CITIZENS OF THE WORLD:
GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CANADIAN
HIGHER EDUCATION

by

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Abstract

This thesis argues that there is a contradiction between the theoretical foundations of Global Citizenship (GC)—a philosophy promoting a universal conception of citizenship and a duty to ameliorate global inequality—and its implementation by Canadian higher education institutions (HEIs). Canadian HEIs are presently “internationalizing”: attracting international students and faculty, partnering with HEIs and businesses around the world, and building international campuses. The teaching of GC is often considered one aspect of this process, and is growing increasingly popular. This thesis provides a conceptual clarification of GC by tracing its roots to the cosmopolitanism of Kant and Greek and Roman philosophers, and analyzes the internationalization activities of Canadian HEIs from this vantage point. It shows that at least some Canadian HEIs are employing business practices that are at odds with GC. Proponents of GC must confront these contradictions if they hope to fulfill the ethical promise of the philosophy.
Acknowledgements

This thesis was inspired by my engagement with educational theory and philosophy while completing my MA at OISE, and my professional work as a college instructor teaching Global Citizenship. While my academic and working lives comingled and sparked the idea for this project, I would never have been able to finish without the invaluable help and support of the following persons, to whom I owe immense gratitude.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis will argue that there is a fundamental contradiction between the philosophical foundations of Global Citizenship (GC) or Global Citizenship Education (GCE)—a philosophy promoting a universal conception of citizenship encompassing individuals of all nations—and its implementation by Canadian higher education institutions (HEIs).\(^1\)

Canadian HEIs are presently “internationalizing”: attracting international students and faculty to their domestic campuses, partnering with HEIs and businesses around the world, and building international campuses. The teaching of GC is often considered one aspect of the internationalization process. In fact, GC is often used as the philosophical justification for internationalization and it is growing increasingly popular. However, this study will show that some Canadian HEIs active in internationalization are employing business practices that are far from the spirit of GC. Furthermore, some HEI business plans and other similar documents suggest that the recent commitment to GC is at least in part a marketing strategy. Colleges and universities promoting GC on the one hand, while engaged in potentially exploitative forms of internationalization on the other, appear to be in an ethically difficult position. Proponents of GC must acknowledge and address this contradiction if they hope to fulfill the ethical promise of the philosophy.

**Background and Context**

I have been leading a double life for the past several years. On the one hand, I am an adjunct instructor at a community college. On the other, until the completion of this thesis, I was a Master’s student at the University of Toronto’s OISE (Ontario Institute for the Study of Education). Much of the inspiration for this thesis comes from my joint

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\(^1\) Global Citizenship is also sometimes called World Citizenship or Cosmopolitan Citizenship.
experience as a teacher and student, and the sense this has given me of the current climate in Canadian HEIs.

Unfortunately, I do feel as if I lead a double-life, with all the negative connotations that go with this phrase. Although I have been teaching for over 10 years, I still operate in the uncertain world of contract teaching, exemplified by the term “adjunct” faculty. HEIs are increasingly reliant on this temporary and/or part-time employment. The percent of temporary faculty in Canadian universities increased from 15.5% in 1999 to 31.7% in 2005; in colleges, the figure went from 21.0% to 24.9%. Similarly, part-time employment increased from 8.7% of university educators to 17.5%, and from 21.4% of college educators to 26.4%. A 2008 Ontario report acknowledged that more than half of college employees in the province were part-time by that year. In the United States, the figures are even more dramatic: part-time or adjunct faculty make up 47% of all university faculty and 70% of all community college instructors.

The difficulties of adjunct teaching are well-documented. Pay for full-time work, albeit without full-time status, is often less than $30,000 per year. In many cases, wages are based on class-time contact hours, unlike the situation for full-timers, who are also paid for preparation time. Some instructors travel from campus to campus and city to city to cultivate a living wage. Usually, there are neither benefits nor pension, nor even

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an office. Others note that academic freedom is at risk as the ranks of temporary and part-time faculty increase. My insecure status means that I cannot be as frank in this thesis as I would otherwise be and that I will be excluding some material.

I have grown accustomed to most of these aspects of adjunct existence. Like many other adjuncts, I love my job. However, recent developments have been more difficult to square with my principles and with what I teach to my students. I am now teaching a new course in GC, which in itself is rewarding and exciting. While there are many definitions of GC, the one formerly highlighted on the college’s website is a good starting point:

[Global Citizenship] presents a foundational, unique and critical look at the roots and impact of inequality and discrimination related to issues of social justice (e.g., politics, economics, religion, technology, energy and environment). Learners explore personal and social responsibility in their personal lives, in their communities and in their global and local work environments. Critical analysis of ideas and examination of the core concepts (identity, inequality and equity, social analysis, social action and reflective practice) will assist learners to develop communication, social action and conflict resolution skills.

GC appears to be a very broad concept, focusing on various forms of inequality, critical thinking, and the encouragement of political activism.

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7 I will, for example, refer to the HEI where I have taught GC as “Canadian College.” The identity of other Canadian HEIs will also be concealed when I feel it is necessary, and I will avoid citing Internet urls that reveal their names.


Elsewhere, the college declares its desire to “conduct socially just and equitable innovative research on global citizenship and social justice as well as serve as a catalyst for action by faculty, students and staff.”¹⁰ This suggests that the college is pursuing GC, not merely as another curricular addition, but as an overarching moral commitment. This sense is further conveyed in the mandate of the college’s newly created institute:

The College commitment is to create a leading edge [institute] that will position the College as an internationally recognized leader in education that places a strong emphasis on global citizenship, social justice and equity. The institute will bring together research and activities related to global citizenship and social justice education at the College. It will provide leadership in facilitating engagement by faculty, students and staff. The Institute will move the College community from a philosophical approach to global citizenship to social action.¹¹

Thus, GC is to inform and inspire all aspects of this college’s academic and administrative mission for faculty, students, and staff alike.

What could be better for a left-leaning, philosophically inclined individual than to be teaching about social justice and equality for an employer dedicated to social change? However, as this thesis will demonstrate, all is not as it seems. At the same time that this college was getting its new course off the ground and opening its centre dedicated to GC, Ontario’s College Employer Council, the bargaining agent for the province’s 24 community colleges, was involved in a nasty battle at the Ontario Labour Relations Board.¹² The issue pertained to the uncounted ballots of a January 2009 unionization vote, still unresolved as of July 2012.

¹² The College Employer Council is composed of the president of each college and the chair of each college’s Board of Governors.
Ontario’s part-time college employees were, for many years, explicitly denied the right to unionize under the *Colleges Collective Bargaining Act (CCBA)*, in seeming violation of numerous international treaties to which Canada is party. Article 23 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, states that “[e]veryone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” The main body responsible for establishing and overseeing labour rights around the world is the International Labour Organization (ILO), an agency of the United Nations. The ILO considers eight of its conventions—those dealing with forced and child labour, discrimination, and the right to organize—the core of these standards. The core conventions dealing with the right to organize are the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87, 1948) and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98, 1949).

Convention 87, which Canada ratified in 1972, pertains to the protection of unionization activities from state interference, and declares:

workers and employees, without any distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.

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13 See Schedule I of the version of the Act in effect prior to the 2008 revisions: *Colleges Collective Bargaining Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. 15, http://www.search.e-laws.gov.on.ca/en/isyquery/a8c02559-36a6-4bbb-b0e6-62911ffe68f8/6/doc/?search=browsePIT&context=#BK103. The prohibition on part-timer unionization dates back to 1975, when it was not uncommon to restrict bargaining units to full-time employees because part-time work was relatively rare.


Convention 98 pertains to the protection of unionization activities from employer interference, and states, “Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of interference by each other or each other’s agents or members in their establishment, functioning, or administration.”\(^\text{17}\) While Canada and 22 other countries have failed to ratify Convention 98, the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work states that all member nations are obliged to respect the rights protected by its core conventions, regardless of whether they have ratified those agreements.\(^\text{18}\) Canada is therefore bound to respect the right to organize.

In June 2005, the National Union of Public and General Employees, acting on behalf of the Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union (OPSEU), filed a complaint with the ILO that the prohibition against part-time employee unionization under Ontario’s CCBA was a violation of Conventions 87 and 98.\(^\text{19}\) In November 2006, the Canadian government submitted a wordy and sometimes patronizing response to the ILO in an attempt to justify this prohibition.\(^\text{20}\) Ontario’s colleges play a “complex and diverse role” in the province, it was argued. They provide “state-of-the art knowledge and skills” for graduates seeking employment in “complex and rapidly changing workplaces.” In order

\(^{17}\) ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, C98, July 1, 1949, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C098. The other countries that haven’t ratified Convention 98 are Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, China, India, Iran, Korea, Lao, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Thailand, Tuvalu, the UAE, the United States, and Vietnam. The situation regarding forced labour is even more embarrassing, as Canada is one of only 14 countries that have failed to ratify Convention 105, the Abolition of Forced Labour. See International Labour Office, 310th Session, “Review of annual reports under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,” March 2011, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_152684.pdf.


\(^{20}\) The Canadian government, as the signatory of the treaties, submitted the Ontario government’s response.
to address “the immediate, and frequently changing, needs of employers and workforce,” colleges must be able to attract “unique or scarce expertise that is in high demand in the private sector.” Apparently, the government knows that individuals with this expertise “are unwilling or reluctant to accept college employment if they are required to or could potentially become part of a bargaining unit.” Therefore, were unionization to be permitted, the colleges would no longer be able to attract the employees they require.

The ILO gives short shrift to this attempted rationalization. In relatively stern language, the ILO states, “all workers, without distinction whatsoever, with the sole possible exception of police and armed forces, should have the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing to further and defend the interests of their members.” Furthermore,

While the particular circumstances of the part-time employees concerned here may call for differentiated treatment and adjustments as regards the definition of bargaining units, . . . the Committee fails to see any reason why the principles above on the basic rights of association and collective bargaining afforded to all workers should not also apply to part-time employees. The Committee therefore requests the Government rapidly to take legislative measures, in consultation with the social partners, to ensure that academic and support part-time staff in colleges of applied arts and technology fully enjoy the rights to organize and to bargain collectively, as any other workers.

The ILO also requested that the government inform it of further developments.

Like other UN bodies, the ILO has no real power of enforcement, even though its conventions are understood as legally binding international treaties. Rather, it exercises moral suasion through meetings, annual progress reports on the fundamental conventions,

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22 Ibid., para. 360.
23 Ibid., para. 362.
and the like. But in June 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the right to bargain collectively was protected under the freedom of association clause of Canada’s *Charter of Rights and Freedoms.*\(^{25}\) In making its decision, the Court cited Canada’s ratification of ILO Convention No. 87 as evidence that the *Charter* should be interpreted to extend to the right to organize collectively.\(^{26}\) The Court declared:

> [I]nternational conventions to which Canada is a party recognize the right of the members of unions to engage in collective bargaining, as part of the protection for freedom of association. It is reasonable to infer that s. 2(d) of the *Charter* should be interpreted as recognizing at least the same level of protection.\(^{27}\)

Although the court considered many factors in its decision, the ILO treaties clearly played a role.

In the face of this now considerable pressure, in 2008 the Ontario government amended the *CCBA* to remove the prohibition on unionization for part-time college workers. OPSEU had been active in the colleges for some time, asking individuals to sign membership cards and letting it be known that a unionization vote was pending. The union was required to obtain a membership equal to 35% of the bargaining unit, as per the *CCBA*. During this period, OPSEU alleges that the colleges engaged in anti-union activity ranging from writing letters discouraging unionization, to banning posters on college property, to telling employees that unionization would lead to program cuts.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{26}\) Ibid., paras. 71, 75-77.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., para. 79.

On January 6, 2009, the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) ordered that a certification vote take place. The union contends that it had 5,000 union cards signed out of 9,000 total part-time faculty. In the days prior to the vote, the College Employer Council posted links to the website LabourWatch, an anti-union organization. The Council also issued communiqués cautioning potential voters that a collective agreement, “generally reduces the level of flexibility an employer has to fashion terms of employment to meet the specific needs of an individual employee or its operations.” The communiqués also warned employees that union dues would be approximately $100 per semester and attempted to malign the union by describing how its members fought against the hiring of more contract faculty. The Council does not acknowledge that the obvious intent of the CCBA, prior to its amendment, was to permit the colleges to replace all full-time unionized employees with part-time or contract non-unionized employees.

In January and February 2009, the part-time faculty of Ontario’s colleges cast ballots in a unionization vote. Immediately following the vote, the College Employer Council initiated a lengthy appeal process at the OLRB, arguing that OPSEU had failed to sign up the required 35% of the bargaining unit prior to the vote. If the employer makes such a challenge, it must provide its own list of the employees it believes to be eligible.

30 Ibid.
31 LabourWatch contends that it is “pro-employee” rather than anti-union. But in one of its documents, it declares that the only things that a union can guarantee are: union dues; strikes; and, “the application of the union’s rules to you as a member–to discipline you or terminate your membership which may require, in some provinces, your employer to fire you.” See Labourwatch, “Frequently Asked Questions: Ontario, All Non-Construction Industries,” http://www.labourwatch.com/forms/faq-en-nc-on.pdf.
According to media reports, the Board and the College Employer Council were going over the union’s list of members one name at a time.\textsuperscript{35}

The National Union of Public and General Employees (NUPGE), the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) and other union organizations consequently filed a second complaint with the ILO. The unions allege that the employer had “flooded” its list of eligible employees with individuals who were clearly not eligible for unionization, in an effort to make the potential bargaining unit larger (and the number of memberships signed smaller as a percentage), resulting in a deliberately lengthy litigation.\textsuperscript{36} The union argues that the legislation, nominally drafted to permit unionization, contains loopholes that ultimately take the right away. The government has declined to address the allegation, reasoning that it would be inappropriate to do so while the matter is still before the OLRB.\textsuperscript{37}

The ILO responded, again instructing the government to take action. The ILO stresses that it “regrets . . . that the Government provides no observations on the complainant’s allegations that mediation and costly litigation at the OLRB can take months or even years. . . .”\textsuperscript{38} Further, the ILO comments that the allegations, if they are true, may indeed hinder the collective bargaining rights of the workers in question, [therefore] the Committee requests the Government to initiate consultations with the union concerned with the view to address the concerns raised by the complainant organization.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[37] Ibid., para. 40.
\item[38] Ibid., para. 42.
\item[39] Ibid.
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The ILO also requested that the government inform it of the outcome of such a 
discussion, and of any decision taken by the OLRB. In yet another warning issued in 
November 2011, the ILO tersely comments that “it expects that the ongoing dispute will 
be resolved by the OLRB without delay.” As of July 2012, the ballots cast more than 
three years ago remain uncounted.

This lengthy account of the unionization of part-time college instructors has, on the 
surface, taken me considerable distance from my thesis that GC is in conflict with the 
internationalization agendas of Canada’s HEIs. However, my digression is in reality a 
microcosm of that thesis. The ILO and its various treaties are an attempt—however 
flawed—at GC. In fact, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
probably the centrepiece accomplishment of cosmopolitanism, the true philosophical 
origin of GC. As I mentioned above, while this unionization struggle was taking place, 
numerous Canadian HEIs were expressing interest in GC and establishing GC programs. 
I was teaching a GC course with a textbook proclaiming the importance of thinking 
critically, questioning inequality, and taking social action in various forms, including 
unionization. One of the readings emphasized the centrality of values such as 
congruence to citizenship: “To achieve true congruence in your life, what you think, say, 
and do must be in alignment.” If values and actions do not align, the text continues, 
“we experience internal conflict, as well as conflict within our relationships and external 
world.” Similar sentiments are being echoed by HEIs across Ontario and Canada, as

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40 ILO, 362nd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, November 2011, para. 44, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--- 
41 Kateri M. Drexler and Gwen Garcelon, “Self-Awareness and Active Citizenship,” in Strategies for Active 
42 Ibid.
many are touting the virtues of GC. But it is not congruent to teach GC and a commitment to social justice around the world on one hand, and to show contempt for the ILO and prevent teachers from unionizing on the other. Nor is it congruent to teach GC while partnering with unapproved institutions, some of which have even been accused of fraud, bribery, and selling degrees, all activities that I have uncovered and will reveal later in this thesis. The behaviour of HEIs is of a piece; the philosophy of GC must either infiltrate institutions at all levels and in all of their activities, or internal and external conflict will result. As Socrates argued, in a much earlier defence of congruence, “injustice . . . produces factions, hatreds, and quarrels.”  

Questionable internationalization activities have resulted in scandal in several countries. In particular, international enrolment in Australia declined significantly when it was revealed that unscrupulous HEIs had encouraged international students to take out loans for worthless credentials. Canadian HEIs must address the disjuncture between their stated beliefs and their actual practices if they are serious about their commitment to GC.

**Chapter Outline**

As I noted above, this thesis will argue that there is a fundamental contradiction between the theoretical foundations of GC, which an increasing number of Canadian HEIs are promoting, and some of the internationalization activities of these HEIs. In order to make this argument, I must engage in both a philosophical and an empirical examination: an examination of the ideals of GC on the one hand, and the behaviour of HEIs on the other. My perspective in this thesis, first and foremost, is as a critic of hypocrisy. But I am also

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ultimately a defender of GC, although I will argue that the philosophy requires considerable conceptual clarification and is not without its weaknesses. In the first and second chapters, I will summarize and analyze the main philosophical premises of GC, in the process providing that conceptual clarification. The first of these chapters will address the philosophical history of GC, while the second will address contemporary developments. Although the concept of GC per se is relatively new, it is best understood as a contemporary manifestation of the older tradition of cosmopolitanism, with roots in the Greek and Roman Cynics and Stoics, and Kant. Both GC and historical cosmopolitanism are grounded in a universal respect for the shared humanity of all persons and some form of active citizenship transcending national boundaries. Contemporary cosmopolitanism has added a richer understanding of global justice, incorporating a duty to work for the diminishment of global inequality, particularly when that inequality is benefitting us in some way. Both cosmopolitanism and GC argue that individuals must look beyond the boundaries of their own nation states and understand themselves as citizens of the world with corresponding moral and political responsibilities. Many advocates are also dedicated to the strengthening of international bodies such as the United Nations.

The third chapter of this thesis marks its turn to the empirical, as I will explore the internationalization of higher education with a particular focus on the Canadian situation. GC represents the demanding moral side of internationalization. However, the actual behaviour of HEIs as they undergo internationalization must also be investigated. I will spend considerable time analyzing Jane Knight’s widely cited and deliberately “motive neutral” definition of internationalization. I will also address the tendency of academics
in the field to distance internationalization from globalization, and to more or less
unquestioningly endorse the former. In the process, I will present statistics on the
internationalization activities of Canadian HEIs, revealing their uneven commitment to
the various aspects of internationalization. In general, there is far more interest in
recruiting international students and partnering with foreign HEIs in business ventures
abroad than there is in teaching GC or becoming true global citizens, despite rhetoric
declaring that GC is one of the drivers of internationalization.

The third chapter also explores government reports and HEI business documents
promoting internationalization. Most scholars are, understandably, not interested in
exploring this relatively mundane literature. In the banal world of HEI business plans,
strategies, and press releases, I have discovered frank analyses of their international
activities, completely stripped of the niceties of GC and social justice. These documents
demonstrate that HEIs and governments are cooperating to advance goals that have more
to do with revenue, economic growth, and international status for both the country and
the involved institutions. What is perhaps most discouraging is the suggestion that GC is
being pursued as a marketing strategy, a “branding” exercise for Canada and its HEIs.

Having thus clarified the baser motives for internationalization, I conclude the chapter
with examples of questionable overseas partnerships formed by some Canadian HEIs.

The fourth and final chapter of the thesis contains my detailed analysis of the
contradictions between the philosophical ideals of GC/cosmopolitanism and the
internationalization activities of Canadian HEIs. This reflects my attempt to synthesize
the philosophical and empirical components of this thesis, and to show that
cosmopolitanism is a living philosophy capable of furnishing illuminating criticisms of a
contemporary issue. I will argue that internationalization in its current form is violating three core principles of cosmopolitanism and GC: the principle that there is a moral code operating above the laws of nations; the principle of fundamental respect for persons; and the principle that we have a duty to address international inequalities from which we benefit. I will suggest that the contradiction between these philosophical principles and the actual behaviour of HEIs poses a grave threat to the GC project to which many educators, including myself, are genuinely committed.

Although the situation I am outlining is quite dire, in my conclusion I will argue that there are still some reasons to be hopeful about the GC project. My classroom experience has revealed that students are receptive to the principles of GC and cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, the internationalization of higher education does have, despite its negative aspects, the potential to forge transnational communities of students committed to a cosmopolitan understanding of citizenship, justice, and equality. However, Canadian HEIs must confront their more cynical business activities if GC and cosmopolitanism are to stand any chance of gaining wider acceptance. If members of the academic community continue to shy away from this confrontation, the newfound GC mission will be perceived as deeply hypocritical by students. Were an internationalization scandal to erupt, those students—already cynical and vulnerable to reactionary movements as well as progressive ones—would become increasingly disillusioned. It is also likely that a scandal would affect the reputation of the institutions involved. The Canadian “brand” itself could be tainted. Cosmopolitanism and GC can and must be used to shine a clear light on the business practices of HEIs, forcing a transformation before such an event occurs.
CHAPTER ONE

GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONCEPT

Since I began teaching GC, I have sought to better understand the concept, coming to realize that it lends itself to multiple interpretations and theoretical approaches. However, it is possible to ascertain common elements, despite some occasionally vague or overly broad definitions. This chapter is primarily dedicated to tracing the philosophical origins of GC. I introduce the topic by providing some interpretations of GC from Canadian HEIs and Oxfam, the origin of one of the most widely cited definitions. I then turn to the scholarly literature, arguing that the philosophical heart of GC is ultimately cosmopolitanism, with roots in the Stoics and Kant. If GC is interpreted from the cosmopolitan tradition, it becomes easier to understand and evaluate.

Global Citizenship in the Classroom

As I noted in the introduction, one Canadian HEI has provided the following definition of GC:

[GC] presents a foundational, unique and critical look at the roots and impact of inequality and discrimination related to issues of social justice (e.g., politics, economics, religion, technology, energy and environment). Learners explore personal and social responsibility in their personal lives, in their communities and in their global and local work environments.

This is not a particularly precise definition of GC, as it introduces many variables and does not explain what is meant by citizenship. However, it is evocative, suggesting that GC is concerned with structural (“foundational”) as opposed to individual explanations for inequality and discrimination. Rather than accepting the argument that the people in

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Somalia are poor because they are unproductive, for example, GC could explore the relationship between loose monetary policy in the United States on the one hand, and indebtedness and inflated food prices around the world on the other. Social justice is broadly defined to encompass inequalities relating to politics, economics, religion, technology, energy, and environment. Finally, the emphasis on “personal and social responsibility” implies that GC refers to individual as well as social change, and taking action as opposed to simply studying problems.

The University of Alberta provides a similarly general definition, saying that GC “moves beyond international awareness and towards developing an understanding and enactment of the rights and responsibilities each person has to contribute to an equitable, sustainable and just world.” Sault College declares that “[a] global citizen is aware of the wider world, respects and values diversity, is outraged by injustice, participates in community from the local to the global level, and feels compelled to act to make the world a more sustainable place.” The syllabus for a course at Wilfrid Laurier notes that GC has a long history, and that it “looks beyond the borders championed by national citizenship and promotes a global ethical foundation. . . .” Once again, these are evocative, but not particularly precise, definitions.

A popular Canadian GC textbook breaks the concept down into considerably more detail. Citizenship is defined from a legal perspective (“a set of rights and responsibilities granted to a people in recognition of their attachment to a particular

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Citizenship, therefore, refers to membership and participation in a specific community, to which are attached specific rights and responsibilities.

But, the textbook continues, this traditional understanding of citizenship may no longer be adequate. In an argument echoed in much of the literature on GC, the text contends that the world is increasingly interconnected, “in terms of communication, transportation, economics, environment, cultures, religions, and so on.”6 One important cause of this increasing interconnectedness is globalization, defined as “an economic process of political, social, and cultural integrations across the entire planet.”7 As the world becomes more integrated, events or processes that take place in one country, or even one city, can have a significant impact around the world. GC therefore expands the traditional understanding of citizenship—rights and responsibilities attaching to a specific people in a specific country—to encompass all nations and peoples. GC, therefore, is an increasing awareness that our lives are connected to the lives of people across the world, that we are members of a global community with rights and responsibilities to do our part to ensure sustainability of resources, social justice and equity, for all are achieved globally.8

Citizens of a single nation “work towards the betterment of [that] nation, its people, its economy, and its environment.” Global citizens “consider the best interests of the entire world and all of the people within it.”9

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6 Ibid., 2.
8 Ibid.
These references to “betterment” and “best interests” seem to be moving beyond the “rights and responsibilities” of the simple definition of citizenship first iterated. Indeed, this is where the GC commitment to social justice enters the picture. The GC textbook notes that in many countries, citizenship is not granted equally to all members of a community, nor does citizenship always guarantee access to basic services such as clean water, sanitation, healthcare, education, or physical safety. At issue, therefore, are what rights and what responsibilities does citizenship entail, and for whom, at either the national or the global level. When a conception of social justice is incorporated into the definition of GC, individuals are awarded far more specific rights: “to dignity, to respect, to earn an education in a safe and productive environment, and to live in a world where access to resources is equitably shared and ethically sustained.” Similarly, individuals have far more specific responsibilities: “to ensure that people are treated justly [and] have equitable opportunities as fellow citizens of this world,” and “[to] make sure that our actions bring about positive changes.”

Indeed, the textbook lists an impressive range of the rights and responsibilities required of global citizens: to challenge commonly held assumptions and beliefs; to ensure that actions and behaviours are respectful and inclusive; to be aware of our use of the world’s resources and find ways to live sustainably; to consider how actions at a local level impact on issues and people at a global level, and vice versa; to help others

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 200.
14 Ibid., 3.
16 Ibid.
in ways that treat people with respect and dignity; to understand and respect diversity; to understand political, economic, and social structures so that we can identify the source of social problems; and to reflect on one’s own sense of self and identity. The textbook’s definition of GC appears, therefore, to be a fusion of the concept of world citizenship with an extremely broad understanding of social justice, supplemented with critical thinking and character education.

Many aspects of this definition of GC appear to originate, directly or indirectly, from Oxfam. The UK-based charity is widely credited with introducing the term GC in its 1997 pamphlet, “A Curriculum for Global Citizenship.” While the original document is no longer available, an updated version is posted on the organization’s website along with numerous resources for teachers and others interested in GC. Oxfam’s definition of a global citizen is someone who:

- is aware of the wider world and has a sense of their own role as a world citizen; respects and values diversity; has an understanding of how the world works; is outraged by social injustice;
- participates in the community at a range of levels, from the local to the global; is willing to act to make the world a more equitable and sustainable place; and takes responsibility for their actions.

Furthermore, education for GC involves: asking questions and developing critical thinking skills; equipping young people with knowledge, skills and values to participate

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17 Ibid., 201.
18 Ibid., 202.
19 Ibid., 202.
20 Ibid., 204.
23 Ibid., 3.
as active citizens; acknowledging the complexity of global issues; revealing the globe as part of everyday local life, whether in a small village or a large city; and understanding how we relate to the environment and to each other as human beings.24

There are numerous similarities between Oxfam’s definition of GC and the one in the GC textbook. Both stress the importance of social justice, understanding events around the world, and local and global action. The environment is given a central place. Self awareness, personal responsibility, and critical thinking are also emphasized. Beyond these similarities, the two definitions share a potentially overwhelming complexity and occasional vagueness. Perhaps aware of these conceptual difficulties, the University of British Columbia’s description of its course on GC backs away from definition, instead stating:

Just what does it mean to be a “global citizen”? When few people even agree on what “global citizenship” means, this idea is murky, even if a more just and tolerant future world is compelling.25

Indeed, a noteworthy aspect of GC is that it has no widely-accepted definition. One of the key debates in the literature on GC is whether GC is even a coherent concept,26 or whether it is “too vague and woolly.”27 In fact, most theorists shy away from offering a straightforward definition. Derek Heater writes that with the sudden increase in interest in GC, or world citizenship as he calls it, “we now understand much more thoroughly just how complex the concept is and how many components are contained in the simply

24 Ibid. Items on this list were taken verbatim from the Oxfam website.
Some have expressed concern that this flexibility can render GC “a politically neutral, if not banal, concept.”

Throughout this chapter and the next, I will try to counter this contention by providing a more precise definition of GC, in the process showing that it is a potentially powerful political concept.

Nigel Dower and John Williams maintain that the various interpretations of GC share a core belief, the principle that

a global citizen is a member of the wider community of all humanity, the world or a similar whole that is wider than that of a nation-state or other political community of which we are normally thought to be citizens.

Many GC theorists, including Dower and Williams, Derek Heater, and Martha Nussbaum, argue that this core belief has its origins in the philosophical tradition of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, cosmopolitan—κοσμοπολίτης in Greek—means world citizen. Cosmopolitanism, to which I now turn, has a long and noble history and provides a much surer philosophical footing for GC.

**Greek and Roman Cosmopolitanism**

The cosmopolitan tradition spans millennia, reaching back to the ancient Greek Cynics and Roman Stoics, and culminating in Kant’s cosmopolitan conceptions of reason and morality. In fleshing out this section, I will summarize the small amount of available information about Diogenes the Cynic, and Zeno and Chrysippus, the Greek Stoics.

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29 Ibid., 4.
31 Luis Cabrera argues that GC should be viewed as a key component of cosmopolitanism rather than as its equivalent. While I think that such a subtle distinction can be made, it is not necessary to the purpose of this thesis. See Luis Cabrera, “Global Citizenship As The Completion Of Cosmopolitanism,” *Journal of International Political Theory* 4, no. 1 (2008): 84-104.
Later, I will have more to say about Seneca, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius, their Roman counterparts. The section concludes with a detailed discussion of Kant, who provides the most solid philosophical foundation for cosmopolitanism, and in turn, GC.

Above, I assessed a definition of citizenship emphasizing membership and participation in a particular community, to which are attached specific rights and responsibilities. This aspect of citizenship has been widely accepted through the centuries: citizenship attaches to a particular community, a particular set of people. Indeed, many thinkers have argued that citizenship is best confined to a relatively small group of people. Aristotle, for example, argued that the polis or Greek city-state should be self-sufficient, and neither too large nor too small:

“[A city-state] that consists of too few people is not self-sufficient (whereas a city-state is self-sufficient), but one that consists of too many, while it is self-sufficient in the necessities . . . is still no city-state, since it is not easy for it to have a constitution. For who will be the general of its excessively large multitude. . . ?”

Ideally, the polis should be just large enough so that it is possible for each citizen to know every other. Elsewhere, Aristotle clarifies that a polis should, in any case, have a population of less than 100,000.

Cosmopolitanism has challenged this understanding of citizenship since its inception. Diogenes the ‘Cynic’ (from the Greek *kuon*, for dog; d. 323 B.C.) was perhaps the first “world citizen.” Much like a performance artist today, he was notorious for challenging

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34 Ibid., 1326b16.
36 Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking and Its Opponents*, 27. There is evidence that an openness of mind as expressed in guest-friendship (*xenia*) to strangers (*xenoi*) is present in the Greek psyche well before the time of Diogenes the Cynic. In Homer’s epic, which predates Diogenes by a millennium or so depending on who’s counting, the hero Odysseus and his men, on arriving on the island of the Cyclopes and wondering about the intentions of its inhabitants, want to know “whether they are savage and violent, and without justice, or hospitable to strangers and with minds that are godly.” See
the conventions of the Greek polis in numerous and often outlandish ways. Stories
handed down and recorded in Lives of Eminent Philosophers (which may or may not be
accurate) suggest that Diogenes questioned social norms that constrained human nature,
“allowing convention no such authority as he allowed to natural right.” Thus, Diogenes
lived in a large clay pot in the market place; ate, excreted, and masturbated in public; and
generally, Heater argues, behaved “like a dog.” But he was not endorsing a life of
hedonism; like many Greek philosophers, he placed high value on the human capacity to
reason and mocked any forms of status not based on wisdom. He also contended that
“bad men obey their lusts like servants obey their masters.” The telos or goal of life
was ultimately “to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural.” What
needed to be brought into harmony with reason/nature were the customs and laws of the
polis.

In a further challenge to the laws of his time, Diogenes rejected the belief that
citizenship should be confined to a particular polis. When asked where he came from, he
is reputed to have replied, “I am a citizen of the world,” perhaps reflecting his exile from
his original home. Nussbaum clarifies that for Diogenes, our shared capacity for reason

1994), 118. It has also been argued that Socrates was a cosmopolitan or world citizen. See Eric Brown,
39 A.A. Long, “The concept of the cosmopolitan in Greek & Roman thought,” Daedalus (Summer 2008),
54. See also Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI.72-3.
41 Ibid., VII.88-90.
42 Ibid., VI.62-4.
provides “the first form of moral affiliation.” Because reason is essentially the law of nature, “the only true commonwealth,” Diogenes adds, “was that which was as wide as the universe.” The world citizen, therefore, shares in rationality with the entire cosmos. Diogenes thus proposes an early formulation of natural law, a code of law above state laws.

In 310 B.C., Zeno (d. 262 B.C.), a student of a student of Diogenes, established a school under the painted arch or stoa of his Athenian house, founding the philosophy known as Stoicism. Zeno wrote his own Republic, seemingly as a challenge to Plato’s more famous version. Unfortunately, this work is only available in fragments and interpretations passed down through the ages. Plutarch provides one of the most frequently cited assessments of the Republic, showing Zeno’s adoption of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism:

> The much admired Republic of Zeno . . . is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law.

Zeno’s Republic allegedly forbade the building of temples and courts and ordered men and women to wear the same clothing so that citizens would better appreciate their shared humanity. Chrysippus (d. 206 BC), a student of a student of Zeno, argued that “[o]ur

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44 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI.72-3.
45 Heater, World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking and Its Opponents, 34.
48 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII.32-35.
individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.""49 Such harmony was apparently important to the Stoics, as it was for the Cynics. Life in accordance with our own nature, defined by an affinity for reason, is life in accord with the whole universe.

Heater summarizes the cosmopolitanism of the Greek Cynics and Stoics as follows:

[A]ll social and cultural distinctions are superficial in comparison with the essential sameness of all members of the human race. As a consequence, all should behave as if they were citizens of the world or universe and in obedience therefore to natural law.50

Heater cautions that the early cosmopolitans were not particularly interested in formal politics; they do not appear to have advocated for a universal state (even if Zeno’s Republic may have contained his ideal city).51 Rather, early cosmopolitanism is more accurately described as a metaphor. All of humanity are citizens of the “metaphysical polis of the kosmos.”52 Indeed, there was a substantial spiritual component to early cosmopolitanism, with the Greek Stoics arguing that there was something “godlike” or divine in the capacity to reason.53

As political power shifted to Rome, so did Stoic philosophy, where the key thinkers were Cicero (d. 43 B.C.), Seneca (d. 65 A.D.), and Marcus Aurelius (d. 180 A.D.). In many ways, it appears that the Romans simply picked up where the Greeks left off. For example, according to philosopher, statesman, and lawyer Cicero, “the universal bond” of humanity is our capacity for reason and speech.54 Marcus Aurelius, philosopher and Emperor of Rome, similarly argues, “All things are interwoven with one another, and the

49 Ibid., VII.86-8.
50 Derek Heater, World Citizenship and Government, 4.
51 Ibid.
52 Derek Heater, World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking and Its Opponents, 30. Finally, there is Plato’s interpretation that Diogenes’ challenges to convention were simply indicative of the latter’s constant need for attention.
bond which unites them is sacred.”

We all share in the “same portion of the divine” because of our minds, he adds. Seneca, philosopher and advisor to Emperor Nero declares, “I am not born for any one corner of the universe; this whole world is my country,” in a near echo of Diogenes’ earlier claim to be a world citizen. Thus, there is Greek and Roman Stoic agreement on the essential unity of all human beings. This agreement is further echoed in the contemporary definitions of GC outlined at the beginning of this chapter, albeit without the mystical overtones. Something unites us as human beings; a shared nature, or perhaps a shared fate.

Similar, too, is the Roman extrapolation from our shared humanity and universe to a formulation of natural law. However, the Romans are perhaps clearer about the connection between reason and this understanding of law, with Cicero furnishing one of the best-known conceptualizations:

True law is right reason consonant with nature, spread through all people. It is constant and eternal; it summons to duty by its orders, it deters from crime by its prohibitions. . . . There will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another later; but all nations at all times will be bound by this one eternal and unchangeable law. . . .

Marcus Aurelius deduces perhaps an equally famous definition of natural, cosmopolitan law in his Meditations:

If we have intelligence in common, so we have reason which makes us reasoning beings, and that practical reason which orders what we must or must not do; then the law too is common to us and, if so, we are citizens; if so, we share a common government;

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56 Ibid., II.1.
57 Seneca lost his life after being accused of conspiring to assassinate Nero.
if so, the universe is, as it were, a city—for what other common
government could one say is shared by all mankind?\textsuperscript{60}

Nussbaum summarizes that Stoicism in Roman hands produced this firm linking of logos
or reason with morality and natural law.\textsuperscript{61} As with the Greek Stoics, law is reason is
nature; since there is but one reason, which is natural (and god-given), there can be but
one law. Furthermore, the appetites or passions must be controlled,\textsuperscript{62} because, as Cicero
argues, we are then more likely to “secure the observance of duties.”\textsuperscript{63} Marcus Aurelius
repeatedly castigates himself for his inability to triumph over his emotions, writing, for
example, that he should “despise” the flesh,\textsuperscript{64} or rid himself “of all aimless thoughts, of
all emotional opposition to the dictates of reason. . . .”\textsuperscript{65} Stoicism has earned a reputation
as a philosophy of detachment for this very reason, and sometimes cosmopolitanism is
tarred with the same brush.

The Roman Stoics also provide further detail about the responsibilities of
cosmopolitan citizenship. Cicero suggests that “teaching and learning, . . .
communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort
of natural fraternity.”\textsuperscript{66} Aurelius’ \textit{Meditations} contain numerous passages in which he
lectures himself to be both more impartial and tolerant of others.\textsuperscript{67} Heater argues that this
educational, discursive component is necessary for the development of an active,
meaningful citizenship.\textsuperscript{68} Seneca asserts that by declaring the world as our country, we

\textsuperscript{60} Aurelius, \textit{The Meditations}, IV.4.
\textsuperscript{61} Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” 7.
\textsuperscript{62} Cicero, \textit{De Officiis}, 103-105.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 145.
\textsuperscript{64} Aurelius, \textit{The Meditations}, II.2.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., II.5.
\textsuperscript{66} Cicero, \textit{De Officiis}, 53-55.
\textsuperscript{67} See, for example, Aurelius, \textit{The Meditations}, I.5 and VI.53.
\textsuperscript{68} Heater, \textit{World Citizenship and Government}, 17.
now “have a wider field for our virtue.” ¹⁶⁹ Unlike Diogenes, who in some ways renounces his duties to his own polis, Seneca argues that the duties of a cosmopolitan citizen expand. For Heater, this marks the introduction of world public service to our understanding of cosmopolitanism and GC. ¹⁷⁰ Marcus Aurelius, although generally counselling against worrying about the opinions of others, makes an exception “when the common good makes it imperative.” ¹⁷¹ Then, his advice is “to imagine what another may be saying, doing, or thinking.” Nussbaum interprets this as a plea for “empathic understanding whereby we come to respect the humanity even of our political enemies,” ¹⁷² which could prove invaluable when trying to solve political problems. There are indeed remnants of all four of these principles—education, communication, empathy, and service—in the Oxfam and various HEI definitions of GC that I discussed above. GC’s seeming commitment to personal transformation is therefore best viewed as a necessary prerequisite to cosmopolitan political engagement. One must cultivate knowledge of other people, the ability to deliberate and empathize, and a commitment to public service.

It is perhaps Cicero, however, who adds the most to our understanding of cosmopolitan duty, as his De Officiis (On Duties), is about precisely that topic, duty. Cicero analyzes numerous types of duty, some of which, such as the duty not to “look like carriers in festal processions,” are of little interest here. ¹⁷³ But many of Cicero’s duties are directly relevant to cosmopolitanism. For example, he argues that not only do we have a duty to avoid inflicting harm, we must protect others “upon whom [harm] is

¹⁷³ Cicero, De Officiis, 133.
inflicted.”  It is not moral, Cicero argues, for individuals to “leave to their fate those whom they ought to defend,” or to contribute “none of their effort” to society. He acknowledges that this active concern for others can be difficult, particularly when we see them “in the far distance; and [therefore] . . . judge their case differently from our own.” But it is urgent to maintain that concern. Cicero offers the example of the man who imagines that it is acceptable to gain at the expense of his neighbour. Were everyone to behave in this fashion, or “appropriat[e] to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good,” human society would be destroyed. Ideally, Cicero writes, “the chief end of all men,” should be “to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical.” Cicero seems to be foreshadowing Kant’s kingdom of ends, as I will discuss below.

Most interestingly, Cicero extends this concern for citizens in a single society to people around the world, or as he phrases it, “the universal brotherhood of mankind.” In an exercise common to the Stoics, Cicero imagines a series of circles showing the various bonds of human society. The broadest circle is drawn around “the universal bond of our common humanity,” followed by ever-shrinking rings around peoples, then city states, then friends and family. According to Cicero, we owe our greatest moral duty to our country and our parents. However, the most “comprehensive” bond—albeit

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74 Ibid., 25.
75 Ibid., 29.
76 Ibid., 31.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 289.
79 Ibid., 293.
80 Ibid., 293.
81 Rousseau’s General Will is also a clear successor to Cicero’s thinking here.
82 Cicero, De Officiis, 295.
83 Ibid., 57.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
not the strongest—is that uniting all humans. Membership in this community gives us “common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man.”

Of things that cost nothing, Cicero insists, we should “bestow even on a stranger,” and he speaks of sharing water, fire, and counsel to those in need. We should always, Cicero writes, “be contributing something to the common weal.” But since individuals generally have limited resources while there is an infinite supply of the needy, Cicero maintains that we will inevitably give more to those closer to us. While we have a duty to all, it is not an equal duty. Regardless, we owe duties “even to those who have wronged us.” In the case of individuals, Cicero limits punishment to repentance and deterrence; perhaps more interestingly, he extrapolates this to relations between states, arguing that the only excuse for going to war is to be able to “live in peace unharmed.”

Despite the Roman Stoics’ provision of more substance to cosmopolitanism, it is still a relatively vague political philosophy in their hands. Cicero himself complained that the content of international law was inadequately conceptualized: “we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy.” George Grube argues that in Rome, Stoicism was a religion more than it was a philosophy, “more inclined to dogmatic assertions than any true philosophic inquiry.” Nussbaum, however, counters that there is a radical moral core to cosmopolitanism, the principle that

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86 Ibid., 55.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 57.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 35.
91 Ibid., 37.
92 Ibid., 69.
we should give our first moral allegiance to no mere more form of
government, no temporal power. We should give it, instead, to
the moral community made up by the humanity of all human
beings. One should always behave so as to treat with equal
respect the dignity of reason and moral choice in each and every
human being.  

Heater similarly summarizes the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism as “a higher set of
principles to supplement [one’s] civic life and by which to live a more richly moral
existence.” This, then, is perhaps the Stoic contribution to our understanding of
cosmopolitanism.

Kant’s Categorical Imperative and World Citizenship

Immanuel Kant was greatly influenced by the Roman Stoics, apparently reading and
planning to comment on Cicero’s De Officiis during the period in which he was writing
his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. While it is possible to recognize signs
of Stoic influence in the Groundwork, this text also serves as the philosophical and moral
foundation of the overt cosmopolitanism that Kant develops in several of his shorter
political essays. This section accordingly analyzes both the Groundwork and these
essays.

Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is famous for providing the first
explication of the categorical imperative (CI, for short), Kant’s self-defined “supreme
principle of morality.” As Kant explains, the word imperative denotes that this moral
rule is a command; the word categorical specifies that the command is unconditional or

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94 Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” 8.
95 Ibid.
96 Gregory des Jardins, “Terms of De Officiis in Hume and Kant,” Journal of the History of Ideas 28, no. 2 (April-June 1967): 241; and Klaus Reich, “Kant and Greek Ethics (II),” Mind 48, no. 192 (July 1939): 447. Klaus Reich and Martha Nussbaum, among others, have outlined the many similarities between Cicero’s text on one hand, and Kant’s Groundwork and essay To Perpetual Peace, on the other.
“objectively necessary in itself,” without any reference to other ends or goals. Kant begins by arguing that such a principle must be purely rational, with absolutely no remnants of the empirical, and apply universally: “If a law is to be morally valid, i.e., is to be valid as a ground of obligation, then it must carry with it absolute necessity.” Kant uses perhaps his most famous example, that of lying, to illustrate. The command, “Though shall not lie,” applies in absolutely all cases; there can be no exceptions based on such-and-such a circumstance. Without the existence of an absolute guide, “morals themselves are liable to all kinds of corruption.” The source of the obligation, furthermore, is pure reason (again, with absolutely nothing to do with the empirical world), which applies to man “as a rational being.” Here is perhaps the first remnant of Stoic thought: the premise that humans participate in a non-material world characterized by law-like reason.

Kant also argues that in the makeup of natural beings, there are no parts or organs that do not serve some kind of purpose. These organs are, furthermore, “the most fit and the best adapted for that end.” Since nature has given us reason, it must therefore serve a purpose. Were that purpose happiness, a common proposition made by other philosophers, our instincts would better serve that end. Reason, furthermore, serves happiness quite poorly. Indeed, Kant is adamant that because “making a man happy is quite different from making him good,” happiness cannot serve as the foundation for

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98 Ibid., 24-5.  
99 Ibid., 2.  
100 Ibid., 3.  
101 Ibid., 3.  
102 Later, Kant adds, “Everything in Nature works according to laws.” Ibid., 23.  
103 Ibid., 8.  
104 Ibid., 9.
moral law. Therefore, there must be something else that reason is designed to do. That something, argues Kant, is “to produce a will which is not merely good as a means to some further end, but is good in itself.” This means, according to Kant, that individuals must obey the moral law for its own sake, out of duty and because it is the moral law.

Kant offers a number of examples to explain this proposition. A merchant may rightly decide not to overcharge a customer. However, perhaps the merchant is only doing so “for his own advantage,” because he will then be seen as a fair trader and earn a good reputation. According to Kant, although the merchant’s actions are in alignment with duty, the merchant cannot be assumed to have acted from duty. Similarly, someone who takes pleasure in giving charitably cannot be said to be acting solely from duty even though “to be beneficent where one can is a duty.”

The only true test of duty, for Kant, is doing something that does not provide advantage to oneself, or that one does not want to do. Here again, Kant may be influenced by the Stoics, with their insistence that one must attempt to eradicate the impact of the emotions on our reason. An Aurelius-like moral struggle or “self denial” is the only way that we can tell that someone is doing the right thing for the right reason.

Similarly, Kant continues, the moral worth of the action lies solely in the fact that the action was done out of duty, “with no regard to the ends that can be brought about through such action,” meaning no regard to the consequences of the action.

\[105 \text{ Ibid., 46.} \]
\[106 \text{ Ibid., 9.} \]
\[107 \text{ Ibid.} \]
\[108 \text{ Ibid., 10.} \]
\[109 \text{ Ibid., 11.} \]
\[110 \text{ Ibid., 11, 19-20} \]
\[111 \text{ Ibid., 13.} \]
notes, for example, that the same consequences could have come about through different causes. The morality of the action depends on the will alone, not on the outcome.

Finally, the last condition of the moral law is that only the law itself can be “an object of respect.” The moral act must be performed out of this respect for duty. Kant elaborates that this respect is “consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of other influences upon my sense.”\footnote{Ibid., 14n14.} We impose the law on ourselves, recognizing it as necessary and rational; therefore, we must obey it.

Kant’s task is to develop a principle that meets these requirements.\footnote{Ibid., 14.} Having stripped away all external material factors, all mere impulses, Kant formulates the first version of the categorical imperative: “I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”\footnote{Ibid.} One must always ask whether one’s actions could be turned into a universal rule that everyone else could follow. If I were to lie or cheat in certain circumstances, what would happen if everyone else were to do the same? To take a simple example, suppose I use the turning lane to speed ahead of traffic when I am racing to work, and then cut in at the front of the line of cars. Kant argues not simply that it is wrong to do so, but that it would be impossible for everyone to do so. Were everyone to use the turning lane to speed ahead in their various special circumstances, no one would be in the straight lane any more. Making an exception for my own behaviour, multiplied by everyone else, makes it impossible for the behaviour to take place. My maxim—cut ahead when I am in a rush—“destroy[s] itself,” in Kant’s words; it cannot be willed a universal law.\footnote{Ibid., 15.} Kant makes the interesting observation that
“we actually acknowledge the validity of the categorical imperative” when we make such selfish decisions, because we count on everyone else’s obedience to the law. We think we are simply making an unimportant exception, forced upon us by circumstance.\footnote{Ibid., 33.} Kant again appears to be following Cicero’s \textit{De Officiis}, in the passage where Cicero discusses the individual who thinks it is acceptable to profit from a neighbour’s loss, but fails to address the consequences of widespread behaviour of a similar nature.

Kant poses a more difficult problem to clarify the significance of the CI: whether it is moral to make a promise that one has no intention of keeping (in effect, lying) when one is under duress. Could lying ever be the right and moral thing to do?\footnote{Ibid., 15.} Kant’s most notorious illustration appears outside of the \textit{Grounding}, in a short essay he wrote called “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy.”\footnote{Immanuel Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” in I. Kant, \textit{Practical Philosophy}, trans. and ed. M.J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 611-615.} There, he argues that if a murderer knocks on your door and asks you whether his intended victim is in the house, it is wrong to lie. It is always wrong to lie, for the same reasons that it is wrong to cut ahead in traffic. Were people to make exceptions here and there for their own lying, no matter what the circumstances, eventually no one could trust anyone any more, and lying would backfire (as no one would believe you). Lying and cheating on a wide scale defeat their own purposes. Kant notes that the intended victim may have in fact left the house unbeknownst to you, so that your lie inadvertently aids the murderer. Alternatively, had you told the truth, you could have called for assistance from the neighbours or the police in the time that it would take the murderer to search the house. But these points are actually incidental to Kant’s main argument, which is that “[a] lie always harms another;
if not some other human being, then it nevertheless does harm to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right.”\textsuperscript{119} The “source of right” is the universal capacity to reason; if one’s reason is manipulated through lies, one loses the ability to use this core human attribute. Therefore, lying cannot become a universal law and it is never moral to lie, regardless of the circumstances.

The famous murderer example often provokes a visceral and negative response to the CI. Hegel accused Kant of promoting “empty formalism,” simply looking for the absence of logical contradiction as a sign of moral integrity.\textsuperscript{120} Others have observed that hiding a Jewish family during World War II would appear to be immoral under Kant’s interpretation.\textsuperscript{121} More charitable readings propose that Kant’s absolute prohibition on lying stems from the fact that his theory is an ideal one, based on a “long-term political and moral goal for humanity:” the ultimate perfection of the species through the use of reason.\textsuperscript{122} Our acting morally—in this case, not lying even when faced with a murderer—helps to “further the realization” of Kant’s ideal, on which I will have more to say below.\textsuperscript{123}

But it is not very often that we find ourselves faced with a murderer on our doorstep, and most of the wrongs plaguing social and political life are of a different nature. Therefore, other illustrations perhaps better show the promise of Kant’s line of reasoning. For example, Kant asserts that there is a moral duty to assist others when they are “struggling with great hardships,” just as the Stoics argued that we have a duty to be

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 612.
\textsuperscript{120} Hegel, \emph{Philosophy of Right}, trans. T.M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), §135.
\textsuperscript{121} See, for example, Tamar Schapiro, “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances,” \emph{Ethics} 117, no. 1 (October 2006): 32-57.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 344.
charitable and prevent others from being harmed. An individual might think it is merely adequate to do no harm to others (Cicero considers the same type of argument, as do many other philosophers). In reality, Kant argues, if “do no harm” were adopted as a universal maxim, you would deprive yourself of assistance in your own time of need. Thus, Kant argues, your will “would contradict itself.” Because this kind of contradiction is less fatal than the internal contradiction found in lying (it is literally impossible to universalize lying because no one will then believe anyone’s lies), the duty imposed is broad or imperfect. Therefore, we have a broad and imperfect duty of compassion. Similarly, it appears that the CI would absolutely forbid torture. Torture is generally undertaken to gain information of some kind, and Kant insists that the CI cannot refer to any consequences beyond the action itself to determine its morality. It is never permissible to torture someone. These kinds of rights and prohibitions form the basis of contemporary human rights treaties and agreements, and as such are vitally important to contemporary GC and cosmopolitanism.

Kant concedes that it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether a person has acted morally. We must not judge the external consequences, but rather the internal motives or “mental disposition,” and it is obviously a hard task to accurately assess what is driving someone to act as they do. Ideally, our thoughts, words, and actions would be congruent, borrowing the term I introduced in the introduction, and there would be no tension between what we want to do, what we should do, and what we do. But even if no one has ever acted strictly from duty to the moral law, Kant believes he has shown that

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124 Kant, *Grounding*, 32.
125 Ibid.
reason of itself and independently of all experience commands what ought to happen. Consequently, reason unrelentingly commands actions of which the world has perhaps hitherto never provided an example and whose feasibility might well be doubted by one who bases everything upon experience. . . .”

Kant recognizes that only “the divine will” can be perfectly good. The actions of mere humans will always be affected with subjective factors and considerations. All the same, Kant believes that the CI is compelling and will have “an influence on the human heart.” Kant has therefore created a regulative ideal. We are commanded to obey the CI by virtue of our reason. That some people won’t obey it, or will obey it for subjective reasons only, does not diminish its power.

Kant then rephrases the CI in three slightly different formulations, arguing that they can all be deduced from the original. The first reformulation is relatively straightforward, “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature,” because universal laws are identical to natural laws, nature being the realm of necessity. The second derivation, the “end in itself” or “humanity” formulation, is far more influential: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” Our existence has an absolute worth, according to Kant, as we are rational beings or “persons” with the capacity to choose our own ends, and rational nature is an end in itself. Going back to the earlier examples of duties, the

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128 Ibid., 20.
129 Ibid., 22
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., 41.
132 Ibid., 30.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., 36.
135 Ibid., 42.
person cutting into traffic or making a false promise is using others as a means to his or her end. Kant writes in greater detail about the wrong of deception and lying:

The man who intends to make a false promise will immediately see that he intends to make use of another man merely as a means to an end which the latter does not likewise hold. For the man whom I want to use for my own purposes by such a promise cannot possibly concur with my way of acting toward him and hence cannot himself hold the end of this action.\textsuperscript{136}

Lying takes away a person’s capacity to choose his or her own ends, in violation of that individual’s humanity. That person would not consent to being manipulated to serving the ends of the liar. Regarding the duty to show care and compassion for others, Kant suggests that the “end in itself” formulation makes an even stronger demand. Because “the ends of any subject who is an end in himself must as far as possible be my ends also,” we have a duty to further the ends of others.\textsuperscript{137} Furthermore, this formulation of the CI imposes a limit on everyone’s freedom, not by simply requiring that we refrain from harming or deceiving others, but by requiring us to perform actions that benefit others as well, much as the Roman Stoics—and virtually every defender of GC and cosmopolitanism—also argue.\textsuperscript{138} This duty goes beyond Kant’s earlier discussion of charity, or aiding those in need of assistance. It is a duty to promote the general welfare.

The next two formulations of the CI are equally noteworthy. Because all humans are ends in themselves, they cannot merely be subject to the CI. Seemingly influenced by Rousseau’s General Will and his famous claim that “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty,”\textsuperscript{139} Kant proposes what he calls the autonomy

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\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 37n23. Perhaps Kant has Locke and Hobbes’ negative liberty in mind.
formulation of the CI: “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law.”\(^{140}\) Thus, the will must be regarded as “legislating for itself.” While we are bound to these laws, it is in accordance with our own will. Therefore, ideally, there need be no “attracting stimulus” or “constraining force” to encourage us to obey. Since we legislate for ourselves, we understand the reason for the laws and should obey them willingly out of duty.\(^{141}\) Autonomy, furthermore, “is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.”\(^{142}\) Violations of autonomy are, therefore, strictly “forbidden.”\(^{143}\)

The final formulation of the CI, generally called the kingdom of ends formula, asserts that if each person is autonomous and an end in himself or herself, then the community of such persons is

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\text{a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom that may be called a kingdom of ends . . . inasmuch as these laws have in view the very relation of such beings to one another as ends and means.}^{144}\]

Because of their autonomy, all humans have an essential “intrinsic worth” and a “dignity” that must be respected in this kingdom.\(^{145}\) While the kingdom is “only an ideal,” we must regard ourselves as living in such a place, and all laws must “harmonize” with a kingdom of this nature. This further explains why Kant believes we must not lie, even to murderers, as we are ultimately working towards the realization of Kant’s ideal social and political community. The kingdom of ends seems to have been directly influenced by Cicero’s contention that humanity should strive to ensure that the interest of each

\(^{140}\) Kant, *Grounding*, 38.
\(^{141}\) Ibid., 39.
\(^{142}\) Ibid., 41.
\(^{143}\) Ibid., 44.
\(^{144}\) Ibid., 39–40.
\(^{145}\) Ibid., 40.
individual is made identical with that of the whole body politic.\textsuperscript{146} We therefore promote our own welfare by promoting the general welfare.

Martha Nussbaum concurs that Kant shares with the Stoics their “moral core,” which is “the idea of a kingdom of free rational beings equal in humanity, each of them to be treated as an end no matter where in the world he or she dwells.”\textsuperscript{147} However, in Kant’s political essays, particularly \textit{Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent} and \textit{To Perpetual Peace}, he explicitly applies this moral core to the issue of cosmopolitanism. The first, \textit{Ideas for a Universal History}, was published in 1784, the year before the \textit{Grounding}. In this short essay, Kant lays out nine theses to build the argument that humanity is destined, through the gradual development of its reason over time as a species, to achieve a “universal civil society.”\textsuperscript{148} Kant argues, as he did in the \textit{Grounding}, that nature is not “prodigal” and that all natural attributes in animals fulfill a purpose.\textsuperscript{149} Human reason, taking centre stage again for Kant, is one such attribute. But reason is unique among capacities. While individual human behaviour appears to be random and purposeless, large-scale behaviour reveals patterns. For example, demographics reveal the operation of laws nearly as rigid as those governing the weather.\textsuperscript{150} Kant therefore makes the claim that only over time will reason reveal its true function, because it requires “trial, practice and instruction” in order to develop.\textsuperscript{151}

Kant then entertains something similar to a “State of Nature” argument familiar from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. He contends that humans are “socially unsociable,” also

\textsuperscript{146} Reich, “Kant and Greek Ethics (II),” 459-60.
\textsuperscript{147} Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” 12.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 30.
by natural design.\textsuperscript{152} We seek the society of others, yet we are destined to compete, fight, and inevitably engage in repeated warfare. We require, it appears, a superior power to impose limits on our behaviour. So, much as Hobbes argued, Kant proposes that we combine together to form a society, agreeing to obey the law and cease fighting. The “perfectly rightful civil constitution” that results, Kant argues, “is the supreme task nature has set for the human species.”\textsuperscript{153} Yet a problem lingers ominously. We will still face continued war with other groups of individuals who have formed their own civil societies, as there is nothing to check our external behaviour in relation to one another.\textsuperscript{154} Some of Kant’s most powerful criticisms relate to the “self-seeking expansionary schemes” of the rulers of these various societies:\textsuperscript{155}

By expending all of the commonwealth’s powers on arming itself against others, by the devastation caused by war, and, still more, by maintaining themselves in constant readiness for war, they hamper progress toward full development of man’s natural capacities.\textsuperscript{156}

There is, for example, “no money left over for public educational institutions, or for anything else that pertains to what is best in the world” because nations indebt themselves for the purpose of war.\textsuperscript{157} Thus, the fine things that humanity can achieve are again thwarted, and we are kept from fulfilling our potential.\textsuperscript{158}

Kant concludes from this quick exercise that the only logical solution is for the warring nations to enter into what he terms “nature’s supreme objective,\textsuperscript{159} a “federation

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 31-2.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 35-6.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 38.
of peoples,” or a “universal cosmopolitan state.” Just as we were encouraged to enter particular civil societies to eradicate conflict, we must now form a universal one. Kant argues that nations, exhausted by generations of war and their now unpayable debts, will ultimately reach this conclusion on their own, through the collective use of their reason. He suggests that the outlines for such a universal cosmopolitan state are already being laid, as nations, aware that conflict interferes with trade, are increasingly acting as arbiters for one another. Kant uses the words “league” or “federation” to describe the future arrangement, suggesting that it would be a relationship between states, rather than the amalgamation of all nations into a single state. He seems to believe that were there a single world state, the potential for the abuse of power would be far too great, “from such warped wood is man made.” A federation would, however, serve to check the power of the nations within it.

In *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1798, Kant fleshes out his cosmopolitan ideal. He clarifies that the federation “must not be a nation of nations,” because laws lose their force as territory expands, and one does not want to be overrun by a “soulless despotism.” He also provides more details about the terms to which the nations in the federation must agree, primarily concerning the prevention of future wars. For example, nations should not be permitted to hire out the troops of another nation or

160 Ibid., 34.
161 Ibid., 38
162 Ibid., 34, 35.
163 Ibid., 37.
164 Ibid., 34.
165 Ibid.
166 Immanuel Kant, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Quest*, in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, 115.
167 Ibid., 125.
168 Ibid., 117. Indeed, Kant states that the federation seeks only “the maintenance and security of each nation’s own freedom.”
accumulate debt in relation to their foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{169} Some of the arguments show the influence of the \textit{Grounding} and the CI. For example, standing armies should be abolished, not only because they “constantly threaten other nations with war,” but because the turning of soldiering into a paid career is to use people as machines or objects rather than ends in themselves.\textsuperscript{170} Similarly, nations have to limit their behaviour even during war so as not to make mutual trust impossible in the future.\textsuperscript{171} Thus, they should be forbidden to use assassins and poisoners, or to breach a promise of surrender.\textsuperscript{172} Wars of extermination are also illegal, as their universalization would lead to “the vast graveyard of humanity as a whole.”\textsuperscript{173} Finally, Kant echoes Cicero in arguing that individuals have a right to hospitality, or to visit anywhere they please “by virtue of their common ownership of the earth’s surface.”\textsuperscript{174} Kant observes how imperialistic countries have abused this hospitality, plundering other nations and treating their inhabitants as though they “counted for nothing” and causing slavery, famine, and yet more war.\textsuperscript{175}

Kant concludes with a passionate plea for cosmopolitanism:

Because a (narrower or wider) community widely prevails among the Earth’s people, a transgression of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere; consequently, the idea of cosmopolitan right is not fantastic and exaggerated, but rather an amendment to the unwritten code of national and international rights, necessary to the public rights of men in general.\textsuperscript{176}

Kant appears to be countering those who argue that the idea of cosmopolitanism is absurd and unrealistic, a rejoinder that still holds force today.

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\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 108-9.  \\
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 108.  \\
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 109.  \\
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 109-10.  \\
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 110.  \\
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 118.  \\
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 118-9.  \\
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 119.  
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In conclusion, Kant has done nothing less than provide an outline of the principles of cosmopolitan law and international human rights.\textsuperscript{177} He has taken Cynic and Stoic morality with its emphasis on reason as the attribute uniting all humans and providing the foundation for natural law, transformed it into the formidable edifice of the CI, and proposed that this principle should provide the foundation for a cosmopolitan federation of nations. He demonstrates, according to Andrew Linklater’s summary, that “individuals have ethical obligations to the rest of the human race which can overrule their obligations to fellow citizens.”\textsuperscript{178} We cannot unquestioningly obey the laws of our own nation if they are in conflict with the CI. We must have respect for the dignity of all persons because of their shared capacity to reason. We must, accordingly, treat others as ends rather than means and act as though they were members of a universal kingdom of ends. Both negative and positive duties are demanded of us—we must avoid harming others \emph{and} further their wellbeing. Nations in a future federation of nations are similarly bound by the CI to refrain from certain activities and to keep certain commitments. They cannot fight endless wars or abuse the hospitality of other nations by treating their citizens as though they “counted for nothing.”

Although it is certainly possible to defend cosmopolitanism from another perspective, Kant’s stature is such that many are influenced first and foremost by his philosophy. The next chapter explores the ideas of two modern Kantians and some of their critics, each of whom gives cosmopolitanism the tools to address more contemporary problems. GC, I will show, is best understood as a combination of both historical and contemporary cosmopolitanism.

CHAPTER TWO

CONTEMPORARY COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

In the preceding chapter, I discussed the history and philosophy of what may be called classical cosmopolitanism, tracing its origins to the thought and practice of ancient Greek and Roman Cynic and Stoic philosophers. Following this historical trajectory, I also discussed the evolution of cosmopolitanism in the works of its greatest Enlightenment proponent, Immanuel Kant. As Nussbaum has argued in her own work on cosmopolitanism, classical and Enlightenment conceptions of cosmopolitanism, although quite varied, are based on the principle of the fundamental moral worth of human beings. Human beings qua human beings ultimately enjoy equal status and have universal duties and obligations regardless of the contingent circumstances of nation, culture, religion, economic status, or language.¹

Contemporary cosmopolitanism is also best understood as a constellation of related concepts and ideas. My aim here is not to assess all of these current conceptions, as that would take me too far from the purpose of this thesis.² Instead, continuing my focus from the previous chapter, I will concentrate on the cosmopolitanism articulated by two philosophers greatly influenced by Kant: Thomas Pogge and Martha Nussbaum. These philosophers endorse the Kantian moral core of cosmopolitanism, but supplement it with a more fully developed understanding of social justice, particularly distributive justice. I

will also address some of the more frequent criticisms of cosmopolitanism or GC, and assess how the philosophy has enriched itself by addressing these potential weaknesses.

**Thomas Pogge’s Institutional Cosmopolitanism**

The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* defines distributive justice as the “normative principles designed to guide the allocation of the benefits and burdens of economic activity.”

There are many conceptions of distributive justice in the history of political thought. For example, Aristotle argued that distributive justice related to the fair distribution of things like money or honours, according to some standard of merit. Many cosmopolitans, influenced as they are by Kant, have adopted the understanding of distributive justice promoted by yet another Kantian, John Rawls. Rawls’ distributive justice concerns itself with the “basic structure” of a society, or “the way in which the major social institutions—for example, markets in capital and labor, bequeathed rights to private property—determine the division of advantages in society.” Rawls himself calls this “social justice” and “the primary subject of justice” because the effects of these arrangements “are so profound and present from the start.” These institutions impact our life outcomes and generally result in some form of inequality.

Thomas Pogge is one of the most influential contemporary theorists of cosmopolitanism, having developed a concept of distributive justice applicable at the international level. Clearly inspired by Kant and Rawls, Pogge declares that he is interested in “promot[ing] moral progress” and in furthering the cause of global justice.

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7 Ibid.
through the fulfillment of human rights and their associated duties and obligations. In a widely cited article, he identifies three elements that are, he says, “shared by all cosmopolitan positions”:

First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. . . . Second, *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, *generality*: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone—not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or such like. Although Kant does not use Pogge’s language of individualism, Kant’s moral philosophy (and cosmopolitanism itself) is based on the principle that individuals, as bearers of reason, are owed a fundamental respect that transcends ties to family, tribe, or nation. Pogge’s second principle, universality, is clearly the universality of Kant’s CI: the respect attaching to the individual attaches to *all* individuals equally, regardless of various irrelevant attributes like sex, race, or religion. Finally, Pogge’s generality principle seems to say that individuals or persons are owed this respect *by* everyone.

Although all forms of cosmopolitanism share these central principles in Pogge’s view, he distinguishes two major forms: legal and moral. Pogge defines legal cosmopolitanism quite narrowly as the “concrete political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a

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9 Ibid., 48-49.
10 Katrin Flikschuh argues persuasively that Kant’s cosmopolitanism is not individualistic and that thinkers like Pogge have read too much of John Rawls’ contractualism back into Kant. See Katrin Flikschuh, “Kant’s Non-Individualist Cosmopolitanism,” in *Kant and the Future of the European Enlightenment*, ed. Heiner F. Klemme (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 425-447.
11 To be honest, I have trouble explaining Pogge’s universality and generality principles in any fashion more subtle than the distinction I offer here. The best way I can think of to summarize universality and generality is by resorting to an oft-cited passage from Rousseau on the General Will, that it “comes from all and applies to all.”
12 Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” 49.
universal republic.” For Pogge, legal cosmopolitanism basically transposes the nation-state model to the global level via some form of world government. Given the risk of ending up with a world-girdling despotic regime (as Kant also feared), Pogge prefers the alternative of decentralized, local forms of governance nested over different territorial levels. Diversity would fare better under such a system, he argues, since local political arrangements could more easily address the concerns of particular cultural and social groups. Furthermore, it would be much simpler for such a scheme to come into existence, as a single world government would require the negation of nation-states, a scenario that Pogge can only imagine in the context of revolution or global catastrophe.

Pogge is, however, far more concerned with moral cosmopolitanism. In contrast to legal cosmopolitanism, Pogge writes,

\textit{Moral cosmopolitanism holds that all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another: we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern—a requirement that imposes limits upon our conduct and in particular, upon our efforts to construct institutional schemes.}

Pogge concedes that moral cosmopolitanism is more abstract, and therefore potentially weaker, than its legal counterpart. Furthermore, its definition is so broad that it could inform countless variations, as I have suggested already. Pogge chooses to emphasize human rights, and introduces a further conceptual distinction to better delineate his focus. \textit{Interactional} conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism emphasize “certain fundamental principles of ethics,” and according to Pogge, relate directly to the conduct of individuals.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[13] Ibid. This version of cosmopolitanism is often called political or institutional cosmopolitanism in the literature, and often has a broader definition.
  \item[14] Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” 63.
  \item[15] Ibid.
  \item[16] Ibid., 49.
\end{itemize}
and groups. From this perspective, “human rights impose constraints on conduct;” for example, one should not purchase products made using child or prison labour. These duties are imposed on everyone and apply to everyone. Institutional conceptions, on the other hand, emphasize “certain fundamental principles of justice,” and therefore relate to overarching institutional standards and “shared practices” rather than individual behaviour. Responsibility for monitoring human rights, from the institutional perspective, should be transferred to institutions rather than being dependent on individual behaviour. Classic examples would be the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the International Labour Organization’s treaties forbidding child or forced labour and permitting unionization, as discussed in the introduction. Individual nations are party to these treaties, which in turn require enforcement by an institution like the United Nations.

While institutional and interactional conceptions of cosmopolitanism can be combined, Pogge favours a form in which the institutional variant is dominant. Institutional cosmopolitanism does not require that every single injustice on the planet be eliminated. Instead, it requires that “one ought not to participate in an unjust institutional scheme,” at least without attempting to reform the institution or aid the victims of the injustice. Individuals have the more limited duty, then, to refuse to cooperate in unjust

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17 Ibid., 50. Most cosmopolitan thinkers call Pogge’s interactional cosmopolitanism “moral cosmopolitanism,” and his institutional cosmopolitanism “political” or “legal” cosmopolitanism. The many labels involved in cosmopolitanism add to the difficulties in defining it clearly.
18 Ibid., 50.
19 Ibid., 51n7.
20 Ibid., 50. This is the key Rawlsian contribution to Pogge’s theory; Rawls’ A Theory of Justice puts forward a framework for deciding the basic institutions of a just society.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 51.
23 Ibid., 50.
24 Ibid.
institutions. Pogge suggests that the institutional variant therefore offers a “more plausible overall morality.” But there are instances in which institutional cosmopolitanism imposes a more demanding obligation. Pogge examines the issue of slavery. If there is a human right not to be enslaved, the interactionalist has a relatively straightforward duty not to enslave anyone, and perhaps not to purchase products made using forced labour. Few would argue that the interactionalist must also wander the globe eradicating slavery. But from the institutional perspective, we have the added duty of not participating in global institutions that support slavery without trying to reform those institutions. It is no longer adequate to shake off responsibility by claiming that one’s only obligation is “to refrain from violating human rights directly.”

Pogge stresses that rich developed nations cannot simply close their eyes to the institutions in which they participate that permit violations of human rights. We cannot see ourselves as “morally disconnected from the fate of the less fortunate. . . ,” even if we did not personally bring about that misfortune. If we are not working to reform these institutions, we are effectively “cooperating in the enslavement,” and very likely even benefitting from its existence. While we are still not personally required to rid the world of slavery, Pogge summarizes,

We are asked to be concerned about human rights violations not simply insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are

\[\text{\underline{\text{\small\textit{\cite{25}}}}\quad \text{Ibid., 51.}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\small\textit{\cite{26}}}}\quad \text{Ibid.}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\small\textit{\cite{27}}}}\quad \text{Pogge does not provide a list of the institutions that he considers to be implicated in global inequality. For this reason, I assume that it is broad and encompasses global organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, but also “institutions” more generally defined as international law, trade agreements, and lending policies.}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\small\textit{\cite{28}}}}\quad \text{Ibid., 52.}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\small\textit{\cite{29}}}}\quad \text{Ibid.}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\small\textit{\cite{30}}}}\quad \text{Ibid.}}\]
\[\text{\underline{\text{\small\textit{\cite{31}}}}\quad \text{Ibid.}}\]
produced by social institutions in which we are significant participants.\textsuperscript{32}

For Pogge, the most realistic way to ensure the justice of economic, social, and political schemes is through the institutional variant of moral cosmopolitanism.

Even though Pogge has distanced himself from what he calls legal cosmopolitanism (the creation of an actual world state) on one hand, and interactional moral cosmopolitanism (the imposition of a code of ethics on all individual behaviour) on the other, his institutional moral cosmopolitanism is actually quite radical. He suggests that, whether we like it or not, we are already cosmopolitan or global citizens, or as he puts it, “participants in a single, global institutional scheme.”\textsuperscript{33} There is, for example, a well-developed system of international law, not to mention a global system of trade. Because of these historical developments, Pogge argues, “human rights violations have come to be, at least potentially, everyone’s concern.”\textsuperscript{34} This passage seemingly echoes Kant’s contention in \textit{Perpetual Peace} that “a transgression of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere.”\textsuperscript{35} A person is a cosmopolitan or global citizen by virtue of his or her participation in the globalized world, particularly through our economic activities, which intentionally or otherwise have global ramifications. People are therefore obligated to ensure that their nations are not participating in unjust institutions.

Furthermore, Pogge insists that we are responsible for \textit{reforming} unjust global institutions. We should not treat “as natural or God-given the existing global institutional framework”\textsuperscript{36} because it is like all institutions, a human construct amenable to change.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 51.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Immanuel Kant, \textit{To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Quest}, in \textit{Perpetual Peace and Other Essays}, 119.
\textsuperscript{36} Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” 53.
Pogge argues that our current global institutional scheme is no doubt responsible for some of the deprivations experienced by poorer countries, and some of the advantages received by their richer counterparts. In particular, he implicates economic institutions and the “centrifugal tendencies of certain free-market schemes.” At minimum, the scheme that favours wealthy countries perpetuates inequality. Surely, he argues, there are “alternative global regimes” that would at least ameliorate inequality. Pogge therefore imposes a greater burden on the wealthy western countries:

[W]e – privileged citizens of powerful and approximately democratic countries – share a collective responsibility for the justice of the existing global order and hence also for any contribution it may make to the incidence of human rights violations.

Pogge sees this principle echoed in Section 29 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which reads, “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forward in this Declaration can be fully realized.” Persons are to be held responsible for their participation in all political, economic and social institutions that they are able to change and make more just. Moreover, the moral responsibility to change the institutional schemes in which one participates increases with the relative position of power one holds in society—the wealthy (and more powerful) share a larger burden to ensure that the institutions they participate in are made more just, whether locally or globally.

In World Poverty and Human Rights, Pogge provides more explicit examples of the complicity of the West in global poverty. He grants that many poor countries

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
have been afflicted with incompetent and corrupt leaders indifferent to the plight of their people.\textsuperscript{41} Yet the West has entered World Trade Organization agreements with Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Indonesia while these countries were ruled by corrupt dictators or juntas. Canada recently signed a trade deal with the Honduran government, winner of an election not recognized by most international observers following a military coup.\textsuperscript{42} We sell these countries weapons, look the other way to the payment of bribes by our businessmen, and provide safe havens for wealth stolen by their elite.\textsuperscript{43} Perhaps even more destructively, the West happily enters arrangements with the rulers of these countries for loans that further indebt their nations, and for the sale of resources that inadequately compensate their people.\textsuperscript{44} “These international privileges,” Pogge asserts, “facilitate oppressive rule and greatly encourage coup attempts and civil wars. . . .”\textsuperscript{45} Pogge adds that these undervalued resources—of which we use a disproportionate amount—are a key component of our relative wealth.\textsuperscript{46} The disadvantage of these poorer nations is ultimately, therefore, our advantage.

In order to redress this situation, Pogge advocates numerous institutional reforms, such as a Global Resources Dividend (a global tax on the extraction and consumption of natural resources),\textsuperscript{47} the Tobin Tax (a global tax on financial transactions),\textsuperscript{48} and a proposal to encourage the distribution of appropriate

\textsuperscript{41} Thomas Pogge, \textit{World Poverty and Human Rights}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 28.
\textsuperscript{42} For some background, see Council of Canadians, “Canada-Honduras FTA about mining and sweatshop protection, foreign affairs committee hears,” March 9, 2011, \url{http://www.canadians.org/tradeblog/?p=1380}.
\textsuperscript{43} Pogge, \textit{World Poverty and Human Rights}, 28.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 29-30.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 202-20.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 117.
pharmaceutical drugs in poor countries.\textsuperscript{49} Pogge is adamant that such initiatives should not be interpreted as “helping the poor,”\textsuperscript{50} but rather as “protecting them from the effects of global rules whose injustice benefits us and is our responsibility.”\textsuperscript{51} As such, we have a cosmopolitan duty to engage in such reforms.

Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism is a demanding moral and political philosophy. I argue, in fact, that Pogge has proposed the means by which Kant’s CI and attendant cosmopolitanism can be plausibly actualized. The CI—act as if the maxim of your action were to become a universal law, in such a way that you treat humanity as an end in itself, and as if you are living in a kingdom of ends—imposes a strict moral code on individual behaviour. Kant argues that the CI could inspire a cosmopolitan federation of nations, and he appears to imagine world leaders eventually consenting to such an arrangement. At the same time, Kant expresses pessimism for the prospects of cosmopolitanism, in part because of his deep cynicism regarding the actions of those very leaders. In Pogge’s language, Kant combines both interactional and institutional cosmopolitanism. Pogge has contributed to the theory of cosmopolitanism by illuminating a way for the average citizen to promote it. It is unrealistic, as discussed above, to expect individuals to roam the world eradicating injustices such as slavery. However, the citizen can have an impact institutionally, by pressuring his or her state through its various international partnerships and treaties to eradicate slavery. Similarly, the citizen can pressure his or her state to fulfill its own international obligations—such as fealty to the various UN treaties—and to provide redress for those institutions that

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 236-60.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
are promoting or maintaining inequality. Citizens have indeed demanded reforms like this all over the world. Outside of pressuring the state, individuals can support reforms such as the Tobin tax and Global Resources Dividend. Pogge has therefore provided very concrete suggestions for cosmopolitan change, and helped the philosophy to address the charge that it is vague and imprecise.

**Martha Nussbaum on the Role of Education in Cosmopolitanism**

Martha Nussbaum is a second illustrious contributor to contemporary cosmopolitanism. Like Pogge, she is a moral cosmopolitan. However, she focuses almost exclusively on the conduct of individuals rather than the practices of institutions. Influenced by the Roman Stoics as well as Kant, Nussbaum places renewed emphasis on the role that reason plays in the cosmopolitan project. We must, she argues, “recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.” Only cosmopolitanism, she continues, makes this demand of individuals.

Nussbaum acknowledges a fundamental problem in the cosmopolitan tradition. It is one thing to acknowledge that there is a moral law requiring us to respect persons and treat them as ends in themselves. We can appreciate on an intellectual level that we should be concerned about the fate of people around the world. However, it is quite another to summon the same depth of feeling for distant people that we do for our family, friends, and fellow citizens. Nussbaum observes:

Most of us are brought up to believe that all human beings have equal moral worth. At least the world’s major religions and most secular philosophies tell us so. But our emotions don’t believe it. We mourn for those we know, not for those we don’t know. And

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most of us feel deep emotions about America, emotions we don’t feel about India, or Russia, or Rwanda.\textsuperscript{53}

Our intellectual understanding that all humans have equal moral worth is therefore in conflict with our more parochial feelings.\textsuperscript{54} Many critics argue that cosmopolitanism is a doomed ideal for this very reason.\textsuperscript{55}

Nussbaum responds to this criticism with the Stoic argument that education can play a role in creating world citizens.\textsuperscript{56} Compassion is not a blind emotion, she argues, but rather contains a component of reason and can therefore be cultivated. Paraphrasing Aristotle, she writes that in order to feel compassion, we have to understand that someone is undergoing considerable suffering not of his or her own doing. We also have to believe that we could experience a similar fate.\textsuperscript{57}

According to Nussbaum, this interpretation of compassion opens the door to a role for education. If people were to learn more about the suffering of people around the world, it is possible that they would ultimately come to feel more compassion. Nussbaum therefore proposes that global citizenship, rather than national citizenship, should become the focus of civic education.\textsuperscript{58}

A cosmopolitan education would serve multiple purposes. Nussbaum argues that learning about other cultures can help to rid students of the belief that our way

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., xiii.
\textsuperscript{55} Many of the essays in \textit{For Love of Country}? are written by scholars criticizing cosmopolitanism from a communitarian or “patriot” perspective.
\textsuperscript{56} Nussbaum, “Introduction: Cosmopolitan Emotions?” xi.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. In this essay, Nussbaum briefly summarizes the Aristotelian position. She discusses compassion or pity in greater length in, “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion,” \textit{Social Philosophy and Policy} 13, no. 1 (1996): 27-58. Aristotle’s analysis of pity takes place in his \textit{Rhetoric}; the three components are outlined at 1385b13ff where he says “Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours. . . .” See \textit{Rhetoric}, in \textit{The Complete Works of Aristotle}, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984). Nussbaum notes that “pity” did not attain the somewhat condescending sense that it now has until the Victorian era (“Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion,” 29.)
\textsuperscript{58} Martha C. Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” 11.
of doing things is the natural or only way.\textsuperscript{59} Simply telling students to respect the basic human rights of others, she argues, is probably inadequate. Instead, students need to be given far more information about other cultures. Nussbaum uses the examples of child-rearing and care for elders.\textsuperscript{60} If we didn’t learn about other cultures, we would assume that the isolated nuclear family is the only way to raise a family. Similarly, we would assume that it is perfectly natural to place seniors in old-age homes. An education for world citizenship can show us the contingency of our practices and beliefs. Learning more about other cultures and geographies, Nussbaum asserts, is likely the only way that we will be able to cooperate to solve difficult global problems, such as environmental degradation.\textsuperscript{61}

Nussbaum also argues that education for GC would help students recognize that we have moral obligations extending beyond national boundaries.\textsuperscript{62} She illustrates using the example of the high standard of living attained in the United States. There is evidence that it will be impossible for everyone on the planet to live in the same fashion without causing ecological catastrophe.\textsuperscript{63} Taking Kant seriously, as Nussbaum insists we must, our way of life cannot be universalized. The Kantian moral demand to treat everyone with equal respect and dignity necessitates coming face to face with this uncomfortable fact: we are permitting ourselves to live in a way that cannot be open to others. If we fail to address this issue in our classrooms, “we are educating a nation of moral hypocrites … whose universe has a self-

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 11-12.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 12-13.
serving, narrow scope. What we say and think is not congruent with what we do. Thus, a cosmopolitan education may be a prerequisite to our making some concessions to our standard of living, redistributing wealth, and acknowledging the limitations of the planet’s resources.

Finally, and perhaps most controversially, a cosmopolitan education is necessary to help children to transcend the “morally arbitrary” boundary of the nation when they are engaged in democratic deliberation. Nussbaum challenges those who defend patriotism as a worthy educational goal, alleging that it often borders on jingoism. She also observes that it is contradictory to preach the virtues of a multicultural society on the one hand, while tolerating indifference to the very countries that contribute citizens to that society on the other. For example, we have Canadian citizens of Chinese and Sri Lankan descent, yet we do not truly consider the welfare of Chinese and Sri Lankans in our deliberations on justice. “What is it about the national boundary,” she asks, “that magically converts people toward whom we are both incurious and indifferent into people whom we have duties of mutual respect?” If we want to be true to our purported multiculturalism, we must take cosmopolitan education seriously.

In conclusion, Nussbaum uses cosmopolitanism to make a persuasive argument for distributive justice, much as Pogge did. But Nussbaum is more concerned about changing individual attitudes, and therefore draws attention to the role that education must play in the fulfillment of the cosmopolitan ideal. It is well and

64 Ibid., 13.
65 Ibid., 14.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
good to argue that institutions might be better able to address distributive justice or
the upholding of human rights, and to contend that the maintenance of a strict
Kantian morality for all individual actions is unrealistic. But if individuals are to
pressure institutions to take distributive justice seriously, they have to feel
compassion for people around the world. Nussbaum’s emphasis on interactional
morality, or individual behaviour, may be the necessary first step. Some of the
principles of GC that I outlined in the first chapter, particularly those pertaining to
the personal transformation required of global citizens, appear to be greatly
influenced by arguments like Nussbaum’s. Education is an important component
of GC because so many people have little understanding of the lives of others
around the world.

**Common Criticisms of Cosmopolitanism and Global Citizenship**

Cosmopolitanism has many vocal critics. In the following, I will briefly outline
three related criticisms: that moral cosmopolitanism is too abstract and impersonal,
that it inadequately addresses the problem of moral distance, and that its appeal to
universalism ignores cultural difference. I will also provide various rejoinders from
the moral cosmopolitan position, in the process providing a yet fuller clarification
of the philosophy.

A good number of critics have charged that moral cosmopolitanism is too
abstract and impersonal. Gertrude Himmelfarb, for example, asserts that
cosmopolitanism asks us to disregard “essential attributes” of our character: our ties
to “parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition,
community—and nationality.”\textsuperscript{68} Recall that Nussbaum stated that the boundaries of the state are “morally arbitrary” and should not play any role in our democratic deliberations. Himmelfarb maintains that, to the contrary, such attributes are what define us.\textsuperscript{69} If we were truly to act as though those ties did not matter, Himmelfarb suggests that we would scarcely be human. Benjamin Barber similarly suggests that Nussbaum “understates the thinness of cosmopolitanism” and counters that the “idea of cosmopolitanism offers little or nothing for the human psyche to fasten on.”\textsuperscript{70} Michael McConnell aims his criticism at the educational aspirations of moral cosmopolitans and GC advocates like Nussbaum:

> Teach children . . . to become “citizens of the world,” and in all likelihood they will become neither patriots nor cosmopolitans, but lovers of abstraction and ideology, intolerant of the flaw-ridden individuals and cultures that actually exist throughout the world.\textsuperscript{71}

McConnell maintains that the cosmopolitan’s appeal to “what we share with other humans as rational beings” is an inadequate basis for a moral community.\textsuperscript{72} As a consequence, cosmopolitan education will not only fail in its stated goal, but could even undermine the ties individuals currently have for their communities.\textsuperscript{73}

This is strong criticism, suggesting as it does that cosmopolitanism is too impersonal to be of much appeal to anyone other than a coolly detached philosopher. Nussbaum herself notes the aloofness of some of Marcus Aurelius’ prose.\textsuperscript{74} Toni Erskine observes that this type of criticism is part of a larger

\textsuperscript{68} Gertrude Himmelfarb, ‘The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism’, in \textit{For Love of Country?}, 77.  
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{70} Benjamin R. Barber, “Constitutional Faith,” in \textit{For Love of Country?}, 33.  
\textsuperscript{71} Michael W. McConnell, “Don’t Neglect the Little Platoon,” in \textit{For Love of Country?}, 81.  
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 82.  
\textsuperscript{74} Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” 15.
movement challenging “impartialist” moral theories. Erskine highlights, in particular, feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan, who criticize the “skeletal lives” of the abstractions populating much of contemporary moral philosophy. Gilligan defends what she calls an ethic of care, centred on relationships, responsibility, and non-violence as an alternative to abstract theories of justice and rights. Tony Burns adds that the debate between cosmopolitans and so-called patriots is very similar to the older battle between liberals and communitarians, largely fought on the terrain of John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*. Rawls proposed a modern social contract theory where individuals choose the basic structure of society (key for his understanding of distributive justice, as I noted earlier in this chapter) from behind a veil of ignorance, where they know nothing of their social status, age, intelligence, strength, health, or values. Rawls, too, was criticized for this “ethically emaciated” understanding of the self. Alistair MacIntyre, for example, argues that the impartiality Rawls sought was neither possible nor desirable, as each individual has a “moral particularity” stemming from his or her various ties. Given Pogge’s obvious Rawlsian connection, it is not surprising that his work is subject to similar challenges.

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75 Toni Erskine, “‘Citizen of nowhere’ or ‘the point where circles intersect’? Impartialist and embedded cosmopolitanisms,” *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 3 (July 2002), 459.
76 Ibid., 461.
81 Ibid.
Erskine is sympathetic to these criticisms, particularly of the “impartialist” cosmopolitanism of Nussbaum and Pogge. However, she argues that both sides of the debate make valid arguments and overstate the errors of their opponents.\footnote{Ibid., 460.} Justice necessitates some kind of universalism beyond our particular, communal experiences. We cannot simply favour fellow citizens when we deliberate on such vital matters as the use of scarce natural resources.\footnote{Ibid., 462.} It is also true that communities can be the source of prejudice, and even “oppression and exclusion.” We must therefore subject them to criticism where merited.\footnote{Ibid., 471.} On the other hand, opponents of abstract universalism are correct that it is impossible to be perfectly impartial. Our particular ties influence us, and cannot be completely overlooked.

Wanting to retain the contributions of both perspectives, Erskine proposes an “embedded cosmopolitanism,” drawing on feminist theorists such as Marilyn Friedman and Onora O’Neill.\footnote{Ibid., 461.} From O’Neill, Erskine borrows the idea that our sense of self is a combination of many influences, as we identify with multiple people and things.\footnote{Ibid., 470-71.} We may be, for example, Canadians, but we are also students, teachers, tennis players, and environmentalists. Erskine observes that this understanding of identity corresponds to the Stoic cosmopolitan image of the concentric circles of identity, starting close to home but eventually encompassing people far away from us.\footnote{Ibid., 471} Friedman makes a similar claim, arguing that “[h]uman beings participate in a variety of communities and social relationships, not only
across time but at any one time.” Friedman also introduces the concept of “communities of choice.” While we are all born into specific families, communities and countries, we may choose to “establish new relationships and participate in different communities.” These communities, in turn, need not be spatially bounded or explicitly tied to a specific state. Communities can have “geographically dispersed memberships,” and one community can integrate with another. Therefore, while community may indeed be morally constitutive, there is nothing to stop us from participating in multiple communities and communities that extend beyond national boundaries.

For Erskine, these understandings of identity and community—morally constitutive, overlapping, and non-territorial—open the way to her embedded cosmopolitanism. This cosmopolitanism accepts that particular associations and ties have moral force. However, communities need no longer be restricted to the local or the national, and may indeed overlap with other communities. It may be possible to exploit these various ties and takes advantage of “the moral force of particular associations.” Erskine summarizes

While moral commitments cannot be derived from our ‘common humanity’, inclusion arises from respect for the ethical standing of a fellow moral agent with whom one shares membership in any one of a multitude of particular, often transnational, overlapping, territorial and non-territorial morally constitutive communities.

89 Ibid., 472.
90 Ibid., 469.
91 Ibid., 472.
92 Ibid., 474.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 475.
For Erskine, we are never the abstract, impersonal agent of impartialist cosmopolitanism. However, our membership in multiple communities, some of which transcend borders, can give us a “critical edge” that may help us to challenge norms. These memberships may also form the basis of a wider community, giving us a greater understanding of people like us in some ways, but unlike us in others. Erskine’s embedded cosmopolitan approach therefore seeks to accommodate the impartialist cosmopolitan demand for universal inclusivity while retaining a situated self deriving moral substance from its social context.

Despite these persuasive arguments, Erskine sometimes seems merely to assert that a socially constructed identity based on membership in multiple overlapping communities offers a more robust account of moral commitment to fellow human beings. I am also not convinced that it is impossible to derive a moral commitment from our “common humanity,” as Erskine states above and as many critics of cosmopolitanism argue. I am sure that I am not the only person who felt pity for the dying Muammar Gaddafi, despite his many atrocities, just as one example. There are also numerous instances in history where people from the same community, or even from the same family, found themselves torn apart by some heretofore unrecognized difference, resulting in bloodshed and civil war.

Nevertheless, Erskine’s is an argument that attempts to synthesize the two opposing perspectives of cosmopolitan universalism and what some have called moral

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95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 468.
97 For example, a civil war broke out in Greece following World War II, stemming from left/right political differences. It was not unusual for people from the same family to take different sides in the conflict, and many Greeks consider the episode worse than WWII itself for that reason.
particularism,\textsuperscript{98} perhaps a more useful alternative than simply considering these standpoints incommensurable and therefore completely rejecting one in favor of the other. The promotion of communities that cross borders, ethnicities, religions, and the like could indeed help to educate people about various international issues, and create a greater sense of fellowship. It certainly cannot hurt.

There is a second common criticism of cosmopolitanism. I noted above that Martha Nussbaum draws on Aristotle’s analysis of pity in her defence of cosmopolitan education, agreeing that we feel more compassion when suffering is closer to our front door. Nussbaum, however, does not spend much time addressing one of the key components of Aristotle’s discussion. Aristotle observed that we feel pity when we imagine that the same [bad] thing could happen to us. But he cautions that those “who imagine themselves immensely fortunate” may be less prone to feeling compassion for others, because they are less able to imagine themselves in dire circumstances.\textsuperscript{99} In my own teaching of GC, I experience this very situation. While it is not universally the case that my relatively privileged students seem less empathetic, I do get a more enthusiastic reception when I’m teaching my less privileged students. These observations highlight what may be an inherent difficulty in teaching about Canada’s wealth and consumption of resources compared to other countries. I will return to this theme in the thesis’s conclusion.

Andrew Dobson furnishes another interpretation of cosmopolitanism, this time in part designed to address this concern. Dobson describes popular conceptions of moral cosmopolitanism such as Pogge’s as “thin.” It is not that Pogge is insincere

in his commitment to global justice. Indeed, Pogge is one of the most astute critics of global inequality today. “How can severe poverty of half of humankind continue,” Pogge despairs, “despite enormous economic and technological progress and despite the enlightened moral norms and values of our heavily dominant Western civilization?” Dobson’s criticism is, rather, that Pogge’s appeal to our membership in a common humanity provides inadequate motivation for political action. The Kantian CI, philosophically elegant though it may be, cannot do the heavy lifting of persuading someone to do cosmopolitanism.

In Dobson’s view, the central dilemma of moral cosmopolitanism is “the distance that separates us from one another and that makes obligations seem supererogatory rather than strict.” This distance is geographic, as Nussbaum acknowledges, but it is also cultural and social. This is the identical problem highlighted by Aristotle in his analysis of pity centuries ago. Although Dobson doesn’t reference Aristotle, he cites Pogge, who is certainly aware of the dilemma:

> We live in extreme isolation from poverty. We do not know people scarred by losing a child to hunger, diarrhea, or measles, do not know anyone earning less than $10 for a 72-hour week of hard, monotonous labor. If we had such people as friends or neighbors, many more of us would believe that world poverty demands serious moral reflection and many more of us would hold that we should all help to eradicate this problem.

Dobson argues that the recognition of our common humanity “seems not to bring such others near enough.” Our sense of compassion and moral obligation loses

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102 Ibid., 170.
104 Ibid., 171.
its force when we are confronted with the specter of individuals very different from ourselves, suffering at a great distance.

Dobson tries to address these issues with his concept of “thick cosmopolitanism.” He does not reject the Kantian principle of universal respect for others. Rather, he casts the debate in terms of political obligation. There are traditionally two basic approaches to obligation, he argues: one informed by charity and the other by justice or causal responsibility. Cosmopolitanism, Dobson maintains, places too much emphasis on charitable obligation, and the duty to perform charitable acts is not traditionally viewed as absolute. In Kant’s language, the duty of charity is “broad,” “meritorious,” or “imperfect.” It does not have to be practiced on all occasions, or on behalf of specific persons.\(^{105}\) It is an obligation of beneficence, merely desirable to fulfill, rather than one of justice, which is mandatory to fulfill.\(^ {106}\)

Dobson uses the parable of the Good Samaritan to illustrate. A man has been robbed and beaten and is lying at the side of the road. Two men pass by, one of whom is even a priest, and neither come to the man’s aid. The third man, the Samaritan, treats the man’s wounds and carries him to safety, leaving money for his care. The Samaritan does not know the wounded man, and did not cause his suffering.\(^ {107}\) Therefore, the Samaritan’s act is “superogatory;” he is not morally compelled to aid the man, but acts out of benevolence. Dobson argues that this story has been so resonant through the ages because the Samaritan’s behaviour is

\(^{105}\) Kant, *Grounding*, 32.
\(^{106}\) Dobson, “Thick Cosmopolitanism,” 168.
\(^{107}\) Ibid., 171.
out of the ordinary. Yet, according to Dobson, cosmopolitanism appears to depend on widespread Samaritanism in order to succeed.

In contrast, drawing on an idea introduced by Andrew Linklater, Dobson argues that cosmopolitanism should place more emphasis on obligations based on causal responsibility. These are duties arising out of the recognition that we have caused at least some of the harms that cosmopolitanism is trying to redress. Dobson, following Linklater, asserts that we will “feel more strongly obliged to respond to the suffering and disadvantage of others if we are responsible for it in some degree or other. . . .”108 This claim opens the door to “thick” cosmopolitanism, precisely because it introduces the possibility of “a thicker connection between people than appeals to membership of common humanity.”109 An obligation based on causal responsibility is one of justice, a much stronger obligation than that of charity:

If I cause someone harm I am required as a matter of justice to rectify that harm. If, on the other hand, I bear no responsibility for the harm, justice requires nothing of me—and although beneficence may be desirable I cannot be held to account . . . for not exercising it.110

Cosmopolitans must, therefore, place more emphasis on establishing obligations based on causal responsibility.

Dobson uses two key examples to make his case: global warming and the globalization of trade. The west has a tendency to view its aid to countries that are experiencing environmental catastrophes as charity. Indeed, aid is charity. But given what we know about global warming, consumption of resources in the relatively wealthy west may very well be leading to dire environmental

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108 Ibid., 172.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
consequences in developing nations. Dobson gives the example of flooding in Mozambique in 2000; one could easily add increased flooding in Bangladesh and the rising sea levels threatening the Maldives, Tuvalu, and the Cook Islands. An argument can be made that global warming is connecting our lives in a way that makes our response to these catastrophes one of justice rather than charity.\textsuperscript{111} Dobson adds that the concept of “ecological footprint,” a measure of the consumption of resources by an individual, an activity, or even a nation, can serve as a rough proxy for the extent of our obligation.\textsuperscript{112}

The second example relates to our participation in the global economy. Dobson refers to a report by Oxfam that claims that large retailers, such as Wal-Mart, and Toys 'R Us, use their power to force suppliers to deliver inventory at a lower price and faster pace. This pressure, of course, leads to reduced wages and poorer working conditions for workers in the countries manufacturing the goods.\textsuperscript{113} Because we benefit from these lower prices, Dobson argues that “anyone who consumes goods from [these retailers] is subject to the charge of complicity in transnational harm—the avoidance of which is a key cosmopolitan injunction.”\textsuperscript{114} Dobson concludes that the links between consumer and producer are no different than if we bought some garden produce over the fence from our neighbour. We do not need to learn to feel empathy for these distant individuals, or feel symbolically linked by our common humanity. “The relationships of which I speak” Dobson

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 173-4.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 177.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 178.
stresses, “are material rather than mental.”

Rather, we need to understand and accept our material obligations of justice.

The GC textbook I referred to in chapter one similarly distinguishes between charity and social justice. The authors point out the universal quality of charity, for instance, as a critical element in all the world’s major religions, but question its efficacy to address serious inequality. The crucial limitation of charity is that it leaves the “root cause unaddressed.” In contrast, the authors state that “social justice initiatives often raise questions about how society is arranged and whether people in positions of privilege and power owe something to those who are not.”

Justice therefore demands more of us than charity. This argument seems to be explicitly influenced by Dobson-style reasoning.

While Pogge certainly acknowledges our direct responsibility for some of the ills in the world, Dobson suggests that cosmopolitans have been reluctant to define our obligations in terms of justice because they are afraid that these obligations are not universal. It is surely true that the wealthy west is not responsible for every ill on the planet, and that compassion and charity can potentially refer to a broader range of ailments than can justice. But Dobson maintains that globalization has rendered obligations based on justice “very pervasive indeed,” even if they are not

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115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Doug Kerr and Sarah Duffy, “Making a Difference Through Social Action,” in Global Citizenship: From Social Analysis to Social Action, 172. To illustrate the contrast between the two approaches, I refer my students to the Giving Pledge website created by Warren Buffet and Bill and Melinda Gates. They invite the “wealthiest individuals and families in America [billionaires only] to commit to giving the majority of their wealth to the philanthropic causes and charitable organizations of their choice either during their lifetime or after their death” noting that this pledge is a “moral commitment to give, not a legal contract.” See The Giving Pledge, http://givingpledge.org/#enter. While I point out to my students the growing number of billionaires who make the pledge, I remind them that they are not legally obligated (or otherwise ‘motivated’ to participate in social justice schemes, say in terms of paying a socially adequate corporate tax rate on their businesses’ immense profits). They reserve the right to change their minds.
truly universal. Dobson also questions Pogge’s reliance on institutional reform, explaining that while this is surely important, “[i]nstitutions and their processes may seem too remote for complicit individuals to feel that they can do much about changing their direction, so the call for action quickly degenerates into a set of reasons for inaction.” For Dobson, individual action is still essential, as we are, as he has stressed, complicit. While some of the work we must do requires engaging with institutions, our political commitment must be more routine and “everyday.”

With this account, Dobson’s emphasis on the role of individuals in assuming responsibility and addressing consequent social and global injustice seems to be in full accord with the spirit and letter of moral cosmopolitanism. While Dobson wants to differentiate his approach from Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism, a perspective synthesizing the two could offer a more compelling account of contemporary cosmopolitanism—that is, a theoretical framework encompassing both institutional reform and individual action whereby informed, critical global citizens can effectively engage with social justice issues on a worldwide scale. Individuals must shoulder some responsibility for change, yet institutions are surely in a better position to enforce major cosmopolitan innovations. Empathy may very well be an inadequate motivator for encouraging major cosmopolitan reforms, as Dobson argues, but it is conceivable that in the future, combined pressure from individuals around the world could lead international courts to impose obligations

118 Andrew Dobson, “Thick Cosmopolitanism,” 175.
119 Ibid., 181.
120 Ibid., 182.
on the relatively wealthy west. Thus, both individuals and institutions can and should play a role.

The third and final criticism of cosmopolitanism that I will address—that cosmopolitanism’s appeal to universal principles overlooks or denies cultural difference—is perhaps most associated with postmodernism. Not wanting to get bogged down in definitional quarrels, here I will simply note that postmodernist theorists typically question universalist concepts such as reason and human rights, and universalist narratives such as Kant’s hopeful theory about the triumph of cosmopolitanism. Sometimes it is argued that universals inevitably exclude and oppress, so postmodernists defend particularity and difference (much as Erskine did, for slightly different reasons, above). Judith Butler, for example, cautions that the “universal moral attitude” that cosmopolitanism asks us to adopt will undoubtedly prove to be not so universal.121 “For it may be that in one culture a set of rights are considered to be universally endowed,” she notes, “and that in another those very rights mark the limit to universalizability.”122 Butler gives the example of lesbian and gay human rights, which are certainly not universally accepted.

Wendy Brown makes the slightly different argument that cosmopolitanism may be just another way in which the wealthy West positions itself as superior to other cultures, in contrast to their alleged intolerance and parochialism.123 Although she doesn’t refer to Kant, Brown challenges the Western view of world history, “in which individuals and societies are configured as developing a steadily increasing

121 Judith Butler, “Universality in Culture,” in For Love of Country?, 45
122 Ibid., 46.
democratic, reasoned and cosmopolitan bearing.” Just as colonialism was justified as a “project of civilization,” cosmopolitanism becomes one more thing the West exports to the rest of the less-civilized world. Donald Rumsfeld, it must be remembered, once boasted that the war on terrorism was “a war for human rights.” Cosmopolitanism from this perspective is a tool of colonization and domination. It would not be the first time that an empire has defended its colonial ventures using the language of progress, reason, and peace.

Kwame Anthony Appiah has tried to address the criticism that cosmopolitanism’s universalism might be oppressive of difference and even latently colonialist. He even uses the word “cosmopolitan” with some reluctance, echoing Brown’s concern:

Celebrations of the “cosmopolitan” can suggest an unpleasant posture of superiority toward the putatively provincial. You imagine a Comme des Garçons-clad individual with a platinum frequent-flyer card regarding, with kindly condescension, a ruddy-faced farmer in workman’s overalls.

For Appiah, however, the core cosmopolitan principle of the equal dignity of all persons need not entail that the philosophy be exclusively universalist. On the contrary, Appiah conceives of a cosmopolitanism—which he calls rooted cosmopolitanism—that values diversity, that is not in favor of a homogenized global culture, and that embraces local differences.

Appiah first of all insists that cosmopolitanism is not exclusively a western ideal. When his father, Joseph Emmanuel, died, he left a message for his children

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124 Ibid., 57.
125 Ibid., 58.
126 Ibid., 53.
reading, “Remember that you are citizens of the world.” Yet Joseph was profoundly patriotic, fighting for the independence of his native Ghana, at that time the Gold Coast. Appiah fondly recalls Kumasi, his home town, with its diverse community of Indians, Iranians, Lebanese, Syrians, Greeks, Hungarians, and English. The “well-travelled polyglot” is just as likely to be rich as poor, Appiah insists, because people have been migrating in search of better lives for millennia. Cosmopolitanism is not merely the privilege of an educated global elite; in some senses, it is a requirement for the world’s poor.

Appiah acknowledges and endorses the central place occupied by the individual in moral cosmopolitanism. This, he remarks, is its distinctly modern aspect. But Appiah refocuses attention on autonomy, a central component of Kantian respect for the individual. Recall that one formula of the CI is that each individual, endowed with reason, is in possession of a will capable of “giving universal law.” We are not merely subject to the CI, we will it ourselves and are therefore self-legislating. For Appiah, the dignity of each human is rooted in this capacity, which he sometimes calls self management. It is best, Appiah continues, “when people live by ideals they believe in.” Respecting “human dignity and personal autonomy” means respecting diversity, including cultural diversity. Happily, cosmopolitans since the time of Diogenes have believed that “there are many

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128 Ibid., xviii.
129 Ibid., xix.
130 Ibid., xviii.
134 Ibid.
values worth living by.”

The cosmopolitan twist is that cultures do not command respect in and of themselves. Rather, cosmopolitans respect culture “because people matter, and culture matters to people.” Thus, it is cosmopolitanism’s respect for individual autonomy that paradoxically leads it to respect cultural differences.

However, there must be some constraints placed on culture, including our own, if the cosmopolitan philosophy is to have any meaning. “We don’t need to treat genocide or human rights abuses,” Appiah contends, “as just another part of the quaint diversity of the species, a local taste that some totalitarians just happen to have.” More generally, Appiah argues that cultural differences must “meet certain general ethical constraints.”

The universal dimension of Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism is similar to that espoused by Pogge. For Appiah, every human being “has certain minimum entitlements,” and these are perhaps best expressed in the “vocabulary of human rights.” Appiah therefore defends a commitment to pluralism, but maintains that there must be limits to tolerance because of the inviolability of the moral status of each individual. Rooted cosmopolitanism further limits its tolerance by insisting that every human being has certain minimal obligations as well. These obligations are also based on the Kantian CI. While a citizen of one country may reserve special treatment for compatriots, he or she is minimally responsible to ensure, to the extent possible, that all other people on the

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137 Ibid., 88.
138 Ibid.
141 Ibid., 96.
planet receive their just entitlements. Primarily, this is a just entitlement to “a dignified human existence.”

Cosmopolitanism means that one can do no less than this, even if one does more for fellow citizens.

Therefore, while Appiah promotes respect for plurality and difference, he simultaneously endorses universal human rights and responsibilities. As Appiah summarizes, his rooted cosmopolitanism can be summed up as “universality plus difference.” If there is a conflict between, say, a custom on the one hand, and universal respect for the dignity of individuals on the other, the latter triumphs. This could, of course, leave Appiah open to the charge of cultural imperialism.

But Appiah’s respect for autonomy leads him to a unique understanding of cultural change. He observes how deeply entrenched practices—in his examples, dueling, slavery, and foot binding—came to a relatively quick end. Their eradication did not depend on a sudden awareness of their barbarity. “Dueling was always murderous and irrational, footbinding was always painfully crippling, slavery was always an assault on the humanity of the slave,” Appiah maintains, even within the cultures engaging in these practices. What did happen was that the respect and recognition granted to practitioners of the old customs was replaced by respect and recognition for practitioners of new customs. Inter-cultural comparisons also played an important role, Appiah suggests. For example, many of the most forceful criticisms of American slavery were British, a fact that appears to

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142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 95.
144 Ibid., 94.
146 Ibid., 12.
have led to an increasing sense of shame in the former colony.\textsuperscript{147} In all cases of successful change, campaigners respected the cultures they were working in, created a core of converts, and developed new institutions that would provide recognition for those converts.\textsuperscript{148}

On one hand, Appiah’s response to the criticism that cosmopolitanism’s universalism is potentially oppressive of cultural difference is perhaps too pat. Cosmopolitanism, in his interpretation, can do everything. It is tolerant of difference, yet a promoter of universal human rights. It embraces autonomy, yet potentially limits it. I suggest that it is difficult to avoid the charge that international human rights (or some other measure of cosmopolitanism or GC) involve the upholding of some kind of universal standard. There is no doubt that specific countries or cultures will not want to uphold that standard, potentially because it is against their cultural norms. But the cosmopolitanism I have outlined up to this point has been for the most part concerned with getting the relatively wealthy West to recognize the impact its actions have had and are having on the rest of the world. In other words, it is trying to force the West to live up to the ideals that the West itself has valorized, and to live up to its own international obligations. Thus, while a particularly tricky aspect of cosmopolitanism does pertain to the establishment of international human rights, we need not be endlessly bogged down with getting other countries to eradicate practices we abhor (however important some of that work might be). There is indeed plenty of work for

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 113-5.
cosmopolitans right here at home. The West would have more credibility were it to address its own hypocrisies first.

**Defining Global Citizenship**

I have covered much ground in this chapter and the previous. Cosmopolitanism and now, GC, have taken me in many directions, some of which may appear only distantly connected. However, I propose that there are three core principles uniting cosmopolitanism and GC. Perhaps the defining principle is the contention that there is a moral code operating above the laws of nations, producing both rights and responsibilities. All cosmopolitans, from Diogenes to Appiah, share this premise. The second principle is that of fundamental respect for persons. Kant’s CI, based on this respect, informs both his cosmopolitanism and that of contemporary GC. Respect for persons is the *reason* we should be cosmopolitan. The third principle is the duty to reform institutions that are producing inequalities from which we benefit. While Pogge and Dobson are perhaps the clearest articulators of this tenet (disagreeing only about the precise nature of the obligation), it animates much of contemporary cosmopolitanism and informs popular understandings of GC via organizations like Oxfam.

There are still vociferous debates about how cosmopolitanism can best be fostered. Should we promote institutional reform, or should we educate our students to become future global citizens? Should we try to create a sense of universal fellowship via reason, as Kant argues, or should we instead try to forge diverse community bonds, and unite via our particularities, as Erskine argues? Is the duty to reform institutions that produce inequality one of perfect obligation, or
imperfect? These disputes, I suggest, enrich cosmopolitanism without fundamentally challenging its core three principles.

I will return to the heart of cosmopolitanism, expressed in these three core principles, in chapter four. But it is time for me to turn to the empirical component of my thesis. I will now explore the internationalization activities of Canadian HEIs, with the ultimate goal of determining how they measure up to this demanding moral philosophy of cosmopolitanism that I have hopefully helped to clarify.
I have thus far argued that the GC promoted by numerous Canadian HEIs is essentially the philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism first and foremost asserts that there is a universal moral code operating above national laws and linking all human beings, based on respect for the dignity of the individual. This moral code produces both rights and responsibilities. Cosmopolitan rights are often linked to the various treaties of the United Nations, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Cosmopolitan duties include public service via the active promotion of the welfare of individuals around the world, or the reform of one’s own government regarding its relationships to other nations. More specifically, contemporary cosmopolitans are concerned about international distributive justice, arguing that institutions that contribute to or maintain global inequality must be transformed. Cosmopolitans also argue that individuals have the more personal duties of learning about other countries, developing empathy, and living a life of moral integrity, so that one’s stated principles are in line with one’s actions.

This chapter marks a fairly dramatic turnaround, as I move from this abstract philosophy invoking first principles and universals to the rather more gritty reality of the internationalization of higher education. I noted in the introduction that a growing number of higher education institutions (HEIs) are actively involved in internationalization. While I will define the term “internationalization” more precisely in
the next few pages, it basically refers to the growing tendency of HEIs to operate on an international rather than a domestic basis. For example, HEIs are increasingly involved in attracting international students and faculty to their domestic campuses, and teaching GC. Similarly, HEIs are now building international branch campuses or offering programs in partnership with other HEIs located around the world. While an argument can be made that universities (and to a much lesser extent, colleges) have always been international in their outlook, the propensity is dramatically more pronounced today.¹

This section will proceed as follows. First, I will present basic information about internationalization, including its definition and data about the size of the market. I will then synthesize the academic literature on internationalization, which I will argue is idealistic if not misleading. I then turn to government documents and HEI business plans, where I uncover a blunter analysis of the essential nature of internationalization. Finally, I assess some of the real world internationalization activities of Canadian HEIs. The contradictions between the philosophy of cosmopolitanism/GC and the reality of internationalization should be glaring and troubling; nonetheless, I will engage in a full analysis of these contradictions in chapter four.

¹ Other terms are sometimes used in place of internationalization. “Cross-border education” may describe off-campus initiatives such as the development of a branch campus, while “trans-national higher education” is defined by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) as “all types of higher education study programmes or set of courses of study, or educational services . . . in which the learners are located in a country different from the one where the awarding institution is based.” See Jane Knight, “The internationalization of higher education: Are we on the right track?” Academic Matters, October-November 2008, 6, http://www.academicmatters.ca/wordpress/assets/AM_SEPT’08.pdf, and Council of Europe/UNESCO “Code of Good Practice in the Provision of Transnational Education,” 31 January 2002, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/recognition/code%20of%20good%20practice_EN.asp.
What is Internationalization?

Canadian scholar Jane Knight has developed one of the most widely cited definitions of the internationalization of higher education, fine-tuning it slightly over the years. Internationalization, according to Knight, is the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of post-secondary education.²

Knight’s definition is intentionally broad, applying at the level of institutions, the education sector (encompassing both public and private players), and nations.³ Furthermore, she argues that the definition is “objective” or “rationale neutral,” as it excludes the different motives that may be driving internationalization.⁴ According to Knight, whether an actor is motivated by profit or the desire to better understand other cultures must be irrelevant at this level of analysis. Knight therefore hopes that the definition can be applied in as many situations and cultures as possible.⁵

Unpacking the terms in the definition, Knight stresses that internationalization is best viewed as an ongoing process. In other words, it must be integrated at the policy level,

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and not be the simple result of one or two unrelated activities like exchange programs or study abroad semesters.\textsuperscript{6} At the heart of the definition, internationalization is concerned with \textit{international} relationships as well as \textit{intercultural} affairs in a single nation.\textsuperscript{7} One might wonder why \textit{global} is included, as it seems to be nearly equivalent to international. Global can certainly capture GC initiatives, and Knight initially claims, somewhat vaguely from my perspective, that the additional term “provide[s] the sense of worldwide scope.”\textsuperscript{8} But in a later aside, Knight clarifies that some practitioners of internationalization, particularly private companies, are “more interested in the global delivery of their programs and services and are not as focused on the international or intercultural dimension. . . .”\textsuperscript{9} In other words, a corporation such as Sylvan Learning might be selling its tutoring services in Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Cayman Islands, yet have no interest in promoting greater understanding of international or intercultural relations.\textsuperscript{10}

Knight continues that this international, intercultural, or global focus must be integrated into the \textit{purpose, functions} or \textit{delivery} of higher education. \textit{Purpose} can refer to the objectives that a nation has for its higher education system, or to the mission or mandate of a particular institution.\textsuperscript{11} Later, I will show how Canadian HEIs have integrated internationalization into their strategic plans. The commonly accepted \textit{functions} of education are teaching, research, and service to the community. For example, HEIs could develop recruitment, hiring, and promotion policies that recognize

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{6} Jane Knight, “Internationalization Remodeled: Definition, Approaches, Rationales,” 12.
\item \textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 11.
\item \textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 12.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Sylvan Learning, “Find a Sylvan Center Near You,” \url{http://tutoring.sylvanlearning.com/find_a_center.cfm}.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Knight, “Internationalization Remodeled,” 12.
\end{itemize}
international/intercultural experience, and support services could be created for international students on campus. Finally, delivery refers to the offering of courses and programs. Some HEIs have started delivering courses or programs in a number of countries; similarly, as noted above, for-profit businesses are now selling their education products around the world. Last but not least, HEIs are delivering courses and conducting research in GC.

Knight’s definition of internationalization makes more sense when one examines the types of activities HEIs are engaging in under its moniker. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the major form of internationalization is represented by students traveling abroad to study. A widely-cited but dated article estimates that international students generated 3% of the total trade in services for OECD nations in 1998. Since the number of foreign students enrolled worldwide increased by 85% between 2000 and 2008 to 3.3 million, their contribution to trade has undoubtedly grown considerably. In Australia, for example, international students replaced tourism as that country’s top services export in 2008, generating $10 billion in revenue. In the United States, international students contributed $16.1 billion to the economy in 2009.

13 Knight, “Internationalization Remodeled,” 12.
14 Ibid.
In Canada, there were 200,000 international students enrolled in universities and colleges in 2010.\textsuperscript{20} Canada is now the sixth top destination country for international students.\textsuperscript{21} The number of international students studying in Canadian universities has tripled since 1998, and increased 10\% in just one year between 2009 and 2010.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, by 2008, international students accounted for 8\% of the total university population, up from 4\% in 1992.\textsuperscript{23} Three-quarters of colleges are recruiting international students, and 81\% are planning on increasing that activity.\textsuperscript{24} Given these figures, it is not surprising that, in 2008, international students in Canada spent $6.5 billion in tuition, accommodation, and discretionary purchases; generated over $291 million in government revenue; and created more than 83,000 jobs.\textsuperscript{25} The economic benefits of international students in this country now exceed those generated from the export of coal or lumber.\textsuperscript{26}

International students are big business.

Student mobility is but one aspect of internationalization, as HEIs have become increasingly itinerant, either on their own or in partnership with other institutions.

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\begin{itemize}
  \item OECD, \textit{Education at a Glance 2010}, 310.
  \item Ibid.
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Sometimes, HEIs establish franchises, and an international partner will be licensed to provide some or all of an educational program in another country. In other cases, HEIs will “twin,” with students completing the first component of a program in their home country and the second with the institution providing the diploma/degree abroad.\textsuperscript{27} If the student receives a qualification from both partners, it is a “double award” arrangement. Virtual or distance learning may also be employed. Although it is less advertised, HEIs are also involved in private sector training initiatives in other countries. Finally, institutions are physically crossing borders, opening branch campuses around the world.\textsuperscript{28}

Unfortunately, there is a shortage of data pertaining to aspects of internationalization other than student mobility.\textsuperscript{29} An Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada study published in 2007 found that 75\% of its responding members were already delivering programs outside of the country, with 194 initiatives in more than 46 countries.\textsuperscript{30} While there were only four completely offshore campuses, twinning programs, distance education, and customized training programs were considerably more popular.\textsuperscript{31} A similar study published in 2010 by the Association of Canadian Community Colleges found that almost 63\% of respondents were involved in delivering programs abroad and 71\% indicating that they planned to increase this activity.\textsuperscript{32} The most popular

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\textsuperscript{28} OECD, “Policy Brief: Internationalization of Higher Education,” 3.


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{32} ACCC, \textit{Internationalizing Canadian Colleges and Institutes}, 3.
\end{footnotesize}
forms of activity involved twinning or double awards. Canada’s colleges are also involved in delivering customized training programs and consultancies. For example, one HEI is managing a corporate training academy for an Egyptian auto company, while another has provided energy training to UAE and Kuwaiti resource firms.

The commitment to GC fits less neatly into this summary of the internationalization activities of Canadian HEIs. At the college level, GC is heralded as a key component of the internationalization process in numerous planning documents and mission statements. But what this actually means in practice is considerably less clear. A 2007 survey of Ontario’s colleges found that GC, or even simply engaging students in international issues, is the area in which the least internationalization activity is being undertaken. This was the case even though internationalization itself was declared a priority for 90% of respondents, and more than 70% had already developed an internationalization strategy. Indeed, the study authors concluded, “very little is being done to expose college students to global issues and inspire them to take action in the

33 Ibid., 10.
34 Ibid; and AUCC, “Knowledge Exports by Canadian Universities,” 3.
classroom, on campus and in their own community. Recentlv, however, several colleges have started teaching GC courses. 

At the university level, 95% of Canadian institutions reference internationalization in their strategic planning documents. GC is again often given direct mention. For example, the University of British Columbia’s strategic plan lists internationalization as one of its five driving principles, stating furthermore that it wants to “make the concept of global citizenship an integral part of undergraduate learning. . . .” The University of Toronto’s planning documents stress the importance of “creating global citizens,” noting that “Canada needs more citizens who understand and can work in a broader range of languages and who are familiar with other national and cultural contexts.” The University of Waterloo operates an active international exchange program, and there have been GC initiatives at the University of Alberta, University of British Columbia, McMaster, Thompson Rivers University, and the University of Winnipeg.

However, universities on the whole appear to be more interested in increasing their international enrollment and expanding their internationalization activities abroad than

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38 Ibid.
they are in GC. The most common internationalization activity directed to an institution’s own students is not the teaching of GC, but the offering of courses in international relations, international business, and European studies.\textsuperscript{45} Although such courses may touch on equality and justice, these concepts are not intrinsic to those fields. What is perhaps more telling is the declining commitment to second-language education at the university level. Only 9% of respondents to the 2007 AUCC survey indicated that proficiency in a second language was a requirement for a first degree (down from 16% in 2000), and 7% for a second degree (down from 22% in 2000).\textsuperscript{46} Furthermore, only about 1% to 2% of students at Canadian colleges or universities have participated in international exchanges.\textsuperscript{47}

Therefore, while Canada HEIs are indeed very active in internationalization, their commitment is inconsistent. They are pursuing international students and partnerships with other HEIs around the world. However, while they may profess otherwise, they are much less interested in GC, exchange programs, and second-language education for students that are enrolled in their institutions. Furthermore, Canadian HEIs are not unique in this one-sided internationalization. A 2006 analysis of the internationalization strategies of 133 HEIs in the United Kingdom found that for the vast majority, recruiting international students was the main activity and expanding abroad was the second goal. Very few HEIs were considering enhancing the international experience for home students or raising staff awareness of intercultural issues; even fewer were contemplating

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{47} ACCC, \textit{Internationalizing Canadian Colleges and Institutes}, 3; and AUCC, “Canadian Universities and International Student Mobility,” August 2007, 4, \url{http://www.aucc.ca/_pdf/english/publications/student_mobility_2007_e.pdf}. 
GC initiatives such as “creating a culture of equality and diversity.” The evidence presented thus far does not suggest that a deep interest in GC or cosmopolitanism is driving internationalization, even though HEIs often declare their allegiance to the philosophy. It is therefore necessary to explore alternative explanations for the dramatic increase in the phenomenon.

**The Relationship between Internationalization and Globalization**

As noted above, to a certain extent, universities have always been international. The notion of the “wandering scholar” stems from the medieval origins of the institution, which at that time had no physical campus. Itinerant, and generally impoverished, scholars would wander from town to town, freely crossing non-existent borders.

Something has happened, however, to turn the internationalization of higher education into a major trend in the last twenty years or so. The statistics cited above depict a rapid growth in both the numbers of students seeking education abroad and the number of HEIs expanding their activities around the world. As Wendy Chan and Clive Dimmock note, “internationalization in its current heightened state and organized form is a recent phenomenon.”

Scholars point out that the term “internationalization” was first used as a keyword in an article in the journal *Higher Education* in 1993. Close on its heels, the first issue of the *Journal of Studies in International Education* was published in 1997.

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51 Brendan Cantwell and Alma Maldonado-Maldonado, “Four stories: confronting contemporary ideas about globalization and internationalisation in higher education,” *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 7,
Similarly, the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) came into force in 1996. The GATS is the World Trade Organization (WTO) treaty that negotiated the inclusion of services in the international trading system for the first time. One of the purposes of the GATS is to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the development of developing countries.52

Essentially, the treaty aims to expand global trade by ensuring that signatories open their service sectors to competition from other countries, just as they have opened their manufacturing sectors.53 “Educational services” comprise one of 12 sectors potentially to be liberalized, with 5 sub-sectors (primary, secondary, higher, adult, and other educational services).54 According to one source, while other service sectors such as travel and financial services will likely be subject to more intense international competition,55 higher education is under the most pressure to liberalize out of the five education sub-sectors.56

As of March 2011, more than 50 WTO members (out of 154 total) have committed to liberalizing higher education, including the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, Mexico, many countries in eastern Europe, and a number of developing

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56 Ibid., 230.
countries. India, Pakistan, Korea, Singapore, and Bahrain have expressed willingness to open this sub-sector, and are already engaged in internationalization activities. While Canada has yet to make any commitments to liberalize education, it is actively involved in internationalization in other countries.

However, given that a number of countries have been internationalizing their education systems even though they have not committed that sector to the GATS process, it is possible that internationalization can be attributed to globalization in general, rather than the GATS in particular. The OECD notes that

> The general trend towards freely circulating capital, goods and services, coupled with changes in the openness of labour markets, has translated into growing demand for international sharing of education and training. . . . Globally oriented firms seek internationally-competent workers who speak foreign languages and have the intercultural skills needed to successfully interact with international partners. Governments as well as individuals are looking to higher education to broaden students’ horizons and help them to better understand the world’s languages, cultures and business methods.

The transition to a “knowledge economy,” based on well-educated workers using new technology in service sector jobs, is often cited as the ultimate driving factor behind internationalization. “Higher education is on its way,” summarizes Canada’s own Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), “to become a key pillar

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58 Verger, “GATS and Higher Education,” 242. For example, Bahrain has announced plans to develop a “higher education city,” while the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada has a webpage devoted to internationalization activities between Canada and India. See Stephen Wilkins, “Who benefits from foreign universities in the Arab Gulf States?” *Australian Universities’ Review* 53, no. 1 (2011): 74, http://opus.bath.ac.uk/22814/1/Who_benefits_from_foreign_universities_in_the_Arab_Gulf_States.pdf.
of national economic development, and a major contributor to a nation’s GDP.”

Workers need education, ideally a multi-linguistic and multi-cultural one for a globalized world, and nations and their transnational corporations need educated workers.

Among internationalization scholars, however, there is a general reluctance to equate the internationalization of higher education with globalization. Knight insists that internationalization and globalization are “very different but related” concepts, distinguishing them as follows:

Globalization is the flow of technology, economy, knowledge, people, values, ideas . . . across borders. Globalization affects each country in a different way due to a nation’s individual history, traditions, culture and priorities. Internationalization of higher education is one of the ways a country responds to the impact of globalization yet, at the same time respects the individuality of the nation.

In other words, “globalization is the catalyst while internationalization is the response.”

Elsewhere, Knight stresses that “national identity and culture are key to internationalization.” While globalization is often criticized because of its potential homogenizing impact on culture, “by respecting and helping to preserve nation-states, [internationalization] is therefore seen as a very different concept.” Sally-Ann Burnett and Jeroen Huisman concur, arguing that internationalization permits the nation state “to continue to play its economic, cultural, and social roles,” whereas globalization involves

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62 Knight, “Internationalization Remodeled,” 8.
64 Jane Knight, “Internationalization of Higher Education,” 14.
65 Jane Knight, “Issues and Trends in Internationalization.”
66 Ibid.
the diminishing of the state’s powers.\textsuperscript{67} Another group of scholars contends that globalization “represents neo-liberal, market-oriented forces enabling a borderless world,” while internationalization “represents arrangements between nation-states primarily cultivating greater tolerance and exchange of ideas.”\textsuperscript{68} Hans de Wit simply notes that globalization is “a too complex and ideologically loaded term” and therefore prefers the term internationalization.\textsuperscript{69}

More recently, Knight, writing with Philip Altbach (another senior scholar in the field), defines globalization as “the economic, political, and societal forces pushing 21st century higher education toward greater international involvement.”\textsuperscript{70} Because the economy is now so dependent on the knowledge-heavy service sector, as noted earlier, education is becoming more important and additional capital is being invested in it. Furthermore, globalization “tends to concentrate wealth, knowledge and power in those already possessing these elements.”\textsuperscript{71} Again, globalization is described as the external force. Internationalization is the response, one that “involves many choices.”\textsuperscript{72} Writing on his own, Altbach clarifies that globalization is a broad set of economic, technological and scientific trends that “directly affect higher education and are largely inevitable,” even if different institutions may respond in a different fashion.\textsuperscript{73} Internationalization, on the other hand, encompasses specific policies and programmes undertaken by

\textsuperscript{69} Hans de Wit, \textit{Internationalization of Higher Education in the United States of America and Europe: A Historical, Comparative, and Conceptual Analysis} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 150.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 291.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Philip G. Altbach, “Globalisation and the University: Myths and Realities in an Unequal World,” \textit{Tertiary Education and Management} 10 (March 2004): 5.
governments, academic systems and institutions “to cope with or exploit globalization.”

Again, Altbach stresses the autonomous aspect of internationalization. Marijk van der Wende appears to agree, defining globalization as “the widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness,” a process mostly beyond the control of individual HEIs. Internationalization is instead a controllable process, and presents one possible response to globalization.

These definitions are all quite flattering to internationalization. Globalization is depicted as an external, impersonal force acting on everyone and everything, contributing to the concentration of wealth and power and the homogenization of culture. Internationalization, on the other hand, is a deliberate policy undertaken by HEIs to preserve culture and national identity and promote tolerance at the same time. However, these assertions strike me as just that, assertions. In general, many internationalization scholars are insistent—in my view, defensively so—that internationalization is a different phenomenon from globalization, and that globalization is a bad phenomenon, while internationalization is a good one. There is a general reluctance to impugn the motives of HEIs and to address the possibility that internationalization is itself a reflection of concentrated wealth and power, or that it could contribute to a further concentration of the same.

Knight does concede that economic motives are one of several reasons for internationalization. As noted, countries are keen to educate their population as a means of improving economic competitiveness, and declining government support for education

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 6.
76 Marijk van der Wende, “Internationalization of Higher Education in the OECD Countries: Challenges and Opportunities for the Coming Decade,” *Journal of Studies in International Education* 11, nos. 3-4 (Fall/Winter 2007): 274-5.
has led HEIs to seek new sources of finance.\textsuperscript{77} However, Knight minimizes the impact of the economic rationale by giving equal weight to three others. Firstly, she writes that nations may have political motives for internationalizing. Indeed, education has long been used as a foreign policy tool to promote values such as peace and liberty, or to create a favourable impression with another country.\textsuperscript{78} Secondly, internationalization can be supported for purely academic reasons. Knowledge knows no borders, as the saying goes, and it is argued that the ability to hire researchers and lecturers—and recruit students—from around the world will improve the quality of education and advance knowledge.\textsuperscript{79} Thirdly, internationalization has been promoted for cultural and social reasons. Perhaps in response to globalization and the increasing movement of people around the world, internationalization has been touted to foster greater understanding of other cultures. Knight writes,

\begin{quote}
One of the leading rationales at the institutional level for internationalization is preparing graduates to be internationally knowledgeable and interculturally skilled, to live and work in more culturally diverse communities both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

In other words, internationalization is partly motivated by the desire to produce “the well-rounded, tolerant citizen.”\textsuperscript{81} Were this truly the case, however, GC should occupy a central place in HEI internationalization activities. Given that this is usually not the case, as I showed above, it is questionable whether this motive weighs very heavily in HEI decision processes. HEIs often claim that they are interested in GC, yet their activities reveal that for the most part, they are only paying it lip service.

\textsuperscript{77} Knight, “Internationalization of Higher Education,” 18-19.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 17-18.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 19-20.
\textsuperscript{80} Jane Knight, “The internationalization of higher education: Are we on the right track?” 8.
\textsuperscript{81} Knight, “Internationalization of Higher Education,” 21.
Knight concedes that the economic rationale for internationalization may be gaining ascendance. There is, as a consequence,

a rigorous debate as to whether the export of education products to international markets is in fact contributing to the international dimension of teaching, research and service or is contributing income to the operating budget of the institution.\footnote{Ibid., 19.}

Despite Knight’s claim, I have not found much in the way of “rigorous debate” in the scholarly literature pertaining to the ultimate motive for internationalization. Indeed, uncritical acceptance or endorsement of internationalization appears to be the norm. Even when Knight is taking pains to defend the motive-neutrality of her definition of internationalization, she contends that “[a] clear and focused definition is needed to effectively advocate for and achieve internationalization.”\footnote{Jane Knight, “Internationalization: Elements and Checkpoints,” \textit{CBIE} [Canadian Bureau for International Education] \textit{Research}, no. 7, 1994, \url{http://quic.queensu.ca/resources/training/files/CBIE_Internationalization_Elements_and_Checkpoints.pdf}.} It is taken for granted that internationalization is a positive development and something to be worked towards.

development is the way cooperation and commercial issues blend together.87 After summarizing new forms of international education delivery such as corporate universities and for-profit institutions, Knight comments, “an exciting but rather complex picture of higher education provision is emerging.”88

I find this kind of language in scholarly articles surprising and even jarring. I am accustomed to questioning and criticism from academics. “I cannot be a teacher and be in favour of everyone and everything;” wrote Freire, “I cannot be in favour merely of people, humanity, vague phrases far from the concrete nature of educative practice.”89 That is the sense I have of internationalization in some of these arguments; scholars approve of it simply because they think it symbolizes tolerance and multiculturalism. These same individuals do not describe globalization in such glowing terms. Scholars are perhaps protecting themselves from exploring the potential downside of internationalization by taking pains to distinguish it from globalization. They appear to be hiding behind the hope that internationalization has the potential to produce global citizens and perhaps even social change, despite the evidence that HEIs are far more interested in its potential to produce extra revenue. But perhaps even this is a charitable reading; it cannot be ruled out that these scholars know that HEIs are primarily pursuing internationalization for revenue purposes, and that these same scholars have found advantage in providing the intellectual window dressing. Knight’s insistence that the

definition of internationalization should not include any motives and should lend to its easier advocacy, seemingly widely accepted by other scholars, may very well be enabling an apolitical understanding of internationalization.

I am not the only one to notice the largely uncritical stance of much internationalization scholarship. Barbara Kehm and Ulrich Teichler observe the “normative tone” and “strong political undercurrents” of the field, with the assumption that internationalization is a positive, important development. Nabine Dohlby and Aliya Rahman add that, for a long time, the audience for research on internationalization consisted primarily of professionals and administrators with practical, applied interests and little concern “with the larger context within which the internationalization of education occurs.” Jonas Stier comments “how seldom we critically scrutinize the ideological underpinnings of internationalization policies.” A recent piece in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* expresses similar concerns:

Those of us involved in the internationalization of higher education rely on a series of assumptions that are often not supported by data or evidence. For instance, we believe that internationalization is not only positive but also very relevant as a key component of the changing landscape of higher education. When asked about why internationalization is important we are prepared to recite a list of its many benefits for the students, the faculty, the institution, and to society in general.

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90 Barbara Kehm and Ulrich Teichler, “Research on Internationalisation in Higher Education,” *Journal of Studies in International Education* 11, nos. 3-4 (Fall/Winter 2007): 262. However, the remainder of the article in which this comment is contained is largely uncritical.


De Wit, a senior scholar in the field who has often discussed internationalization in relatively glowing terms, similarly lamented, “Internationalization has become a synonym of ‘doing good,’ and people are less into questioning its effectiveness and essential nature.”\(^94\) This is a key criticism, in my view, as Knight’s definition shies away from an analysis of the essential nature of internationalization with her assumption of neutrality.

Knight has, within the last two years, expressed some discomfort with recent developments in internationalization (of which I will have more to say below). She writes, “It is impossible to ignore the latest race for attracting international students and academics for ‘brain power’ and for ‘income generation;’” and asks, “Who would have guessed two decades ago that international education would be struggling to deal with fake degrees and accreditations. . . ?”\(^95\) She also notes that some HEIs appear to be engaging in internationalization simply to “improve global brand or standing.”\(^96\) Despite these discouraging developments, Knight insists that her motive-neutral definition should stand.\(^97\) But in my view, Knight is trying to have it both ways, insisting that internationalization be defined as abstractly as possible, yet chiding HEIs who confuse international marketing with internationalization. “The objectives, anticipated outcomes and investment in a global branding initiative,” she cautions, “are different from those required for academic internationalization.”\(^98\) Given Knight’s professed neutrality about


\(^{95}\) Knight, “The Internationalization of Higher Education: Are We on the Right Track?” 7.


\(^{97}\) Knight, “The Internationalization of Higher Education: Are We on the Right Track?” 6-7.

\(^{98}\) Knight, “Five Myths about Internationalization,” 15.
the “purposes and outcomes” of internationalization, I argue that she has denied herself the intellectual tools to make this criticism.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a definition is, “[a] precise statement of the nature, properties, scope, or essential qualities of a thing.” I suggest that an assessment of the motives and desired outcomes of internationalization is key to a full understanding of the phenomenon. Knight’s definition, widely endorsed in the internationalization community, is fastidious in its rejection of these underlying drivers. In general, internationalization scholarship falls short of providing a full, critical appraisal of its subject matter. It is in the business plans of HEIs and government documents promoting internationalization that the essential nature of the process is uncovered. More worrying yet are the actual business activities of some HEIs, an arena seemingly divorced from the philosophical ideals of GC or any of its cosmopolitan underpinnings. I now turn to this very different take on internationalization.

**Internationalization from the Corner Office**

As I noted briefly in the introduction to this thesis, there are venues in which there is a much franker assessment of internationalization and the true meaning of GC for Canadian HEIs. These are the government reports advocating that Canada expand its efforts to internationalize its higher education system, HEI business documents, and publications in management journals. These documents use the language of “market share” and “positioning” and “competition” in their defense of internationalization and GC, rather than the niceties of improving cross-cultural understanding and encouraging distributive justice.
Canada’s DFAIT is responsible for the promotion of the country as an international study and research destination. In a major report on the marketing of Canada’s education system abroad, DFAIT argues that Canada must attract international students, not because doing so will contribute to GC, or even because it will improve the quality of Canadian education and research, but rather because there is a global “competition for talent.”

With the transition to a service economy, the decline in demand for low-skilled individuals is being matched by an increase in demand for individuals with advanced education, particularly those in the sciences and technology. Indeed, Canada has a particular need to pursue this “talent acquisition” strategy because of its demographic shift to an older population.

The second key reason for the pursuit of international students is even more narrowly economic: “revenue generation,” in the words of DFAIT. As discussed above, international students offer tremendous financial benefits to the countries receiving them. Enrollment in higher education in many western democracies is plateauing, in large part because aging populations don’t go to university or college. Recruiting ever-increasing numbers of international students is therefore not simply a “nice to have” policy; it is now a “basic necessity,” an essential component of a nation’s education strategy. “The intense global competition for recruiting top talent on the one hand,” summarizes DFAIT, “and attracting large quantities of income-generating international students on the other is a simple reality.” These exhortations have led to policy

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100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 20.
102 Ibid., 137.
103 Ibid., 33.
104 Ibid., 13, 33.
105 Ibid., 14.
changes, as the federal government proposed in 2007 to double the number of international students in the country in a decade. DFAIT itself was mandated to develop a “brand” and marketing strategy for Canadian education abroad. Similarly, in March 2010, the Ontario government announced that it planned to increase the number of international students in the province by 50 percent. The federal and provincial governments have also cooperated to make it easier for international students to apply for immigration, killing two birds with one stone.

Other government and HEI documents are similarly blunt. For example, a Simon Fraser University plan notes, “As provincially funded student enrollment has now reached an almost steady state . . . any growth in tuition revenue will come from the enrollment of international students or the over enrollment of domestic students.” A report prepared for the government of Nova Scotia similarly observes:

The primary 17–29 age cohort upon which all Canadian universities draw is shrinking . . . and this trend is expected to continue over the next 25 years. As a result, post-secondary education enrolment is expected to decline steadily in most jurisdictions for the foreseeable future. The report assesses these trends and evaluates options for finding alternative pools of potential recruits, both in the province and beyond.

Internationalization scholars tend to ignore this relatively crude need for HEIs to maintain their existing enrollment by recruiting increasing numbers of international students.

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106 Ibid., 33.
107 Ibid., 126. The brand is “Imagine Education au/in Canada.”
109 Each province has something called a Provincial Nominee Program (with some variation in names across the country), permitting it to “fast track” immigration applications for certain categories of potential citizens. Almost all of the provinces have created a special class for international students.
Furthermore, per student funding to Canadian HEIs actually decreased by 16% between 1980 and 2006.\textsuperscript{112} HEIs are therefore under pressure to replace lost revenue, and the fee structure of Canadian colleges and universities has been redesigned to encourage the recruitment of international students. Until the late 1970s, international and domestic students were charged the same fees. In 1976, the federal government proposed that colleges and universities introduce a fee differential as a means of generating additional revenue. A number of provinces consequently deregulated the amount of tuition that can be charged to international students, while fees for domestic students are still controlled.\textsuperscript{113} Ontario deregulated international student tuition fees for both universities and colleges beginning in 1996–97.\textsuperscript{114} In 2010, fees for international students at the University of British Columbia were a minimum of $18,720, and at the University of Toronto, $18,522. In 2010-2011, deregulated college tuition in Ontario was approximately $11,000 per year of a diploma program.\textsuperscript{115}

A University of Toronto planning document is clear about the consequences of fee deregulation:

Under current funding arrangements, there is financial pressure to increase international undergraduate student enrolment. Despite the higher cost of education for international students, the University is able to set tuition fees to cover these costs. This is in sharp contrast with the woefully inadequate government funding coupled with tuition regulation for domestic students.

\textsuperscript{112} TD Economics, “Post-Secondary Education is a Smart Route to a Brighter Future for Canadians,” May 17, 2010, \url{http://www.td.com/economics/special/ca0510_pse.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{114} Canadian Information Centre for International Credentials, “Postsecondary Education in Ontario,” \url{http://www.cicic.ca/606/Description.canada}.

This plan nearly concedes that the deregulation of domestic student tuition could lead to a diminished reliance on international student fees: “Should domestic tuition become deregulated, this dynamic could change.”

Almost as an afterthought, the plan grants, “However, the academic value of internationalization remains.”

Colleges and university documents employing business language reveal the extent to which the development of GC initiatives is based on their marketing potential for these desired international students. Canadian College declares, “Our commitment to Global Citizenship gives us a unique position in the marketplace, and an ability to serve students from Barrie to Beijing, from Markham to Mumbai.” The term “positioning” is echoed elsewhere in Canadian College’s literature, where it proclaims that GC “will position the College as an internationally recognized leader in education that places a strong emphasis on global citizenship, social justice and equity.” Thompson Rivers University similarly stresses, “Study abroad programs for Canadian students, as well as programs welcoming international students into our communities, play an integral role in positioning both our institutions and our youth in a global way,” and, “The diversity and scope of TRU’s international initiatives has positioned TRU as an international university.” A related term appearing frequently in these documents is “signature.”

The Council of Ontario Universities recently recommended that Ontario develop a

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117 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 90.
“signature program” to attract talent to its universities from around the world.\(^{122}\)

Canadian College describes its GC course as the heart of its “Signature Learning Experience.” Camosun College similarly revealed that it is introducing a signature learning experience in “social, environmental, and global citizenship.”\(^{123}\)

While these terms may not be familiar to those without a business background, “positioning,” “differentiating,” and “signature” are widely used concepts in marketing. For example, a number of recent articles describe internationalization as a “positioning strategy” for HEIs.\(^{124}\) Liang-Hsuan Chen notes:

> While positioning shows how one program or institution relates to other programs or institutions in the same market, a “brand” or “reputation management” helps a program, institution, or country achieve a unique position.\(^{125}\)

Liang-Hsuan informs readers that, “Joint venture schools, twinning, or ‘in-country delivery’ programs are seen as internationalization activities . . . that directly relate to promoting institutions’ international profile, recruiting international students or diversifying revenue sources.”\(^{126}\) Apparently, students view favourably those international institutions that set up shop in their home country. Twinning and joint ventures therefore help to build an institution’s brand, and not inadvertently, contribute to revenue. Furthermore, a survey conducted by the same author reveals that Canada’s diverse and multicultural environment influences international students in their choice of


\(^{126}\) Ibid., 24.
destination, as this was the third most popular reason for selecting Canada above other countries. Clearly, an HEI’s internationalization efforts could further “position” an institution as an appealing destination.

The term “signature” is particularly interesting because it appears to have two distinct histories. In education theory, a signature pedagogy is a distinct way of teaching a particular discipline, often a profession. For example, the dynamic back-and-forth debating typical of law school is the signature pedagogy of legal education. The method of teaching is just as important in the training of future lawyers as is the content; the desired pedagogical result is a way of thinking and behaving as much as it is the comprehensive knowledge of the subject matter. Signature pedagogies also tend to be interactive and to involve a substantial component of public performance for the student. This approach to teaching holds promise from the perspective of GC, concerned as it is with attitudes and behaviour, knowledge and practice. Indeed, Eva Aboagye has argued that some HEIs have pursued GC out of the desire to develop a signature pedagogy. Aboagye also suggests that the adoption of a signature pedagogy can provide students with a competitive advantage in a difficult job market.

However, the term “signature” has a rather different meaning in marketing literature, where it is often used to describe an event or program that has greater brand recognition than the organization behind it. For example, one organization will, for $29,500, organize a “signature event” for non-profit organizations, promising “a headline-grabbing

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127 Ibid., 14.
129 Ibid., 57.
131 Ibid., 155.
fundraiser for non-profits that is sure to cause a stir [and] thousands of dollars worth of valuable media coverage!”

A “signature program” has similar connotations. At least one education marketing company advises its clients to “differentiate themselves with signature programs and unique marketing strategies” and to “better define their institutions by developing more coherent and consistent messages.”

Canadian College spent $500,000 on advertising and hired the services of a marketing agency when it launched its GC program. A newspaper article at the time discloses, “The campaign, designed to showcase an education program unique to [Canadian College], has a bigger purpose: to raise the school's profile.”

The message appears to be that a specific institution can build recognition for itself here and abroad if it associates itself with a memorable program or event. A signature gives an HEI brand recognition.

These competing meanings of “signature” once again reveal the dialectic at the heart of the internationalization and GC projects. On the one hand, well-meaning educators are eager to impart cosmopolitan values to their students, in the hopes of promoting a progressive politics dedicated to international distributive justice. On the other, governments and HEI administrators are using GC as part of a marketing strategy to differentiate an institution or a nation from its competitors. University administrators, management scholars, and marketing firms feel no need to justify internationalization from the position that it will promote GC or cosmopolitanism. Rather, in these quarters,

132 Over the Edge, “Over The Edge USA is Your Non-Profit Organization’s Next Signature Event,” http://www.overtheedgeusa.com/default.asp.
135 Lewington, “School touts global citizenship to set itself apart.”
GC is more likely to be promoted because it contributes to internationalization, which in turn contributes to revenue. HEIs, just like athletic wear and car companies, look for ways to distinguish themselves from their competitors. Canadian HEIs, at least in part, appear to be pursuing internationalization as a means of branding themselves as multicultural centres of education attractive to students from around the world. Their commitment to GC appears to be secondary to their commitment to increasing enrollment and revenue. I question whether the good intentions of GC scholars and educators can provide adequate protection against these less altruistic motives, particularly when the scholars and educators are reluctant to acknowledge the existence of these other drivers.

**Examples of International Partnerships**

I conclude this chapter with a snapshot of real-world examples of Canadian HEI endeavours overseas. Many Canadian HEIs are involved in internationalization activities in India, one of the countries contributing the largest number of international students to OECD nations. India, along with China, is ranked highest in terms of priority for further expansion abroad for Canadian HEIs. India has a long tradition of education, with a number of reputable universities and colleges. However, in a bid to increase options for a burgeoning middle-class eager to obtain more education, India has engaged in a rapid expansion of its post-secondary sector. The number of universities in India has increased dramatically in recent years, from 25 to 398 between 1950 and 2007, while the

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136 Chinese students make up 17.1% of all international students enrolled in OECD nations, and Indian students 6.8%. See OECD, *Education at a Glance 2010*, 328.

137 AUCC, “Knowledge exports by Canadian Universities,” 3.
number of colleges shot up from 700 to 22,500. Enrolment has similarly expanded from 0.1 million to 11.2 million.\footnote{Pawan Agarwal, “Privatization and Internationalization of Higher Education in the Countries of South Asia: An Empirical Analysis,” Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), 2009, 15, \url{http://www.saneinetwork.net/pdf/SANEI_VIII7.pdf}.}

There is considerable concern about the quality of some of these new enterprises. Altbach notes that many of the new institutions are small, making it “impossible to ensure [their] quality. . . .”\footnote{Philip Altbach, “India’s Higher Education Quality Deficit,” \textit{Inside Higher Ed}, August 8, 2010, \url{http://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/the_world_view/india_s_higher_education_quality_deficit}.} A mushrooming of private institutions further complicates matters, as the sector is affected by “ineffective regulation and regulatory loopholes.”\footnote{Pawan Agarwal, “Internationalization of Indian Higher Education,” 2010, United States-India Educational Foundation, \url{www.usief.org.in/%2FUSIHEC%2FChapter%25204%2FInternationalization%2520of%2520Indian%2520Higher%2520Education.pdf?ei=y9fMTd1FdKftgtZ8LiECg&usg=AFQjCNGDZH0i9Dyat6CN7amZ32_v9lJlug}. As a consequence, some of these institutions have “indulge[d] in gross malpractices.”\footnote{Ibid., 19.}

A number of Indian colleges and other educational establishments were also hastily converted into “deemed” universities. Originally, this status was reserved for longstanding institutions of good reputation conducting research and teaching in a specialized field such as information technology, and only 36 institutions were deemed universities between 1956 and 1995.\footnote{R. Ramachandran, “University Business,” \textit{Frontline} 26, no. 14, July 4-17, 2009, \url{http://www.frontline.in/fl2614/stories/2009071726140040.htm}.} However, after the criteria were weakened in 2000, the number skyrocketed to 127. It now appears that a number of “dubious and mediocre” institutions were able to qualify for deeming,\footnote{Ibid.} some of which are allegedly run by politicians or “family fiefdoms.”\footnote{Basant Kumar Mohanty, “Rap on deemed varsities-UGC tells institutes to stick to new rules or face ‘action,’” \textit{Telegraph} [India], May 12, 2011, \url{http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110512/jsp/nation/story_13972312.jsp}. See also Charu Sudan Kasturi, “‘Pioneer’ varsity on unfit list-44 deemed institutes found wanting but given a three-year lifeline,”}
The Indian government has now conducted a number of investigations into deemed and private universities. Forty-four of these institutions were recently determined to be of such poor quality that the Indian government has decided to seek their de-recognition in the courts, while another 44 were given three years to meet the required standards for universities.\(^{145}\) One of the institutions that the Indian government is seeking to de-recognize runs a college that is partnered with a Canadian HEI. Indeed, its joint campus was opened by the Canadian High Commissioner to India several years ago.\(^{146}\) The parent institution has been investigated by the Indian tax department for charging “extra” fees (i.e., bribes), has run afoul of various accrediting bodies, and is the frequent target of criticism in the Indian media.\(^{147}\) Most recently, the founder filed a court petition along with 13 other deemed universities arguing that there was nothing inherently wrong with appointing family members to top positions in their institutions. The courts curtly dismissed the petition, stating, “The argument based on proprietary right clearly undermines the nature of [the] institution that has been created.”\(^{148}\) A second institution, a private HEI given its license by the state of Himachal Pradesh in 2008, was not recognized by the University Grants Commission (the body that monitors quality in the Indian university system) until after the date of its partnership with another Canadian

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\(^{145}\) Kasturi, “Pioneer’ varsity on unfit list.”

\(^{146}\) Vinayaka Canadian Business School, “About Us,” [http://www.vcbs.ac.in/aboutus.html](http://www.vcbs.ac.in/aboutus.html).


college. This university has also been accused of opening unauthorized franchises beyond its jurisdiction. In August 2010, a member of the state’s Legislative Assembly indicated that there were numerous complaints about the institution in question, “with parents alleging exploitation of students and over-charging.”

There are other examples in which Canadian colleges and universities have negotiated partnerships with Indian HEIs that appear to have engaged in questionable practices. An Ontario HEI has teamed with a number of institutions in India, one of which is a university created in 2005. In 2011, the university was placed under investigation by the Indian Anti-Corruption Bureau because of allegations regarding the entrance exam for one of its medical programs. Students noticed that the exam contained material from a mere 10 consecutive pages in their preparation material (implying that the exam had been rigged to favour students who would have been informed in advance). Apparently a similar incident had taken place at the same university in 2006. The Indian Supreme Court has also criticized the university’s admission practices, accusing it of selling

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positions in medical school when it admitted several students who had not even written
the entrance exam.  

A number of Indian HEIs have also been placed on a regulatory watch list for
operating unapproved programs (generally, twinning arrangements) with at least five
Canadian colleges or universities.  

Another Ontario HEI has a transfer agreement with
the Ansal Institute of Technology, an institution offering technical or management
courses without the approval of the Indian regulatory body.  

One college—affiliated with one of the dubious deemed universities also partnered with a Canadian college—has
also been accused of attempting to “inappropriately fast-track” students through a
twinned program with a vocational college in South Australia. Students were not
meeting course requirements, yet were receiving credentials from both schools.  

A particularly complex and troubling case involves the Continental Institute of
International Studies (CIIS), formerly the Canadian Institute of International Studies.
The CIIS is a private college in India’s Punjab province describing itself as an extension
campus of a long list of Canadian HEI partners. The CIIS is owned by Worldwide

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154 No author, “Supreme Court slams lapses in medical college admissions,” *Indo-Asian News Service*,
admissions/42245](http://www.inewsone.com/2011/04/09/supreme-court-slams-lapses-in-medical-college-
admissions/42245).

155 See “Institutes Running Technical Program with Foreign Collaboration without AICTE [All India
 programme-foreign-collaboration.html](http://www.indiaedu.com/notice-board/tech-
 programme-foreign-collaboration.html). The institution in question, Monarch International College of Hotel
Management, may now have received accreditation for its partnerships, as it is no longer on the regulatory
watchdog’s list. However, it is not on the list for approved institutions, either. See All India Council for
india.org/misapphotel.htm](http://www.aicte-india.org/misapphotel.htm); and “List of Accredited Program [sic].” [http://www.aicte-
india.org/misaccreditedinstitutions.htm](http://www.aicte-india.org/misaccreditedinstitutions.htm). Programs between other Indian institutions and several Canadian
HEIs are now on the list. See AICTE, “List of Unapproved Institutions Running Technical Programme
With Foreign Collaboration without AICTE Approval,” [http://www.aicte-
india.org/unforeigninstitutions.htm](http://www.aicte-india.org/unforeigninstitutions.htm).

156 “ISB among 201 institutes running sans approval: HRD,” *Times of India*, April 29, 2010,
[http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-04-29/india/28129768_1_indian-

157 Michael Owen, “TAFE SA online standards queried,” *AdelaideNow*, March 27, 2007,
Immigration Consultancy Services (WWICS, also known as the WorldWide Group), which describes itself as the “world’s largest immigration company.” Stealing some of the language of GC, WWICS describes itself as a “provider of accredited International Education that transcends the boundaries of inter-continental divides.” One of WWICS’ many lines of business is “providing international education opportunities” around the world. As of January 2012, CIIS was listed by the relevant education oversight body as running its programme without approval. The founder and CEO of WWICS has long been accused of fraud and corruption in a case involving the illegal building of a golf resort. An Indian investigative report states that the man in question was living in Canada at the time and had declared himself bankrupt, yet had come to acquire acres of environmentally-sensitive land by “influencing members of the lower judiciary, the administration and the police.” In February 2012, WWICS was raided by Indian police with the allegation that it was illegally dealing in work permit visas and issuing these visas on the basis of fake documents. Yet somehow, this corporation has persuaded Canadian HEIs to partner with it in international ventures.

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I uncovered this list of eyebrow-raising stories through several days of Internet research. It is in no way systematic, or even representative of the many international partnerships undertaken by Canada’s HEIs. However, I was surprised at how easy it was to find evidence that at least some of these partnerships are quite dubious. But if internationalization is driven primarily by the desire for more revenue and candidates for immigration, perhaps that surprise is misplaced. One large Canadian university has even admitted that “[m]easuring the success of the University’s internationalization efforts by the number rather than the quality of international strategic partnerships and student mobility agreements has resulted in some agreements with universities below [the university’s] standards….”163 The cases I have uncovered are potentially not so rare then, and further investigation may need to be conducted.

Similarly, I do not want to imply that all of India’s HEIs are affected by corruption and scandal. The problems I have outlined are primarily confined to newly created or private institutions. There are many established colleges and universities that Canadian HEIs could have chosen as their partners instead. Instead, it appears that they sought out these new, untested, and in some cases, unapproved, organizations. Indeed, Canadian HEIs have occasionally engaged in dubious practices at home. For example, Ontario has over 400 private career colleges that have been allowed to operate with minimum supervision. These colleges graduate more than 46,000 students per year,164 and frequently target recent immigrants and international students.165 Students are eligible for

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loans from the publicly funded Ontario Student Assistance Program. In 2008, one such college was ordered to cease operations for operating an unapproved program, shortly after the college owner attempted to bribe a public official.\textsuperscript{166} A 2009 report by the provincial ombudsman, followed by a newspaper exposé, revealed similarly dubious practices in other colleges.\textsuperscript{167} The problem is not confined to private institutions. In 2010, a class action lawsuit was certified against George Brown College on behalf of 119 students, 78 of whom were international, who paid $11,000 for a program that promised to give them specific credentials that the college could ultimately not provide (and appears to have known that this was the case).\textsuperscript{168} A second 2009 report by Ontario’s ombudsman recommended that the government exert greater control over the province’s colleges because of a similar case relating to Cambrian College.\textsuperscript{169}

Although Ontario’s problems do not appear to be as widespread as those in India, there seems to be a wild-west mentality among HEIs involved in internationalization. Altbach recently pronounced that “[a] spectre of corruption is haunting the global campaign towards higher education internationalization,”\textsuperscript{170} and draws an analogy to the sub-prime crisis. In their eagerness to be international “players,” HEIs have sometimes

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} Ombudsman of Ontario, \textit{Too Cool for School Too: Investigation into Cambrian College’s administration of its Health Information Management Program and the oversight provided by the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities}, August 2009, \url{www.ombudsman.on.ca/media/104854/cambrien_web_ready.pdf}.


acted like subprime lending institutions, with associated trappings: “sleazy recruiters, degree packagers, low-end private institutions seeking to stave off bankruptcy through the export market and even a few respectable universities forced by government funding cutbacks to enter foreign markets for profit making.”¹¹⁷¹ I suspect that HEIs have been able to get away with such activities because they still garner a lot of respect in our culture, and are generally considered above such base behaviour. Governments are quietly complicit because they have cut back funding to higher education, and because they need warm immigrant bodies to contribute to economic growth. GC and cosmopolitanism are an afterthought in this scenario, or worse, a tool. Martin Haigh echoes this sentiment. In theory, he writes, “[i]nternationalization is a process for the education of planetary citizens.”¹¹⁷² In practice, however, “[it] is about income generation for cash-strapped HEIs.”¹¹⁷³ Kumari Beck, one of the few outspoken Canadian critics of internationalization, notes, “We are often lulled into complacency that an academic rationale drives internationalization in Canada.”¹¹⁷⁴ As I noted earlier, the contradictions between internationalization and cosmopolitanism/GC, often heralded as part of the inspiration for internationalization, should be glaring. Regardless, I now turn to my fuller analysis of these contradictions and the implications they have for the future of cosmopolitanism and GC.

¹¹⁷³ Ibid.
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that internationalization scholars are for the most part deeply committed to the process they are analyzing, one of the ingredients of which is GC. However, I argued that this commitment was uncritical and apolitical, and at times defensively so. I also presented four types of evidence suggesting that HEIs are far more interested in the revenue-generating aspect of internationalization than the cosmopolitan or GC aspect. First, statistics from multiple sources show that most HEIs are primarily engaged in recruiting international students and setting up cross-border ventures, while cursorily pursuing GC, exchange programs, and language training. Second, business documents frankly state that Canada is engaged in open competition for skilled immigrants, who will incidentally provide additional tuition revenue for cash-strapped HEIs. Third, similar documents reveal that GC is being used as a branding tool to help “position” and “differentiate” HEIs relative to their competitors so that they can attract more of these international students. Finally, I provided numerous instances in which Canadian HEIs have partnered with extremely questionable institutions abroad, giving the impression that the primary concern of these ventures was to gain quick entrance into a foreign market and to recruit students to come to Canada, regardless of the kind of education these students were likely to receive in the process.

The apparent contradictions between the philosophy of cosmopolitanism and GC, on the one hand, and the activities of Canadian HEIs engaged in internationalization, on the other, should be troubling. In this chapter, I want to analyze the three violations of the
cosmopolitan spirit that I think are most dangerous to the GC project, coming back to the heart of the philosophy as I defined it in chapter two: violation of the principle that there is a moral code of behaviour operating above the laws of nations; violation of the principle of fundamental respect for the person; and violation of the duty to reform institutions that are producing injustices and inequalities from which we benefit. In the process, I will demonstrate that cosmopolitanism is, contrary to some of its critics’ claims that it is too abstract and dispassionate, a dynamic philosophy capable of providing a powerful criticism of a contemporary problem. In fact, cosmopolitanism helps to illuminate the true nature of the harm currently being caused by the internationalization of higher education. It can also help to provide potential remediation of these harms, if its insights are taken seriously.

Violation of the Principle of the Universal Moral Law

Perhaps the defining feature of cosmopolitanism through the ages is the principle that there is a moral code—and maybe one day, a legally binding one—operating above the laws of nations. “There will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens” Cicero elegantly proclaimed, “but all nations at all times will be bound by this one eternal and unchangeable law. . . .” Kant declared that “nature’s supreme objective” is the development of such a law. Cosmopolitans aspire to be, in Diogenes’ words, “citizens of the world.” While contemporary cosmopolitans refrain from the metaphysical pronouncements of their predecessors, they share the conviction that the boundaries dividing nations are “morally arbitrary,” in Nussbaum’s words, in deliberations on the

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fundamental rightness or wrongness of activities.\textsuperscript{3} Global citizens, the popular GC textbook asserts, “consider the best interests of the entire world and all of the people within it.”\textsuperscript{4}

Cosmopolitans draw attention to the ways in which we uphold double standards of behaviour in violation of the philosophy’s central principle. Kant, for example, was particularly critical of activities carried on between nations that would be considered intolerable or even illegal within a single country, such as acts of naked aggression and enslavement. Nussbaum observes our uneven commitment to multiculturalism: on the one hand we take pride in our pluralistic societies, while on the other we remain largely indifferent or even hostile to the fate of the countries from which our citizens are drawn. Furthermore, our consumerist way of life uses the planet’s resources to such an extent that we must tacitly deny a similar standard of living to the rest of the planet. Pogge is particularly critical of the role played by wealthy nations in the design and perpetuation of global institutions that benefit themselves greatly, while worsening the plight of poorer countries.

We are still, it seems, crude promoters of our own little tribes or nations, in defiance of the cosmopolitan ideal. Nussbaum labels such behaviour “hypocritical.” But it is Kant’s first formulation of the CI—“I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law”—that is the animating force behind the cosmopolitan principle of a universal law above the law of nations.\textsuperscript{5} As already discussed, Kant highlights the logically contradictory nature and potential destructiveness of our hypocrisy. If every nation were to obtain our standard of living,

\textsuperscript{3} Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” 14.
\textsuperscript{5} Kant, \textit{Grounding}, 14.
there is the distinct possibility of environmental catastrophe. If every nation sought to impose unequal terms in international trade negotiations, mutual distrust would arise along with the possibility of war. Kant brilliantly encapsulates the moral and social risks inherent in these contradictions and appeals to the universal standard of the CI.

Judging by the examples I provided in the last chapter, some Canadian HEIs are engaged in internationalization activities that cannot be universalized. For example, if enough Canadian HEIs were to gain a reputation for engaging in disreputable practices, or working with disreputable international partners, the Canadian “brand” could become contaminated. The World Bank notes that students make education choices influenced by the brand image of the foreign provider’s country. Furthermore, the World Bank adds, HEI providers are aware of this and “invest heavily in marketing and advertising the ‘foreign brand’ as the essence of quality.” It could be argued that some Canadian HEIs are using Canada’s reputation to obscure less than stellar education offerings. Bashir suggests that, in cases where foreign HEIs are providing low-quality programs, “students may be paying more for a foreign education of uncertain value than for a domestic qualification with some value. . . .” For the moment, students view a partnership with a Canadian HEI as a stamp of foreign approval for their domestic institutions. Such a scenario could, however, quickly sour. In Kant’s language, the maxim of Canadian HEIs—which appears to be, in at least some cases, “form international partnerships regardless of their quality”—would destroy itself were it to be universalized. Other

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7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.
practices I discussed in the last chapter, such as treating international students merely as fodder to boost Canada’s economy and HEI revenue, and promoting GC as a competitive tactic, could similarly backfire. These HEIs could ultimately undercut their own intent, taint the image of other HEIs acting in good faith, and even damage the reputation of the country as a whole, as has already happened in Australia.

While the CI is an extraordinarily demanding moral standard, cosmopolitanism requires a commitment to at least some form of universal code. As discussed earlier, today’s cosmopolitans have argued that the treaties of the UN and the ILO, flawed as they may be, are examples of cosmopolitan principles in action. Interestingly, another UN agency, UNESCO, has devised guidelines for HEIs engaged in internationalization.9 Aware of the evolving problems in internationalization, the purpose of the guidelines is “to protect students and other stakeholders from low-quality provision and disreputable providers as well as to encourage the development of quality cross-border higher education. . .”10 The guidelines are, furthermore, premised on what would appear to be cosmopolitan ideals: “international cooperation;” the meeting of “human, social, economic, and cultural needs;”11 and “mutual trust and respect among countries.”12

Although the guidelines are not legally binding, governments are encouraged to take precautions to protect students both at home and abroad. They should, for example, establish a registration system for foreign education providers and support the development of reliable quality assurance measures for education exports and imports.

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10 Ibid., 7.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 10.
They should also provide reliable information on the criteria and standards they use for these systems.\textsuperscript{13} HEIs in turn are advised to develop quality management systems and publicly commit to ensuring that their domestic and international programs are “of comparable quality.” HEIs are also advised to consult competent quality assurance and accreditation bodies in the countries to which they are exporting education, and to respect the verdicts of these bodies.\textsuperscript{14}

Judging by the evidence I presented in the last chapter, at least some Canadian HEIs are not living up to their cosmopolitan responsibility to implement these guidelines. The questionable international partnerships that have been formed reveal that these Canadian HEIs have not been monitoring quality closely. While Canadian HEIs have developed quality assurance measures, recommending self-evaluation and peer review for the assessment of both domestic and overseas programs,\textsuperscript{15} a study of 51 Canadian universities confirms that only five had used any type of review for their international activities. “I find it mystifying that every aspect of university life goes by the external peer review process,” the author observed, "except internationalization."\textsuperscript{16} Thus, Canadian HEIs have not implemented their own quality control measures. Nor have they always relied on the verdicts of their overseas counterparts. As discussed in the last chapter, some Canadian HEIs have partnered with institutions that have not obtained appropriate accreditation, that have been repeatedly cautioned for their failure to do so.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 13-14.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{15} AUCC, “Principles of institutional quality assurance in Canadian higher education,” \url{http://www.aucc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Principles_of_institutional.pdf}.
\item \textsuperscript{16} AUCC, “Internationalizing Canadian campuses: Main themes emerging from the 2007 Scotiabank-AUCC workshop on excellence in internationalization at Canadian universities,” 20, \url{www.aucc.ca/_pdf/english/publications/aucc-scotia_web_e.pdf}.
\end{itemize}
and that have even been cited in the courts. Therefore, Canadian HEIs have violated several of the UNESCO guidelines for their overseas ventures.

Canadian HEIs can, finally, be accused of a yet more serious violation of cosmopolitan universalism, as they have been vocal opponents of Canada’s participation in the GATS.17 Recall that this treaty opens various service sectors of a country’s economy to competition from service providers in other countries. A statement co-signed by the AUCC—the “national voice for Canadian universities”—expresses concern about what would happen to the “quality, integrity, accessibility and equity” of the Canadian education system were such liberalization to take place. The statement continues that foreign providers motivated by profit would be less likely to follow rules such as those promulgated by UNESCO. Canadian HEIs are, however, above suspicion, as, “Quality is a key objective for both domestic provision of higher education and international education exports.”18 The AUCC couches its resistance to liberalization in a concern for the fate of developing nations. To that end, the AUCC argues that higher education should not be treated as a commodity. Rather, the purpose of education is “to contribute to the sustainable development and improvement of society as a whole.”19 As a consequence, “Education exports must complement, not undermine, the efforts of

17 The General Agreement on Trade in Services, discussed in the last chapter.
19 AUCC et al., “Joint Declaration on Higher Education and the General Agreement on Trade and Services.”
developing countries to develop and enhance their own domestic higher education systems.\textsuperscript{20} In this statement, Canadian HEIs appear to be model cosmopolitans.

However, Canadian HEIs are once again employing double standards. Canadian HEIs are devoted to the internationalization of higher education, but in one direction only. They are virtually all active in the education sectors of other countries while they are resisting reciprocal activity for foreign HEIs in Canada. None of the HEI documents praising internationalization that I have examined even mention the prospect of allowing foreign HEIs to export education to Canada. Although Canadian HEIs insinuate that their foreign counterparts will be less likely to maintain quality controls and follow UNESCO guidelines, I have shown that they are guilty of the same negligence. I am not expressing support for the GATS, with which I have many concerns. However, Canadian HEIs appear to be engaged in distinctly hypocritical behaviour falling short of the spirit of cosmopolitanism. They are not following the international guidelines that have been developed. They are also refusing to allow their own actions to be universalized, a tacit admission that they are beneficial to only some parties. I conclude that these HEIs are violating the hallmark principle of cosmopolitanism that there is a moral code operating above the laws of nations to which we must all adhere.

\textbf{Violation of the Principle of Fundamental Respect for Persons}

Internationalization in its current practice also violates cosmopolitanism because it does not treat individuals with the fundamental respect that is integral to the philosophy. Respect for persons is so central to cosmopolitanism because, as Pogge asserts, “the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons,” as opposed to tribes, ethnic,

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
cultural or religious communities, and nations. Each of the cosmopolitan thinkers I have analyzed in this thesis has expressed philosophical commitment to this principle. The word “respect” features prominently in their accounts. Pogge states, “we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern—a requirement that imposes limits upon our conduct.” Nussbaum chooses the same word, arguing that we must “recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.” Appiah, in particular, emphasized the importance of “respecting human dignity and personal autonomy,” or what he called self management. Erskine, too, speaks of the “respect for the ethical standing of a fellow moral agent.” Finally, the Canadian GC textbook asserts that all people have the right “to dignity, [and] to respect.”

This emphasis on respect is also fundamentally Kantian, and indirectly refers to two particular reformulations of the CI. The first is the “end in itself” or “humanity” formulation: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” Humans have an “intrinsic worth” and a “dignity” that must be respected. In everyday language, you are not supposed to “use” people. Kant does not say that one’s behaviour must be completely governed by the ends of others, but he is clear that one cannot treat others only as a means, and that one cannot have an end in mind for someone that the person does not share. The second reformulation of the CI is known as the

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22 Ibid., 49.
24 Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 268.
25 Erskine, “Citizen of nowhere” or ‘the point where circles intersect’?” 475.
27 Kant, Grounding, 26.
28 Ibid., 40.
“autonomy” formulation: “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law.” 29 The CI is in accord with our free will and we are therefore bound to obey it; as I wrote in chapter two, we effectively give the CI to ourselves because we have the capacity to reason and to understand the law. In other words, we are capable of governing our own behaviour, choosing our own ends free from “attracting stimulus” (i.e., rewards) or “constraining force” (i.e., punishments). 30 This capacity to live by one’s own laws commands respect. Respecting autonomy means respecting the individual’s ability to make his or her own decisions, and connects with our duty to treat others as ends-in-themselves with their own desires and goals. Respecting autonomy necessitates that we do not coerce or deceive others into serving our own ends.

Some Canadian HEIs appear to be violating the cosmopolitan principle of respect for persons by disregarding both the end-in-itself and autonomy formulations of Kant’s CI. Regarding the former, I have presented evidence showing that Canadian HEIs solicit international students assiduously because they pay higher tuition than domestic students and will contribute to the financing of the education system. Canadian governments, in turn, want international students to come to Canada because this decreases the pressure to improve funding for education, and increases the likelihood that these students will immigrate and contribute to economic growth. There is, in the words of many government and university documents, both a revenue and a skilled labour shortage, and the recruitment of international students is sought to alleviate both problems. Canadian HEIs and governments are therefore clearly using international students as a means.

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29 Ibid., 38.
30 Ibid., 39.
Now, Kant has granted some moral slack in the humanity iteration of the CI, as I just noted. Are Canadian HEIs using international students *exclusively* as a means to increased tuition revenue, or are they also treating them with respect and showing concern for their education? Similarly, are the federal and provincial governments promoting the general welfare of these students? It seems likely that Canadian HEIs and governments are treating international students as ends-in-themselves, at least in part. There are numerous government programs to help immigrants to settle into Canada, and Canadian HEIs typically have an international student office tasked with making life easier for these students. Certainly, international students are given access to the same courses, services, and facilities as are domestic students. However, the number of international students enrolled at Canadian HEIs increased dramatically after the provinces permitted the charging of differential fees. HEIs, therefore, became more interested in international students when they became a more lucrative source of revenue. Furthermore, I presented some evidence suggesting that HEIs would pull back from their recruitment of international students were the fee cap to be removed for domestic students. I also showed that HEIs are only tangentially interested in aspects of internationalization that do not increase revenue, such as education in languages and GC. Therefore, while Canadian HEIs and governments are undoubtedly concerned about international students as ends-in-themselves, there is certainly evidence that they are being used as a means. Whether this equation is adequately balanced from a Kantian perspective on respect for persons is perhaps still up for debate.

However, I have also presented evidence indicating that some Canadian HEIs have been particularly dishonest in their pursuit of international students, signalling a further
disrespect for the autonomy of persons. I argued that it wasn’t simply the case that these HEIs are marketing their GC courses to potentially interested students; rather, they are offering GC because it will make their institutions more appealing relative to others. They are using GC as a tool, and their interest in it is therefore instrumental. The HEIs may be doing the right thing, but they are doing it for the wrong reason, like Kant’s merchant who is honest simply because it will earn him a good reputation. This further instance of HEI instrumentality is damaging to the autonomy of persons because it interferes with the ability to govern one’s behaviour free from outside manipulation. Indeed, as I noted in chapter one, Kant contends that lying or deception “does harm to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right,”\(^31\) because our capacity to formulate the law for ourselves defines our humanity. When individuals are misled, they cannot appropriately make decisions about how to live their lives. They cannot reason adequately, because they are being given the wrong information. Christine Korsgaard argues that Kant condemns deception so thoroughly because the deceiver takes advantage of the honesty of the individual being misled, and uses that person’s capacity to reason as a tool to be manipulated. “Your reason is worked like a machine,” she writes; “the deceiver tries to determine what levers to pull to get the desired results from you.”\(^32\) Because autonomy is so central to Kant’s notion of personhood, lying and deception are particularly despicable.

I argue that this sort of behaviour is particularly duplicitous coming from HEIs. While the average citizen is probably inured to relentless advertising campaigns for consumer products, we are less savvy to such behaviour on the part of our educational institutions.

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\(^31\) Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” 612.

We still trust our HEIs, and expect them to offer programs in which they have an intellectual interest and for which there is an intellectual justification. According to the most recent World Values Survey, 67.9% of people around the world have either “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in their education systems, second only to the amount of confidence expressed in religious leaders (82.6%), and compared to 41.5% of people expressing the same confidence in major companies. It is jarring to find that an HEI is offering a course simply because it might increase enrolment. It is particularly disconcerting when the involved course is GC, because GC involves an explicit dedication to respect for the autonomy of the individual. Were potential students to know the main reason for the HEI’s interest in GC, it could affect their decision regarding which institution to attend. If the HEI is so instrumental in its reasoning, perhaps it simply wants to appear interested in the values represented by GC and cosmopolitanism. The students could legitimately ask whether the HEI pays more attention to marketing than to teaching and course development. The students could also wonder whether the HEI will abandon GC and turn its attention to the next fad if it turns out that GC does not increase enrolment. Students could, ultimately, become increasingly cynical and even withdraw from civic engagement, another of GC’s core values.

I will close this section with a brief consideration of the notion that internationalization scholars are being dishonest with their audience. I noted in the last chapter how little explicit criticism there is of internationalization, as it is taken for

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granted that internationalization is a thoroughly positive development. However, I was able to uncover numerous instances of negative developments in internationalization quite easily. Internationalization scholarship, from this perspective, is almost an extension of the marketing programs of HEIs active in internationalization. The lack of full disclosure amongst internationalization scholars hinders the ability of other members of the HEI community to understand and analyze this important development in education. Other educators would undoubtedly become more concerned about the internationalization activities of their respective institutions if they were to be given a more frank and disinterested account of developments in the field. Citizens might also be uncomfortable with what HEIs are doing under the “brand” name of Canada if they were given more complete information about those activities. In closing, internationalization scholarship potentially disrespects persons by interfering with their autonomy, through the withholding and concealing of vital information, just as the internationalization activities of certain HEIs disrespect the autonomy of potential students. Internationalization is further implicated in a violation of cosmopolitanism.

**Violation of the Duty to Reform Institutions Producing Injustices**

The third and final violation of cosmopolitanism committed by Canadian HEIs is the violation of the duty to reform institutions that lead to injustices from which they are benefiting. Pogge is one of the major proponents of this principle. His institutional cosmopolitanism requires that “one ought not to participate in an unjust institutional scheme” without attempting to reform the institution or aid the victims of the injustice.\(^{34}\) Pogge asserts that many of the key institutions of contemporary times—in particular, the global trading system and its supporting organizations—exacerbate or at the very least

\(^{34}\) Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” 50.
maintain global inequality. Furthermore, the wealthy west has played a major role in the evolution of these institutions, overlooking alternatives that would be more equitable. Pogge argues that such institutions must be reformed, because they place the welfare of those in some countries above the welfare of those in others, in violation of the fundamental equality at the heart of cosmopolitanism. Failing reform, we owe it to the disadvantaged individuals to provide redress for the ensuing inequalities. It is inadequate for individuals and nations simply “to refrain from violating human rights directly.” Rather, we must be active in our pursuit of “certain fundamental principles of justice.”

As I showed in chapter two, other cosmopolitan philosophers have contributed to this line of thinking. Dobson argues that cosmopolitanism needs to make more explicit the nature of the injustices between wealthy and poor countries. He advocates for a “thick cosmopolitanism” emphasizing duties of justice as opposed to charity. With the former, we are strictly obligated to provide compensation for our “complicity in international harm.” Even those cosmopolitan thinkers who refrain from making direct demands for distributive justice agree that global citizenship entails rights and responsibilities. Cicero wrote eloquently of the need to expand the sphere of our virtuous actions, to protect others “upon whom [harm] is inflicted,” and to “always be contributing something to the common weal.” When Kant analyzed the implications of his CI, he argued that the duty to treat individuals as ends in themselves carries with it the responsibility of

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35 Ibid., 52.
36 Ibid., 50.
37 Ibid., 52.
38 Ibid., 50.
40 Cicero, De Officiis, 25.
41 Ibid., 57.
furthering the ends of others, and not merely avoiding the commission of any harms.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, the GC textbook speaks of the duty to “to ensure that people are treated justly [and] have equitable opportunities as fellow citizens of this world,” and “[to] make sure that our actions bring about positive changes.”\textsuperscript{43} Most cosmopolitans have embraced this concept of an active citizenship dedicated to fighting injustice.

Above I noted that Canada is a participant in the GATS, but has chosen not to open its education sector to foreign competition. Yet we benefit from the existence of the GATS, and the general liberalization of foreign education sectors that has occurred in its wake. I have not yet assessed the ways in which the institutional framework in which internationalization is embedded is in all likelihood contributing to distributive injustice. I begin this discussion by returning to Knight’s definition of internationalization, “the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of post-secondary education.”\textsuperscript{44} I made much of the “motive neutrality” of this definition in the last chapter. All the same, Knight does address the motives that HEIs and governments have for internationalizing: economic, political, academic, and cultural. The OECD offers another widely-cited typology. Three of the approaches to internationalization that it highlights are similar to Knight’s: mutual understanding (promoting better understanding of other cultures); skilled migration (recruiting faculty and students for study and work in the host country); and revenue generating (seeking full-fee paying students). The fourth is capacity building: building a

\textsuperscript{42} Kant, \textit{Grounding}, 37.
\textsuperscript{43} Sgroi, “Global Citizenship,” 200.
\textsuperscript{44} Knight, “Updated internationalization definition,” 2.
developing country’s capacity for economic growth by permitting foreign institutions to provide education.  

My first observation is that both typologies approach the topic of internationalization exclusively from the perspective of the institutions engaging in the practice, rather than that of the students and communities HEIs are supposed to serve. Knight doesn’t ask why a student living in India or China would want a diploma from Canada or elsewhere. The motives for becoming an international student are discussed in only the most general way, as a desire to receive a cross-cultural education and become a global citizen. The OECD similarly offers,

> One way for students to expand their knowledge of other societies and languages, and thus improve their prospects in globalised sectors of the labour market, such as multi-national corporations or research, is to study in tertiary education institutions in countries other than their own.  

Yet the flow of international students is largely one-way, reflecting a distinct migration from developing nations to wealthy ones. “Some 83% of all foreign students are enrolled in G20 countries,” summarizes the OECD, “while 77% of all foreign students are enrolled in OECD countries.” More than half of all international students seek out just six countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, France, and Canada, in that order. A further noteworthy observation is the dominance of English-speaking or English-teaching countries in the top 20 destinations. The top countries of origin, on the other hand, are China, India, and South Korea; Asian students as a whole

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47 Ibid., 318.
48 Ibid., 322.
49 Ibid., 323.
represent more than half of all international students.\textsuperscript{50} Recall that Canada had 200,000 international students in 2010; India’s total was a mere 22,000.\textsuperscript{51} If the only variable explaining international education were the desire for cultural enrichment, the flow of students would be less lopsided, as students from the wealthy G20 would surely want to share in this cultural exchange by taking a degree in a non-G20 nation.

It is also worth noting that HEI dedication to a supposedly cosmopolitan student body is limited to countries that have rising middle classes that can afford to educate their children abroad. Hence, there is an interest in recruiting students from South Korea and China, but not Ghana or Honduras. Nelly Stromquist observed this contradiction as well in her case study of a university recruiting international students: “students from poorer regions such as those from Africa and many Latin American countries are not recruited.”\textsuperscript{52} A 2004 survey of internationalization in the UK similarly notes that “current international trends and developments are essentially market-based and are predicated upon students who are able to pay the full cost of education. . . .”\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, the number of international students from lower-income families is decreasing in Canada.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, internationalization ignores students from the poorest countries, as well as the poorest students from countries with rising incomes, such as India and China. It

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 318.
appears, therefore, that internationalization is leading to greater choice in education for the world’s middle class, rather than to equity for its poor.\textsuperscript{55}

So why are so many international students seeking out Canada, Australia, the United States, and the other top destination countries? There are in all likelihood several reasons. If international students return home after their education, they will make more attractive employees to the multinational companies located there, and they will make considerably more money than they would if they sought work with a domestic firm.\textsuperscript{56}

But in particular, students seeking to study abroad are often attracted by the possibility of migration.\textsuperscript{57} Agerwal observes that students from “low-wage, source countries” are obtaining degrees abroad as a means of “augmenting their chances of obtaining a high wage job” in those destination countries.\textsuperscript{58} A number of studies show that many students choose to remain in the country in which they have studied.\textsuperscript{59} I noted in the last chapter that Canada and its provinces have made it much easier for international students to apply for citizenship upon completion of post-secondary education. Clearly, the countries recruiting international students are aware of this underlying desire to migrate. A recent OISE thesis by Heather Kelly suggests that the internationalization offices of Canadian HEIs “are increasingly directed towards an immigration advising function,” complete with explicit connections to the federal government’s immigration programs.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{55} Hatakenaka, \textit{Internationalism in Higher Education}, 29.
\textsuperscript{56} Bashir, \textit{Trends in International Trade in Higher Education}, 43.
\textsuperscript{57} World Bank, 45.
\textsuperscript{59} Nick Adnett, “The growth of international students and economic development: friends or foes?” \textit{Journal of Education Policy} 25, no. 5 (September 2010): 630-1.
clear that the desire to migrate is a major demand shaper of internationalization, an explanation largely missing from the accounts of scholars who emphasize only the perspective of HEIs.

This one-way flow of students has a number of implications for distributive justice. It has, first, led to the allegation that internationalization is contributing to “brain drain.” While this hypothesis was initially developed to explain the migration of doctors, nurses, teachers, scientists, and other educated professionals to wealthier countries, it has now been expanded to cover the exodus of international students. What Canada’s government has termed a “talent acquisition” strategy has in other circles been viewed less kindly as “a glorified form of poaching,” or “beggar thy poor neighbor,” with potentially serious repercussions for the countries losing a good percentage of their middle class. Devesh Kapur and John McHale argue that there is evidence that skilled migration out of a developing country reduces both its income levels and long-term growth. Another study argues that countries lose a measurable percentage of their tax base when potential high-income earners migrate. India, for example, was estimated to have lost 2.5% of its fiscal revenue in 2005 due to high-skilled emigration to the United States alone. Middle class emigration can also have a detrimental effect on the growth of institutions in these countries, an integral component of development. There is evidence that HEIs are the institutions most affected, and given that these are the “wellspring of future human

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capital,” the loss could be grave indeed. In India, there are now thousands of empty postdoctoral positions and teaching vacancies (approximately 50% of all university posts in 2007-08). Nick Adnett also hypothesizes that the out-migration of the middle class could reduce pressure on governments in developing countries to improve education funding, as the squeakiest wheels have departed. Thus, the already advantaged education systems of wealthy countries grow stronger and stronger, while those in poorer countries stagnate or deteriorate. Adnett concludes, therefore, that internationalization is contributing to global inequality.

Adnett observes that this development is almost completely ignored in the literature on internationalization. Scholars have instead countered that it benefits developing countries to have their citizens educated elsewhere, or that what is really happening is “brain circulation,” because a number of individuals educated abroad do eventually return to their home countries. Phillip Brown and Stuart Tannock are—rightly, I believe—dismissive of these alternative hypotheses, summarizing their criticisms as follows:

At the end of the day, ... three key facts remain: first, there is a growing movement of the highly educated from poor to wealthy nations of the world, and not the other way around; second, this movement is especially damaging to the poorest and smallest nations, particularly when the workers involved provide public services in health care and education; third, noble and uplifting rhetoric aside, managed migration policy in rich nations continues

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64 Ibid., 97-8.
67 Ibid., 626.
68 Ibid.
69 OECD, Education at a Glance 2010, 310.
to be set by a concern, first and foremost, with national self-interest, not a concern with global responsibility or the interests of other nations.  

While some international students will indeed return to their homes, there is nothing approaching balance for the developing countries. For example, in 1990, it was estimated that 1,500 Indians returned home from the United States, while over thirty times that number departed. In 2004, Altbach indicated that more than 80% of Indian and Chinese students stayed to work in the United States after completing their qualifications. Similarly, a 2007 study found that seven out of every ten students who leave China to study abroad never return. While the imbalance has been mitigated somewhat by the growing economic power of these nations (India’s IT sector, for example), it persists to this day.

Cosmopolitanism demands that we make serious efforts to redress this situation, as we are the beneficiaries (and in some cases, the creators) of the institutional structures supporting internationalization. Yet with little acknowledgement of the problem, we appear to be a long way from the cosmopolitan ideal. It has been estimated that the amount of money that the top destination countries earn from foreign students is ten times what those same countries donate in support of the educational systems of developing

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Furthermore, the aid given by wealthy nations is now primarily in the form of scholarships. Bashir notes that this is really a form of “tied aid,” conditional on the “purchase” of education from the donating country (and perhaps, as just summarized, benefitting the funding country more than the receiving one). Scholarship support represents a dramatic departure from the kind of developmental aid that Canadian HEIs formerly engaged in as a matter of course. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Canadian HEIs frequently partnered with HEIs in developing countries such as Rwanda, Nairobi, and Tunisia to provide technical aid to those institutions, with the assistance of the Canadian government. Generally, these projects involved capacity building and institutional strengthening, or initiatives unrelated to education like food-system assistance.

What should wealthy nations and their HEIs do to address this situation? Adnett proposes that, at minimum, HEIs need to redirect foreign aid away from scholarships, which are having the effect of worsening the condition of education systems in the developing world. Adnett advises a return to providing direct support for those education systems through the establishment of high-quality partnerships, rather than projects designed to increase the flow of international students out of the country or to compete

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77 Adnett, “The growth of international students and economic development: friends or foes?” 632.
80 James Shute, “From Here to There and Back Again: International Outreach in the Canadian University,” in A new world of knowledge: Canadian universities and globalization, eds. Sheryl Bond and Jean Pierre Lemasson (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999), 23-9. The discussion in this chapter reveals that these Canadian initiatives were not motivated by larger geopolitical goals such as anti-communism or regional hegemony, unlike similar partnerships originating from the United States and the United Kingdom.
with local institutions. If scholarships are to be employed, it would be better if they were provided to the poorer students in developing countries, so that internationalization does not worsen inequality in those countries. These are concrete proposals that Canadian HEIs could immediately adopt. The federal government also has a potential role to play, as Bashir argues that trade negotiations must confront the issue of whether wealthy countries are engaging in unfair trade practices when they subsidize the activities of their HEIs in the developing world. I noted in the last chapter that some Canadian HEIs have established branch campuses and are even offering training programs to foreign businesses. These initiatives have the indirect support of Canada’s federal and provincial governments, as they fund these institutions. Bashir notes that domestic HEIs in developing countries often lack the resources to vie with these flashy foreign competitors and their well-established brand names. As of yet, there is no sign that the developed world is even contemplating this inequity in its trade negotiations. In general, Canada’s HEIs and governments are not living up to their cosmopolitan duty to provide some form of redress for inequalities from which they benefit.

I will close this chapter with a discussion of one further implication for distributive justice connected to internationalization. This time, it is Canadians who are negatively affected, technically meaning that the issue has nothing to do with cosmopolitanism. However, it offers further insight into the general attitude of Canadian HEIs and governments towards distributive justice, and for that reason I wish to consider it here.

I have consistently argued that Canadian governments and HEIs are increasingly relying on international students to fund the country’s education system. Some scholars

81 Adnett, “The growth of international students and economic development: friends or foes?” 634.
82 Ibid., 635.
go farther, suggesting that governments are using internationalization to shrink the public sector and to privatize higher education by stealth.\footnote{Brown and Tannock, “Education, meritocracy and the global war for talent,” 385.} Lower-income and First Nations Canadians may be particularly affected by this development. Recall that in the last chapter, I quoted a university document in which it was suggested that growth in tuition revenue could come either from the increased enrolment of international students or the “over enrollment” of domestic students.\footnote{Simon Fraser University, Academic Plan 2010 to 2013, 12, http://www.sfu.ca/content/dam/sfu/vpacademic/files/vp_academie_docs/vp_academie_plan2010.pdf.} Given that the university in question was still seeking more students, “over enrollment” cannot refer to the number of students, but rather to their quality. A second document phrased the alternatives to recruiting more international students in a similar fashion: recruiting either low-income individuals or members of visible minorities, particularly First Nations.\footnote{Tim O’Neill, Report on the University System in Nova Scotia (Province of Nova Scotia, September 2010), http://premier.gov.ns.ca/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/09/EducationReport.pdf.} It is well known that these groups are underrepresented in Canadian HEIs, particularly at the university level.\footnote{Canadian Council on Learning, Post-secondary education in Canada: Who is missing out? (Ottawa: The Council, 2009), http://www.cel-cca.ca/pdfs/LessonsInLearning/04_01_09-E.pdf; Kathryn McMullen, “Postsecondary Education Participation among Underrepresented and Minority Groups,” Education Matters 8, no. 4 (December 2011), Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 81-004-X, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/81-004-x/2011004/article/11595-eng.htm.}

Thus, we see that Canadian HEIs are faced with a clear choice: they can increase their domestic enrollment by targeting underserved populations, or they can attract more international students. Tannock suggests, however, that governments and their HEIs may be choosing internationalization and its attendant immigration because it is the cheaper option for obtaining growth. “The global talent war,” he summarizes in an interview, “is a way to externalize costs, cut taxes and shrink the public sector, while avoiding any immediate consequences of declining investment in the domestic educational
infrastructure.” Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhodes make a similar argument in their book analyzing what they call “academic capitalism,” the increasingly market-oriented behaviour of HEIs:

[I]nstitutions are increasingly moving to national and international student markets because public colleges and universities can charge these students more. The increased significance of revenue considerations that comes with academic capitalism leads to a greater concentration of institutional energies and monies on students already privileged and served by higher education, with a lesser focus on those student populations that historically have been underserved.89

Even community colleges, they write, are aiming their programs at more lucrative markets, either in other regions of the country, via online learning, or by attracting mature (i.e., employed) and international students. 90 Each of these populations has a greater ability to pay than low-income students. This observation applies just as equally to Canadian community colleges, which were originally created to address the needs of students in underserved communities, regardless of previous academic performance. 91

Today, the website of virtually any of these institutions shows that they are active in the same pursuits as their American peers. While I do not have the tools to evaluate the precise impact these changes are having on lower-income Canadians, the extent to which Canadian governments and HEIs are abandoning an earlier commitment to this population is not addressed in the literature on internationalization. If anything, it is argued that internationalization will allow Canada to continue expanding its education

90 Ibid, 288.
system. However, there is some evidence that poorer Canadians will not be served by this expansion.

The internationalization of higher education is, therefore, perpetuating if not contributing to a complex web of inequality. Better-off students in developing countries are attracted to the seemingly prestigious education systems in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Many of these students will immigrate to those countries; if they return home, they will receive a wage premium relative to their poorer peers. The countries losing a portion of their youth to emigration are faced with diminished tax revenues and potentially weakened institutions, hurting their prospects for further development. The HEIs involved in internationalization appear to be expanding their middle-class constituency through internationalization, as opposed to recruiting lower-income students at home. Cosmopolitanism demands some form of redress for this complex situation; instead, as of yet, Canadian HEIs and most internationalization scholars are ignoring if not explicitly denying the problem. Philip Altbach, one of the few scholars to draw attention to this predicament, concludes,

Inequality characterizes contemporary internationalization. . . . Creating international higher education relations based on equality constitutes a major challenge—one that academe has so far largely ignored.  

Therefore, HEIs appear to be violating the cosmopolitan duty to reform institutions that lead to injustices from which they are benefiting. Combined with the above evidence that at least some HEIs are also violating the core cosmopolitan principles of respect for individual autonomy and respect for a universal moral code, there is considerable

evidence that Canadian HEIs are not particularly committed to cosmopolitanism, and that internationalization is primarily motivated by revenue generation. Indeed, cosmopolitanism and GC are almost nowhere in sight in this close examination of internationalization. In the final analysis, internationalization may very well be a threat to cosmopolitanism and GC.
This thesis has now come full circle. I began with a description of the recent efforts to unionize part-time and temporary employees at Ontario’s colleges. The behaviour of the colleges during this period appeared to be at odds with their newfound commitment to GC. I have just concluded my analysis by raising the possibility that HEIs are further turning their backs on equity at home by recruiting full-fee-paying international students in lieu of lower-income Canadians.

My direct experience of this tension, as a teacher of GC in a Canadian HEI, made me uneasy and inspired this thesis. In order to give more substance to my gut feelings, I first had to develop a more precise definition of GC. Ultimately, I linked the concept to cosmopolitanism and Kantian moral philosophy, and argued that GC and cosmopolitanism are united by their adherence to three key principles: the principle that there is a moral code of behaviour operating above the laws of nations; the principle of fundamental respect for the person; and the principle that we have a duty to reform institutions that are producing injustices and inequalities from which we benefit. I believe that this clear and fairly simple definition of GC, albeit imperfect, marks an improvement over many of the more vague alternatives circulating in the field.

I then engaged in a closer analysis of Canadian HEI behaviour. GC is often touted as the justification for internationalization, the growing tendency of HEIs to operate on a global as opposed to a local or national basis. I summarized the scholarly literature on internationalization, examined government and HEI documents pertaining to the trend, and provided several examples of actual internationalization activities engaged in by
Canadian HEIs. This was a complex web of material, but I ultimately argued that its sum total shows that internationalization is for the most part driven by the promise of increased revenue and immigration, purely instrumental motives. Despite protestations to the contrary, GC is generally given a back seat to these economic concerns. In the worst instances, GC may be merely a strategy deployed to attract international students. I also argued that internationalization scholarship is generally uncritical of this reality, and ultimately apolitical. As far as I am aware, I am the first scholar to examine internationalization scholarship and the internationalization activities of HEIs from the viewpoint of GC.

The final component of my thesis involved my detailed analysis of the contradictions between GC and these internationalization activities. I demonstrated the ways in which some (and in certain cases, many) HEIs are violating the three core principles of GC/cosmopolitanism. The language of GC and cosmopolitanism is, I concluded, providing a moral veneer for activities that are in reality little different than those of multinational corporations seeking to maximize profits. That these activities are carried out by institutions that are awarded a great deal of trust by society is particularly disturbing, because such behaviour is less expected and therefore less easy to guard against. I believe that this section marks a genuine contribution to cosmopolitanism, as I have shown very clearly how the philosophy can be used to illuminate and confront a current problem, bringing the philosophy to life and hopefully demonstrating its current relevance.

Can GC or cosmopolitanism survive in an environment so apparently toxic to its ideals? I am not overly optimistic, as the situation I have presented is obviously quite
discouraging. However, I believe that there is some reason for hope. While marketing departments are having an ever greater impact on the direction of higher education, they do not fully control what goes on in the classroom. To that end, I have not yet had much to say about my actual experiences of teaching GC. To conclude my thesis, I will offer some insight about what goes on in these classrooms, and in the process tie up a few loose ends regarding cosmopolitanism.

As I offered at the beginning of this thesis, I teach GC at an HEI with a large population of international students. My students major in diverse fields, ranging from child care, to information technology, to graphic design, and to police, automotive and media studies. I have found my classes to be receptive to the ideals of GC. However, it is not simply the case that I raise the issue of, say, poverty in rural Africa, and I am met with a rapt audience hanging on my every word. Rather, I have to win them over to the main ideas of GC slowly. I must start by providing them with basic information about the topic in question. Most of my students do not have a good grasp of world issues, nor for that matter, geography, history, or economics. They are technology-savvy, but they use their digital time exploring popular culture. Somewhat perversely, they have more knowledge about the alleged end of the world in 2012, or the supposed alien holding tank at the military base “Area 51,” than they do about the global economic crisis. My international students are less well-versed in conspiracy theory, and some know more about geography and politics. I would still hesitate to call them well-informed. Martha Nussbaum and the Stoics are therefore quite correct that education is the necessary first step for cosmopolitanism. If empathy for unknown people around the world is to have
any chance of being cultivated, we must teach broadly about other people, places, customs, and problems.

But in my experience, exposing my students to knowledge of a global problem is usually inadequate. I have learned that I have to explain how the issue relates to them on a personal level if I am to be successful in sparking their interest. More precisely, I have to demonstrate exactly how an issue affects my students. Recall that Nussbaum—following Aristotle—made this very point: in order to feel compassion, we have to understand that someone is undergoing considerable suffering not of his or her own doing, and we have to believe that we could experience a similar fate.\(^1\) In Aristotle’s words, pity is “a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours. . . .”\(^2\) But I suggest that my experience is even less flattering to human nature. My students need to be shown, not simply that they could, theoretically, suffer from a similar fate. They need to be shown that they are actually affected, or will be affected, by the situation I am describing. I don’t find them to be particularly adept at abstracting beyond their personal experiences. They are not naturally inclined to perform the thought exercises necessitated by Kant’s categorical imperative. While some of my students are exceptions to this generalization, particularly the older ones, they are just that, exceptions. Education is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient, to the cosmopolitan project.

My classroom experience perhaps demonstrates the relevance of some of the criticisms of cosmopolitanism that I outlined in chapter two. Dobson, for example,

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\(^1\) Nussbaum, “Introduction: Cosmopolitan Emotions?” xi.

argued that much of cosmopolitanism is too “thin” to motivate individuals to the action seemingly demanded by the philosophy. He warned that cosmopolitanism must rely on more than appeals to our common humanity, or our innate ability to reason.³ His “thick” cosmopolitanism—based on the contention that the language of justice and obligation will prove a more effective call to arms than the language of respect and charity—is designed to provide this firmer foundation.⁴ Our obligation to people around the world must be made explicit and direct, via the chains of causal responsibility.⁵ Dobson would perhaps have me explain to my students the material connections between our usage of resources on the one hand, and climate change in the Arctic and in the Pacific Islands on the other, or between our love of cheap consumer goods and the recent rash of suicides in Chinese factories.

These are the kinds of teaching techniques that I do, in fact, employ when I am clarifying the key concepts of GC. For example, I show my classes the short but extremely popular Internet film The Story of Stuff, which provides some damning statistics regarding the United States’ consumption of consumer goods relative to the rest of the world.⁶ I also show segments of Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth, similarly framed to show the excessive consumption of natural resources by industrialized countries and their consequently larger responsibility for global warming.⁷ These films have proven to be excellent pedagogic tools for teaching some of the main principles of cosmopolitanism. However, as I have been stressing, I must still add a more self-

⁴ Ibid, 175.
⁵ Ibid.
regarding element, telling my students that they will suffer a similar fate if we do not take cosmopolitanism seriously and address the structural causes of injustice around the world. They, too, will feel the impact of global warming; they, too, will feel the sting of wage cuts and privation.

Conveniently, albeit unhappily, the global financial crisis has come on the scene to give teeth to my warnings. The crisis has made my students realize that their opportunities are more limited than they previously thought. Many of my domestic students have substantial debts and are trying to make ends meet with poorly paid part-time work. Some of them have recently lost jobs, and returned to school with the hope of improving their prospects. My international students are learning that Canada is not immune to unemployment and the erosion of its relatively high standard of living. I would not say that the crisis has radicalized my students, but it has made them more sympathetic to the plight of others around the world. Aristotle warned that the “immensely fortunate” may be less prone to feeling compassion for others, and my classroom experience demonstrates that shared suffering has made my students more questioning and open to the ideals of GC and cosmopolitanism.8

Thus, I believe I have attained some success in advancing the cause of GC and cosmopolitanism. Regardless, I sometimes despair about what happens when my students leave the classroom. As I noted above, some of them are adherents of conspiracy theory. Two movies, Endgame and Zeitgeist, have captured the imagination of a number of them.9 Both movies criticize the international banking system and elite

8 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1385b20-27.
9 The first movie, Endgame: Blueprint for Global Enslavement, is the product of Alex Jones, whose website provides insight into his worldview; see http://www.infowars.com/. The second movie, Zeitgeist, is the product of Peter Joseph and can be viewed at http://zeitgeistmovie.com/.
control of the government and the economy in a way that is quite friendly to cosmopolitanism. However, these critiques are couched in a larger conspiracy theory that the global elite are planning to create a totalitarian “one world government” to replace the nation state. Believers in the “one world government” theory are generally hostile to the United Nations and all forms of internationalism, including environmentalism, because of their links to international treaties. It perhaps goes without saying that they are also hostile to cosmopolitanism. So, while I believe I have successfully interested my students in GC and the philosophy of cosmopolitanism, I worry that they will revert to these more cynical belief systems.

My fears tie into another criticism of cosmopolitanism raised in chapter two, the postmodern challenge to grand historical narratives such as human progress. Cosmopolitanism, particularly its Kantian variant, predicts the gradual unfolding of human reason over time and the resulting triumph of peace over war, and international justice over inequity. As Wendy Brown phrased it, “individuals and societies are configured as developing a steadily increasing democratic, reasoned and cosmopolitan bearing.” Postmodernism questions the belief that any single narrative, such as cosmopolitanism, could be an accurate or even a desirable description of world affairs. Judith Butler argues that the values that appear to be universal inevitably turn out to be quite particular, and confined to a specific time and place. Brown added that cosmopolitanism could indeed be viewed as one more western attempt to dominate other peoples and nations. Postmodernism reminds us that for every Renaissance, there is a

Dark Ages; for every Enlightenment, a World War Two; for every European monument, an enslaved African nation. I have suggested that the global economic crisis has made my students more open to the ideas encapsulated by cosmopolitanism. But who is to say that they will not, in the end, be seduced by the right-wing conspiracy theorists? History, sadly, provides no guarantees. If anything, history shows that crises are just as likely to drive people to reactionary politics as they are to progressive movements.

Having now completely broken my promise that this conclusion would showcase reasons for optimism about the prospects of cosmopolitanism, I will turn to what I believe to be the most promising aspect of internationalization. Because Canadian HEIs have recruited so many international students, many classrooms are now genuinely multicultural. I encourage my students to talk about their home countries and their experiences as newcomers to Canada. My domestic students are accordingly given more personal knowledge of what life is like in other countries, and they in turn can provide international students with more intimate knowledge of Canada. The classroom, and the friendships it spawns, becomes the basis for a community transcending local and national boundaries. As such, it provides an illustration of the “embedded cosmopolitanism” advocated by Erskine as a counterbalance to the “impartialist” theories of Kant and other rationalist cosmopolitan thinkers. Erskine criticized traditional cosmopolitanism for placing too much faith in abstract reason and downplaying our inevitable emotional ties to particular communities. In the real world, she argues, it is just as difficult to be impartial where one’s personal ties are concerned as it is to develop an emotional bond to anonymous human beings living around the world. However, Erskine maintains, we can

13 Toni Erskine, “‘Citizen of nowhere’ or ‘the point where circles intersect’? Impartialist and embedded cosmopolitanisms,” Review of International Studies 28, no. 3 (July 2002), 461.
14 Ibid., 459.
build a sense of connection to other people via our membership in multiple communities, some of which will cross territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{15} While we cannot feel a meaningful bond with everyone on the planet, we can come to respect and identify with people far outside the boundaries of our birth communities, giving cosmopolitanism deeper roots than those supposedly provided by our shared ability to reason.

The internationalization of higher education does indeed have the potential to bring people together from diverse parts of the planet. This potential would be greatly enhanced were students from poorer countries, and poorer students from middle-income countries, given the same opportunity to study abroad as are middle class students. If HEIs and governments are serious about the role that GC and cosmopolitanism should play in internationalization, they will have to provide full funding to these groups of students, as I argued in chapter four. This expansion of scholarship programs for poorer international students represents the bare minimum required for the transformation of internationalization.

However, I do not believe that HEIs have much incentive to change their current practices. They would perhaps be more inclined were the academic community—the people most likely to understand what is going on in the name of internationalization—to demand these changes. I argued earlier that the literature on internationalization is surprisingly uncritical, in an apparent abandonment of one of the traditional roles of scholarship. Most academics probably place implicit trust in the messaging that has accompanied internationalization: that it promotes GC, and is good for both HEIs and their students. Yet surely other members of academia are aware of the practices I have highlighted in this thesis. Perhaps some academics are compromised, benefitting from

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 475.
internationalization via directorships and deanships. Perhaps others are silenced out of fear for job security. Indeed, the casualization of academic labour that I outlined in the introduction may very well be playing a role in the surprising lack of criticism of internationalization.

Criticism of the internationalization practices of Canadian HEIs may yet emerge from other quarters. As I noted earlier, internationalization scandals recently affected the reputation of the Australian HEI system. Stories from other countries active in internationalization are now emerging with great frequency. In late 2011, BBC investigations into the international partnerships formed by the University of Wales revealed numerous instances of fraud and potentially criminal behaviour. One partner was offering fake MBAs to help its students become eligible for U.K. visas, another was headed by a pop star with similarly fake credentials, and a third was selling diplomas.\(^\text{16}\) The ensuing outcry led to the closure of the University, founded in 1893 and the second largest HEI in the United Kingdom.\(^\text{17}\) As I was writing this conclusion, a North Dakota University was being widely accused of operating as a diploma mill for international students, primarily from China. Hundreds of students received degrees for which they had not completed all the requirements. A dean of one of the university’s colleges committed suicide as the scandal unfolded.\(^\text{18}\) The story received coverage around the

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17 The university’s name will live on in modified form—the University of Wales Trinity Saint David—under the charter of one of its colleges, a former university in its own right. See Julie Henry, “University of Wales abolished after visa scandal,” \textit{The Telegraph}, October 22, 2011, \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-15165625}.

world, and the Chinese government is now apparently conducting its own investigation.\footnote{Wang Dongliang, “Ministry of Education investigates US ‘diploma mill’,” \textit{People’s Daily}, February 20, 2012, \url{http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/7734397.html}.} As I noted in the last chapter, Appiah stressed the role that international reputation can play in explaining major social change. Nations care about their image before other nations, and can be influenced by criticism from abroad.

If a scandal were to erupt in Canada, the newfound interest in GC by the country’s HEIs would in all likelihood be perceived as empty and hypocritical rhetoric by our students, as well as by the staff and the communities that these schools serve. Our students would perhaps be driven further into the arms of the conspiracy theorists, with their message that there is virtually no one you can trust. From my perspective as a committed critical educator, I cannot imagine anything worse. It is also highly likely that a scandal would affect the bottom lines of the affected institutions, and perhaps Canadian HEIs in general. Post-secondary institutions, as centres of reflection and practice, stand in the best and perhaps only position to promote the teachings of GC and cosmopolitanism, and to integrate that philosophical vision and spirit at every level of education. It is up to the Canadian HEI community to ensure that internationalization fulfills the principles of GC and cosmopolitanism before a scandal is exposed, destroying the potential of the movement.


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