And in Our Hearts Take up Thy Rest: The Trinitarian Pneumatology of Frederick Crowe, S.J.

by

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Abstract

By the end of his life, Frederick E. Crowe S.J. (1915-2012) was “widely recognized as the world’s foremost Lonergan expert.”¹ Most famous as the inspiration behind ten institutes around the world for promoting the study of Bernard Lonergan (1904-84) and co-editor of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Crowe also modestly sought to expand his fellow Canadian Jesuit’s thought, especially in matters related to the Holy Spirit.

Although Crowe’s 1959 article, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,”² has long been considered a “classic”³ and his courses on the Trinity at Regis College in Toronto have been called “legendary,”⁴ no serious study of Crowe’s thought has ever been undertaken. And in Our Hearts Take up Thy Rest: The Trinitarian Pneumatology of Frederick Crowe is the first dissertation ever written on Crowe.

In the dissertation, I claim that Crowe’s reflections on the Holy Spirit go through three stages with two main transition points. Following Crowe’s work from 1953 to 2000, I argue that Crowe’s development should be organized around three main questions: (1) What is the personal property of the Holy Spirit eternally and in time? (2) How is the mission of the Holy Spirit ordered to the mission of the Son? (3) Can the Holy Spirit, as intersubjective Love, be thought of as the first person in the Trinity?

In the final chapter, the three stages of Crowe’s development are presented as a series that is unified by his distinction between two kinds of love: complacency (restful serenity) and concern (restless inclining). Although Crowe’s theory of love itself develops, Crowe always maintained that human love provides an analogy for the Holy Spirit’s eternal procession. While Crowe’s pneumatology evolves in response to perceived shifts in Lonergan’s writings, Crowe’s own concerns about the life of the Church also shaped the way he asks his three pneumatological questions. Noting the influences of Newman and Basil of Caesarea on Crowe, I present Crowe’s pneumatology as rooted in the Trinitarian theology of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Bernard Lonergan. Crowe emerges as creatively dedicated to the psychological analogy.
Dedication
For Our Lady and St. Philip
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Introduction

According to Frederick Crowe, Bernard Lonergan’s formula for a dissertation was this: “What X says on Y.” Fr. Crowe added that X should be “a thinker of stature.” This dissertation is about what Frederick Ernest Crowe, S.J. (1915-2012) says on the Holy Spirit. Frederick Crowe is not of the same stature as Lonergan in terms of his philosophical and theological importance. Hundreds of doctoral dissertations have been written about Lonergan’s thought. And hundreds more could be written. But Frederick Crowe is unique in his dedication to the thought of Bernard Lonergan. Crowe tried to collect and then to read everything Lonergan wrote and everything written about Lonergan.

After seventy-five years as a Jesuit, Frederick Crowe died in 2012, on Easter Sunday. All of his papers are fittingly kept in the Lonergan Research Institute at Regis College, the Jesuit School of Theology at the University of Toronto and a member of the Toronto School of Theology (TST). Crowe not only founded the Lonergan Research Institute (LRI), but was also instrumental in the formation of TST in 1968.

Beginning in 1953, Crowe taught at Regis for twenty-seven years with a special focus on Trinitarian theology. In 1980, at the age of 65, he stopped teaching to make room for younger Jesuit professors. When Crowe finished teaching, he worked full-time at the Lonergan Center, which he had established in 1971. In 1985, the Lonergan Center received an Ontario provincial charter and became the Lonergan Research Institute. Together with Robert Doran,

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6 Crowe, Old Things and New, 126.

After I decided to write my dissertation on Crowe, Jonathan Robinson, my superior at the Toronto Oratory, recounted a conversation he once had with another priest. During the conversation, the name of Frederick Crowe came up. Fr. Robinson, who took some of Lonergan’s theology classes at the Gregorian University in the late 1950s and early 1960s, said, “Oh, isn’t he the amanuensis of Lonergan?” The priest with whom Fr. Robinson was speaking insisted that Crowe was more than an assistant to Lonergan. This thesis argues that part of Crowe’s distinctiveness as a theologian can be seen in what Bruce Marshall calls, a “Trinitarian pneumatology.” Crowe always studied the Holy Spirit’s eternal and temporal identity in relation to the Father and Son.

**Changes to My Proposal**

When I began this thesis, I hypothesized four distinct stages to Crowe’s pneumatology. I suggested that there was a *first stage* (1953-1967) in which Crowe was more focused on the Thomistic understanding of love as an analogy for the Holy Spirit’s procession. I proposed a *second stage* (1968-82) in which Crowe concentrated on the role of the Holy Spirit in overcoming the problem of faith and critical history. I claimed in my proposal that there was then a *third stage* (1983-97) in which Crowe not only reversed the missions in the years 1983-84 but also rethought the ordering of the persons in the immanent Trinity. Finally, I said that

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there was a *fourth stage* (1998-2012) that focused vaguely on the future of the Church and the life to come.

But as I worked on the dissertation it became clear that the 1983-4 reversal of the missions of Son and Holy Spirit was tied to what Crowe was thinking about in the late 1960s and 1970s. The reversal of the missions was the term of a line of thinking and not the beginning of a new line. Stage two needed to include Crowe’s reversal of the missions. Crowe’s interest in faith and critical history is present in that second stage, but it is not the key to organizing his reflections on the Spirit. That interest was more a by-product of his attempt to understand Lonergan’s own theology after 1965. As I reworked the second stage of Crowe’s development, I also realized that I should not force his final years into a distinctive stage. These realizations caused me to revise my hypothesis about the explanatory stages.

Instead of four stages, I now distinguish three recognizable stages in Crowe’s pneumatology. These stages correspond to Crowe’s most well-known positions on the Holy Spirit. In the first stage (1953-1968), Crowe developed his ideas about the Holy Spirit proceeding eternally as complacent and concerned Love. In the second stage (1969-84), Crowe argues that the Holy Spirit is the first divine person sent to us. In the third stage (1985-2000), Crowe proposes two orderings of the divine persons in the inner Trinitarian life. He asks whether the Holy Spirit can be thought of as the first person in the immanent Trinity.

**State of the Question**

Work on Crowe’s theology and especially his pneumatology has not changed very much in the last two years. No theses have been written, as far as I can tell, about Frederick Crowe, and no major articles discussing Crowe have appeared. The most significant development has been Robert Doran, S.J.’s founding of the Institute for Method in Theology. According to Doran,
Many of the books that were in Bernard Lonergan’s possession at the time of his death in 1984 were stamped by him on the inside first page, “Institute for Method in Theology.” His vision was of an interdisciplinary research effort conducted on a large scale and aimed at implementing the unfolding in many fields of the “generalized empirical method” that he proposed in *Insight* and dramatically developed in *Method in Theology*.10

In March 2017, Doran held a colloquium at Marquette University laying out the plans for the new Institute. Part of the reason for starting the Institute at this moment in time is the fact that twenty-three of the twenty-five proposed volumes for the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* have now been published (with the last two in the works).

In terms of the systematic theology component of the Institute, Robert Doran thinks that Crowe’s theology of the divine missions needs to be enriched, if it is to have the pivotal role in systematic theology that Doran once thought it would have. In my proposal, I mentioned Robert Doran’s 2012 claim about the importance of Fr Crowe’s thesis in “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” for the future of systematic theology.11 In my conclusion, I will return briefly to Doran’s more recent ideas about the need to nuance Fr. Crowe’s work on the order of the missions. The key point for now is simply this: we need more clarity about the history of Fr. Crowe’s own theology. Only when we get clearer on Crowe’s development will we be able to compare it to Lonergan’s own achievement. I hope that this thesis will serve in some small way the aims of the Institute for Method in Theology.

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Methodology – Procedure – Implications


In his analysis of the historical development of the theology of the Word, Crowe argued that each stage comprised a movement from latent to explicit questions. Each new significant question and its answer have anticipations earlier on. Gradually those pre-thematic reflections lead to the emergence of the question as a separate concern. Finally, the question itself is concentrated on or made thematic or brought into the spotlight. Like Crowe’s own analysis, my history of Crowe’s development begins in each stage with anticipations of his eventual focus of attention; I then look at how that focus of attention emerged, and finally I study the way Crowe concentrates on a particular, significant question.

The thesis, then, has three main parts according to the three stages of Crowe’s pneumatology. The thesis begins in Chapter One with an introduction to Crowe’s life and how it was influenced by Bernard Lonergan. Chapters Two and Three discuss the first stage of Crowe’s pneumatology (1953-68). Chapters Four and Five take up the second stage (1968-1984). Chapters Six and Seven deal with the third stage (1985-2000). The conclusion, Chapter Eight, summarizes the findings of the thesis, provides an evaluation of Crowe’s development as a whole, and suggests the lasting value of Crowe’s trajectory.

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As I stressed in my original thesis proposal, the greatest implication for Crowe’s pneumatology is in the area of spirituality. Among his contributions, his work on love as complacency is potentially the most valuable. Working on Crowe’s development has led me to appreciate the contemplative dimension of his own life. If one were to try to argue for a fourth stage in his development, one could study the question of the Holy Spirit’s role in prayer. Crowe wrote several pieces related to this question in his later years. There is, however, no clear trajectory or question in the final years of his thought that I have found.

**Crowe’s Writings**

This thesis is based on Crowe’s published writings.\(^4\) Crowe’s own books consist mainly of four volumes of his collected essays, edited by Michael Vertin. In 1989, *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea* was published by the Catholic University of America Press.\(^5\) The volume includes twenty-two essays as well as Crowe’s Homily for the funeral of Bernard Lonergan. In 2000, *Three Thomist Studies* appeared.\(^6\) This volume contained Crowe’s three long articles on Aquinas that were written between 1955-1961. Included in this volume is Crowe’s most well-known article, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas.”\(^7\) In 2004, Michael Vertin brought out *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*.\(^8\) This third volume contains twenty of Crowe’s papers “that, like those of the first volume, explore and develop and employ various facets of

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\(^4\) I have made some use, however, of the Crowe Archive. References to those boxes include the letters and numbers on the outside of each box in the Crowe Archive.


\(^7\) This long, three-part essay, first appeared in *Theological Studies* 20 (1959) 1-39, 198-230, 343-95.

Lonergan’s work.”19 Finally in 2010, a fourth volume of Crowe’s writings was published: *Lonergan and the Level of Our Time*. This most recent volume “comprises twenty-eight papers that collectively span the period from 1961 to 2004.”20 Among these twenty-eight papers are five previously unpublished writings. “As in the first and third volumes,” the editor notes, “the papers are divided into two groups, with the sequence in each group being roughly chronological.”21 Over time, I would like to bring out at least one more collection of Crowe’s more substantial publications. This envisaged ‘fifth volume’ of his writings could include more of his devotional writings, his homilies, and his polemical writings.


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20 Ibid., xi.
21 Ibid.
book on the development of Lonergan’s Christology was completed and published. The book, *Christ and History: Bernard Lonergan's Christology (1932-1982)*, has just been reprinted in conjunction with the publication of Lonergan’s *The Incarnate Word, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, volume 8.

Last, but not least, are the course notes that Crowe published for his students at Regis College. These mimeographed notes can be found in the Lonergan Research Institute. Among his course notes, special mention must be made of Crowe’s 1965-6 course notes, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*. These notes, 280 pages in length, were re-issued in a more permanent form in 1970 and will be discussed at great length in Chapter Three. Over the years, at least fifty people wrote to Fr. Crowe asking for copies of these notes. At various points, efforts were made to find a major publisher for the work, but the book never appeared.

**Acknowledgments**

At the end of this introduction, I turn in gratitude to all those who made this thesis possible. I thank my community and especially our Provost, Fr. Jonathan Robinson, for sending me to Regis for my doctorate and for funding my education through the generosity of our benefactors. To my brothers in the Toronto Oratory, I am especially grateful for your accepting me and sustaining me as a son of St. Philip.

I am grateful to all the others who have been praying for me during my doctoral studies, especially all the novices, seminarians, and brothers at St. Philip’s Seminary, as well as the parishioners of Holy Family and St. Vincent de Paul. I am grateful to my family and friends in North Carolina for their support and prayers. In various ways, Fr. Derek Cross, Fr. Philip

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29 See *Crowe Archive, A-3-4-1*, second to last file contains Crowe’s correspondence regarding the notes.
Cleevely, Annabelle Orejana, Priscilla Joven, and Donna Lasecki have been especially solicitous in helping me complete my program. Unexpectedly, Dr. Leo Serroul kindly provided me with a wealth of digital resources after my thesis was proposed. During the writing of this thesis, Dr. Emiko Koyama and Fr. Juvenal Merriell generously read and commented on the entire manuscript. Fr. Juvenal has been my constant support during my doctoral studies, even driving with me to Guelph, Ontario and New Brunswick to gather data on Crowe’s early years.

I am grateful to the relatives and friends of Fr. Crowe who kindly met with me on my pilgrimage to New Brunswick in August 2015. Patricia Byrne was extremely thoughtful in providing me with photographs of her uncle. I thank Jarvis and Lois McQuinn for their hospitality in Sussex and Mr. Davidson of Jeffries Corner for explaining to me the history of the Crowe family properties. I thank Mr. Fred Farrell of the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick for supplying me with information on Fr. Crowe’s high school records and Mrs. Patsy Hale of the University of New Brunswick for providing me with information from Crowe’s alumni file at his alma mater. I must also thank Lib Gibson, the daughter of Raymond Jerome Crowe, the oldest brother of Frederick Crowe, who provided online access to all her genealogy work on the Crowe family. Although I never met Fr. Crowe in this life, my visit to New Brunswick helped to make Fr. Crowe and his family real to me.

In May 2012, just before I began my doctoral studies, I took part in the Aquinas Studium at Regis College, organized by Gilles Mongeau, S.J. The week long gathering of professors and graduate students from around North America introduced me to some Lonergan-inspired theologians who deeply impressed me by their joy, wisdom, and precision of mind. Chief among them that week was Jeremy Wilkins. Then in the fall of 2012, I took my first class on Lonergan under Michael Vertin. The class was, “Augustine, Aquinas, and
Lonergan.” It was the perfect introduction for me to Lonergan’s thought as it situated him in a theological tradition that I already appreciated. Vertin’s pedagogy also showed me the potential fruitfulness of studying Lonergan. During that first semester, an intellectual seed was planted within me. In the subsequent years, a budding interest in Lonergan was nurtured and watered by my friendship with Gilles Mongeau S.J., various reading courses with Jeremy Wilkins, more courses with Michael Vertin, Graduate Seminars at the LRI, conversations with Oratorian confreres, and the weekly informal gathering of like-minded graduate students, Eric Mabry, Matthew Thollander, Jon Polce, S.J., Bryan Gent, and Joshua Harris.

Over the past five years at the Toronto School of Theology (TST), I am grateful to Robert Sweetman, Sr. Gill Goulding, C.J., and Fr. Gordon Rixon, S.J., who encouraged me at critical times in my studies. I owe a unique debt to Michael Vertin, who has assisted me all along the way and answered many questions, to Robert Doran, who introduced me to the Crowe Archive, and to Jeremy Wilkins, who agreed to be my thesis supervisor despite moving to Boston College.

In my first semester at TST, I took a course, “Scripture and Theological Method,” with Ephraim Radner and Christopher Seitz. Professor Radner told us to write our future theses on one author. But he also stressed the need to work on a topic that was of interest in the school where one was studying. These two pieces of advice stuck with me. As the time was drawing near to decide on a thesis topic, I had a chance conversation with Darren Dias, O.P. Dias talked about the need for someone to do more work on Crowe. As I left his office and walked towards the subway at Queen’s Park, a great joy came upon me. I knew at that moment that I should write my thesis on Frederick Crowe’s pneumatology. Following St. Philip Neri’s own
example, Oratorians have a special love and devotion to the Holy Spirit. That interest in the Holy Spirit is why I continue working on Frederick Crowe’s theology.

The odd thing is that I did not like Crowe’s 1984 essay, “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” when I read it in Jeremy Wilkins’ 2013 course, “Transformative Dynamics of Grace.” Crowe’s ideas on reversing the order of the missions seemed to contradict the truth that we receive the Holy Spirit through the incarnate Son. In class, after a long discussion of the article, Dr. Wilkins said, “There may be problems with the essay, but Crowe is on to something.” After working on Crowe’s pneumatology for the past two years, this is also my own assessment, as this thesis will indicate.

Even if one wants to disagree with Crowe at various points, it is important to determine what questions Crowe is really asking. It may be true that in the end his questions are more important than his answers. But Crowe’s questions reach to the heart of the Trinitarian mystery.

As we will see in Chapter Three, Crowe had a great love for St. Basil of Caesarea. Matthew Levering has said that in terms of pneumatology “Basil’s central goal is to combat the subordinationist views of the Spirit.” In a similar way, we can say that Fr. Crowe’s central goal in his Trinitarian pneumatology is to combat Sabellianism. In 1965, Crowe asked: “would your theology be any different if Sabellius were right?” “You may think my effort to discern the ‘character’ of each person in the world excessively formal,” Crowe then added for his students, “but you have to ask of your own theology,” he continued, “whether it would need revision if one and the same person had actually showed himself to the world as Father, Son,

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31 Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 195.
and Holy Spirit.”

In his course on the Trinity, Crowe coined the neologism, “Trinification,” as he tried to express the way we enter into communion with each of the three divine persons.

Crowe’s career of teaching Trinitarian theology spanned the years before and after the Second Vatican Council. Fr. Crowe’s pneumatological development provides a glimpse into Catholic Trinitarian theology in the second-half of the twentieth century. His writings on the Holy Spirit, moreover, can still speak to us. *Cor ad cor loquitur*, heart speaks to heart.

Heart can speak to heart, even after death, because of the Communion of Saints. And so, I thank Fr. Crowe for his friendship in the mystical body of Christ. In that body, we have “efficacious communion” with one another at Mass through the power of the Holy Spirit. May Fr. Crowe eternally rest in the hoped-for Father. *To the greater glory of God* – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 178.
Chapter One – Frederick Crowe, S.J.: Dean of First Generation Lonergan Disciples

“I remember well the years 1947-50 when he was our teacher and I would pester him with questions.” – Frederick Crowe, S.J. in 2006 on his teacher Bernard Lonergan, S.J.35

In his recent book on Bernard Lonergan, Louis Roy, O.P. summarizes Frederick Crowe’s basic interpretation of Lonergan’s philosophical and theological project.36 Crowe, Roy notes, understands Lonergan’s writings “as an intellectual tool destined to be adopted by thinkers who wish to know thoroughly how their own conscious activities are structured and who wish to apply their talents in a sustained undertaking of understanding and scientific production.”37 In a word, Crowe’s Lonergan provided us with a new “organon for our time.”38

This reading of Crowe is correct. But Crowe also wanted to do something for Lonergan’s thought that Lonergan did not think had been done for Aquinas’ thought.

At the end of Lonergan’s March 1968 paper, “Belief: Today’s Issue,” Lonergan compared the science of modernity with the science of thirteenth century Western Europe. Lonergan insisted:

One has to be creative. Modernity lacks roots. Its values lack balance and depth. Much of its science is destructive of man. Catholics in the twentieth century are faced with a problem similar to that met by Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Then Greek and Arabic culture were pouring into Western Europe and, if it was not to destroy Christendom, it had to be known, assimilated, transformed. Today, modern culture, in many ways more stupendous than any that ever existed, is surging around us. It too has to be known, assimilated, transformed. That is the contemporary issue.

The contemporary issue, then, is a tremendous challenge. Nor should one opt out on the speciously modest plea that one is not another Aquinas. There could have been no Aquinas without the preceding development of Scholasticism. There would have been no Aquinas if there had not been the students to whom he lectured and for whom he wrote.

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35 Frederick Crowe, S.J., “Author’s Preface,” Developing the Lonergan Idea, xii.
37 Engaging the Thought of Bernard Lonergan, 14.
38 Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, 1.
Finally, there would have been a far more successful Aquinas, if human beings were less given to superficial opinions backed by passion, for in that case the work of Aquinas would not have been so promptly buried under the avalanche of the Augustinian-Aristotelian conflict that marked the close of the thirteenth century.  

Frederick Crowe wanted to make sure that Fr. Lonergan’s synthesis of faith and modern science did not get buried under an avalanche at the end of the twentieth century.  

Crowe thought that Lonergan was a new Aquinas for the twentieth-first century. Crowe, Lonergan’s student and friend, tried to ensure that there would be a far more successful Lonergan. And so, he set himself the task of preserving and spreading Lonergan’s intellectual apostolate through collecting all primary and secondary materials, including recordings, in the Lonergan Center.  

What this thesis tries to make clear, however, is that Crowe was more than the keeper of the Lonergan flame. Crowe was also “creative.” Crowe was a theologian in his own right. In particular, Crowe uniquely explored and extended Lonergan’s pneumatology.  

Nevertheless, Lonergan’s writings are the main context from which Crowe’s more modest writings on the Holy Spirit emerge. The goal of this introductory first chapter is to answer the question: why did Frederick Crowe come so completely under Bernard Lonergan’s influence? In answering this question, I will introduce the three principal writings of Bernard Lonergan: Verbum (1949), Insight (1957), and Method in Theology (1972). The influence of these three works corresponds to the three stages through which Crowe’s Trinitarian pneumatology developed.

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40 See Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., “The Lonergan Center,” Jesuit Bulletin 1975, 3. The idea was suggested to Crowe in 1970 by J. Patout Burns and Gerard Fagin. The name was suggested by the late Michael Novak (cf. Ibid., 4).
Before looking at the immediate intellectual context of Crowe’s theology, I will start with the “remote context,”\footnote{Crowe, *Lonergan*, 1.} with Crowe’s life before he studied under Lonergan. As we will see, Crowe’s Trinitarian theology results from the interaction of Lonergan’s methodology and Crowe’s own apostolic concerns. This sense of an intellectual mission has its roots in Crowe’s religious, intellectual, and moral upbringing in New Brunswick.

**Early Years: Home (Canada), Newman, and his Jesuit Vocation**

Frederick Ernest Crowe was the third of six children of Jeremiah and Margaret Crowe. Born on 15 July 1915, Frederick Ernest was baptized in St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Sussex on 1 August 1915. Fr. Crowe, however, grew up fourteen kilometres outside Sussex in a tiny place called Jeffries Corner. His parents ran a grocery store in a building attached to their home. According to Patricia Byrne, a first cousin of Fr. Crowe, “The Crowes were always frugal.”\footnote{Patricia Byrne, interview by author, August 26, 2015, Sussex, NB.} Nevertheless, her Aunt Margaret, Fr. Crowe’s mother, “always had candy for us. She made the best crispy ginger snaps. She would give us chocolate bars at her store.”\footnote{Patricia Byrne, interview by author, August 26, 2015, Sussex, NB.}

In short, Crowe grew up within a rural Canadian Catholic family in the mid 1920s.\footnote{He did not claim that the account was autobiographical, but the description aimed “at being concrete in the measure that is possible for me” (*Old Things and New*, 17).} “Imagine then an old-fashioned home,” he writes,

> An ordinary number of ordinary children; ordinary parents for whom divorce is about as unreal as a trip to the moon; siblings who quarrel and fight as most siblings do, but are basically obedient and well enough behaved; a frugal home, where there is no cold or hunger, but no luxuries either; a home where the children are trained to help, each with chores to do; a home where there are games, especially in the long winter nights; where there is reading, if not much stimulating conversation; a religious home, where there are scenes of the Last Supper and the Crucifixion, where family prayers are said, the Rosary even, if you would be really old-fashioned.\footnote{Ibid., 18.}
Like most ordinary Catholic families, Crowe’s actual home life was not without its sorrows. Nevertheless, we know that Crowe’s childhood was filled with many joys. Many of these joys were based on his love of reading.

Across the street from the original Jeremiah Crowe property still stands the one-room school house where Fr. Crowe received his earliest formal schooling (the dilapidated building is now used as a storage shed). The basic curriculum in that school was provided by a set of books called “New Brunswick Readers.” His mother had been a teacher before getting married and instilled in him a love of reading. His principal teacher in those early years, however, was his relative, Irene Haugen. In 2005, Crowe dedicated his book, *Christ and History* to her with these words:

I dedicate this work to my cousin, Mrs. M. Irene Haugen. Seventy-eight years ago she prepared me for High School Entrance Examinations and taught me to prize scholastic excellence. For many years she has most generously supported my ventures in theological publications. Now she is an inspiration for a host of friends and relatives as she looks forward, alert and serene, to August 17, 2005, and the completion of her first hundred years. I join with them to wish her well as she starts year one hundred and one.

At the age of twelve, Frederick enrolled in Sussex County High School in the fall of 1927, having completed two-years of school work each year during elementary school.

Three years later, just shy of his fifteenth birthday, Crowe graduated at the top of his high school class and won a Beaverbrook Scholarship to the University of New Brunswick. Four years later, in 1934, Fr. Crowe earned a Bachelor’s of Science in Engineering. With the Great Depression

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46 Fr. Crowe was eleven when his eight-year-old, younger brother “Johnny” died on 28 March 1927. “It almost killed her” is how someone described the effect of John Vincent’s death on Margaret Crowe (Cousins of Fr. Crowe, interview by author, 26 August 2015, Sussex, NB).
47 For example, see *Old Things and New*, 87.
48 Cf. Ibid., 65-74, esp. 66n3. Copies of those books are still available.
50 *Christ and History*, 10.
Depression at one of its worst points, “there was not a single electrical engineering job in the whole of the Maritimes,” his cousin, Frank Cogger, recalls.\(^{51}\) As a result, Fr. Crowe took a job at his uncle and aunt’s grocery store, “Purtill’s,” in Norton, New Brunswick. During that time of working at the grocery store, “he found himself again hearing a call that he had originally experienced in his early teens, a call to the religious life.”\(^{52}\)

On September 6, 1936, Frederick Crowe entered the novitiate for the Upper Canada (i.e., English-Canadian) Province of the Society of Jesus.\(^{53}\) The Society of Jesus (Jesuits) is especially tied to the history of the Church in Canada.\(^{54}\) With Crowe’s academic abilities and family interest in teaching, the Jesuits must have seemed like a good fit for a young man hearing a call to the religious life.

On the other hand, due to Crowe’s humility, we know very little for certain about what drew Crowe to the religious life. St. Philip Neri used to say, “What we know about the virtue of the saints is the least part of them.”\(^{55}\) While many people have told me what great kindness, gentleness, and holiness they experienced in Fr. Crowe, I only introduce this quotation from St. Philip Neri to explain the fact that the roots of Fr. Crowe’s Jesuit vocation and his attraction to the Holy Spirit are mostly hidden from us.

One thing we do know for certain, however, about Crowe’s early religious practice was his devotion to John Henry Newman (1801-90). Years later, in a 1968 book review, Crowe remarked:

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51 Frank and Olive Cogger, interview by author, 25 August 2015, St. John, NB. Olive, for her part, insisted that Fr. Crowe was “an ordinary person, like we are. He was easy to talk to.”
52 Michael Vertin, “Editor’s Introduction,” in *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, ix.
53 In 2016, the Jesuits in Canada combined their two provinces into a single Canadian province.
54 The Jesuits had some schools in the Maritimes, but not in New Brunswick.
Theologians brought up on Newman’s prose, with the cadences of *The Second Spring* and *Christ upon the Waters* still making music in our minds, find it hard to discuss Newman technically. . . . In our tradition Newman functions, I think, somewhat as he conceived the deposit to function in the early Church. **He is our blood. His mentality guides us implicitly, not only the positions he worked out but also the deeper notions that, by a kind of intellectual instinct, formed his judgments. . . .** notions that I think are absorbed and operative in the unformulated system of those steeped in Newman from their youth.\(^{56}\)

Newman’s sermons, in other words, with their intense love for the Holy Spirit, were well known to Crowe. Of particular interest, as a possible influence on Crowe, is the 1834 Pentecost sermon on the Holy Spirit: “The Indwelling Spirit.”\(^{57}\) Newman proclaimed that the Holy Spirit Himself perchance in His mysterious nature, is the Eternal Love whereby the Father and the Son have dwelt in each other, as ancient writers have believed; and what He is in heaven, that He is abundantly on earth. He lives in the Christian's heart, as the never-failing fount of charity, which is the very sweetness of the living waters.\(^{58}\)

Newman’s way of speaking of the Holy Spirit in that sermon has echoes, as we will see, in almost all of Crowe’s later writings on the Holy Spirit.

In addition to his writing, Blessed John Henry Newman was also the founder of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri in the English-speaking world. In the conclusion of this thesis, we will return to St. Philip Neri and his friendship with St. Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, for the light they shed on the importance of Crowe’s Trinitarian pneumatology.

Soon after their founding in 1540, some of the first Jesuits were involved in missionary work. Other Jesuits, including St. Jean de Brebeuf, initially arrived in what is now Canada in 1611. After difficulties forced them back to France, St. Jean de Brebeuf and others returned to

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New France in 1625. The Jesuits were at work in Canada until the Society was suppressed worldwide in 1773 by Pope Clement XI. After the Society of Jesus was reinstituted in 1814 by Pope Pius VI, the Society returned to Quebec in 1842. By 1845, a novitiate had been established in Montreal. It was not, however, until about seventy years later that “English Canada got its own novitiate in Guelph in 1913.”

When these English-speaking Canadians finished their novitiate, a juniorate was added at the same location in Guelph in 1915. During the juniorate at Guelph, “in an atmosphere of somewhat more concentrated attention than would be normal in a secular college,” the Jesuit brothers worked the farm while studying Latin and Greek as well as English and Rhetoric. Bernard Lonergan entered the Jesuit novitiate in Guelph “in the summer of 1922.” Lonergan was already a priest and working on his doctorate in Rome, when Frederick Crowe moved to Guelph to begin his life as a Jesuit in 1936.

During his novitiate, Crowe spent “his two years of ascetical training” under Joseph P. Monaghan, S.J. (1884-1980). After the two further years of the juniorate, Crowe first met Fr. Bernard Lonergan at a retreat in 1940. Crowe writes:

I remember an evaluation he gave us fifteen years later, when fresh from our own juniorate studies, we sat at his feet one summer day and asked him to tell us (guru style, we would now say) what the value of Greek and Latin classics was. The response was

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59 Michael Swan, “Jesuits 1611-2011: 400 Years of Giving,” The Catholic Register, 15 September 2011. The Jesuit novitiate in Guelph is about ninety miles south of the Martyr’s Shrine, Midland, Ontario, near where St. Jean de Brebeuf and others gave up their lives in the 1640s.
62 By the time that Crowe joined the Society, a separate English province had been formed in 1924. According to Fr. Jean-Marc Laporte S.J., “Fr. Crowe was the kind of guy who would do what his superiors said. Those years of the juniorate were for studying Greek, Latin, French, English, literature, and the arts of communication. We [as Jesuits] are meant to communicate the truth to others and had to be trained how to organize our thoughts, how to think logically, and how to write. Fr. Crowe was intelligent, but he also took his commitments seriously. If his superiors told him that this was what these years were for, then he would throw himself into that work” (Jean-Marc Laporte S.J., interview by author, November 10, 2015, Toronto).
forthright: the work of translation takes you behind words to ideas. . . . I do not remember where the conversation went from there.64

Crowe then adds a detail that tells us more of his own intellectual development at this point in his life: “I suppose that 30 years later he would talk of grammatical structures, different stages of meaning, different levels of culture, and that there was something of this in 1941 [sic], but if so it apparently had little meaning for me and did not stay in my memory.”65

Following the classical studies of the juniorate, three years of scholastic philosophy studies began for Crowe in Toronto.66 Having already completed a Bachelor’s degree, Crowe was able to earn a Licentiate in Philosophy in 1943. With seven years of formation complete, Crowe set off for his three years of regency in Halifax, Nova Scotia. According to Crowe, regency is the period “between philosophical studies and theological studies, in which the young Jesuit was expected to teach, to coach athletic teams, to oversee student publications, to be prefect of dormitories, and in general to make oneself useful to the school or college in

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64 Lonergan, 11.
65 Ibid. If Crowe was “fresh from” his juniorate, it seems like the date should have been 1940. William Mathews, however, puts this “preached retreat, four talks a day plus a conference, following the Ignatian format” given to “Jesuit student of philosophy” in the summer of 1941 (Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005] 110).
66 Beginning in 1885, Jesuit seminarians studied philosophy at the Jesuit-run College de l’Immaculée-Conception in Montreal. The Jesuits founded the College of Christ the King (Collegium Christi Regis) in 1930 as the Jesuit Seminary of philosophy at 403 Wellington Street West, Toronto, Ontario. A faculty of theology was added in 1943. The school was eventually called Regis College. See Dictionary of Jesuit Biography: Ministry to English Canada, 1842-1987 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Jesuit Studies, 1991) xvi-xx. Fr. Frederick Crowe studied philosophy at Regis College from 1940-3. When Frederick Crowe finished his philosophy studies, however, Regis College did not grant their own degrees. Crowe’s licentiate in philosophy was bestowed in 1943 from L’Immaculée Conception in Montréal. L’Immaculée Conception is where Bernard Lonergan taught theology after he returned from his doctoral studies in Rome in 1940. In 1958 in order to focus more on teaching theology, the Regis College faculty of philosophy was closed and Jesuit philosophy students were sent to St. Michael’s College, Gonzaga University. “Regis became a pontifical faculty with the ability to grant ecclesiastical degrees in 1956 and eventually moved to the campus of the University of Toronto in 1976” (Swan, “Jesuits 1611-2011: 400 Years of Giving,” The Catholic Register, 15 September 2011).
During his regency, in the middle of World War II, Brother Crowe had “charge of the athletic equipment” at the Jesuit college, St. Mary’s.

With his regency completed, Brother Crowe was then sent back to Christ the King Seminary (Regis College) to begin his theology studies in the fall of 1946. In the spring of 1947, a fortuitous event in Crowe’s life took place. Bernard Lonergan was sent to Toronto principally to teach a course at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. But during that same semester, Lonergan lived at Christ the King Seminary and taught there “a mini course, On Scripture and Tradition.” It was in that mini course that Crowe “first became a student of Fr. Lonergan.”

Lonergan’s Influence on Crowe

After teaching in Toronto in the spring of 1947, Bernard Lonergan was transferred to Regis College as a full-time professor in the fall of that same year. Since Crowe took that one course with Lonergan in his first year of theology studies, Crowe was part of the first English-speaking cohort to study under Lonergan for all four of their theology years. Looking back, Crowe spoke about those years with his “master:”

Setting out to give some account of this dissertation, I cannot myself avoid a very personal approach. I carry the freight of my own apprenticeship to Lonergan, four years when I sat as a disciple at the feet of a master, and this just at the time when he

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67 Lonergan, 17.
68 Crowe Archive A-3-4-1, File: Footnotes, 3.
69 See Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, CWL 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) xxiii.n72. See also Lonergan's Quest, 178. The course was called “the Divine Processions.” Five students attended, including Walter Principe, C.S.B. Principe “remembered it as his first real exposure to serious textually based historical scholarship, and initially found it overwhelming. Lonergan struck him as having a computer-like mind” (Ibid.).
71 Ibid.
72 According to Michael Vertin, Crowe would occasionally “brag” about this honour. For Crowe’s description of Lonergan’s teaching method, see Mathews, Lonergan's Quest, 178.
was fresh from his study of grace in Thomas and engrossed in his work on Thomist
cognitive theory.\footnote{Lonergan, 43. The description comes in Crowe’s discussion of Lonergan’s dissertation on operative grace in
(1941) 289-324; 3 (1942) 69-88, 375-402, 533-78. Lonergan’s articles, based on his dissertation, were collected
original dissertation and the subsequent articles were published as Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the
Thought of St Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, edited by Frederick E. Crowe,
and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). For background on Lonergan’s own doctoral
work, see Lonergan, 42-8.}

Crowe refers here to Lonergan’s 1941-2 articles, “St. Thomas’ Thought on Gratia Operans”
and Lonergan’s 1947-9 Verbum articles on Aquinas’s doctrine of intelligible emanation in the
human mind.\footnote{Cf. Bernard Lonergan, S.J., “The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas,” Theological Studies
7 (1946) 349-92; 8 (1947) 35-79, 404-44; 10 (1949) 3-40, 359-93. These articles were edited by David Burrell,
C.S.C. and publisher together in 1967. See Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967). For the most recent edition, see Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in
Aquinas, CWL 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).}

Soon after Lonergan’s 1941 article on operative grace appeared, Crowe had “tried to
read the first paragraph of Gratia Operans but gave up.”\footnote{Mathews, Lonergan’s Quest, 110.}
Crowe eventually, however, read
the articles with great interest. Years later he expressed his appreciation for the articles in this
way: “Then I think of the Thomist psychology which, with all its defects, I found so deeply
explanatory of and clearly verifiable in my religious experience that I cannot regard it as of
merely archaeological interest.”\footnote{Crowe, “Preface,” Grace and Freedom, x.} Crowe may have read them in the fall of 1947 when he took
his second Lonergan course. During that course on the theology of grace, it was not only what
Lonergan was teaching that so attracted Crowe in his course on grace with Lonergan, but also
how it was taught:

I feel bound to say that this experience, of studying divine grace under Lonergan, was
an experience of having a doctrine that had taken possession of its teacher. There was
conviction in Lonergan’s voice, even when he adduced proof texts in the ahistorical
manner of older theology, even when the Scripture he read in proof was from the Latin Vulgate. Those texts rang with feeling. 77

In 1949-1950, Crowe’s fourth year of theology under Lonergan’s “tutelage,” 78 Crowe took Lonergan’s class on the Trinity. 79 As in the course on grace, Crowe was deeply impressed by these lectures on the Trinity:

They ended with a sweeping view of life and thought, exploiting the potentialities of the trinitarian categories of intelligence, word, and love. It was an exhilarating experience for me, and not only that: as well it became an anchor through several years of change in a changing world conceived in the categories of a changing theology. 80

It is hard to overestimate Lonergan’s influence on Crowe’s thinking about the Trinity.

The Influence of the Verbum Articles

In 1949, Lonergan published his article, Imago Dei. In that final article of the series, what became the fifth chapter of Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Lonergan explained the underlying point of these articles. “When Aquinas spoke of God as ipsum intelligere [the act of understanding itself],” Lonergan asks, “did he mean that God was a pure act of understanding? To that conclusion we have been working through four chapters. But to cap that cumulative argument, there comes the impossibility that Aquinas meant anything else.” 81

After working through various possible meanings of intelligere to show that Aquinas could only have been thinking of the act of understanding, Lonergan writes:

It remains that ipsum intelligere is analogous to understanding, that God is an infinite and substantial act of understanding, that as the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, so also each is one and the same infinite and substantial act of understanding, finally that, though each is the pure act of understanding, still only the Father understands as uttering the Word. 82

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77 Crowe, “Preface,” Grace and Freedom, x.
79 It was the first time that Lonergan had taught the course in Regis’ four-year cycle of courses.
80 “General Editors’ Preface,” The Triune God: Systematics, xx. Emphasis is mine.
81 Verbum, 198. See for example, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 14, a. 4.
82 Verbum, 198-9. Cf. ST, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad. 3; a. 2, ad. 4.
The whole question of the divine knowing occurs after Aquinas has treated the divine substance (Summa Theologiae I, qq. 2-13). In those questions on God’s substance, Aquinas explains not so much what God is, but rather what God is not. Aquinas admits that we do not know God’s essence in this life. But in place of our knowing what God is, is it possible to use his infinite act of knowing as a kind of substitute in our thinking about God? In other words, can we treat God’s act of intellect as a kind of property by which we have some analogous notion of what God is like?

In Summa Theologiae I, q. 14-26, Aquinas begins to discuss the divine operations that remain within God. He treats of God’s intellect and will. Lonergan’s position probably finds its inspiration in Aquinas treating of God’s inner activity after treating what God is. We may not know what the essence of God is, but we can extrapolate from our experience of human acts of understanding to an infinite act of divine understanding. Instead of just thinking of God as the utterly simple, infinite act of existence, this procedure thinks of him as an unrestricted, infinite act of understanding. Would such a procedure help us grasp the unity between the questions on the one God in the Summa and the questions on the Trinity?

Bernard Lonergan thought that the Summa Theologiae marked a great advance in Thomas Aquinas’ thinking about the Trinity. “Though Aquinas,” Lonergan writes,

in his earlier works began from God the Father to treat next the generation of the Son and then the procession of the Holy Spirit, his Summa Theologiae eliminated even the semblance of a logical fiction of a becoming in God. The Summa treats first God as one, to turn to God as triune ‘secundum viam doctrinae [according to the way of teaching].’ In this presentation, the starting point is not God the Father but God; the first question is not whether there are processions from God the Father but whether there is procession in God.83

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83 Verbum, 213. On the distinction between two different orders of learning, the way of teaching (via doctrinae) and the way of discovery (via inventionis), see “Theology and Understanding,” Collection, CWL 4, ed. Frederick Crowe, S.J. and Robert M. Doran, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 123-7.
According to Lonergan, Aquinas’ treatment of the one God in questions 2-26 before he treats of the Triune God (qq. 27-43) does not need a great apology. Lonergan goes on to say:

After establishing two processions in God, the existence of real relations in God is treated. Only after both processions and relations have been treated is the question of persons raised. The significance of this procedure is that it places Thomist trinitarian theory in a class by itself.84

Lonergan wrote in a very similar way in his book, *The Triune God: Systematics.* 85

Lonergan begins his systematic account of the Trinity with the processions. In the third assertion of chapter two, Lonergan turns to a discussion of the divine nature. The procession of the Word, that is, the generation of the eternal Son, raises the question of the divine nature. “Since generation results in a likeness of nature,” Lonergan writes, “we have to consider the question: What is the nature of God?”86 In this discussion, Lonergan defends the importance of thinking of God’s nature as intellectual as providing an analogical understanding of what God is. Although we do not have the beatific vision in this life by which we would know what God is, “this in no way prevents us . . . from ordering what we know analogically [of God] in such a way that some element of what we know analogically is first after the manner of a nature or essence.”87 Lonergan, to the chagrin of some Thomists,88 looked to God’s act of

84 *Verbum*, 213.
87 Ibid., 195.
88 For an example, see Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, “The Priority of Judgment over Question: Reflections on Transcendental Thomism,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 14.4 (1974) 476. I thank Fr. Daniel Utrecht for bringing this essay to my attention. For contemporary negative reactions by Jesuits to the *Verbum* articles, see *Lonergan’s Quest*, 182-4.
understanding for this element that provides the first element in our ordering of what God is. “In this sense,” Lonergan writes, “the nature of God is God’s act of understanding, upon which follows God’s infinity and aseity and simplicity, and whatever else there is in God but unknown to us.”

Lonergan then argues at some length for how God’s infinity, aseity, and simplicity follow from the view that God’s nature is primarily intellectual.

In these philosophical arguments, Lonergan is considering ‘nature’ as essence, from which all other aspects of God follow like properties. But then he turns to thinking of nature “in the sense of an intrinsic principle of operation.” Here again Lonergan concludes “that the divine nature is intellectual.” By our natural knowledge of God, Lonergan thinks that we can know that God is intellectual. But that notion of God as intellectual does not prove on its own that there are distinctions in God. Lonergan only accepts that there are distinct persons in God on the basis of the revelation. “For although,” Lonergan writes, “absolutely no real distinction can be posited in God according to our natural knowledge of God, still, as we come to know God through faith and theology, we discover real personal distinctions in God that are constituted through relations of origin.”

Reflecting on these personal distinctions within the Trinity, Aquinas himself linked the origin of the persons to the divine nature. In his question on man as the image of God, Aquinas writes,

the mode of origin is not the same in all things; rather the mode of origin in each thing is in accord with what befits its own nature: animate things being produced in one way, inanimate things in another; animals in one way and plants in another. It is evident,

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89 The Triune God: Systematics, CWL 12, 195. “Aseity (Latin a, from; se, itself: ens a se) is the property by which a being exists of and from itself” (George M. Sauvage, C.S.C, The Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 1 (New York: Robert Appleton, 1907) 774.
91 The Triune God: Systematics, 197.
92 Ibid.
therefore, that the distinction of divine persons is *in accord with what befits the divine nature*.\(^{93}\)

After quoting this passage, Lonergan immediately quotes a line from the following article in the *Summa*: “the uncreated Trinity is distinguished on the basis of the procession of the Word from the Speaker and of Love from both.”\(^ {94}\) Aquinas goes on to discuss the way a word and love proceed in the rational creature. But these finite processions within the image of God are analogous to the processions of the Word and the Holy Spirit. Since the origins of those persons “are according to the emanations of intellectual consciousness, we must conclude,” Lonergan writes, “that the divine nature is intellectual.”\(^ {95}\)

*Crowe’s Acceptance of a Dynamically Conceived Divine Nature*

Crowe knew these texts in Aquinas and Lonergan and found them persuasive. In his own course notes on the Trinity, Crowe asks: “What grounds the relation of origin between the Father and Son, and what grounds the relation of origin between the Spirit on one side, and the Father and Son on the other?”\(^ {96}\) Drawing on Lonergan, Crowe adds:

> The answer, in its final formulation, will be that the divine nature is ‘rational’ (we have no better single word for it at the moment), so that in God there is One who from the fullness of infinite understanding utters a Word, this Word is also One who is divine, and from him flows a Love that is likewise One who is divine; thus the one infinite ‘rational’ nature ‘grounds’ the distinct ‘characteristics’ of three divine persons who are, nevertheless, but one God.\(^ {97}\)

Crowe’s use of the words ‘ground’ and ‘rational’ echoes Lonergan’s *Verbum* articles. A “basic contention” of those 1947-9 articles was “that the human mind is an image, and not a mere vestige, of the Blessed Trinity because its processions are intelligible in a manner that is

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\(^{93}\) *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 93, a. 5. Emphasis is mine.

\(^{94}\) Ibid., a. 6. Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 28, a. 3.

\(^{95}\) *The Triune God: Systematics*, 199.

\(^{96}\) *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 119.

\(^{97}\) Ibid.
essentially different from, that transcends, the passive, specific, imposed intelligibility of other natural process.” But then Lonergan makes use of the word ‘ground’ in talking about the procession of a word in human consciousness:

Any effect has a sufficient ground in its cause; but an inner word not merely has a sufficient ground in the act of understanding it expresses; it also has a knowing as sufficient ground, and that ground is operative precisely as a knowing, knowing itself to be sufficient.

The point is that our concepts and judgments proceed from our awareness of the sufficiency of our understanding. We grasp the reason why this has to be the definition of a circle, for example. In terms of the judgment, we grasp, for instance, the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming the truth. Inner words do not proceed automatically like images in the imagination.

Lonergan then introduces a single term to summarize what he wants to say in these articles:

We may say that the inner word is rational, not indeed from the derived rationality of discourse, of reasoning from premises to conclusions, but with the basic and essential rationality of rational consciousness, with the rationality that can be discerned in any judgment, with the rationality that we now have to observe in all concepts.

Lonergan later uses the words “reflective rationality” to express the way in which inner words (definitions and judgments) consciously and intelligently proceed in us.

By 1965-6, Crowe did not want to separate this dynamically conceived divine nature from the psychological analogy. The divine nature so conceived helps understand why there are two processions and three divine persons. Crowe speaks of the “doctrine of a ‘rational’ God who is Dicens, Verbum, and Amor.” Crowe saw Lonergan’s teaching on the divine

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98 Verbum, 47.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 207.
102 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 142 [Speaker, Word, and Love].
nature as filling out the trajectory of Augustine and Aquinas. This is why the title of *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*’s chapter five is “The Psychological Analogy: The Divine Nature Such as to be Dicens, Verbum, and Amor.”\(^\text{103}\) Crowe loved the following line of Lonergan: “The Augustinian psychological analogy makes trinitarian theology a prolongation of natural theology, a deeper insight into what God is.”\(^\text{104}\)

For Crowe, Lonergan both clarified Aquinas’ notion of the two processions in God and brought the question of the procession in God to “its clearest formulation and proper order.”\(^\text{105}\)

According to Crowe,

> The ultimate question to which the analytic mind came in the course of history . . . was the following: Why are there processions in God? What kind of ‘nature’ is it that, though infinite, has Son proceeding from Father, and Spirit from both, while the Father himself proceeds from no one?\(^\text{106}\)

Crowe articulates here in 1965-6 what he had begun to hold in 1949-50. Thinking of God’s nature as dynamic will stay with Crowe for the rest of his life and deeply shape the third stage of his pneumatology.

**Under the Influence of *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding***

Frederick Crowe was ordained a priest in June of 1949. He returned to Regis College in 1949-50 to work on his licentiate. Lonergan was given the Catholic Theological Society of America’s (CTSA) Spellman Medal at a special dinner in the fall of 1949 for his articles on Aquinas.\(^\text{107}\) When Crowe finished his licentiate thesis under Lonergan, he was sent to Rome

\(^{103}\) Ibid., 119 [Speaker, Word, and Love].

\(^{104}\) *Verbum*, 215-6.

\(^{105}\) *The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity*, 119.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.

\(^{107}\) Mathews, *Lonergan’s Quest*, 202. For the minutes of the CTSA Fourth Annual Meeting in June 1949 see [http://ejournals.bc.edu/ojs/index.php/ctsa/article/viewFile/2271/1865](http://ejournals.bc.edu/ojs/index.php/ctsa/article/viewFile/2271/1865) (accessed on 11 April 2017). Lonergan was the secretary of the gathering, but also was designated as the recipient of this award.
for his doctorate at the Gregorian University. Like Lonergan fifteen years earlier, Crowe then travelled to Amiens, France, for “a third year of novitiate,” his final year of formation, “his year of tertianship, a short ten months but regularly a profound experience for Jesuits.”

When Crowe completed this year in Amiens, he was asked to teach theology at Regis College in Toronto. He would be taking the place of Lonergan who had been assigned to teach at the Gregorian. When Charles Boyer, S.J., visited Toronto in the fall of 1952, Lonergan learned that he would be heading over to Rome the following year. Years later, he explained:

I worked at *Insight* from 1949 to 1953. During the first three years my intention was an exploration of methods generally in preparation for a study of the method of theology. But in 1952 it became clear that I was due to start teaching at the Gregorian University in Rome in 1953, so I changed my plan and decided to round off what I had done and publish it.

In a letter from December of 1952 to Fr. Crowe, Lonergan explained how much of *Insight* he had written:

About 12 chapters done. About 6 chapter to go . . . Topics: insight in maths, empirical science, common sense, knowing things, judgment; objectivity of insight; nature of metaphysics; God; dialectic of individual consciousness (Freud) of community (Marx) of objectivity (philosophies), of religion. Had hoped to include theology, but impossible now that I am going to Rome in September.

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108 In 1950, Crowe finished a Licentiate in Theology at Regis. He wrote his dissertation, “The Unity of the Virtues in St. Thomas Aquinas,” under the supervision of Lonergan (Cf. *Three Thomist Studies*, xvii). Crowe later wrote his doctoral dissertation on Aquinas: “Conflict and Unification in Man: The Data in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.” Crowe completed the doctorate in 1952 at the Gregorian University in Rome. After Crowe finished his dissertation, a fifty-two-page extract was published the following year. See Frederick Crowe, S.J., “Conflict and Unification in Man: The Data in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas” (Roanne: Gregorian University, 1953). I thank Fr. Justin Kizewski, S.T.D., for copying this for me from the Gregorian Library.

109 *Lonergan*, 27.


112 *Lonergan*, 71.
Crowe was amazed to find the book finished by August 1953. In the summer of 1953, Crowe arrived in Toronto and “read the manuscript (not the Preface, and possibly not the Introduction) in early August, when the final sections had already been returned by the typists.” In was decided that Crowe would produce an index for the book; but for various reasons, the publication of *Insight* was delayed until 1957.

In his 1957 review article, “The Origin and Scope of Bernard Lonergan’s *Insight,*” Crowe talked about how for many reading *Insight* will be “the beginning of a new and extended intellectual experience.” Crowe said that *Insight* would give to many readers “a new orientation.” Crowe was convinced that the book was in fundamental continuity with the best of Catholic philosophy, while at the same time taking a remarkable step forward. On the one hand, Crowe’s “own tentative view is that *Insight* is destined to take a place among the great books of modern thought, but it might be rash at the present time to assign it a more precise ranking.” On the other hand, Crowe connected Lonergan’s work with the Thomist revival which began under Pope Leo XIII. In Crowe’s mind, *Insight* was not “intended as a totally new line of thought but as a development of Thomism according to the Leonine *vetera novis augere et perficere.*”

Crowe’s review begins with the main theme of *Insight* and then takes up the relationship between *Insight* and Thomas Aquinas’ thought. The theme of the book is to help readers toward “the full perfection of self-knowledge” on the basis of which there follows a “consequent ontology.” Crowe was persuaded that Lonergan had uncovered the basic

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113 Ibid., 72.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., 21.
117 Ibid. [to strengthen and complete the old by aid of the new] (*Aeterni Patris,* 24).
119 Ibid.
structure of human knowing with its three interrelated levels. These three levels provide a basis for grounding Thomistic metaphysical analysis.

Crowe was not shy in comparing Lonergan’s achievement with the partial successes of Sigmund Freud in the area of self-knowledge and Martin Heidegger in the area of ontology. Lonergan’s method in *Insight*, according to Crowe, fits with other twentieth century proposals: “Postpone metaphysics and take our departure from the subject, in the present case, from the dynamism and immanent laws of cognitional activity itself.”

Crowe was persuaded that Lonergan had “worked out in full detail” what Freud and Heidegger had proposed in the realm of self-knowledge and metaphysics.

*Insight’s* original subtitle was an “essay in aid of a personal appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness.” In our consciousness, in our awareness of ourselves and our knowing activity, we can discover, Lonergan was saying, an unchanging, but dynamic structure of operations. What is this structure? In his 1965 essay, “Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Nature and Operation in All,” Crowe gave a useful summary of Lonergan’s “748-page introduction” to “the notion of structure” in *Insight.* Since this summary gives us a good take on “Crowe’s Lonergan,” I think it is worth quoting Crowe’s summary of Lonergan at length:

In the beginning is experience: I hear and taste and feel and smell and, most of all, I see. So of course does my dog; but there is the difference between me and my dog that I get ideas about my experience; more basically, there is in me a wonder, a capacity to seek the intelligibility of experience; it is this wonder that gives rise to ideas. Sooner or later, however, in the self-correcting process of learning, I discover that my ideas are not always right, that error abounds when I accept my ideas uncritically, that ideas in general are just possible explanations of the data and, if I am to be rational, I must institute a further inquiry, I must reflect on the correctness of my ideas; it is this

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120 Ibid., 26.
122 Ibid., 17. Cf. *Insight*, 748.
123 Crowe, “Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Nature and Operation in All,” Appropriating, 36.
reflection that gives rise to rational truth and knowledge of the real. So there are three levels: experience (data, presentations of sense, representations of imagination), understanding (ideas, thoughts, suppositions which are possible explanations), reflection (grasp of evidence grounding judgment and knowledge). And the dynamism which operates the transition from level to level is manifested in a twofold question: the question for understanding which turns experience into something to be understood, the question for reflection which turns the idea into something to be investigated for its truth. Furthermore, within each of the two higher levels there is the extremely important element of formulation, the Thomist twofold *verbum*: on the level of understanding, ideas are formulated into concepts (transition from the engagement with the particular to release from the particular into universalization); on the level of reflection, grasp of evidence is formulated in judgments (transition from subjective grounds of affirmation to objective judgment and the “public” character of knowledge, the possibility of communication).124

Crowe’s summary of the structure of human knowing lends itself to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Dynamism that operates the transitions between levels and the question that manifests this dynamic wonder</th>
<th>Levels of Cognitional activity</th>
<th>Names of Level with Operations on that level</th>
<th>Element of formulation – Thomist twofold <em>verbum</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Further inquiry – question for reflection? <em>Is my idea/concept correct?</em></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reflection (grasp of evidence grounding judgment and knowledge)</td>
<td>→ judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonder about what is experienced → gives rise to questions for understanding and ideas → <em>What is this all?</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Understanding (I get ideas, thoughts, suppositions which are possible explanations about my experience)</td>
<td>→ concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Experience (I hear and taste and feel and smell and, most of all, I see; i.e., data, presentations of sense, representations of imagination)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

124 Ibid., 36-7.
In the first stage of his development, Crowe maintained that Lonergan’s Thomism, with his interpretation of a twofold inner word and its emphasis on insight into phantasm, led Lonergan to grasp the “cognitional process in its dynamism and immanent conditions of unfolding.”

From Aquinas’ largely theoretical account of knowing, Lonergan was able, in his own words, to piece together “a sufficient number of indications and suggestions to form an adequate account of wisdom in cognitional terms.”

Crowe draws our attention to a reference to science in an important passage of *Insight*: “the contribution of science and of scientific method to philosophy lies in a unique ability to supply philosophy with instances of the heuristic structures which a metaphysics integrates into a single view of the universe.”

The way scientists proceed – *starting with data, formulating hypotheses, and testing for verification* – provides the instances that Lonergan is referring to. The method of modern science, as it has developed in the seven centuries after Aquinas, illustrates the threefold structure of human knowing.

Crowe understood that Lonergan was then basing his philosophy, his metaphysics, “on cognitional activity.” Because this dynamic structure of operations is “unchanging,” it gives philosophy “permanent stability and removes it from the possibility of radical revision.”

The metaphysical principles of all material reality could only be revised by an appeal to experience, to understanding, or to judgment. In trying to refute the structure of our knowing, one ends up supplying “an instance of the unchanging structure of cognitional activity.”

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129 Ibid., 30.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
Four years after *Insight* was published, Crowe wrote an article in 1961 defending the way Lonergan lines up the three-fold structure of human knowing with the three metaphysical principles of proportionate being: potency, form, and act. The article, “St. Thomas and the Isomorphism of Knowing and Its Proper Object,” sought to present evidence in Aquinas’ writings that supports Lonergan’s claim of an isomorphic relationship between knowing and what is known. Lonergan’s argument, according to Crowe,
is that human knowing is structured in a set of three related acts and that the contents of those acts must be similarly structured: human knowing in its proper field, is a unification of experiencing, understanding, and judging; and so what is known in this field will be a parallel unification of a content of experience, a content of understanding, and a content of judging. Further, knowing is objective; the pattern of cognitional contents is not just notional but reflects the ontological pattern of what is known. And so, corresponding to experience, understanding, and judgment in the human subject, we have potency, form, and act in the proportionate object of his knowing.132

In 1957, Crowe was aware of the many intellectual influences on Lonergan’s thought, yet Crowe was still convinced that Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy was the basis of *Insight*.133 But on this foundation, Lonergan built a larger structure. In a word, Crowe thought that Lonergan had reached “up to the mind of Aquinas” as few others had.134

Taking someone through Crowe’s remarkable, but complicated argument for finding isomorphism in Aquinas would require a whole other chapter. Such analysis is not really so important for Crowe’s pneumatology.

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133 Crowe will later nuance his understanding of the actual history of Lonergan’s thought. See *Lonergan*, 39.

What is relevant is the fact of Crowe’s appropriation of Lonergan’s notion of levels of thought. If the classes that Crowe took with Lonergan and the theology of the *Verbum* articles persuaded Crowe to take seriously Lonergan’s theology, *Insight* gradually convinced Crowe about the need for a new philosophy. Crowe found in Lonergan a defence for the Thomistic metaphysics that was rooted in a verifiable cognitional theory.

In his “Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Nature and Operation in All,” Crowe makes the following remark:

> We need then a critical awareness, an appropriation and evaluation of our own powers of intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation of the universe of being; we need also an awareness and appropriation of our power for harmonious accord with the universe, but the emphasis of this article has been on the cognitional side rather than on the affective.\(^{135}\)

In this passage, Crowe’s reference to a *harmonious accord* is an allusion to his series of 1959 articles, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas.” There Crowe argues that corresponding to our judgments of existence there exists an affective complement. This affective acceptance of what is he identifies with Aquinas’ notion of *complacentia boni*. In 1965, he speaks of this first affective moment as a “harmonious accord.”\(^{136}\)

Crowe thought, I will argue, that Lonergan’s *Insight* had not spelled out enough the affective dimension of life. Crowe’s work on an affection that complements the judgment of being was an attempt to expand Lonergan’s thought. Crowe thought that we can become aware of this power of complacency with what is. Crowe also wanted to use this harmonious accord, this first moment of love, as an analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit.\(^{137}\)

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\(^{135}\) Crowe, “Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Nature and Operation in All,” *Appropriating*, 49.

\(^{136}\) Crowe’s 1959 article will be the main focus of chapter 3.

The whole question of affectivity raises an important question for Lonergan’s levels of knowing. How does love fit with these levels? Does it belong as an extension of the third level? Does it belong on a fourth level? To summarize some of the findings of this thesis, Crowe eventually accepted the idea that love belongs in a fourth level of consciousness. And this issue brings us to the third book of Lonergan’s that especially influenced Crowe, *Method in Theology*.

*Method in Theology*’s Influence

Lonergan did not publish his second great masterpiece, *Method in Theology*, until 1972. In its early stages, *Insight* was intended to become a book on methodology for theology. Crowe later expressed the connection between *Insight* and *Method in Theology* in this way: “*Insight* studied the operations that are the basis of method; work on method itself can begin in earnest now.”

With his being sent to Rome in 1953, Lonergan decided that a book on theological method would have to wait.

In Crowe’s opinion, the years of Lonergan’s teaching of theology in Canada (1940-53) and in Rome (1953-65) were not wasted time in terms of methodology. In those twenty-five years of actually teaching theology, Lonergan worked out the nature of theological method.

Moreover, Lonergan held graduate level seminars on methodology in those years at the Gregorian as well as summer courses at places like Regis College. There was an especially important summer session in 1962 at Regis.

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138 *Lonergan*, 83.
140 In 1961-2, Lonergan taught a graduate seminar called *De Methodo Theologiae* at the Gregorian. That summer, Lonergan lectured at Regis College in English. The lectures were held from July 9-20, 1962 and were called “The Method of Theology” (*Lonergan*, 93).
As Crowe had immediately written a review of *Insight* in 1957, so Crowe wrote a review of *Method in Theology* that was published in 1973.\(^ {141}\) Crowe admitted, however, that the review would not necessarily “reveal the essential Lonergan.”\(^ {142}\) The review would “rather show what is at the centre of my interests and consciousness.”\(^ {143}\)

The review began by explaining the genesis of the book. The review then explained the connection between the book and Lonergan’s present thinking. Crowe explains: “my view on the central and most comprehensive difference between Lonergan’s thinking at the present time and that of the ‘earlier Lonergan’: the shift from exploring cognitional process to exploring values and the fourth level of consciousness.”\(^ {144}\) Crowe even adds that this shift from an emphasis on intellect to emphasizing love is the “criterion” by which one might “divide his thought so far into two periods.”\(^ {145}\) Crowe did not think that this later Lonergan emerged only with the publication of *Method*. Crowe thought he could identify a shift in Lonergan around 1965.

Lonergan’s concern with methodology, however, goes back to the 1930s, and Crowe traced some of this history in his 1991 book *Lonergan*.\(^ {146}\) For our purposes, what has to be emphasized is Lonergan’s 1965 breakthrough to the idea of functional specialties. Drawing on the three levels of thought (experience, understanding, judgment) and adding a level of decision as the fourth level of consciousness, Lonergan was able to explain eight distinct and interrelated tasks in theology. “From the structure of consciousness,” Crowe explained, “we


\(^{142}\) Ibid., 123.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 123.

\(^{144}\) Ibid., 131.

\(^{145}\) Ibid., 131.

\(^{146}\) *Lonergan*, 81ff. The chapter is titled: “Experiments in method: a quarter-century of exploration.”
move to the specialties they organize. The four levels, and the two directions in which one may move through them, give the eight functional specialties.”\textsuperscript{147}

The eight functional specialties are distinct but interrelated stages in the whole process of theology, and Lonergan divided this whole process into two phases. In the first phase, there are the stages of research, interpretation, history, dialectic. In the second stage, we pass through the stages of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. Crowe explains how Lonergan ties the functional specialties to the four levels of consciousness:

Thus, on the four levels of the upward development of consciousness we have research corresponding to experience, interpretation corresponding to understanding, history corresponding to judgement, and dialectic corresponding to decision. And, on the same four levels but in a downward movement, we have foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications on the levels, respectively, of decision, judgment, understanding, and experience.\textsuperscript{148}

Crowe’s description of Lonergan’s functional specialties are illustrated in the following chart with the four levels of operations in the middle:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|l|}
\hline
\textit{1st Phase of Theology} & \textit{Levels of Consciousness} & \textit{2nd Phase of Theology} \\
\hline
Dialectic & Decision & Foundations \\
\hline
History & Judgment & Doctrines \\
\hline
Interpretation & Understanding & Systematics \\
\hline
Research & Experience & Communications \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Two Phases of Methodical Theology}
\end{table}

Corresponding to human experience, understanding, judgement, and decision, we have the functional specialties of research into data that is experienced in the fonts of theology,

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 111.
understanding of that data in interpretation, judgement about what is changing in the data through history, and then an analysis of the differences, dialectic, leading to a decision, a personal commitment about which of the competing histories to follow. The second phase begins with the fourth level of decision and moves downward through the levels of judgment and understanding to experience.

This second phase of theology, according to Crowe’s interpretation, presupposes religious conversion and the gift of grace. Based on one’s conversion, foundations look within human interiority in order to better articulate doctrines. Since conversion involves a decision for God, foundations are placed at the level of responsible decision. Then one moves to the level of judgment and works out the doctrines that need to be articulated. A Systematics, corresponding to the level of understanding, is then able to be work out a way of putting these doctrines together. And this leads to a return to the level of experience as we try in Communications to bring the Gospel to others on a level of their experience.

What Crowe came to see was that these two phases of theology contained the seeds for “one of the last of [Lonergan’s] great general ideas,” the two paths of human development. In 1976, Lonergan explained

Human development is of two types. There is development from below upwards: experience, understanding, judgments of fact, judgments of value. This is the way we appropriate, make things our own. On the other hand, there is development from above downwards, the benefits of acculturation, socialization, education, the transmission of tradition.

149 Cf. The Lonergan Enterprise, 89.
150 “It is by knowing,” Crowe says about theology’s reflection on conversion, “what we are that we will know what formulation of doctrines is appropriate for our time, and we are what we are by the gift of the Spirit of God” (Ibid., 89).
151 “The Task of Interpreting Lonergan,” Appropriating, 158.
In *Insight*, Lonergan had focused on *three levels of thought*. He had focused on the development from experience, through understanding, to knowledge of what is. By the time of *Method in Theology*, Lonergan has *four levels of consciousness*. In addition to the questions – what is this? Is it correct? – there arises the question: *what is the worthwhile or valuable thing to do?* This is the question of responsibility and decision.\(^{153}\)

Soon after *Method in Theology*, Lonergan begins to speak of the general movement from experience → understanding → judgment → values as a development from below. He contrasts that movement with an interior movement that begins, to continue the metaphor, “from above downwards.” Lonergan will even say that the development that begins from above is prior: “The structure of individual development is twofold. The chronologically prior phase is from above downwards.”\(^{154}\)

Fr. Crowe first mentions the two ways of development in passing during a lecture at the 1976 Lonergan Workshop. “Fr. Lonergan has recently emphasized,” Crowe said:

> that “human development is of two quite distinct kinds.” There is “development from below upwards,” and this will be my concern. . . . The other kind is “from above downwards,” the result of the “transformation of falling in love.” . . . *I leave it aside, however, in this paper*, well aware that in so doing I may seem to commit the folly of those who build just half a ship.\(^{155}\)

In 1979, Crowe again mentions the two paths in passing, claiming that they are “unexplored” and his own reflections on them “rudimentary.”\(^{156}\) But in 1981, after more careful research,
Crowe was able to compare the two ways of development to the two phases of theology that Lonergan worked out in *Method*: “This twofold scheme is new, though it stands in continuity with *Method* . . . for it derives directly from the contrast between the two phases of theology, and almost comes to explicit formulation at one point.”\(^{157}\) Crowe did not think that Lonergan had thematized the two paths of development when he wrote *Method in Theology*. Yet Crowe thought that it was implicit in the way Lonergan set up the two phases of theology with their respective movements between stages.

Although Lonergan published *Method in Theology* in 1971 and had been working on it since 1965, Crowe only gradually appropriated the work. Crowe was busy in the 1970s reprinting Lonergan’s early Latin theology.\(^{158}\) He was busy developing the Lonergan Center in the library of Regis College at their Bayview Avenue property.\(^{159}\) He was also involved in the formation of a new ecumenical school of theology.

Ever since the Jesuits helped to form the Toronto School of Theology (TST) in 1968, non-Catholic theology students began to take courses at Regis. The location in Willowdale was not very convenient for Jesuits to travel to the other TST schools in downtown Toronto, nor was it convenient for their students to reach Regis. So, discussions began about whether to move Regis again. This whole affair with its personal difficulties became a great burden to Crowe.\(^{160}\)

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\(^{157}\) “On Ultimate Reality and Meaning,” *Appropriating*, 102. For the two phases, see *Method in Theology*, Chapter Five. For the place that Crowe thinks the distinction is almost made explicit, see *Method in Theology*, 142. These two movements will be the focus of Part III of this thesis.


\(^{159}\) In 1962, the Jesuits moved Regis to a more rural setting on Bayview Avenue in Willowdale, Ontario, just outside Toronto.

\(^{160}\) According to Fr. Laporte, S.J., this issue and the subsequent rift with Lonergan was painful for Fr. Crowe who was heavily involved in the move of Regis College (Jean-Marc Laporte, S.J, interview by author, November 10, 2015). Part of Lonergan’s objection was based on the need to live near a good library for doing real scholarly work.
In 1975, out of dissatisfaction over the Jesuits’ decision to sell the Bayview Avenue buildings and move to a downtown location, Bernard Lonergan asked to be transferred to Boston College. Fr. Crowe, by contrast, was in favour of relocating the school in order to be closer to the other schools in the ecumenical TST. The move would require living quarters to be apart from the college in separate houses with communities of smaller sizes.

With the 1976 move of Regis College, Crowe expanded (in rented office space near the new Regis College) the Lonergan Center. In these years, 1975-6, Crowe did not publish very much. Part of the reason for this was Crowe’s efforts to write a book about *Method in Theology*’s functional specialty of history. Crowe’s archives show him working for many years on this book that came out in 1978.161 Between 1976-8, Fr. Crowe was also involved in a theological commission dealing with questions of women’s ordination to the ministerial priesthood.162 But all the while, Crowe was still energetically teaching theology at Regis College while trying to adapt his pedagogy to the changed student body of the 1970s.163

Much of Crowe’s thinking in the 1970s had to do with problems of historicity. For example, Crowe begins the paper he prepared for the International Lonergan Congress 1970 in this way: “The problem I am addressing began to emerge about two centuries ago and has

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162 These issues dealing with Crowe’s attitude towards the Magisterium will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five.

163 One of Crowe’s long time and most loved courses at Regis was called *The Word of God Communicated to Men*. See especially his course notes, F. E. Crowe, *De Verbo Dei cum Hominibus Communicato* (Toronto: Regis College, 1963). That course was about the transmission of divine revelation. In the 1960’s Crowe came to think of revelation as primarily history itself, with the culmination of history happening in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. He is God’s “primary word” to us (*Theology of the Christian Word*, 104ff.). Crowe finished teaching the Trinity course at Regis in 1977.
been with us in fairly clear formulation most of our century.” In 1904, Maurice Blondel explained the problem as that “of the relation of dogma and history, and of the critical method and the necessary authority of doctrinal formulae.” In 1966, Van Austin Harvey published his work, *The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief*. Crowe quotes Harvey’s way of expressing the problem: “orthodox belief corrodes the delicate machinery of sound historical judgment.” Crowe notes that Harvey’s book “examines the three greats of the passing era, Bultmann, Tillich, and Barth.” Harvey’s judgment of all three theologians is that they do not make it clear “how it is possible to be a critical historian and a believer.” Blondel was a Catholic philosopher. Harvey was a Protestant theologian. But both conceive the problem, Crowe thinks, in similar terms.

The exact nature of the problem of dogma and history only gradually came home to Crowe. As he gradually assimilated Lonergan’s later ideas, Crowe became convinced, in the second stage of his pneumatology, that Lonergan’s *Method in Theology* provided the basic tools for solving the most fundamental aspects of the problem of history and dogma.

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But 1979 brought a new opportunity for Crowe – a chance to reflect on Lonergan’s entire life’s work. Various Jesuits were trying to celebrate Lonergan’s seventy-fifth birthday. In particular, Gonzaga University wanted to honour this milestone with a series of lectures. In 1972, Lonergan had given the first set of St. Michael’s lectures at Gonzaga in Spokane, “where Fr. Lonergan’s thought has been studied assiduously ever since the appearance of Insight in 1957.”\textsuperscript{170} Besides Lonergan, “E. L. Mascall, George Lindbeck, Joseph Komonchak, David Tracy, and Paul Ricoeur,”\textsuperscript{171} had delivered subsequent lectures. Gonzaga thought it was fitting that the 1979 lecture “should return to the profound thinking of Bernard Lonergan.”\textsuperscript{172} They invited Crowe to deliver these lectures, because “no one most probably is better qualified than the eminent theologian Frederick Crowe, SJ, the director of the Lonergan Center at Regis College, Toronto.”\textsuperscript{173}

Crowe delivered three lectures at Gonzaga between October 5-7, 1979. These lectures, prepared “as a whole and delivered as a unit,”\textsuperscript{174} were subsequently published as \textit{The Lonergan Enterprise}. The first and third of the lectures had featured “as a pair”\textsuperscript{175} in an earlier 1979 lecture tour through seven cities of Australia. The Lonergan Centre in Sydney, directed by Fr. Peter Beer, S.J., had teamed up with Fr. Thomas Daly of the Melbourne College of Divinity, to bring Crowe to Australia in order to celebrate Lonergan’s seventy-fifth birthday. Crowe’s central idea in the lectures was inspired by a letter of John Henry Newman.

\textsuperscript{170} The Lonergan Enterprise, ix. The December 1972 inaugural St. Michael’s Lectures were subsequently published as Bernard Lonergan, \textit{Philosophy of God, and Theology} (Westminster Press, 1974).
\textsuperscript{171} The Lonergan Enterprise, vii.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., ix.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., ix. The first lecture was later delivered at Marquette and appeared “as the Pere Marquette Lecture of 1980 under the title, \textit{Method in Theology: An Organon for Our Time}” (Ibid., x).
After John Henry Newman wrote his *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, he sent a copy to his friend Robert Dale. Dale replied to Newman’s letter and spoke about the new theology that was needed:

No one, as far as I know, has ever done for Theology what Bacon did for physical science, and since I saw the announcement of your Essay I have been looking for its appearance with great curiosity and interest, for there are many passages in your writings which indicate that you had given very much thought to many of the questions that would be illustrated in a Theological *Novum Organon* . . .

In his reply, Newman wrote,

You have truly said that we need a Novum Organum for theology – and I shall be truly glad if I shall be found to have made any suggestions which will aid the formation of such a calculus – but it must be the strong conception and the one work of a great genius, not the obiter attempt of a person like myself, who has already attempted many things, and is at the end of his days.

Crowe began his 1979 lectures with these two passages from Newman’s *Letters and Diaries*. But Fr. Crowe also quotes both of these passages at the end of his 1980 address to the University of St. Thomas in New Brunswick.

In that lecture, Crowe goes on to explain briefly the basic thrust of the quotations. Francis Bacon had invented an inductive organon, “an instrument of mind” that was parallel to the instrument of mind that Aristotle had unknowingly invented by his logical works. This logical organon had served for thousands of years “to systematize deductive thought and reduce the leeway of error.” Seeing the need for a new inductive instrument to guide experimental science, Francis Bacon “would do for experimental science what Aristotle had done for

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179 “The Janus Problematic,” *Appropriating*, 287. The address was on the nest of questions surrounding the relationship between our orientation to the past and to the future, to tradition and innovation.

180 Ibid.
demonstrative thinking.”

Crowe brings up Dale’s letter and Newman’s response because of how they “saw the need for an analogous organon in the field of theology.” What Aristotle did for medieval science with his logical organon, and Bacon proposed to do for modern science with his own inductive tools, Crowe thinks Lonergan has analogously done for modern theology.

Crowe’s *The Lonergan Enterprise* provides suggestions for how this new organon can be implemented. He offers a program for carrying out the eight functional specialties. The basic insight underlying these eight tasks of theology happened in Rome. These two phases of theology, however, with their eight distinct tasks was worked out by Lonergan while he was living back in Canada. As Crowe’s encounter with *Verbum* and with *Insight* were connected with the transferring of Bernard Lonergan to teach in different places, so Crowe’s contact with Lonergan’s *Method in Theology* was also connected with a move of Lonergan.

During the summer vacation of 1965, Lonergan was diagnosed with lung cancer and had to undergo life-threatening surgery. His superiors decided that he should recuperate in Toronto and not return to Rome. And so, after twelve years of living in separate Jesuit communities, Lonergan and Crowe were back together. In the years immediately following his return, Lonergan did not have to teach and instead worked on lectures and articles that would eventually take shape in *Method in Theology*. By 1971, Lonergan had finished *Method*. It was published the following year.

Crowe was convinced that the later Lonergan had appeared around 1965. As Crowe had followed Lonergan’s method of reading Aquinas as laid out in *Verbum*, as Crowe had tried to follow the method that Lonergan laid out in *Insight*, so Crowe continued to follow

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181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.

**Conclusion**

In his book, *Lonergan*, Crowe said that “it would be a mistake to start our exposition of Lonergan’s thought where his academic career starts.”\(^{183}\) Instead, he began with Lonergan’s family life in Buckingham, Quebec, with “the dynamic mental and psychic background” in which Lonergan grew up and from which his work emerged.\(^{184}\) This introductory first chapter has followed this path. It began with the “remote context”\(^{185}\) of Crowe’s Trinitarian pneumatology, the thirty years before Crowe first took a class with Lonergan. Then in the second half of the chapter, I tried to introduce the three main texts in Lonergan’s corpus that both attracted Crowe to Lonergan’s thought and shaped Crowe’s pneumatology.

In his 1947-49 *Verbum* articles, Lonergan found a way to connect the treatise on the one God, De Deo Uno, and the treatise on the Triune God, De Deo Trino. What unites them and what unites natural theology and Trinitarian theology, according to Crowe, is the concept of God as rational. There are two processions in God because God’s nature can be thought of as a kind of intellectual dynamism that unfolds in an act of infinite understanding that speaks an act of infinite Truth from which is spirated an infinite act of Love. Trying to unpack the

\(^{183}\) *Lonergan*, 1.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{185}\) Ibid., 1.
nature of this act of love in us as it applies to the Holy Spirit was the focus of the first stage in
Crowe’s own pneumatology (1953-68).

In his 1957 book, *Insight*, Lonergan provided a philosophy and a methodology for
solving all kinds of philosophical problems. Crowe thought that Lonergan uncovered the basic
three-level structure of human knowing by which counter-positions, positions involved in
some fundamental confusion, could be refuted and a true metaphysics could be grounded. In
the years that followed, Lonergan explicitly added a fourth level of consciousness to the three
levels worked out in *Insight*. In this analysis, Lonergan had new ways of thinking about the
relationship of knowing and loving. In the second stage of his pneumatology (1969-84), Crowe
used Lonergan’s “philosophy of interiority”\(^\text{186}\) to think about how love can precede knowing.
In so doing, he found a way to articulate how the Holy Spirit’s mission can precede the Son’s.
The Holy Spirit as proceeding Love in God is the exemplar, according to Crowe, of all love.
The Holy Spirit thus brings love with him as he enters our world. The Son, in like manner, as
spoken Truth is the exemplar of all truth and brings truth with him following upon love. The
relationship of the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit is the focus of Crowe’s
second stage of his pneumatology.

In his 1972 book, *Method in Theology*, Lonergan brought together his four levels of
consciousness to explain a two-phase notion of theology. Crowe thought that this view of
theology, especially with the input of the Holy Spirit in our converted interiority at the
beginning of the second phase, helped to overcome the difficulties arising from the historicity
of all things human when it seems to conflict with Church teaching. Crowe claimed that
Lonergan had provided a new organon for the restructuring of Catholic theology. But beyond

these ideas, Crowe became fascinated by the two sides of the movement in theology. As he read Lonergan’s post-Method in Theology writings, he became convinced that Lonergan was making explicit what was implicit in Method, viz., that human development has, more generally, two paths of development: from below upward and from above downward. These two paths become the main preoccupation of Crowe’s Lonergan studies in his third stage of pneumatology.

In Crowe’s third stage (1985-2000), he proposes, without rejecting the traditional ordering (Father-Word-Holy Spirit), a complementary inverse ordering beginning with the Holy Spirit (Holy Spirit-Word-Father). In the third part of this thesis (Chapters Six and Seven), the theological and rhetorical reasons for Crowe’s innovation are examined.

Lonergan’s ideas on divine rationality, the way in which love is primary, and the two paths of human development deeply influenced Crowe. Crowe embraced these ideas, he explored them, and he expanded them. Out of these influences, specific questions about the Spirit emerged.

Chapter Two – Appropriating Aquinas on Love

In his “The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Lonergan was troubled by Louis Billot, S.J.’s claim that the intellectual procession of a word is exactly parallel to what happens when an image proceeds forth “in the imagination.” In this way of conceiving intelligible emanations, Lonergan thought that he might have found the source of another theologian’s trouble with the psychological analogy for the Trinity. Maurilio Penido, while not denying the authority in Catholic theology for the procession of a word from the human intellect as an analogy for the Son’s eternal generation, had questioned the authority of the Holy Spirit’s procession being understood by the analogy of a procession of love in the will. Lonergan writes, “By definition, the will is a rational appetite. Might it not be that the procession according to the will is to be grasped only in terms of an analysis of rationality and rational consciousness?” Lonergan thought that inquiry into the distinctive way an intellectual word emanates would be a significant step to better understanding the procession of love in the will.

In his Verbum articles, Lonergan argued that the Holy Spirit’s procession was not understood by Aquinas as a procession of love “from the will or any procession from something in the will, but the procession of love in the will from the intellect.” Crowe wanted


to deepen this insight of Lonergan. He does so by an investigation of what Aquinas means by *complacentia boni* and applying it as an analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit.

In his student days, through Lonergan’s influence, Crowe recognized the importance the Thomist psychological analogy with its two intelligible emanations for understanding the two divine processions and the unity of the three persons. But if Lonergan was especially focused on the intelligible procession of the Son, Crowe turned his attention to clarifying the procession of the Holy Spirit as Love.

**The Spirit’s Proprium Emerging as a Theme**

I am convinced that when Crowe first took Lonergan’s theology courses between 1947-50, Crowe already had a profound interest in the mission of the Holy Spirit. What Lonergan’s courses added was an interest in understanding the eternal processions of the Son and Spirit. From Lonergan, Crowe learned to understand more precisely the Holy Spirit as Love according to the psychological analogy.

In the fall of 1953, having completed his doctorate in theology and his year of tertianship, Crowe was assigned to the task of teaching theology at Regis College (Christ the King Seminary) in Toronto. One of his first courses that fall was on the Trinity. In those years, since the course on the Trinity was taught every four years at Christ the King, Crowe taught the course again in 1957-58. Years later, Crowe admitted that his great interest even in those first years of teaching was not in questions of the missions and interpersonal Trinitarian relations, but in questions of *emanatio intelligibilis* [intelligible emanation] within God:

The potentialities of the psychological triad had one drawback: they kept me from attending sufficiently to the riches of the interpersonal relations. These I found years later in chapters 5 and 6 of *Divinarum Personarum*. I do not say that those riches were

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*and Concern” forms chapters 3-6 of *Three Thomist Studies*. Chapter 3 (pp.73-112) is part 1 of the original article. Chapter 4 (pp. 113-47) is part 2. Chapter 5 (148-87) is part 3. Chapter 6 (pp. 189-203) is an important appendix dealing with the question of whether intellect and will are distinct faculties in the human soul.*
only potential in the lectures of 1949-50; we receive what we are ready to receive, and whether or not Lonergan presented the ideas that were to become chapters 5 and 6, I was not ready to receive them. Even after those chapters came out in print and I was teaching them, I was still for some years a particular fan of the *emanatio intelligibilis*.

In 1959, Crowe published his long article: “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas.” Crowe says that this study was the fruit of four years of work. Not long after he first taught the Trinity course (1953-4) at Christ the King Seminary, Crowe thus began working on this article that takes up the way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds within the Godhead.

Crowe argued that *complacentia boni* is the first act of love and thus the most basic act of will for Aquinas. Recently, Michael Sherwin, O.P. has praised Crowe for drawing attention “toward the centrality of *complacentia* in Aquinas’ mature theory of love.” *Complacentia boni* [complacency in the good] was frequently used by Aquinas in his more mature questions on love in the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*. And Sherwin has pointed out some of the most significant passages mentioning *complacentia*.

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192 *Three Thomist Studies*, xvii. “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas” was not *ex officio* about Trinitarian theory, but about the nature of human love. The study does, however, have five significant passages dealing with the procession of the Holy Spirit: “Complacency and Concern,” *Three Thomist Studies*, 87-92, 102-104, 138-40, 151-53, and 163-66.

“And similarly the adjustment of sensitive appetite or of will to something good, that is to say, their very complacency in the good [complacentia boni], is called sensitive love, or intellectual or rational love.”\textsuperscript{194}

“Thus also the desirable gives to the appetite, in the first place, a certain adjustment to itself, which is a complacency in the desirable, from which follows all movement towards the desirable. . . . the first change of the appetite by the desirable is called love, which is nothing else than a complacency in the desirable [complacentia appetibilis].”\textsuperscript{195}

“The very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is nothing else than a complacency in the good [complacentia boni].”\textsuperscript{196}

In these passages, Aquinas links complacency with intellectual or rational love. He claims that this complacency is a kind of adjustment or change in the will. He calls it the first change by which the will has an aptitude to the good. This first change is called both complacency in the good and love. Crowe more or less cites these same passages (along with many others), and I have tried (when it is possible) to give Crowe’s translations as they appear in his article, “Complacency and Concern.” Crowe recognized that other Catholic philosophers and theologians had “drawn attention to the complacent aspect of the will’s psychology,” but he thought that they had “done so merely in passing.”\textsuperscript{197} What was needed, Crowe maintained, was “an ex professo study of the idea which will give it sharper determination, show its far-

\textsuperscript{194} “Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacencia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis” (\textit{ST} I-II q. 26 a. 1). See Three Thomist Studies, 99.

\textsuperscript{195} “Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitu, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacencia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. . . Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacencia appetibilis” (\textit{ST} I-II q. 26 a. 2). See Three Thomist Studies, 100 for the places from which I pieced this translation together.

\textsuperscript{196} “Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacencia boni” (\textit{ST} I-II q. 25 a. 2). See “Complacency and Concern,” Three Thomist Studies, 99.

\textsuperscript{197} Three Thomist Studies, 92.
reaching ramifications in Thomist psychology, and help to disclose its implications for our times.”

One of these implications would be in Trinitarian pneumatology.

The immediate context, therefore, for Crowe’s study of complacent love was the discussions on the nature of love in the middle of the last century. In 1908, the Jesuit Pierre Rousselot “raised an agitation that has not yet subsided by setting up a dichotomy between what he called the physical and the ecstatic concepts of love.”

The distinction between these two loves has to do with whether there is any thought of the self. In the 1930s, the Swedish Lutheran bishop, Anders Nygren published his two-part study of love, *Agape and Eros*.

Crowe discusses Nygren at greater length in the third part of his article (chapter five of *Three Thomist Studies*), and sees a certain parallel between Nygren’s interpretation of Christian views of *eros* and common scholastic notions of love. Within scholastic circles, Crowe thought that the “dominant notion of voluntary activity has taken the will as an appetitive faculty whose essential act is an inclination manifested in tendency: the will regards an end, and its activity is process towards that end.” This common scholastic understanding of love, as an “inclination manifesting itself in a tendency” towards the good, corresponds in some significant way, Crowe thinks, with what Nygren’s study presents as the historical

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198 Ibid. For a list of those who have touched on the importance of *complacentia boni* in Aquinas, see *Three Thomist Studies*, 92n40. Crowe’s professor at the Gregorian, Zoltan Alszejgy, published a study of Bonaventure’s notion of love, *Grundformen der Liebe: Die Theorie der Gottesliebe bei dem hl. Bonaventura* (Romae: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1946). This work mentions Aquinas, but Alszejgy does not “wholly approve of attempts to reconcile Bonaventure and Thomas” (*Three Thomist Studies*, 92n40). Crowe, however, thinks that aspects of love found in Bonaventure’s writings, such as “the passivity and quiescence of love” can also “be found in Thomist writings on love” (*Three Thomist Studies*, 92n40).


200 See Anders Nygren, *Eros och Agape* (Stockholm, 1966). Partially translated into English in 1932, the second part of Nygren’s study was published in English in two further volumes in 1938 and 1939. Finally, in 1953, a complete translation of Nygren’s work came out in English.

201 *Three Thomist Studies*, 73.

202 Ibid.
understanding of *eros* as a love concerned with what one does not yet have. *Eros* is our basic, self-seeking, act of love, in contrast to God’s basic act of self-giving love, *agape*, Nygren claims.

Besides his criticisms of aspects of Nygren’s sharp distinction between *eros* and *agape*, Crowe also criticizes the dominant scholastic view of human love as a “process towards” or as an inclination manifesting itself in a tendency. He admits that love can have this aspect and calls such love ‘*concern*.’ But Crowe does not think that love as *concern* is the most basic act of the will. Complacent love is the most basic act of will, according to Crowe’s reading of Aquinas.

Crowe mentions several texts taken from one of the major commentators on Aquinas, John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), that express the scholastic view of love he is trying to resist. “The intellect,” John of St. Thomas writes, “draws the object to itself. . . but desire is allured and drawn by the object, and thus its object is its attractive force.” In this view, objects are received by human beings through *the intellect*. We go out to the object, in the way of motion, through *the will*. Crowe does not want to deny that the will’s love is the principle of tending towards the good. But he thinks that St. Thomas’ teaching and his own verification of this teaching in his experience of love give a more complex account of voluntary activity.

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203 Ibid.

204 Crowe admits that this expression of his, concern, “has no linguistic cognate in the basic terms of Thomist psychology” (*Three Thomist Studies*, 77). He does think that concern “corresponds quite accurately, I think, to the *intentio finis* [the intending of the end] of the *Prima secundae*” (*Three Thomist Studies*, 77). Crowe thinks that Aquinas uses the word *intentio* [intending] in too many different ways to use an English cognate for what he is calling concern.

Around the same time as Nygren wrote his first part of *Agape and Eros*, the French Dominican Henri-Dominique Simonin argued that St. Thomas Aquinas’ later position viewed love “not so much as a term giving tranquility as a movement whose cause is a form received in intellect and whose act is variously described as *consonantia, inclinatio, proportio.*” Aquinas’ thinking, therefore, underwent a development away from the view of love as a form in the will to “the view that will’s nature is to tend to a term.”

Fr. Crowe, however, is not the only one who took issue with Simonin. “F. A. Blanche,” Crowe writes, “in an otherwise favorable [sic] review, holds that there is a certain exaggeration in Simonin’s thesis.” According to Crowe, the exaggeration that Blanche rightly identifies in Simonin is this:

> the idea of love as a completion and lulling (‘apaisement’) of the will has not disappeared in the later works of St. Thomas, nor indeed has that of formation. Desire is tendency and movement, but love, like delight, implies presence already of the good and hence a state of rest.

In other words, Blanche maintains that love as rest has not completely given way in later writings of Aquinas to the idea of love as tendency.

Even though Blanche, unlike Simonin, recognizes both these aspects of love in the mature Aquinas’ writings, viz., love as a resting and love as “something like an ontological formation of potency,” Crowe does not think that Blanche has fully solved the problem of love in Aquinas. “It also seems to me,” Crowe writes, “that the problem is a little more

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207 *Three Thomist Studies*, 75. Michael Sherwin argues that between the Commentary on the Sentences and the second part of the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas replaced “the language of form with the language of complacentia” (By Knowledge and By Love, 77). Crowe will argue that this shift in language is not an abandonment of the view of love as resting, but the use of a better terminology for this passive aspect of love.
209 *Three Thomist Studies*, 75.
210 Ibid.
complicated than either Simonin or Blanche realized.”

They were too caught up in the Nygren debate about love as a self-regarding (eros) attitude and as a non-self-regarding (agape) attitude.

Crowe’s own position is that there is a more “fundamental division, prior to all question of the self.” Love has two roles, according to Crowe. “In one role love is passive, quiescent, complacent; in the other it is active, striving, tending to an object.” Love as active (concern) is much more common in the writings of Aquinas, but love as passive is also present, often implicitly. In fact, it is this passive role of love that “is basic both psychologically and ontologically.” “And the real problem,” Crowe writes, “is that St. Thomas never brought these two notions into careful confrontation or worked out extensively their relations to one another, with the result that two contrasting and unintegrated lines of thought show up in a whole series of questions.” Since Aquinas did not fully integrate these two roles of love, Crowe is making explicit what is largely implicit in Aquinas.

Crowe’s article, “Complacency and Concern,” tries to show how this distinction between the two roles of love is a “recurrent duality” in Aquinas and implicitly underlies

211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid. Sherwin criticizes this conclusion: “The synthesis Crowe seeks between receptive and active aspects of love (between ‘complacency’ and ‘concern’) are already present in Aquinas” (By Knowledge and By Love, 78n67). Sherwin thinks that Crowe fails “to recognize the primary meaning of inclinatio in Aquinas. Like H.-D. Simonin and Pierre Rousselot, Crowe reads inclinatio as primarily signifying a motion or impulse. For Aquinas, however, inclinatio, primarily signifies a principle of motion. It is the appetitive orientation of the appetite toward its object” (Ibid.). As we will see, Crowe does understand that love as an inclination is a principle of action. But he is asking a more fundamental question than Sherwin seems to recognize. Both Sherwin and Crowe argue against seeing love in the mature writings of Aquinas as primarily a tendency (Simonin’s view). They both stress the importance of complacencia in the mature Aquinas. But Sherwin wants to identify complacencia with inclinatio (By Knowledge and By Love, 77). Crowe thinks that Aquinas’ use of complacencia boni (and other words) show him wrestling to grasp what love is prior to its being a principle of action, prior to it being a principle to bring about what is not yet.
216 Three Thomist Studies, 113
many other questions in his mature writings. One of those questions is Aquinas’ view of the mode of the Holy Spirit’s procession. As mentioned, Crowe has five significant passages in “Complacency and Concern” dealing with the Holy Spirit’s procession as love. He argues that the passive role of love, love as complacency, is the best analogy for the way the Holy Spirit can be understood to proceed as Love in God.

Crowe’s Reading of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Complentia Boni

Crowe recognizes that his translation of the Latin complacentia boni as complacency in the good has its drawbacks. ‘Complacency’ in contemporary English has connotations of irresponsible self-satisfaction. It sometimes means unwarranted contentment with the status-quo. It means acceptance of what should not be accepted. These connotations are “poles apart from Thomist complacencia.”217 The word, complacencia, complacency, however, “has the root sense of a concept I take to be altogether basic in Thomist psychology of the will, and I think we must just accept its unwelcome connotations as part of the unavoidable limitations of language.”218 The root sense of complacency in Aquinas, Crowe maintains,

indicates that will, before being the faculty of appetite, of process to a term, is the faculty of affective consent, of acceptance of what is good, of concord with the universe of being, and that the basic act of will is to be understood only if it is regarded not as an impulse to a term, or even the principle of process to a term qua principle, but simply as itself a term.219

217 Ibid., 76.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid., 76-7. Serenity, and not complacency, is the word Crowe began to prefer to use around 1969 when translating complacentia boni. He explained his reasons in this way: “The Thomist terms are usually complacere and intendere, but to translate the first by ‘complacency,’ as I did in a series of articles in Theological Studies, vol. 20 (1959), is to sabotage what seems to me an important idea. ‘Serenity’ is better, but it suggests the somewhat helpless attitude adopted in adversity, as in the AA’s serenity prayer. The Thomist complacere is a more positive joy in what is, manifested most purely, I think, in the spontaneous joy that a child has in people and things before his psychological life becomes complicated by the concerns of older realism. But ‘joy’ itself lacks the intellectual connotation. In fact, we have no word in English for the idea” (“Pull of the Future and Link with the Past,” 41n26).
When Crowe singles out love as a principle of a process to a term *qua principle*, Crowe is thinking of the way Aquinas compares love, desire, and delight to the inclination, the movement, and the rest that a body has when it is held in the air, falls to the ground, and then rests on the ground. Love, like gravity, is the principle of a process, the process of falling and coming to rest. But Crowe thinks that this view of love as a principle *qua* principle is not the most fundamental view of love in Aquinas’s writings.²²⁰

Before love is a principle of our tending towards the good, Crowe is saying, it is itself the end-point of a process that begins in the senses and the intellect. In general, Crowe writes, “willing basically is the end of a process, a quiescence; only secondarily is it the initiation of another process.”²²¹ Complacency according to Crowe’s reading of Aquinas, is the affective completion of a process of receiving reality. Crowe denies that the intellect simply takes in what is and the will then goes out to what is. There is an affective dimension both to our reception of being and our moving towards being. Crowe, in fact, articulates a very nuanced two-fold way of receiving and moving, in which the will itself is both *moved* (mota) and *moving* (movens) us towards the good.

At the beginning of his second section of “Complacency and Concern,” Crowe describes the most basic finding of his article so far: “A fundamental framework for organizing the data of human psychology is supplied by the *duplex via* [*a twofold way*], the passive process of receiving and the active process of causation.”²²² Crowe then summarizes what he found out about complacency:

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²²⁰ For Aquinas’ use of the analogy of a body with its inclination to fall, its falling, and its resting for the affections of love, desire, and delight, see *ST* I-II q. 23 a. 4 and *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book 3, c. 26, n. 15.
²²¹ *Three Thomist Studies*, 77. Of vital importance is Crowe’s diagram in *Three Thomist Studies*, 90. I discuss this diagram later on in this chapter.
²²² Ibid., 113.
Love as complacency is a term in the via receptionis, coming at the end of a process; it is found in this form in the proceeding Love of the Holy Trinity, in the passive aspect of willing, in the simple harmony, agreement, correspondence resulting when the will is adjusted affectively to the good independently of all desire.\footnote{Ibid.}

In terms of the other side of the duplex via, the way of intending the end, the way of motion, the path of concerned love, Crowe summarized his findings in this way:

Love as tendency is at the beginning of the via motionis; it is most evident in appetite, desire, the pursuit of beatitude, but perhaps is to be discovered also in an analogous and higher form in the agape which desires to give and communicate the self or what the self has.\footnote{Ibid.}

Crowe has a diagram that I find useful in understanding what he is saying about the way an act of will can be the end of a process and the beginning of a new process. The diagram is adapted from the diagram that Bernard Lonergan used in his course on grace.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Diagram for Understanding the Act of Complacent Love}
\end{figure}

The two vertical lines distinguish the realm of human intellect and will. $X$ stands for “the influence of the sensible world”\footnote{Ibid., 90. The diagram is on the same page. I am very grateful to Mr. Michael Czesnik for making this copy of Crowe’s diagram.} on the human powers of intellect and will. $X \rightarrow A \rightarrow B$ thus represents the way of receiving (via receptionis).

The key letter in the diagram is $B$. It represents both the act of complacent love, the passive act of willing the end (velle finem), and love as concern. But $B$ is first of all a passive
act that depends on A. A is “the judgement on the good as end, specifying the act of willing the end.”  

Y, on the far side of the diagram, stands for our subsequent activity in the world. That activity flows from taking counsel about what to do, C, and coming to a decision, D. The diagonal line from B to C shows the influence of willing the end on our intellectual search for the means to that end. “D,” Crowe writes, “is the election of some means to the end, the act in which will is *mota et movens* [moved and moving], reducing itself from potency to act.”  

The movement from B→C→D→Y, i.e., from concern (intending the end) → thinking about means → election → moral or artistic activity, is Crowe’s presentation of the way of motion (*via motionis*).  

But how does B go from being an affective complacency to being an act of concerned love for what is not yet? Is there a change on the side of the will between what we could call B` (the passive moment of complacent acceptance) and B`` (love as principle of motion)? Or is it a case of what Lonergan calls extrinsic denomination? In other words, are we calling this one unchanging act of love ‘concern’ when something extrinsic to B takes place? In this case, the taking counsel for the means would extrinsically give a new name to B without any change happening to the will. God does not change, for example, when he begins to be called Creator. He can be called Creator because of some change extrinsic to him, viz., creation having taken place.

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\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid. By using the words *mota et movens*, Crowe is referring us to Aquinas’ language in *Summa Theologiae* I-II q. 111 a. 2. This article on operative and cooperative grace was the basis for Lonergan’s own dissertation at the Gregorian. The dissertation, as mentioned in Chapter One, was reworked and published in a series of articles around the time Crowe first met Lonergan.}\]

\[\text{For a very helpful account of this diagram, see Michael Vertin, “The Two Modes of Human Love: Thomas Aquinas Interpreted by Frederick Crowe,” *Irish Theological Quarterly* 69 (2004) 31-45.}\]
Crowe does not think the shift of will between what I have called B` and B`` is merely an extrinsic denomination. He insists that a further judgement takes place beyond the initial A judgment of the intellect. This “further judgment makes us aware that the good which is not yet can be effected through our own efforts and by appropriate means, and then the will responds with the first indeterminate *intentio finis*.”\(^{229}\) In other words, through further judgments new aspects of the object emerge.\(^{230}\) These new judgements account for shifts in the will from being complacent to being concerned. Unfortunately, I do not think that Fr. Crowe’s diagram captures very well this further judgment.

He wants to say that B in the diagram is both the act of complacent love and the act of concerned love. But where is the judgment to be placed in the diagram that explains how B changes? It is hard to say, and Crowe himself did not think that these articles of his were the final word on the transition between complacency and concern.\(^{231}\)

Maybe this lack on integration in Crowe’s diagram is fitting, however, given Crowe’s interpretation of Aquinas’ own position. Crowe admits that if his “tentative position on the historical side is correct, St. Thomas never really integrated these two modes of love with one another, or brought them together in sharp confrontation, or employed them as a scheme in the systematic articulation of his works.”\(^{232}\) Like Aquinas’ lack of integration of these two ideas on love, Crowe persuasively distinguishes complacency and concern but his diagram leaves

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\(^{229}\) *Three Thomist Studies*, 134 [Intention of the end]. For intending the end as the ordering of the mind towards the end without any determination of means to that end, see *Summa Theologiae* I-II q. 12, a. 1 ad. 3, q. 12, a. 5, sed contra, and q. 12, a. 4, ad. 3.

\(^{230}\) *Three Thomist Studies*, 133. See *Summa Theologiae*, I-II q. 40, a. 2: “secundum diversas rationes objecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi motus in vi appetitive [according to diverse aspects of the object apprehended, diverse changes follow in the appetitive power].”

\(^{231}\) “I must be content to distinguish elements as clearly as possible, leaving their exploitation to another occasion” (*Three Thomist Studies*, 134).

\(^{232}\) Ibid., 113.
questions unanswered about where we should place the further judgement which gives rise to concern.

While Aquinas distinguished these two modes of love, Crowe thinks that Aquinas gave most of his explicit attention to love as concern. Crowe writes: “The doctrine of love as tendency claimed attention throughout his career; the doctrine of love as complacency, explicit enough at times, was nevertheless kept more or less on the periphery of his thought.”233 The writings of Aquinas show, Crowe thinks, that he has this idea of a passive act of complacent love, but he hardly ever makes it thematic.

There is one place where Crowe thinks that complacent love is not on the periphery of Aquinas’ thought: the treatise on the passions in the Prima Secundae of his Summa Theologiae.234 Crowe speaks of complacency as coming to “the center” of Aquinas’ thought in those questions on the passions.235 By this metaphor of moving an idea from the periphery to the center of one’s thought, Crowe means that Aquinas in the Prima Secundae actually focused on and consciously tried to explain the role of this passive moment in the will. In that section of Summa, however, as Aquinas searched for the suitable word for this idea, “the context did not demand or favour a thorough going treatment, and the doctrine was never developed beyond an inchoate stage.”236 But how can Crowe say that the idea was coming to the center of Aquinas’ thought and yet was at an inchoate stage?

233 Ibid., 113-4.
234 Ibid., 114. The treatise on the passions, the movements of the sense appetite, is found in Summa Theologiae, I-II questions 22-48. As is well known, Aquinas does not limit himself to the movements of the sense appetite in those questions. He repeatedly extends the discussion to the movements of the will. According to Michael Vertin, Crowe’s article focuses on “rational love, the basic form of willing” (Vertin, Three Thomist Studies, iv).
235 Ibid., 114.
236 Ibid. In chapter four, Crowe tries to verify this thesis in seven other areas of Aquinas’ thought. He tries to integrate his distinction of two attitudes of willing or loving with “the rest of Thomist thought” (Ibid., 149). See especially ST I-II, q. 28, a. 1 ad. 2 and q. 28, a. 5. Aquinas, in other words, did not live in a time like Fr. Crowe lives in when little room is left in much of contemporary culture for the existence of an notion of a contemplative
A useful contrast, perhaps, could be found in St. Francis de Sales, Treatise on Divine Love. Crowe refers to St. Francis in “Complacency and Concern.” And Francis clearly distinguishes two moments of love that form a single whole. Early in Book I, St. Francis de Sales says:

the complacency and the movement towards, or effusion of the will upon, the thing beloved is properly speaking love; yet in such sort that the complacency is but the beginning of love, and the movement or effusion of the heart which ensues is the true essential love, so that the one and the other may truly be named love, but in a different sense: for as the dawning of the day may be termed day, so this first complacency of the heart in the thing beloved may be called love because it is the first feeling of love (I.VII).

Both complacency and the subsequent “movement towards” the beloved are properly called love. One is the beginning, the other is the completion. Aquinas leaves the discussion of complacency in an inchoate stage because he does not relate it explicitly to love as a tendency. The same cannot be said of St. Francis de Sales’ discussion.

Application of Complacency to the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit

Crowe finds parallels between Aquinas’ discussions of complacent love and his discussions of the Holy Spirit. Crowe writes, “Many characteristics of the love of complacency complacent love. As a result, Crowe is telling us, Aquinas’ context did not lead him to produce a more robust reflection on complentia boni.


238 Three Thomist Studies, 85.

239 For an outline of the 12 Books, see Francis X. Clooney, S.J., Beyond Compare: St. Francis de Sales and Sri Vedanta Desika on Loving Surrender to God (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005) 16-8. Although Clooney principally makes use of Mackey’s translation of the Treatise, Clooney adjusts that translation at points (Ibid., 217n39). For example, Clooney translates the French equivalent of complentia, complaisance, as “deep pleasure” (Ibid., 166). Clooney then has an extended discussion of complaisance (deep pleasure). Clooney stresses that complacency “is key to the exposition de Sales makes central to the whole Treatise” (Ibid., 170).

240 Book I.VII has many more references to complacency. Clooney writes, “At the end of chapter 7, de Sales concedes that love itself is a kind of deep pleasure” (Beyond Compare, 240n64). Book I.XVI and Book II.XIII-XV are also full of references to complacency as contrasted to love as a movement towards.
are predicated of the Holy Spirit, though not under the name of complacency.” Crowe then begins to list the parallels: “the third person is conceived as proceeding from the Verbum and Dicens, from the Word and the One uttering the Word. That is to say, it is not as tendency that this Love is primarily conceived, but as proceeding, as term, as bringing process to a close.” Crowe does not mention directly the question of the Filioque of the Nicene Creed, but he does mention Aquinas’ claim about the way Love proceeds in the uncreated Trinity: “since the uncreated Trinity is distinguished according to the procession of the Word from the One uttering, and of Love from both . . .” As complacent love proceeds in us from an uttered judgment, so in God the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word uttered by the Father. In complacent love, we reach the end of a process of receiving. In God, the Holy Spirit is the term of the two divine processions.

Crowe thinks that it is significant that “some of the most forthright statements relating intellect and love according to this viewpoint are made in Trinitarian discussions.” The viewpoint is of love as proceeding from intellect and bringing a certain process to a close. Instead of focusing on the way love can tend towards the object loved, Crowe is focusing on the origin of love. He is focusing on what he considers to be love’s original spiration from the intellect. He finds in this way of conceiving love the best analogy for the Holy Spirit’s procession: “Clearly, whatever may be said about the tending of love to the loved object, an important principle of explanation for the Holy Spirit is found in his relation as term to the Word.” Crowe is drawing here on Lonergan’s work in Verbum. There Lonergan collected

241 Three Thomist Studies, 138.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid., 138n63. See ST, I, q. 93, a. 6
244 “Complacency and Concern,” Three Thomist Studies, 138.
245 Ibid.
texts from Trinitarian passages in Aquinas that deal with the relationship of intellect and love.\textsuperscript{246}

Before love can be a principle of tending towards a good that \textit{is not yet}, there must be a more passive moment of reception in the will regarding \textit{what already is}\.\textsuperscript{247} This is Crowe’s basic hypothesis about the way Aquinas envisages rational love. There is one text in Aquinas that especially is important for Crowe’s thesis as it applies to the procession of the Holy Spirit. In \textit{Summa Theologiae} I, q. 37, a. 1, Aquinas speaks of a “certain impression . . . of the thing loved in the affection of the one who loves.”\textsuperscript{248} Instead of speaking of love as an impulse towards the loved object, Aquinas uses the language of \textit{impression} or imprint when he is talking about the Holy Spirit. Crowe thinks we can interpret this impression of love as \textit{complacentia boni}. He refers us back to some texts he mentioned earlier from Aquinas. In \textit{Summa Theologiae} I-II q. 28, a. 2, Aquinas speaks about something being “imprinted on its affections by a kind of complacency.”\textsuperscript{249} Crowe thinks that this imprint or impression is the way Aquinas thinks that the loved thing (\textit{amatum}) is in the lover (\textit{amans}).

In light of these parallels with Aquinas’ language of the Holy Spirit and complacentia, Crowe especially likes what Aquinas says in one of the following articles of I-II q. 28 where he asks whether love is a harmful or injurious passion (\textit{passio laesiva}): “it pertains to love that appetite is adapted to a kind of reception of the good that is loved, insofar as the loved object

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{246} Verbum, 109n20.
\item \textsuperscript{247} Crowe thinks that the best avenue of all for approaching the Thomist idea of \textit{complacentia boni} may be found “in Jean-Pierre de Caussade’s \textit{abandon} to divine providence” (\textit{Three Thomist Studies}, 77). See Jean-Pierre de Caussade, \textit{Self-Abandonment to Divine Providence}, tr. A. Thorold (London: Burns & Oates, 1933).
\item \textsuperscript{248} “Ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio, ut ita loquor, rei amatae in affectu amantis, secundum quem amatum dicitur esse in amante” (\textit{ST} I q. 37. 1).
\item \textsuperscript{249} “Amatum continetur in amante, inquantum est impressum in affectu eius per quandam complacentia” (\textit{ST} I-II, q. 28, a. 2, ad. 1)
\end{itemize}
is in the lover.”\textsuperscript{250} As Crowe writes, “Far from being a tendency towards the good, love is a passive reception of the good!”\textsuperscript{251}

According to Crowe’s interpretation of Aquinas, complacency is “the reception of the good in the affective faculty.”\textsuperscript{252} By this complacent love, there is “the presence of the loved object in the lover.”\textsuperscript{253} By speaking of the Holy Spirit as analogous to an “impression that the loved thing makes on the affection of the one loving,” Aquinas gives the basis for conceiving “the divinity of the Holy Spirit as the presence of God in the divine proceeding Love.”\textsuperscript{254}

In \textit{Summa Theologiae} I, q. 37, a. 1, ad. 2, Aquinas refers to the Holy Spirit as “something remaining in the lover.” Crowe thinks that this description fits well with the way Aquinas speaks in \textit{Summa Theologiae} I q. 27, a. 3 ad. 1, when he talks about how the divine processions within God “terminate in the will.”\textsuperscript{255} If the Holy Spirit remains \textit{in} the lover and if his procession is the term of the divine processions, the divine processions, therefore, “reach an internal term in the Love that is the Holy Spirit.”\textsuperscript{256} Crowe modestly adds the conclusion we can take from comparing these texts:

Not only does nothing in all this require us to think of love as a tendency, but it can be brought beautifully into harmony with the theory of love as complacency. Since much of this ground was covered in the preceding part of this study, there is no need to dwell on the matter here.\textsuperscript{257}

Even if one grants Crowe the Thomistic basis for his way of explaining the procession of the Holy Spirit as complacent love, what does one do with the texts in Aquinas where the Holy

\textsuperscript{250} “Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante” (\textit{ST} I-II, q. 28, a. 5).
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Three Thomist Studies}, 111.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{255} “Processio enim quae est ad intra in intellectuali natura, terminatur in processione voluntatis” (\textit{ST} I q. 27, a. 3 ad. 1).
\textsuperscript{256} \textit{Three Thomist Studies}, 139.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
Spirit is spoken about as a tendency, an impulse towards the loved thing? Crowe has a way of putting these texts to work for his own theory.

Crowe refers us back to the ways Aquinas first introduces the procession of the Holy Spirit in the two Summas. In Summa Theologiae I, q. 27, a. 4, Aquinas speaks of the procession of love first in terms of an “inclination.” Unlike the procession of the intellect, the procession of the will does not bring forth a likeness. Instead the procession of the will is better conceived as having the aspect of “impelling and moving.” Since “spirit is named from a certain vital motion and impulse,” the proceeding Love in God should be called Spirit. Aquinas explains how “from love someone is said to be moved or impelled to do something.”

In the Summa Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 19, n. 10, Aquinas also speaks of the will and love “as inclining . . . and impelling.” Earlier in that same chapter, love is repeatedly spoken of as “an inclination” (nn. 2-3). At the same time, the object of love is described as being in the will “as the term of the motion in a proportionate motive principle” (n. 10).

Crowe thinks that in Aquinas’ texts there are “two sets of ideas” that are “not easy to reconcile unless we recognize a second aspect of love formulated perhaps but vaguely before the Trinitarian treatise was written, and not set in clear distinction to the love of tendency even afterwards.” On the one hand, love is the inclination or principle of movement towards a desirable object. On the other, love is some kind of impression in the will from the intellect. The second aspect of love is love considered as complacency in the good.

In other words, Crowe maintains, love as an-inclination-manifesting-itsel-in-tendency is often used by Aquinas to explain the procession of the Holy Spirit. At the same time, Aquinas also spoke about the Holy Spirit’s procession in language that harmonizes with

258 Ibid.
complacent love. Crowe then asks: “which of the two is to be retained and exploited in the Trinitarian analogy?” Crowe wants to hold onto the psychological analogy. He wants to keep analogies of love for the procession of the Holy Spirit. He finds two analogies in Aquinas. His answer to his own question is unequivocal: “Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of the complantia boni.”

Crowe then gives his reason for preferring love as complacency: “For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, love in clearest dependence on the word, love as passive.” In fact, Crowe wants us to give up using love as tendency to explain the Holy Spirit’s procession. “Nor is there any loss,” he writes, “to Trinitarian theory through discarding the notion of love as tendency.”

To those who object that he is discarding the very analogy Aquinas used very frequently, Crowe responds by explaining the reason Aquinas used that particular analogy: “St. Thomas felt obliged to assign a scholastic sense to the word ‘Spirit’ and did so in terms of tendency, but we can drop that attempt today and so avoid the incongruity of comparing the Holy Spirit with an impulse ad aliquid faciendum [for doing something].” Crowe does not here give another meaning of ‘Spirit,’ nor does he comment on the theological method behind Aquinas’ opting for an analogy in terms of tendency.

Crowe, instead, goes on to make another point: “Moreover, the divinity of the Spirit is as well conceived through the presence of the loved object in the will by complacency as by

\[\text{259 Ibid., 140.}\]
\[\text{260 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{261 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{262 Ibid. Crowe is not always careful to distinguish the terminology of ‘love as tendency’ from ‘love as the principle of movement.’ Sherwin wants to insist that love is the principle of tending. When Crowe speaks of ‘love as tendency,’ I think he is using a kind of shorthand.}\]
\[\text{263 Ibid.}\]
its presence as the term of movement.”

‘Term of movement’ refers to the way the loved object itself is the goal of the movement of love itself. Love as tendency is the principle for tending towards full possession of the loved object. He contrasts this full resting with complacency because complacent love already is a kind of resting in the object loved. In love as tendency, two important points about Trinitarian theology are accounted for. Love as a tendency explains the relation such love has to a proceeding word. That same love also has the divine goodness for its object loved. Crowe points out, however, that when the analogy of complacency is used, “the twofold habitudo, to the Word as principle and to the divine goodness as object, still remains.”

Crowe then adds a third point about Trinitarian theology. It is the old problem of why the Holy Spirit is not also called a Son of God. If he is equal to the Son in divinity, why is his procession not a generation? The analogy based on love as tendency can be used to explain this. But so can love as complacency: “The difference between a procession which results in a similitude by reason of the mode of procession (generatio) and one that does not on this account result in a similitude but for another reason, also remains.”

In terms of the explanatory power, Crowe concludes, “there seems to be no significant loss and a clear gain” in abandoning the analogy of love as tendency for the procession of the Holy Spirit. In short, an analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit should help explain three aspects of Catholic belief:

1. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and/through the Son.
2. The Holy Spirit is equal in divinity with the Father and Son. He is God.
3. The Holy Spirit is not another Son of God or a grandson of the Father.

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264 Ibid.
265 Ibid. This twofold habitudo is taken up by Aquinas in both ST I, q. 37 a. 1, corp. and in a. 1 ad. 2 and SCG 4, c. 19, n. 8
266 “Complacency and Concern,” Three Thomist Studies, 140.
267 Ibid.
Crowe thinks that both analogies of love are able to help us understand how these are true. This is why there is no significant loss in opting for the analogy of complacency. The basic advantage of the analogy of complacent love is how it more clearly expresses the dependence of the Holy Spirit on the eternal procession of the Son, the Word spirating love. At the same time, Crowe thinks that the analogy of complacent love better explains a fourth point of Catholic belief:

4. The Holy Spirit’s eternal existence does not depend on creation.

Basing ourselves on the revelation of the Trinity, Crowe thinks that we can conceive divine Understanding uttering an eternal Word and the Word issuing in eternal Love; and this proceeding Love, *amor notionalis* [notional love], is entirely contained within the Trinity, is a term of the internal processions, and is not to be explained by relation to the created universe.268

Crowe will later bring out the way in which this proceeding Love is related to rational creatures as apt and able to be given to them.269 But here his emphasis is on how a notion of proceeding Love in God can be conceived without bringing in an orientation to something outside of God.

Crowe has argued for an analogy based on Aquinas’ own Augustinian inspired analogy of Speaker, Word, and Love. He has admitted that his own application of complacency as an analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit is not directly used by Aquinas, but he thinks that the basic Thomist analogy for the Trinity is Dicens, Verbum, Amor, [Speaker, Word, Love]. To treat, as Nygren had done, the other Augustinian triad of lover, beloved, and love, as the view of Catholic theology, Crowe writes, “is a serious historical error.”270 Moreover, Crowe claims, “the only analogy that might claim a privileged status in Catholic theology is the

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268 Ibid., 163
269 See *ST I* q. 38, a. 1 ad. 4
270 *Three Thomist Studies*, 163
Thomist one of *Dicens, Verbum, and Amor*, which of course also derives from Augustine.\(^{271}\)

In the Thomist analogy, Crowe insists, “The distinctive character of Love here is its rational procession from the Word.”\(^{272}\)

**Conclusion**

Before his long article, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,”\(^{273}\) Father Crowe was interested in the Holy Spirit and the eternal processions as intelligible emanations. These emanations had served as the focus of his teaching Trinitarian theology in Toronto during the 1950s and 1960s and had been the aspect of Lonergan’s course that grabbed his attention at the time of his own theology studies.\(^{274}\) During the years in which he worked out his theory of complacent love (1954-59), Crowe had begun to make the question of the mode of the Holy Spirit’s procession his own. The Holy Spirit’s proprium, his eternal personal ‘character,’ is proceeding complacent Love. This analogy of an affective response in the will to *what is* ensures that the Holy Spirit’s eternal existence depends on the utterance of the Father’s Word of truth and not on what God might create.

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\(^{271}\) Ibid.

\(^{272}\) Ibid.

\(^{273}\) In 1959, Fr. Crowe wrote a shorter article with a shorter title: “Complacency and Concern,” *Cross and Crown* 11 (1959) 180-90. This article is an application of his distinction to the spiritual life. Unless otherwise noted, “Complacency and Concern” refers to his scholarly article in *Theological Studies*.

Chapter Three – Basil Helps to Extend the Search into the Economy of Salvation

“If we have anything intelligent to say in our final chapter on the Trinity in the world, anything relevant, anything worthwhile, it will be due to this beginning made by Basil.”

Frederick Crowe, S.J.

In letter 236, St. Basil of Caesarea writes about the need to distinguish the three divine persons, “For, if we do not consider the particular properties [charaktêras] of each . . . , but merely confess God (in each) on the ground of the common essence, it will be quite impossible to give a sound exposition of faith.” That portion of letter 236, written about the year 376 AD, is contained in M. J. Rouët de Journel, S.J.’s Enchiridion Patristicum. The letter was written after Basil’s treatise, On the Holy Spirit, and together with letters 233-235, recapitulates “the theological vision of Against Eunomius.” These letters, including 236, were written to Amphilochius, his spiritual son and student, late in Basil’s life “at a time of theological and ecclesiastical maturity in his life, at a time when he had grown confident in what he wanted to say about God.”

Fr. Crowe places great importance on this quotation from St. Basil. “I hope,” he tells his theology students, “this statement of Basil’s will strike a spark in the reader; at least may he not set it down as a trifle within the range of any child’s intelligence.” Crowe then refers to the personal impact of this passage on his own mind: “For my part, I do not know of any passage in

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275 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 91.
276 Ibid., 91. For the text of Basil, Crowe refers the reader to J. P. Migne, S. P. N. Basili Opera Omnia, Patrologia Graeca 32 (Paris, 1886) 883, Epistola 236 n. 6. He also refers us to M. J. Rouët, Enchiridion Patristicum: loci ss. patrum, doctorum, scriptorum, ecclesiasticorum; quos in usum scholarum collegit (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1953) 926. The translation of Basil’s principle seems to be Crowe’s own.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid., 28. Hildebrand dates On the Holy Spirit to 373 or 375.
280 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 91.
the fathers that I read with such a moving sense of assisting at a great evolution in the understanding of our faith.”

Crowe will even speak of “this beginning made by Basil” as “the acorn from which our trinitarian treatise has grown.”

The very last line of Crowe’s 1965-6 course notes reads: “once you commit yourself to the principle of St. Basil, you cannot consistently abandon it till you have applied it to the whole range of human history and human institutions that are affected by the entry into the world of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.” In other words, Crowe came to think that one can extend Basil’s search for the character of each divine person from the level of the ontological Trinity to the level of the economic Trinity.

When Crowe taught the Trinity course in 1961-2, he wrote a short set of thirty-page notes for his students. There is no focus on Basil’s principle in those notes. When Crowe taught the Trinity class in 1965-6, he wrote his monumental, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*. In this chapter, I look first at how Crowe in his 1965-6 notes studied more deeply the eternal personal properties of each of the Three and second how he applied this principle to the way each of the Three is present in the world. Crowe’s final chapter of *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity* is his search for the proprium of the Holy Spirit in the world. Basil’s principle has become Crowe’s.

**Background to Crowe’s 1965-6 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity**

*The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity* has two parts: a *via analytica* and a *via synthetica.* In the first part (chapters 1-5), Fr. Crowe analyzes the historical development of Trinitarian

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281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid., 195.
284 In the beginning of his notes, Crowe writes, “The debt to Bernard Lonergan’s *De Deo Trinino* of almost every page of these notes on the Trinity is hereby acknowledged in general; sometimes more particular references are given, sometimes they are not. And the greater than the debt for items of objective doctrine is the one I owe for the very idea of dividing the treatise into analytic and synthetic parts and structuring them according to a fundamental principle of cognitional theory” (*The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 4). Crowe uses Lonergan’s principle of cognitional theory in his organizing “the wealth of the deposit of faith” (Ibid.).
doctrine from the testimony of the Scriptures to the account of the Trinitarian processions in terms of a psychological analogy. The idea of dividing the first part of the treatise into these five chapters is taken from Lonergan’s Fifth Thesis of the *Pars Dogmatica* in which he explains the order of the *via analytica* in almost exactly the terms used by Crowe: “Thus, we proceeded historically from the missions of the divine persons to their consubstantiality, thence to their relative properties, to the procession of the Holy Spirit from both Father and Son, and finally to the psychological analogy in St. Augustine.”

Crowe’s five historical chapters match very neatly with Lonergan’s description of the analytic part of Trinitarian theology. The analytic part of Crowe’s treatise began with what was first for us, the sending of the Son and Spirit as recounted in the Scriptures. That same analytic part concluded with what is first in itself, the divine nature as rational and giving rise to intelligible processions of Word and Love. Below is a comparison of Lonergan’s description of the way of analysis and Crowe’s first five chapters:

**Table 3: Comparing Lonergan’s *Via Analytica* to Crowe’s First Five Chapters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lonergan’s description of the <em>Via Analytica</em></th>
<th>Crowe’s principal divisions of Part 1 Development of Trinitarian Dogma: Analytic Process of History</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“We proceeded historically from…”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revelation of the Missions of the divine persons</td>
<td><em>Chapter One</em>: From OT Yahweh to NT Father, Son, and Holy Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To their consubstantiality</td>
<td><em>Chapter Two</em>: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as Consubstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thence to their relative properties</td>
<td><em>Chapter Three</em>: One God in Three Persons Distinguished by Mutual Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To the procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son</td>
<td><em>Chapter Four</em>: Relations by Origin: Processions in God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And finally to the psychological analogy in St Augustine</td>
<td><em>Chapter Five</em>: The Psychological Analogy: the Divine Nature Such as to be Dicens, Verbum, and Amor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the via analytica, Crowe’s synthetic way reverses the above order of ideas. The synthetic or systematic view begins with what is first in itself, God’s inner life understood through the psychological analogy, \( prius quoad se \) and ends with what is first for us \( prius quoad nos \), the missions of Son and Spirit. Beginning with the principle of a dynamically understood divine nature, Crowe’s synthetic part (chapters 6-8) offers a systematic understanding of Trinitarian doctrine by means of one analogy, \( per modum unius \) [by means of a single principle].\(^{286}\) Thus, the second half of Crowe’s treatise, corresponding to Lonergan’s Pars systematica, looks like this:

\[\text{Table 4: Division of the Second Half of The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Two</th>
<th>Systematic Overview: OMNIA PER MODUM UNIUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Divine Nature as rational, Processions, Relations, Persons in God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>The Three Divine Persons in the World: General Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8</td>
<td>The ‘Trinification’ of the Human World</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice how the four topics covered in chapter 6 (Divine Nature as rational, Processions, Relations, Persons in God) are the same four topics covered in chapters 2-5. In chapter 6, however, those topics are discussed in the inverse order. In chapter 2, Crowe’s historical analysis showed how the Church moved from reflecting on God sending the Son and Spirit to the idea that the Father, Son, and Spirit are consubstantial persons. In chapters 3-5, Crowe follows the history of how the Church developed the idea of these persons being distinguished according to mutual relations, these relations being founded on eternal processions within God, and finally these processions being grounded on a dynamically conceived ‘rational’ divine nature.

\(^{286}\) The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 141.
Having gone through his long analysis of history, Crowe is able to discuss these same ideas more quickly from the systematic prospective. Chapter 6 begins with the divine nature as rational, on the basis of which we can understand the existence of divine processions. On the basis of divine processions, we can understand the idea of real subsisting relations. From relations, we form a better understanding of divine persons. In other words, Crowe inverts and condenses the materials of chapters 2-5 into a single chapter.

Crowe can also cover all this material in one chapter of less than twenty pages because he has the four chapters (150 pages of Latin) of Lonergan’s De Deo Trino, Pars Systematic to which he can refer his students for the same material. He encouraged them to spend as much time as possible with that work of Lonergan. He told his students to view his own chapter six as a means of helping them “over a few hurdles” in Lonergan’s work. 287

The biggest reason for Crowe’s compromising on the length of chapter six was “simply my practical recognition of what can be done in a seminary course on the Trinity today.” 288 By 1965, Crowe did not think that with the majority of his students he could “go deeply into the theory of the Trinity.” 289 He was up against a “real practical problem” 290 of what the majority of his students were interested in and could handle.

Crowe realized that the psychological analogy can only be properly understood after “prolonged reflection.” 291 He did not think that his own chapter six was sufficient to provide them with such a proper understanding of the psychological analogy. And he was worried about how such an imperfect understanding would yield bad results in their understanding of how the Three

287 Ibid., 144.
288 Ibid., 143.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid., 144.
291 Ibid.
are present in the world. But given the restraints of his seminary course at Regis, Crowe did not think he could spend any more time on theoretical questions dealing with God in himself.

In the final two chapters of *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, Crowe moves from what is first in itself (God’s eternal life) to what is first for us, God’s presence in the world. Chapter seven of *The Most Holy Trinity* deals with questions of how divine persons can be present in the world from the side of God. Crowe’s final chapter deals with the human need for the Three to be in the world. Unlike Lonergan, however, who spent only a quarter of his systematic part on the divine missions, Crowe spent sixty percent of his systematic view on the way the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are in the world.

Crowe did not think he was alone in emphasizing the divine missions. Speaking of various advances in the 20th century in Catholic Trinitarian theology, Crowe cites Lonergan’s work on consciousness as an example of a specific development. “Likewise,” he adds, “in the study of the divine missions, a great deal of work has been done, with broad theories developed to conceive the whole supernatural area in synthesis, and this we shall take up in chapter seven.” Crowe did not think that his treatment of this question was thus part of a larger movement within 20th-century Catholic Trinitarian theology. “I should say,” he writes,

that the chief effort, at least in extension if not in intension, has been in the field of practical application; application, first of all, to the mystic life (this effort goes back to the middle ages); application, then in much more everyday matters, so that we have studies or articles on the Trinity in relation to every angle of life, fraternal charity, morality, the sacraments, etc.; this we shall see in chapter eight. 

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292 Ibid., 137.
293 Ibid. Among those responsible for reviving questions on the invisible missions of the Son and Spirit was Lucien Chambat, O.S.B., *Presence et union. Les missions des personnes de la Trinité selon Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Abbaye Saint-Wandrille : Fontenelle, 1945). The main work in English in this period is Francis Cunningham, O.P.’s book: *The Indwelling of the Trinity: A Historical Study of the Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press, 1955). Crowe’s course notes show that he is aware of these works. At the heart of these works is the question of the invisible mission of the Son, a mission that seems connected with the gift of wisdom. In no place have I found Crowe discussing explicitly the “invisible mission” of the Son.
Crowe, unfortunately, does not extend his treatment of the divine missions to all these everyday matters. In a way, he takes a kind of short cut.

He concludes his book by showing how all of theology could be restructured according to a Trinitarian framework. He proposes that all of the materials of theology could be attached to treatises on the “individual persons of the Trinity.”⁴ He links all the sacramental and institutional aspects of our faith with the established and traditional study of the Incarnate Word, de Verbo Incarnato. He links, in contrast, “the charismatic and individual in the church”⁵ – grace, prayer, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, new movements in the Church – with a proposed new treatise: de Spiritu dato [on the given Spirit]. Finally, Crowe sketches how “everything that comes under the heading of the eschatological”⁶ can be subsumed under a new treatise on the hoped-for Father [de Patre sperato]. In so far as all of the Christian life is studied in these areas of theology, Crowe offers his students a general way of relating even everyday life to the presence of the Three Divine Persons in the world.

**Conceiving the Personal Properties of the Three in the Godhead as Never Before**

Knowledge of the psychological analogy for the Trinity was not something Crowe thought his students could have simply through reading books, even Lonergan’s books. The psychological analogy for the Trinity had to be experienced, understood, and verified in a personal way by each student. Only by grasping for oneself and in oneself what it means to speak an inner word and to love on the basis of that word does one properly understand what Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan were talking about in their psychological analogies.

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⁴ *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 192.
⁵ Ibid., 193.
⁶ Ibid.
Crowe thus begins the systematic overview by helping us locate the relevant psychological acts in our consciousness that provide the analogies for the three persons of the Trinity (6.1.1). Once he explains what we mean by intelligible emanation of a word from an act of understanding (6.1.2) and of love from that word (6.1.3), he tries to help the students grasp that the term of each procession is God (6.1.4). He does this by a series of analogies that help someone approach an infinite limit. At stake in these limit examples, is the question of divine simplicity.

Divine simplicity means that all that is in God is God. The psychological analogy enables one to understand the way the Word and Speaker and Love are distinct from one another. But this analogy also helps to grasp how distinct persons are so intelligibly related and united that their distinction does not violate the divine simplicity.

When Crowe turns to the question of how the eternal Amor [Love] proceeding in God is also God, he mentions “Lonergan’s argument” and “the Thomist argument.” Right before these references, he speaks of “our analogy.” Here, “in the context of our analogy,” is his argument for why proceeding Love in God is God:

When intellect knows itself, it is present to itself in a similitude of itself, and in God this ‘similitude’ is God. Now in loving, the one loved is also present in the will by dynamic presence, or, as I would prefer to say, by affective presence. That is, the amari or being loved of the one loved and the amare or loving of the lover are one; as the amatus [one loved] is integral to the amari [being loved], so he is to the amare [loving]. Well, then, in God’s love of the infinite goodness that he is, God is present to self in his own love of self, and this affective presence is not just affective presence; it is God.

Note Crowe’s use of the first person here. He is aware, I think, of the uniqueness of his position on complacency. He also prefers the words, “affective presence.” Crowe has slightly developed his language since 1959, but he is still thinking about this divine proceeding love as complacent

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298 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 148.
love. Nevertheless, his preference for the phrase “affective presence” is the fruit of his “Complacency” studies through which he more profoundly appropriated “our power for harmonious accord with the universe.”

Crowe has not only developed in his thinking about the Holy Spirit, he also has developed his understanding of the procession of the Son. Crowe writes, “The uttered Word has a real orientation to Love; the will is a rational appetite, it embraces the good that is rationally affirmed and, by the same token, the rational affirmation looks towards the love that proceeds from it.” Crowe is trying to explain how the psychological analogy helps us understand the divine persons as real relations. The classic problem is that the name, Holy Spirit, does not seem to imply a relation to another like the terms Father and Son imply. Through thinking of the Son and the Spirit according to their names, Word and Love, their mutual implication of one another is clearer, Crowe suggests. As a rational affirmation looks forward to its affective complement, so the eternal Word is eternally oriented towards the Love that proceeds from him. Thus, Crowe uses this orientation in our knowing and loving to explain why the Word and Spirit are really related to each other:

The orientation is real, the procession is real, hence the principle and term are really related to one another, so that, when Love proceeds eternally in God, there is a real relation between this proceeding Love on one side and, on the other, the Word and the One uttering the Word who together are the principle of proceeding Love.

Note in this quotation how Crowe distinguishes the One uttering the Word, the Word, and the proceeding Love. He wants there to be a kind of intelligible implication of the other two persons in the proper name of each divine person.

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299 “Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Nature and Operation in All,” Appropriating, 49.
300 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 150.
It is important to recognize that the analogy on which he relies does not appeal to divine attributes absolutely considered. Crowe insists that the Holy Spirit is proceeding Love and not simply ‘love.’ The absolutely considered divine attributes, for example, love or truth, are not immediately relevant for his Trinitarian theory. This distinction between essential names and proper or notional names is especially important for Crowe’s thinking about the Father.

Crowe insists on speaking of the Father as the One uttering the Word. He never says that the Father is analogous to the act of understanding absolutely considered. To understand (intelligere) is common to all Three persons. Truth (Veritas) (in its absolute aspect) is common to all three persons. Love (Amor, absolutely considered) is common to all Three persons. The divine persons share the same essence and that essence is understanding itself, truth itself, love itself. But the Father alone is the Intelligere Dicens Verbum [Understanding Speaking a Word]. The Son alone is the Veritas dicta [the Truth spoken]. The Spirit alone is spirated proceeding Love. God the Father is analogous to an act of understanding, not absolutely considered, but as an act of understanding which generates a true word. God the Son is analogous to an act which expresses that understanding. God the Holy Spirit is analogous to the basic act of love grounded on the expression of God’s infinite understanding.

Crowe has argued that we have intelligent acts like these within our conscious life. “But,” he writes, “the three acts in us are not just three acts, they are joined to one another by rationality, by processions, by origins; the intelligere is intelligere dicens verbum, the verbum is veritas dicta, the amor is amor procedens.” In this section of his treatise, Crowe is ordering our ideas about God. He is placing first the ideas that are required to understand other ideas. In this case, processions are needed to understand how there can be relations in God.

302 Ibid., 148.
On the basis of his articulation of the psychological analogy, Crowe has worked out distinct properties for each of the Three divine persons. The persons are distinguished by these relative properties. Crowe is thus using the psychological analogy to understand more fully the real relations in the Trinity. Crowe is seeking to answer the question that Basil posed: what truly distinguishes the divine persons.

Moving Away from the Term Spiration

On the basis of the hypothesis that God is rational in the sense of Speaking a Word of truth on the basis of his infinite Understanding and then from that Truth breathing forth Love, Crowe explores the relations that follow upon these processions when they are “understood according to the likeness of the intelligible emanations of a word from a speaker and love from both.”

From the relations, he studies the persons in themselves and then as they are in the world.

Crowe, however, has three difficulties with using the Thomistic terminology for relations in God. “Traditionally,” Crowe writes, “these relations are called: paternity and filiation (the mutual relation of Father and Son), and active and passive spiration (the mutual relation of Father and Son on one side, and Holy Spirit on the other).” Since Crowe is seeking to understand these relations by starting with the eternal processions, he finds the terms, paternity, filiation, and

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303 Ibid., 160 [intelliguntur secundum similitudinem emanationis intelligibilis verbi a dicente, at amoris ab utroque]. Cf. Ibid., 144ff. In terms of the inner word, Crowe writes, “I have said understanding expresses itself in the concept, and this expression is the ‘emanatio intelligibilis.’ One way to approach this idea is by contrast with causality. Understanding and concept (the same applies to reflection and judgment) are related as cause and effect: the understanding produces its verbum. But the verbum is not merely the product, or effect, or operatum of the intelligere; it is also the rationally conscious expression of understanding. That is, when we define, not as parrots, but as intelligent men, we do so in virtue of understanding; when we judge not as bigots, but as rational men, we do so in virtue of reflection, and that ‘in virtue of’ does not indicate causation in the ontological sense; it indicates that the verbum is not only caused by but also is because of, in the cognitional sense of proceeding from rationally conscious grounds” (Ibid., 145-6). Emphasis is in the original. In terms of love, Crowe writes, “This flow of love in the will from the verbum is also an emanatio intelligibilis: we do not love irrationally, at least love need not be irrational; we do not choose blindly; there is something of the rationality of intellect in the act of the will . . . And this is the analogy for the procession of the Spirit in God” (Ibid., 146).

304 Ibid., 151.
spiration “quite awkward.” The terms are awkward for Crowe because (1) they are non-psychological terms, (2) paternity does not seem to suggest a way in which the first person can be related to the second and third by one relation, and (3) they do not indicate how the Word as a real relation can be related simultaneously to the first and third persons.

According to Crowe, the first difficulty with the traditional terms stems from their “emerging in the analytic sequence as ‘defensive’ doctrine.” The doctrine of relations, Crowe explained in chapter three, developed as the Church tried to defend the distinction of three persons in God. The focus at the time, however, was not on “conscious intellectual activity.” Since Crowe wants to understand the whole Trinitarian doctrine by the analogy of “conscious intellectual activity,” he finds the traditional names for relations difficult to wield.

Crowe has a second, more fundamental, difficulty with the traditional terms. Paternity, filiation, and spiration (active and passive), “do not indicate the ground in the first person for a relation to both the second and third persons.” Paternity expresses the Father’s orientation to the Son. Spiration expresses his orientation to the Holy Spirit. Instead of thinking of the Father in relation to the Son and then subsequently in relation to the Spirit, Crowe wants a name for the Father that would explain how he can be related to the Son and Spirit by one real relation. Crowe finds such a concept in the psychological analogy:

‘Fatherhood’ points only to the Son and not to the Spirit. But Understanding uttering a Word points to Love as well, for it is not coldly speculative understanding that is in question here, but an understanding of the divine goodness and beauty and harmony; so the Word that is uttered is not an abstract concept but the full expression of that goodness and beauty and harmony, a Word, therefore oriented towards Love.

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305 Ibid.
306 Ibid.
307 Cf. Ibid., 83ff.
308 Ibid., 151.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid., 151-2
Crowe finds support for finding a ground in the psychological analogy for the relationship the first person has to the Son and Spirit in the texts of Aquinas. “The Son is the Word,” Aquinas noted, “but not just any word. He is a Word spirating Love” (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2). In other words, in speaking the Word that himself brings forth Love, the Father is oriented not only to the Son, but also to the Spirit. The terminology of a Speaker of a Word seems to express, in contrast to the traditional name of paternity, the grounds for the Father, the Speaker, being related to the Son and Spirit.

The third awkwardness that Crowe finds in the traditional names for the four real relations, paternity, sonship (filiation), active and passive spiration, is closely related to the second awkwardness. “The traditional names,” Crowe writes, “do not indicate the unity of the ground of relationship in the second person to the first and third; filiation and active spiration convey two different ideas.”

Filiation or sonship conveys the idea of one who comes forth, after the manner of an image, from another with the same nature as the one from whom he came forth. The Son is of the same nature as the Father and is his perfect image. Filiation is passive. Active spiration is the idea of the Son bringing forth a breath of love. These two ideas are supposed to be applied to the same divine person. When the second person is conceived as subsisting filiation, his being the principle of the Holy Spirit seems to be added on to what he is as the Son. Crowe is not at all denying the importance of the concept of eternal Sonship. It played a vital role in the development of Trinitarian theology. “But,” he adds, “if you conceive the second person as the uttered Word, Veritas dicta, you can understand this one characteristic as ground for a relation both to the One uttering the Word and the Love that necessarily follows from such a Word.”

Crowe believes that God has revealed himself as three eternal divine persons. The Holy Spirit, in this sense, is

\[^{311}\text{Ibid., 152.}\]

\[^{312}\text{Ibid.}\]
necessary to the inner life of God. Since Crowe believes that the Spirit proceeds eternally and
without change from the Father and Son (by what must be a kind of eternal necessity), Crowe
likes the analogy of a truth spoken precisely because love will flow from that word by a kind of
moral necessity.

Two things must be noted here. First, Crowe is alive to the potentially confusing aspect of
traditional Thomistic Trinitarian theology in which there are four real relations and three
subsisting real relations. Active Spiration, according to Lonergan, does not constitute a subsisting
person, as it is “not really distinct from paternity or from filiation.” Crowe wants to find a
characteristic that conveys both the passive orientation that the Son has to the Father and the
active orientation that the Son has to the Spirit. Second, Crowe finds in the psychological analogy
the clue to this problem. The spoken Word can thus be understood as from the Speaker and the
source of proceeding Love. In the concept of a spoken Word, the Son is referred to the Father and
Spirit “by a single real relation.”

Crowe thinks this account provides “a new answer to the question: How many real
relations are there in God?” He notes how the four mentioned by Aquinas are not the only
answer given by medieval theologians. According to Crowe, Duns Scotus taught that each divine
person has a “real relation of similarity, equality, and identity towards the other two” resulting
in at least 18 real relations in God and possibly 23 (if the four relations of origin are included and
a relation of “disparity of origin”). On the basis on the psychological analogy, however, Crowe
thinks that one can argue for only three real relations.

314 “Assertion VI,” The Triune God: Systematics, 255.
315 “Assertion VI,” The Triune God: Systematics, 251.
316 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 152
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
When one approaches the question of relations from the testimony of the Scriptures, the obvious place to start is with the terms Father and Son. Jesus of Nazareth expressed a unique relation that he had towards the Father: No one knows the Son but the Father and no one knows the Father but the Son (Matthew 11:27). What distinguishes the Father in God? He is the one who brings forth the Son. The Son is the Son because of his unique relation to that Father. But Crowe thinks that once we move to the idea of an eternal generation of this Son by way of intellect, a deeper understanding can occur about this characteristic unique to the Son. Sonship is not necessarily the clearest way of conceiving his distinctiveness within God. In the prologue of his Gospel, John also called him the Word: *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God* (John 1:1).

The Father does not proceed. The Word proceeds from the Father and has another proceeding from him: the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit does not have someone proceeding from him. Sonship, Crowe maintains, does not capture this uniqueness of the Word in the same clarity as uttered Truth does. Crowe is approaching Basil’s question with what he has learned from the psychological analogy. A better understanding of real relations can be gained from the psychological analogy. In chapter six of *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, Crowe says, “It seems to me simpler and more accurate to say there are simply three real relations in God, one in each person towards the other two, the one ground of relation determining the relation as one in each case despite the multiplication of terms.”\(^{319}\) According to Crowe, the eternal procession of the Word, understood according to the likeness of an intelligible emanation, becomes the ground or foundation for understanding the real relation that is the Word.

\(^{319}\) Ibid.
Not only does Crowe think it is simpler and more accurate to talk about *three* real relations, he also thinks it is “more concrete. For ‘paternity’ is a kind of abstraction, regarding the ground of the Father’s relation to the Son, but prescinding from the ground of his relation to the Spirit.”\(^3\) Lonergan taught Crowe that science always heads towards the understanding of the real and the real is concrete. “Sciences,” Crowe will write, “reach their perfection in application to the concrete.”\(^4\) What is concrete in God? The three distinct persons. Crowe tells his students: “you can speak of either three or four real relations in God and be correct, for you can count four prescinding from aspects that are one in the concrete, or count three if you take a more concrete view.”\(^5\)

In the rest of chapter six, Crowe turns to question of persons in God. In this way, he is trying to follow the order of St. Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologiae*. Aquinas began with processions in God (q. 27), next took up relations (q. 28), and then moved to the divine persons in general (qq. 29-32). Crowe, after treating “persons in God” (Section 3.1), tries to enrich Aquinas’ doctrine with Lonergan’s insights into what it means for a person to be a subject (3.2) and how we can speak of intersubjectivity in God (3.2).

In section 3.1, Crowe explains the origin of many different ways of considering what a divine person is. First, he speaks about how the name was introduced into Catholic thought by Tertullian. Next, Crowe takes us through various proposed definitions of the word person in Augustine, Boethius, Richard of St. Victor, and Thomas Aquinas. Crowe characterizes this line of development as a *logical* consideration of the person with the basic final definition being

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\(^3\) Ibid.  
\(^4\) Ibid., 191.  
\(^5\) Ibid., 152.
“subsistens distinctum in natura rationali.”

Crowe then explains how these various definitions were given metaphysical elaboration by “Scotus, Capreolus, and the renaissance scholastics” who sought “to explain the constitution of a person.” Out of these theories, debates arose regarding what really does constitute a person. From these debates (and many other debates), Crowe suggests that “thinkers turned in the next stage to cognitional and psychological studies as more empirical than the metaphysical field.”

But that trend, that turn towards the subject, Crowe claims, “was copied in the fields of experimental and depth psychology and so the question of the person also came to be treated almost exclusively in psychological terms.”

Crowe aptly notes how these modern approaches generated vast debates not unlike how the earlier metaphysical theories did. As philosophers turned to cognition and psychology to get behind and beyond the metaphysical debates, so Crowe thinks that “the vogue is now to turn to more literary forms of thought, to the concrete interpersonal relationships familiar to us all, to artistic sketching and phenomenological description.”

Crowe does not think that any of these five approaches has to be rejected, including the logical and metaphysical. Each approach has something to contribute and answers a different kind of question. All the approaches can be seen as part of a heuristic approach to articulating fully what a person is.

After his historical summary of the notion of person, Crowe turns to the idea of “persons as subjects” (3.2). He gives a very brief survey of the history of the post-Kantian distinction between subject and object. What Crowe means by subject is “conscious person.”

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323 Ibid., 155 [a distinct subsistent in a rational nature].
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid., 157.
refers to various views of consciousness among contemporary Catholic and Protestant theologians. Crowe’s preference is for Lonergan’s account of consciousness: “internal experience, strictly understood, of oneself and one’s acts.”

Crowe then explains how this notion can be analogously applied to each of the Three divine persons in the inner Trinitarian life.

In section 3.3, Crowe takes up his last issue in this chapter, “the Divine Persons and the Intersubjective.” Crowe notes that a divine person is only a subject “by intersubjectivity. He is distinct from the other persons in God only by relation to them, by being turned towards them; his being is being-towards-another.”

This is a beautiful section in which Crowe uses his psychological analogy to talk about the joy of the Three in the Trinity.

At the end of chapter six, Crowe has a fourth section, in which he summarizes in Latin the thesis of this chapter (4.1), states some remaining theoretical problems (4.2), and gives a bibliography (4.3). In his Latin summary, Crowe gives many useful definitions including definitions of intelligible emanation, subject, and consciousness.

Crowe admits that this chapter six is a compromise. He discusses in one chapter from the systematic viewpoint what he discussed in four chapters from the historical or analytic viewpoint (“three equal persons in God, of distinction of the persons by relations of origin, of origin by the twofold procession of Word and Love”). But he is not sure what else he can do in the current situation of seminary training in which seminaries allot only one course to the Trinity. Nevertheless, Crowe’s understanding of only three real relations in God was a conscious effort to help his students in 1965 answer for themselves Basil’s question: what distinguishes the three divine persons from each other.

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329 Ibid.
330 Ibid., 158.
331 Ibid., 143.
Discerning the Personal Property of the Three in the World

Fr. Crowe began his 1965 Trinitarian treatise by discussing in chapter one the economic Trinity as manifested in the Scriptural accounts of the sending of the Son and the Spirit. The move in chapter two was from what is first for us (the experience of the Incarnate Son and the experience of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost) to what is first in itself, the consubstantiality of the Three. This discussion of the ontological Trinity continued in chapters 3-5 and into chapter 6. Finally, in chapters seven and eight, Fr. Crowe returns to the economic Trinity, but does so with all the understanding made possible by the *via analytica* and the *via synthetica*. These two final chapters are not short and show Crowe’s great interest in this question of the Trinity in the world.

*Chapter seven* deals with what it would mean for the Three to enter “any world the Trinity entered.”\(^{332}\) It deals first with the general metaphysical problem of how God can be said to enter the world at all (7.1). Secondly, Crowe applies “the content determined by our psychological analogy and so consider[s] the Father in the world as *Dicens*, the Son in the world as *Verbum*, and the Holy Spirit in the world as *Amor*.”\(^{333}\) Crowe uses Basil’s word in the title of this section (7.2): “Each of the Three in the World with His Proper Character.” Finally, he says a few things (7.3) concerning “the new society that results from their presence in the world.”\(^{334}\)

In *chapter eight*, Crowe introduces his neologism, Trinification. Crowe’s point is that when God communicates himself to us, it is the Triune God who does so. Chapter eight discusses the human *need* for the Triune God and the Triune response to this need. Crowe discusses first our need as images of God for understanding, truth, and love (8.1.1). He also discusses our need for the Trinity to take away the loneliness of our human spirit (8.1.2). These two needs structure

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\(^{332}\) Ibid., 162.

\(^{333}\) Ibid., 163.

\(^{334}\) Ibid.
God’s response (8.2.1). Finally, these questions lead him into a discussion of how historically God has responded to our need for Trinification and the stable structure this Trinification has established for understanding ourselves and history (8.2.2-3).

The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’s Presence in the World as Exemplars

By 1965, Crowe was interested not only in the presence of the Son and Spirit in the world, but also the Father. He said that it was “a new and extremely difficult question: whether he is in the world in a way that is proper to himself and is not common to all Three. It is a new question.”335

The person he credits with introducing the question was Maurice de la Taille in his 1928 work, “The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation of Uncreated Act.” “Here,” Crowe writes, “for the first time (as far as I know), these three items of revelation were seen as ‘instances’ of a kind.”336

In talking about these three revealed “items,” Crowe refers to the hypostatic union, sanctifying grace, and the light of glory.

The three items of revelation come out more clearly in the original French title of de la Taille’s article: “Actuation créé par Acte incréé: lumière de gloire, grace sanctifiante, union hypostatique” [Literally: Created actuation by Uncreated Act: light of glory, sanctifying grace, hypostatic union]. Crowe does not think that de la Taille dreamed “of a one-to-one correspondence between these three facts and the three persons of the Trinity.”337 In other words, de la Taille did not uniquely relate the light of glory, sanctifying grace, and the hypostatic union in a one-to-one relationship with the presence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the world. According to Crowe, de la Taille “makes only the most casual reference to the Spirit’s role in sanctifying grace, and

335 Ibid., 165.
337 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 166.
none at all to a possible role of the Father, i.e., special to the Father, in the light of glory.”

Nevertheless, Crowe himself thinks that a one-on-one correspondence can be made between these three created actuations and the three divine persons. The idea suggested to Crowe by de la Taille’s work, however, would look something like this:

Table 5: Crowe’s Aligning of the Persons of the Trinity with Three Created Realities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons of Trinity</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Son</th>
<th>Holy Spirit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding created actuations due to a special role of Three persons</td>
<td>Light of glory</td>
<td>[hypostatic union]</td>
<td>Sanctifying grace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While Crowe does not think that de la Taille completely made this step, Crowe thinks that Lonergan made it “in his course on grace at Regis College in 1950-51, and put [it] into print in his Divinarum Personarum . . . (p. 214) in 1957.” Crowe is referring to what is now called Lonergan’s “four-point hypothesis.” Lonergan formulated this hypothesis about four ways of imitating the four real relations in this way:

If one asks about the supernatural character of the formal terms, it is pertinent to note the following. First, there are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation

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338 Ibid.
to the Father and Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of Sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.341

How is this four-fold connection possible? Lonergan gives this answer: “Just as God by the divine intellect knows the four real relations, so also by the divine intellect, together with the divine will, God can produce beings that are finite yet similar [to the four real relations] and absolutely supernatural.”342 Below is a table summarizing Lonergan’s teaching:

Table 6: Lonergan’s Four-Point Hypothesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four real divine relations that ground external imitation of the divine substance</th>
<th>The four absolutely supernatural realities made known by revelation</th>
<th>It would not be inappropriate to say one of these respective realities is a created paternity</th>
<th>These different created supernatural realities have, therefore, a special relation to the:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paternity</td>
<td>Christ’s secondary act of existence</td>
<td>participation of paternity</td>
<td>special relation to the Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Spiration</td>
<td>Sanctifying grace</td>
<td>participation of active spiration</td>
<td>special relation to the Holy Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Spiration</td>
<td>Habit of charity</td>
<td>participation of passive spiration</td>
<td>special relation to the Father and Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filiation (Sonship)</td>
<td>Light of glory</td>
<td>participation of sonship</td>
<td>special relation to the Father</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lonergan is working from certain created realities that are, in some sense, external to God (ad extra) and not absolutely identical with the divine essence: the secondary act of existence of Christ’s human nature, the created sanctifying grace infused into the essence of the human soul that makes a creature just and pleasing to God, the created habit of charity, and the created light of glory by which a creature is able to see God face to face. Lonergan correlates these respectively to the four real relations in God: paternity (the relation of the Father towards the Son), Active Spiration (the relation of Father and Son towards the Spirit), Passive Spiration (the relation of the Holy Spirit towards the Father and Son), and Filiation (the relation the Son has towards the

341 The Triune God: Systematics, 471-3.
342 Ibid.
Father). The difference, Crowe claims, between Lonergan’s approach and his own lies in the fact that Lonergan’s approach “was through the created terms ad extra,” whereas Crowe’s “approach is through the persons themselves.”

Lonergan left ways to think of our participation in the four real relations. Crowe admits that this view of Lonergan’s “was the creative idea behind our generalized theory” in chapter seven for how the Three persons are in the world in their distinctive characteristics. Crowe prefers, however, to think of “the Three as present” to us in a way proper to each person:

*Table 7: Crowe’s Way of Explaining the Three Divine Persons as Present in a Proper Way*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Three Divine Persons</th>
<th>Present in the world in a special, personal way, proper to each and not had by the others in this way</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Father</em></td>
<td>To the saints in the beatific vision (a “reasonable hypothesis”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Son</em></td>
<td>To all men as Man among them and their Brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Holy Spirit</em></td>
<td>As present in the church, (generally interpreted as a special mode of inhabitation in the souls of the just) [167]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without totally abandoning the four-point hypothesis, Crowe admits that this preference is related to his preference of talking about three real Trinitarian relations rather than four.

In chapter six I argued briefly that we should talk of three trinitarian relations rather than of four, that we count four only by prescinding from an aspect that is concretely one with the aspect considered; naturally the doctrine of chapter seven should be coherent with that of chapter six, and so I prefer not to speak here of four relations and their participation in created grace.

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343 *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 166. **Emphasis** is mine.
344 Ibid., 170.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
Lonergan argued that the four utterly supernatural realities or graces “that are never found uninformed”\textsuperscript{347} (light of glory, grace of union, habit of charity, and sanctifying grace) were created as likenesses of the four real relations. This idea of likeness lies behind Crowe’s own idea that the personal properties of the Three are the exemplars of the created understanding, truth, and love that we need and that come to us through the presence of each of the Three as individual persons.

**Presence of Each of the Three in the World in a Proper, Unique and Personal Way**

One looks for the words ‘divine missions’ in the synthetic or systematic part of Crowe’s 1965-66 treatise, and instead one finds the phrase: the presence of the Three in the world. Where one hopes to find discussion of the sending (missio) of the Son and the sending of the Spirit, one finds talk of “being-in-the-world” of the Son and Spirit and Father. Crowe consciously makes this substitution. He says in his Latin *thetica* for chapter seven: “pars 2a fundatur in eius asserto XVII, sed ‘esse-in-mundo’ substituitur loco ‘missio’ [the second part is founded on his (Lonergan’s *The Triune God: Systematics*) assertion 17, but ‘being-in-the-world’ is substituted in place of ‘mission’]”\textsuperscript{348}

In chapter seven, Crowe takes up the question of a personal and proper presence of each of the Three in the second section: “each of the Three in the World with His Proper Character.”\textsuperscript{349} Crowe’s goal is to find the way in which each person is present as an individual person that is exclusive to him. Crowe does not want us to forget that the fundamental idea of our whole ‘system’ is supplied by the psychological analogy, that the personal ‘character’ of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is defined for us by the divine rationality which ‘moves’ God to utter a Word and breathe forth Love; so this aspect of the Trinity in the world has certainly to be treated.\textsuperscript{350}


\textsuperscript{348} *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 176.

\textsuperscript{349} Ibid., 172.

\textsuperscript{350} Ibid.
Crowe is still talking about the entry of the Three from the side of the Three themselves. He will discuss the relevance of their entry for us in chapter eight. Crowe summarizes the second section of chapter seven in these words:

In the second section of chapter seven we determined the general features of trinitarian entry into the world. The Father will come as Understanding, the Son as Word, the Spirit as Love; they will be in the world, each with his own proper character, and this will be meaningful for those rational creatures to whom they come.351

At this point, the Understanding that Crowe refers to is the understanding of the Divine Essence given by the light of glory. In other words, he is not talking about something generally given in this earthly life. As he says a bit later, “The Father we conceive to be really in the world as divine Understanding expressing itself, not in the world of earthly life but in the world where my knowledge ‘will be whole, like God’s knowledge of me’ (1 Cor 13/12).”352 When he says that the Three enter this world, he means to include the world of heaven.

Crowe immediately points out that the created understanding of God’s essence, for example, that is produced as a consequence of the entry of the Father into our world is not produced somehow by the Father alone. “Not that each” person, Crowe writes, “will produce in the images of God that psychological act which he is in the Trinity and for which he stands in the imago Dei, but in ways that go beyond the perspective of efficient causality their presence as Understanding, Truth, and Love will be meaningful.”353 Earlier, Crowe spoke about there being room

for a relation of our understanding to infinite Understanding in the world, of our truth to infinite Truth in the world, and of our love to infinite Love in the world – a relation to them as exemplars, as subsistent persons, as constitutive of the meaning of our universe, and perhaps in other ways.354

352 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 186.
353 Ibid., 185. The question of the meaningfulness of the entry of the Holy Spirit in the world will be discussed in Chapter Five.
354 Ibid., 173.
Crowe does not want to say that all human love is efficiently produced in us by the sending of the Holy Spirit. He does not want to say that all truth is efficiently produced by the Word alone being sent. But he does want to say that divine love in us finds its exemplar in the Holy Spirit. Truth finds its exemplar in the Son. They are subsistent Love and Truth, according to the psychological analogy. Crowe thinks that the sources of the Catholic faith “show the Word in the world, and indeed in the world as Word” and “show the Spirit in the world, with some indication that he is here as Love.” He also thinks that the same sources “seem to indicate a really special relation of our knowledge to the divine Word, and a really special relation of our sanctification to divine Love.” The Son and Spirit, therefore, are present to us in unique and proper ways during this life.

Crowe thinks that “what is true of our special relation to the Word and Love on earth would be true a fortiori of our relation to Understanding in heaven.” Crowe repeats the point that the understanding given us in heaven will be produced by all Three persons, but still it is possible that the Father will be present to us in a unique and personal way in the beatific vision.

**Trinitarian Response to Our Need for Trinification**

Crowe has a hypothesis that the Father has a special role to play in the beatific vision. As the Son has a special role to play by being sent into our world in the flesh and the Holy Spirit has a role by being sent into our hearts, so the Father has a role in the created order too. His role occurs in heaven where “we might conceive that in the light of glory, where the Father is present to us and we are joined to him by a grace which is an imitation of the divine filiation, we are sons of

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355 Ibid., 174.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
God in a new sense and brothers of his Son in a new sense.”

Crowe even speculates that the beatific vision will bring the Son to us in a new sense. “Here on earth he is our Brother as human, as one of us; there in heaven he is our Brother as divine, because we share in his divine filiation.”

The result of this new sharing in divine filiation is a new sharing in the Holy Spirit. When we share in the Son’s divine filiation in heaven,

the Father has a new reason for giving us the Love which is the Holy Spirit; just as he loves his Son, as it were, twice, first eternally as God and then temporally as Man, so he will love us twice, first as men joined to his Son in human fellowship, and then as Gods (inquantum possibile [inasmuch as it is possible]) joined to his Son in divine fellowship.

Eternally, there is an order of origin among the persons of the Trinity. The Father is the origin of the Son. And the Father and the Son are the origin of the Holy Spirit. Crowe is saying that the order in which we encounter the persons in heaven will follow this ordering.

In heaven, Crowe thinks that we will still be related to the divine persons in their personal distinction. There will be an order in which persons will be present to us: Father, then Son, then Holy Spirit. In the vision of God, Crowe conceives that the Father makes “his Son present to us also and [gives] his Spirit in a new way.”

But Crowe does not think that this is the historical order in which the persons are present to us.

The Father does not come to earth the way the Son and Spirit do. The Father’s “coming is coincident with our receiving the light of glory and reaching our destination.”

But if the eternal Truth brings truth into this world so that on the basis of that truth there can be love, how can the Father not be present on earth in a proper way? In the psychological analogy, truth depends on

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358 Ibid., 188.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid., 189.
362 Ibid.
understanding. How can the Truth here and now be present in a proper way without the one who is Understanding being present? Crowe answers this objection by pointing out that “we can have truth without its proper principle in our understanding, as when we believe in another, trusting his understanding.”\textsuperscript{363} Crowe is talking about the way faith supplies now what beatific understanding will provide in heaven. We have the truth because we accept in faith the word of another’s understanding. Then, once we have truth, “we can also have love. Son and Spirit can therefore be in our world as Truth and Love (to which correspond faith and charity) without the Father being in our world as Understanding.”\textsuperscript{364}

Fr. Crowe strongly insists on the Son’s presence as Truth before the Spirit’s presence as Love. The Trinitarian entry into the world has special events in “748 and 781 A.U.C. (if indeed they were sent at those dates).”\textsuperscript{365} Crowe is talking about the manifest presence of the Son and Spirit in Palestine. This “was thousands of years after the creation of man” that God sent his Son and Spirit “in manifest presence to our world.”\textsuperscript{366} Crowe does not deny the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament period. This is clear, he thinks, from Old Testament saints. Still, he does not think the manifest presence of the Spirit took place until Pentecost. Before that point “he was in the world incognito.”\textsuperscript{367}

This raises a question. The Son was made man somewhere around 4 B.C., 748 A.U.C. Does this mean that the Spirit was “in the world without the Word?”\textsuperscript{368} The problem from the side of questions of intellect and will is that the will always follows the intellect. Nothing is loved that

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., 190.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., 189. “A.U.C.” refers to the foundation of the city of Rome, the urbs, and is short for “ab urbe condita” or “anno urbis conditae.”
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 190.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid.
is not first known. The coming of the Holy Spirit into the heart brings charity in the will. There is a “charity that the presence of the Holy Spirit gives.”

Crowe makes an interesting basic distinction between faith and charity. “Charity,” he says, “has a concreteness that does not allow the distinctions possible in intellectual operations, as there can be judgment of faith without our own understanding, so there can be implicit judgments (heuristic anticipations) and explicit judgments.”

On the side of the intellect, there is a whole set of distinctions that can be made and applied to the faith of those who lived before the Word became flesh. Crowe quotes John 1:10: “He was in the world; but the world . . . did not recognize him.” Crowe interprets this to mean that in the period of the Old Testament there were some kind of signs for the people in which the Word was in the world. These prepared them for his manifest coming. Through these signs, there was implicit faith “in the Word incarnate” that “could fulfill the conditions on the side of intellect for the charity that the presence of the Holy Spirit gives.”

Crowe knows that his students might be uneasy with his conviction of the Spirit’s presence in the Old Testament period. “You may have wished,” he writes, “when I spoke of the Spirit being given in the OT, to challenge me with John’s statement: “the Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified.” Crowe responds first by referring to several passages from Luke as well as a text in Hebrews and 2 Peter. The Holy Spirit

1. is the “agent in the conception of Jesus” (Luke 1:35)
2. descends from heaven “at the baptism of Jesus” (Luke 3:22)

369 Ibid.
370 Ibid.
371 Ibid.
3. spoke “through the OT prophets” (Hebrews 3:7, 2 Peter 2:21)


Crowe’s point is that the Holy Spirit is active before the Death, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ. Whatever John 7:39 means, it cannot rule out all presence of the Holy Spirit before Christ’s glorification. “Some distinction has to be made,” Crowe writes, “and the simplest explanation seems to be that John is speaking of the manifestation of the Spirit as distinct from the Son, a distinction that is clear when he comes in power though the Son has returned to the Father.”

Crowe thinks that John contributed to the life of the early Church by bringing out the Son and Spirit’s distinction. As part of this contribution, John “insists also on the order of the Son’s going and the Spirit’s coming.”

But why did the Son and Spirit come in the way they did? Why did the Spirit come at “Pentecost and not someone else”? Why did he “come in the way he did and not some other way”? When Crowe answers this question, he does so with the term he learned from Basil. Just as he answered these kinds of questions in terms of the Son’s coming in the flesh, so these questions about the Spirit are “answered again by reference to his eternal personal ‘character.’”

Crowe then begins to refer to the kinds of conclusions he drew in his study, “Complacency and Concern.”

He first makes this distinction: “The Spirit is Love and love is first of all a peace and harmony and rest in the enjoyment of what is, and then it is an unrest and a desire and striving for what is not (complacere and intendere).” But then, unlike earlier, Crowe applies all of this

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373 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 190.
374 Ibid.
375 Ibid., 192.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
description of love to the Love proceeding in God. According to Crowe, “All this the Spirit is in God, the term of Understanding and Word as the divine complacere [being complacently in love], the principle of divine creativity as intendere [tending] (Creator Spiritus).”378 The key words here are term and principle. In “Figure 1” used in the last chapter, we saw how Crowe conceived of a moment in the human will, ‘B,’ that is first of all the term or end point of a receptive process. That same act of will, ‘B,’ can become the principle of another process, a process of bringing about what is not yet. In other words, Crowe’s emphasis on the analogy of complacent love for the mode of the Holy Spirit’s procession does not now rule out that the analogy of concerned love also applies to the Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit is eternally complacent love and concerned love, restful love and restless love. This divine restfulness therefore is what the Spirit will be in the world, that is to say, he will represent acceptance of what is and harmony with the universe of being, he will find his role in relation to that of the Son, bringing men to the truth, not as revealer of new truth but as hearing the Son with love and obedience.379

Crowe then takes up the restless aspect of the Spirit’s presence in our world: “furthermore, as representing the divine unrest he will be the principle of growth in the new being, keeping the freshness of youth in the church and continuously renewing it (Vatican II, De Ecclesia, c. 1).”380

Crowe later will speak of the role of the Holy Spirit as counteracting “the tendency to petrification” in the institutional Church.381 The Holy Spirit is thus the “principle of perpetual rejuvenation in the church.”382 He admits that the Holy Spirit “does indeed stand for the

378 Ibid. Crowe is referring to the Latin hymn Veni, Creator Spiritus [Come, Creator Spirit].
379 Ibid., 193
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid., 194
382 Ibid.
acceptance of the word of God and for harmony with all that is, but what we are is largely potential, so he stands also for the emergence of new understanding and new forms in the church.”

Crowe illustrates this role of the Holy Spirit by a comparison of the way the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit operate in us. The virtues, according to Aquinas, “are a form, and an interior principle of right conduct.” By contrast, the gifts of the Holy Spirit (wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear of the Lord) should not be thought of as “forms and are not an interior principle of right conduct.” Crowe quotes Lonergan who said that the gifts “link us dynamically with the sole source of absolute perfection.” They link us with the Holy Spirit himself and exist in the soul as dispositions “to follow external guidance and direction of another.” Crowe’s example for illustrating the difference between the way the virtues help guide us and the gifts is memorable. He writes,

Think of a football player running interference; as a runner, he has a virtue, an internal principle, the full expression of whose potency would be running at the greatest possible speed; but as running interference, he is at the disposal of the ball-carrier, and the best speed is not necessarily the fastest possible but is governed by an external principle.

In football, a lead blocker cannot get too close to the ball carrier or too far ahead. In either case, he will not be helping the ball carrier to avoid the other team’s defence. This person running interference must constantly follow the guidance of the ball carrier. He adjusts himself to the movements of the one with the ball behind him.

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383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
In this analogy, the Holy Spirit carries the ball and we are blocking for him. Crowe writes, “Well, the gifts put us at the disposition of the Spirit, to be governed according to his wisdom and love, and not simply according to the forms or virtues or patterns intrinsic to us. And in this way the Spirit continually rejuvenates the church.”

Crowe was writing these words towards the end of Vatican II. He knew of the struggles within the Church for and against changes to the liturgy and life of the Church. His thinking about changes is guided by his Trinitarian pneumatology:

If we remember that truth is the guide, that law is the intelligibility of the good, that love without order is a rudderless ship, and at the same time recognise that our truth is only partial, that what is a good law today is not necessarily a good law tomorrow, that the urge to love is to establish an ever better and better order, then we may be able to read “the signs of the times” (Vatican II, Decree on ecumenism), be acquitted of the Protestant charge that we resist the Lordship of the Spirit (see G. S. Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, 1965, revised ed.), and still be true to the Catholic doctrine that the Spirit proceeds eternally and temporally from the Word that expresses divine Understanding.

Conclusion

Although Crowe had begun his teaching career more interested in the intelligible emanations, his main interest by the end of this first stage, under the influence of St. Basil, was in the presence of the Three in history. He was convinced that the Spirit was at work in the changes coming with Vatican II and in the ecumenical movement. By 1966, in his article, “Development of Doctrine: Aid or Barrier to Christian Unity,” Crowe could write:

One [preliminary] question is why a novice in the field of ecumenism should presume to speak to you on that subject at all. My answer is partly to lay the blame on the Holy Spirit, who all too clearly means to involve everyone, expert or novice, in the ecumenical movement. Something wonderful, pentecostal, challenging, is going on in regard to Christian disunity, and we cannot evade the responsibility laid on us by the Spirit.

389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
It was Crowe’s effort to discern this unique role of the Holy Spirit in the Church’s life in the mid-1960’s that also helped him accept what he had largely dismissed in 1959, namely, the analogy of concerned love for the procession of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit in the world stands for harmony, but also the restless renewal of the Church. The Spirit must, somehow, have this restless character in eternity.
Bridge between Part I (1953-68) and Part II (1969-84)

This dissertation argues that Fr. Crowe’s pneumatology went through three significant stages. In the first stage, the principal question driving Crowe’s reflections was about the *proprium* or unique characteristic of the Holy Spirit. Crowe began Stage I with a concern for the eternal personal property of the Spirit, but under the influence of St. Basil, started to think more about what was the proper role of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation. Crowe’s basic answer was that the Holy Spirit eternally and in time has the characteristic of proceeding complacent and concerned love.

My claim is that Crowe’s second stage is marked by the subsequent question of the *relation* of the Spirit’s mission to the Son’s mission. In the first stage, Crowe consistently argued that the Spirit’s mission was always to be understood in the context of the Son’s mission. But at the end of the second stage, Crowe eventually argues that the Son’s mission is in the context of the Spirit’s. He will speak of two steps in God’s one plan of salvation. First, God gives his love in the sending of the Spirit. Second, he discloses the fullness of his love in the mission of the Son.

How did Crowe arrive at his reversal of the divine missions? There are two basic reasons. First, Fr. Crowe was trying to explain what he thought the later Lonergan taught concerning the relation of the divine missions. Second, Fr. Crowe was motivated by concerns about the state of the Catholic Church. Crowe’s recognition of a later Lonergan and his recognition of a profound transition in the Catholic Church both occurred in 1969.

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Crowe had been closely following Lonergan’s thought throughout the 1960s. But by the time of the International Lonergan Congress, Crowe began to think that Lonergan himself had undergone a profound shift: “There is no doubt that Lonergan’s thinking has undergone a profound reorientation in the last five years.”393 “What has happened,” Crowe adds, “between 1964 and 1969, I would judge, is that a new understanding of values and their role has been added. This does not eliminate the role of truth; rather, it supplies it with a better dynamism, especially in the religious sphere.”394 In 1969, for example, Lonergan wrote, “man exists authentically in the measure that he succeeds in self-transcendence, and I have found that self-transcendence has both its fulfillment and its enduring ground in holiness, in God’s gift of his love to us.”395 In *Insight*, the detached and disinterested desire to know, as that desire unfolds in questions, was the dynamic ground for self-transcendence. By the late 1960s, Crowe thinks that Lonergan has articulated another ground of cognitional development, the gift of religious love. It is precisely that gift of religious love which Crowe will utilize in his argument for the priority of the mission of the Holy Spirit.

In 1969, Crowe also was dramatically affected by the widespread dissent in the Church over Pope Paul VI’s *Humanae Vitae*. Writing in the summer of 1969, Crowe said, “To my mind we are in a new situation; we are not the Church we were a year ago; there is a new spirit at work.”396 The second stage of Crowe’s pneumatology is the story of Crowe adapting himself to these perceived changes both in Lonergan’s thought and the life of the Church. With Lonergan’s death on 26 November 1984, this second stage of Crowe’s development can be

396 “Responsibility of the Theologian, and the Learning Church,” *Appropriating*, 175. This paper was delivered in 1969.
seen to come to a close. On that same day, Crowe delivered the paper in which he most clearly set forward his thesis on the reversal of the missions.

In *Chapter Four*, I look at the way Lonergan’s later theology helped Crowe to reverse the order and context of the missions. In *Chapter Five*, I will place Crowe in the larger and more controversial context of the Catholic Church’s life after Vatican II. Fr. Crowe was motivated in his decision to reverse the missions by his conviction that such a theology of the missions was needed to guide the Church’s life in the future. Without his interaction with the method of the later Lonergan, Crowe never would have formulated his thesis on the missions in the way he did. Without the context of the crisis in authority within the Church, Crowe would never have applied Lonergan’s ideas on the mission of the Holy Spirit to the problems of the day.
Part II (1969-84): Reversing the Relation of the Two Divine Missions

Chapter Four – Who Provides the Context: the Son or the Spirit?

“The Spirit proceeds from the Son and works in the context of the Son.”
– Frederick Crowe, October 27, 1968

“On the contrary, God first sent the Spirit, and then sent the Son in the context of the Spirit’s mission.”
– Frederick Crowe, November 26, 1984

Did God first send the Son or the Holy Spirit into the world? Between 1968 and 1984, Fr. Crowe changed his position about the relation of the two divine missions. In 1968, he says that the Son is sent first and provides the context for the Spirit’s mission. In 1984, the Spirit is sent first and provides the context for the Son’s mission. Why did Fr. Crowe change his mind?

Two aspects of Crowe’s position need to be distinguished. There is the question of which person was sent first, the Son or the Spirit. But there is also the question of the context for the missions. Crowe first changes his mind about which person is sent first. In 1968, he would say that the Son is sent first because truth must precede love. From 1972 on, however, the idea of the Spirit being sent first is implicitly operative in Crowe’s thinking.

In the first stage of his development, Crowe explained that the Holy Spirit finds “his role in relation to that of the Son, bringing men to the truth, not as a revealer of new truth, but as hearing the Son with love and obedience.” Finding the role of one person in relation to another is very close to what Fr. Crowe means by working in the context of another. By 1984, Fr. Crowe will change his mind and place the Son’s mission in relation to the Spirit’s. The


399 Frederick Crowe, S.J., The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 193.
Holy Spirit’s prior mission eventually provides for Crowe the divine rationale for sending the Son. The gift of the Spirit is the gift of Love. This Love needs to be declared for God and humanity to be fully in love. The Son’s mission is to declare the Love that has already been bestowed.

The question of the order of the two missions was with Crowe from early on in his theology studies as part of Lonergan’s courses. The question found its way into Crowe’s notes on the Trinity. But Lonergan’s later writings (post-1965) seem to call into question the very foundation for Crowe’s earlier position on the order of the missions and provide an analogy for reassessing the context of the two missions.

This chapter, following the methodology of Crowe in *Theology of the Christian Word*, looks at this stage of Crowe’s pneumatology in three parts. We first look at this question of the relation of the missions in his earlier thought (section I); second, we trace out how the question of reversing the context of the Spirit’s mission emerged for Crowe (section II). Finally, we will examine Crowe’s way of answering this question once it had become thematized (section III).

**Background: The Relation of the Divine Missions in Crowe’s Earlier Thinking**

In the first stage of his pneumatology, Crowe largely followed the position of his teacher, Bernard Lonergan, on the relation of the divine missions to one another. Lonergan had a question in his textbook *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica*: “Are the divine missions ordered to each other?” Lonergan follows Aquinas in thinking of the missions within time as constituted by the eternal divine processions and divine relations. There is an order in God according to the processions, however. “There is no procession of love except in an order to

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400 “Quaestio XXVIII – Utrum divinae missiones inter se ordinentur?” *The Triune God: Systematics*, 479.
the procession of the Word,” Lonergan writes. From the order of the eternal processions, Lonergan reasons to an order in the missions.

Lonergan also thinks that the missions are ordered to one another according to their consequent terms. Lonergan tries to show how “the fact that a divine person sends or is sent cannot have the correspondence of truth through the divine perfection alone.” “Appropriate external terms” are also required for it to be true to say that the Son and Spirit are sent into the world. The appropriate external term, the consequent condition, of the sending of the Son, according to Lonergan, is the created human nature assumed by the Word. The consequent term of the Holy Spirit’s mission is “the gift of sanctifying grace.”

Lonergan follows Thomas Aquinas in seeing that God’s love is not like human love. God’s love is not responsive to a pre-existing good. His love causes the good that is in creatures. Aquinas goes on to say that there is a difference between the general love that God has for all things (Wisdom 11:25) and the “special love” that he has for the rational creature. That special love causes in us a “participation in the divine good” that draws us “above the condition of nature.” Since Aquinas thinks of this sharing in the divine goodness as something contingent and external to God, he maintains that this grace is not just the favour (gratia) by which God considers that we are just and pleasing to him. Aquinas speaks of this

401 “Question 28,” The Triune God: Systematics, 479.
402 Ibid.
403 “Question 25,” Ibid., 467.
404 Ibid.
405 “Question 27,” Ibid., 475.
406 Summa Theologiae, I-II q. 110, a. 1
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
grace as a supernatural quality within the essence of the soul\textsuperscript{409} and calls it \textit{gratia gratum faciens}, the grace that makes us pleasing.\textsuperscript{410}

Lonergan connected the special love spoken about by Aquinas in \textit{Summa Theologiae} I-II q. 110, a. 1 with the mission of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, according to Aquinas, “proceeds as Love.”\textsuperscript{411} He is love taken notionally in God and not as the essential love that is common to all three persons. Aquinas says that the Father and Son “love themselves and us by the Holy Spirit or proceeding Love.”\textsuperscript{412} As proceeding Love, the Holy Spirit can be also understood as Gift. Lonergan draws our attention to this passage in Aquinas: “a gift is not called a gift from the fact that it is actually given, but inasmuch as it has the aptitude to be able to be given.”\textsuperscript{413} The point is that the Holy Spirit can be called gift eternally because he is the divine person apt to be given. He is apt to be given because he proceeds as Love and love is the “first thing we give to someone.”\textsuperscript{414}

Lonergan reads these texts of Aquinas from the \textit{Prima Pars} and the \textit{Prima Secundae} together to mean that the special love that the persons of the Trinity have for certain created persons leads to the sending and giving of the proceeding Love. Lonergan puts a very strong emphasis on sanctifying grace, habitual grace, as the consequence in us of this sending of the Holy Spirit. This appropriate external effect has a special connection to the person of the Holy Spirit. And this connection also serves to explain for him the order that exists between the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit.
Lonergan begins with Galatians 4:4-6: “God sent his Son . . . so that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts crying, ‘Abba, Father.’” Lonergan comments: “From these words it seems we must understand that the mission of the Son is to make us children of God by adoption; and that the mission of the Holy Spirit is in accord with the adoption.” Lonergan then spells out the connection in terms of the Holy Spirit as proceeding Love:

The Holy Spirit is sent as a special and notional divine love. The special divine love is that according to which the just are loved as ordered to the divine good. But since God does everything in accord with the order of justice, this special love itself supposes a special reason. And this special reason cannot be other than God’s own Son, who is both mediator and redeemer.

The Son’s mission provides the special reason or the context for the sending of the Holy Spirit. Lonergan then explains how the incarnation leads the Father to love human beings with the same love with which he loves his Son made man. Lonergan appeals to the baptism of Christ, with the descent of the Holy Spirit, as evidence that the Father loves the Son as man by the Holy Spirit. If the Father loves the man Christ Jesus with the special love, he can also love other men with that special love. Lonergan quotes Christ’s words in John 17:23, “You have loved them even as you have loved me.” Lonergan ties this quotation of Christ to the Holy Spirit. The point is this: “if the Father loves us as he loves his own Son, he surely loves us and gives to us by the Holy Spirit.”

Lonergan will speak of the Son’s mission as “the first mission [prior . . . missio].”

The Son reconciles us to the Father. The Spirit’s “consequent mission . . . is to each one of the

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415 “Question 28,” The Triune God: Systematics, 481.
416 “Question 28,” Ibid., 481.
418 “Question 29,” The Triune God: Systematics, 491.
just, who have been reconciled.” Lonergan likes this passage from St. Paul: “This Spirit he poured out richly through Jesus Christ our Saviour, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life” (Titus 3:5-7). The Holy Spirit is sent to justify us by the gift of sanctifying grace. But the Spirit is only sent to us because of the incarnation and redemption. The ultimate end of each mission is the same, Lonergan will insist. The ultimate end is drawing us into the life of heaven for the glory of God the Father.

There is one other important element to Lonergan’s doctrine of the missions for understanding Crowe. In his De Deo Trino, Lonergan goes on to ask: “Is it appropriate that the divine persons be sent, the Son visibly and the Spirit invisibly?” Earlier on, Lonergan focused on the incarnation of the Son (the visible mission) and the sending of the Holy Spirit into our hearts (an invisible mission). But now he asks about an invisible mission of the Son and a visible mission of the Spirit. There had long been reflections on the invisible mission of the Son (the way the Son seems to be sent to us by the gift of wisdom) and the visible mission of the Spirit (e.g., in tongues of fire at Pentecost). And so Lonergan asks: “Is the Son also sent invisibly and the Holy Spirit visibly?” He answers yes. In terms of the various visible missions of the Holy Spirit, Lonergan thinks that these are best understood in relation to the Spirit’s invisible mission. Lonergan sees the dove at Christ’s baptism, the bright cloud at his transfiguration, and the wind and the tongues of fire at Pentecost as sensible manifestations of the Holy Spirit’s “invisible mission.”

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419 Ibid., 491.
420 “Question 28,” Ibid., 487.
421 “Question 30,” Ibid., 491.
422 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I q. 43, a.5-7.
423 “Question 31,” The Triune God: Systematics, 499.
In regards to the Son’s invisible mission, Lonergan claims that the ways in which the Son is sent invisibly are *appropriated* to him according to some likeness. Effects of grace that have more connection with the intellect are appropriated to the Son because these effects are analogous to the Son’s procession. Effects of grace that have more connection with the will are appropriated to the Holy Spirit who proceeds as Love.424

Lonergan, therefore, has two different senses of “the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit.” Very briefly in CWL 12, “Question 31,” Lonergan speaks about an appropriated invisible mission of the Spirit linked with effects of grace on the will itself. He also speaks at greater length, as we have seen, of an invisible mission which brings sanctifying grace to the essence of the soul. Lonergan wants to hold, it seems to me, that the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit that brings sanctifying grace is not a simple appropriation, but is proper to the Holy Spirit.

Crowe knew these questions in *De Deo Trino*. Referring to question 28 in *De Deo Trino*, Crowe summarizes Lonergan’s account of how God rationally makes us lovable:

His method of making us lovable is tricky (see BL, *The Mystical Body of Christ*, also DDT, II, q. XXVIII: “Utrum . . . missiones inter se ordinentur”). He loves his Son with an eternal Love in heaven. Now suppose that the Son becomes Man; will God not have the same Love for him in his human state as he does in the eternal? But, if he loves his Son, he must also love his Son’s friends; and, if the Son is Man, all men will be his friends in the solidarity of the human race and human fellowship. In this way the cunning God is able to trap himself into making us lovable (sending his Son to be our Brother), and thus making it rational for him to bestow his Love (sending his Spirit into our hearts).425

In this argument, the Spirit is clearly sent in the context of the Son’s mission. Even if the Holy Spirit is sent into men’s hearts before the Incarnation, it must be in view of the Incarnation.

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424 Ibid.
425 *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 187.
Granting the Incarnation as the basic rationale for why God gives us the Spirit, Crowe takes up several questions related to the working out of these missions in history.

One question has to do with God the Father not entering this world in a manifest way. As we saw in the previous chapter, Crowe thinks that the Father does enter our earthly world, but enters in the beatific vision through the light of glory. But given the importance of the psychological analogy for understanding the Trinity, it seems like it is unfitting for the Word and Love to enter the world without their ground, the Understanding which speaks the Word. “It is true,” Crowe writes, “that there cannot be truth if there is no understanding at all, but we can have truth without its proper principle in our understanding, as we believe in another, trusting his understanding.”

The understanding here must be Jesus of Nazareth’s beatific vision or immediate vision of God. In Christ’s human understanding, God the Father is made present in this world. Our grasp of truth by faith rests on Christ’s understanding. Thus, Crowe adds, “When we have truth, we can also have love. Son and Spirit can therefore be in our world as Truth and Love (to which correspond faith and charity) without the Father being in our world as Understanding.”

A second problem was precisely the presence of the Holy Spirit in the time before the Incarnation. Crowe was convinced that the Holy Spirit was at work in the Old Testament: “it seems clear that God gave his grace to the saints of the OT and that, giving his grace, he gave his Spirit of love.”

But how can the Spirit of Love be in the world without the Word of Truth

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426 Ibid., 189-90. Emphasis is Fr. Crowe’s.
427 Ibid., 190.
428 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 190. Although normally Crowe links the presence of the Holy Spirit with charity, here he says that grace is the consequence of the gift of the Holy Spirit. As we saw in the previous chapter, Lonergan had his distinction between passive and active spiration. Sanctifying grace was a participation in active spiration. Charity was a participation in passive spiration. But Crowe had moved away from participation in four real relations to the way the three persons are the exemplars for created effects that indicate their presence. This may be part of why the distinction between grace and charity in Crowe becomes harder to find.
being in the world? “It might seem,” Crowe writes, “that faith is the presupposition of charity, and the charity that corresponds to the presence of the Spirit requires the faith that corresponds to the presence of the Word.” Truth and faith correspond to the presence of the Word. Charity (along with sanctifying grace) corresponds to the presence of the Spirit. In these “primitive times” before the Incarnation, Crowe explains, “the Spirit came incognito and did his work in secret while he awaited the time when the fullness of the Word could be manifested.” The Spirit of Love was present before the Word was present in his fullness. The Word’s presence in primitive times was partial. His presence, Crowe thinks, corresponds to the way we can make all kinds of intellectual distinctions between implicit and explicit judgments. The Word was present before the Incarnation as the full truth can be present heuristically and by anticipation through implicit judgments. This idea of heuristic anticipations explains how the Holy Spirit was present in the world as Love before the Father sent his Son born of a woman.

Crowe was committed to several ideas therefore. The Holy Spirit was really present in the Old Testament. Charity corresponds to the sending of the Spirit. But Crowe also would not accept that charity could be in the will without truth in the intellect. In this life, such truth requires faith. And so faith precedes charity. As the Son enters our world as Truth, his mission precedes the Spirit’s who enters our world as Love.

429 Ibid. Crowe is probably drawing this distinction from Aquinas’ discussion of the order of the theological virtues. For example, Aquinas writes, “In the order of generation . . . faith precedes hope, and hope precedes charity, according to their acts (for the habits are simultaneously infused). For an appetitive motion is not able to tend to something either by hoping for it or loving it, unless that thing is apprehended by the senses or intellect. Now through faith, the intellect apprehends those things which the appetite hopes for and loves” (Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 62, a. 4).
430 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 191. But the Holy Spirit’s presence, Crowe says, was not fully manifest until Pentecost (Ibid., 190).
For Crowe to abandon this position of the Son’s mission providing the context for the Spirit’s, he needs two changes in his thinking. First, he needs to find a way of thinking of the mission of the Holy Spirit as providing a rationale for sending the Son. Second, he needs to re-think the order of faith and love. If he wants to hold on to the idea of the Holy Spirit entering this world as love (which he will always cling to) and wants to think of the Spirit as being sent first, then he will need to be able to think of love as preceding truth. In 1969, Crowe makes this very move.

**Emergence of the Need to Rethink the Relation of the Missions.**

In March 1968, Lonergan gave a lecture at the Thomas More Institute in Montreal in which he said: “There remains the fourth topic, faith. I would describe faith as the knowledge born of religious love.” Lonergan admitted that such a consideration of faith provided “a basis for ecumenical dialogue.” Lonergan wanted “to point to a horizon common to all Christians and acceptable in some respects to all men of good will.” A few months later, Lonergan first used the words “falling in love” as related to the love of God in his October 1968 paper, “Theology and Man’s Future.” Lonergan speaks in a similar way of “falling-in-love” in his 1969 article, “The Future of Christianity.”

Crowe was not far behind Lonergan in accepting this new way of thinking about faith and Lonergan’s new way of speaking about love. In the fall of 1969 Crowe wrote that “the faith by which a believer says, ‘God is my Savior,’ is the spontaneous result of his falling in

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432 “Horizons,” CWL 17, 25.
love with God.” For the first time in his writings, Crowe voices the view that love precedes faith. Earlier in this same 1969 essay he explained how theology, as a work of human understanding of our faith, is the third activity in a process that begins with love. From love, the truths of faith are believed; and from faith, theology emerges as we seek understanding. Crowe insists that on earth the “structure of our created finite activity as pilgrims” follows that order.

In God’s eternal, unchanging life, however, Crowe still thinks, the “process” is the reverse. The Father as Infinite Understanding speaks a Word of truth, the Son. From this Word of truth, infinite Love (the Holy Spirit) eternally emerges without change. While Crowe has begun to think that the structure of our finite activity as pilgrims reverses this immanent Trinitarian order, nevertheless, Crowe still thinks that these three acts in us (love, believing [judgment], understanding) are respectively related to the same Three divine persons (Holy Spirit, Son, Father). Even though love is first in our activity as pilgrims, Crowe still assigns it as the analogue for the Holy Spirit: “As the gift of the Spirit is the divine falling in Love with us, so our response is a falling in love with God (charity) which enables us to believe (articles of faith) and belief in turn supplies a basis for pondering and reaching dim understanding (theology).” This believing and theological understanding are fittingly connected with the Son and Father:

As the Word appeared briefly in a limited district, so our articles of faith are piecemeal and partial. As the Understanding is not yet, so our theology is only analogical

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436 Ibid., 45.
437 Ibid. For the background of what Crowe is saying about love and the Holy Spirit, see Aquinas’s teaching referred to above: *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 37 a. 2 ad. 3, I, q. 38 a. 1 ad. 4, I-II, q. 110 a. 1, I-II, q. 106 a. 1.
understanding, and analogy, as Aquinas says, is a similarity of that type which involves a still greater dissimilarity. So we live in hope.\footnote{Pull of the Future and Link with the Past,” 45.}

Crowe has not abandoned the Thomistic psychological analogy in which love follows the word.\footnote{Without adverting to it, Crowe is implicitly pointing towards a new kind of psychological analogy. Crowe has the rudiments of an analogy from the level of love, to the level of judgment, to the level of understanding. Crowe will make this move in his next stage of development, but here he does not make it thematic.} But he has already accepted an idea of love as preceding knowing that will lead him later on to think that the Holy Spirit is the first person sent to us. Nevertheless, Crowe may not have recognized this implication for the missions in 1969. In a December 1971 letter to a student, for example, he modify something that he said in class:

I think now I would qualify my phrase of God speaking “twice.” Maybe I would put it this way: as God sent first his Son and then his Spirit, so he uttered his one Word (all history, with Christ as its center and its meaning) and enables us at the same time to hear it with the one gift of his Spirit (to prophet, evangelist, believer, etc.).\footnote{Crowe Archives A 3-1-2 – Letter to Garth B. Wilson, December 22, 1971.}

In 1971, Crowe said explicitly that “God sent first his Son and then his Spirit.” Crowe in 1969 can still write: “The order, however, is fixed: Love follows from the resources of the Word, and works in the context of the Word, not outside it.”\footnote{“Pull of the Future and Link with the Past,” 44} As Love proceeds eternally from the Word, so the Holy Spirit’s mission follows upon the mission of the incarnate Word. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit “works in the context of the Word.” Crowe has not yet integrated his older theology of the missions with his new ideas about the priority of religious love.

A few months after Crowe’s 1969 article, “The Pull of the Future,” appeared, Lonergan gave a paper in St. Louis in February 1970: “The Response of the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the Modern World.”\footnote{“The Response of the Jesuit as Priest and Apostle in the Modern World,” A Second Collection, 140- 58 [165-87]. His paper was first published in September 1970 as vol. 2, no. 3, in Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits.} In that paper, Lonergan stresses the interpersonal nature of love: “Being in love is not just a state of mind and heart. It is interpersonal, ongoing; it has its ups
and downs, its ecstasies and quarrels and reconciliations, its withdrawals and returns; it reaches security and serenity only at the end of a long apprenticeship.” Lonergan then uses the example of a man and woman in love. “If a man and woman were to love each other,” Lonergan writes, “yet never avow their love, then they would have the beginnings of love but hardly the real thing. There would be lacking an interpersonal component, a mutual presence of self-donation.” Lonergan then lists things that would be lacking in such a situation of unexpressed love:

There would not be the steady increase in knowledge of each other. There would not be the constant flow of favors given and received, of privations endured together, of evils banished by common good will, to make love fully aware of its reality, its strength, its durability, to make love aware that it could always be counted on.

After explaining the analogy, Lonergan applies it to God’s ways of loving humanity:

What is true of the love of intimacy, also is true of the love of God. Though God is one, he is not solitary. The one God is three persons: Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father is not only the light in which there is no darkness but also love, *agápe* (1 John 1:5; 4:8,16). The Son is his Word, through whom all things were made (John 1:3), sent into the world to manifest the Father’s love for the world (John 3:16; 1 John 4:14-16). The gift of the Spirit is what floods Christian hearts with God’s love. United in Christ through the Spirit, Christians are to love one another (*koīnōnia*), bear witness to God’s love (*marturía*), serve mankind (*diakonía*), and look forward to a future consummation when their love of God will not just be orientation to mystery but coupled with a knowledge of God similar to God’s knowledge of them (1 Corinthians 13:12).

The manifestation of love in the Son is like the avowing of love between spouses at their wedding. The implication is that the being in love, the falling in love, between a man and woman is analogous to the gift of the Holy Spirit.

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443 “The Response of the Jesuit,” CWL 13, 147 [173].
444 Ibid.
445 Ibid., 147 [174].
446 Ibid.
In this same paper from 1970, Lonergan talks about the Holy Spirit in connection with the salvation of those who do not know the manifestation of God’s love in the Son. “God wills all men to be saved (1 Timothy 2:4),” Lonergan writes,

And theologians have concluded that he gives all men sufficient grace for salvation. Just what this sufficient grace is, commonly is not specified. But it is difficult to suppose that grace would be sufficient if it fell short of the gift of loving God above all and loving one’s neighbour as oneself. So I am inclined to interpret the religions of mankind, in their positive moment, as the fruit of the gift of the Spirit, though diversified by the many degrees of social and cultural development, and distorted by man’s infidelity to the self-transcendence to which he aspires.447

Lonergan does not think that every aspect of the religions of mankind is positive and beneficial. The gift of sanctifying grace, the consequence of being sent the Holy Spirit, orients people to God. But this inner gift of the Holy Spirit can lead to distorted religious practices as non-Christians try to express in various outward ways the love they have received.

Having made the point about the Holy Spirit and world religions, Lonergan returns to talking about the gift of the Spirit in relation to the Son and Father. “There is a notable anonymity to this gift of the Spirit,” Lonergan writes.448 Lonergan brings up Christ’s words in John’s Gospel to explain this anonymity. “Like the Johannine pneuma, it blows where it wills; you hear the sound of it, but you do not know where it comes from or where it is going (John 3:8).”449 According to Lonergan, “What removes this obscurity and anonymity is the fact that the Father has spoken to us of old through the prophets and in this final age through the Son (Hebrews 1:1-2).”450 It is hard to escape the idea that the Spirit is sent before the Son. But it is worth noting that Lonergan includes the prophets as part of how the Father declares this love.

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447 Ibid., 147-8 [174].
448 Ibid., 148 [174].
449 Ibid., 148 [174].
450 Ibid., 148 [174-5].
Before he sends his Son, the Father is already speaking through the prophets about the gift of love. The gift of the Spirit before Christ, according to Lonergan, is not without avowals of love.\footnote{Crowe’s tendency, as we will see later, is not to emphasize the declarations of love made through the prophets. He will emphasize the declaration of love made in the Son’s incarnation.}

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan twice refers to this analogy of human love. The first time was in chapter four (Religion) in a section called “The Word.” Lonergan uses ‘word’ to mean “any expression of religious meaning or of religious value.”\footnote{\textit{Method in Theology}, 112.} An ‘outer’ religious word is the word that enters the world of signs and symbols, the world of judgment and decision, the world mediated by meaning. The ‘inner’ word is the “prior word”\footnote{Ibid., 112.} of love that God speaks to the human heart and seems less conditioned by historical situations. “Religion is the prior word God speaks to us by flooding our hearts with his love,” Lonergan writes. “That prior word pertains,” Lonergan adds, “not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the world of immediacy, to the unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe.”\footnote{\textit{Method in Theology}, 112. Cf. \textit{Method in Theology}, 290-1.}

Lonergan then defends the need for outer words in religion. He claims that the outer word “has a constitutive role.”\footnote{Ibid., 112.} He explains:

> When a man and woman love each other but do not avow their love, they are not yet in love. Their very silence means that their love has not reached the point of self-surrender and self-donation. It is the love that each freely and fully reveals to the other that brings about the radically new situation of being in love and that begins the unfolding of its life-long implications.\footnote{Ibid., 112-3.}
Lonergan then applies this analysis of human love to our love for God. “What holds,” he writes, “for the love of a man and a woman, also holds in its own way for the love of God and man.”

Lonergan thinks that eventually people who have been given the gift of God’s love need objectifications of that inner gift. In particular, the person needs

The word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom, the word of fellowship that unites those who share the gift of God’s love, the word of the gospel that announces that God has loved us first and, in the fullness of time, has revealed that love in Christ crucified, dead, and risen.

In their outer words, Lonergan explains how “the religious leader, the prophet, the Christ, the apostle, the priest, the preacher announces in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of love that God works within us.”

Lonergan makes it clear, however, that the word that comes from the prophets of Israel and Jesus of Nazareth are not on the same level as the objectifications of this gift of inner love that we find in other religions. “There is,” Lonergan writes, “a personal entrance of God himself into history, a communication of God to his people, the advent of God’s word into the world of religious expression. Such was the religion of Israel. Such has been Christianity.”

Like the inner word that is outside of historical conditions but is from God, the outer expressions of Judaism and Christianity are from God. In these two cases, Lonergan explains, God’s gift of his love is matched by his command to love unrestrictedly, with all one’s heart and all one’s soul, and all one’s mind and all one’s strength. The narrative of religious origins is the narrative of God’s encounter with his people. Religious effort towards authenticity . . . become[s] an apostolate. . . . Finally, the word of religious expression is not just the objectification of the gifts of God’s love; in a privileged area it is also specific meaning, the word of God himself.

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457 Ibid., 113.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid.
460 Ibid., 119.
How does this gift of love, this inner word, this prior religious word relate to Lonergan’s earlier thought on sanctifying grace, the consequent term of the mission of the Holy Spirit?

In chapter eleven of *Method in Theology*, Lonergan writes, “It is this other-worldly love, not as this or that act, not as a series of acts, but as a dynamic state whence proceed the acts, that constitutes in methodical theology what in a theoretical theology is named sanctifying grace.”\(^{462}\) The perspective in methodical theology is from the side of how things are experienced by the subject. The perspective in theoretical theology is relating things to one another. The perspective is different, but the prior inner word of love, according to Lonergan, is identical in reality with sanctifying grace.

Not long before Lonergan connects the inner word of love with sanctifying grace in chapter eleven, he alludes to the analogy of human love that he used in chapter four. Lonergan is explaining the transcultural basis for the categories of a methodical theology. The basis is this gift of sanctifying grace as experienced. “Similarly, God’s gift of his love (Rom. 5:5),” Lonergan writes,

has a transcultural aspect. For if this gift is offered to all men, if it is manifested more or less authentically in the many and diverse religions of mankind, if it is apprehended in as many different manners as there are different cultures, still the gift itself as distinct from its manifestations is transcultural. For of other love it is true enough that it presupposes knowledge – *nihil amatum nisi prae cognitum* [nothing is loved unless it is already known]. But God’s gift of his love is free. It is not conditioned by human knowledge; rather it is the cause that leads man to seek knowledge of God. It is not restricted to any stage or section of human culture but rather is the principle that introduces a dimension of other-worldliness into any culture. All the same, it remains true, of course, that God’s gift of his love has its proper counterpart in the revelation events in which God discloses to a particular people or to all mankind the completeness of his love for them. For being-in-love is properly itself, not in an isolated individual, but only in a plurality of persons that disclose their love to one another.\(^{463}\)

\(^{462}\) *Method in Theology*, 289.

\(^{463}\) Ibid., 282-3.
As in chapter four, Lonergan speaks of a disclosure of love. This disclosure takes place in the events of the Old and New Testaments. Such disclosures are the counterparts to an interior gift of God’s love.

By June of 1972, Crowe is quoting chapter four of Method in Theology. That summer he gave a long lecture, “Eschaton and Worldly Mission in the Mind and Heart of Jesus,” at Villanova University on the question of Christ’s beatific or immediate vision of God. In one part of the paper, Crowe tries to show that in Christ “the immediate knowledge of God is the principle of his love and obedient, whereas in us the love of God and our obedience to him form the principle of our faith.” Crowe then has a long footnote about the relationship of the “early Lonergan to the later Lonergan.” Crowe interprets the later Lonergan as saying this: “in our human condition on earth he sees falling in love with God as prior to faith in the traditional sense.”

Crowe goes on to argue that the order of the divine persons in the immanent Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit or Understanding, Word, and Love) is reversed as we are led back to God. “That is,” Crowe writes, “the Holy Spirit is given to enable us to believe in the Son who will lead us to the Father.” Crowe “think[s]” that this inversion is “Lonergan’s
position.”469 “This inverse order,” Crowe writes, “is paralleled in the field of the virtues: charity floods our hearts and enables us to speak the truth of what is revealed; this truth we then try to understand in the painful and inadequate achievements of theology.”470 In God and the blessed (including Christ on earth), the order is Understanding, Word, Love. In pilgrims on earth, Crowe interprets Lonergan as teaching that the order is inverted: love → truth → understanding.

In the text of the talk, Fr. Crowe puts forward this position both as Lonergan’s position and as his own. Fr. Crowe has adopted this position of the Spirit as coming first through his interaction with the later Lonergan. It is the priority of the gift of God’s love (as understood by Crowe) before faith [judgment] in Lonergan’s writings that leads Crowe to this interpretation. If love is prior to faith, then the Spirit’s presence is prior to the Son’s, Crowe has begun to recognize. From the first stage of his pneumatology, Crowe has been committed to the idea that the Spirit is “in our world . . . as Love.”471 He insisted that it is “charity that the presence of the Holy Spirit gives.”472 Crowe wanted to think of the Holy Spirit entering the world and bringing complacent and concerned love as a consequence. Since he finds Lonergan placing religious love before faith, he interprets this as the Holy Spirit leading us to the Son.

In June 1974, Crowe gave a talk at Boston College for the Lonergan Workshop. The talk was called, “Lonergan’s New Notion of Value.” In the talk, Crowe set out what he thought were the general lines of contrast between the Lonergan of Insight and the Lonergan of Method in Theology. Crowe writes,

469 Ibid. Crowe puts all of this in a footnote, “not wishing to clutter up this paper with questions that may be of greater interest to me than to my audience” (Ibid.).
470 Ibid.
471 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 190.
472 Ibid.
There is a distinction between the way the operations of conscious intentionality go forward “ordinarily,” that is, from the empirical through the intellectual and rational to the responsible level, and an exception to this “ordinary” process which occurs in God’s gift of his love in religion. In this exceptional case, deliberation and intellectual activity are not prior to the fourth level; they are subsequent.473

Instead of the fourth level arising out of the three prior levels (Experiencing → Understanding → Judgment), the fourth level becomes the prior level in a kind of downward dynamic movement beginning from God’s love.

Following Lonergan’s lead, Crowe had given up his exclusive use of faculty psychology’s theory of intellect and will.474 He has tried to accept Lonergan’s intentionality analysis with its four levels. But Crowe still wants to hold on to love as the sign of the Spirit’s presence. By locating love within the fourth level, Crowe has a stronger ground for thinking of the Spirit as preceding the Son in the world.

Having found a way to invert the order of the missions, the question of reversing the context of the missions slowly begins to emerge in Crowe’s thinking. The occasion was a request to contribute an essay for a festschrift in honour of his colleague at Regis and fellow Jesuit, the Scripture scholar, David Stanley.475 Crowe wanted to do something on Scripture in honour of his friend. And so, building on an insight he had at the first ever Karl Barth Colloquium,476 Crowe took up the question of reconciling the power and consolation the Scriptures offer to those who do not have a scholarly knowledge of the texts.

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473 “Lonergan’s New Notion of Value,” Appropriating, 56.
475 David Stanley, S.J. (1914-1996) entered the Jesuit novitiate in Guelph, Ontario in 1933. Ordained a few years before Fr. Crowe, Fr. Stanley taught for many years at Regis College. Paul VI appointed him as a member of the Pontifical Biblical Commission.
On the one side, modern historical-critical scholarship presents itself as necessary for understanding the Scriptures. On the other side, such scholarship “is not a practical device for my prayer life,” Crowe writes.\(^{477}\) Crowe had gone a long way in accepting the findings of modern critical scholarship. He was very open to those who greatly limited Christ’s actual references to himself, for example.\(^{478}\) But at the same time, there is “the experience of many of us who treasure this holy book, and have copies as marked up as a school boy’s manual – so often handled that they are ready to fall apart at the binding.”\(^{479}\) How can people seem to have such an unenlightened understanding of the text and benefit so much from it?

Crowe’s basic answer is that the meaning of the texts “mediates Jesus, who in turn by the meaning he has mediates the transcendent world of his Father.”\(^{480}\) Crowe uses Lonergan’s notion of mediation to explain what he means. Lonergan’s basic account of the world mediated by meaning is quoted at length by Crowe:

> Finally, there is the notion of mediation. Operations are said to be immediate when their objects are present. So seeing is immediate to what is being seen, hearing to what is being heard, touch to what is being touched. But by imagination, language, symbols, we operate in a compound manner; immediately with respect to the image, word, symbol; mediately with respect to what is represented or signified. In this fashion we come to operate not only with respect to the present and actual but also with respect to the absent, the past, the future, the merely possible or ideal or normative or fantastic. As the child learns to speak, he moves out of the world of his immediate surroundings towards the far larger world revealed through the memories of other men, through the common sense of community, through the pages of literature, through the labors of scholars, through the investigations of scientists, through the experience of saints, through the meditations of philosophers and theologians.\(^{481}\)


\(^{478}\) Ibid., 287.

\(^{479}\) Ibid., 279.

\(^{480}\) Ibid., 282.

Crowe takes this idea of a child’s world of immediacy and thinks about the world of immediacy for the religious person approaching the Scriptures. The world of immediacy for such a person, Crowe thinks, is not just a matter of his or her immediate surroundings. “The religious subject’s world of immediacy,” Crowe writes, “is constituted interiorly by the gift of God’s love, by the love which floods our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is given to us.”

How did Crowe make this connection? He found it in chapter four of Lonergan’s *Method in Theology*:

> Before it enters the world mediated by meaning, religion is the prior word God speaks to us by flooding our hearts with his love. That prior word pertains, not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the world of immediacy, to the unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe.

In quoting Lonergan, Crowe seeks to make the point that the mediation of Jesus by the Scriptures is “not between a null point that we are and the infinity that God is.” Instead, the mediation “is between God and human subjects already in love with God, already experiencing immediately the mystery of love and awe.”

Why would God want people to encounter his Son in the flesh if they already have the immediate presence of God through the gift of his love in the Holy Spirit? “The answer seems to be,” Crowe writes, “that the divine reality is mediated for imagination, thought, judgment, and decision. The mediation is for the divine reality as objectified, and that is a distinct and necessary step for the sort of beings we are.” The sending of the Son in a human nature is a distinct and necessary step. The implication is that the Spirit’s gift is also a distinct and necessary step. What Crowe is struggling with is the relationship between the inner word and

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484 Ibid.
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid.
outer word of *Method in Theology* and the connection of that pair to the missions of the Spirit and the Son.

Crowe repeatedly speaks of a person who is “already” experiencing the mystery of God’s love before the divine reality is mediated through the Scriptures to him. Crowe is applying to the problem of the power of the Scriptures the basic idea of the Spirit’s priority that he has been thinking about for several years. But what we also see in this passage from Crowe is the *emergence of a new question*. It is one thing for the Spirit to be given first and lead us to the Son. The Spirit, thus considered, finds his mission in the context of the Son’s mission. It is another thing to see the Son’s mission in relation to the Spirit’s prior mission. For example, consider what Lonergan said in his 1974 paper, “Mission and Spirit,”

> Without the visible mission of the Word, the gift of the Spirit is a being-in-love without a proper object; it remains simply an orientation to mystery that awaits its interpretation. Without the invisible mission of the Spirit, the Word enters into his own and his own receive him not.\(^{487}\)

Without the Spirit’s invisible mission, the Word is not accepted by those he is sent to. The Spirit is sent, Lonergan is saying, in order to enable us to hear the Word. This line of thinking fits with Crowe’s 1968 ideas of the Spirit being sent in the context of the Son’s mission. The Spirit is sent to help us hear the Son.

But Lonergan also says that the mission of the Son is the “interpretation” of what took place in the gift of the Spirit. In other words, what has been happening within people in terms of God’s love is declared and explained by the mission of the incarnate Word. By including this idea of interpretation, Lonergan seems to be opening the door for Crowe’s later 1984 suggestion that we need to a reverse the order and context of the divine missions. If the Son

\(^{487}\) “Mission and Spirit,” *A Third Collection*, 32 [CWL 16, 32]. This paper by Lonergan was written in 1974 and published in 1976. Crowe may have known about this paper before he wrote his essay in honour of David Stanley, S.J.
interprets what God is already doing in the Spirit, then the Son, it seems, is sent in the context of the Spirit’s mission. The purpose of the Son’s mission is understood in light of the prior mission of the Spirit.

In his 1975 essay, Crowe also gives some indication of thinking about the Son as sent in the context of the Spirit’s mission. The gift of the Spirit in our hearts is vital, but needs completion by the Scriptures. The divine reality also needs to be mediated in a way that brings forth a decision from us. The outer word of the Scriptures extends the mission of the Son and is a kind of completion of what begins with the gift of the Spirit.

Crowe quotes a long passage from Lonergan’s *Method in Theology* in support of the idea of God needing to mediate himself through something like the Scriptures:

> By its word, religion enters the world mediated by meaning and regulated by value. It endows that world with its deepest meaning and its highest value. It sets itself in a context of other meanings and other values. Within that context it comes to understand itself, to relate itself to the object of ultimate concern, to draw on the power of the ultimate concern to pursue the objectives of proximate concern all the more fairly and all the more efficaciously . . .

> One must not conclude that the outer word is something incidental. For it has a constitutive role. When a man and woman love each other but do not avow their love, they are not yet in love . . .

> What holds for the love of a man and woman, also holds in its own way for the love of God and man.488

Following Lonergan’s lead in *Method in Theology*, Crowe is stressing the way outer words are necessary for us to be in love with God. We might experience love of God; but until this love gets objectified, we are not in love with God. This 1975 essay is the first time that Crowe has explicitly referred to Lonergan’s analogy for God’s love for us based on the love of a man and a woman. When Crowe refers to it, he introduces the analogy and then skips over the details.

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of what Lonergan says about this love. It is as though Crowe was struck by this analogy, but
was unclear what to do with it.

Crowe thinks that this idea of a prior religious word already present when a religious
person approaches the outer word of the Scriptures “is the most fundamental point” he has
made about the way the Scriptures mediate “Jesus who in turn mediates God.” At the same
time, Crowe adds that this point “is the most undeveloped to date, and I have to leave it with
these rather cryptic indications of its relevance.”

Crowe admitted that the reason he had to leave the essay’s most key point
“underdeveloped” was that he “was already committed rather heavily.” Fr. Crowe was
especially dedicated to trying to implement Method in Theology. This implementation required
both institutional changes, recruitment of theologians to take part, and Crowe’s own
intellectual efforts to understand and communicate the later Lonergan’s method.

As part of that program, Crowe began to work on a book that would apply Lonergan’s
notion of history, as a distinct functional specialty or task of theology, to a topic that Lonergan
worked on for many years: the transmission of Revelation. The book, Theology of the Christian
Word: A Study in History, was finally finished in 1977 and published the following year.
Although the question of the reversal of the contexts for the missions began to emerge by 1975,
Crowe’s Theology of the Christian Word was a return to questions that Crowe had been
thinking about for a long time due to teaching assignments, but in the light of Lonergan’s
Method in Theology. Theology of the Christian Word, nevertheless, shows a growing
appreciation for Lonergan’s analogy of human love as applicable to the divine missions.

490 Ibid.
491 Ibid.
In the seventh chapter of that book, Crowe writes: “I do not propose to study the trinitarian basis of the Son/Spirit complementarity, but simply to investigate how it works out in a theology of the word spoken on earth to the human race.”492 In other words, Crowe is seeking in chapter seven to provide a Trinification of the transmission of revelation by focusing on the roles of the Son and Spirit in God the Father’s plan. To speak of their complementarity is to speak of the relation of the mission of the Son and Spirit.

Crowe thought that there were “two ways of being one-sided in our approach to this question”493 of the complementarity of the two sendings. “The older way,” Crowe writes, “showed a concern with the need for the Spirit: If the Son is Savior, what need have we for more?”494 In contrast to the older way of being one-sided over the question of the missions, there was a newer way. “The newer form,” Crowe writes, “put with a similar one-sidedness, would ask about the need for the Son: If the Spirit is the gift of God to all his children, and a sufficient gift for salvation, what need have we of the Son.”495 Crowe does not think that we should start with one mission and then ask about the need for another. He thinks we need to start with the unity of God’s plan. When we start with God’s plan, “then the two sendings are joined in the unity of a response to a single need, and the two forms of God’s word in the unity of one communication.”496

This reference to God’s plan is a veiled reference, I think, to Lonergan’s analogy of human love. That analogy provides a way of understanding God’s plan for the two missions as part of one communication of love: love bestowed, love declared, love consummated. In

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493 Ibid., 142.
495 *Theology of the Christian Word*, 142.
496 Ibid.
fact, a couple of years after *Method* was published, Lonergan gave a talk in November 1974, entitled, “Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation.” At the end of the talk, Lonergan speaks of a threefold giving that is part of God’s giving himself in love:

Finally, as Aquinas, so we too can place the meaning and significance of the visible universe as bringing to birth the elect – the recipients to whom God gives himself in love, in the threefold giving that is the gift of the Holy Spirit to those that love (Rom. 5:5), the gift of the divine Word made flesh and dwelling amongst us (John 1:14), the final gift of union with the Father who is originating love (1 John 4:8, 16).497

Besides the veiled reference to this way of understanding God’s communication of himself in love, there is one explicit reference to Lonergan’s analogy towards the end of chapter seven. Crowe is distinguishing Lonergan’s use of the terms “outer word” and “inner word.” The outer word applies above all to language about religion. “This ‘outer’ word,” Crowe writes,

is not to be regarded as something merely incidental to religion; on the contrary, it has a constitutive role to play. For love that is not avowed, “has not reached the point of self-surrender and donation”; this holds true for the love of man and woman, and it holds true “in its own way for the love of God and man” (113).

By quoting Lonergan, Crowe shows that he is thinking about this analogy from *Method in Theology*. The context of *Theology of the Christian Word*, however, was not the place for Crowe to develop the analogy. He is writing about the communication of the outer word of God across time.

Crowe claims that there are various ways to examine the Son/Spirit complementarity in the transmission of God’s word, but he studies the complementarity in terms of interiority. “Interiority,” he writes, “is made known to us by way of experience, specifically, inner experience as contrasted with outer experience, the inner experience that we have come to

497 “Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation,” *A Third Collection*, 53 [51]. This was part of a lecture series at the University of Chicago. It was delivered on 8 November 1974.
name consciousness.” 498 By interiority, Crowe seems to be talking about “interior sources of knowledge.” 499 Interiority “stands for the subjective and individual factor” 500 involved in knowing. There is an individual and subjective factor involved when we hear and accept the word of God. There is an individual and subjective factor to our handing on that word to others. The role of the Spirit is to provide the subjective and individual “condition for the possibility” 501 of hearing the Word of God spoken in the Son. The Holy Spirit stands “as the interior complement to the outer word that the Son is.” 502

From where is Crowe deriving this idea? This idea, “though it had forerunners at the Reformation, seems only now to be emerging in that precise form.” 503 The person in whom Crowe thinks this idea especially emerged was Bernard Lonergan. He draws on Lonergan’s Method in Theology to explain how an inner word of the Holy Spirit relates to the outer word that God speaks in history.

In March 1984, Crowe gave the keynote address at a symposium in honour of Bernard Lonergan at the University of Santa Clara. The theme of the symposium was “Religion and Culture.” At one point in the lecture, Crowe addresses the problem of why Lonergan did not write much theology after he published Method in Theology. He did not, in other words, show us how he would restructure theology in light of his own eight functional specialties. Crowe maintains, however, that Lonergan did leave a “number of hints and some fairly firm guidelines for that renewed theology.” 504 He mentions three areas of theology: divine grace, 

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499 Ibid.
500 Ibid., 127.
501 Ibid., 144.
502 Ibid., 145. Emphasis is mine.
503 Ibid.
504 “The Task of Interpreting Lonergan,” Appropriating, 155.
Christology, and the Trinity. In terms of the Trinity, Crowe has a couple of sentences that are important for his understanding of the divine missions:

For the Trinity, there are scattered clues in the discussions of various workshops, with some published indications as well. And we have even a new and very important area of theology in the inner and outer word of Method, and the relation of this pair to the missions of the Son and Spirit.\textsuperscript{505}

It was this relation between the inner and outer words and the two missions that Crowe was especially interested in. He added in a footnote: “I have developed this relation a little in my ‘Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions.’”\textsuperscript{506}

We saw Crowe struggling with this relation in his 1975 essay, “The Power of the Scriptures.” In his 1978 book, Crowe tried to situate Lonergan’s notion of an inner word within the history of reflection on the Christian word of God. But in 1983, Crowe tries to develop Lonergan’s theology of the missions and finally says explicitly that the Spirit is sent first. In November 1984, Crowe will go even further in reversing the ordinary way we think about the relation of the two missions.

**Full Thematization of the Reversal of the Missions**

Crowe in 1978 was insistent on “two forms of God’s word in the unity of one communication.”\textsuperscript{507} He wanted to think of the two sendings in light of how God must have conceived their unity. In 1983, Crowe quotes Method in Theology’s analogy of how being in love requires both falling in love and avowing that love.\textsuperscript{508} Crowe thinks that this analogy is how Lonergan “‘explains’ the ways of God in sending his Son and his Spirit.”\textsuperscript{509} God gives

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\textsuperscript{505} “The Task of Interpreting Lonergan,” Appropriating, 155. In his footnote, Crowe tells us where to look for Trinitarian clues. The citation from A Third Collection should read “pp. 93-95.”

\textsuperscript{506} “The Task of Interpreting Lonergan,” Appropriating, 155n.23.

\textsuperscript{507} Theology of the Christian Word, 142.

\textsuperscript{508} Cf. Method in Theology, 112-3.

his Holy Spirit to all peoples. In this way, he and they fall in love with each other. Crowe quotes Lonergan’s interpretation of “the religions of mankind in their positive moment as the fruit of the gift of the Spirit.”\textsuperscript{510} The Father’s declaration of love in his sending of the prophets and finally the Son has taken away the “notable anonymity of this gift of the Spirit.”\textsuperscript{511}

Crowe has taken the quotation about human love from \textit{Method in Theology}. He has linked it with a passage from Lonergan’s 1970 essay, “The Response.” Crowe is clarifying what he thinks Lonergan has been saying implicitly for years: God loves us by the gift of the Spirit. He avows his love by the sending of the Son. The reversal of the missions appears nearly complete, therefore. In the first stage, Crowe thought that God sends the Spirit because he “trap[s]”\textsuperscript{512} himself through the sending of the Son. The Son’s mission formerly justified the sending of the Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit’s mission explains the Father’s avowal of love in the Son’s mission.

Crowe defends this idea of the two missions with a passage from St. Paul and St. John. Crowe quotes Romans 5:8: “Christ died for us while we were yet sinners, and that is God’s own proof of his love towards us.”\textsuperscript{513} Crowe also quotes 1 John 4:8-9: “God is love; and his love was disclosed to us in this, that he sent his only Son into the world to bring us life.” “Our view,” Crowe then says, “is linked with the New Testament and traditional theology, but does give us a new perspective, from which the members of the great world religions are not so much anonymous Christians as they are anonymous Spiritans.”\textsuperscript{514}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{510} “The Response of the Jesuit,” \textit{A Second Collection}, 147 [174].
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., 148 [174].
\textsuperscript{512} Cf. \textit{The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity}, 187.
\textsuperscript{513} See “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” \textit{Appropriating}, 308. See also “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” \textit{Appropriating}, 330.
\textsuperscript{514} “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” \textit{Appropriating}, 308.
\end{footnotesize}
Having sketched out what a systematic theology would require, Crowe looks at how we should re-read the history of the divine missions. Crowe’s interpretation is that the Son’s mission was known to us first. But what is first for us is not necessarily first in itself, Crowe explains. What is actually first in itself is the mission of the Spirit. We only learned of this prior mission of the Spirit through the subsequent mission of the Son. Crowe explains, “God, ‘falling in love’ with the human race, will also be drawn to ‘avow’ his love. The ‘falling is the gift of the Spirit, actually given from the beginning.”

The Spirit’s mission leads the Father to send the Son. The Father is drawn to send the Son because of the Spirit’s mission. Crowe implies that the Son’s mission finds its place in relation to the love bestowed in the sending of the Spirit. “The ‘avowal’ [i.e., the sending of the Son] took place at a particular time and place, when the ‘angel Gabriel was sent . . . with a message for a girl . . . the girl’s name was Mary’ (Luke 1:26-27).” Crowe thinks that we are made aware of this avowal of love first. “Only slowly,” he adds, “do we come to realize that the Spirit was long before given incognito, and continues to be given, even to those who have not heard of the Son or the Gospel.”

It is only at this point, in a footnote, that Crowe finally writes, “In this view, the self-communication of God follows an order that is the reverse of the order of processions. In the divine being the Father is the ‘first’ person, the Son and Spirit ‘second’ and ‘third’; but the Spirit is communicated to us first, the Son second and the Father last of all.” What was somewhat implicit in the 1970s has now become explicit. The Spirit is communicated first.

Once Crowe had accepted that the Spirit is communicated to us first, he could ask the question of the relation of the missions of the Son and Spirit in a new way. If the Spirit is

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515 Ibid., 309.
516 Ibid.
517 Ibid.
518 Ibid., 309n23.
already present in those to whom the Son is sent, does he still find his role in relation to the
Son? Would it be better to think of the Son as sent in the context of the Spirit’s mission? Does
the presence of the Spirit as given by God provide the rationale for sending the Son in the
flesh?

In November 1984, Crowe answers these questions in the affirmative: “We have simply
to reverse the order in which we commonly think of the Son and Spirit in the world.” Crowe’s claim in November 1984 goes beyond simply saying that the Spirit is communicated first to us.

At the beginning of his 1984 Chancellor’s Lecture at Regis College, given for the
school’s annual convocation, Fr. Crowe explained the origin of his lecture. The previous year’s
convocation address discussed ecumenical relations between various Christians. Fr. Crowe
thought, therefore, that a follow-up lecture on the wider ecumenism of Christianity and world
religions makes sense. But Fr. Crowe also explained the “personal reason” for the choice of
his topic. When Fr. Monet, the President at the time of Regis College, came to ask Fr. Crowe
to give the convocation address on some aspect of Lonergan’s thought, Fr. Crowe had
just read the following line in Brian Hebblethwaite’s The Problem of Theology: “Lonergan’s
insistence on the role of religious conversion . . . renders theological judgments undiscussable
across the borders of different world religions.” According to Crowe, “that coincidence” of
the previous year’s talk on ecumenism with having just read a line critiquing Lonergan’s
usefulness for ecumenism “proved decisive.”

519 Ibid., 325.
520 “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” Appropriating, 324.
522 Ibid., 325.
Fr. Lonergan’s health was on the decline. A year before, he had been moved by Fr. Crowe from Boston to the Jesuit infirmary in Pickering, Ontario.\textsuperscript{523} Monet proposed a lecture to honour Fr. Lonergan’s “nearly eighty years in the service of the gospel and his long association with our college.”\textsuperscript{524} The convocation address was set for the evening of November 26, the Monday after the Solemnity of Christ the King. That morning, however, Fr. Lonergan died. And so, Fr. Crowe’s address on Lonergan’s contribution to wider ecumenism took on an added poignancy that evening. Crowe’s lecture had two main parts. In the first, he explained his basic thesis on the need to reverse the order of the divine missions. The second part of the lecture drew out the implications for “the wider ecumenism of the world religions.”\textsuperscript{525}

In 1983, Crowe had briefly mentioned the idea of “anonymous Spiritans.” Crowe followed Lonergan in thinking of the world religions, in their positive moment, as the fruit of the Spirit. These positive moments were expressions of the inner gift of grace, Crowe thought. Instead of looking to the mission of the Word and the various seeds of the Word scattered among these religions in their outer words as a basis for ecumenical work, Crowe wanted to turn to the mission of the Holy Spirit. He thought that Lonergan’s later ideas about the priority of the gift of the Spirit and the religious conversion that the Spirit enabled gave a common foundation for wider ecumenism. Crowe writes:

What I am affirming, then, is our religious community with the world religions in some true and basic sense of the word, community, if not in the full sense of a common confessions of faith, a common worship, and a common expression of hope in the eschaton. This community is effected by our common religious conversions, which in Lonergan’s view, is our common orientation to the mystery of love and awe through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit who is given to us.\textsuperscript{526}

\textsuperscript{523} According to several contemporary Jesuits, Crowe and Lonergan were in regular contact between 1975 and 1983.
\textsuperscript{524} “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” \textit{Appropriating}, 324.
\textsuperscript{525} Ibid., 325.
\textsuperscript{526} Ibid., 335.
Crowe thinks that such an understanding of the world religions should shape our approach to non-Christian religious persons:

We do not, therefore, go to the world religions as strangers, as to heathens, as to pagans, enemies of God. For we are one with them in the Spirit, and expect to find in them the fruits of the Spirit. If these fruits seem often to be lacking, we will reflect that they are far too often lacking in ourselves also, though we have the outer word of doctrine and the sacraments deriving from the Son.\(^{527}\)

Crowe refers us in a footnote to Lonergan’s *Method in Theology* and his 1970 paper, “The Role of the Jesuit.” Where did this interest in world religions come from in Lonergan’s thinking? Crowe thinks that Lonergan was inspired by Vatican II in his search “toward a common language of dialogue among the religions.”\(^{528}\)

After explaining the way in which genuinely religious people who have never heard Christ proclaimed can be called “anonymous Spiritans,” Crowe finishes the lecture with the question of evangelization. Crowe sees two steps in God’s approach. He thinks “of God sending the Son in a second step following on the hidden gift of the Spirit.”\(^{529}\) While the gift of the Spirit unites us to non-Christians, “nevertheless,” Crowe writes, “our confession of faith in Christ the Lord sets us apart with a difference of likewise divine proportions. We have a treasure that others do not possess; it is a treasure, however, given to be shared.”\(^{530}\) Crowe finds support in Paul’s experience of having to preach the Gospel (1 Corinthians 9:16). Crowe sees a parallel for the Christian’s obligation to give Christ to others in Christ’s own handing on to us of his divine nature (Philippians 2:6). Crowe is moved by the mandate of Mark 16:15: “Go forth to every part of the world, and proclaim the Good News to the whole creation.”

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\(^{527}\) Ibid.

\(^{528}\) Ibid., 338-9.

\(^{529}\) Ibid., 339.

\(^{530}\) Ibid.
Building on Augustine’s and Aquinas’ idea of the Holy Spirit as God’s gift, “it is possible to do now,” Crowe writes,

what Augustine and Aquinas did not do, and probably could not do in their time, that is, make the gift universally applicable throughout the world, and so come to a theology of the Spirit’s worldwide presence among us, a presence from the beginning of human time and to the ends of human space.\textsuperscript{531}

Crucial to Crowe’s thinking is the teaching of the Church about the universal offer of salvation.\textsuperscript{532} The fact that God offers sufficient grace to all men is Crowe’s reason, following Lonergan, for seeing a universal offer of the Holy Spirit. If all human beings, at all times, have been offered the grace of salvation, and such grace is the consequence of the gift of the Spirit, then that gift of the Spirit stretches back to the beginning of human history. “Such is Lonergan’s theology, as I understand it,” Crowe writes,

of God’s first step in the divine self-communication; a step not taken in the fullness of time but at the very beginning of time; a word, but one spoken in its own way, not outwardly through seer and prophet, but inwardly in the heart, and so a word to all God’s people, Jew and Gentile, Christian and non-Christian.\textsuperscript{533}


Lonergan’s analogy from human love provided Crowe with a way of understanding the unity of the divine missions from God’s perspective. “God, it seems,” Crowe writes, “needs both the Spirit and Son to achieve the fullness of the divine being-in-love with us.”\textsuperscript{534}

\textsuperscript{531} Ibid., 329.
\textsuperscript{532} Crowe points us to Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler’s article, “Salvific Will of God,” Dictionary of Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1981), for “an overview of the Roman Catholic position” (Appropriating, 324). Various statements by the Magisterium can be used to support this interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:1-6: DS 2305 [1295], DS 2430, Cf. DS 2479, DS 2865-67 [1677], DS 3866-3873, and Lumen Gentium, 14-16 (DS 4136-4140).
\textsuperscript{533} “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” Appropriating, 329.
\textsuperscript{534} Ibid., 330.
how Crowe mentions first the Spirit and then the Son. In light of Lonergan’s analogy of human love, “God really and truly falls in love with us, where the ‘falling’ is the gift of Love, the sending of the Spirit.”\(^{535}\) This real sending of the person of the Holy Spirit, according to Crowe, produces in us the gift of God’s love. “But,” Crowe adds,

> for reasons we must ponder long and deeply, God does not declare this Love from the beginning. There is the prolonged silence of the ages when God loves secretly, when the Spirit is present among us incognito, when in an almost human manner God holds back from a declaration of love.\(^{536}\)

If God wills all men to be saved, at all times, then there was this incognito sending of the Spirit from the beginning. But from the beginning of human history, God had not sent his Son in the flesh. “Then at last,” he writes, “in this the final age, and in the most eloquent manner possible, the avowal is made; God’s Love is declared, and the one and only Son is sent to be our savior.”\(^{537}\)

Under the influence of Lonergan’s early 1970s analogy of human love, Crowe emphasizes the Spirit’s mission in a new way. The Spirit is God’s first step towards us. This gift is not seen as primarily a stepping stone towards the mission of the Son. It is a distinct step. It calls out for another step. It demands another step. That other step is the gift of the Son. The Son’s mission is seen as completing what God began with the gift of the Spirit. In 1984, Crowe will speak of a “partial moment” and a “completion.”\(^{538}\) The gift of the Spirit is the partial moment. That partial work is completed by meeting the Son in faith.

It took Crowe a long time to publish his idea that the Spirit is communicated first. He said it explicitly only in 1983, and then in a footnote. He had been teaching it implicitly since

\(^{535}\) Ibid.
\(^{536}\) “Ibid.
\(^{537}\) Ibid.
\(^{538}\) Ibid., 326.
at least 1972. But this is not the major development in the second stage. The major development is making this prior gift of the Spirit the context for the mission of the Son.

What does this mean about the events of Pentecost? Crowe explained the great significance of Pentecost “through a distinction between presence and manifest presence.” Building on Augustine and Aquinas, Crowe came to think that Pentecost was the moment when the Holy Spirit was manifested as a divine person. Before that, he was really present in human hearts, but unknown to us as a divine person. The Incarnation and Pentecost disclosed the already present Holy Spirit to us.

**Conclusion**

On Reformation Sunday, October 27, 1968, Fr. Crowe was asked by St. Luke’s Lutheran church to preach for them. The title of his homily was “Son and Spirit in the Church.” In that homily, Fr. Crowe refuses to think that the “Son and Spirit can themselves be in conflict. The Spirit proceeds from the Son and works *in the context of the Son.*” By 1984, Crowe had explicitly reversed the respective context of the two missions. Crowe came to think that the Holy Spirit’s mission provides the context, the rationale, the special reason, for the Son’s mission.

Bernard Lonergan’s pre-1965 Latin theology works provided the framework for Crowe to think about the order of the divine missions in the first stage of his pneumatology (1953-1968). As Crowe interacted with the later Lonergan’s theology of love, Crowe came to think

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539 Ibid., 333n13.
540 See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 2.10 and 4.29. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 6, ad. 1. Cf. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 731.
541 St. Luke’s is on Bayview Avenue in North York, Ontario, near Toronto, and not far from the old Regis College.
543 Ibid., 20. *Emphasis* is mine
in the second stage of his theology of the Holy Spirit (1969-1984) that Lonergan had changed his mind on the order of the missions. The Spirit, Crowe began to suspect, is the first divine person communicated to us. Crowe adopted this position between 1969-1972, even before he had begun to appreciate in earnest the analogy of human love.

As soon as Crowe begins to appropriate this analogy for the roles of the three in the world (the Holy Spirit as God’s falling in love with us, the Son as declaring love, and the Father as love consummated), he also begins around 1974-5 to rethink in an obscure way the context of the two missions. The analogy of human love seems to provide a unified way of understanding the two missions in a single divine plan in which the Holy Spirit is sent first. Hints of this unified plan appear in his 1978 book, Theology of the Christian Word. Through accepting this analogy of human love as explanatory for the ways God sends the Spirit and Son, the whole question of reversing the contexts of the mission emerges in Crowe’s thinking.

Crowe accepted the reversal of the contexts of the missions at first as a kind of “hypothesis only.” As he grasped more deeply Lonergan’s new analogy of human love, his hypothesis of the reversal of the missions became Crowe’s “thesis.” With the cessation of Lonergan’s intellectual output, Crowe brought his ideas on the reversal of the order and context of the missions into the spotlight in 1983 and 1984.

Does this new position of Crowe’s mean the rejection of the older idea of the Spirit being sent on account of the Son? What does Crowe now think of the older argument about the Son’s mission providing the special reason for sending the Spirit? Is there room with the Son being the avowal of divine love for the Father to trap himself into giving the Spirit? Crowe has said that the manifest presence of the Spirit follows upon the mission of Christ. As a man

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544 “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” Appropriating, 328.
and woman may fall in love more after they avow their love, so Crowe thinks that there is a way in which God falls in love with us more, that is, more fully bestows the Holy Spirit, after the declaration of divine love in the Son.

Crowe has an idea of “the epochê of the Spirit.” He was “borrowing the word from philosophy, where it means, in particular, suspension of judgment, or, more generally, a check on one’s natural activity.” Crowe proposed that an epochê of the Spirit, analogous to the kenosis in the Son, “must be affirmed.” This check on the Spirit’s activity must be affirmed because, Crowe writes, “the Spirit in our hearts still allows us to form the most preposterous ideas, to commit the most abominable deeds.” Crowe saw “this self-restraint as being exercised in different degrees, as being removed step by step in the stages of history.” Crowe distinguished three stages to the self-restraint of the Spirit. The Spirit’s epochê would be at its greatest degree of severity when the Spirit dwelt anonymously for long ages in our hearts. There would be a great release from self-restraint at Pentecost, after God’s avowal of the divine Love in the only Son. There will be a complete release in our final state, when we will know as we are known (1 Cor 13:12) and enjoy the full reign of the Spirit over all our conduct.

If there is a great release at Pentecost, after the Son’s avowal of Love, then Crowe must still think that the fullness of the Spirit’s manifestation to the world depends on the Son’s completion of his mission. The second stage of Crowe’s pneumatology has not totally rejected the idea of the Holy Spirit’s mission taking place on account of the Son’s mission.

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545 Ibid.
546 Ibid.
547 Ibid.
548 Ibid.
549 Ibid.
550 Ibid., 332-3.
551 In 1989, Crowe admitted in a footnote: “there is a new specificity and fullness in that mission [of the Spirit] that is contingent upon the Son being faithful to his mission even to the cross” ("Rethinking God-with-us," Level of Our Time, 340n19).
But why did Crowe care so much about this question of the relation of the missions? Was it purely the internal demands of trying to keep pace with the mind of Lonergan? The answer to this question leads us into the broader context of Crowe’s theology, the other main factor in Crowe’s change of mind. Crowe’s concern for the Church’s life was a major factor in his concern for the relation of the divine missions. Crowe’s tensions with Church authority in this second stage convinced him of the danger of overemphasizing the mission of the Son. That struggle also convinced him to prioritize the Spirit’s mission.
Chapter Five – Arguing with Church Authorities as Helping to Reverse the Missions

“The Son represents the institutional, but an institutional open to the full range of the human as God conceived it. The Spirit represents the charismatic, but works without disorder in the context provided by the Son. The Father awaits us in the eschatological hope.” — Frederick Crowe, S.J.

1968 was the year Pope Paul VI published *Humanae Vitae*. In the aftermath of the dissent over this encyclical, Crowe faced a crisis over authority. In 1976, the Pope approved a statement restricting priestly ordination to men. Once again, Fr. Crowe faced a crisis concerning the Magisterium. Crowe came to think that many of the leaders in the Catholic Church had an unbalanced understanding of the relationship between the institutional and charismatic dimensions of the Church. The proper context, according to Crowe’s later thinking, for the institutional aspects of the Church was provided by the charismatic side of the Church.

As we saw in the last chapter, Fr. Crowe linked the institutional aspects of the Church with the mission of the Son and the charismatic dimensions with the mission of the Spirit. Even in 1968, Crowe thought that certain problems, for instance, at the time of the Protestant Reformation were based on a misunderstanding of the relation of the two missions. Catholics stood more for the prolongation of the mission of the Incarnate Son in their focus on the institutional dimensions of Christianity, Crowe suggested. Protestants focused more on the prolongation of the Spirit’s mission in the innovating, charismatic, and renewing aspects of...

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552 Frederick Crowe, *A Time of Change: Guidelines for Perplexed Catholics* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1968) 164. ‘Charismatic’ is broader than the “charismatic movement” and refers to the Holy Spirit’s role as “the source of life-giving movement in the church as a whole” (“Son and Spirit in the Church,” *Grace and Friendship*, 20). Nevertheless, Crowe was very interested in the charismatic movement (cf. *Old Things and New*, 141 and *The Lonergan Enterprise*, 96).


555 “Son and Spirit in the Church,” *Grace and Friendship*, 17-22.
the Church. There was a general failure, Crowe thought, to grasp the relation between these two necessary aspects of the Church. As the Church needed to reverse the way she thought of the institutional and the charismatic, so she also needed, Crowe eventually thought, to reverse the order in which she thought of the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit. By at least 1983-4, Crowe came to think, I maintain in this chapter, that the reversal of the missions was a necessary doctrine for guiding the future life of the Church.

Crowe admitted, in the introduction of his 1984 Chancellor’s Lecture, “And so I find myself here this evening, paying tribute to this great theologian, and choosing, from a thousand possible topics, his contribution to the wider ecumenism of the world religions.” From a thousand topics, Crowe chose the reversal of the divine missions. Beyond all the stated reasons for this choice at the beginning of the lecture, Crowe reveals at the end of the lecture the deeper source of his choice: his concern for the life of Church.

The first half of this chapter lays out Crowe’s main struggles with Church authority in the years after the Second Vatican Council. These struggles with the Magisterium’s teaching on artificial birth control (section 1) and women’s ordination (section 2) revealed what he thought was wrong with the mode of living in the Church. The trouble was the Roman curia’s mode of dominating the learning process within the Church by an unbalanced reliance on tradition. The second half of this chapter discusses Crowe’s deeper penetration into the remedy: placing priority of the mission of the Holy Spirit.

By 1984, Crowe thought that the common view of seeing the Son’s mission as prior to the Spirit’s led to an imbalance in the life of the Church. Crowe did not argue for a reversal of

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the mission simply because he thought Lonergan had done so. Crowe argued for this thesis because he thought it was true.

**Crowe’s Struggle with the Magisterium**

1. **Aftermath of *Humanae Vitae***

   Pope Paul VI’s encyclical, *Humanae Vitae*, published on 25 July 1968, reaffirmed, contrary to the hopes of many, that all sexual acts in marriage must be open to life and thus rejected the use of the birth control pill. Crowe was not one of the 87 theologians who signed a famous statement of dissent. But, he agreed with their judgment of the non-binding, non-infallible character of the encyclical’s teaching. Crowe, however, was unsettled by this rupture between the Pope and a great portion of the Church.557 One does not have to agree with his quiet dissent to admit that he was asking a real and important question: what was the meaning of this widespread dissent among so many otherwise faithful Catholics? By June 1969, he could write,

   To my mind we are in a new situation; we are not the Church we were a year ago; there is a new spirit at work; we have a new awareness of our co-responsibility; God has taught us new ways of living as his people; he has sanctioned a new respect for pluralism, and brought more clearly to our attention the legitimacy of dissent within the Church. All of this I assume as fact, and I consider it the responsibility of a theologian to try to explain that fact.558

Crowe considered himself neither an exegete, nor a historian, but a theologian. He understood his work as one of understanding, of trying to explain, to give reasons for religious facts. “Our responsibility [as theologians],” he adds,

   is to go to the heart of the matter, to what was really involved in the chapter of history just concluded, to teach the deeper truths that will guide the long-range development


of the Church’s life. It is a matter of analyzing the new situation and of trying to indicate a style of life, a *modus vivendi*, principles of conduct, that suit our new assumption of responsibility.\textsuperscript{559}

What does Fr. Crowe mean by a chapter of history being concluded? It is the chapter of history, Crowe explained a few years later, that began in the early modern period’s reaction to medieval Catholicism. Crowe thought that certain structures in medieval Europe involved a “domination of all areas by the Church.”\textsuperscript{560} The “grave defect” of medieval Catholicism was the failure to recognize fully “the legitimate autonomy of the human, the natural, the whole range of human institutions.”\textsuperscript{561} By legitimate autonomy of the human, Crowe means that human and natural things have “a value in themselves.”\textsuperscript{562}

In the first place, having a value in themselves means that “human achievements are not merely means to a higher end.”\textsuperscript{563} Crowe then gives some examples, namely, the arts and the study of languages and philosophy. “The arts,” he writes, “do not exist simply to decorate sacred functions. The study of languages and philosophy is not undertaken solely for the exposition of scripture.”\textsuperscript{564} There is some sense in which art and human studies have their own proper end and worth. They would be valuable even if they were not used for sacred tasks by the Church.

Secondly, the fact that the human dimension has its own value means that the human or natural aspects of the world have a limited measure of autonomy. “That is to say,” Crowe writes, “the multiplication table is independent of the decrees of an ecumenical council; the

\textsuperscript{559} Ibid., 175.  
\textsuperscript{560} “The Christian University,” *Appropriating*, 170. Fr. Crowe gave this address at the graduation ceremony for St. Mary’s University, Halifax in May 1971. He was trying to offer a history of the Church in ten minutes.  
\textsuperscript{561} Ibid., 169.  
\textsuperscript{562} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{563} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{564} Ibid.
problems of astronomy are not solved by looking up the Bible.”

When this limited freedom of the laws of the sciences is not recognized by theologians, we have what Crowe calls “theological imperialism.”

Crowe acknowledges that such imperialism may be paternal, but still “it does not correspond to the mind and will of God for his creation.” In other words, God created a natural world that has its own proper laws.

The trouble with such imperialism, according to Crowe, is that it “leads inevitably to rebellion.”

In the humanistic rebellion of the early modern period that followed, there was a reaction, Crowe maintains, against everything “the Church stood for.”

Crowe thinks that the inner dynamism of the human, stifled by a theological imperialism, burst forth after the Middle Ages. “Philosophy refused,” Crowe writes, “to be any longer simply the handmaid of theology; the arts asserted their independence of sacred functions, to develop rather according to their own inner dynamic; nations repudiated the hegemony of a sacred rule in Rome.”

In a word, it was “a rebellion of the whole phalanx of this world’s values.”

Crowe is not talking primarily about the Protestant Reformation. He sees this movement as a related phenomenon. But there was a more fundamental rebellion from within the culture of the Middle Ages. Crowe sees this reaction to imperialism as a “long and sad story” spanning the last “five or six centuries of the modern era.”

What ends this chapter of the Church’s history is her learning the lesson of human autonomy.

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565 Ibid.
566 Ibid.
567 Ibid.
568 Ibid.
569 Ibid., 170.
570 Ibid., 169.
571 Ibid.
572 Ibid.
Crowe thought that this lesson was officially accepted by the Catholic Church in the Second Vatican Council’s document *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*. Crowe speaks of this document as “the longest, the most unexpected, and to my mind, the most important document of that Council.”\(^{573}\) In that document, the Church “turned back to the world and took a tentative step towards it.”\(^{574}\) In so doing, the document “liberated us from an undue attachment to a way that is now gone.”\(^{575}\) The old ecclesiastical imperialism over the human, in Crowe’s mind, is finished in theory.

But what will take its place? Crowe is not sure, but he is committed to trying to develop the ideas that the Church needs as she tries to cooperate with the world of man. And this recognition of the autonomy of the world and our need to cooperate with it as a Church is what Crowe sees as the closing of a chapter of history. The human elements have been rebelling, sometimes wrongly, for centuries. Finally, with Vatican II’s *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*, this legitimate autonomy has been recognized.

But Crowe also thinks that the Church in the late 1960s was in a more complicated situation than the Church was a generation earlier. It used to be able to be said that “in those days France got the ideas, and Rome judged their orthodoxy.”\(^{576}\) Crowe thought there was “real validity in the arrangement. However, that was an era when the truth was more in our possession; we had not yet begun the great migration in the world of ideas.”\(^{577}\) Crowe really thought that something new was happening at the time of this lecture. “The situation today,” he writes, “is not one in which we study new ideas as possible conclusions from fixed starting-
points in traditional premises.” In other words, in the older arrangement the Pope had the responsibility of speaking authoritatively in certain situations. But in the new situation, Crowe is saying, the Pope himself can no longer form these judgments without wider input from the Church. We are in less possession of the truth because the amount of data about which judgments have to be made has so increased. Answers to these new questions cannot simply be deduced from premises found in the older doctrinal teachings of the Church.

Crowe is not, however, a revolutionary or a Protestant advocating discontinuity with the past:

Surely our new ideas must not contradict the ancient faith – in extreme radical eyes this will put me squarely with the conservatives – but today’s ideas are so new that confrontation with the ancient faith is not the primary question – and that perhaps in conservative eyes will put me among the radicals. The key words here are “today’s ideas are so new.” Crowe does not think that the Pope and the bishops in union with him are able to pass judgment on these new ideas without a long process of learning. This process of learning is where the co-responsibility of theologians and informed lay people especially emerges.

Crowe thought that God was, in general, giving the Church more responsibility. “God wants us to take over more and more of the government of the world, according to our degree of maturity. As St. Thomas would say, the progressive actuation of our potencies calls for a corresponding exercise.” In other words, Crowe seems to think that this new role of the laity in helping the Church learn is part of a larger growth within the Church. As God entrusted new powers to the Church, the Church needed to act accordingly. Teenagers cannot act in school

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578 Ibid.
579 Ibid., 188.
580 Ibid.
as little children do, for example. Their new powers of maturity call for corresponding exercises of responsibility.

All this seems a bit vague. We have to remember, however, that Crowe was trying to understand what was happening. And understanding for him was about coming up with ideas that may or may not be right. His idea for explaining the validity of the widespread dissent was this: “When one man speaks for God, divine intervention must in the nature of the case occur continually; when the people speak, God can trust them a little more.”581 The one man he refers to is the Pope. God would continually be giving the Pope help to teach the truth in faith and morals. As God entrusted this role of speaking for God to a wider number of people, Crowe thought that the guidance would be less continual. Many people in the long run, working together in a Spirit-inspired, self-correcting process of learning, can be trusted to find the truth, Crowe is saying. The Pope and Roman Curia did not, Crowe thought, seem to realize what God was doing in the Church.

Fr. Crowe was looking for what will guide the Church as she sheds theological imperialism for good. He was clearly concerned with the life of the Church. He wanted to understand what is happening and formulate principles for the “long range development of the Church’s life.”582 The principle that he eventually arrives at is the reversal of the two missions. He comes to see the principle of the priority of the Spirit’s mission as fundamental for the Church’s life because the Spirit provides the grace by which the required learning can take place. Such a principle is very general and abstract. But this is the kind of analysis Crowe

581 Ibid.
582 Ibid., 175.
thought Lonergan promoted.\footnote{“Students of Lonergan are supposed to be generalists,” (Frederick Crowe, “The Future: Charting the Unknown with Lonergan,” Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes, 347. For the meaning of a generalist, see Frederick Crowe, “The Genus ‘Lonergan and . . .’ and Feminism,” (Developing the Lonergan Legacy, 143). For Lonergan’s own 1977 words on being a generalist, see Bernard Lonergan, “Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response,” Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, 382-3.} We have to get to the ultimate and most general principle which will guide the Church’s life.

What was ailing the Church was a neglect of learning. The required research and discernment needed for the Church to learn properly so as to teach authentically was being overlooked. Instead there was an overreliance on what the institutional Church had already understood and judged about what Christ had already revealed in his mission on earth. The most general problem that I think Crowe came to recognize was the prioritizing of the mission of the Son.

2. Struggle over Women’s Ordination

Crowe’s next large struggle against the Magisterium also confirmed his sense of what the Church really needed to guide her life. By the mid-1970s, a debate over women’s ordination was snowballing. Catholics and non-Catholics were debating the question. Finally, the Pope asked the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) to issue a document.

On the feast of St. Teresa of Avila, October 15, 1976, Paul VI approved the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood (Inter insigniores). Towards the end of its introduction, the document states:

In execution of a mandate received from the Holy Father and echoing the declaration he himself made in his letter of November 30, 1975, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith judges it necessary to recall that the Church, in fidelity to the example of the Lord, does not consider herself authorized to admit women to priestly ordination.\footnote{CDF, Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women, 5.}
Despite various statements by Pope Paul VI and this statement by the CDF, Fr. Crowe was unconvinced by all the arguments against ordaining women.

Even before this document had been released, the Catholic Theological Society of America commissioned a Task Force of theologians in the summer of 1975 “not to perform new research, but to conduct a theological review and critique of the work that has been done by various committees and conferences under Roman Catholic and other Christian sponsorship.” Fr. Crowe was a part of this five-person Task Force, which met four times over the next two years. Together with the other members of the Task Force Crowe acknowledges a global apprehension of the “relevance and irrelevance for our time of practices followed or decisions taken in the past; there is as well the possibility of discerning an emerging mentality and consensus on the signs of the times and stirring of the Holy Spirit among us.” Distinguishing a focus on decisions in the past from what is happening in the present, Crowe calls for a “mindset that we call open” in which

the focus is on God as operating in the eternal now and therefore still exercising a sovereign freedom with a range of possibilities open; . . . [the focus] is on the Holy Spirit as the Creator Spirit leading us into an ever-new future; it is on the human race as responding to the Creator Spirit by determining the needs of our time and freely creating the means that will, under God’s initiative and with God’s help, provide for them.

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585 Frederick Crowe, S.J., Sara Butler, M.S.B.T., Anne Carr, B.V.M., Margaret Farley, R.S.M., and Edward Kilmartin S.J., *A Report on the Status of Women in Church and Society: Considered in Light of the Question of Women’s Ordination* (New York: Catholic Theological Society of America, 1978) 1. Fr. Crowe wrote the Prolegomena for the fourth part of the document (Ibid., 19-21). He also co-authored section (IV.A): “Arguments from the Praxis of Jesus, the Apostles, and the Church” (Ibid., 21-25). All the other sections of the document, except “I. Introduction” and “V. Summary and Conclusions,” are attributed to another member of the Task Force put together by the Catholic Theological Society of America. The Introduction and the Conclusion sections seem to me, however, to indicate the influence of Fr. Crowe.


587 Ibid., 20.
Crowe acknowledges that women have never been ordained to the pastoral ministry, but he does not think that this ends the discussion. Past decisions were made in past situations. “Women’s ordination,” Crowe writes, “is a question never before addressed to the church in a comparable set of circumstances. It demands a new effort at self-understanding, and an openness to new practice under the guidance of the Creator Spirit.” Part of the new set of circumstances is the decision by other Christians to admit “women to pastoral office.”

Considering these Christians as somehow part of the Church, Fr. Crowe thinks that this decision should have significance for Roman Catholic considerations of the question. The other important factor is how even Catholics have allowed women in some parts of the world to carry out pastoral ministries where there is a shortage of priests. Fr. Crowe thought that input was somehow coming to the Catholic Church on this question not from the past as much as from the present.

Crowe thought that behind the CDF’s opposition to women’s ordination was a different mindset or mentality. This “closed” mindset focuses “on the past, the already determined, the formulations and institutions already handed down to us.” In general, this closed mentality disregards “the competent research of dedicated Christian scholars and believers.” In place of such research, this mentality tends to substitute “a decree on what the documents of faith mean.” In other words, women’s ordination will be ruled out by an appeal to what Christ decided in the past by his own example. Once this decision has been made, no place is given to present-day data from modern research. Crowe adds that such decrees on what the Scriptures

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588 Ibid., 24. This section was also co-authored by Sara Butler and Elizabeth Fiorenza.
589 Ibid., 25. This section was also co-authored by Sara Butler and Elizabeth Fiorenza.
590 Ibid., 20.
591 Ibid., 21.
592 Ibid.
mean are bolstered by “an exaggerated reliance on teaching authority.”\textsuperscript{593} All the elements of this closed mindset seem to be aimed at the CDF’s document on women’s ordination.

In line with this distinction between an open and a closed mindset, Crowe summarizes his basic trouble with many of the arguments which oppose women’s ordination. These arguments are “based on an unwarranted (because, in fact, fundamentally untraditional) adherence to past formulations and institutions as the unchanging norm for all time.”\textsuperscript{594} In other words, the basic trouble is the mentality, the presuppositions, behind the arguments. This mentality decides ahead of time what will count for evidence. Crowe, by contrast, together with the Task Force, recommends “the full and free investigation of the question with the readiness to form the judgments and take the decisions toward which the Holy Spirit is leading us.”\textsuperscript{595}

The issue over women’s ordination can be seen as part of the larger question in Crowe’s mind over authority and freedom. In this case, Crowe’s reservations about the Magisterium’s teachings on restricting ordination to men are rooted in his conviction that human and historical data were not sufficiently considered by those in authority. The Church needed to allow these human sciences to express their conclusions more freely. The sociological data, the psychological data, and the biological data, in other words, were not being given their due freedom as evidence in the arguments over women’s ordination by the Magisterium.

The response to this objection from the side of the Magisterium of the Church, however, boils down to this: “the human sciences, however valuable their contribution in their own domain cannot suffice here, for they cannot grasp the realities of faith: the properly

\textsuperscript{593} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{594} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{595} Ibid.
supernatural content of these realities is beyond their competence.” But the question for Crowe would be whether most of the arguments used by the Magisterium rely too heavily on presuppositions regarding the nature of men and women, their attributes, Jesus’ attitude towards women, and the roles of men and women – presuppositions that the human sciences have called into question. Unless we want a double truth theory (faith teaches one thing about men and women and the human sciences teach something else to the contrary), Crowe seems to be suggesting that the Magisterium must engage more with the arguments coming from the present research.

As we consider his attitude towards the human sciences of psychology, biology, and sociology, we have to understand Fr. Crowe’s more critical understanding of the historicity of the Scriptures to grasp more fully his position on women’s ordination. Crowe was never a fundamentalist and his course notes from 1965-6 show much awareness of historical-critical scholarship. But by 1972 he could make a remarkable concession in his acceptance of modern criticism and mentality:

> I accept the fact that the gospels are not biographies, that we really do not know exactly what Jesus said and did in the way we would like to know. I accept as quite probable the view that Jesus did not claim to be the Messiah or Son of God, that possibly he did not even claim to be Son of Man, that he did not particularly concern himself with the features of the true Messiah or with purifying the Jewish idea of the Messiah.

This view of Crowe’s presupposes that the Gospel writers attributed much to Christ that he never said. If we do not really know what Christ said, then it is difficult to draw conclusions about Christ’s mindset. Such a position needs to be compared with criticisms made in *A Report on the Status of Women in Church and Society*.

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596 CDF, *Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women*, 16. Part of this quotation is found in *A Report on the Status of Women in Church and Society*, 34.

597 For why theology needs the human sciences, see *Method in Theology*, 364.

In response to the argument that Christ’s decision to admit only men to the pastoral office is normative for the Church today, we read:

It must be noted that the argument based on the praxis of Jesus rests on the confidence that we are able to say with certainty what the practical mindset of Jesus of Nazareth was. Any theological awareness of the “Quest for the Historical Jesus” debate would shatter this confidence.599

This passage, co-authored by Fr. Crowe, highlights how historical-critical biblical scholarship had undermined for Crowe one traditional basis against women’s ordination. Crowe’s own confidence in being able to draw conclusions about what Christ said and did had been seriously damaged. His confidence in using the fact that Christ only chose men for the Twelve as an argument against women’s ordination was also shattered. Fr. Crowe thought that the Roman curia, however, still relied on older notions of the historicity of the Scriptures and still held an unwarranted reliance on past formulations and institutions.

In the first half of this chapter, we have discussed two crises that Crowe experienced regarding the institutional Church. Crowe was critical of the positions of the Magisterium on artificial birth control and women’s ordination. In addition, he was critical of the mode of operating used by the Magisterium in making its decisions on these disputed questions. Crowe thought that the Magisterium was neglecting data provided by the present experience of Catholics and the human sciences. He thought that the medieval ecclesiastical imperialism had not completely disappeared. Since these questions of birth control and women’s ordination had always been answered negatively by the tradition, a crisis was emerging in the “relation between tradition and theology.”600 Theologians were pushing for certain things while the Magisterium claimed to be clinging to tradition. On the one side there was the authority of the

599 A Report on the Status of Women in Church and Society, 22.
600 “Lonergan’s Early Use of Analogy,” Level of Our Time, 57.
Church; and on the other the freedom of theologians to investigate questions. But what could be done to find a way through this impasse between the Magisterium and theologians?

**Rethinking of the Role of the Spirit in Relation to the Son’s Mission**


   In 1983, Crowe sees a wonderful fittingness in the way God communicates himself to us according to both what he is and what a human being is. Corresponding to our “orientation to the outer and objective” God sends the Word, “the one who is already God’s objectified understanding.”\(^{601}\) The Word’s character as eternal, objectified understanding continues in time within humanity’s objective world. In this way, the eternal Word becomes, “in a ‘natural’ prolongation, the outer Word the human race needs.”\(^{602}\) God communicates himself to us in the data of sense through his Son, but how will he communicate himself to us according to the needs of our subjectivity, our interiority, the data of consciousness? He sends the Holy Spirit, “the one who is divine subjectivity surging up in the infinite Love that responds to the infinite Word.”\(^{603}\) The Holy Spirit is sent into our hearts flooding them “with the love that makes us spiritual.”\(^{604}\) And so our inner focus in our relationship with God is on the Spirit. The outer focus of our Christian lives is on the Son.

   The title of this talk is important. Crowe calls it: “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” The word ‘tension’ immediately suggests the earlier crises that we examined. There the tension in the Church was between the institutional-hierarchical and what the Spirit was saying through other dimensions.\(^{605}\) But Crowe had come to see a more fundamental

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\(^{602}\) Ibid.
\(^{603}\) Ibid.
\(^{604}\) Ibid., 308.
\(^{605}\) On this distinction, see also *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 773.
tension within the Church: “a tension for us between the role of the Son and that of Spirit.” As we will see, Crowe does not think that such a tension is intrinsic to the two distinct missions. The tension that has developed is “due, not to the Father’s purpose, but to our failure to keep the two foci as clearly distinct as the Son and Spirit are themselves distinct.”

Crowe’s basic image in the essay for helping us to understand the importance of the two missions with their inner and outer complementary words is that of an ellipse. In the ellipse there are two foci. Crowe contrasts the ellipse with its two internal centers with the single center of a circle: “A circle, as you know, is a special form of an ellipse, one in which the two foci coincide.” In the past, Crowe thought that a Christocentric religious attitude has neglected the role of the Spirit. Instead of having a focus on both the Son and the Spirit, the elliptical nature of our Christian life was collapsed into a circle with Christ alone at the center. “Of course,” Crowe quickly adds, “our God is triune, and eventually we must find a place for the Father, but at least we have a first approximation on the way to a complete integration of the three persons in the work of our redemption.” Without mentioning Trinification, Crowe’s wants to find the way all three persons are involved in our redemption. But his special concern is the role of the Holy Spirit.


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607 Ibid., 308.
608 Ibid., 304.
Divine Missions?”

In the middle of his article, McDonnell writes, “While insisting on the ‘real’ distinction between the two missions of Word and Spirit, there is a danger of conceiving of them as two foci at the ends of an elongated circle.” Fr. McDonnell even inserts a drawing of the elongated circle, something not found in Crowe’s article:

Figure 2: Kilian McDonnell’s Elliptical Depiction of the Two Divine Roles

Fr. McDonnell then comments: “While possibly not heretical, such a conception would be dangerous and might lead to a kind of economic tritheism.” McDonnell’s main positive rebuttal is that the Holy Spirit’s function or role is to put us into contact with Christ. McDonnell thinks that the two missions are better thought of as two circles superimposed on one another. There is always one focus: the Incarnate Word. The Holy Spirit is how we are able to know him.

Noting the need to keep the two missions “in balance and fruitful tension,” Fr. McDonnell does not want to deny the reality of the two missions. He does not want to deny the importance of distinct roles for each divine person. He does not want to deny the equality of the two missions. He just thinks that they are both “at the center, but in different ways: Christ as the ‘what’ and the Spirit as the ‘how.’”

According to Michael Vertin, a friend of both Fr. Kilian McDonnell and Fr. Crowe, Fr. Crowe was bothered by reading the suggestion of his being possibly heretical. As far as I know,

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613 Ibid.
614 Ibid., 226.
615 Ibid., 227.
however, Fr. Crowe never responded to this critique. While I have not found Fr. Crowe ever repeating this idea of an ellipse, Fr. Kilian repeated his warning almost twenty years later. Unfortunately, while Fr. Kilian is on to something in his critique, he neither explains why Crowe’s idea leads to a possible economic tritheism nor deals with Fr. Crowe’s philosophical commitments.

Crowe develops the image of the ellipse because its two focal points reflect how the “Son and Spirit are distinct and complementary.” And he thinks that “the kairos has come for a shift from the Christocentric to the elliptical with the two foci of Son and Spirit.” Crowe compares this shift to the Copernican revolution in philosophy that is associated especially with Immanuel Kant. Copernicus had shifted the focus, the center of the universe, from earth to the sun. In a similar way, Crowe thought that Kant has shifted the focus of philosophy from the object to the subject. But Crowe does not think that this is a sufficient answer to the question of the importance of subjectivity. What we need is a philosophy like Lonergan’s which focuses on the subject without losing the object. This is why Crowe thinks that the kairos has come for a shift in theology. “Our ancestors,” Crowe writes, “did not have a philosophy that would enable them to relate the roles of Son and Spirit in the fundamental way it is possible for us.” The philosophy he refers to is Lonergan’s philosophy of interiority.

Lonergan’s philosophy, according to Crowe, is perfectly designed to help us better understand the distinct roles of the Son and Holy Spirit in our sanctification. “Paul, Luke, and John,” Crowe writes of the New Testament authors, “each contributed something to the

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618 Ibid.
619 Ibid.
solution of the problem.” Crowe then mentions Augustine and Thomas Aquinas as helping to organize “things a bit with their doctrine of visible and invisible missions.” In other words, Augustine and Aquinas provided a theoretical framework by the distinction between visible and invisible missions for understanding the data of the New Testament when it recounts the mission or sending of the Son and Spirit. “But,” Crowe adds, “it is only with the turn to the subject, with the emergence of a philosophy of interiority, with the replacement of causality by meaning as a basic category, that we have the conceptual system we need for an integrated theology of the roles of Son and Spirit in the world.” According to Crowe, Lonergan developed this philosophy of interiority in dialogue with thinkers after Aquinas. At the same time, however, Crowe thought that Lonergan’s philosophy transposed Aquinas’ theoretical distinctions without destroying them.

Besides the turn to the subject and the comprehensive theory of interiority that eventually emerges from this turn, Crowe also thinks that we need the replacement of causality with meaning as the basic category in theology, if we want to solve the difficulty of relating the roles of Son and Spirit in a systematic way. The main problem historically is understanding the role of the Holy Spirit. But Crowe is alive to the way a certain theory of causality has made this difficulty even more difficult. No Christian theologian denies that the Son alone died on the Cross. This is proper to him and not just appropriated. The Son assumed a human nature in which he can die. But it seems to many, that “the Spirit, having no nature but the divine, can

620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
exercise no activity in the world that is proper to himself but only that which is common to the
three persons.” Crowe then quotes the Council of Florence: “Pater et filius et spiritus sanctus
non tria principia creaturae, sed unum principium.” In other words, we call the Father the
Creator, but he is not alone the creator. We appropriate this title to him because he is the source
of all Trinitarian life. In a similar way, should we not simply see the activities attributed to the
Holy Spirit as appropriations that are not uniquely his, but are said for some kind of fittingness?
How could the Holy Spirit be a unique cause? If he cannot, we have no way of speaking of his
truly distinctive role in our redemption. This was the question in the first stage of Crowe’s
development. Is there a distinctive role for the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation?

Crowe thinks that the replacement of meaning for causality helps to put the teaching
of the Council of Florence in a new context. The metaphysical principle of Florence “becomes
secondary, even marginal, in a universe where meaning, value, intentionality analysis, are
basic.” Crowe is not rejecting the metaphysical principle. It answers certain theoretical
questions about the Trinity that must be answered. Crowe is not denying that there is one divine
power possessed by all three divine persons. But he is wrestling with an idea that he received
through Lonergan.

Crowe thought that Lonergan helped to introduce the notion of meaning into Catholic
theology. And Crowe was especially struck by Lonergan’s notion of “incarnate meaning.”

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan introduces this idea with a quotation from Newman: “Cor

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624 Ibid., 305.
625 [The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three principles of creation, but one principle] DS 1331.
626 “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” *Appropriating*, 305.
ad cor loquitur [Heart speaks to heart].” Incarnate meaning,” Lonergan continues, “combines all or at least many of the other carriers of meaning. It can be at once intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, linguistic. It is the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his words, or of his deeds.” The six different kinds of meaning in Lonergan are not essential for this chapter. But Lonergan’s connecting incarnate meaning with a “person” is essential.

If every person has a distinct meaning and if the Holy Spirit is a person, then the Holy Spirit has meaning in himself. Crowe claims that the “Holy Spirit has his distinct meaning, else he would not be himself.” The Holy Spirit “brings his own meaning into the world with him.” Since meaning, as Lonergan taught Crowe, is “constitutive of human and transcendent reality, so the world is affected by [the Holy Spirit’s] presence.”

What is the meaning of the person of the Holy Spirit? Crowe does not spell this out, but it is possible to say a bit more about what he might mean. The Holy Spirit, in Crowe’s theology, proceeds from the Father and the Son as Love. What it means to be the Holy Spirit, therefore, is to be proceeding Love. He has this distinct meaning within God. And Crowe thinks of this proceeding Love in two ways.

The Holy Spirit’s eternal identity, as Crowe came to realize in his The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, is both proceeding Serenity (i.e., complacency) and proceeding Restlessness (i.e., concern). Both kinds of love find their exemplar in the Holy Spirit. Both kinds of love provide analogies for the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the eternal loving Acceptance in God of what is. But he is also the eternal restless Love for what could be. The

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629 Method in Theology, 73. Newman took this as his motto when he was named a cardinal (cf. Sheridan Gilley, Newman and His Age [London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1990] 400.
630 Method in Theology, 73.
631 “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” Appropriating, 305.
632 Ibid.
Holy Spirit, as eternal Concern, is eternal openness to change and newness. Since 1965, Crowe thinks of the Holy Spirit as this eternal, energetic, overflowing impulse towards those on whom God can bestow love.

The notion of incarnate meaning helps Crowe to begin to think about how the Holy Spirit can have a unique and proper role in the world without assuming a created nature like the Son. He is an inner word, a meaning, that God speaks to our hearts. That gift of the Spirit has meaning for us as he modifies our interiority.

But Crowe also thinks that the incarnate meaning of the Holy Spirit overcomes a problem arising out of Christology. The more scholars became aware of the historicity of the human life of Jesus of Nazareth, the more difficult it seemed to some to apply his words and deeds to all times and places. The particularity of the Son’s human and historical life causes problems for trying to find out what followers of Christ should do in much different historical situations. He was made “man in a particular time and place, under the particular conditions that human historicity makes inevitable.”

This historicity “automatically prevent[s] his becoming an immediate model for the whole human race in all its variety.”

In the context of thinking about the Holy Spirit’s distinct meaning, Crowe claims that “there should be no insuperable difficulty, then, in conceiving him as the principle of indefinite adaptability which the historicity of man requires and the particularity of the God-man does not readily furnish.” Crowe speaks here of the Holy Spirit as the principle of infinite adaptability. This is connected with seeing the Holy Spirit as concerned love, open to what is not yet and can be. The Church is in need of adapting to changing circumstances. The God-

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634 “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” Appropriating, 308.
635 Ibid.
636 Ibid., 305.
man gave us certain ways of living that we used to think were unchanging, but we now realize that they were historically conditioned. And thus, Crowe maintains, the incarnate Word is not the principle of infinite adaptation that we need for changing situations. Instead of looking always to the incarnate Word for our model of change, Crowe is urging us to think more of the distinct meaning of the Holy Spirit.

In this context of the distinct missions of the Son and Spirit, Crowe’s “own question” is this: what is the “relation between the roles of the Son and Spirit.” Crowe finds confidence in his attempt to deepen the Church’s answer to this question by the trajectory of thought he finds in the New Testament. The progress is from obscurity in Paul, to almost asking the question in Luke, to asking the question in John. Crowe did not see the impossibility of “further understanding, and so of prolonging the trajectory into post-biblical times.”


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637 Ibid., 310.
638 Ibid.
639 Ibid., 311.
640 Ibid.
John presents the Spirit as depending on the work of the Son (John 16:12-15). “But,” Crowe writes, “it is clear that the Spirit is sent in some sense to replace the Son: the disciples are not to be left orphans, they will receive another Advocate (Jn 14:15-18).” John’s Gospel even records Our Lord’s words that it is better that he goes away. “If I do not go, the Advocate will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you” (Jn 16:7).

In these texts, Crowe presents a progress in understanding within the New Testament. But he also sees a constant refusal throughout the history of the Church “to accept responsibility” for furthering the work of understanding the relation between Son and Spirit in our redemption. What is worse, Crowe thinks, is how there has even been “a sort of suppression of the religious experience that fills the New Testament.” He brings up as evidence two facts. First, he contrasts the way the Holy Spirit guided the Church in the Acts of the Apostles and “the merely ‘negative assistance’ that theologians would allow him to exercise at ecumenical councils.” The second and more fundamental fact, according to Crowe, is how “we tacitly downgrade the reality of his presence among us.” He attributes this downgrading to an inbuilt tendency in human beings for only considering as real what we can sense. Since the Son was sent into the world of sense, his mission is more real, we seem to think, Crowe notes. “It is as if we took over,” Crowe writes, “and gratefully applied the behaviorism of positivist psychology.” In so doing, Crowe is saying, we ignore the real interior mission of the Holy Spirit.

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641 Ibid.
642 Ibid.
643 Ibid.
644 Ibid.
645 Ibid.
646 Ibid.
In so doing, the ellipse of the Christian life becomes the circle with the single focus on Christ. “We allow,” Crowe writes about the Holy Spirit, “the focus which should be distinctly his in the ellipse of the divine missions to vanish, to merge with that of the Son in a Christocentric religion, and so lose its proper identity.” Thus we distort the Christian life. The result, Crowe is saying, is that we end up putting too much emphasis on the Son’s role. We try to make him become the principal guide for all we need. The trouble is that we need the Holy Spirit’s interior guidance. Crowe does not think that the mission of the Son was to supply all we need for our salvation.

Part of the reason, Crowe suggests, for the collapse of the ellipse to the circle is the subtlety with which the Spirit speaks. “Of course,” Crowe writes, “it is difficult to determine what the Spirit is saying. Diggings in Palestine, dictionaries of Aramaic, the comforting feeling of a holy book – all the data that make the mission of the Son so really real – they tell us nothing of what the Spirit is saying to us here and now.” Notice how Crowe is distinguishing what God said in the past through the Son and what he is saying now by the Spirit. The Son’s message is contained in monuments from the past. This way of speaking of the outer words in the past is parallel to his critique of the Church authorities of his day.

They relied, for example, in their decision about women’s ordination too heavily on the things that make the Son’s mission so really real. The trouble is that they were, in a sense, requiring “of Jesus what the kenosis of human historicity leaves him unable to provide.” Crowe was not applying these last words explicitly to the Church leaders, but they match closely his earlier critique. Crowe came to understand, maybe without formulating it, that the

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647 Ibid., 312.
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
Church had too long required of the mission of the Son and its prolongation what that mission and its prolongation could not provide. “At the same time,” Crowe writes, we “fail to draw on those resources which the Father gave us for precisely the need we experience, namely, the real, the really real, presence of the Holy Spirit within us.”

Thus, there is an implicit parallel between the institutional Church’s approach critiqued by Crowe and the more general failing of the Church in balancing the two missions. As the Church’s Magisterium failed to draw on what was provided for its guidance in the questions of birth control and women’s ordination, viz., the input of certain groups of people, so the Church more generally has failed to draw on the interior presence of the Holy Spirit. As the Church relied too heavily on the Magisterium to answer all the questions, so the Church has depended too much on the data of the Son’s mission.

The parallel between overreliance on Christ’s mission and overreliance on the institutions of the past is almost explicit in Crowe’s writings. When Crowe concludes his paper, he grows more modest. He admits the dangers of his thesis. Firstly, he shows fear of “disloyalty to him ‘who loved me and sacrificed himself for me’ (Gal 2:20).” Secondly, as a Jesuit, he fears “diminishing the power of that meditation on the words and deeds of Jesus which has nourished thousands of saints and millions of sinners, notably through the Spiritual Exercises of my own Ignatius of Loyola.” Thirdly, Crowe fears “belittling the present role of Jesus, as he reigns in heaven, ‘able to save absolutely those who approach God through him . . . always living to plead on their behalf’ (Heb 7:25).”

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650 Ibid.
651 Ibid., 313.
653 “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” Appropriating, 313.
After expressing these three fears in relation to the Son, he immediately mentions the institutional Church: “I fear doing injustice to the institutional Church, whose authorities are sinful human beings like me but _do_ represent the mother who gave me my Catholic parents, the mass, the sacraments, the scriptures, my tradition, the saints whom I admire from far off.” The institutional Church includes the Pope and the bishops in union with him, but it also includes all the other outer things he mentions: parents, the sacraments, the scripture, tradition, and the saints. Crowe is not trying to get rid of these aspects of the Church. He is afraid of doing injustice to this part of the Church. What Crowe especially wants is a reform of how the institutional Church exercises its authority.

“We have laid so much stress,” Crowe will later say, “on the teaching Church – and this not as a function related to and integrated with the learning function, but as an office belonging to certain people – that we have not attended to the learning function.” Crowe insists that there is a good reason to distinguish the teaching Church and the learning Church as groups. Christ entrusted some members with a unique charism of truth. But Crowe insists that there is also a more basic division of functions. The whole Church, even the teaching Church, must learn before it can teach. The learning function, Crowe explains, “is primary in regard to the Church as a whole and in relation to the totality of our cognitional procedures.” We have neglected this function because we have neglected the role of the Holy Spirit who “guides us into all truth” (John 16:13).

Crowe thought that the Church was like a biologist friend of his who had almost lost the use of one his eyes because he was always looking into his microscope with the other eye.

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654 Ibid.
655 Crowe, “The Church as Learner: Two Crises, One Kairos” Appropriating, 372.
656 Ibid.
As the Church relied too much on the teaching function without using the learning function, so she is also in danger of losing that function all together. Crowe recognizes, however, that the Church cannot “correct that imbalance overnight.”

Instead of seeing the entirety of the Church’s life in the context of the teaching of the institutional Church, Crowe wanted there to be a double focus in the Church: on learning and teaching. Crowe also wanted another double focus: on the Spirit and on the Son. But Crowe clearly put priority on the Spirit’s mission in his 1983 lecture. Before God discloses his love in the mission of the Son through the witness of the Church, God bestows the Holy Spirit on those who are being saved. The Spirit brings to us what he eternally is, concerned Love. This love enables us to learn what God wants of us (here and now) in fidelity to what God said to us in the Son. The learning Church requires both the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit.

2. 1984 Chancellor’s Lecture at Regis College

The second important discussion for the reversal of the divine missions is Fr. Crowe’s well-known 1984 lecture, “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” given on the night Lonergan died, November 26. In that lecture for Regis College’s convocation, Crowe’s ‘thesis’ was this: “We have simply to reverse the order in which we commonly think of the Son and Spirit in the world. Commonly we think of God first sending the Son, and of the Spirit being sent in that context, to bring to completion the work of the Son.” After stating his thesis and explaining the position he is inverting, Crowe explains his position further:

on the contrary, God first sent the Spirit, and then sent the Son in the context of the Spirit’s mission, to bring to completion – perhaps not precisely the work of the Spirit,

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657 Ibid., 374.
but the work which God conceived as one work to be executed in the two steps of the
twofold mission of first the Spirit and then the Son.660

Crowe thinks that a corollary of his thesis is that it provides for Christians a new way of relating
to those sincere followers of the various world religions.

Crowe introduces his distinction, drawn from Lonergan, Aquinas, and Aristotle,
between what is first for us (quoad nos) and what is first in itself (quoad se).661 Crowe does
not want people to think that he is totally reworking Christianity. In God’s plan, what is first
in itself is the gift of the Spirit, Crowe maintains. But in our experience of distinct divine
persons, what is first for us is the incarnate Son. The already present person of the Spirit is
made known to us through Christ’s words and his manifest presence at Pentecost.

But at the end of the article, Crowe addresses the real audience for the talk: the Church.
The talk was a challenge for the Church to be the kind of reality that other people would want
to investigate. And so, as people examine the Church, they would be led back to inquire about
the long-ago actions of her Lord. In other words, the whole question of rethinking the order of
the missions of Son and Spirit has very practical consequences for the Church. Crowe thinks
that the Church needs to re-examine “our own attitude” towards the religious people of the
world.662

Crowe compares the religious situation of the Church in the 1980s to the situation of
the people of Israel in the time of Paul, the Apostle. Crowe explains how Paul in Romans 9-
11 “has to face and accept and explain the fact that his own people, the chosen race, had

660 Ibid. Emphasis is mine.
661 For the distinction between what is first for us and first in itself, Crowe refers us to Aquinas’ Commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics: In II Metaph., lect. 1, no. 278. He also cites Lonergan’s article, “Theology and
Understanding,” Collection, 127-130.
stumbled and fallen from God’s favour.” The Hebrew people “had refused to accept the gift on God’s conditions, and by that refusal had lost, not only the newly offered gift but also the position that was uniquely theirs in regard to the ancient promise itself.” Despite all the prior graces, Paul’s people had not accepted the merciful plan of God in Jesus of Nazareth to unite all nations.

As the Hebrew people failed to accept God’s conditions, so Crowe thought that the Church in the late twentieth century was in danger of failing to accept the extent of God’s merciful plan. It is one thing to rejoice in the sending of the Son in the flesh and another to rejoice that God has in fact offered the Holy Spirit to all people. “We too,” Crowe writes,

have to beware lest, by refusing to acknowledge the breadth and depth and height of the divine mercy, we become unfaithful stewards of the very privilege that we do in fact possess, and turn into avatars of the people so broken-heartedly lamented in Romans 9-11.

Behind this comparison with the time of St. Paul is Crowe’s confidence that God offers sufficient grace to all men to be saved.

Following what he thinks is the teaching of Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan, Crowe links the grace of salvation with the Holy Spirit. God offers the grace sufficient to be saved, Crowe maintains, when he blesses us with “the first and foundational gift of God, the divine Love in the person of the Holy Spirit.” Crowe did not think that Aquinas and Augustine taught such a universal offer of salvation. But he thought that they did teach that those being saved were given grace through the gift of the Holy Spirit. And so, Crowe thinks that in the last two centuries, especially through the teaching of Pope Pius IX and subsequent teaching by

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663 Ibid., 334.
664 Ibid.
665 Ibid.
the Magisterium, we can posit a universal offer of the Holy Spirit to all people at some point in their lives.

Crowe did not think that this universal offer of salvation means that the offer will be universally accepted. But it does mean that we need to rethink our relationship to authentically religious people. Crowe maintains with Lonergan that this gift of the Holy Spirit, when accepted, brings about a conversion, a new orientation “towards the mystery of love and awe.”

As we have seen in Chapter Four, Crowe argues for two steps in God’s unified plan of salvation: the sending of the Spirit and the sending of the Son. The basis for Crowe’s understanding of these two missions is Lonergan’s “own beautiful and, I think, quite distinctive analogy: that of a man and a woman in love and of the two stages by which they achieve the fullness of being in love.” The declaration of love in an outward way by a man to a woman or vice versa is like the Father’s sending of the Son.

What is important for our purposes is how Crowe links this public proclamation of love with “the outer word of doctrine and the sacraments deriving from the Son.” What God declared in the life of Christ continues to be declared by the outer doctrine of the Church and her sacraments. We have a need for such outer communications as human beings oriented towards the data of sense. Crowe’s point is that this orientation has led the Church at times to neglect the inner words of the Holy Spirit.

669 “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” Appropriating, 335.
Crowe speaks of the Church as becoming practically “binitarian.” Instead of having room for a trinity of persons, we make room only for the Father and Son. We practically leave out the role of the Holy Spirit. “The reason,” Crowe writes, “is simple: we are all ingrained behaviorists, behaviorists by nature and by original sin.” The other word Crowe uses to describe this condition of humanity is extroversion. “We are born extroverts, extroverts from the first moment we grope for mother’s breast.” This natural tendency gets manifested in the whole of our lives, Crowe explains, and in our philosophy and in our society. In addition, this tendency to extroversion is, Crowe writes, “the natural bent of our religion and religious institutions: our institutions always seem far more substantial than our charism, and so the institutional Church naturally inclines to behaviorism, and naturally distrusts any movements that claim to come from the Spirit.” Crowe speaks here of mistrust. Earlier he spoke of the mistrust by the Magisterium of contemporary evidence from the human sciences and Christian experience.

Clinging to the elements that derive from the Son’s mission, the institutional Church, Crowe thinks, has missed what the Spirit is saying presently within the hearts of the people in the Church. The institutional Church is following the natural bent of the human being. In other words, practical binitarians only have one divine mission that they tend to focus on: the Son’s. And thus, we have developed an imbalanced “Christocentric mentality.”

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672 “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” Appropriating, 331.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid., 339n26.
Conclusion

In the spiritual life, as one progresses, one learns to rely more and more on the Holy Spirit. “As we become more spiritual,” Crowe wrote as far back as 1961, “we should become more aware of the Holy Spirit and his work in us; not as if we ever out-grow the Son (a recurrent heresy takes that position).” What if this growing reliance on the Spirit is true of the Church herself at this time in history? This idea of the Church as spiritually maturing is at the heart of the second stage of Crowe’s pneumatology. The Church was being asked by God to depend more and more on the Spirit’s guidance. Instead of simply falling back on old certainties about what God said in the past, the Church must learn to trust the continuous guidance of the Holy Spirit. She must open herself to the primacy of love. She must open herself to the primacy of the Holy Spirit’s mission. As long as the Church neglects to listen to the Spirit, Crowe is telling us, she will neglect to learn as she should. Without the Spirit, we cannot discern the signs of the times. Through the Spirit, the Church is “guided into all truth” (John 16:13).

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Bridge to Part III (1985-2000)

In the third stage of his pneumatology (1985-2000), Frederick Crowe asks a new question: Is the traditional ordering of the divine persons, Father-Son-Holy Spirit, the exclusive ordering of the Trinity? Or does the traditional “in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” also “admit, side by side with it, the formula ‘In the name of the Spirit, and of the Son, and of the Father’?” 677 “This is really the fundamental question,” Crowe says. “That is my question,” Crowe adds. 678

The third part of this thesis tries to shed light on what Fr. Crowe was up to in asking this new question in his 1995 essay, “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios.” Was Crowe rejecting Aquinas’ and Lonergan’s theology? Was he serious about thinking of another ordering of the divine persons that begins with the Holy Spirit? Was there a deeper pedagogical reason for asking and answering his question in the way he did?

In his Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas says that among the three divine persons “there must be an order according to origin but without priority.” 679 Commenting on this passage in Aquinas, Lonergan wrote:

But the order of the Son from the Father is by way of generation, the order of the Spirit from Father and Son is by way of spiration, and these two orders are ordered because the love that is spirated on the basis of holiness is from the Word that is generated on the basis of truth. 680

Since the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit are eternal, Lonergan adds, “this order is not based on temporal succession.” 681 Lonergan then distinguishes an order of cause

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677 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 404.
678 Ibid., 404-5.
679 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 42, a. 3 (“oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem, absque prioritate”).
681 The Triune God: Systematics, 373.
and effect from a non-causal ordering. Since the order in God is not based on cause and effect, there is no priority among the persons. “Rather,” Lonergan adds, “the order within God is based on origin and on the divine intellectual nature.”\textsuperscript{682} Lonergan is not saying that we believe that the Son is from the Father because we believe in God having an intellectual nature; we believe that the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit is from both, but then seek to understand how this is so. The psychological analogy helps the theologian, according to Crowe, “to think out”\textsuperscript{683} the order among the persons that faith accepts.

Crowe introduces his 1995 essay by asking his readers to perform an experiment. Are they willing to make the sign of the Cross while saying the words: “In the name of the Spirit, and of the Son, and of the Father.”\textsuperscript{684} Crowe thinks that if we take seriously the perfect equality of the persons, then we should have no trouble saying this prayer while we make the sign of the Cross. But Crowe is not simply asking us to name the Three in reverse order. He is asking us whether we can think of the “Three in such a way that just as the Father is first in the usual order, so the Spirit is first in the new formula.”\textsuperscript{685} Crowe is asking whether we will experiment with thinking of the order – Spirit, Son, Father – “as an order that reflects the Trinitarian relations themselves.”\textsuperscript{686}

Crowe admits that there is “a certain novelty”\textsuperscript{687} in his approach. He recounts hesitancy and resistance among the limited number of people he has asked to make the experiment, including himself. And thus, he insists that this new line of thought “does not deny the traditional belief, nor is it a substitute for the traditional belief.”\textsuperscript{688}

\textsuperscript{682} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{683} “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 408.
\textsuperscript{684} Ibid., 396.
\textsuperscript{685} Ibid., 397.
\textsuperscript{686} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{687} Ibid., 396.
\textsuperscript{688} Ibid.
In the first stage of his pneumatology, Fr. Crowe focused on the question: What is the personal property that distinguishes the Holy Spirit both eternally and in the economy of salvation? In the second stage, Crowe was led to ask: What is the relationship between the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit? Unlike the questions that distinguished the first and second stages of Crowe’s development, the question of his third stage, the question of whether the Holy Spirit can be first in the Trinitarian order, was not asked by Lonergan. In the third stage, Crowe launches out into the deep. But at the same time, Crowe tries to give a Lonerganian inspired answer to the question. He uses categories that he derives from Lonergan to answer his question about a complementary ordering of the divine persons (Holy Spirit – Son – Father).

In the 1980s and 1990s, Fr. Crowe wrote a series of six essays in which he tried to “rethink” certain older questions in these Lonerganian categories. Two of these “re-thinking” essays directly addressed questions about the mission and eternal identity of the Holy Spirit. In Crowe’s 1989 essay, “Rethinking God-with-us,” the emergence of this new question on the Trinitarian order can be detected. In 1995, that question becomes thematized.

As in Part I and Part II of this thesis, Part III is broken down into two chapters. Chapter Six treats of the anticipation and emergence of this new question. Chapter Seven covers his provocative way of answering it. In Chapter Six, we continue “our regular procedure of searching” Crowe’s earliest writings “for anticipations of an idea thematized much later,” and examine how this question emerges “as a separate concern.”

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691 Ibid., 49.
at “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homousios,” in which this new question is “in the spotlight.”"\(^{692}\)

\(^{692}\) Ibid., 52.
Part III (1985-2000): The Holy Spirit as the First Person in the Trinity

Chapter Six – Intentionality Analysis: Paving the Way for Rethinking Trinitarian Order

“[H]is trinitarian theology is tied in with the whole range of his thinking.” – Frederick Crowe

What Fr. Crowe said about Bernard Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology applies equally to his own. In the second stage of his Trinitarian pneumatology, Crowe began to think of the Holy Spirit as the first person in the economic Trinity. In the third stage, Crowe proposes a way of thinking of the Holy Spirit as the first person in the immanent or essential Trinity. These two positions are related, but Crowe’s question in the third stage did not immediately arise from his reversal of the order of the missions. In response to an imagined objection to his position on the priority of the Holy Spirit’s mission, Crowe writes in 1984:

Again it might be asked how our position accords with the tradition on trinitarian relations and processions, and the answer would be the Thomist answer that a divine person is sent into the world in virtue of the same relation and procession that belongs to that person within the Trinity: the Spirit given to all peoples is given therefore by the first and second persons of the Trinity.

Once Crowe reversed the order and context of the missions, he was still thinking of the eternal order of the Trinitarian persons as: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. How did he come to ask this new question about a complementary ordering of the persons in the Trinity?

My main argument in this chapter is that Fr. Crowe asked his new question because he came to think more deeply about the implications of what Lonergan calls “intentionality analysis.” This analysis involved a move away from understanding our knowing and loving

693 “The Spectrum of ‘Communications’ in Lonergan,” Developing the Lonergan Legacy, 55.
through a theory of faculties of the soul (intellect and will) in favour of a phenomenological
description of four distinct and interrelated levels of consciousness: experience, understanding,
judging, and deciding. By the early 1980s, Crowe interprets Lonergan as teaching that the four
levels of consciousness possess, according to a metaphor, two ways of development: from
below upward and from above downward.

With his deeper understanding of Lonergan’s two ways of development, Crowe
recognized, besides the dynamic disinterested desire to know, a second dynamism within
human development: intersubjective love. On the basis of this dynamic operator, Crowe
thought that a triad emerges in consciousness: intersubjective love, truth, and “experienced
orientation to mystery.” By 1989, he began to wonder whether this trio and its order could
also be applied to the Trinity. As Crowe used an intellectually dynamic divine nature to explain
why in God there is a Speaker, a Word, and Love, so the dynamism of intersubjective love
now offers (potentially) another way of thinking about why there are three in God.

The goal of this chapter is not to evaluate the coherence or validity of Crowe’s proposal
of rethinking the Trinity. The goal is to answer the question: how did Crowe arrive at this
question? Section one focuses on Crowe’s anticipations of this question in his earlier ways of
explaining the psychological analogy in terms of movement within levels of consciousness. In
section two, we turn to the emergence of this reordering of the divine persons “as a separate
concern.” Our attention will be on Fr. Crowe’s 1989 article, “Rethinking God-with-us.”

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696 Cf. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, CWL 3, 28 [4]). This description corresponds to what Lonergan
calls “the essential dynamism of human intelligence” (Insight, 57 [33]). Lonergan speaks of this intellectual eros
as an operator of development: “on the intellectual level the operator is the concretely detached and disinterested
desire to know” (Insight, 555 [532]).
698 Theology of the Christian Word, 49.
Crowe’s Earlier Explanations of the Psychological Analogy

When Crowe taught his students about the eternal procession of the Son, he used various diagrams. In the *Table 8* below, Crowe’s 1965-6 diagram is reproduced. In 1965-66, following Lonergan’s 1957 *Insight*, Crowe recognized three levels in the human cognitional structure: experience, understanding, reflection/judgment. Together, these three levels constitute full human knowing. Crowe grafted the two intelligible emanations of Aquinas – the emanation of a concept and the emanation of a judgment – onto Lonergan’s second and third cognitional levels. The result was this:

*Table 8: Crowe’s Own Diagram for Intelligible Emanations*

```
R -------------------------------> VC
 Level of Truth
U -------------------------------> VI
 Level of Ideas
E -------------------------------
 Level of Data
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Concerning this diagram, Crowe explains, “E is experience, U is understanding, R is reflection, VI is the verbum incomplexum, or concept, VC is the verbum complexum, or judgment, and the arrows indicate the emanatio intelligibilis [intelligible emanation] that is the analogy for the processions of the divine Word.” R, U, E represent three levels in the Lonerganian framework of consciousness, set forth in *Insight*. Within the second and the third levels from the bottom, Understanding (U) and Reflection (R), there is an analogy for the procession of the eternal Word. The Word, the Son, proceeds from the Father as a concept or a judgment

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699 Cf. *Insight*, 300 [274-5]).
700 *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 145.
proceeds respectively from a direct insight or a reflective insight (act of understanding) uttering that inner word.

In 1965, Crowe is clear that the analogy for the procession of the eternal Word is the procession of an inner word taking place within a given level of consciousness. “It is a procession,” Crowe writes, “not from level to level, but within a level, either within the level of understanding or within that of reflection, when a concept proceeds from understanding or a judgment from reflection.” Crowe’s point can be illustrated in a slightly different way by the following table:

Table 9: Reworking of Crowe’s Diagram of Inner Words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is it so?</th>
<th>3rd Level</th>
<th>Reflection ------------------&gt; Inner word of a Judgement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is it?</td>
<td>2nd Level</td>
<td>Understanding--------------&gt; Inner word of a Concept/Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Level</td>
<td>Experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, there is an intellectual dynamism within us, the unrestricted desire to know. This desire is expressed in questions, questions that move us from level to level in the process of knowing. In answering these questions, acts of understanding become the basis for conceptualization and affirmation. These concepts and judgments of existence provide two analogies for the procession of the Word in God.

These analogues for the procession of the Word proceed directly from the respective acts of understanding that ground them. The judgment that something is, for example, is not the immediate expression of the act of understanding that grasps what something is. The judgment, the unconditional assent, proceeds from a conscious reflection on the sufficiency of

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701 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 144-5.
the evidence for answering the question, is it so (an sit). The reflective act of understanding that grasps the sufficiency of the evidence and from which the judgment issues is the analogue for the Father.\footnote{I think that Crowe was right in 1965-6 to interpret Lonergan’s doctrine of levels of knowing in light of Lonergan’s interpretation of Aquinas’ twofold procession of a concept and a judgment from two acts of insight. I also think that Crowe has good reasons for using the procession within a level for his analogy of an intelligible emanation of an inner word.}

In the three levels highlighted in 1965-6 (Experience, Understanding, Reflection), Crowe already recognizes two kinds of movements. There is a vertical, upward movement between levels as one asks and answers new questions. There is also a horizontal movement within a level as concepts and judgments are formed. In 1965, Crowe rejects the vertical movement between levels as the proper analogy for the procession of the Son.\footnote{Lonergan’s 1947-9 \textit{Verbum} articles imply that the movements within the second and third levels are analogies for the Son’s procession. I do not think Crowe only came to this point in 1965, but he explicitly stated it in his 1965-6 notes, possibly in response to questions from his students.}

What was not clear in Crowe’s 1965-6 analysis was where acts of love fit into this diagram. Do these levels of cognitional process leave room for affective responses to these cognitional operations? Are the affections to be thought of as taking place on another level or within these same levels?\footnote{In \textit{Insight}, there are at least two places where Lonergan seems to indicate that the “will” belongs to another level beyond “experience, understanding, and judgement.” See \textit{Insight}, 594, 653 [571, 630].} If acts of love were to be thought of as taking place within the levels, one would have a trio in the second and third levels that would act as a psychological analogy for the Three persons (understanding – inner word – love). But if one thinks of love as happening exclusively in another level, a fourth level (or fifth level), some kind of vertical movement will be needed to think of the procession of the Holy Spirit.
In his *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, Crowe had a figure,\(^{705}\) in which he fits Lonergan’s interpretation of the procession of the Spirit on top of the faculties of intellect and will:

*Table 10: Crowe’s Diagram for the Procession of Love in the Will*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding (Intellect)</th>
<th>Word (Will)</th>
<th>Love</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Consciousness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original point for Crowe’s use of this Lonergan-inspired diagram is to show that the act of the will that corresponds to the Holy Spirit in the psychological analogy is simply “an act in the will from the intellect.”\(^{706}\) The procession of the Word, by contrast, corresponds to a second intellectual act emerging from the prior intellectual act of understanding. The analogy for the Holy Spirit’s procession is not to be pictured as a parallel secondary act of will that emerges from the basic act of the will.\(^{707}\) Unlike with the procession of the Word, Lonergan and Crowe do not think that some additional expression of love is needed to understand Aquinas’ analogy for the Holy Spirit’s eternal procession. The basic act of the will, the will’s act of love itself, as following upon an intellectual inner word, is the analogy for the Holy Spirit.

In his 1959 articles, “Complacency and Concern,” Crowe thought that complacent love was the basic act of the will, the affective response to a judgement of existence. In some ways, this should mean that complacent love should be placed *within* the third cognitional level as the complement to the inner word of judgment. But Crowe never said this explicitly. He knew,

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\(^{705}\) *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 147.

\(^{706}\) Ibid.

however, what Lonergan had said in *Insight*: “The goodness of being comes to light only by considering the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will.” Even in 1974, Crowe would look back on *Insight* and say that in that book: “deliberation, decision, and the like, do not constitute a new and distinct level, but a continuation or extension of cognitional activity.” If love is also an extension of intellectual activity and not a distinct level, then it could be an extension of the cognitional activities especially on the third level.

On the other hand, Crowe had already published an article in 1965 in which he seems to suggest that love might be on a fourth level:

> The foregoing account was limited to the three levels of cognitional activity. If we add now the very essential further element of the affective and voluntary, we have four levels of human consciousness and activity: the empirical (experience), the intellectual (understanding), the rational (reflection), and the moral (voluntary). Crowe uses the words, “if we add.” There is a sense of hesitation in Crowe, but he does speak of “the affective and voluntary.” The affective would include the affection of love. At the end, Crowe mentions the fourth level of consciousness as “the moral (voluntary).” Since he linked up the affective and voluntary earlier in the paragraph, Crowe seems to be aware in 1965 that the fourth level of consciousness might also be the level in which one experiences love.

In the late 1950s, Crowe had worked out his idea of complacency in the context of faculty psychology, but with an eye to Lonergan’s levels of thought in *Insight*. Then in the 1960s he recognizes Lonergan talking and writing about a level of love as the fourth level of

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708 *Insight*, 619 [596].
710 “Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Natural and Operation in All,” *Appropriating*, 37. Emphasis is mine. For the four levels, as opposed to just three levels, Crowe appeals to Lonergan’s 1964 article, “Cognitional Structure,” *Collection, CWL* 4, 205-21.
consciousness. Crowe begins to think that this fourth level, in which love is found, has become a new focus of the later Lonergan. Lonergan’s references to a fourth level in the 1960s (and possibly even a fifth level in 1973) left Crowe wondering about the way forward. In other words, it was not easy for Crowe in the mid-1960s to connect his doctrine of complacent love with Lonergan’s developing levels of consciousness.

As Crowe moves into his second stage (1969-84), there is the additional complication. Crowe begins to think of love in a radically new way. Crowe accepts Lonergan’s teaching that religious love can precede faith. We saw this in an essay from 1969: “the faith by which a believer says, ‘God is my Savior,’ is the spontaneous result of his falling in love with God.” In that same essay, Crowe has the rudiments of a psychological analogy that begins with love, moves to faith, and ends with theological understanding.

The trio (love, act of faith, and understanding) in that order, aligns almost exactly with the way Crowe later characterizes the fourth, third, and second levels of consciousness. In 1969, Crowe has implicitly anticipated his later psychological analogy based on a downward movement between the levels of consciousness. Crowe, however, does not integrate this aspect of our religious life with the four levels of consciousness until sometime after 1985. All through the 1970s and early 1980s, Crowe basically held in his mind two unintegrated ideas: Lonergan’s dynamically related levels of consciousness (adding Lonergan’s fourth level in a

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711 Cf. “Lonergan’s New Notion of Value,” *Appropriating*, 57. Lonergan’s reference to the level of love as the fifth level was in CBC radio interview broadcast on October 24, 1973 (Cf. Ibid., 57n32). Crowe recognized the question of a fourth versus fifth level. He also was alive to the vast implications of their being a fourth level and even a fifth level. But this particular issue was not a focus of Crowe’s writings.

712 “Pull of the Future and Link with the Past,” 49.

713 Ibid., 45. It must be kept in mind that the act of faith spoken about here is a judgment or assent made on the basis of love and is prior to an understanding of what is believed.
definitive way between 1972-4) and one exception to the structure that occurs through falling in love with God.

Once Crowe masters what he calls “one of the last of [Lonergan’s] great general ideas,” the two paths of development — Crowe is poised to think about the Trinity, and especially the Holy Spirit, in new ways. Crowe was especially struck by the following passage from Lonergan’s 1977 lecture, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,”

> Development may be described, if a spatial metaphor is permitted, as ‘from below upwards’: it begins from experience, is enriched with full understanding, is accepted by sound judgment, is directed not to satisfactions but values. . . . Again . . . development . . works from above downwards: it begins in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the son, the pupil, the follower. On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief. On belief follows the growth in understanding of one who has found a genuine teacher and has been initiated into the study of the masters of the past. Then to confirm one’s growth in understanding comes experience made mature and perceptive by one’s developed understanding.

As one moves up from experience, one comes to understand. This level leads to new questions and we reach the level of judgment and later loving decisions. A similar pattern appears in children especially, but in the reverse order. Lonergan mentions affectivity first. This affectivity leads to apprehension of values → beliefs (judgments) → growth in understanding → experience made mature and perceptive. Crowe provided a table of these two paths:

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714 “The Task of Interpreting Lonergan,” Appropriating, 158.
715 This quotation is from a lecture at the Fifty-First Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Detroit, April 16, 1977. See “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection, 180-1 [174-5]. Crowe provides a list for the other instances in which Lonergan referred to these two paths after 1974 (The Lonergan Enterprise, 115n37).
Table 11: Crowe's own Diagram for the Two Ways

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V</th>
<th>Values achieved</th>
<th>Values handed down and appréhended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Reflection on ideas, issuing in judgment</td>
<td>Reflection on values; beliefs received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Understanding of experience, i.e., ideas issuing in concepts</td>
<td>Understanding of received beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Experience accumulating</td>
<td>Experience made “mature and perceptive”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in 1965-6, but with the addition of a fourth level, Crowe uses E for the level of experience, U for understanding, R for the level of reflection and judgment, and V for the level of values and love. The two arrows “indicate the main dynamics of development.”

Crowe calls these two four-level paths the way of achievement (upward path) and the way of heritage (downward path). Crowe is clear that “love is fourth-level . . . activity.” Love, however, has a different place in the two movements: “Love, then, as it was the original gift in the way of heritage, is also the crowning element in the way of achievement.” The love that crowns the way of achievement is a kind of serenity or complacency with what is and with those around one. In the way of heritage, on the other hand, “values and judgments are communicated in an atmosphere of love and trust.”

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716 Old Things and New, 14.
717 Ibid.
718 An Expansion of Lonergan’s Notion of Value,” Appropriating, 347.
719 Old Things and New, 96.
720 Ibid., 17.
Crowe admits, however, that this “diagram is simplified” because he has left out the “horizontal dynamic” 721 within each “level of thought.” 722 For example, Crowe writes, “in the left-hand column values issue in decisions, reflections issues in judgments, understanding in concepts, experience in the vast and various world of images that is the mind’s treasury.” 723 Without going into details, Crowe adds that similar horizontal movements take place in the way of heritage. In short, the very analogies that Crowe used earlier for the procession of the Son are still recognized by Crowe, but his attention is on “the movement from one level of consciousness to another.” 724

The dynamism that accounts for the movement from one level to another is represented by the arrows in Crowe’s graph. “The dynamism of the upward movement,” Crowe explains, is the eros of the human spirit: it is the subject, the subject as operator. But in the new downward direction, the dynamism is not simply subjective; it is intersubjective, it is the intersubjective in its full range from spontaneous intersubjectivity to persons in community. We are “we” before we are “you” and “I” and this makes operative a dynamism of love that is quite distinct and different from the eros of Insight. 725

In using the word intersubjective and the distinction between a prior “we” and a subsequent recognition of “you” and “I,” Crowe is drawing on Method in Theology. In the third chapter of Method in Theology, “Meaning,” Lonergan’s first section, ‘Intersubjectivity,’ begins:

Prior to the “we” that results from the mutual love of an “I” and a “thou,” there is the earlier “we” that precedes the distinction of subjects and survives its oblivion. This prior “we” is vital and functional. Just as one spontaneously raises one’s arm to ward off a blow from one’s head, so with the same spontaneity one reaches out to save another from falling. . . . It is as if “we” were members of one another prior to our distinctions of each from the others. 726

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721 Ibid., 96.
723 Old Things and New, 96.
725 Ibid., 350.
726 Method in Theology, 57.
Crowe thinks that he is using the word intersubjective in a slightly broader fashion than Lonergan is using it. “I use the word, ‘intersubjectivity,’” Crowe writes, “to refer here to the full range of relations between subjects; this is not, I think, the particular use Lonergan sometimes makes of the term, as when he refers to the intersubjectivity that is vital and functional, and intersubjectivity of ‘action and feeling.’” 727 But the point is that from our relations with other subjects in a community a love exists in each person that can spontaneously act as an operator for our personal human development.

As we have seen, Crowe explicitly distinguishes the desire to know from this operator of intersubjective love. Crowe goes on to describe in a basic way “the great difference in modes of operation as the two dynamisms move us in opposite directions from level to level.” 728 Crowe starts with an example from the top two levels:

It is one thing to move up from judgments of facts and values to a responsible decision (third level to fourth); it is quite another for a mother to ponder in love what is best for her child (fourth level to third). In the former we may well speak of duty, and think of it as the “Stern Daughter of the Voice of God,” but surely not in the latter. 729

Crowe then gives a description of movements between the bottom two levels in both the upward and downward movements. His special interest is the relationship between insight (second level) and image (first level).

It is one thing to struggle for the upward emergence from the image [to] insight into the image (first level to second), and quite another to evoke images in illustration of an insight we already possess (second level to first). In the former case, as Lonergan said years ago, “we are at the mercy of fortune, the sub-conscious, or a teacher’s skill . . . in the ferment of trying to grasp we know not what,” but in the latter “we can operate on our own, marshalling images to a habitually known end.” 730

729 Ibid., 350. For the line “Stern Daughter of the Voice of God,” see the poem Ode to Duty by William Wordsworth.
In short, images precede the insights in the upward movement. In the downward movement, our insights enable us to produce new images as ways of evoking that same insight, as teachers do when they are trying to help their students understand. Crowe has not applied his re-thinking of intentionality analysis to the Trinity, but the tools he later will use to do so are in place by 1985.

As Crowe came to recognize and to adopt Lonergan’s two ways of development, Crowe accepted that the downward path of development had intersubjective love as its dynamic operator. At the beginning of his third stage of reflecting on the Holy Spirit (1985-2000), Crowe had in place a robust image of human consciousness operating in two directions. This two-fold path of development lies behind the emergence of Crowe’s question about whether the Holy Spirit can be thought of as the first person in the Trinity.

**Emergence of the Question of the Holy Spirit’s Firstness**

After Fr. Crowe gave his 1984 lecture, “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” there was a small buzz of excitement surrounding the lecture in Jesuit circles. The lecture was published in 1985, together with Fr. Crowe’s homily at Bernard Lonergan’s funeral Mass. Over the next few years, Crowe received letters of encouragement and gratitude from Jesuit theologians such as Jacques Dupuis and Francis X. Clooney. Fr. Dupuis wrote that Fr. Crowe’s idea on the mission of the Spirit “goes much in the same line of my own thinking on the subject.”

On December 9, 1986, Fr. Crowe wrote to Fr. Francis Clooney, S.J., a professor at Boston College: “One reason that I asked for your comments is that I want to incorporate this idea into a larger work on the dynamics of the Three in the world. I hope to get started on this

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731 *Crowe Archives* 2-1-2, Dupuis letter of 10 November 1985.
after Christmas and I will be pondering then what you had to say on the lecture.” This letter to Fr. Clooney shows that Crowe wanted to continue thinking about the economic Trinity, the Three in the world. Unfortunately, Fr. Crowe’s proposed book never appeared, and no record of it has yet been found in the Crowe Archives.

What did appear was an article in 1989 called, “Rethinking God-with-us: Categories from Lonergan.” This article includes a distilling and clarifying of the ideas we saw in his 1983 and 1984 lectures on the Holy Spirit. The focus is on the economic Trinity, the God of our experience, and not the immanent Trinitarian life. But this 1989 article indicates a new question in Crowe’s mind about the immanent Trinity. By 1989, Crowe thinks that a new psychological analogy may be applicable to the inner life of the Trinity, in which the Holy Spirit is thought of as the first person.

In the first stage of Crowe’s pneumatology (1953-68), the distinctive role of the Father was set within the beatific vision. The Father’s distinctive role was in the next life. But was it possible to think of a place for the Father in our experience during this life? By 1989, Crowe can write, “Like the long obscurity of the Spirit while the focus was on the Son, there has been an obscuring of the personal role of the Father, both in the final state of eternal life and in the

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732 Crowe Archives 2-1-2, letter to Fr. Francis Clooney, S.J., 9 December 1986. For Fr. Clooney’s biography, see the following interview: http://groups.creighton.edu/sjdialouge/documents/articles/clooney_frontline.html. For a review of Clooney’s accomplishments, see Gavin D’Costa’s review of “St Francis De Sales and Sri Vedanta Desika on Loving Surrender to God – by Francis X. Clooney,” Reviews in Religion & Theology 17, no. 3 (July 2010): 297-9.

733 This article has five main sections. In the final section, Crowe suggests three or four implications of his theology, including re-thinking aspects of the liturgical year to bring more focus on the Holy Spirit. “I am sure,” he writes, “that many besides myself have felt like a sheer physical pain the cutting back of the liturgy of the Holy Spirit: where we once had at least an octave, we now have only one day” (“Rethinking God-with-us,” Level of Our Time, 351).

734 In the next chapter, I will argue that this question becomes thematized and the focus of Crowe’s attention in his 1995 article, “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios.”
present temporary state of the Father’s absence.” The newness here is on a role for the Father in the present temporary state.

As Crowe reflected on the role of the Father in our present state, he came to think of the Father as present in our experience by our consciousness of a lack, a need. “There is,” Crowe writes,

a sense of our potential infinity, and therefore of an infinite emptiness. There is an experience of the dark night of the senses and of the human spirit. It is the absence, the lack, the need, the hunger, the emptiness, the longing, the abandonment, experienced in our human condition as long as we are separated from the presence of the Father in our world.

Crowe thinks that the Father’s absence is “the absence, as experienced absence, of God as ‘fons divinitatis,’ the absence of God the Father, originating person in the sending of the Son and Spirit, God our eschatological hope.”

Crowe notes that in traditional theological language, the absence that he is describing is our not having the beatific vision. The difference is that Crowe is talking about this absence from the side of the subject. The absence of God “is understood experientially now.” Crowe has his idea of our outer experience of the Son and our inner experience of the Holy Spirit. Crowe has come to see that “ordinarily (I do not wish to pronounce on the extraordinary experience of the mystics) there is in this world no experience of God (the Father), but there is experience of the mystery of mysteries – experience, so to speak, of the absence of experience.”

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736 Ibid.
737 Ibid. [fount of divinity].
738 Ibid.
739 Ibid., 341.
In 1989, Crowe tries to develop this role of the Father’s absence. He begins on the philosophical level with the question of God. He refers to various passages in Lonergan where he speaks of the question of God as being more important than how we answer that question. Crowe moves quickly to the notion of a Trinitarian spirituality. Philosophical questioning about God is “only the pale philosophic copy of the desire of Trinitarian spirituality, once we have learned of the sending of the Son and Spirit, to glimpse the mystery of mysteries, the originating divinity who is principle of the presence of the Spirit and Son among us in our exile.”

Crowe notes how “there is never an answer” when “we call out to the Father for understanding of the mystery of evil, for assurance of the divine truth we have received, for communion with dear ones who have gone from among us.” Crowe develops this silence in relation to the dear ones who have died. They too are silent. “No word comes back from those who have gone before us.” Crowe is not only speaking of his beloved brother who died so young and his sister who died in her early thirties; he is talking about the whole mystical body of Christ: “Not from our dear ones, not from our brothers or sisters in religion, not from Mary, the mother of the Lord, not from Jesus himself. They have gone into the presence of the originating divinity and seem to have forgotten us.” Crowe admits that there may be authentic apparitions (e.g., at Lourdes), but “this seems only to deepen the longing for the revelation and presence of the Father. All this, I suggest, belongs to the Trinitarian spirituality of our relation to the Father.”

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740 Ibid., 345.
741 Ibid. Fr. Crowe dedicated Lonergan and the Level of Our Time, to the memory of his five siblings.
742 “Rethinking God-with-us,” Level of Our Time, 345.
743 Ibid.
744 Ibid.
Behind this way of speaking of the Father is a passage in Lonergan: “an orientation to transcendent mystery is basic to systematic theology. It provides the primary and fundamental meaning of the name, God.”\(^ {745}\) Crowe has taken this orientation to transcendent mystery and applied it to our orientation to God the Father. Slowly, Crowe will begin to prefer ‘Mystery’ as the way to speak of the Father.\(^ {746}\)

But why does the Father, the Mystery of mysteries, not enter our present world except by our experience of his absence? Over the years, Crowe had always sought an answer to the ways of God in the world by looking for fittingness arguments based on the eternal characteristics of the Three according to the Thomistic psychological analogy. In terms of the fittingness for the Father’s presence as last, Crowe answers this question by reviewing Lonergan’s Thomistic 1964 theology of the immanent Trinity. “The Father,” Crowe writes,

is the *Intelligere Dicens* [the Act of Understanding Who Speaks] in the Trinity, the source of all divinity, the Understanding that issues in Truth, and in such Truth as will issue in infinite Love. Therefore, since the Father is the hidden, original, abysmal Source of the other persons in God and of their mission to us, it is fitting that the Father remain hidden in this life and be instead the final revelation, the One who becomes present to us through our understanding, in the light of the beatific vision.\(^ {747}\)

Lonergan offers a basis for seeing the fittingness of the Father not entering our world except in this hidden way. As we saw in stage two, this Thomistic account of the Trinitarian presence in the world provided by the psychological analogy was not sufficient for Crowe in accounting for the order and context of the missions. He deployed Lonergan’s analogy of human lovers


\(^{746}\) This shift to the name of Mystery, rather than Father, corresponds with Crowe’s growing desire in the third stage of his development to use inclusive language. In 1989, he ended the *preface* to * Appropriating the Lonergan Idea* in this way: “Let me end with a word of thanks and one of apology: . . . of apology to the female half of our race – it was only around 1984 that I abandoned the pretence that God and the whole human race were male, so only a few of these essays reflect the change that decision necessitated in my writing style” (xiv).

(falling in love, declaring love, consummating love) to supplement the psychological analogy in explaining God’s ways in the world.

In 1989, a slightly different issue emerges as he tries to find the fittingness of the Father’s absence. Crowe notes how “rather late in life Lonergan began to change his way of explaining the psychological analogy.” The key change that Lonergan introduces, according to Crowe, is a rethinking of the analogue of the Father. Instead of being thought of as the Act of Understanding Speaking a Word, the first person is “now conceived as originating love expressing itself in a judgement of value.” Crowe quotes a 1975 passage of Lonergan:

In God the origin is the Father . . . identified with agape . . . such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem [word spirating love], which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

Lonergan adds a bit later that each of the divine persons “in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father is originating Love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.” By putting these two passages together, Lonergan’s 1975 analogy can be stated in this way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Originating) Love: Judgment of Value</th>
<th>expressing that Love</th>
<th>(Originated) Proceeding Love</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father:</td>
<td>Word:</td>
<td>Holy Spirit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Summary of Lonergan’s 1975 Psychological Analogy

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748 Ibid., 347.
751 “Christology Today: Methodical Reflections,” A Third Collection, 94 [92].
By 1989, Crowe thinks that there is a problem using this analogy (as it stands) to understand the presence of the Three in the world. The problem is that Lonergan’s thinking was on the move. Lonergan expressed this 1975 analogy, Crowe explains, in the midst of trying to think out “one of the last of his great general ideas before he turned, in the final years of his active life, to the specific field of economics.”752 This late, great general idea is the idea of two ways of human development.

According to Crowe, Lonergan did not leave us with a fully worked out and revised psychological analogy. “It seems to me,” Crowe writes, “speaking now from the viewpoint of 1977, that what he was after in 1975, in the first step of the psychological analogy, was the knowledge born of love that he took from Pascal but did not fully develop in Method.”753 In other words, Crowe is saying, before Lonergan had even worked out, as an ordinary aspect of human life, a theory for the downward path of development, Lonergan is using something very much like it in speaking of the first person as originating love. “If that is the case,” Crowe adds, “then the Three and their processions should ‘logically’ have been conceived now on the analogy of the way down, in the full sequence of the movement from love to knowledge rather than from knowledge to love.”754 “In the ‘logic’ of the sequence,” Crowe adds, “there are some options; but using the scheme of ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness’ I would tend to think of Father, Son, and Spirit in terms respectively of love, knowledge born of love, and experience made mature and perceptive.”755 Below is a chart depicting Crowe’s first approximation at using the downward development as an analogy for the immanent Trinity.

752 “Interpreting Lonergan,” Appropriating, 158.
753 “Rethinking God-with-us,” Level of Our Time, 348.
754 Ibid.
755 Ibid.
Crowe has combined levels two and three, applied them as an analogy for the eternal Son, and called them “knowledge born of love.” Crowe situates “Originating Love” on the fourth level and “the judgment of value” on the third level, now called “knowledge born of religious love.” Crowe admits that Lonergan never explicitly connected “experience” with the Holy Spirit. “Would he,” Crowe writes of Lonergan, “have taken the step of using experience for an analogy of the Holy Spirit? Maybe yes, in some quite eminent sense of experience; but maybe no. I have not found an answer to this historical question in the record he left us.” Crowe is picking up on a shift in Lonergan’s conception of the psychological “analogy found in the creature,” but he interprets Lonergan in light of the downward path of development.

Was this interpretation necessary? In 1975, Lonergan provided these three analogues for the three divine persons: “the dynamic state of being in love . . . judgments of value . . .

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756 This is not the first time that Crowe has put a judgment of value on the third level. See *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 160. See also “An Expansion of Lonergan’s Notion of Value,” *Appropriating*, 350.
758 “Christology Today: Methodical Reflections,” *A Third Collection*, 93 [91].
decisions that are acts of loving.” 759 The judgment of value as a manifestation or expression of the gift of God’s love is like the Son of God. The judgment of value then is the ground for an act of loving that is like the Holy Spirit. Since a judgment of value, for Lonergan, has to do with affirming that something is worthwhile to do and requires an apprehension of value “given of feelings,” 760 one could easily interpret Lonergan’s triad as a horizontal movement within the fourth level, not a vertical movement. 761

Table 14: Lonergan’s 1975 Trio for the Psychological Analogy – Within Fourth Level?

| Dynamic state of being in love | Judgment of Value | Decisions/Acts of Loving |

We have to remember Crowe’s earlier 1965 claim about the analogy for the procession of the Word: “it is a procession, not from level to level, but within a level.” 762 Crowe earlier interpreted Lonergan’s psychological analogies for the procession of the Son as occurring within a level of intentionality. By 1989, Crowe is no longer thinking of the psychological analogy as exclusively being explained from within levels of consciousness. Crowe writes, “the Three and their processions should ‘logically’ have been conceived now on the analogy of the way down, in the full sequence of the movement from love to knowledge rather than from knowledge to love.” 763

Crowe speaks of two sequences. The first one goes from knowledge to love. This must be the path of development from below upwards. From the data of our experience, we come to know through acts of understanding and judgment. This knowing leads to questions of what

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759 “Christology Today: Methodical Reflections,” A Third Collection, 93 [91].
760 Method in Theology, 37.
761 On the fourth level as the level of values, see Method in Theology, 121, 245-7.
762 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 144.
763 “Rethinking God-with-us,” Level of Our Time, 348.
is worthwhile to do and (hopefully) subsequent responsible decisions, that is, acts of love. The
implication is that this upward sequence between levels provides the analogy for the Trinity in
which the Father is conceived of as the Understanding Speaking a Word,\textsuperscript{764} the Son as that
Word breathing forth the Love that is the Holy Spirit. From the second level, we move to the
third and then the fourth.

Table 15: “From Knowledge to Love” – Crowe’s Analogy for the Trinity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Consciousness</th>
<th>Levels of Consciousness on the Way Up</th>
<th>Corresponding Divine Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Loving Decisions</td>
<td>Holy Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Judging</td>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>Experiencing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other sequence mentioned by Crowe is from love to knowledge. Crowe is explicit
that this sequence has some options in terms of application to the divine persons. On the basis
of Lonergan’s 1977 writings, Crowe says that he “would tend to think of Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit in terms respectively of love, knowledge born of love, and experience made mature and
perceptive.”\textsuperscript{765} In the analogy of the way up, the Father is the first person and corresponds to
the second level, the level of understanding. In the analogy of the way down, the Father is still,
according to Lonergan, the first person, but now corresponds to the level of love.

\textsuperscript{764} In short, I find no evidence that Crowe is still thinking of the Father as a reflective act of understanding which
speaks a word within the third level.

\textsuperscript{765} “Rethinking God-with-us,” Level of Our Time, 348.
Even though Crowe says that he would tend to think of the Father as corresponding to the fourth level, he says this as an interpretation of Lonergan. Crowe himself says that there are various options for the analogy on the way down. What are the other unspecified options? The most obvious option would be to make understanding the analogy for the Holy Spirit, instead of experience. But is it possible that Crowe is thinking of more radical options too?

Crowe goes on to say that there are two questions concerning the use of the “downward movement for Trinitarian analogy,” viz., how to interpret Lonergan and the objective question itself. In terms of the objective question, Crowe thinks “it likely that we will get Lonergan’s answer only by carrying his idea beyond the point he himself had reached in 1975.” This quotation needs to be read in conjunction with Crowe’s suggestion that there are various options for the downward movement when applied to the Trinity. In 1975, Lonergan still was thinking of the Holy Spirit as proceeding Love. The Son was still “a word breathing forth love.” The only change in Lonergan’s 1975 analogy, according to Crowe, was the conception of the first person, the Father. To move beyond the point that Lonergan reached in 1975 could mean rethinking the other two persons as well, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

What if we think of the Holy Spirit not so much as proceeding Love but as the intersubjective or interpersonal love? As far back as the summer of 1972, Crowe had written:

Most of Lonergan’s work in Christology was prior to 1965 when he spoke in terms of intellect and will and saw understanding in the mind of Christ as prior to love in the heart of Christ. But most of his work on values is subsequent to 1965; he does not now speak of intellect and will but of levels of consciousness and when he applies this to our human condition on earth he sees falling in love with God as prior to faith in the traditional sense.  

766 Ibid.
767 Ibid.
768 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 43, a.5 ad. 2.
But Crowe also added:

The general principle operative here is that the relationship between mind and heart is the opposite in our religious experience and faith life of what it is in the blessed and what it is conceived to be in God. That is, the order in God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; or, in the Thomist transformation of these biblical names, the order is Understanding, Word, and Love. And this I take to be the natural order of the rationally conscious universe.\(^{770}\)

For decades, Crowe taught that the order in God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.\(^{771}\) This ordering of the persons, accepted in faith, was understood in theology through an analogous order of operations that obtains in the blessed and in our natural order of conscious operations from below upwards: understanding, truth, love. Since the early 1970s, Crowe was convinced that another order obtained in our graced-life of faith: love, true beliefs, understanding (theology). These graced operations occur in an “inverse order”\(^{772}\) to what Crowe then thought of as our natural order of conscious operations. The inverse order of love, truth, understanding corresponds to their exemplars: Holy Spirit, Son, Father. This ordering is implicitly connected with the downward psychological analogy laid out in *Table 15*.

**Conclusion – Summary**

In the second stage of his pneumatology (1969-84), Crowe was already thinking of love coming before faith and the understanding of theology. While he did not apply that triad, love-faith-understanding, to the downward movement of consciousness (Crowe was not yet aware of such a movement as a normal aspect of human conscious operations),\(^{773}\) his idea of the priority of love is easily mapped onto the downward movement. Was Crowe thinking about

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\(^{770}\) Ibid. Emphasis is mine.

\(^{771}\) For a restating of this same position, see “Son and Spirit: Tension in the Divine Missions?” *Appropriating*, 306-7.

\(^{772}\) “Eschaton and Worldly Mission,” *Appropriating*, 223n44.

\(^{773}\) For example, Crowe added this note, when his June 1974 lecture, “Lonergan’s New Notion of Value,” was reprinted in 1989: “At the time of this lecture, 1974, I did not know of Lonergan’s two ways of development” (*Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, 56n30).
love in the downward movement as an analogy for the Holy Spirit when he said that we need to move beyond the point Lonergan reached in 1975? I think so. The downward movement could be best applied to the Trinity, Crowe began to think, if the first person was not the Father, but rather the Holy Spirit.

In 1989, Crowe does not say this explicitly. He simply adds, “Meanwhile, we remain with his very Thomist analogy of 1964, modifying it only in the conception of the first person as originating Love uttering a Word.” Crowe is looking for “an integral view of God-with-us.” In other words, Crowe wants an analogy that will help us understand the presence of the three in a unified manner, per modum unius. He has been thinking about “relating levels of thinking to one another” and has expressed hopes that a downward moving analogy between levels might provide this unified view. Crowe will carry Lonergan’s idea further in 1995. But what we see here is the emergence of a question. Can we think of another eternal ordering of the persons that better explains our new understanding of their presence in the world?

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774 “Rethinking God-with-us,” Level of Our Time, 348.
775 Ibid., 358.
776 Ibid., 349.
Chapter Seven – Hiding his Goal: Crowe’s Re-ordering of the Three Persons

“. . . to elaborate a Lonerganian theology of the divine economy working in human history would therefore be a long and difficult task, and I do not know whether in the end enough data would be found for a comprehensive view . . . What I feel is the fascination of the question . . . ,, the hope that someone may yet be able to undertake the study.”777 – Frederick Crowe, S.J.

By the mid-1990s, it seemed that Fr. Crowe’s work on the Trinity was finished. He was still captivated by questions of the presence of the Trinity in the world. His long-desired book on the economic Trinity, however, would have to be left to someone else to write.778 But then, a young Jesuit theology student asked Fr. Crowe for a directed reading course on the Trinity. “I was fascinated by his Trinity notes from the 1960s,” Fr. Gilles Mongeau said.779 And so Gilles Mongeau approached Fr. Crowe about supervising a course based on those notes together with other Trinitarian texts. Fr. Crowe agreed and oversaw the course in the fall of 1994 (October–December). Crowe’s syllabus and hand written notes are in the Crowe Archives.780

As Fr. Crowe prepared that course, he re-read Basil, Augustine, Aquinas, Lonergan, and Rahner. And out of that course came the confidence to publish his last major article on the Trinity: “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios.”781 In that article, Crowe revisited many questions from his earlier Trinitarian theology. But the most radical new

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777 “Lonergan’s Universalist View of Religion,” Developing the Lonergan Legacy, 141.
778 Robert Doran S.J.,’s work, The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions, vol. 1 Missions and Processions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) can be seen as beginning to take up this challenge.
779 Conversation with Fr. Mongeau after my thesis proposal examination, 1 October 2015.
780 Crowe Archives A-3-4-1. Fr. Crowe had to reapply to the Toronto School of Theology for his status to teach an advanced degree course. He was glad, in the end, that he did the course, but told Gilles Mongeau, “That was a lot of work. I will not do that again” (Conversation with Fr. Mongeau during my thesis proposal examination, 1 October 2015). Another graduate student, Gerard Whelan, S.J., also sat in on the course.
question in this piece is his willingness to think of an eternal order in the Trinity with the Holy Spirit as the first person.

The article begins in section one with an account of what it means for the three divine persons to be homoousios. Crowe especially liked the interpretation of consubstantial offered by George Prestige: “that the Son is God in the same sense as the Father is God.”

In section two, Crowe lays out a theological trajectory that takes seriously the equality of the three persons. The trajectory starts with the Council of Nicaea’s doctrine of homoousios and the Athanasian Creed’s teaching about there being no priority among the persons. The arc moves towards the thought of Aquinas and his many interpreters, especially Bernard Lonergan, to show how Thomist teaching on divine eternal processions and relations rules out any priority among the divine persons. Section three asks about trying to develop this theological tradition in terms of the order of the divine persons. Is the order, Father-Son-Holy Spirit, the only way to think of the order of the persons in the immanent Trinity? Crowe does not deny the traditional belief in that ordering, but proposes an order, Spirit-Son-Father, as a complementary way of thinking about the persons. The fourth section takes us into a few questions of theological method that Crowe’s rethinking of the Trinity evokes.

In a crucial sentence in the final section, Crowe summarizes the purpose of his essay as working for a “true advance in theology that takes seriously not only the homoousios but

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782 For the Council of Nicaea’s doctrine of the Father and Son as consubstantial or homoousios, see DS 125. Crowe also commonly refers to Lonergan’s explanation of consubstantial according to Athanasius: “that the same things are said of the Son as are said of the Father, with the exception of Fatherhood” (“Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Lonergan and the Level of Our Time, 394). Cf. Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Doctrines, CWL 11, 175-77, 195-97. Lonergan refers us to Athanasius, Oratio 3 contra Arianos, 4 (PG 26, 329 B).
784 Aquinas says: “it is necessary for there to be an order according to origin but without priority [Unde oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem, absque prioritate]” (ST I q. 42, a. 3).
also the Thomist view of Trinitarian relations.”

Crowe’s reference to relation at the end of the essay tells us what his essay is really about: Trinitarian relations. The reordering of the divine persons is really an effort to help us take seriously the doctrine of mutual and simultaneous Trinitarian relations.

Crowe’s decision to speak about real relations in the economic Trinity also indicates where the deep interest of this essay lies. He asks: “Are we dealing with a real relation that pertains to the person of the Spirit – that is, a Trinitarian relation to the Son and Father – or are we dealing with only a sequence of created events in our human return to God?”

Crowe then asks: “what does this real relation reveal to us about the inner life of God.” Later on Crowe repeats this idea:

But if the church agrees that real Trinitarian relations of the Spirit are involved in the Spirit’s task of revealing the Son, and agrees that such real relations in the economic Trinity lead us into the immanent Trinity, then perhaps the conceptual system Lonergan has provided will be of some use in understanding this new development.

Crowe, as we will see, does not think that sufficient attention has been paid to the way in which each Trinitarian relation conditions the other term of that relation. Crowe proposes a different ordering of the persons because he thinks it brings out the eternal ‘characterization’ of the Father and Son by the Holy Spirit, not in terms of origin, but in terms of implication.

People do not seem to understand, Crowe is telling us, what it truly means for the Holy Spirit to be fully God as a relation. The traditional ordering (Father, Son, Spirit) is still valid and important. But by providing other sets of concepts for thinking of the three persons in

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785 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 414.
786 Ibid., 407. Lonergan defined relation as “the order of one thing to another [ordo unius ad alium]” (CWL 12, 246-7; cf. CWL 12, 687n1). A relation is real when it “is not only conceived but also truly is [non tantum concipitur sed etiam vere est]” (Ibid., 246-7). Cf. Summa Theologiae I q. 28, a. 1.
787 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 407.
788 Ibid., 411.
another order, with the Spirit as the first in the order, Crowe enables the reader to make diagrams or phantasms of the two orderings. Making these two images helps one to grasp more fully what it means for the Holy Spirit to be a Trinitarian relation.

At the very end of his third stage of development (1985-2000), Crowe wrote an essay called, “‘Stare at a Triangle . . .’ A Note on How to Get an Insight and How not to,”789 in which he proposed “the shuffling of the data”790 as a key to getting an insight. We need to get the free images or phantasms in the right arrangement for the insight to emerge.791 This is precisely what I think that Crowe is doing in this essay. He is trying to guide the production of the appropriate phantasm by shuffling the data about the ordering of the persons. The goal is to help elicit the appropriate insight into the Holy Spirit as a Trinitarian relation. In short, he wants us to grasp that the Son and the Father, in some way, ‘depend on’ or are characterized by the Holy Spirit in eternity. To ignore this aspect of the Holy Spirit is not to take fully seriously his equality with the Father and Son. The key for unlocking the rhetorical strategy of the essay is Crowe’s stated desire at the end of the article, viz., “of gaining further insight into the infinite mystery that God is.”792 How do we gain insights? We need appropriate phantasms. Diagrams or phantasms depicting the Holy Spirit as the first person help theological insight to emerge.

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790 “How to Get an Insight and How Not to,” Level of Our Time, 131.
791 See Lonergan’s account of phantasms, insights, and teachers in Verbum, 42. Cf. Insight, 299.
792 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 396.
What are Crowe’s Stated Reasons for Rethinking the Order of the Divine Persons?

Crowe offers two explicit reasons for his new ordering of the divine Persons. The first is that he is trying to determine whether people really think that the Holy Spirit is God in the same sense as the Father and Son are God. Crowe wonders whether

we include in our unexamined concept of the Father’s ‘firstness’ a character or trait or aspect or property (in the sense of an absolute property) or excellence or glory or quality or virtue or possession or rank or grade or role or distinction (in the sense of honor) – a ‘dignitas’ in Latin, an ‘axioma’ in Greek – that prevents the Son or Spirit from being God in the same sense as the Father is God?793

Crowe wants to expel such a “contradiction”794 within the theological community of the Church. The contradiction is found in those who hold that the three persons are consubstantial, homoousioi, but who treat “the Son and Spirit as if they were somewhat less than the Father.”795 By conceiving a real order in the Trinity that starts with the Spirit, we make “the Spirit fully the equal of the Father” and thus “advance one more step in the task of taking seriously the homoousios.”796

The second reason for Crowe’s proposed new ordering is that such an ordering might be necessary depending on the Church’s judgment regarding the role of the Holy Spirit in revealing the Son to us. Is a real relation involved in that task of the Holy Spirit? If so, does this real relation in the economic order lead us back to an aspect of the “immanent Trinity?”797

Early in the essay, Crowe briefly examines the tradition for evidence for an ordering of the divine persons that begins with the Holy Spirit. Crowe looks at the Scriptures, the Fathers, and among theologians.

793 Ibid., 398.
794 Ibid., 414.
795 Ibid.
796 Ibid., 405.
797 Ibid., 411.
In terms of the New Testament, Crowe especially mentions the way the Spirit reveals or directs us to the Son, “No one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except by the Holy Spirit” (1 Corinthians 12:3). He also cites the passage where the Holy Spirit “did not allow” (Acts 16:7) Paul and Timothy to enter Bithynia. He refers us to the ways that the Holy Spirit directs “even the Lord Jesus” after his baptism according to “Matthew 4:1; Mark 1:12; Luke 4:1-2, 14.” Crowe especially likes St. Paul’s phrase: “for through him [Christ] we both have access in one Spirit to the Father” (Ephesians 4:28). In short, Crowe thinks that the Scriptures suggest a “general context of our return, through the Son and in the Spirit, to the God who made us.”

According to Crowe, St. Basil explicitly formulated what the Scriptures teach: “Thus the way to the knowledge of God is from one Spirit, through the one Son, to the one Father.” As in his first stage, Fr. Crowe tries in this third stage to follow in St. Basil’s footsteps. Crowe notes how “immediately after the passage” just quoted “he [Basil] has the following: ‘conversely, the natural goodness and the natural power to sanctify, and the royal dignity, pass from the Father through the Only-begotten, to reach the Spirit.’” Crowe’s point is “that Basil has the two orders side by side.”

It is true that Basil is setting what we could call the economic order side by side with the immanent order of the persons. What Crowe is trying to do, on the other hand, is to ask whether two eternal orderings of the persons can both be thought of side by side. Crowe

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798 Ibid., 406, 406n22.
799 Ibid., 406.
801 Ibid.
802 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 406.
proposes that an eternal ordering that starts with the Spirit “would simply add to the traditional belief in the hope of gaining further insight into the infinite mystery that God is.”\textsuperscript{803}

After referring to St. Basil and the Scriptures, Crowe says, “these few soundings I leave for biblical and patristic theologians to develop further or reject, as it seems best to them.”\textsuperscript{804} Crowe then mentions one piece of evidence “from the side of theological systematics . . . namely, the view that the Spirit is the nexus of Father and Son.”\textsuperscript{805} Crowe highlights the work of François Bourassa S.J.\textsuperscript{806} “who wrote frequently on the topic in the pages of \textit{Sciences Ecclésiastiques}, its successor, \textit{Science et Esprit}, and \textit{Gregorianum}.”\textsuperscript{807} Crowe thought that the growing appreciation of the idea of the Holy Spirit as nexus supported the inverse ordering of the divine persons.

In the first and third stages of his pneumatology, Crowe was uneasy with the idea of the Holy Spirit as the ‘nexus’ or bond or link of Father and Son.\textsuperscript{808} He knew that the idea was in Aquinas, but Crowe preferred the idea of proceeding love to the idea of nexus in order to understand the identity of the Spirit.\textsuperscript{809} Crowe wrote, “the nexus concept fits uneasily in the order Father, Son, and Spirit, in which Father and Son have to be already united, in order to be

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{803}{Ibid. 396.}
\footnote{804}{Ibid., 406.}
\footnote{805}{Ibid.}
\footnote{806}{In the September 1994 (15.3) issue of the \textit{Lonergan Studies Newsletter}, Fr. Crowe wrote, “Fr Francois Bourassa died Christmas day in Montreal. A pupil of Lonergan at the College of the Immaculate Conception in the 1940s, and later his colleague for a year at the Gregorian University in the 1960s, he was especially devoted to the theology of the Trinity, and wrote extensively on that topic. René Latourelle has an article in the current issue of \textit{Science et Esprit} (46:1 [1994] 5-11), 'François Bourassa, S.J.: Un grand théologien.' Of special interest is a paragraph on how Père Bourassa succeeded Lonergan in teaching the Trinity at the Gregorian University, and won the at first reluctant respect of students who had been greatly attached to Lonergan” (\textit{Lonergan Studies Newsletter} 15, 23). Cf. \url{http://www.lonerganresearch.org/site/assets/files/1184/lsn_set_3_25.90-94.pdf}. The \textit{Lonergan Studies Newsletter} was started in 1980 as a quarterly publication. Fr. Crowe took over as editor of the eight to ten-page publication in 1988 (cf. \textit{Lonergan Studies Newsletter} 15, 28).}
\footnote{807}{“Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the \textit{Homoousios},” \textit{Level of Our Time}, 406n25.}
\footnote{808}{\textit{The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity}, 124.}
\footnote{809}{See Aquinas’ way of explaining the term in \textit{Summa Theologiae} I q. 37 a. 2, a. 1 and II-II q. 1, a. 8, ad. 3.}
\end{footnotes}
the one principle of the Holy Spirit.”\textsuperscript{810} In other words, the doctrine of the Father and Son as a single principle of spiration requires that they be united in order for there to be one principle of spiration. If they are “already” united and “then” breathe forth the Spirit, how is the Spirit their nexus? Yet, when one begins to think about the order of the persons as Spirit, Son, and Father, Crowe thinks that the idea of nexus works much better, “and, I would say, more coherently.”\textsuperscript{811} How so?

In the order, Spirit, Son, and Father, “the Spirit is first conceived in relation to the Father and Son as they are one in the Spirit’s love, a love that as it were unites them in that one relation before they are distinguished.”\textsuperscript{812} “In this conception,” Crowe goes on to say,

the infinite Love that is the Spirit finds its ‘object’ and ‘partner’ first in the Word and Mystery as one, as united in the nexus of the Spirit’s love, and then as distinguished from one another, as the ‘You’ of the Word and the ‘You’ of the Mystery of whom the Word is the expression.\textsuperscript{813}

In the more traditional order, the nexus, according to our thinking, follows upon the distinction of Father and Son, Crowe maintains. In Crowe’s proposed order that begins with the Holy Spirit, the nexus “has a role in the distinction of Father and Son, again of course in our thought process.”\textsuperscript{814}

Crowe’s essay is not trying to prove the validity of this new ordering. He is simply trying to provide a few reasons for thinking that the Spirit could be thought first and then to investigate what he calls the “intellectual equipment” needed to understand such an ordering. If the Church were to conclude that the Spirit is in some way first in the immanent Trinity, how could such an order be made intelligible to us?

\textsuperscript{810} “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homooios,” the Level of Our Time, 406n25.
\textsuperscript{811} Ibid., 407.
\textsuperscript{812} Ibid., 406n25.
\textsuperscript{813} Ibid., 407.
\textsuperscript{814} Ibid.
We have to return for a moment to Crowe’s earlier ideas about relations. Crowe’s argument for there being eternal relations in God was based on the divine missions:

The Father really sends the Son into the world, and a real sending means a real mutual relation between sender and sent. On the part of the Father, this real relation has to be eternal, since he has not human nature to ground a temporal relation. On the part of the Son, it has to be eternal, first, because it is mutual, and if it is eternal in the Father it is eternal in the Son too; secondly, because the ‘sending’ and ‘being sent’ are prior by nature to his ‘being in the world’ with a human nature, and therefore have their basis in his eternal being.⁸¹⁵

After deducing the eternal mutual relations of Father and Son from the sending of the Son by the Father, Crowe makes a similar argument for thinking of the Holy Spirit as a real relation:

He too is really sent by the Father, and since neither of them assumes a created nature, the real relation implied must be eternal; he is really sent by the Son, and the real relation implied here must likewise be eternal; eternal in the Spirit who has no ground for a temporal relation, and eternal in the Son, both because it is mutual, and because he cannot as Man send the Spirit, it is as God that he sends him.⁸¹⁶

Crowe’s argument rests on the idea that the real sending of a divine person implies or “involves” a relation between the one sent and the one sending.⁸¹⁷ A relation, for Crowe and Lonergan, means the “order of one thing to another.”⁸¹⁸ The Son is eternally related to the Father as being from him. The Father is the one from whom the Son is. The Spirit is from the Father and the Son. Knowledge of these eternal relations is based on the way the Son and Spirit are in the world as from another.

Whether or not Crowe’s argument is sound is not the point for now.⁸¹⁹ The point is to see how Crowe thought of relations. Crowe was convinced that a divine mission implied a real relation. In other words, he moved from the economic order to the immanent life of Trinity.

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⁸¹⁵ *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 97.
⁸¹⁶ Ibid.
⁸¹⁷ Cf. Ibid., 165.
⁸¹⁸ “[Ordo unius ad aliud]” (Ibid., 99).
⁸¹⁹ Sometimes Crowe speaks of the Father as a relation and the Son as a relation and the Holy Spirit as a relation...
In light of Scriptural passages that imply a sending of the Son by the Spirit or suggest that the Spirit is the first person sent to those being saved, Crowe thinks that there are basically two questions that the Church will eventually have to answer. The first is this:

In this aspect of the tradition [viz., Scriptural witness to an order that starts with the Spirit], are we dealing with a real relation that pertains to the Spirit – that is, a Trinitarian relation to the Son and Father – or are we only dealing with a sequence of created events in our return to God.  

In light of his earlier theology, Crowe is basically asking about whether the Son is ever shown really to be sent or led by the Spirit.

If the answer is that the Spirit’s role in the mission of the Son involves a real relation, then Crowe thinks that another question will have to be answered: “If there is some reason to maintain such a Trinitarian relation in the economy of salvation, what does this real relation reveal to us about the inner life of God?” From the missions and real relations in the divine carrying out of the plan of salvation, Crowe is saying, we learn about the inner life of God. And so, he tries to lay out a conceptual framework, “for thinking of an aspect of intra-Trinitarian life that starts with the Spirit.”

Crowe is not overturning the doctrine of relations of origin. He is not denying that the Father brings forth the Son, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But Crowe has become interested in another aspect of the Trinitarian life. From his earlier years as a

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820 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 407.
821 In his The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, Crowe does not discuss, as far as I can tell, the Spirit’s role in the human life of the Son. One wonders how his theology of the missions would have changed if he had reflected more on the working of the Holy Spirit in the humanity of Christ.
822 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 407.
823 Ibid., 409.
seminary professor, “another question haunts me,” Crowe wrote: “how can we show that there are only three in God? that no one proceeds from the Holy Spirit?” In other words, why do the Father and Son require the existence of a third person, the Holy Spirit, and no more? In 1995, Crowe is still thinking about the way the Holy Spirit is necessary in God. Thinking of the Holy Spirit as the first person is a way of bringing out how any one divine person mutually implies the other two. Crowe wants to carry theology “forward another step in our time.”

In this way, Fr. Crowe was earnest in his desire to supply a way of thinking of the Spirit as the first person. The essay is not simply about providing appropriate phantasms to provoke insights. We know that he was convinced that the Holy Spirit’s mission was prior and provided the context for the Son’s mission. The priority of the Spirit’s mission gives a basis in revelation for thinking that this temporal relationship of the Spirit to Christ points towards an eternal ordering. As theologians move from the sending of the Spirit by the Father and Son to the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son, so Crowe wants to move in an analogous way from the role of the Spirit in time to his identity in eternity.

Following Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan, Crowe, in his first stage, found in the knowing and loving acts of human beings an analogy for the distinction of the Son and Spirit in God. The procession of a word and the procession of love offered analogies for the processions of the Son and Spirit. In a similar manner, Crowe looks to Lonergan’s downward development as an analogy for a new ordering of the Three that begins with the Holy Spirit and complements the traditional ordering of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

824 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 118.
825 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 395.
Trying to Win a Hearing: First Set of Concepts

Fr. Crowe says that there are two sets “of concepts in Lonergan” that he uses to try to win “a hearing for my proposal.” The first set is Lonergan’s notion of “love consciously oriented to a beloved.” The second is the two paths of development: the way of achievement and the way of heritage.

In this 1995 essay, Crowe distinguishes proceeding love from an interpersonal or intersubjective love that is “consciously oriented to a beloved.” The love that is found in the summit of the way of achievement is a proceeding love. It is the end of a process. The love that is found in the fourth level in the way of heritage (especially the gift of God’s love) is the beginning of a new process of development. Crowe can write, “But now this gift is not taken as the end of a process (as is the procession of the Spirit in the usual order); it is taken rather as a beginning, as a first in our return to God.” Fr. Crowe uses both kinds of love as analogies for the Holy Spirit:

We start with the Holy Spirit as love: not as proceeding love – though as I keep repeating, that concept retains its validity – but as love consciously oriented to a beloved, as love in intersubjective relationship, not simply love of infinite goodness, but love for which the other is a ‘you.’

This notion of the Holy Spirit as proceeding Love stayed constant in Crowe from the beginning of his life as a theologian, but he added to it the idea of the Holy Spirit as interpersonal or intersubjective love.

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826 Ibid., 410.
827 Ibid.
828 Ibid.
829 Ibid., 409.
830 Ibid., 410.
One might object, however, that Fr. Crowe, has misunderstood Lonergan on this point of interpersonal or intersubjective love and applied this love too widely. In answering a question in 1972, Lonergan said:

The religious experience of the Christian is specifically distinct from religious experience in general. It is intersubjective. It is not only this gift of God’s love, but it has an objective manifestation of God’s love in Christ Jesus. That intersubjective component creates a difference.\[^{831}\]

In Christianity, the one we are in love with has already been found: Jesus of Nazareth. This is why Lonergan says that Christian religious experience is intersubjective. Two days earlier, Lonergan had said: “There is an intersubjective element to love that is present in Christianity, where God is expressing his love in Christ as well as giving you the grace in your heart; and this element is missing when you haven’t got a Christian revelation.”\[^{832}\] The love that is given by God to those outside Christianity, general religious experience, is not, according to Lonergan, intersubjective. If Lonergan was so clear about the Christian basis for religious love being intersubjective, why would Crowe use the idea of intersubjective love more broadly?

Fr. Crowe was puzzled by another passage in those lectures in which religious love seems to be oriented towards God. Lonergan claims that the gift of God’s love is what leads men to seek knowledge of God. God’s gift of his love is God’s free and gratuitous gift. It does not suppose that we know God. It does not proceed from our knowledge of God. On the contrary, I have suggested that the gift occurs with indeed a determinate content but without an intellectually apprehended object. Religious experience at its root is experience of an unconditioned and unrestricted being in love. But what we are in love with remains something that we must find out. When we find it out in the context of a philosophy, there results a philosophy of God. When we find it out in the context of a functionally differentiated theology, there results a functional specialty, systematics. So it turns out that one and the same God has unknowingly been found and is differently being sought by both philosopher and theologian.\[^{833}\]


\[^{832}\] “Philosophy of God, and Theology, Lecture 1,” Ibid., 178.

\[^{833}\] Lonergan, “Philosophy of God, and Theology, Lecture 3,” Ibid., 204.
What Fr. Crowe is picking up on is the way this religious love leads us to search and find God. Crowe’s point is that “love has cognitional consequences.” In Lonergan’s own words, the cognitional consequences are a philosophy or theology of God.

Crowe applies this idea of love of God having cognitional consequences to the inner life of God. He compares such love and knowledge of God to the Spirit and Son by saying:

and in God there ‘results’ the Word as determinate ‘object’ of the Spirit’s love, and as a conscious subject consciously returning that love in a mutual relationship. Hence the Spirit is a love for which the Word is not just an object but a ‘you,’ and a love that has the Word responding as to a ‘you.’

Notice how the Word is responding to the Spirit and not the Father as ‘you,’ in Crowe’s analysis. In this analogy, the Word is understood to depend on the Spirit.

Having spoken of the mutual relationship of the Spirit and Son, Crowe then turns to the emergence of a third divine person. “Further,” he writes, “love desires to know more and more about the beloved. Consequently, in human love of God, which ‘knows’ with the heart ‘that’ God is but does not know with the head ‘what’ God is, philosophy and theology keep striving forever to penetrate more deeply into the what.” It might seem that Crowe is really playing fast and loose now with Lonergan’s thought. Lonergan had two analogues: a love of God and a resulting philosophy or theology of God. Crowe is turning these ‘two’ into analogues for three persons.

Without being explicit about his sources, Crowe is probably drawing on Aquinas’s treatment of God in the Summa Theologiae. First, Aquinas asks whether God is (I q. 2). When this has been answered, he takes up the questions about what God is (I qq. 3-13). On this basis,

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834 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” Level of Our Time, 410.
835 Ibid.
836 Ibid.
Crowe can distinguish two general moments in a philosophy or theology of God. There is the discovery \textit{that} he is and \textit{what} he is. The latter moment is a “penetrating more deeply into ‘what,’”\(^{837}\) that is, a moment of human understanding. In the end, this understanding, however, is more about penetrating more deeply into what God is not than what he is.\(^{838}\) And so, Crowe cleverly applies this latter moment to the Father, whom he calls, Mystery. “Analogously, the divine love the Spirit has for the Son reaches beyond the Son to the ultimate, the infinite Mystery of the One uttering the Word.”\(^{839}\)

Crowe knows that Lonergan did not use these concepts of the emergence of a philosophy and theology of God directly for God’s inner life. But Crowe thinks this set of concepts “seems applicable to God.”\(^{840}\) In setting up this analogy between Lonergan’s doctrine of the origin of a philosophy of God grounded in religious love and the inner Trinitarian life, Crowe does not totally leave aside differences between the human and divine sides of the analogy. The human side involves not knowing and then seeking and finding, “while on the divine side there is no stage of unknowing, no seeking, but eternally full and conscious intersubjective communion of Love, Word, and Mystery.”\(^{841}\) At the same time, however, Crowe notes that such cautions are also required “in the order Father, Son, and Spirit.”\(^{842}\) In the traditional order, “there is no stage of un-being, no priority of Communicator over those

\begin{footnotes}

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Cf. Aquinas’ words in the beginning of \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, q. 3: “\textit{Sed quia de Deo scire non possimus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possimus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit} [Since we are not able to know what God is, but what he is not, we are not able to consider how God is, but rather how he is not].”}

\footnote{“Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios,” \textit{Level of Our Time}, 410.}

\footnote{Ibid. It might seem that Crowe is saying that the Word and the Father (Mystery) have their origin from the Spirit, but this is not true. Crowe says that the Word is the “expression” (407) of the Father, the “One uttering the Word,” (410); the Word’s origin is from another.}

\footnote{Ibid., 410.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
receiving the communication, when the Father communicates the divine being to Son and Spirit.”

Crowe has not forgotten his earlier suggestion of the Holy Spirit as nexus of love. “If we wish,” he adds in parentheses, “to retain the idea of the Spirit as nexus, we would introduce an intermediate step: the Spirit oriented to ‘what’ the Spirit loves, with ‘what’ the Spirit loves then being differentiated into the two persons who are Word and Mystery.” This intermediate step seems more in keeping with Lonergan’s account of the love of God, in a general religious experience, as not having an intellectually determinate object. The recognition of a divine ‘you’ seems to be discovered later.

Winning a Proposal: Second Set of Concepts

After discussing a first set of concepts to help win a hearing for his proposal regarding the inner Trinitarian order of persons, Crowe takes up a second set of concepts found in Lonergan. Crowe’s discussion is very brief, but this is only because the first set of concepts (intersubjective love – knowing the one loved – understanding mystery) is intimately tied to the second set. The second set is the concepts of a twofold ordering of human knowing “that has come to be known as ‘the way up’ and ‘the way down,’ though the spatial metaphor is only a handy mnemonic.”

We have looked at these two orderings of human development earlier in Chapter Six of Part III. The way up is the way that begins with experiencing data, and then moves by means of questions to an understanding of that data, a judgement on that understanding, and a decision about what the responsible response would be. The ordering on ‘the way down’ reverses the

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843 Ibid.
844 Ibid.
845 Ibid., 411.
relations of the levels. We begin with the level of values and love, then come judgments, then understanding of those truths, and finally more perceptive experience of the world.  

Crowe thinks that the relevance of this twofold ordering is that each ordering respectively can be applied to the two orderings of the divine persons he has been discussing. The traditional ordering, according to Crowe, would line up with the development from below upwards:

\[\text{Table 16: Summary of Crowe's Psychological Analogy 'From Below Upwards'}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Levels of Intentionality on the Way up</th>
<th>Corresponding Divine Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>Loving Decisions</td>
<td>Holy Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>Judging</td>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>Experiencing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The new ordering proposed by Crowe would line up with the downward development in this way:

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Crowe thinks that both of these analogies could possibly help to understand different aspects of the mystery of God. At first glance, this proposal has something to it. But there are drawbacks to this use of analogies between levels of consciousness.

In making the Son analogous to the judgment on the third level and the Father analogous to the Understanding on the second level, he has chosen analogues from human activity that do not immediately relate or depend on one another. The understanding on the second level helps to answer the question: what is this that I am experiencing? A (direct) act of insight gives rise to an inner word, a hypothesis, a concept, a definition, a formulation. The judgment that corresponds to the Son only takes place through another kind of insight or act of understanding. Once the person asks the question, but is it so, about that hypothesis, concept or formulation, a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence can take place. Evidence is gathered and weighed. The (reflective) insight emerges, for example, that this formulation cannot be otherwise. And on the basis of that reflective insight, the yes, the judgment can emerge. By
contrast, Crowe’s analogues among our conscious acts seem to be only indirectly related to one another. He relates the judgment of fact to the act of understanding of what something is to help us understand the relation of Son and Father. When Crowe decides to use this vertical movement for a Trinitarian psychological analogy, it could be objected that he is weakening his ability to explain why the Son and Spirit proceed.

Crowe’s response, however, could be that he is not dealing with analogies of acts anymore. His psychological analogies are based on the levels themselves. The level of understanding itself is like the Father. The level of judgement is like the Son. The level of loving decision is like the Holy Spirit. Every analogy limps, he might say. An analogy between levels can be useful in some way like so many analogies (shamrock, three matches, etc.) but it is less illuminating for the processions than the analogy within a level of consciousness.

Why would Fr. Crowe make these theological sacrifices? Was he allowing his imagination to get the better of him? Was he misled by what people call the short-hand way Lonergan refers to the levels of consciousness by one act? Or did he know what he was doing?

**Pedagogical Purpose of The Two Sets of Concepts**

Looking back on his own growth, Crowe admitted in 2007, “I am grateful to have focused first on intelligible emanation and to have come later to an appreciation of interpersonal relations.” This reference to interpersonal relations gives us a clue about Crowe’s strategy and should be read in conjunction with several remarks about relations in “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the Homoousios.” Speaking about Thomist

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847 But the levels are related to one another through operators and those operators are questions. What do these operators correspond to in God? I do not really think there can be an answer to these questions.

848 *The Triune God: Systematics*, xx.
Trinitarian theology, Crowe says: “The crowning step in this development, however, is still to come. It is found in the doctrine of the Trinitarian relations, which we conceive as mutual, inclusive of one another, equally ‘productive’ of one another and totally simultaneous.” By calling it the crowning step, Crowe is indicating his greater appreciation for this idea of relations in the Trinity. Crowe’s great interest in 1995 is in the Trinitarian relations. Looking back, Crowe could even admit that “the potentialities of the psychological triad had one drawback: they kept me from attending sufficiently to the riches of interpersonal relations.”

Crowe acknowledged that he found these riches in Lonergan’s *Divinarum Personarum*, especially chapters five and six. “Even after those chapters came out in print,” Crowe adds, however, “and I was teaching them, I was still for some years a particular fan of the *emanatio intelligibilis* [intelligible emanation].”

When Crowe was teaching the Trinity in the first stage of pneumatology, he was dedicated to explaining Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of intelligible emanations, especially as it applied to the procession of love. When Crowe wrote his 1995 article, his fascination, I surmise, was with the interpersonal relations in the Trinity. Here is how he characterizes the Thomist understanding of relations:

> Divine Utterance is as ‘dependent’ on the divine Word as the divine Word is dependent on the divine Utterance – neither more nor less. The Father-Son relationship, considered as relation, is no more due to the Father’s initiative and activity than it is to the Son’s: it emerges simultaneously and without priority in the two terms.

Crowe speaks, in a loose manner, of the Father-Son relation in the singular, instead of speaking of two mutually opposed relations. The point he wants to make, I think, is this: the Father is

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849 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the *Homoousios,*” *Level of Our Time*, 403.
850 *The Triune God: Systematics*, xx.
851 Ibid.
852 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the *Homoousios,*” *Level of Our Time*, 403.
Father precisely because he brings forth a Son. The Father *is* in so far as he is towards the Son. The Son *is* in so far as he is from the Father. Crowe then speaks in a similar fashion about the Holy Spirit:

Similarly, the relation, considered as a relation, between the Spirit and the spirating Principle is conceived as mutual and simultaneous, without any one-sided initiative attributed to either term: as relation it emerges simultaneously and without priority in both terms at once.\(^{853}\)

Finally, Crowe addresses the Thomistic doctrine of the connection between relations and processions:

Furthermore, the relations ‘emerge’ from the processions, and the processions are intrinsic to the divine being. From that viewpoint there is no first person, no second person, no third person, but all Three are coeternal and coequal, as declared in the *Quicumque*; and all three together offer a new insight into what God is by nature.\(^{854}\)

There are many things that one could comment about in Crowe’s summary of Thomist Trinitarian theology. But the main point is his emphasis and characterization of the terms of the relations as mutually dependent on each other. Crowe finishes this section of his essay with this remark: “we reach the furthest point yet achieved in this trajectory [“established by Augustine, the *Quicumque*, and Thomas Aquinas”\(^{855}\)] with the Thomist doctrine of relations, which are mutual, simultaneous, and without priority on either side.”\(^{856}\)

By the time of his third stage, Crowe sought a psychological analogy that more clearly grounds a doctrine of Trinitarian relations “as mutual and simultaneous, without any one-sided initiative attributed to either term.”\(^{857}\) How can one think, for example, of a way to express that the Son proceeds from the Father, but the Father is also dependent on the Son? In the two

\(^{853}\) Ibid.
\(^{854}\) Ibid.
\(^{855}\) Ibid., 404.
\(^{856}\) Ibid.
\(^{857}\) Ibid., 403.
paths of development, *taken together*, Crowe can depict the dependence of the persons on one another.

*Table 18: Upwards and Downwards Analogies Taken Together*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analogy from Below</th>
<th>Levels of Intentionality</th>
<th>Analogy from Above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holy Spirit</td>
<td>4. Decision/Love</td>
<td>Holy Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word</td>
<td>3. Judgment</td>
<td>Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>2. Understanding</td>
<td>Mystery/Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Experiencing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Towards the end of “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the *Homoousios*,” Frederick Crowe says: “the traditional order of understanding, word, and love follows the upward course, while the order I propose follows the downward course; and since the two are equally part of ordinary life, they serve to support the two ways of thinking of Trinitarian order.”

In the *upward course*, Crowe provides an appropriate phantasm for thinking of the Son, analogous to the third level, as proceeding from the Father who is analogous to the second level. Likewise, the path from below upwards, by placing the Spirit on the fourth level, expresses the truth of the Filioque. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son or through the Son.

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858 Ibid., 411.
In the **downward course**, the Father, as equivalent to the second level, depends on the Son, represented by the Word that is born of Love. In placing the Spirit on the fourth level, Crowe highlights how the spirating Principle, the Father-Son, is simultaneous and dependent with the one Spirated. This is why Crowe says that we can think of the Spirit “oriented to ‘what’ the Spirit loves, with what the Spirit loves being differentiated into the two persons who are Word and Mystery.”

On the way down, the analogy helps to grasp how the Father and Son as one Spirator “depend” on the other relation as well. In short, the vertical analogy between levels is less useful for grasping Aquinas’ doctrine of intellectual emanation, but the two sides of the analogy are more useful, Crowe is proposing, in understanding the richness of the interpersonal relations.

**Conclusion**

Crowe’s desire to provide images for gaining insight into the Holy Spirit as a real relation is similar to one of the problems addressed in the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity’s 1995 clarification: “The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit.” The document deals with the question of whether the Father and Son are eternally characterized in reference to the Spirit. Towards the end of the document, it is said:

This role of the Spirit in the innermost human existence of the Son of God made man derives from an eternal Trinitarian relationship through which the Spirit, in his mystery

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861 “If in the Trinitarian order the Holy Spirit is consecutive to the relation between the Father and the Son, since he takes his origin from the Father as Father of the only Son, it is in the Spirit that this relationship between the Father and the Son itself attains its Trinitarian perfection. Just as the Father is characterized as Father by the Son he generates, so does the Spirit, by taking his origin from the Father, characterize the Father in the manner of the Trinity in relation to the Son and characterizes the Son in the manner of the Trinity in his relation to the Father: in the fullness of the Trinitarian mystery they are Father and Son in the Holy Spirit” (“The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit,” *L'Osservatore Romano*, (Weekly Edition in English 20 September 1995) 3. For a longer discussion of this statement, see Levering, *Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*, 22n53, 117-20, 165-6.
as Gift of Love, characterizes the relation between the Father, as source of love, and his beloved Son.\textsuperscript{862}

I have found no evidence that Crowe had this document in mind in writing his essay. Pope John Paul II seems to have requested the clarification only in June of 1995. Crowe finished a first draft of his essay in December 1994.\textsuperscript{863} What this document of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity shows, however, is that the problem addressed by Crowe in his 1995 essay was in the theological air. Crowe’s interest was not an isolated one.

Crowe brought to that essay all his theological learning, but also his rhetorical skills. He disguises his purposes. In asking us to make the sign of the Cross backward, in providing two sets of concepts, Crowe acts as the teacher. He provides phantasms to promote insights. We have his earlier writings that provide phantasms for intelligible emanations. This pneumatological work opens up “the riches of interpersonal relations.”\textsuperscript{864}

\textsuperscript{862} “The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit,” 3
\textsuperscript{863} See Crowe Archives A-2-2-1, 22 December 1994 Letter, Michael Vertin to Fr. Crowe. Vertin’s letter is in response to having received a copy of Crowe’s article, “Rethinking the Trinity.”
\textsuperscript{864} The Triune God: Systematics, xx.
Chapter Eight – Crowe’s Contribution as a Trinitarian Pneumatologist

At the end of Volume 1 of *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, Yves Congar writes, “By pneumatology, I mean something other than a simple dogmatic theology of the third Person. I also mean something more than, and in this sense different from, a profound analysis of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in individual souls and his sanctifying activity there.” Congar goes on to speak of a “full pneumatology . . . a true pneumatology.” This full pneumatology should “describe the impact, in the context of a vision of the Church, of the fact that the Spirit distributes his gifts as he wills and in this way builds up the Church.” From the first stage of his reflecting on the Holy Spirit, Crowe was convinced of the need for a more robust pneumatology. By the end of the Crowe’s second stage, he explicitly wanted to write the kind of pneumatology that Congar called for. While Crowe never finished that desired work, nevertheless, Crowe sensed many of the same questions and, in his own modest way, wished to speak to them creatively.

Crowe wrote on the Holy Spirit as occasions demanded and his work of promoting the Lonergan apostolate allowed. In all that he has written about the Holy Spirit, however, Frederick Crowe writes as a Trinitarian pneumatologist; he always is working “on the Spirit’s *identity*” and “the essential features of the Spirit’s *work*” in relation to “the Father and the Son.” In fact, this thesis has argued that Crowe’s theology of the Holy Spirit can be organized around three questions: what is the *proprium* of the Holy Spirit? How does the Spirit’s mission relate to the Son’s? Can the eternal ordering of the Three persons be rethought with the Spirit as the first person?

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866 Ibid., 157.
867 Ibid., 156.
The clarity with which these questions were posed is the basis for the distinction of three stages in the development of Crowe’s Trinitarian pneumatology. Following Crowe’s own methodology in *A Theology of the Christian Word*, I looked for the emergence of new questions in Crowe’s thinking. These questions are the operators in the development of Crowe’s thinking on the Holy Spirit. And in each part of this thesis, I traced how Crowe’s three main questions were anticipated in his earlier writings. Once the significant new question emerged and became thematic, I then looked at how Crowe explained what was proper to the Holy Spirit in eternity and in time (Stage 1: 1953-68), how he explained, in light of the primacy of love, the priority of the Holy Spirit’s mission in relation to the Son’s mission (Stage 2: 1969-84), and how the Holy Spirit, as Love, can possibly be thought of as the first person in the immanent Trinity (Stage 3: 1985-2000).

The marking off of three stages with sixteen year periods has been somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, the divisions are rooted in major changes in Crowe’s life. The first stage (1953-68) begins with his return to Canada from Europe to take up his career as a teacher of theology to Jesuit seminarians. In teaching his course on the Trinity, Crowe was profoundly moved by a remark he found in St. Basil of Caesarea’s letters on the need to account for what distinguishes the three divine persons. Within the Trinity, the Holy Spirit alone has the property of proceeding Love. In the economy of salvation, the Holy Spirit brings into the world what he is eternally.

Later on, Crowe was deeply changed by the dramatic events surrounding Pope Paul VI’s encyclical *Humanae Vitae* on 25 July 1968. With Crowe’s 1969 essay on this topic, a new stage in his theology of the Holy Spirit can be identified. The second stage of his pneumatology (1969-84) is heavily marked by his concern for the life of the Church in the post-*Humanae
Vitae and post-Vatican II years. In wrestling with the relationship between the charismatic and institutional aspects of the Church, Crowe came to rethink the order and context of the two divine missions. Unless we find a way to think of the Holy Spirit’s mission as prior, Crowe came to hold, we will always be over-emphasizing the institutional and hierarchical dimensions of the Church at the expense of the Marian, prayerful, charismatic side of the Church. Crowe saw these two sides of the Church as respective prolongations of the mission of the Son and the mission of the Spirit. In other words, by overemphasizing the mission of the Son, the Church tends to think, Crowe maintained, that all the answers for how a Christian should live in the modern world are already “out there” in the ancient revelation of the Son. The Magisterium simply has to tell us what has always been true. But Crowe began to think that questions were emerging for which there may not be an answer already “out there.” Unless we are in love with God, by the gift of the Holy Spirit, Crowe thought, we will not properly discern the signs of the times needed to guide the Church in the modern world. In the second stage, Crowe found in Lonergan a new emphasis on the priority of love and thus of the priority of the mission of the Spirit.

The transition from the second stage to the opening of the third stage is marked by the death of Bernard Lonergan (November 26, 1984). Lonergan was the major theological influence on Crowe’s own theology of the Holy Spirit. With Lonergan’s gradual decline in health, there were no more developments to explore in Lonergan’s thought. In the third stage, Crowe tended to expand on Lonergan’s ideas. He published a series of essays in which he was re-thinking fundamental issues inside and outside of Christianity with the help of Lonergan’s categories. In general, he wanted to test the implications of Lonergan’s ideas. In terms of pneumatology, this expansion of Lonergan’s ideas meant working out the implications for the
psychological analogy of Lonergan’s two ways of human development. In his appropriation of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis with its four levels of consciousness, Crowe articulated how love can have primacy over knowing in the downward development. In the categories of intellect and will, Crowe found it difficult to articulate this primacy of love. Stage three ends with the year 2000.

In the first stage, Crowe was more concerned with the *past*: what did Aquinas and Lonergan say about the Holy Spirit’s personal property? In the second stage, Crowe was more concerned with the *present*: what doctrines from Lonergan does the Church need now in terms of the Holy Spirit’s mission? In the third stage, Crowe’s focus was more on the *future*: what will the Church’s theology need if she were one day ready to define more things about the Holy Spirit?

Fr. Crowe would live until the age of 96, dying April 8, 2012. He continued to publish articles and books well into the third Christian millennium, but there are no new major questions about the Holy Spirit that emerge. And so, we have three stages to Crowe’s Trinitarian pneumatology.

What is one to make of this modest, but provocative Trinitarian pneumatology? In particular, do any of his three questions have lasting value for the Church and her theologians? And is there a unity to these stages and their three questions? Crowe has his own contribution to make. And there is a unity to Crowe’s developing pneumatology: his theory of complacent love.

After treating the root of the development and the unity of Crowe’s three stages in terms of his theory of love (*part I*), this concluding chapter evaluates each of the three stages in terms of their potential lasting value (*part II*). The first section of part II is a discussion of
the importance of Crowe’s doctrine of complacency. Inspired by Francis X. Clooney, S.J.’s recent work on St. Francis de Sales (1567-1622), I situate Crowe’s distinction between complacent/serene love and concerned/restless love within the spiritual tradition of St. Francis de Sales. In the second section, I go on to compare Crowe’s reversal of the divine missions with the Catechism of the Catholic Church’s discussion of the priority of the Spirit’s work. In the third section, I highlight Crowe’s contribution to discussions about the usefulness of the psychological analogy in Trinitarian theology. Finally (part III), I discuss the friendship of two sixteenth century saints and argue that Crowe’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit as eternal complacency, when combined with a doctrine of intersubjective love, could be what is most valuable in his Trinitarian pneumatology.

Dialectic – the Root and Unity of the Three Stages

Stage 1 of Crowe’s pneumatology began with a focus on the eternal life of God and moved more towards a focus on the presence of the Holy Spirit in the world. Crowe thought of the Holy Spirit as an eternal act of complacent love. Later, by 1965, as he witnesses the great changes happening in the Church, he accepted that the Holy Spirit should also be

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869 Clooney compares the notion of loving surrender in a south Indian Hindu theologian Sri Vedanta Desika’s (1268-1369) Essence on the Three Auspicious Mysteries and in Francis de Sales’ Treatise on the Love of God. “It seems,” Clooney writes, “that ‘loving surrender’ serves reasonably well as a key to the Treatise” (Beyond Compare, 24). Clooney, the Parkman Professor of Divinity and Comparative Theology at Harvard Divinity School, speaks of “the Treatise as a classic of spiritual theology that like the Essence focuses in practice on loving surrender to God . . . reinforcing in the reader the disposition to recognize loving surrender as a real possibility” (Ibid., 14).


conceived of as concerned love. Complacent love was described as a serene love, an affective acceptance of what is. Concern is restless, a response to what is not, but could be. Complacent love is the end of a process that begins in the intellect, in which we have harmony with what is. Concerned love is the beginning of a process towards bringing about what is not yet. The Holy Spirit, Crowe maintains by 1965-6, enters our world and brings serenity and restlessness.\textsuperscript{872} Crowe’s concern for the Church and her mission was not totally absent from Stage 1.

In Crowe’s second stage of development, his concern for the life of the Church had an even greater impact on his pneumatology. Stage 2 was dominated by the question of the relation of the mission of the Son and the mission of the Holy Spirit. In order to better understand God’s ways in the world, Crowe adopted Lonergan’s analogy of human lovers who fall in love, declare their love, and consummate their love. These three moments correspond to the mission of the Spirit, the mission of the Son, and the beatific vision of the Father after this life. The Son is sent in the context of the Spirit’s mission. The restless falling in love that we experience by the gift of the Spirit finds its proper counterpart in our response to the mission of Son who declares God’s love to us.

There is, in terms of his theory of love, a kinship between the concerned, restless love of Stage 1 and the falling in love that we experience through the gift of the Holy Spirit. Both concerned love and human falling in love initiate a process of action. The difference is that the concerned love was secondary to complacency. Concerned love is not the initial moment of love. Falling in love, however, is a kind of first. Moreover, the falling in love has an interpersonal aspect. It has someone as its object.

\textsuperscript{872} The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 192-4.
Crowe memorably claimed that Aquinas himself had two different conceptions of love running through his writings that were “never contradicting one another outright but never fully integrated either.” Something similar should be said for Fr. Crowe’s writings about love, but with an important caveat. Crowe had his idea of a proceeding complacent love, serenity. He then got hold of a notion of falling in love that initiates a process of believing and declaring love. Through this analogy of human love, Crowe began to embrace the idea of what he later called intersubjective love. In his second stage, Crowe thus came to have two notions of love that he had not yet tried to integrate.

In stage 3, in the hopes of guiding the Church’s future theology, Crowe has the task of relating the two notions of love: proceeding love and intersubjective love. Crowe finds a place for proceeding love and for intersubjective love in Lonergan’s two paths of human development. In other words, Crowe carries out for his own thinking what he wished Aquinas had done in a slightly different context (the caveat).

Both kinds of love are then used as analogies for the Holy Spirit. As Crowe thought of the Holy Spirit both as complacency and concern in his first stage, so he thought of the Holy Spirit as proceeding Love and interpersonal/intersubjective Love in his third stage. As proceeding Love, the Holy Spirit is conceived of as the third person of the Most Holy Trinity. As interpersonal Love, the Holy Spirit, Crowe suggested, can be thought of as the first person.

The Holy Spirit as proceeding love helps us to understand his origin from the Father and Son. It also helps us to understand how he is God and distinct from the Father and Son. But the Holy Spirit as intersubjective love brings out how the Son and Father are characterized.

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873 Three Thomist Studies, 146.
by their relation to the Holy Spirit in eternity. The Holy Spirit as interpersonal Love, according to Crowe, leads to an analogy for taking more seriously the Holy Spirit as a real relation.

Crowe learned about Aquinas’ idea of complacency from Lonergan. He learned about the analogy of human lovers from Lonergan. He learned about the idea of interpersonal love from Lonergan. Lonergan introduced Crowe to these various ideas of love, but Crowe developed and applied them in new ways to the Holy Spirit.

Lonergan taught Crowe that the Holy Spirit was best understood, even Scripturally, as Love. Lonergan, however, never applied complacency to the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit. Lonergan never explicitly used his idea of falling in love to reverse the order and the context of the two divine missions. Lonergan never tried to use intersubjective love as an analogy for the Holy Spirit. In all three stages, Crowe respectively expanded these Lonergan concepts of love and then applied these ideas of love to the Holy Spirit in ways that went beyond Lonergan. What unites the three stages of Crowe’s developing pneumatology, beyond his concern for the life of the Church, is the fact that his questions are rooted in his theory of human love.

In the first part of this thesis, after discussing Crowe’s interpretation of Aquinas’ *complacentia boni*, I asked the question raised by Michael Sherwin, O.P.’s critique of Crowe:

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874 *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 123, 127-31. The area, therefore, in which one must engage Crowe’s pneumatology is in the adequacy of his theory of love. Professor Michael Vertin, for example, would stress in the classes that I took with him (2012-2014) how people’s theories of knowing influence their philosophy and theology. The editors of a volume of essay in Vertin’s honour called this epistemological issue “the focus of Vertin’s teaching and scholarly career, the central theme and preoccupation that he has called attention to in all his publications; for Vertin is convinced that at the heart of empirical disputes over a broad range of disciplines and issues is the philosophical problem of articulating an adequate theory of knowledge” (John J. Liptay, Jr. and David S. Liptay, eds., *The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007] x). This kind of cognitional analysis is certainly relevant in engaging Crowe’s thought in terms of pneumatology. But possibly more importantly one must evaluate Crowe’s theory of love.
Are the two loves (complacency and concern) really distinct? Crowe thought that they were. Complacent love followed a judgment of existence. Another judgment was required for the act of concern to emerge, a judgment of what could be and was not. Both of those loves ‘proceeded.’ The Holy Spirit relates to the Father and Son as an act of proceeding love relates to the act of understanding and the judgment that is spoken on the basis of the understanding. In stage one, Crowe used this dual conception of love as restful and restless to understand the role of the Holy Spirit in the world. Crowe’s book, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, explained the presence of the Three in the world by means of the characteristics of the Three divine persons according to the psychological analogy.

Crowe’s way of distinguishing complacency and concern as the end of a process and the beginning of a new process maps onto his distinction between proceeding love and interpersonal/intersubjective love. Crowe’s acceptance of the analogy of human lovers with Lonergan’s description of falling in love marks the transition between Crowe’s distinction of two kinds of love in stage 1 and the two kinds of love (proceeding and intersubjective) in stage 3. The falling in love is both the beginning of a process and a kind of interpersonal love with someone as the object of the love. The notion of human falling in love (stage 2) is an anticipation of Crowe’s idea of intersubjective love (stage 3).

In stage three, Crowe clearly distinguishes love as proceeding from love as intersubjective communion. Why was Crowe so open to this distinction? He thinks that he finds it in Lonergan. But Crowe’s interpretation of this distinction is deeply rooted in his earlier distinction between complacent and concerned love.

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876 *Three Thomist Studies*, 134. See Figure 1: Diagram for Understanding the Act of Complacent Love in chapter two and my subsequent discussion.
Crowe’s notion of ‘concerned love’ is not exactly identical with his later notion of intersubjective love. Concerned love was still a love proceeding from a judgment. Intersubjective love is not a proceeding love for Crowe. Yet Crowe has transposed his distinction between two kinds of love from the context of faculty psychology to the context of intentionality analysis.

Evaluational History – Lasting Value of each of Crowe's Questions

Stage 1 (1953-68): Is Complacency an Analogy for the Holy Spirit?

The 23rd Annual Lonergan Workshop was held in honour of Fr. Crowe’s life and work. This 1996 meeting discussed the topic: *The Structure and Rhythms of Love*. The gathering highlighted the lasting importance of Crowe’s article, “Complacency and Concern.” Crowe himself spoke on the subject of complacency.\(^{877}\) He admits that over the past forty years he has moved on to other intellectual interests, but that his work on complacency had left a lasting mark. Thus, Crowe never abandoned his first great idea and the root of his later developments.\(^{878}\)

If *complacentia boni* lies at the root of all Crowe’s reflections on love, and if his reflections on love underlie all his pneumatological developments, then some kind of evaluation of complacency is necessary. If Fr. Crowe is wrong about this kind of love, then the ship of his theological thought was off course from early on. As a ship that begins to be off course at the start ends up far from its intended destination, so a mistake about complacency might explain why so few scholars have found Crowe’s work worthwhile to study. On the


\(^{878}\) Two of the articles that resulted from the meeting dealt closely with Crowe’s interpretation of *complacentia boni*. See Mark Doorley “Resting in Reality,” *Lonergan Workshop*, vol. 13, (1997) 33-55 and Robert M. Doran, S.J., “‘Complacency and Concern’ and a Basic Thesis on Grace,” Ibid., 57-78. According to Lawrence, “David Tracy’s tribute to Fred was a *tour de force* on the idea of love in the history of Western philosophy and theology” (Ibid., iii).
other hand, if Crowe is right about complacency, if he is on to something fundamental in human life and Christian spirituality, then this insight of his might spark more interest in his other writings on the Holy Spirit.

As we discussed in Chapter Two, Crowe’s articles “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of Thomas” illustrated his interpretation of complacency by appealing above all to the notion of abandon in the spiritual classic, Self-Abandonment to Divine Providence. But Crowe also referred to St. Francis de Sales’ Treatise on the Love of God. Crowe claimed that St. Francis de Sales’ famous distinction between affective and effective love was relevant for his own distinction between complacency and concern. “St. Francis de Sales,” Crowe writes, “includes both complacency and desires in affective love, and puts obedience to God’s commands and acceptance of his decrees together under effective love.” Crowe then remarks: “Our division would put desires under concern, acceptance under complacency (a later essay will exploit this more fully).” In other words, Crowe seems to think that there could be affective complacency and affective concern, but also effective complacency and effective concern.

If one wanted to keep St. Francis de Sales’ division and defend Crowe’s division of complacency and concern as more basic, the division of our love for God would look like this:

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880 Three Thomist Studies, 85n28.
882 “Complacency and Concern,” 85n28.
Like Crowe, St. Francis was a Thomist heavily influenced by the Jesuits. He was “educated at the Jesuit college at Clermont (later Lycée Louis-le Grand) in Paris, . . . He lived under Jesuit direction from his school days onward, he made the Spiritual Exercises annually at a private retreat.”

In the Treatise, St. Francis offers a Thomistically inspired account of love that has been nourished by the Ignatian turn towards subjectivity. De Sales’ Treatise on the Love of God, moreover, returns over and over again to the idea of complacent love from different angles.

It is also not an accident that Crowe connected his view of complacency with both St. Francis de Sales and de Caussade. De Caussade had connections with the Visitation nuns, founded by St. Francis de Sales. De Caussade was their chaplain in Nancy from 1728-1731 and from 1733-39. Many of his letters about abandonment to divine providence were written to these nuns. And their own founder’s treatment of this subject in “the whole of book IX” of

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886 De Sales uses the word complaisance or complaysance over 180 times in the Treatise. For some of the crucial references, see Treatise on the Love of God, Book I.IV, I.VII, I.XVI, Book II.XIII-XV, Book V.I-V, V.IX-X, Book VI.I, Book VIII.Introduction, Book IX.VI, Book XII.I.
887 The Study of Spirituality, 417.
the \textit{Treatise} is considered to be foundational for later writers. Although “the spiritual literature on l’abandon is considerable,” Marcel Viller, S.J. adds, St. Francis de Sales “is able to be considered as the doctor of l’abandon.”\textsuperscript{888} And so, it is here in the school of St. Francis de Sales and de Caussade, with their emphasis on complacency and \textit{l’abandon}, that we can best locate Crowe’s own reflections on the notion of complacency. It would take us too far afield to trace St. Francis’ teaching on complacency and compare it with Crowe’s and Aquinas’. Nevertheless, Crowe’s teaching on complacency has a strong tradition behind it.

In short, I find St. Francis de Sales compelling on the distinction \textit{in this life} between complacency and a second moment of love. If there is a distinct act of complacency, and if it is a kind of love, and if the Holy Spirit is to be thought of as love, then \textit{why can this complacent love not be used as an analogy for the Holy Spirit?} Fr. Crowe saw this question more clearly than others. Even if one wants to disagree with an aspect of his account of complacency, the question remains: can such a love help us to understand the distinctive identity of the Holy Spirit?

\textbf{Stage 2 (1969-84): Should We Reverse the Order of the Divine Missions?}

If I am very persuaded by Crowe’s account of complacency, I am slightly less persuaded by his reversal of the order and context of the two divine missions. One of the disappointing aspects of Crowe’s theology in stage 2 is his lack of explicit references to the teachings of the Vatican II and the post-Vatican II Magisterium. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable agreement with some of the main lines of Crowe’s teaching in the second stage of his pneumatology and the teachings of the \textit{Catechism of the Catholic Church}. In the beginning

of its discussion of the article, *I believe in the Holy Spirit*, the *Catechism* quotes two passages from St. Paul:

“No one can say, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except by the Holy Spirit” (1 Corinthians 12:3).

“God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts crying, ‘Abba! Father!’” (Galatians 4:6)

After highlighting these acts of faith, made possible by the Holy Spirit, the *Catechism* remarks:

This knowledge of faith is possible only in the Holy Spirit: to be in touch with Christ, we must first of all been touched by the Holy Spirit. He comes to meet us and kindles faith in us. By virtue of our Baptism, the first sacrament of faith, the Holy Spirit in the Church communicates to us, intimately and personally, the life that originates in the Father and is offered to us in the Son (*CCC* 683).

Like Crowe, the *Catechism* speaks of our being first touched by the Holy Spirit. The mission of the Spirit is somehow prior to our encounter with the Son. The *Catechism* again quoting St. Irenaeus adds:

Baptism gives us the grace of new birth in God the Father, through his Son, in the Holy Spirit. For those who bear God’s Spirit are led to the Word, that is, to the Son, and the Son presents them to the Father, and the Father confers incorruptibility on them. And it is impossible to see God’s Son without the Spirit, and no one can approach the Father without the Son, for the knowledge of the Father is the Son, and the knowledge of God’s Son is obtained through the Holy Spirit.889

Except for the emphasis on Baptism, this passage also reminds one of Crowe’s stress on the priority of the Spirit’s mission in his 1984 address: “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions.” The Spirit is the first divine person bestowed on those being saved, Crowe maintained. If one grants that the fruits of baptism can be given apart from the reception of the sacrament itself, Crowe would endorse the *Catechism*’s teaching. In fact, the *Catechism* has an even stronger statement about the priority of the Spirit in our lives. “Through his grace,”

the *Catechism* writes, “the Holy Spirit is the first to awaken faith in us and to communicate to us the new life, which is ‘to know the Father and the one whom he has sent, Jesus Christ.’”\(^{890}\) This statement does not mention Baptism.

The *Catechism* does not want to disconnect salvation from the truth. God “wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth,” St. Paul writes (1 Timothy 2:4). And thus, the *Catechism* notes, “Salvation is found in the truth. Those who obey the prompting of the Spirit of truth are already on the way to salvation” (CCC 851). The *Catechism* is talking here about the missionary activity of the Church. In other words, those who obey the prompting of the Spirit are, in this reference, those who are not yet baptized. The Church “must go out to meet their desire, so as to bring them the truth” (CCC 851).

While the *Catechism* presents the Holy Spirit as the first one of the divine persons that touches us, the *Catechism* also notes how the Holy Spirit is the last person revealed. The *Catechism* explains how the Holy Spirit has been at work with the Father and Son from the beginning of time. “But in these ‘end times,’ ushered in by the Son’s redeeming Incarnation, the Spirit is revealed and given, recognized and welcomed as a person” (CCC 686). In treating of the events of Pentecost, the *Catechism* says something similar: “when the seven weeks of Easter had come to an end, Christ’s Passover is fulfilled in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, manifested, given, and communicated as a divine person” (CCC 731).

Based on the authority of the *Catechism*, there is strong support for Crowe’s claim at the end of his second stage for a priority of the Holy Spirit’s mission. The *Catechism* will even say: “One cannot believe in Jesus Christ without sharing in his Spirit. It is the Holy Spirit who reveals to men who Jesus is” (CCC 152). As the Father brings forth the Son and together they

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\(^{890}\) CCC 684. Cf. John 17:3.
breathe forth the Holy Spirit, so the Holy Spirit leads us to the Son and together they lead us to the Father.

For many years, Robert Doran enthusiastically endorsed Crowe’s proposal for reversing the divine missions. In his 2012 book, *The Trinity and History*, Doran even said:

Here I follow Frederick E. Crowe’s great paper, “Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions,” which I think should ground the work of Lonergan scholars in systematic theology well into the twenty-first century. If Crowe is right, his thesis changes the parameters of systematic theology in a radical fashion.\(^{891}\)

Doran was talking about the way the mission of the Holy Spirit is thought to be prior to the mission of the Son. But in the past few years Doran has qualified this evaluation.

In 2014, he said, “Crowe has set us on a right path, but more must be said to fill out his basic hunch.”\(^ {892}\) In 2015, Robert Doran, S.J., also wrote:

But, contrary to what I affirmed in earlier Doerr lectures, Frederick Crowe’s influential affirmation of a mission of the Holy Spirit prior to the mission of the Son needs to be further nuanced. If the missions are the processions joined to created external terms, then the order of the missions, whether visible or invisible, must follow the order of the processions. An invisible mission of the Word in the form of the actual grace of insights born of religious love must be acknowledged as a principle of the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit.\(^ {893}\)

Discussing Doran’s position on the invisible mission of the Son is beyond the scope of this thesis, but his suggestions are important. Crowe never was very forthright about Aquinas’ doctrine of the invisible mission of the Son. As we saw in Chapter Four, Lonergan says very little about the invisible mission of the Son. The effects of grace in our souls that have more

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\(^{891}\) Doran, *The Trinity and History*, xi.


regard for the intellect are appropriated to the Son, according to Lonergan.\textsuperscript{894} Lonergan’s brief discussion of this issue is probably why Crowe himself discusses it so briefly.

In his 1989 essay, “Rethinking God-with-us,” Crowe claimed that he was talking “about our inner experience of the Spirit and our outer experience of the Son carried forward in the Body of Christ that is the church.”\textsuperscript{895} Crowe went on to say that this was “a recasting of the very traditional doctrine of the invisible mission of the Spirit, the visible mission of the Son, the non-mission, the non-advent, of the Father. It is a recasting of some aspects of our Trinitarian doctrine.”\textsuperscript{896} Instead of focusing on a pair of visible missions (of Son and Spirit) and a pair of invisible missions (of Son and Spirit), Crowe seems to focus exclusively on the recast invisible mission of the Spirit and the recast visible mission of the Son. Doran has come to think that the order of the missions must always follow the order of the processions. He also is insisting that the two distinct missions of Son and Spirit not be separated from one another.\textsuperscript{897}

But we have to keep in mind that Crowe is trying to articulate that there is a mission of the Holy Spirit whose main effect is prior to acts of faith. In other words, Crowe proposes some kind of proper and non-appropriated, inner mission or gift of the Spirit that does not follow upon an \textit{inner} mission of the Word. It seems to me that what Crowe (with Lonergan too) is trying to transpose Aquinas’ doctrine of the grace of the Holy Spirit as residing in the essence of the soul. That created participation in the divine nature is the gift of God’s love and does not depend on our prior cognitional acts.

\textsuperscript{895} “Rethinking God-with-us,” \textit{Level of Our Time}, 342.
\textsuperscript{896} Ibid., 347.
\textsuperscript{897} Doran insists that “there is never Spirit without Word or Word without Spirit” (\textit{Essays in Systematic Theology 52: The Trinity in History: First Steps Beyond Volume 1}, 23).
Much more work needs to be done on Crowe’s Christology and doctrine of creation. If Crowe’s valuable position on reversing the missions failed to answer all the relevant questions, his writings after 1985 also suffer from a lack of precision.

Stage 3 (1985-2000): Crowe’s Use of the Psychological Analogy

D. Juvenal Merriell has pointed out the often overlooked, but central, place concern for the Holy Spirit has in the whole of Augustine’s *De Trinitate*. The question of how the Holy Spirit is to be distinguished within the Trinity is one of the two central questions of the book. Something similar can be said, *mutatis mutandis*, about the focus of Frederick Crowe’s 1995 essay: “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the *Homoousios*.” One of the special problems of that essay is “how to conceive” the real relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son “in the inner life of God.” In asking about whether there can be two complementary orderings of the divine persons, Father-Son-Spirit and Spirit-Son-Father, Crowe is largely seeking a way to better understand how the Holy Spirit is both truly God and a relation within the Trinity.

His answer was to think of the Holy Spirit both as proceeding Love and intersubjective or interpersonal Love. The analogy of proceeding love on the way up slightly modifies the more traditional Augustinian analogy as interpreted by Aquinas and Lonergan. The analogy on the way down, with intersubjective love being the analogue for the Holy Spirit as the first

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898 D. Juvenal Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas’ Teaching* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990) 18-35. For a list of others who have considered the centrality of the Holy Spirit in Augustine’s work, see Ibid., 19-20n19. Fr. Merriell, for example, writes, “It is better to see books 5 to 7 as a stage in the movement of the *De Trinitate*, a stage in which Augustine begins to shift his attention from the first problem of the equality of the three Persons to the second problem about the procession of the Holy Spirit” (Ibid., 22).

899 After speaking of the problem of how the three work inseparably, but only one of the divine persons is said to do certain things, Augustine writes, “Another puzzle is in what manner the Holy Spirit is in the three, being begotten neither by the Father nor Son nor both of them, while being the Spirit of the Father and the Son” (Hill, *The Trinity*, I.2.8; CCL 50:36-37).

900 “Rethinking the Trinity: Taking Seriously the *Homoousios*,” *Lonergan and the Level of Our Times*, 408.
person, though inspired by Lonergan’s later thought, was Crowe’s own invention. What is true of Crowe’s 1995 essay is also true of his entire Trinitarian pneumatology. He was carrying on, in his own small way, the Augustinian project. Like St. Augustine in the *De Trinitate*, Crowe sought to understand what distinguishes the Holy Spirit from the Son by means of an analogy of love. But in his search, Crowe explicitly located this question of the proprium of the Spirit in relation to Basil, not Augustine.

The third stage of his Trinitarian pneumatology shows that Fr. Crowe never gave up on the psychological analogy. In the late 1940’s, Fr. Lonergan wrote the following about the psychological analogy:

. . . As long as our concepts are in development, the psychological analogy commands the situation. But once our concepts reach their term, the analogy is transcended and we are confronted with the mystery. In other words, the psychological analogy truly gives a deeper insight into what God is. Still, that insight stands upon analogy; it does not penetrate to the very core, the essence of God, in which alone trinitarian doctrine can be contemplated with in its full intelligibility; grasping properly *quid est Deus* is the beatific vision. . . . the theologian . . . under the direction of divine revelation really operates in virtue of and towards an understanding that he personally in this life cannot possess.

Hence it is that the psychological analogy enables one to argue that there are two and only two processions in God, that the first is ‘per modum intelligibilis actionis’ [through the mode of intelligible action] and a natural generation; that the second is ‘per modum amoris’ [through the mode of love] and not a generation; that there are four real relations in God and three of them really distinct; that the names *verbum* and *imago* [word and image] are proper to the Son, while the names *amor* and *donum* [love and gift] are proper to the Holy Spirit. But do not think that Aquinas allows the psychological analogy to take the place of the divine essence as the one sufficient principle of explanation. The psychological analogy is just the side door through which we enter for an imperfect look.

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Lonergan wrote these words before he taught his famous classes in Rome on the Trinity. But they were written at precisely the time when Crowe was Lonergan’s student in Toronto (1947-50). Crowe, in other words, never lost the mark that this presentation of the psychological analogy left on him. All his work on the psychological analogy is building on Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology.

The young Crowe was also deeply influenced by Lonergan’s interpretation of the hypothetical nature of theological understanding in theology.903 “Thomist trinitarian theory,” Lonergan writes, “on its own showing, is no more than a hypothesis which does not attempt to exclude the possibility of alternatives.”904 Fr. Crowe has the following to say about the hypothesis of the psychological analogy:

A word now on the ‘hypothetical’ and ‘deductive’ nature of our procedures. We are saying that, if God is rational in the way described, then it will follow that there are two processions in the interior of the deity, which result in opposed relations, which relations constitute persons; and we acknowledge that the consequence is not a true ‘deduction’. This may seem to leave the whole process up in the air. But remember that the psychological analogy is not a mere hypothesis; it has a solid basis in itself as the term of the via analytica [the way of analysis]. It is only as starting point of the treatise that its validity is hypothetical, and this hypothetical element diminishes with the success of the hypothesis in giving a coherent view of the Trinity, in emerging over rival analogies as the most intelligible, the most far-reaching, the most faithful to the data of revelation, etc. And remember with regard to the ‘make-believe’ character of the deduction that we are simply ordering our ideas, not ordering realities in God; our ideas of relations can follow from our idea of processions, but in God relations do not follow from anything, they are eternal, subsistent, and identical with the divine essence.905

904 Verbum, 218. Cf. ST, I, q. 32, a. 1, ad. 2. But in “Assertion 1” of The Triune God: Systematics, Lonergan argues, “that there does not seem to be another analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession” (14ff).
905 The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 142. Emphasis is in the original.
On the one hand, the psychological analogy was always a hypothesis for Crowe. On the other hand, its success in explaining the Trinity makes it more and more probable in his mind. Crowe never abandoned either of these ideas.

What distinguishes the processions, the “interior coming forths” of the Son and the Spirit? Why is the Holy Spirit’s procession not a generation? We know, by faith, that the Spirit is not a Son. But “to disclose the faith to our minds,” Gilles Emery writes,

it is precisely such an analogy that Thomas is looking for, so that we can grasp something of the content of the profession of faith, by putting it in the light of the knowledge of something whose object is proportioned to what we can know through our own human experience.\footnote{Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 97.}

Emery’s language of ‘an object proportioned to what we can know’ reminds one of Lonergan and Crowe’s way of speaking. Emery speaks about the psychological analogy enabling us to grasp something of the content of our faith. Crowe would certainly agree. In Crowe’s later analogy on the way up, he still has a basis for distinguishing the procession of the Son from the procession of the Holy Spirit. The Son proceeds as a word of truth. The Holy Spirit proceeds according to the mode of love.

In his third stage of his Trinitarian pneumatology, Crowe proposed various modified hypotheses about the Trinity. The most innovative was his attempt to use an analogy from above downwards. Crowe used interpersonal/intersubjective love as an analogy for the Holy Spirit as the first person in a new ordering of the Trinity in order to help us better understand the way in which the Holy Spirit eternally characterizes the Father and the Son.

\footnote{Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 97.}
\footnote{Gilles Emery, Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 222n13. Cf. Lonergan’s commentary (“Chapter 1,” CWL 12, 10-19) on the teaching of Vatican I’s Dei Filius about the nature of theological understanding: “Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God’s help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end” (DB 1796, DS 3016).}
Despite all the criticisms of Aquinas and Augustine and the psychological analogy, Crowe never abandoned some version of it. At the end of his third stage, Crowe has analogies on the way up and analogies on the way down, but they are all psychological analogies. They start in some way with what is closest to us. Through what we have some experience of within ourselves, we understand something analogously of the inner life of God.

And his fundamental confidence in the validity of the psychological analogy, I maintain, is the most valuable aspect of Crowe’s final stage. He helps to keep alive the question of the psychological analogy in the Church’s theology. In the freshness with which he proposes analogies, he holds up the whole question before theologians. There is more to be explored, he is telling us, but we have to be creative. One does not need to agree completely with his approach or his way of explaining real relations in God to appreciate his interest in the psychological analogy. Fr. Crowe was convinced that a psychological analogy helped to disclose why there are three persons in God, what distinguishes them, and how they relate.

A Final Word

High above the tomb of St. Ignatius of Loyola in Rome is a massive sculpture of the Holy Trinity. Fr. Crowe would have visited this tomb in the church of the Gesù during his student days in Rome (1950-2) and on subsequent visits to the Eternal City. As a Jesuit, Fr.

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Crowe wanted to find God in all things. But God is Triune, and Fr. Crowe’s special concern was to find the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in all things.

Not far from the Gesù is the Chiesa Nuova, the church that contains the relics of St. Philip Neri. St. Philip and St. Ignatius, though vastly different in background, age, and temperament, became friends in mid sixteenth-century Rome. St. Ignatius reportedly called St. Philip the bell of the Society. Like the bell of a church, St. Philip called men to enter the Society of Jesus, but did not enter into the Society himself.\footnote{911} Some of the early sons of St. Philip and the sons of St. Ignatius were also close friends of one another.\footnote{912} As a Toronto Oratorian and a son of St. Philip, it has been a great privilege to carry on this tradition and to enter into the world of the Canadian Jesuit theologian, Fr. Crowe, the son of St. Ignatius.

But there is also a particular attraction for an Oratorian to study Fr. Crowe’s Trinitarian pneumatology. St. Philip is especially famous for his unique experience of the Holy Spirit on the Vigil of Pentecost 1544 in the Catacombs of San Sebastiano in Rome. When he was twenty-nine years old, he was praying as he was accustomed to for the gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit when the Holy Spirit appeared to him as a globe of fire.\footnote{913} According to reports by those few people with whom Philip shared this secret, the globe entered his mouth and lodged in his breast. From that day forward, miraculous palpitations of St. Philip’s heart began to occur during intense times of prayer. Even in winter, St. Philip did not need to wear heavy coats, on account of the great heat he felt in his body. After his death, the autopsies showed that two of


\footnote{912} St. Philip’s greatest disciple, the Church historian, Cesare Baronius, was one of St. Robert Bellarmine, S.J.’s closest friends and was intimately connected with the work of the Jesuits (James Broderick, S.J., \textit{Robert Bellarmine: Saint and Scholar} [Westminster: Newman Press, 1961] 177-80, 417).

his ribs had been broken and formed a kind of dome over his heart area. Doctors, at the time, claimed that this was to allow his heart to expand during his intense palpitations without his being killed. As the heart is the great symbol of love, Oratorians have called this mystical phenomenon, “the Stigmata of the Holy Spirit.”

The French Oratorian and theologian, Louis Bouyer, claims “that what first attracted people to Philip was the manifest presence of the Holy Spirit in his soul.” At the beginning of his book, Bouyer describes a day in the life of St. Philip. At the end of the day, all his spiritual children have gone home. “Philip remains alone and the Holy Spirit, who has been his constant companion all through the day, takes possession of him in tranquility.”


But how can one begin to understand our communion with the Holy Spirit? Throughout his writings, Fr. Crowe tried to shed light on this question in each of his three stages. There is thus

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914 See de Sales, Treatise on the Love of God, VI LXV and La Vita di San Filippo Neri, 27n58.
915 Stigmata, the nominative plural form of the neuter noun, stigma, stigmatic, can be used as an indefinite plural.
917 The Roman Socrates, 12.
a natural affinity between a pneumatologist like Fr. Frederick Crowe and the sons of St. Philip Neri.

My own view is that Crowe could have combined his idea of complacency with his notion of intersubjective love, the love in which the other is a ‘You.’ Crowe could then have thought of the Holy Spirit, not just as the loving acceptance of what is, but as the loving acceptance of the other, another person. In this way, the Holy Spirit would be the loving acceptance of the Son in the Father. He would be the loving acceptance of the Father in the Son. In the Holy Spirit, in the unity of this Loving Acceptance, the Father and Son are one. As the Father’s voice said at the waters of the Jordan: “You are my Son, the beloved; in you I have complacency within myself [in te complacui mihi” [Luke 3:22].\(^{921}\)

There exists in human beings this loving acceptance of other people. Think of St. Ignatius and St. Philip. Such complacent love can be experienced especially with people who are different from us and with whom we are not looking forward to spending time. One can pray to the Holy Spirit in those moments.\(^ {922}\) The subsequent effect within may be the sudden loving acceptance of this other person as he or she is. As Frederick Crowe once wrote: “His Spirit is in us, then, as proceeding from the Father and Son; he is in us in a way the Father and Son are not. And this presence corresponds to his eternal character in heaven, where he is Amor.”\(^ {923}\)

The Holy Spirit brings into our troubled hearts what he eternally is: restful, accepting love of the other. As Gilles Emery has written, “The Holy Spirit manifests himself in the communion of love that is poured out when he dwells in the heart of believers. Through what


\(^{922}\) On praying to the Holy Spirit, see CCC 2670-72.

\(^{923}\) Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, 172. Emphasis is in the original.
he does, the Holy Spirit reveals who he is.”924 As Brian Daley has written, the “work of the Spirit, this manifestation of divine love, is not simply something superadded to his existence as a distinct person within the life of God; it is a living out, in temporal, created terms, of what the Holy Spirit is as a divine person.”925 Having this Love within us was Christ’s final request at the Last Supper: “that the love with which thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them” (John 17:26).

“Veni, Creator Spiritus, . . . in our hearts take up Thy Rest.”926

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926 The first two lines of the hymn, “Veni Creator Spiritus,” Liturgia Horarum, Pentecost, Vespers I.
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