belonged only to \textit{legati a latere}, the cardinal proxies of the pope. Any other ecclesiastic had to be specially granted the power by the pope.\textsuperscript{256} It was an honor for Torgotorio, therefore. Additionally, the fact that it was granted as soon as he was consecrated, and the suggestion that he needed to clean up the spiritual state of his diocese that his predecessor, the pro-Pisan Archbishop Bernardo, had left behind, gives the impression that Bernardo had not enjoyed the same privilege.

It also is an indication that in the years before Torgotorio’s consecration, there had been strong differences in politics between clergy and laity. Just prior to Torgotorio’s episcopate, of course, Arborea had undergone at least one invasion by the Visconti in which Archbishop Bernardo of Oristano had been complicit, and at least two invasions by Judex Mariano of Logudoro. Thus, the widespread violence between laymen and clerics during Bernardo’s episcopate was probably connected to these clashes between Pisa, pope, and Genoa, and may be evidence that some of Arborea’s clergy supported one side, while many of the laity supported another. Unfortunately, apart from Torgotorio de Muru himself, who had formerly been the bishop of Terralba, the names and origins of Bernardo’s suffragans are unknown. In the absence of documentation, the likely situation under Archbishop Bernardo can be surmised by considering the behavior of German colonizing prelates in Eastern Europe. As has been shown previously, they were prone to promoting German or German-origin prelates, while passing over the native Slavic candidates. Archbishop Bernardo of Oristano was also an archbishop representing a colonizing power, and it may well be that he behaved like the German prelates: if so, the church in Arborea would have had a number of Pisans in it in the first two decades of the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{257} These hypothetical Pisan clerics would certainly help explain why clerics had been so involved in the fighting accompanying the Visconti invasion of Arborea. At the same time, in 1224 the canons of Oristano had elected pro-Rome Torgotorio, and not a Pisan bishop, to be their new archbishop. The canons of the cathedral in Oristano, therefore, presumably disagreed with Archbishop Bernardo’s siding with the Visconti, and wished to see the Church of Arborea take a new direction. In sum, Torgotorio de

\textsuperscript{255} \textit{nonnulli tue diocesis pro iniectione manuum violenta in clericos et alias religiosas personas ... in excommunicatione decedant ... tihi presentium indulgemus ... ei ... beneficium absolutionis impendas.} Sanna, \textit{Onorio III e la Sardegna}, pp. 162-163, doc. 128.


Muru represented an ethnic and political change of direction for the Church of Arborea, and his leadership would have dramatic consequences for the survival of the judicate.

### 4.5.3 Judex Pietro II’s Oath of Fealty to the Holy See

Although elected under Honorius III, it is during the papacy of Gregory IX that Torgotorio proved his worth and importance to Rome in frustrating Pisa’s plans to colonize Arborea as it had colonized Cagliari and Gallura. Gregory IX may perhaps be seen as a pope who, more than Honorius III, managed to use the local clergy in Sardinia as a ground force, and his effective use of Torgotorio can be seen in the many commissions he gave him. By far the most important event in which Torgotorio took part was Judex Pietro II’s oath of fealty to the pope in 1237. This oath marked the point at which Arborea left behind the danger of being subsumed by Pisa, and set out on a split course of good relations with the pope and pro-Pisan politics, which would allow the judicate to survive the thirteenth century intact.

From the pope’s point of view, Pietro II’s oath was a triumph. It took place just days after Adelasia of Logudoro swore fealty to Gregory IX, and in a period in which Adelasia’s husband, Ubaldo II of Gallura, was hinting that he might be brought to do the same thing. Thus, although Cagliari in 1237 may have seemed more or less lost to Rome, and firmly in the hands of the Pisan commune and the Sardo-Pisan nobility, the papacy at this point had good prospects of subsuming the other three judicates into its direct patrimony. From Pietro II’s point of view, choosing the papal yoke instead of fealty to Pisa or Genoa brought important political benefits. Although Pietro II had functioned as sole ruler since at least 1232, when Judex Mariano of Logudoro had died, there was still the possibility that the judices of Logudoro could claim a right to rule in Arborea. In return for Pietro’s recognition of the pope as feudal lord, Gregory IX “invest[ed] you and your wife with the whole land of the judicate of Arborea,” a recognition of sole rule that had eluded the judices of Arborea from before 1205, when Guglielmo of Massa had first divided the judicate.258 Although, naturally, no records discuss Pietro’s private thoughts regarding his fealty to Rome, the idea that he would agree to trade fealty for papal validation of his rule is supported by similar patterns elsewhere in Europe. King Zvonomir of Croatia, for example, sought to bolster his weak claim to the throne by swearing “an unbreakable feudal oath” to Pope Gregory VII.259 Likewise, similar reasoning must surely have encouraged both Benedetta of Cagliari and Adelasia of Logudoro to swear

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258 *te ae uxorem tuam cum tota terra iudicatus Arboreae concedimus.* CDS, pp. 356-357, doc. 75; Petrucci, *Re in Sardegna, a Pisa cittadini,* p. 50.

259 Sedlar, *East Central Europe in the Middle Ages,* p. 163.
their own allegiances, since both of them were in a difficult position as women rulers surrounded by powerful enemies, and papal support should have strengthened their right to rule in the eyes of their subjects and neighboring powers.

Furthermore, just five months after Pietro II had become a vassal of St. Peter, Gregory IX charged Archbishop Torgotorio to begin reclaiming lands for the judicate that been “illicitly alienated and conceded to certain laymen living outside Arborea” by Judex Pietro II’s predecessor, “Judex Barisone, and by certain others who succeeded him.” Gregory IX, through his legate Alexander, also arranged the treaty of 1237 which established that “if any of the wealth of the judicate of Arborea is found either stolen or seized in the judicate of Logudoro, the judex of Logudoro will be held to return it.” Gaining papal sanction and papal aid in recovering this lost demesne land would have strengthened Pietro’s treasury and his ability to defend his realm. Another advantage was that, by the nature of the Holy See, no continuity of family, “ethnicity” or politics would bind its vassals to any permanent political positions on the part of the popes. Fealty to Pisa, for example, meant an enduring relationship with the Visconti, the Massa, the Gherardesca, and the Donoratico, and a virtual invitation to these families to take personal control in Sardinia. Finally, papal lordship would not result in fleets of traders arriving, demanding trading privileges and sapping the judices of important sources of income. Nor would powerful noble families arrive from Rome to establish themselves in Arborean territory and threaten judicial power, as had happened with Pisan and Genoese families in Cagliari, Logudoro and Gallura. In other words, fealty to Pisa or Genoa was an invitation to colonize; fealty to Rome was just that: fealty. Thus, there were good reasons for even Pietro II, a judex who had been friendly to Pisa, to choose fealty to the papacy over fealty to Genoa or Pisa.

At the same time, a peculiarity of Pietro II’s oath shows a uniquely tight relationship between the judex and nobility of Arborea, a relationship that existed neither in Cagliari nor in Logudoro, and that may be extremely important for understanding the relationship between the Church in Sardinia, the Sardinian judices, and foreign powers that wished to dominate or colonize Sardinia. As seen above, when Benedetta of Cagliari swore fealty to the pope in 1224, she promised to make all freemen who held a fief from her swear fealty to the Church, too. This phrase was her undoing, because it was neither sworn by, nor

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261 si qua furtiva vel ablata de bonis judicatus Arboreae in judicatu Turritano inventa fuerint ... ipse judex Turritanus reddere... teneatur. Fabre, Le Liber censuum de l’Église romaine, p. 582. This was the response to the identical promise made by Judicessa Adelasia of Logudoro: see above, at n. 208.

262 See exact quote above, at n. 109.
supported by, the same freemen, who were furious and rose up against her in alliance with Pisa. In contrast, when Adelasia made her oath on March 29, 1237, just days before Pietro II, she neither promised her subjects’ obedience, nor had their support as witnesses. Indeed, her lay witnesses seem to have been limited to the unidentified “noblemen: Lord Monacho, Lord Bartolomeo Visconti of the Pisans, Lord Albizo, Lord Truffa,” and “many Pisan soldiers,” presumably mercenaries. The great Logudorese names of Doria, Spinola, Malaspina, de Zori, de Lacon, and de Athen do not appear. It can readily be imagined that in a judicate like Logudoro, with its powerful Pisan and Genoese minorities and with a regicidal rebellion in its recent history, Adelasia did not even consider trying to win the widespread support of her maiores for her vow of fealty to Rome, nor did Gregory IX ask the impossible of her.

Pietro II, unlike his contemporary Adelasia of Logudoro, but like Benedetta of Cagliari, “promised to make all of these things be observed by his subjects.” Yet unlike either Benedetta or Adelasia, Pietro II’s oath was supported by an identical oath taken by his nobles. The wording is as follows: “On the same day, and in the same place, Lord Lorenzo de Zori, Lord Guantino, Lord Pietro de Martino, Lord Arzocco de Martis, nobles, swore and promised that they will give counsel, help and favor to Judex Pietro so that he may do and observe all orders and precepts of the Lord Pope […] and if the said Judex does not do this, the same nobles promised that they will do everything of whatever nature that the Lord Pope has ordered them to do.” These nobles, therefore, were included in the ceremony, witnessed their judex’s vow of fealty to Rome and were in turn witnessed by him as they made the same vow. In this way, a community was formed around and through the vow of fealty to the pope, each member having publicly committed himself to upholding the judicate’s new political orientation.

Furthermore, “on the following day in the same way, these nobles: Chancellor Pietro de Ficu, Comita de Zori, Parasone Pinna, Guantinus de Martis, Comita Spanu, Furatus Zurrumpa, Barasone Pistoris,” swore the same things: that they would give “counsel, help and favor to the same Judex Pietro of Arborea in his

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264 in omnibus et per omnia ... promisit observare et facere a suis subditis observari. CDS, p. 355, doc. 71.

265 Eodem die, et eodem loco dominus Laurentius de Zurri, dominus Guantinus, dominus Petrus de Martino, dominus Arzoccus de Martis, nobiles, iuraverunt et promiserunt, quod dabunt Judici Petro consiliium, auxilium et favorem ad facienda, et servanda omnia mandata et praecepta domini Papae [...] et si dictus iudex ea non fecerit, ipsi omnia facere promiserunt quaecumque eius dominus Papa iniuexerit facienda. CDS I, p. 355, doc. 71. Apart from the great de Lacon family, the de Martis family had provided at least one bishop to Arborea and one to Torres in the twelfth century, as Chapter Three shows at n. 195.
doing and observing all mandates of the Lord Pope." This significant addition to Pietro’s vow is joined by a remarkably long list of ecclesiastical witnesses, much longer and from a much wider geographical area than the witnesses of Adelasia just days before. The clerical witnesses to Adelasia and Ubaldo Visconti’s vows seem to have been limited to two Logudorese bishops (Bisarcio and Ampurias), the abbot of SS. Trinità of Saccargia, a monk from Saccargia, and the prior of Bisarcio, all of whom held positions in Logudoro. Pietro’s vow, in contrast, was witnessed by nine bishops from across Sardinia. From Cagliari there were the archbishop of Cagliari and the bishop of Suelli; from Arborea there were Archbishop Torgotorio de Muru of Oristano, the bishop of Terralba and the bishop of Usellus; and from Logudoro there were the bishops of Bisarcio, Castra, Ottana, and Ploaghe; there was also the prior of the monastery of S. Maria di Bonarcado in Arborea.

There are two possible explanations for these anomalies, which are not mutually exclusive. One, suggested as long ago as 1851, is that Gregory IX did not trust Pietro II to hold to his vows. It is not unlikely; after all, Pietro II had given repeated demonstrations of sympathy with Visconti Pisa, and since Gregory IX no longer had a Judex Mariano II of Logudoro to be Pietro II’s keeper, perhaps the pope wanted to involve as large a community of witnesses and co-swearers as possible, both from the prelacy and from the lay nobility, in order to act as watchdogs. Indeed, this seems the most likely explanation for the great number and wide geographical origin of the bishops present: they were representing the pro-papal forces in Sardinia who would be committed to holding Pietro to his word. If so, they provide a snapshot of the pope’s strongest representatives in Sardinia; it is not surprising that Cagliari could send just two pro-Roman bishops, whereas anti-Pisan Logudoro could send four.

The other explanation concerns Pietro’s lay witnesses. It is that the Arborean aristocracy was remarkably unified in support of its judex’s turn to Rome, far more so than the mixed indigenous and Sardo-Pisan nobility of Cagliari, or the mixed indigenous, Sardo-Genoese and Sardo-Pisan nobility of Logudoro. Here, in fact, may be a clue as to why Arborea was able to survive as a unified judeicate into and

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266 Sequenti vero die simili modo iuraverunt nobiles, videlicet Petrus de Ficu Armentarius, Comita de Zurri, Parasone Pinna, Guantinus de Martis, Comita Spanu, Furatus Zurrumpa, Barasone Pistoris: quod dabunt eidem iudici Petro Arborensi consilium, auxilium et favorem ad facienda et servanda omnia mandata domini Papae. CDS, p. 355, doc. 71.

267 See CDS, pp. 347-349, docs. 57-60.

268 CDS, p. 352, doc. 67. This list includes two bishops from Cagliari, three from Arborea and four from Logudoro.


270 If so, it is remarkable that Cagliari’s only bishop is the bishop of Suelli: this is the same diocese that, as argued previously, seems to have held somewhat apart from Cagliari’s general Pisan orientation.
throughout the fourteenth century, while the other judicates would fall to the Pisans and Genoese in the 1250s. In his monograph on Benedictine monasticism in Sardinia, Gabriele Colombini suggests that Arborea’s endurance as a judicate can be explained by the fact that it had fewer monasteries in its territory, and therefore had alienated less income-producing land from the control of the judex. Yet loss of land and income seems to have been just as great a problem for the judices of Arborea as it was for Logudoro and Gallura; indeed, Gregory IX’s instructions to Archbishop Torgotorio to recover demesne land alienated by Judex Barisone show that Barisone, in seeking a way out of his financial and political troubles of the 1160s and 1170s, must have granted away a ruinous amount of land to foreigners. Furthermore, it has been shown that Gregory IX went to some effort to help both Logudoro and Gallura repair their treasuries and regain lost land. Thus, the survival of Arborea as a unified judicate cannot be convincingly explained by its economic health: its financial difficulties were similar to those of Logudoro and Gallura, and all three judicates received papal assistance in recovering their lost land.

Pietro II did, however, have something that neither Benedetta of Cagliari nor Adelasia of Logudoro had, and this was his nobility’s support for his vow of fealty to Rome. The wealthy and powerful noble families of Genoese or Pisan descent in Cagliari and Logudoro had loyalties to their native cities, which, as has been shown in the case of Logudoro, strongly colored their attitudes toward their judices. The names cited above as upholding Pietro II’s oath, however, show a very different sort of aristocracy in Arborea. Lorenzo is a mainland Italian name, possibly the expression of his family’s cultural link to Genoa and the city’s relics of S. Lorenzo, but Lorenzo’s surname is de Zori, one of the most important indigenous aristocratic families in Sardinia. Pietro de Martino, to judge by his surname, may have descended from one of the Catalan families that accompanied the Catalan wife of judex Barisone II in 1157, but since judex Pietro II was himself of the Catalan de Bas dynasty, there can have been no conflict of loyalty there. Zurrumpu and Pistori do not seem at first to be the most typical of Sardinian names, but Zurrumpu is probably an alternate spelling of de Arrubiu, which is indigenous, and Pistoris is most likely a variant of the indigenous Puzari. Furthermore, the first names of both of these men are traditionally

272 See *Les registres de Gregoire IX*, Vol. 2, doc. 3875; also CDR, p. 88, doc. 138. The fact that this land had not only gone to foreigners, but to foreigners who did not live in Arborea, suggests a graver situation than that of Logudoro, and argues further against Colombini’s thesis. Functioning monasteries and resident foreigners would have contributed in various ways to the local economy, but absentee landlords are a hallmark of exploitative colonialism: in Arborea, the income from these alienated lands is likely to have sent their income straight overseas to the landowners, rather than circulating in the Arborean economy.
273 CDS, p. 355, doc. 71.
274 In comparison, the widespread name of de Zori is often spelled also as de Tori and de Çori, showing an interchangeability between “d” and “z,” while the Doria also frequently spelled their name as de Oru.
Sardinian: the names Furatu and Barisone did not have corresponding forms in mainland Italy. Other than these ambiguous elements, every other name is emphatically Sardinian. Furthermore, the almost uniform use of indigenous first names by these men, with the exception of Lorenzo de Zori, indicates that the great families in Arborea continued to identify themselves culturally with Sardinia, rather than with foreign models. The names show a very different situation from the Italianized naming-practices seen in Logudoro and Cagliari by this time, and suggest a far lower level of cultural colonization in Arborea than in the rest of Sardinia.

All of these indigenously-named people, moreover, were chosen or accepted by the papal legate to witness Pietro II’s fealty to the Holy See, suggesting their owners’ immense importance in Arborea’s politics. This importance is also displayed by the fact that the majority of their names appear as witnesses in the three other lay-witnessed royal charters surviving from Pietro II’s reign. Lorenzo de Zori, Pietro de Martino, Costantino de Martis and Comita Spanu, for example, appear in all three. One of these documents, furthermore, dates from as early as 1228, meaning that the recurring appearance of these men took place over a period of at least ten years, clear evidence of their enduring importance. Out of eleven co-swearers of Pietro II’s 1237 vow, in fact, a full eight names appear as witnesses at least once in a document issued by Pietro II. In an act of 1230 seven of these appear as a group, and there they are given their titles. These titles show the seven men to have been Pietro II’s most important officials: they were his *curadores*, or regional governors; his chancellor; and the head of his cavalry. In sum, the administration of Arborea seems to have been controlled by Sard or Sardo-Catalan families throughout the 1230s: despite the colonies of Genoese or Pisans who lived in the judicate, Italian immigrants had not

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275 In other words, although foreign individuals may have married into the Arborean aristocracy, the families as a whole would seem to have maintained their Sardinian identity and, thus, their use of Sardinian first and family names. This should be compared with Bartlett’s findings on the usefulness, both to colonizers and colonized, of intermarriage between native and colonizing families. Bartlett says that such marriages were usually “between immigrant men and native women;” this, in a patrilineal society, would result in the offspring taking the foreign surname. The overwhelming dominance of Sardinian surnames in this group of men suggests either that any foreign marriages in their families had been contracted with foreign women, not men; or that offspring of any such intercultural marriages had continued to use the Sardinian naming system, which preserved both matriline and patriline surnames. See Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, p. 55.


277 Lorenzo de Zori, Pietro de Martino, Costantino de Martis, Arzocco de Martis, Furatu Zurrumpa, and Barisone Pistoris were *curadores*; Pietro de Fici was the chancellor and Comita Spanu was the head of cavalry. For the positions in judicial administration, see Petrucci, “Storia politica e istituzionale,” pp. 105-106. The Sardinian practice of using multiple surnames and nicknames as identifiers makes it possible that the number of witnesses in 1237 who were also witnesses to other documents is actually higher than eight: see Giannetta Murru-Corrisi, “The Patronymic and the Matronymic in Sardinia: A Long-Standing Competition,” *The History of the Family* 5:2 (2000), pp. 161-180.
achieved official political power. This should be compared to Logudoro, where descendents of the Genoese Doria held a hereditary position as curadore in Logudoro.278

All of this certainly is not to suggest that no foreign nobles had ever settled in Arborea; indeed, the regent for Pietro II’s son after 1241 would be a member of a Sardo-Pisan family that had enjoyed the lordship of Usellus in Arborea since probably the 1190s.279 It does show, however, that foreign Pisan and Genoese families in Arborea had not reached the heights of power and influence that the Genoese Spinola, Doria and Malaspina families enjoyed in Logudoro, or that the Pisan Gherardesca, Massa, and Visconti families had in Cagliari. Thus, even well into the thirteenth century Arborea’s lay and ecclesiastical nobility remained dominated by indigenous, or at most Sardo-Catalan, families; such families’ loyalties were only weakly tied to Pisan or Genoese interests.

This point, and its importance, can be seen more clearly if the findings from the analysis of Pietro II’s 1237 witness-list are placed in the context of Arborea’s history since the early twelfth century. Taken together, the evidence suggests a consistent trend in the nature and success of foreign colonization in Arborea, which made Pisan and Genoese colonization there far less effective and quite different from that of Logudoro and Cagliari. As Chapters Two and Three showed, Arborea in the twelfth century never became strongly Pisanized, either politically or demographically, because it was both economically and politically closer to Catalonia and Genoa. At the same time, because twelfth-century Genoa was economically and politically weaker than Pisa, and because it did not have the papal legation in Sardinia, Genoa was unable to exploit this closeness to Arborea and colonize the judicate as Pisa was doing in Logudoro and Cagliari. Chapter Three’s conclusion that the archbishops of Arborea were almost all indigenous may be seen as a consequence of precisely these historical developments. Indeed, as Chapter Three showed, even the suffragan dioceses of Arborea seem to have been dominated by Sardinian names in the twelfth century. This, again, stands in strong contrast to the provinces of Torres and, especially, Cagliari.

The relative scarcity of foreign prelates in Arborea’s bishoprics and archbishopric throughout the twelfth century must also be a sign that the indigenous nobility, which was providing these bishops and

278 See Libellus Judicum Turritanorum, p. 50.
archbishops, was continuing to dominate political life in Arborea. Indeed, what Turtas rightly argues to have been a unique closeness between the Arborean judices and the Arborean Church\textsuperscript{280} was, in reality, probably an effect of the fact that the Arborean Church continued to be dominated by indigenous noble prelates. In their ecclesiastical roles, their blood relations with powerful local families may have given them a sort of local and instantaneous political power that foreign prelates would not have had. A bishop from an Arborean noble family, for example, would probably be able to count on the immediate support of his family in conflicts with the judex, whereas a foreign bishop would have no such familial backing. This would have encouraged the more interdependent relationship between judex and Church in Arborea that Turtas has noticed.

Turtas has also pointed out that, in Arborea, priors and abbots do not appear as witnesses to judicial acts, in contrast to the other judicates.\textsuperscript{281} As Chapter Three has shown, Italian bishops in Logudoro encouraged foundations to Western monastic Orders, and were active in “Westernizing” the Sardinian Church. The promotion of foreign priors as important political players in Logudoro and Cagliari would be consistent with these Italian bishops’ “Europeanizing” and colonizing policies. If, however, the Arborean prelacy remained dominated by indigenous nobles who had far less incentive to encourage foreign monastic Orders, this could help explain why monasteries in general, and priors and abbots in particular, never attained the political importance in Arborea that they enjoyed in both Logudoro and Cagliari. Lacking many supportive Italian bishops, Italian priors and abbots in Arborea who wished to expand their political power would have had to face both a local nobility and a prelacy who were predominantly indigenous or Sardo-Catalan.\textsuperscript{282} The indigenous prelacy, in particular, may have preferred not to strengthen the foreign monastic Orders that were appropriating diocesan land and income elsewhere in Sardinia.

Finally, as described in Chapter Two, the nobles and prelacy of Arborea seem to have resented Arborea’s financial subjection to Genoa, and actively to have resisted Genoa’s attempts to impose its authority in the judicate. Although the pro-Pisan Archbishop Bernardo of Oristano was installed in Arborea under Judex Guglielmo of Massa’s reign, once he died the canons of Oristano’s cathedral seem independently to have elected a man faithful to Rome, Torgotorio de Muru. There is no evidence of these canons’ names, but if


\textsuperscript{281}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 241.

\textsuperscript{282} It is also possible that, if conflicts over land-ownership arose between monasteries and bishops in Arborea, and if the bishops were seen as part of the magnatorial class, the great aristocratic families would be more likely to support the bishops’ cause in the judical court. Such ecclesiastical conflicts could, after all, be subject to the secular justice system in Sardinia. In short, the continuing domination of indigenous nobility in Arborea would have resulted in entangling ecclesiastical issues with the lay aristocracy, more than in other judicates. This would only be strengthened by the Byzantine traditions still affecting Sardinian political life, as discussed in Chapter Three.
they represented Arborea’s indigenous or Sardo-Catalan nobility in 1224, they may have been expressing a wider sentiment held by the Arborean nobility that turning to Rome was the only way to escape falling into the clutches of Pisa or Genoa. If so, this would explain why Pietro II’s nobility and administration supported his vow of fealty to Rome. In sum, it is being argued that the Arborean nobility’s capacity to unite behind its judex’s vow of fealty to Rome, in contrast to the leading families of Cagliari and Logudoro, is the symptom of a far weaker Italian presence in Arborean politics. This, in turn, is due to Pisa’s failure to colonize Arborea in the twelfth century, Genoa’s inability to dominate Arborea’s Church in the twelfth century, the consequent lack of powerful Sardo-Pisan or Sardo-Genoese families in Arborea, and the overall predominance of indigenous or Sardo-Catalan names in Arborea’s bishoprics.

4.5.4 Epilogue: Arborea’s Successful Balance Between Pisan Judex, Genoese Clergy and Sardo-Catalan Nobility

With Judex Pietro II, Honorius III and Gregory IX had managed to neutralize a Pisan threat and prevent Arborea from becoming another Pisan colony in Sardinia, first by uniting a Logudorese invasion with a pro-Rome archbishop, and then by convincing Pietro II to swear fealty to Rome. After the death of Pietro II of Arborea in 1241 it might have seemed that this accomplishment was in vain, once again because of the normal weaknesses of dynastic inheritance. When Pietro II died his son, Mariano II, was a minor, and the regency was given to Guglielmo da Capraia, a Sardo-Pisan. Consistent with his Pisan lineage, Guglielmo da Capraia began a pro-Pisan policy that would seem destined to clash with Innocent IV’s (1243-1254) stance against Pisa. Before 1250, however, he had demonstrated enough “devotion and faithfulness” to convince even Innocent IV, the Genoese pope, to confirm Guglielmo’s “lordship” of “the land in Arborea that [he] confessed to hold from the Roman Church.”283 Furthermore, in Arborea it is even clearer how Innocent IV made use of his fellow Genoese citizens in Sardinian sees to counter the colonizing policies of Emperor Frederick II and Pisa. In 1244, just a year after being elected pope,

283 pro puritate tue devotionis et fidei apud nos [...] tuis supplicationibus [...] terram quam in Arborea ab ecclesia Romana obtinere dinoseris ... patrocinio committimus. CDR, pp. 113-114, doc. 185. It may be wondered whether the aristocratic community also played some role in bringing him to this alliance with Rome, since the greatest nobles had already had sworn to hold Pietro II to his vow of loyalty. Furthermore, Alberto Boscolo notes that the Capraia were enemies of the Visconti, which might help explain why the papacy seems not to have opposed the Capraia’s rise to power in Arborea. Alberto Boscolo, I conti di Capraia, Pisa e la Sardegna (Sassari: Edizioni Gallizzi, 1966), p. 26. Cardini, however, states that from 1241 to 1250 Guglielmo da Capraia ruled Arborea without papal blessing, but rather with Ghibelline support: only when the papacy began to triumph over the Holy Roman Emperor did Guglielmo da Capraia turn to the pope for recognition of his right to rule. See Franco Cardini, “Capraia, Guglielmo da”.

Innocent IV wrote to Archbishop Torgotorio de Muru of Oristano regarding the vacant see of Civita in Gallura, and suggesting a certain “Guido, priest, born Girard Rubei de Sigestro of the diocese of Genoa” as a candidate for the position. Ten years later, in 1254, Innocent IV nominated an anonymous Genoese prelate to the archbishopric of Arborea and also conferred a canonry in Oristano upon his cousin, Ottobuono de Fiesco Conti, who came from Lavania, a town that lay in Innocent’s family territory near Genoa. This was the same year that the pope nominated Genoese men to the diocese of Ampurias and a canonry of Bisarcio in Logudoro; it is also, significantly, the year in which Genoa’s ally, Judex Chiano of Cagliari, captured Castel di Castro. It could be seen, therefore, as a pan-Sardinian “Genoization” of the Sardinian Church in preparation for ejecting the Pisans from Cagliari, once and for all.

It is true that in 1255, after Innocent IV died, this Genoese clergy in Arborea was unable to prevent Arborea’s regent, still Guglielmo da Capraia, from sending “twenty-five indigenous soldiers, well-equipped and armed, to serve the city of Pisa.” Pisa was as Ghibelline as ever, and 1255 is when the new pope, Alexander IV, was organizing a crusade against Frederick II’s bastard son Manfred in Sicily, “as being an enemy to God, the church of Rome [...] an ally, abettor, and protector of the Saracens, and as unjustly occupying the kingdom of another.” Guglielmo da Capraia’s twenty-five Sardinian soldiers, therefore, were being sent to fight against the pope. In 1258, furthermore, Guglielmo da Capraia was commanding Pisan war-ships against Genoese forces near Syria, and was known as “the general representative of the Pisans living in Sardinia.” In return for his role in defeating the Genoese and the

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284 Guidone presbytero nato quondam Girardi Rubei de Sigestro Januensis dioecesis, CDR, p. 99, doc. 153. Of course, ever since 1138 Civita had officially belonged to the archdiocese of Pisa and should have been a matter for the archbishop of Pisa to attend to, but in reality the nomination of its bishops had taken only a few decades to revert in fact, if not in theory, to the popes: Luigi Mezzadri, Maurizio Tagliaferri, Elio Guerriero, eds., Le diocesi d’Italia (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 2007-2008), p. 835. An illustration of this is Bishop Magister of Gallura, discussed above, who was nominated by Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa, but who was only consecrated after Innocent III gave his blessing; the consecration was done by Archbishop Ricco of Cagliari, who was loyal to Innocent III. Magister, as shown in Chapter Three, ended up working actively for Innocent III’s goals.

285 For the archbishop of Oristano see Vidili, “La cronotassi,” p. 25. For Canon Ottobuono see CDR, p. 117, doc. 196, where Innocent IV is instructing the bishop of S. Justa to find a canonry for “O. de Flisco Comitis Lavanie;” and CDR, p. 121, doc. 203, where “Ottobonum de Lavania” has become both a canon of Arborea and the nuntius of the archbishop of Arborea.


288 Giuseppe Müller, Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscane coll’Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’anno MDXXXI (Florence, 1879; reprinted Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p. xxi; Petrucci, Re in Sardegna, a Pisa cittadini, pp. 61, 80.

289 dominus Guillielmus comes [...] nomine et vice omnium Pisanorum in Sardinea existentium. This is how he is referred to in the charter in which the Genoese conceded S. Gilla, in Cagliari, to Pisa in 1257. CDS, p. 375, doc. 97.
judices of Cagliari, Arborea received a third of Cagliari’s territory. This in turn began a process of expansion by which, as Cagliari and Logudoro dissolved, Arborea would expand until it finally controlled a large part of Logudoro and much of the ex-judicate of Cagliari.²⁹⁰

Yet while Guglielmo da Capraia is frequently depicted as more or less a puppet for the Pisan commune, this is too simplistic.²⁹¹ When Emperor Frederick II’s son Manfred began to try to build up a kingdom for himself, his ambitions included conquering Logudoro, as well as becoming king of Sicily. Pisa remained staunchly Ghibelline; Guglielmo da Capraia, however, used papal condemnations of Manfred’s ambitions in Sardinia as a justification to begin an expansionistic war, with papal blessing, against the lands to the north. In 1263 Pope Urban IV (1261-1264) even directed the archbishop of Arborea to preach a crusade against Manfred and, simultaneously, give “counsel, help and favor [to Regent Guglielmo] [...] persuading others [...] throughout Sardinia to do the same.”²⁹² In opposing Manfred, Guglielmo da Capraia thus found himself joining ranks with the pope and the Sardo-Genoese Doria and Malaspina.²⁹³ In this sense he was behaving more like a Sardinian judex than a representative of Pisa, more interested in reinforcing his own judicate, than in abiding by the Ghibelline political positions of Pisa. He thus replicates the pattern set by the Massa judices of Cagliari and the Visconti judices of Gallura: their new positions, rights and responsibilities as rulers in Sardinia gradually but significantly altered their identities until they were no longer simply Pisan, but Sardo-Pisan, and in cases like Benedetta of Cagliari seem to have felt more Sardinian than Pisan.

More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the military value of the upper clergy to papal politics, already seen with Archbishop Ricco’s control of the castles in Gallura, Archbishop Torgotorio’s charge of the castle of Girapala in Arborea, and the bishop of Ampurias’ responsibility for the castle of Monte Acuto in Logudoro, is underlined in this episode. Urban IV’s letter does not specify what kind of “help and favor” he had intended the archbishop of Arborea to give the regent, but a visitation account by Archbishop Federico Visconti of Pisa, in Sardinia in 1263, shows how Arborea’s prelates had understood that papal directive, for “the judex of Arborea, his archbishop and his suffragan bishops were besieging

²⁹³ See Soddu, I Malaspina e la Sardegna, pp. xxvi-xxvii.
the castle of Goceano in the judicate of Torres with a great army.” Repeated Church councils, especially during the Reform Movement of the eleventh century, had made it extremely clear that no cleric ought to carry arms or participate in fighting. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of warrior bishops had easily survived into the thirteenth century throughout Europe, particularly in Germany, but also in England, France and Italy. The fact that this campaign against Manfred was being sanctified as a crusade, furthermore, provided a convenient justification for churchmen to be taking active part in it.

Throughout these interactions with the pope, therefore, the regent and acting judex Guglielmo da Capraia seems to have been an extremely astute politician, able to treat with both pope and Pisa. He swore fealty to the pope as the Arborean nobility had done, but knew how to profit from Pisa’s conquest of Cagliari; he could secure the support of both Pope Urban IV and his own judicate’s clergy for his expansion into Logudoro, while nevertheless remaining friendly with Archbishop Federico Visconti of Pisa. It is doubtless in part because of his expert leadership that Arborea faced the second half of the thirteenth century stronger and larger than it had ever been. Taking a longer view, the Pisan-friendly attitude of Arborea’s judices in the first half of the 1200s had allowed Arborea to grow fat off Pisa’s military victories, while the presence of anti-Ghibelline and Genoese prelates in Arborea, like Torgotorio de Muru, had kept the judicate from becoming a Pisan dominion like Cagliari. Furthermore, this curiously divided political situation was surely only able to function and strengthen Arborea as a whole because its aristocracy was not dominated by families of Pisan or Genoese origin. A nobility of Sardinian or Catalan origins, which seems to have retained a Sardinian cultural orientation, continued to identify its interests with the Catalan-Sardinian judices of Arborea, rather than with either Pisa or Genoa. A unified political identity on the part of the Arborean nobility could also explain why Arborea was not torn apart by civil wars, such as those of Logudoro in 1232-4, that were partly motivated by the clashing Pisan and Genoese loyalties of Logudoro’s aristocracy. In sum, it is being argued that the combination of Pisan-friendly judices, indigenous or Genoese pro-papal clergy, and a politically unified nobility is largely to be credited for Arborea’s ability to weather the storms of the thirteenth century and emerge stronger than ever.


296 As briefly noted above, Urban IV directed the archbishop of Arborea to “preach the word of the cross against Manfred, for the relief of the same nobles,” ie, acting Judex Guglielmo da Capraia and his army. Les Registres d’Urbain IV, Vol. 2, p. 149, doc. 321.
4.6 Conclusions

This chapter has shown how papal claims of lordship in Sardinia, added to the arrival of Pisan judices in Cagliari and Gallura, changed the way Pisa and Genoa sought to colonize Sardinia in the thirteenth century. From Innocent III on, the papacy represented a strong and determined competitor for lordship over Sardinia. Meanwhile, Pisa’s political differences with the papacy throughout the Guelf-Ghibelline conflicts cost the city the force of its treasured legation, and robbed it of the spiritual and moral authority it had enjoyed in Sardinia for more than seventy years in the twelfth century. One consequence of this was that the Pisan commune began to take a more active direct approach to colonizing Sardinia, combining military invasions and political marriages to secure a place for Pisans at the head of three judicates. Another consequence, however, was that the clergy began to represent a counter-cultural force as far as Pisa was concerned, with strongly pro-papal and Genoese clerics beginning to appear in the Sardinian Church. The popes’ expanding right to nominate prelates directly meant that the network of archbishops and bishops could now be used to spread anti-Pisan influence, place men loyal to the pope in key positions, and reward Genoa for its loyalty. In this way, Genoa finally managed to enter Sardinia’s upper clergy on the side of the pope, as Pisa had done in the twelfth century. The force of these conflicting forces: pro-papal clergy on one hand, and pro-Pisan, pro-Hohenstaufen, or even pro-Genoese nobility or judices on the other, tore Cagliari and Logudoro apart. Arborea’s ability to balance the two forces, however, allowed the judicate not only to survive, but to grow larger than it had ever been.
Conclusions

In the Introduction to this thesis, colonization was defined as the settlement of a foreign land in which the settlers have the two-fold intention, if not always the principal drive, of achieving a certain political or economic leverage such that the fruits of the settled land can be used to benefit their homeland or cultural group, and of changing the culture of the settled land to align more closely with their home culture. It has not, of course, been suggested that this definition is all-encompassing or definitive; rather, it has provided a frame within which to see relations between Sardinia and outside powers in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The relationship between the Church and secular medieval colonization is necessarily complex, both by reason of the enormous range of institutions and activities that can be called “the medieval Church,” and because colonization is in itself a many-layered process. For this reason, the working definition proposed here has made it possible to identify three main aspects as being particularly important to colonization: a shift of populations, a drive toward political domination, and a tendency to try to remake the colonized culture into an image of the colonizing culture. In Sardinia, as elsewhere in Europe, all three elements were present, and are important for the analyses and conclusions drawn by this thesis.

As the Introduction pointed out, however, the thesis has not focused on demographic shifts in Sardinia, as these have already been studied in depth by John Day. More than demographics, this thesis has given attention to the second and third points of the definition. Regarding the second point, that of political and economic leverage, the drives of Pisa and Genoa to achieve both political and economic domination in Sardinia are clear, while the popes and the Holy Roman Emperors focused mainly on political control. The transparency of all these powers’ ambitions to win lordship over Sardinia has made it possible also to see how the upper clergy interacted with these political drives, supporting them or thwarting them. Finally, in investigating the third point of the definition, the thesis has looked at the way both Church and secular powers tried to remake Sardinian society in the image of the colonizing society, whether this is taken to mean Pisa, Genoa, or the Christianity of Rome. The extent to which Church reform and the “Italianization” of Sardinian society went hand in hand has shown that this aspect of colonization, too, featured close interactions between the Church and secular colonizers. By using this frame, therefore, this thesis has been able to identify, for the first time, a series of interactions between the political, cultural and spiritual identity and aims of the Roman Church, on one hand, and the political-cultural colonization of Pisa and Genoa in Sardinia, on the other. Specifically, by focusing on the archbishop of Pisa and the bishops and archbishops of Sardinia in this process, it has shown that the personnel of the Church, which
are not commonly considered agents of colonization in Sardinia, were in reality fundamental to bringing the Sardinian judicates closer to being political and cultural extensions of the Italian mainland. Many of the aspects examined here have not previously been discussed in the literature on medieval Sardinia, and some of them, as far as I am aware, have not appeared anywhere.

Chapter Two, for example, undertook the first in-depth examination of the way Pisa’s archbishop-legate represented and furthered the city’s mercantile and political ambitions in Sardinia. Although the importance of the Pisan archbishop in Sardinia is a commonplace in Sardinian historiography, no study has examined his role as representative of a colonizing Pisa in any detail. It is true that Pisa, like Genoa, used whatever colonizing tools seemed likely to be most effective at any particular historical moment. These might include trade agreements, military aid to contenders for a throne, straightforward military takeovers of a judicate, marriages of important consular families into the Sardinian judicial families, or political support to ambitious or beleaguered judices. Nevertheless, Chapter Two showed that the archbishop of Pisa was a fundamental part of Pisa’s early and long-lasting success, and of Genoa’s difficulty in rivalling Pisa’s power in Sardinia throughout the twelfth century. The archbishop united the ecclesiastical authority of a papal legate and a primate with the secular authority of Pisa; this is not substantially different from the way the archbishops of Magdeburg united the ecclesiastical authority of archbishop with the political identity of the Holy Roman Empire, which was intent on extending control over Eastern Europe.

The archbishop of Pisa, for instance, took on the persona of the pope to call and preside over synods that were almost surely focused on implementing ecclesiastical reforms. He also filled the role of mediator in conflicts between secular and ecclesiastical powers in Sardinia. In his role as mediator, even in the 1090s and before he was papal legate, he could assert an authority that was higher than that of the judices themselves in their own realms. He could also influence the elections of bishops and archbishops in Sardinia, at least through the second decade of the thirteenth century; these prelates were, in their turn, important political players in each judicate, and helped guide the political direction of each judex. In this way, the ecclesiastical/moral authority of the archbishop as representative of the pope, and the secular/political authority of the archbishop as representative of Pisa, fed each other in a circular relationship. There can be little doubt that the joint secular/sacred authority invested in the archbishop of Pisa was a main reason why the judices found themselves swearing fealty to both the archbishop of Pisa and the Cathedral of S. Maria from the 1130s on: in other words, to the archbishop and city of Pisa. Thus, the cultural, religious and political prestige that the legation lent to Pisa was a vital, if hard to quantify, factor in the city’s success in Sardinia.
Based on these findings from Chapter Two, Chapters Three and Four traced the political and cultural-ecclesiastical activities of prelates in Sardinia, and found that mainly foreign, but also Sardinian, prelates actively worked at times to subject Sardinia to various outside powers. In the twelfth century these outside powers were mainly Pisa and Genoa, but in the first half of the thirteenth century the papacy became an important rival and, predictably, the most effective user of the clergy for its own political purposes. Both Chapters Three and Four showed that, although bishops had no official role in judical governments, they were deeply involved in judical politics. They sometimes wrote the trade agreements between judices and Italian communes, for example, like the trade exemptions granted by Judex Mariano I of Logudoro in 1082. They also usually had a hand in deciding the political alliances of the judices, and were electors of new judices, as in the election of Adelasia of Torres in 1234. The directly political roles played by bishops became particularly clear in the thirteenth century, when papal letters show that bishops and archbishops throughout Sardinia were active in either encouraging or resisting Pisan and Genoese attempts to colonize the judicates. In the first half of the thirteenth century three successive archbishops of Oristano, Justus, Bernardo and Torgotorio, answered respectively to Genoa, Pisa and Rome; all three used their diplomatic, ecclesiastical or military skills to further the colonization of their own political masters, and to hinder that of their enemies. The same pattern was seen in Logudoro and Cagliari between 1200 and the late 1250s. Similar alignments between German or German-origin bishops and the promotion of German interests has been shown to have developed in Eastern Europe, where, as in Sardinia, these alignments were stark enough to provoke great local resentment. In the ways prelates interacted with political colonization, therefore, Sardinia again shows itself to be part of a larger European phenomenon.

Perhaps even more than their activities in furthering the political colonization of outside powers, as Chapters Three and Four showed, the prelates in Sardinia are notable for their efforts to “Europeanize” Sardinia. Particularly in the twelfth century, foreign bishops and archbishops in Sardinia were active in founding or enriching European monastic Orders and importing continental spiritual trends, like the hospitalier movement. Here, Sardinia’s relevance as a part of a larger European picture was shown by comparing it to various colonized territories in Eastern Europe, and finding numerous important similarities. It was pointed out, for example, that the foundation of Western monastic and military Orders in Eastern Europe accompanied both ecclesiastical reform and political colonization, just as it did in Sardinia. Thus, if Sardinia was colonized by Pisa and Genoa specifically, its Europeanization was also part of a larger process that saw “central” European politics, armies and devotional practices assert themselves over peripheral areas.
In contrast, however, Chapter Three noted that although foreign prelates to an extent reflected Sardinia’s demographic shifts toward a mixed Sard-Italian population, they seem not to have influenced Italian lay immigration to Sardinia directly. This marks a contrast with Eastern Europe, where German-origin bishops in Eastern Europe could become feudal lords, and could encourage foreign immigration by granting fiefs to German settlers. Indeed, Eastern Europe shows a clearer interaction between the Church and this large-scale movement of people than Sardinia does. In Sardinia, it was argued, prelates had less opportunity to influence immigration in any immediate way, since traditional Sardinian society was not based on feudal relationships and bishops had no fiefs to grant away. Thus, the cultural influence of foreign bishops tended to be limited to their ecclesiastical policies and their own actions, not to their interaction with large-scale demographics.

Additionally, it was shown that foreign cultural colonization in Sardinia was not always successful. Foreign bishops probably tried to import continental donation customs, such as the granting of jurisdictional immunities to monastic foundations, to a Sardinia that was in some respects still culturally Byzantine, but some of these practices do not seem to have taken root. Indeed, Chapter Three made the case that where the *libertas ecclesiae* was concerned, Sardinia showed a remarkable cultural resistance to Western norms, retaining secular jurisdictional authority over ecclesiastical bodies well into the thirteenth century. Similarly, Chapter Four showed that Arborea, the only judicate to have hosted relatively few foreign prelates and to have avoided early Pisan colonization, was also the only judicate to have a low number of Western Order monasteries, and the only Sardinian realm in which indigenous names continued to dominate both the Church and secular politics. Thus, it was argued that Arborea provides an illustration of the ways that all three aspects of the working definition of colonization were interconnected. Low demographic shifts, unsuccessful political domination by any single foreign entity, and only partial ecclesiastical Europeanization were all part of a single phenomenon in Arborea: unsuccessful colonization. It was also pointed out that these single aspects corresponded to Arborea’s unique survival as a political entity throughout the thirteenth century, supporting the hypothesis that the overall degree of success of ecclesiastical colonization, explored in this thesis, was intimately linked to the overall degree of success of political colonization.

The analyses in Chapters Two, Three and Four, therefore, showed how the secular ecclesiastical hierarchy could be used to further political colonization in Sardinia. At the same time, in addition to interpreting the role of the Church as a colonizing force that acted upon Sardinia, this thesis has sought to avoid a weakness inherent in Robert Bartlett’s model of “Europeanization:” that is, the emphasis Bartlett gives to European norms as having been imposed on passive peripheral cultures, and the relative lack of attention that he gives to these peripheral cultures as active parties in the colonizing process. To avoid this, the
The present study has endeavored to see the Sardinian rulers and Sardinian society as active, rather than passive, agents in the process of colonization. This aspect is seemingly contradictory, but is verified in other regions of Europe, and highlights the complex nature of colonization. Although the sources from Sardinia have preserved almost no direct insights into the minds of the judices, this thesis has explored both the advantages and disadvantages that colonization could bring to Sardinian rulers, and suggested possible motivations behind the actions of judices who encouraged or resisted foreign presences in their realms and churches.

In considering the motives of the judices in their frequent cooperation with their colonizers, once again the institutions, traditions and cultural tools of the Church are an important factor. As Chapter Two showed, key among the advantages of being associated with a city and archdiocese like Pisa were the spiritual, political and cultural prestige that would accrue to Pisa’s Sardinian allies. Such prestige, furthermore, would have validated the judices’ own authority at home and abroad. Both Chapters Two and Three suggested that the judices would also gain important political prestige from placing themselves at the forefront of an ecclesiastical reform that they knew to be inevitable, and allying themselves with a reforming ecclesiastical power like the archdiocese of Pisa. Thus, it has been argued that their desire to foster a relationship with Pisa was responsible for the appointment of at least some part of the northern Italian prelates who governed Sardinian dioceses. In the judices’ willingness to foster the association with their culturally prestigious colonizers, once again, Sardinia was shown to be part of a larger pattern in Europe, since in encouraging representatives of a foreign, prestigious culture that was interested in establishing political authority over them, the Sardinian judices were acting just like rulers experiencing colonization in Eastern Europe.

In sum, this thesis has drawn together the complex cultural, political and demographic aspects of colonization, and has analyzed the way they intersected with the identities and actions of Sardinia’s clerics. These analyses have shown how important the Church could be, and how complicated its role, in the success or failure of colonization in medieval Europe. At the same time, this study could profitably be extended to achieve a more precise and complete view of how the Church was involved in the complex phenomena making up colonization. For one thing, this thesis has only analyzed the upper secular clergy in Sardinia. The lack of sources makes it impossible to study the lower secular clergy, or the effects of ecclesiastical colonization on “every-day life” in twelfth- or thirteenth-century Sardinia, but an examination of the monasteries and friaries in Sardinia would greatly enrich an understanding of how foreign ecclesiastical institutions interacted with the society they were seeking to “Europeanize.” Including the monastic and mendicant Orders might find that, where institutions other than the upper secular clergy were concerned, colonization was a less one-sided process than the study of prelates has
suggested. Indeed, it might conclude that foreign monastic and mendicant Orders in Sardinia became almost as “Sardinianized” as they “Europeanized” Sardinia.

Another limitation of this thesis is its chronological extent, which has allowed it only to consider the Pisan and Genoese colonization in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries. A more comprehensive treatment of the matter would also examine the Aragonese conquest in the fourteenth century. The Aragonese colonization of Sardinia was profoundly different from the Pisan and Genoese colonization examined here, largely because it was organized by a single political figure, the king of Aragon, and because it was effected by a military conquest and the immediate establishment of foreign administrative structures, rather than by the gradual infiltration of mercantile and political influence. Certainly, the interactions between the Church and Aragonese colonization could not well be analyzed without first having an understanding of how Pisan and Genoese ecclesiastical colonization had created the Sardinia that existed in 1323, when the Aragonese and Catalans arrived. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by this thesis provide a foundation upon which to understand how the Sards, Pisans, Genoese and Aragonese interacted in the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, enlarging the study to include the fourteenth-century Aragonese presence in Sardinia would be important to understand how the Church could interact in different times, and in very different types of colonization, within a single geographical and cultural area, that of Sardinia.

The present thesis, therefore, has created the basis for a future project of tracing the full extent of ecclesiastical involvement in the colonization of Sardinia from the eleventh century to the early fifteenth century, when the last independent indigenous Sardinian polity, the judicate of Arborea, was finally extinguished. It has shown that, for a variety of reasons, the upper secular clergy represented a uniquely effective colonizing force that could be harnessed by a variety of political powers. In Sardinia, the role of the prelates in the colonization and Europeanization of each judicate made colonization by Pisa and Genoa at once more complete, allowing the communes to extend a spiritual control over Sardinia, and less easily maintained, as the pope took a greater interest in asserting direct lordship over the island and thus challenged communal power there.

More broadly speaking, the analyses undertaken in the previous pages have made a number of new contributions both to Sardinian medieval studies, in particular, and to the study of medieval colonization, in general. Where previous work has compared Sardinia only to its immediate Mediterranean neighbors, this has been the first study to place medieval Sardinia in a Europe-wide context. Taking a broader perspective and comparing Sardinia to East-Central Europe has made it possible to see how in many ways Sardinia was part of a general European pattern of colonization, but also how its responses to colonization were at times unusual or unique. Beyond Sardinia, this thesis has used Bartlett’s theory of
“Europeanization” to carry out a study of the processes of colonization on a land that was neither “center” nor “periphery.” Because Sardinia was, on one hand, both geographically central and had been Christian since late Antiquity, and on the other hand had developed a political and ecclesiastical culture very different from most lands in the European “center,” the case of Sardinia provides an unusual context for the study of center-periphery relations during a colonizing process. Finally, the thesis has directed the study of colonization away from its conventional economic-demographic roots by focusing on the way in which the Church’s interaction with colonization provided a rich array of cultural and religious tools for the colonizers, as well as a source of legitimization, prestige, and, at times, instruments for resistance to indigenous rulers. Thus, this thesis has offered a new perspective on colonization and Europeanization in medieval Europe.
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Appendix

Map: The Judicates and Dioceses of Medieval Sardinia
### The Judices of Sardinia: mid-eleventh century to mid-thirteenth century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logudoro</th>
<th>Cagliari</th>
<th>Arborea</th>
<th>Gallura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1063-pre-1073</td>
<td>Barisone I</td>
<td>1058-1089</td>
<td>Orzoccor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1065-ca. 1114</td>
<td>Mariano I</td>
<td>1089-1102</td>
<td>Costantino I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 1114-1127</td>
<td>Costantino I</td>
<td>1102-1130</td>
<td>Mariano II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1127-ca. 1153 (abdicated)</td>
<td>Gonnario I</td>
<td>1130-1163</td>
<td>Costantino II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1147-ca. 1191</td>
<td>Barisone II</td>
<td>1163-1188</td>
<td>Pietro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 1191-1198</td>
<td>Costantino II</td>
<td>1188/1190-1214</td>
<td>Guglielmo of Massa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1198-1218</td>
<td>Comita I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | Gallura |
| | | 1080-1100 | Torchitorio |
| | | 1100-ca. 1116 | Ittocorre de Gunale |
| | | 1116-1133 | Costantino II Spanu |
| | | 1133-1146 | Comita Spanu |
| | | 1146-1170 | Costantino III de Lacon-Gunale |
| | | 1170-1170 | Barisone? |
| | | 1190-1214 | Elena; after 1206 with |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1214-1232</td>
<td>Massa</td>
<td>1214-1217</td>
<td>post-1211-1217</td>
<td>Benedetta of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ugo I de Bas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Massa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1218-1232</td>
<td>Mariano II</td>
<td>1214-1217</td>
<td>1217-1241</td>
<td>Barisone II de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barisone II</td>
<td></td>
<td>1224? – 1232</td>
<td>Serra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1232-1250</td>
<td>Guglielmo II</td>
<td>1232-1250</td>
<td>Mariano II of Logudoro</td>
<td>Pietro II de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serra-Bas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250-1256</td>
<td>Chiano</td>
<td>1241-1297</td>
<td>Mariano II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guglielmo da</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capraia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1256-1258</td>
<td>Guglielmo III</td>
<td>1241-1264</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Archbishops and Bishops in Sardinia: 1060s – 1200*

<p>| Province of Torres (Logudoro): mid-eleventh century to end of the twelfth century |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| <strong>Torres</strong> | <strong>Ploaghe</strong> | <strong>Sorres</strong> | <strong>Ampurias</strong> |
| 1065 | Simone | (1063-1082) | Giorgio Maiule |  |
| (1073-1074) | Costantino di Castra | (1073-1082) | Franco |  |
| 1090 | Cristoforo |  |  |  |
| (1112-1120) | Azzo | 1112 | Pietro | 1112 | Jacobus | (1112-1127) | Nicola |
| 1116? | Manfredi |  |  |  | 1113 | Alberto |  |
| (1120-1122) | Vitale Tola | pre-1125-pre-1127 | Costantino Berrica |  |  |  |  |
| 1127 | Costantino Berrica | 1127 | Gualfredo | 1127 | Bernardo |  |  |
| 1134 | Azzo | pre-1134 | Pietro da Canneto | (1134-1151) | Giovanni | 1134 | Bono |
| (1134-1139) | Pietro da Canneto | 1139 | Gualfredo |  |  | (1139-1142) | P. |
| (1139-1146) | Azzo | (post-1139-1146) | Giovanni |  |  |  |  |
| (1154-1170) | Pietro, monk |  |  | (1153-1170) | Giovanni Sargu |  |  |
| (1170-1178) | Alberto, Cassinese monk | 1170 | Costantino de Lella | 1171-1178 | Goffredo, Cistercian | (1170-1179) | Comita de Martis |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>1176</th>
<th>1181-1200</th>
<th>1200</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1181-1195/6</td>
<td>Herberto, Cistercian prior</td>
<td>After ca. 1150, chronological order unknown</td>
<td>- Justus</td>
<td>(1181-1200)</td>
<td>Augerio, Cistercian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1196-1199</td>
<td>Bandino, Pisan canon</td>
<td>- Stefano Scarpa</td>
<td>- Costantino Thonchellu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Anonymous, requested by chapter of Torres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* sees written in larger **bold** font are the archdiocesan sees for each judicate; those written in normal font are diocesan sees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of Torres (Logudoro): mid-eleventh century to end of the twelfth century (continued)</th>
<th>Bosa</th>
<th>Ottana</th>
<th>Bisarcio</th>
<th>Castra</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Costantino di Castra</td>
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<td>pre-1082</td>
<td>Nicodemo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pre-1082</td>
<td>Gavino</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Pietro</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>Giovanni</td>
<td>(1112-1127)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Marino</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1123-1127)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Giovanni</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>Ugo</td>
<td>(1139-1146)</td>
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<td>Pietro Spanu</td>
<td>(1160-1170)</td>
<td>Zaccaria</td>
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<td>Goffredo</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Giovanni Thelle</td>
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<tr>
<td>1176</td>
<td>D. (Dionigi Raineri?)</td>
<td>1176</td>
<td>U. (or V.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>Giovanni (?)</td>
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### Province of Cagliari: mid-eleventh century to end of the twelfth century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cagliari</th>
<th>Sulcis</th>
<th>Dolia</th>
<th>Suelli</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre 1073</td>
<td>Alfredus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1073-1081</td>
<td>Jacobus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1089</td>
<td>Lamberto</td>
<td>(1089-1090)</td>
<td>Virgilio</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1089-1090)</td>
<td>Ugo</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>Raimondo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>Salvio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1112</td>
<td>Gualfredo</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>Arnaldo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1114-1120)</td>
<td>Guglielmo</td>
<td>(1114-1120)</td>
<td>Alberto</td>
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<tr>
<td>1126</td>
<td>Pietro</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>Alberto</td>
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<tr>
<td>1141</td>
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<td>Aimo</td>
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<td>1140</td>
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<tr>
<td>1163</td>
<td>Bonato/Bonito</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>Rodolfo</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>(1183-1217)</td>
<td>Ricco</td>
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<td>(1190-1200)</td>
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### Province of Oristano: mid-eleventh century to end of the twelfth century

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Oristano</th>
<th>S. Justa</th>
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<th>Terralba</th>
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<tr>
<td>early 1100s</td>
<td>Omodeo</td>
<td>1119</td>
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<td>1125</td>
<td>Teodoro</td>
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<tr>
<td>1131</td>
<td>Pietro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1146</td>
<td>Comita de Lacon</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>Paucapalea</td>
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<tr>
<td>1165</td>
<td>P.</td>
<td>(1164-1185)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1185</td>
<td>Ugo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1192-1198)</td>
<td>Justus, Genoese</td>
<td>(1195-1196)</td>
<td>Stefano</td>
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Archbishops and Bishops in Sardinia: 1200-1260s

<table>
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<th>Province of Cagliari: 1200-ca. 1260</th>
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<td>(1183-1217)</td>
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<td>(1218-1226)</td>
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<td>(1237-1255)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Province of Torres (Logudoro): 1200-ca. 1260</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Torres</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1202-pre-1215</td>
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<td>1225</td>
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<td>(1230-1231, or -1247)</td>
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<td>1259-1262</td>
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<td>Province of Oristano: 1200-ca. 1260</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Oristano</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1200-1220) Bernardo</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1224-1244) Torgotorio de Muru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1261</td>
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