Overlap, Identities, and Expectations: Explaining Challenges to Cohesion in Security Communities

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
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Abstract

This dissertation asks why there are recurrent challenges to cohesion in security communities (SCs) in international relations. Each of the three papers provides a specific part of the answer to this question.

Focusing on SCs and the balance of power (BOP), the first paper juxtaposes two common ways of governing security relations between actors in international relations and describes the repertoires of practices that they are based on. A process-based understanding of SC and BOP suggests that they may overlap. We explain why that is the case and identify different types of overlap (temporal, functional, spatial, and relational). Challenges to cohesion may arise in cases where SC and non-SC practices coexist.

The second paper focuses on the process of identification in SCs. It does so by bringing together the literatures of ontological security, recognition, and security communities. A revised ontological security view suggests that security communities need to not only continually reinforce a sense of “we-ness” but also recognize members’ distinctiveness. This tension leads to struggles for recognition during which actors employ different strategies: adoption, reform, denial, or exit. I show how struggles for recognition can help explain challenges to cohesion in security communities, and I illustrate how my argument may help adjudicate the debate about the state of transatlantic relations after the end of the Cold War.
The third paper conceptualizes security communities as governance mechanisms that include but also may go beyond the routinization of peaceful conflict resolution: Members of a security community “do things together;” they exhibit collective intentionality – which can be inward as well as outward oriented. I argue that collective intentionality gives rise to different kinds of expectations: I develop an analytical framework for understanding the interplay of predictive and prescriptive expectations among members of a security community and its effects on the cohesion of the community. Somewhat counterintuitively, I suggest that managing expectations is particularly challenging in security communities because of the problem of complacency, the likelihood of resentment, the expectation of forgiveness, and the problem of recognition needs.

Taken together, my arguments imply that stable cooperative inter-state relationships can only partially rely on structural conditions for their maintenance: Supposedly stable ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ structures do not exist outside of or separate from the continuous political process of struggles for recognition and expectations management.
Acknowledgments

One spring afternoon many years ago I was sitting in a café in my hometown in Hamburg, Germany. I remember the day well. That morning I had received the acceptance letter for the Ph.D. program at U of T; I was happy and excited. I glanced up at the couple sitting at the table next to me. They had their backs turned to me, and I could not hear anything they were saying. There was nothing particularly remarkable about them, but something must have caught my attention. And then I noticed the blue baseball cap with a white maple leaf. I could not help it and did something thoroughly un-German: I got up and walked over to the couple. “Are you from Toronto?” I asked, secretly hoping to make an impression with my basic NHL knowledge. Barely waiting for their reply (which was yes), I grinned with excitement and blurted out, “I’ll be moving to your city soon!” I cannot remember their reaction, but in retrospect I have always imagined it to be a stereotypical mixture of American enthusiasm and German standoffishness that amounted to Canadian politeness. I do not believe in signs, and that afternoon many years ago has no spiritual significance for me. But, in a way, that day is one of the bookends to my Ph.D. journey. It is remarkable and meaningful to me as a marker in the past. Going back to it in my mind now, it provides me with a general sense of the passage of time and, more importantly, also serves as a reminder of how far I have come. Sometimes the past and our past selves can feel like a different world. The next time I will be going to that café, I will be sitting there as a Canadian citizen with a Ph.D. – and a son.

The challenges of long, hard journeys are easier to face with the support of experienced guides along the way, of fellow travelers who become friends, and of those who stayed behind. I am extremely grateful to everyone who has supported me on this journey. First and foremost, there is my supervisor Emanuel Adler. Emanuel has been one of my biggest champions from day one. His door was always open, and I spent countless hours discussing ideas and projects with him; his enthusiasm is remarkable and contagious. Discussions with Emanuel always remind me why I started an academic career in political science in the first place: Because I am interested in problems of world politics, in ideas and people, and in cultivating my own and my students’ curiosity about international
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The poet David Whyte writes “… the ultimate touchstone of friendship is not improvement, neither of the other nor of the self, the ultimate touchstone is witness, the privilege of having been seen by someone and the equal privilege of being granted the sight of the essence of another, to have walked with them and to have believed in them, and sometimes just to have accompanied them for however brief a span, on a journey
impossible to accomplish alone.”¹ This journey would indeed have been impossible to accomplish alone; friends near and far have made it so much more enjoyable. I especially thank Teresa Kramarz, Rebecca Sanders, Margaret Haderer, Eva Lett, Vanessa Peters, Arjun Tremblay, Karlo Basta, Seung Hyok Lee, Alena Drieschova, Yulia Eskin, Tanja Ostwald, Jeremiah Riemer, Mihaela Mihai, Leah Soroko, Andrew Gross, Leslie Wee, Cliff van der Linden, Vincent Pouliot, James McKee, Bill Flanik, Reuven Shlozberg, Emre Gönülügür, and Serdar Tekin. The “Halbert Post-Docs” Amir Lupovici, Gadi Heimann, and Nava Löwenheim were great colleagues and became true friends during their respective stays in Toronto. My cycling buddies Todd Clayton, Ari Caylaky, Eliza Choi, Erica Morse, Reem Abood, and Colin Leong have allowed me to forget about my dissertation for hours and sometimes days at a time when riding in the Ontario countryside.

My parents, Sigrid and Rolf-Dieter Greve, have been supporting me in all my endeavours for as long as I can remember. They trusted me and gave me space to discover myself – even if that meant that I would move thousands of kilometres away pursuing a path that neither one of them knew very much about. My love for them has only grown over time!

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1 Introduction: Challenges to Cohesion and the Maintenance of Security Communities

Maintaining a security community resembles driving in a close convoy; both require continuous mutual attention and responsiveness.
- Karl W. Deutsch et al. (1957: 43)

Why do longstanding allies, let alone those bound by common interests, an intricate web of institutions, shared practices, and by a sense of collective identity, worry about each other’s reliability? Take, for example, the European-American relationship, which has been seen as an important pillar of the postwar international order and a textbook case of a security community, though it has recently been looked at as more of a basket case – its cohesion challenged both from within and without.

In the decades after the Second World War, the transatlantic relationship and NATO as its main institutional embodiment had come to be regarded as a “security community” (Deutsch et al. 1957). Among members of this community, war had become unthinkable, and close political, military, and economic cooperation had become common sense and the default mode of interaction.

The conflict over the war in Iraq in 2003, which pitted the United States against some of its most longstanding allies in Europe, was perceived by many as a watershed in transatlantic relations that threatened to undermine elements of the security community (cf. contributions in Kopstein and Steinmo 2008, Anderson, Ikenberry, and Risse 2008). Even those who viewed the community as remaining intact (Pouliot 2006; cf. also Duffield 2001, Jervis 2002, Peterson 2004) usually acknowledged a change of some kind, albeit one that did not amount to an all-out irreversible crisis. The more pessimistic accounts saw the community at a “crossroads,” possibly headed for “continued drift” (Daalder 2001a); and, if these accounts were not quite predicting a “divorce” or a “chasm” (ibid.), they did observe a “widening Atlantic” (Ferguson 2005) or dramatically declared that “a Rubicon of sorts has […] been crossed” (Cox 2005: 208).
In the years since, the community’s cohesion has repeatedly been challenged, be it during the war in Afghanistan, the intervention in Libya in 2011, or by U.S. surveillance practices in allied states. On top of that, the European Union has been under strain from a series of financial crises, and its worst refugee crisis since the Second World War with more than 1 million people applying for asylum in 2015 and 2016. Finally, democracy has become under threat in both Europe in America with the rise of right-wing populist leaders and a widening democratic disconnect among the citizenry of consolidated democracies (Foa and Mounk 2016). In sum, the postwar, liberal internationalist order looks to be unraveling before our eyes.

One could be forgiven for dismissing these views as exaggerated and alarmist. For one, we have been here many times before: An elaborate crisis literature by scholars, pundits, and policymakers has proclaimed the end of the transatlantic alliance in almost every year since its existence – yet it endures (see Thies 2009: chap. 1). Patrick Jackson even argues that “the West that we have is importantly constituted by a tradition resting in part on a notion of civilizational decline. It did not have to be that way, but it is – and that makes appeals to Western decline intuitively plausible, both historically and in the present” (Jackson 2010: 68). Second, when comparing the Atlantic area to other regions of the world, the supposedly interplanetary differences between Martian Americans and Venusian Europeans that Robert Kagan claimed to see in the wake of the Iraq War (Kagan 2003) may yet reveal themselves as a case of the rather mundane narcissism of minor differences. Yet, on the other hand, might we regret shrugging off these developments as normal diplomatic spats and wake up to a world where geopolitical rivalries make a comeback in Europe and in transatlantic relations? Are we bound to miss the signs because we have cried wolf too often? Is this the time when everything is different? Will our recent past be seen as the beginning of the end of the community and the order that was built upon the lessons from two world wars?

From a social scientific perspective, what is needed is less of a reflexive attitude of proclaiming each crisis as the worst and the end of “the West,” or, alternatively, as just another bump in the road that does not get to the heart of the relationship and will not have any lasting effects on the established postwar transatlantic order. As a recent intervention into the debate about “the West” noted, despite an extensive literature on transatlantic
relations, it “has not been a place where basic debates about international relations theory have been conducted” (Ikenberry 2008: 4). The three papers that make up this dissertation aim to advance an innovative understanding of security communities (SC) and provide analytical frameworks that can help us adjudicate debates about the state of the postwar transatlantic order. Although the security community research program sees itself vindicated in the continued existence of “dependable expectations of peaceful change” in the transatlantic relationship, and some have declared the community “alive and well” (Pouliot 2006), it largely takes itself out of the running for understanding the dynamics of that relationship. It has focused mainly on the emergence and the spread of SCs – and lately also on conceptualizing processes of decline. But it has largely neglected the issue of cohesion.

Thus, the main overall question animating this project is: Why are there recurrent challenges to cohesion in mature security communities, and how are security communities maintained despite these challenges? All three parts of this dissertation provide a specific part of the answer to this question. They each focus on supporting, respectively, one of three main ontological and theoretical claims underlying this project:

- First, security communities are a process or a mechanism of governing security relations between actors in international relations – not primarily a structural or systemic outcome.
- Similarly, and second, as to the collective identity of members of a security community, we need to pay attention to the process of identification and different layers of identity that may conflict with one another.
- Third, security communities are inward and outward oriented. We need to recognize the importance of expectation management when members of SCs govern together.

I argue that these three moves, individually and together, allow for a better understanding of challenges to cohesion and the maintenance of security communities.

To set the stage for the upcoming chapters, the rest of this introduction will do three things: First, I will discuss the concept of cohesion generally and how it applies to security studies, specifically. Whereas cohesion is and has been a central concern in the alliance literature, scholars working on security communities have so far, somewhat surprisingly,
neglected the issue. Second, I will suggest three main reasons for this: Implicitly or explicitly, a good portion of the relevant literature has an ahistorical view of SCs as binary outcomes; SC scholars have neglected the complex process of (collective) identification; and the fact that SC members govern together has so far not received a lot of attention.

Third, I will provide a brief summary of each chapter of this study: Based on my reading of the existing literature, I will make the case for: a process-based understanding of security communities that allows for them to develop in a non-linear fashion and thus expects to see ‘overlap’ between SC and non-SC practices empirically (chapter 2); an account of collective identification that highlights the unresolvable tension between affiliation and individuality and thus expects to see cohesion as a constant work in progress (chapter 3); and paying attention to the outward orientation and governance function of SCs that necessitates a continuous alignment of members’ predictive and prescriptive expectations (chapter 4).

1.1 Cohesion

Generally speaking, cohesion describes the act or state of sticking together tightly – a condition of unity. The question of what makes groups form and what keeps them together is of interest to, among others, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists, who each come to the problem of cohesion from a different angle, and thus define and operationalize it with their own research interests in mind. The “definitional confusion in the social cohesion literature” noted by Noah Friedkin does not only result from disciplinary boundaries, however, but also because we are dealing with micro-macro interaction, i.e. complex, “reciprocally linked individual-level and group-level phenomena” (Friedkin 2004: 410). The assumption is that the more cohesive a certain group, the more effective it is in cooperation, and that this in turn strengthens cohesion: “Groups are cohesive when group-level conditions are producing positive membership attitudes and behaviors and when group members’ interpersonal interactions are operating to maintain these group-level conditions.” (ibid.).

In IR and security studies, the phenomenon of group cohesion is of particular importance in studies of cooperation. But whereas the cohesion – or, as it is often referred
to in that literature, the reliability – of alliances is an established research program, scholars of security communities have not dealt explicitly with issues of cohesion. One general reason for this difference may be that alliance theory sees commitments under anarchy and in the shadow of war as inherently tenuous; cohesion is thus problematic by definition. Security communities, on the other hand, may be expected to be relatively cohesive given their collective identity. (For more specific reasons for the lack of attention to cohesion in SCs, see below.)

I will briefly review the alliance literature’s take on cohesion here; it provides some good entry points for thinking about cohesion in security communities, but also has some limitations.

Why does cohesion matter? From an alliance perspective, a lack of cohesion in peacetime puts the credibility of the joint commitment at risk; it may lead to deterrence or compellence failure. On the other hand, Thomas Christensen has argued that a lack of cohesion in alliances can complicate coercive bargaining situations in unexpected ways: Facing an adversarial alliance that is internally divided is actually “worse than [facing] a monolith” (Christensen 2011). A lack of cohesion in wartime can make the difference between victory or defeat. Traditionally alliance cohesion is understood to be closely tied to the threat level. In her study of First World War alliances, Patricia Weitsman comes to the conclusion, however, that “the disproportionate burden sharing that in part came with asymmetries of power and in part with buck passing had a more telling influence on alliance cohesion during the First World War than did the rise and fall of threats coming with defeats and victories” (Weitsman 2003: 111).

While the scholarship on alliances agrees that the level of cohesion has a significant impact on outcomes of state interaction in war and in peace, there is no consensus in the literature on how to define cohesion: While some see the cohesion of alliances reflected simply in their duration (Walt 1997), most define cohesion with recourse to shared goals or objectives (for a good overview, see Weitsman 2003) or war participation or defection: In her analysis of NATO’s war in Afghanistan, Sarah Kreps defines cohesion as “the degree of convergence among member states’ commitments to the alliance,” with the key indicator
being whether states “defect,” i.e. remove or reduce troops, prior to the end of hostilities (Kreps 2010: 191, fn. 1).

While duration, war participation, and shared goals and objectives all capture elements of cohesion that would tell us something in a security community context as well, the alliance literature misses two important points. First, referencing shared goals and objectives as a measure of cohesion suggests that lack of cohesion is mainly an issue of different interests or preferences. But as we will see in chapter 4, different interests or preferences may or may not challenge the cohesion of security communities. Independent of whether preferences are shared or not, the more important element for cohesion is whether or not expectations are aligned. Second, the alliance literature’s view of cohesion does not capture the ‘micro’ element of Friedkin’s definition: “Positive membership attitudes and behaviors” indicate a sense of cohesion among the actors themselves. This is an important element when trying to adjudicate the level of cohesion of security communities.

1.2 Security Community Theory and Cohesion

In this section, I will address three barriers in the security community literature to understanding the problem of cohesion. I start with putting Deutsch’s original formulation from 1957 in context and then focus on Adler and Barnett’s 1998 reformulation as well as newer analytical contributions.

Karl W. Deutsch and his collaborators worked on their study Political Community and the North Atlantic Area in the 1950s – a time of incipient European integration, but also a time when the memory of World War II was still fresh, the Cold War was in full swing, and new dividing lines in Europe and other parts of the world began to spring up (Deutsch et al. 1957). Questions surrounding the establishment and organization of political community were thus at the forefront of people’s minds. Deutsch and his collaborators were part of what James Caporaso called the first generation of (European) integration scholars: they witnessed how ideas of integration that had their origin in societal movements and elite-led political plans were slowly turned into reality, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic
Community (EEC) (Caporaso 1998). Prior to the end of the war, David Mitrany, the pioneer of functionalism, had proclaimed “the problem of our time is not how to keep the nations peacefully apart, but how to bring them actively together” (Mitrany 1966 [1943]: 28). Deutsch et al. shared this sense of political urgency and opportunity: They parsed the history of political community – of integration – to learn lessons for their present, to get a sense of whether a project like European integration would have any chances of success.

While Deutsch was an integration scholar, his cybernetic approach with its focus on material and symbolic transactions had much less of an impact on regional integration theory than Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalist take which highlighted the role of political institutions (Caporaso 1998: 2f.). But Deutsch has become a household name among constructivist IR scholars as the father of the security community research program. This is largely due to Emanuel Adler’s and Michael Barnett’s edited volume which recovered the security community concept and put a constructivist spin on it (Adler and Barnett 1998).

In a broad theoretical way, the security community framework has its roots in the system-level argument that there need not be one universal international order that defines state interaction, but that there might exist different ordering principles across space and time. That is, not all states populate the same international order. This goes against Kenneth Waltz’s argument of one international system that is defined by the universal ordering principle of anarchy (leading to a states system based on self-help) and a structure that is determined by the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units (Waltz 1979: 245f.). Arguments that challenge this neorealist view seek to capture empirical variation in the character and effects of anarchy in the current international system (in some areas states seem to be able to all but overcome the regional security dilemma, whereas in others the neorealist “law” of the principle of self-help relations under anarchy seems to hold) by positing the coexistence of different kinds of ordering principles.3

2 For Deutsch’s cybernetic understanding of politics – seeing “government somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem of steering” – see Deutsch (1963). Here: xxvii.
3 This has most forcefully been argued by Alexander Wendt (1992 and 1999). It is worth recalling that IR theorists regarded as “classical” realists, such as E. H. Carr, had a view of the international system that acknowledged variations in ordering principles (Carr 2001 [1939]).
It was this theoretical and empirical puzzle that “war has been eliminated permanently, for all practical purposes, over large areas” that led Karl W. Deutsch and his collaborators in 1957 to study “how this condition came about and how it might be extended over larger and larger areas of the globe” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 4). They introduced the term “security community” to describe “a group of people which has become ‘integrated.’ By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population” (ibid.: 5, emphasis in original). In a large-scale comparative study, they arrived at a range of background conditions conducive to integration into “amalgamated” (new sovereign entities) or “pluralistic” (units retaining sovereignty) communities and applied their findings to the North Atlantic Area. Deutsch’s concern was very much with the emergence of security communities as creating pockets of a stable peace – and since he could not look back upon decades of experience with security communities (except, by analogy, on the domestic level), he did not elaborate on their inner dynamics, except inasmuch as he deduced certain conditions “conducive to disintegration” of political communities in general (Deutsch et al. 1957: 59-65).

Deutsch’s method was very much historical, and while he and his collaborators expected “that the achievement of a security-community would involve something like the crossing of a threshold, from a situation where war between the political units concerned appeared possible and was being prepared for, to another situation where it was neither” (ibid.: 32), what they found was that “integration may involve a fairly broad zone of transition rather than a narrow threshold; that states might cross and recross this threshold or zone of transition several times in their relations with each other; and that they might spend decades or generations wavering uncertainly within it. Thus we found that states

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4 The background conditions mostly revolve around responsiveness/we-feeling, transactions, and social communication. Deutsch did not consider the North Atlantic Area an established pluralistic security community in 1957. The reservations he had largely stemmed from the non-democratic regimes of Spain and Portugal, from being cautious about making definite predictions about Germany, and from a lack of “we-feeling.”
could maintain armed forces which were potentially available for warfare against each other, but which were not specifically committed to this purpose” (ibid.: 33).

What we see here is a recognition of the vicissitudes of historical processes. In Adler and Barnett’s 1998 reformulation there is less of an attention to process in this sense. The focus is more on conceptualizing security communities as outcomes of a rather linear process that follows three phases (nascent, ascendant, mature). In phase three, the threshold that Deutsch expected to see but did not find empirically is reintroduced: “At this point, regional actors share an identity and, therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and a security community now comes into existence. A threshold has now been crossed; it becomes increasingly difficult for the members of this ‘region’ to think only in instrumental ways and prepare for war among each other” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). With this move Adler and Barnett unfortunately go back on one of Deutsch’s key findings. Instead, in the wake of Adler and Barnett’s reformulation, security communities tend to be seen as binary outcomes that either do or don’t exist. This is the first barrier in the current literature to understanding challenges to cohesion.\(^5\)

The second barrier lies in the literature’s take on identity: Deutsch’s and his collaborators’ notion of a “sense of community” is fairly thin – they define it as “a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5). Written at a time when constructivist understandings of culture and identity made inroads into IR, Adler and Barnett’s volume very much foregrounds the idea of a collective identity as constitutive of security communities: Mutual trust and collective identity formation are “necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 38). Even though collective identity thus came to be seen as the key marker of security communities, it has not received a lot of close scholarly attention. The most notable exceptions is Janice Bially Mattern’s work on “representational force” and “narrative threats” to members’ identity in order to enforce

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\(^5\) In later work, Adler has adopted a more process-oriented view of security communities. See, for example, Adler (2008) where he traces the spread of security community practices to Central and Eastern European countries during the 1990s.
cohesion (2000, 2005a, 2005b). The process of collective identification is inherently problematic and can be used to explain challenges to cohesion (as we will see in chapter 3).

In a security community context, cohesion is important both for maintaining dependable expectations of peaceful change on the inside and for members to be able to act collectively on the outside. Thus, a third barrier to understanding challenges to cohesion is the fact that the existing literature has so far not paid a lot of attention to the outward orientation of security communities. Deutsch’s idea of a “political community” provides an opening here (cf. Kitchen 2009). Bjola provides one rare take on this more ‘agential’ side of security communities; he argues that “the main source of conflict within in the [transatlantic security community] stems from periodical challenges to its external identity that is, to the role the community is supposed to play on the world stage” and that “successful management of political crises depends on the diplomatic strategies by which the security community opens and closes debate,” namely in a deliberative, antagonistic, or feudalistic fashion (Bjola 2011: 196, 200ff.).

In sum, the three barriers to understanding challenges to cohesion in security communities are: (1) implicitly or explicitly, against Deutsch’s original formulation, security communities are seen as binary outcomes of a fairly linear process; (2) SC scholars have largely neglected the complex process of (collective) identification; and (3) the fact that SC members govern together has so far not received a lot of attention.

1.3 Where Do We Go from Here?

Deutsch and his collaborators noted in 1957 that they had “found only one case of a pluralistic security-community which failed in the sense that it was followed by actual warfare between the participants” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 30).6 They note that this “relative superiority of a pluralistic security-community” was limited, however, since it worked only when peace was the main goal. Yet, in their cases, they “found that men have often wanted more: they have wanted a political community that would not merely keep the peace among

6 The case was Austria and Prussia within in the framework of the German Confederation after 1815. In contrast to that one failure of a (dubious) pluralistic security community, they list seven cases of amalgamated security communities that failed (ibid.).
its members but that would also be capable of acting as a unit in other ways and for other purposes” (ibid.: 31). Thus, “[n]oticing that war has become an unavailable policy option is only the first step toward understanding the politics of peace” (Mitzen 2016: 242). I aim to contribute to understanding the politics of peace here. This project advances three explanations for why and when we can expect to see challenges to cohesion in security communities and proposes novel analytical frameworks for studying them. Each one of the three papers tackles one of the barriers identified above to understanding challenges to cohesion in security communities.

1.3.1 Process Ontology: Overlap of BOP and SC Practices

As we have seen, one barrier to understanding challenges to cohesion in security communities is the all-too prevalent, implicit understanding of SCs as relatively ahistorical, binary outcomes. Instead, chapter 2 implies a process-based ontology of security communities as mechanisms that develop over time and space, and not necessarily in a linear fashion. A processual approach “presumes that everything in the social world is continuously in the process of making, remaking, and unmaking itself (and other things), instant by instant. The social world does not consist of atomic units whose interactions obey various rules, as in the thought of the economists. Nor does it consist of grand social entities that shape and determine the little lives of individuals, as in the sociology of Durkheim and his followers” (Abbott 2016: ix).

Focusing on the balance of power (BOP) and security communities (SC), we juxtapose two common ways of governing security relations between actors in international relations and describe the distinct repertoires of practices that they are based on. A process-based understanding of BOP and SC suggests that they may overlap. We explain why that is the case and identify different types of overlap (temporal, functional, spatial, and relational). Challenges to cohesion may arise because SC and non-SC practices can coexist.
1.3.2 Layered Identities: Ontological Security Dynamics

Chapter 3 of this dissertation addresses a second barrier to understanding challenges to cohesion in security communities: namely, the implicit assumption that a collective identity and we-feeling provide ontological security by default. Questioning that assumption, this chapter focuses on the process of identification and layers of identity in SCs. It does so by bringing together the literatures of ontological security, recognition, and security communities. My revised ontological security view suggests that security communities need to not only continually reinforce a sense of “we-ness” but also recognize members’ distinctiveness. I argue that this tension leads to struggles for recognition during which actors employ different strategies: adoption, reform, denial, or exit. I show how struggles for recognition can help explain challenges to cohesion in security communities, and I illustrate how my argument may help adjudicate the debate about the state of transatlantic relations after the end of the Cold War.

1.3.3 Purposive Collective Action: Expectation Management in SCs

Finally, in chapter 4, I conceptualize security communities as governance mechanisms that include but also may go beyond the routinization of peaceful conflict resolution: Members of a security community “do things together;” they exhibit collective intentionality – which can be inward as well as outward oriented. I argue that collective intentionality gives rise to different kinds of expectations: I develop an analytical framework for understanding the interplay of predictive (cognitive) and prescriptive (normative) expectations among members of a security community and its effects on the cohesion of the community. Somewhat counterintuitively, I suggest that managing expectations is particularly challenging in security communities because of the problem of complacency, the likelihood of resentment, the expectation of forgiveness, and the problem of recognition needs.

In conclusion, why should we care? Taken together, my arguments imply that stable cooperative inter-state relationships can only partially rely on structural conditions for their maintenance: Supposedly stable ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ structures do not exist outside of or separate from the continuous political process of struggles for recognition and
expectations management. Seemingly innocuous debates about burden-sharing may develop (or be manipulated) into struggles for recognition. If interested in the maintenance of particular inter-state relationships, policymakers and other interested parties would be well advised to not only reflexively cite commitments to shared values or common interests, but to stay attuned to whether these commitments are still reflected in the more specific expectations that allies have of one another.
2 When Security Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance*

2.1 Introduction

By now arguments about the varieties of international order7 abound in International Relations (IR). This contentious variety includes the security mechanisms, institutions, and practices that sustain international orders, including balance of power and alliances, hegemony, security regimes based on regional or global institutions, public, private, and hybrid security networks, as well as different kinds of security communities. While this demonstrates that we cannot assume one universal ordering principle or make essentialist distinctions between anarchic international and hierarchical domestic political orders (Lake 1996, Donnelly 2006), it is remarkable that, to a large extent, the theoretical IR literature, following paradigmatic divides, has tended to treat varieties of international order as mutually exclusive. In some cases, a progressive order “ladder” that political actors are supposed to climb up – beginning with balance of power and ending with security community or world government – has been suggested (Morgan 2003b: 33). In other cases, the variety of order has been theorized from a regional perspective. Even then, however, with a few exceptions, regional order has been conceived in exclusive terms. The contribution of this chapter is, first, the contention that, while analytically and normatively distinct, radically different orders, and in particular, the security systems of governance on which they are based (such as balance of power and security community) often coexist or overlap in political discourse and practice. Second, we aim to show that it is theoretically and empirically promising to make this overlap a key subject of research in its own right. This means going beyond acknowledging overlap in principle; it means understanding and


7 By order we mean a pattern or arrangement of institutions and practices that advance a society’s common values, such as security, welfare, freedom, and equality. For a definition of social and international order, see Bull (1977).
explaining overlap and inquiring into empirical consequences for regional security governance.

We can approach the issue of overlap by asking: Is the balance of power making a comeback in Europe? Just as a number of preeminent scholars in the field place serious doubts on the potential for generalizing balance of power theory across time and space (Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007), balance-of-power thinking seems to resonate again (some might say, still) with European political practitioners: On April 2, 2008, the French prime minister, François Fillon, was reported as having explained France’s (and Germany’s) reluctance to extend NATO membership invitations to Georgia and Ukraine at the NATO summit in Bucharest with the following words: “We are opposed to the entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.”8 Analysts were quick to note that – beyond German and French tendencies to accommodate Russia, whether motivated by economic or less instrumental reasons – one balance in question here could be seen as that between major European powers and the United States.9 Another balance that is of concern to practitioners and analysts in this respect may be the balance between NATO countries and Russia.

Is the above instance indicative of a return to or continuation of competitive dynamics and a new French, German, or European assertiveness? Or is the European security community (Deutsch et al. 1957, Adler and Barnett 1998) so firmly institutionalized by now that it all but prevents the rearing of the head of Europe’s balance of power past? Are instances of balance-of-power thinking, in other words, just anachronistic remnants from a bygone era without practical consequences in the mature European and transatlantic security community?

Questions with regard to the overlap and relationship between balance of power and security community are not only confined to Europe: For example, how do we square the hub-and-spoke system of American bilateral alliances in Asia and the realist, balance-of-

power dynamics between the states in the region with what some see as an incipient security community with ASEAN at its core (Acharya and Tan 2006, Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama 2002, Acharya 2001, Emmers 2003)? How do we explain the introduction of security-community practices to the Middle East in the early 1990s (the so-called Multilaterals) and attempts to construct a new regional identity in the Mediterranean (Samuel Huntington’s sphere of contention between civilizations) involving both Christian European and Muslim and Jewish Middle Eastern states (Adler et al. 2006)?

Much effort has gone into making theoretical and conceptual arguments that come down squarely on one side or the other in each of the cases mentioned. The starting point of this chapter is the contention that in fact it is reasonable to believe that different mechanisms of security governance overlap and that the security dynamics of a region are deeply affected by the overlap. This does not mean, however, that we must surrender all our theoretical efforts to overwhelming complexity. We might indeed follow John Ruggie (1993) in arguing that we still lack the vocabulary to describe dynamics in the (post-) modern system of states and “multiperspectival,” “non-territorial” entities like the EU or security communities more generally, and we do not claim to invent this vocabulary here. But we will argue that we can begin to reflect critically on our current vocabulary by trying to conceptualize and understand this overlap.

There is an analytical and a practical-political/normative element to this exercise: The analytical goal is to notice and understand (conceptually and theoretically) the overlap of security mechanisms. The practical-political/normative challenge follows from the analytical in that the recognition of the coexistence and overlap between a variety of security orders and mechanisms begs the question of the possibility and the future of world order. Scholars and practitioners alike will have to grapple with the political-practical and normative questions for years to come. In this chapter, however, we limit ourselves to the analytical task.

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10 An indication of the lack of vocabulary with regard to security mechanisms is the creation of notions like ‘soft’ balancing or ‘muffled and channeled’ balancing which describe qualitatively different dynamics from traditional balancing. For the former, see Pape (2005), for the latter, see Deudney (2007: 50).
In short, this chapter seeks to make four main contributions: First, theoretically the argument presented here sees balance of power and security community not only as analytically distinct security orders but also focuses on them specifically as mechanisms based on a distinct mixture of practices. Second, this move opens up the possibility of a multiperspectival vision of regional security governance and a conceptualization of overlap. Third, this can help inform and enhance empirical research. For example, by focusing on the overlap of different kinds of security governance systems, and the practices that go with them, we may be able to get a better idea of the structural determinants of security policies, of whether, for example, a region may find itself in a transition between systems of security governance. Finally, our argument on overlapping mechanisms has an impact on how we think about the boundaries of regions: The traditional geographical/geopolitical notion of (regional) boundaries defines them with reference to location (answering the question “where are we/they?”); the social or cognitive notion of boundaries defines them with reference to identity (answering the question “who are we/they?”); the practical notion of boundaries which we elaborate on here with our focus on overlapping mechanisms delineates them with reference to practices (answering the questions “what do we/they do and how do we/they do it?”).

This chapter is structured as follows: We first clarify our understanding of overlap and of mechanisms of security governance and establish balance of power and security community as two distinct mechanisms based on different sets of practices. While the theoretical and conceptual literature has so far predominantly focused on the broad, ideal-typical, variety of security orders, the empirical literature on (regional) security, on the other hand, in effect (explicitly or implicitly) sometimes highlights overlap. We attempt to close this gap. We thus, second, conceptualize overlap of security mechanisms along four dimensions (temporal, functional, spatial, and relational). We provide some ideas as to how to understand overlap theoretically and give empirical illustrations along the way that show the effect of the overlap on regional dynamics. In addition, we stress the point that defining regions by the practices states use adds an important conceptual layer to our understanding of the nature of regions. Finally, we close with some thoughts on the added value of our conceptualization for further research.
2.2 Overlap

In general terms, overlap means “occupying the same area in part” or to “have something in common with.”\textsuperscript{11} Thus, rather than just denoting variety or coexistence, the notion of overlap of security systems, and of their related mechanisms and practices, highlights that actors’ dispositions and expectations may respond simultaneously to two distinct systems of rule, two different ways of conceiving power, two sets of practices – which may be distinguished, not only analytically, but also normatively – and to two different ways of imagining space. Thus, for example, security dispositions and expectations, perhaps also security strategies in one specific region may originate and derive their meaning from different and even competing sets of security practices, mechanisms, rules, and processes. Some security practices, for example alliances and coalitions of the willing, may derive from the concept of balancing power, conceived as state capabilities and resources, which should be compared and weighted against the material capabilities and resources of other states. Yet simultaneously, other security practices may derive from conceiving a specific region as a mature or tightly-coupled security community where power is understood to create a core of strength which in fact may attract non-members of the community to join. Conceived this way, power refers not only to material but also to symbolic resources, for example normative resources that can not only serve regional objectives but also stabilize and pacify the extra-regional near abroad. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a good example of overlap: Having started as an alliance within a bipolar balance of power system between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and their respective allies, it developed into the institutional representation of a security community in the North Atlantic area in the 1990s without abandoning its deterrent and balance of power functions and capabilities.

A concern with \textit{overlapping} systems of governance and their related mechanisms and practices takes us beyond what we might call the predominant “spectrum” or “worlds” view of security orders, which comes in three forms: First, in their seminal work on regional security complexes, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, for example, devise a “spectrum” that runs “from conflict formation through security regime to security

community” based on patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 53f.). Second, David Lake suggests a continuum of security relations (alliance, protectorate, informal empire, empire) based on the degree of anarchy/hierarchy (Lake 1996). And, third, some dichotomize orders as of zones of peace vs. zones of turmoil/war or “two worlds” (with a core functioning according to the liberal logic and the periphery functioning according to the realist logic) (Singer and Wildavsky 1993, Kacowicz 1998, Goldgeier and McFaul 1992). These important classificatory approaches to regional orders enable ideal-typical comparisons with reference to empirical and theoretical questions such as: How do specific orders emerge, why do we see certain orders in some regions but not in others, and what effects do they have on war and peace (Solingen 1998 and 2007)?

There are two main problems with the spectrum or worlds view, however: First, it leads to an implicit, maybe initially fruitful but ultimately limiting and misguided division of labor where realists deal with the realm of conflict while liberals and constructivists try to understand the realm of cooperation. With regard to Asia Andrew Hurrell notes, however, that “the most important lessons of the past decade of regionalist debates have been … that it is not helpful to draw an overly sharp distinction between power-based accounts of the region on the one hand and institutional and identity-based accounts on the other” (Hurrell 2007: 143f.). Second, while transitional movements, and even overlap, between orders are acknowledged in abstract and/or empirical terms (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama 2002, Morgan 2003a, Lake and Morgan 2003), they do not enter the theoretical frameworks: Patrick Morgan, for example, explicitly suggests a transitional movement from balance of power to pluralistic security community (via the particular route of great-power concert and collective security) (Morgan 2003b). He treats security orders “as rungs on a ladder up which regional security complexes may climb as they pursue security management” (ibid.: 33). Neither the ladder nor the arrangement of the rungs nor the climb that regional security complexes might pursue are adequately theorized: Can they skip a rung, go up and down the ladder, or be at different places of the ladder at the same time? In our conceptualization below, therefore, we try to marry insights from typologies of systems of security governance to theoretical arguments in order to make the step from ideal-typical variety of orders to overlap of systems and their underlying mechanisms and practices.
2.3 Security Governance

Security governance is a system of rule conceived by individual and corporate actors aiming at coordinating, managing, and regulating their collective existence in response to threats to their physical and ontological security. This system of rule relies primarily on the political authority of agreed-upon norms, practices, and institutions, as well as on the identities, rationalities, technologies, and spatial forms, around and across which international and transnational security activity takes place. In this chapter, the focus is mostly on security practices and on the mechanisms these practices derive from.

Conceptually, realist scholars explain what they consider to be a very thin system of international security governance by means of power, hegemony, empire, or some combination thereof. Neo-liberal scholars usually refer to rationally designed functional, efficiency-building institutions, which, while created and dominated by states, sometimes have unintended consequences and lives of their own. Constructivist scholars explain the evolution of systems of rule in international security as a function of the role of ideas, especially norms, and learning, socialization, and persuasion processes. Postmodern scholars, in turn, suggest scripts of power-based discursive practices and remote control systems, which, emanating from power/knowledge structures, create the reality actors perceive and act upon. Our theoretical constructivist approach conceives the possibility that security governance empirically embodies a combination of practices, some of which are thought to be realist, others which are thought to be constructivist, etc. From this perspective, realism, for example, should not have a monopoly on conceiving power and security.

A complicating factor with regard to the notion of security governance is that, while the concept is used both in domestic and international politics, it does not necessarily point to the same issues: Whereas in domestic politics it describes a movement “from government to governance” – suggesting a process of fragmentation and “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes 1996) – in international politics, the term can be seen to have emerged describing the move from (realist) anarchy to governance. The overlap between several systems of governance, however, shows that while overlap partly entails understanding the transition or evolution of a (traditionally realist, anarchical) balance of power system to a
security community system of governance, or vice versa, there are other ways of conceiving overlap, such as functional and relational. Moreover, we follow the English School in taking the balance of power as an institution, thus as reflecting a minimal yet socially and reflexively based security governance system (Bull 1977). And we conceive of security community as a security system of governance in which states are not entirely hollowed out and may play important roles in keeping expectations of peaceful change dependable. Our understanding of (security) governance thus makes no strong claims regarding a hollowing out of the state (through subnational or transnational public and private actors) or a move away from anarchy towards world government (through the establishment of supranational authority). What primarily concerns us here is governance as an order-creating mechanism.

2.4 Balance of Power and Security Community as Mechanisms of Security Governance

Balance of power and security community are two distinct mechanisms of security governance. They rest on different notions of power, different ideas on the role of war in creating order, and different views on alliances/alignments. Derived from this are different repertoires of practices.

Mechanisms of security governance are a more or less clearly delineated set of rules, norms, practices, and institutions that coordinate security relations between actors in the international system. The relationship between the actors and the rules and norms that underlie particular mechanisms of security governance is mutually constitutive and constantly re-enacted: Sovereign entities (states, city states) may through their practices constitute the mechanism of the balance of power; this mechanism at the same time constitutes these entities in a particular relationship to one another (one based on sovereign independence and deterrence).

Proposing the balance of power and security community as mechanisms of security governance thus differs (1) from seeing balance of power and security community only as alternative structural or systemic outcomes of state interaction and (2) from seeing them
first and foremost as alternative analytical descriptors of particular unit-level state *policies* or *behavior*. As *mechanisms* and sets of practices, balance of power and security community become represented in policies, determine outcomes, and connect between them. At the unit level, thus, actors can and do draw on practices from different mechanisms. The systemic outcomes of state interaction might not add up to a balance-of-power or security community system in a particular region.

Practices are “skill-based performance[s] that [are] recognized as such” (Adler and Pouliot 2008; cf. also Adler and Pouliot 2011). The requirement of inter-subjective recognition makes practices social activities endowed with meaning (Pouliot 2008, Adler 2005). Practices are thus not located outside of or apart from discourse (Neumann 2002). The practice of state investment in military technology is endowed with meaning through a discourse (about a state’s foreign policy goals and the role of the military, e.g.) and through other practices: joint military exercises or the pooling of military resources under a joint command give the investment a different meaning than amassing troops at a state’s border, for example. At the same time, therefore, practices objectify meaning and discourse (Adler 2008). What matters primarily is not the presence or absence of one particular practice (as is often suggested by the typological approaches to the variety of security orders), but the broader *repertoire* or *constellation* of practices. The diplomatic practice under the ever-present *possibility* of the use of force differs from diplomacy and consultation in a security community with dependable expectations of peaceful change (Pouliot 2008: 280). Similarly, “confidence building is vastly different in a traditional international system than in an emerging pluralistic security community – in one it eases tensions to facilitate modest cooperation among states that remain insecure, while in the latter it embodies an emerging sense of community and the disappearance of insecurity” (Morgan 2003a: 53).

### 2.4.1 Balance of Power Mechanism and Repertoire of Practices

Waltz’s claim that “if there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it” (Waltz 1979: 117) notwithstanding, the meaning of the

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balance of power remains contested and elastic as a theoretical concept and in the political discourse. It can denote an equilibrium or a particular distribution of power, it can describe a particular policy towards arriving at such a distribution, it can call for such a policy, or it can make analytical and theoretical claims as to the occurrence of balances of power in the international system (Haas 1953, Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007). The core analytical statement and causal claim of the Waltzian “systemic” view of balance-of-power theory is that “hegemonies do not form in multistate systems because perceived threats of hegemony over the system generate balancing behavior by other leading states in the system” (Jack Levy cited in Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007: 3).

This chapter probes into the specific practices that underlie the balance of power understood as a mechanism in order to juxtapose it with the mechanism of security community. The balance of power mechanism of security governance rests on the notion of the international system as being composed of competing centers of power that are arranged according to their relative capabilities and are, in the absence of an overarching authority, locked into the security dilemma (Jervis 1978, Herz 1951) which might generate prisoner-dilemma dynamics of arms races and wars.

The notion of power that underlies the balance of power mechanism is predominantly that of material and coercive power, denoting how “one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to do” (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 40). Material power is thus inherently threatening.13

The balance of power mechanism of security governance is predicated on the availability of war (with the exception of system-wide war) as an order-sustaining or creating tool (Bull 1977). The classic tradition of balance-of-power thinking advocates “limited” war from a practical, but also from a very pronounced moral standpoint: as a civilizational step beyond the “religious” wars of the Middle Ages (Maurseth 1964).14 Particularly since the technological and political developments of modern mass society and the advent of the nuclear age gave war a new apocalyptic meaning, this idea of an order-

13 For a refinement of balance of power into balance of threat theory, see Walt (1987).
14 Especially Carl Schmitt has made arguments to that effect. See Odysseos and Petito 2007.
sustaining/creating limited war has lost adherents. It remains, however, theoretically part of the balance of power mechanism of security governance.

In the context of the balance of power mechanism inter-state alliances are traditionally understood as formal though inherently unstable agreements between states for mutual support in case of war.\(^\text{15}\) Morgenthau describes alliances as “[t]he historically most important manifestation of the balance of power” (Morgenthau 1993 [1948]: 197). They are a matter of expediency, not principle. They are a response to the external security dilemma (without being able to resolve it completely), yet also create an internal dilemma between the “fear of abandonment” by allies (because of the existence of alliance alternatives) and “fear of entrapment” (being dragged into a war over interests of the ally that one does not share) (Snyder 1997). Thus, while alliance formation is an inherent practice of the balance of power mechanism of security governance, in the predominant view it does not fundamentally change the competitive power dynamics.

In general, a fully articulated notion of the balance of power owes its existence to the notions of a mechanical balance, of equilibrium and homeostasis. Metaphorically and historically speaking, however, we can – with Richard Little (2007: 66-68) – distinguish between an adversarial dynamic of the balance of power (based on the image of weighing scales) and an associational dynamic (based on the image of an arch). In contrast to the former, the latter makes room for the systematic management of great power relations based on notions of common interest and a “just equilibrium.” The main historical practice at the heart of the associational balance of power mechanism were major peace conferences (Utrecht 1713 onwards) that tried to settle territorial disputes between the great powers.

The pattern of behavior associated with the adversarial balance of power perspective is balancing and/or bandwagoning.\(^\text{16}\) As shown by the debate about whether or not states (will) balance against American power (Ikenberry 2002, Paul, Wirtz, and

\(^{15}\) For a broader (almost all-encompassing) definition of an alliance as the “formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states,” see Walt (1987: 1, fn. 1).

\(^{16}\) Our focus on patterns of behavior and the underlying practices of the balance of power mechanism differs from the Waltzian systemic view of the balance of power as occurring automatically as a by-product of state behavior.
Fortman 2004), however, it is not clear what balancing means and which skill-based performances are actually recognized as balancing?“Hard” balancing practices by states are traditionally understood as the aggregation of capabilities through alliance formation (“external balancing”) or the investment in a state’s own capabilities (“internal balancing”) aimed at checking a potential hegemon and/or threat (Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007: 9f.). The problem with this view is that the attribution of motives (and the timing, see Levy 2003) is crucial here, since alliance formation and investment in capabilities are potentially ubiquitous practices in international relations. In the end practices become balancing practices through the mutual, often implicit and habitual ascription of motives by the actors involved and through the constellation of practices in which they are embedded.

Examples of specific practices that are usually seen to undergird the balance of power mechanism are deterrence, military planning, which builds on worst-case scenario development and procurement, as well as institutions that spend resources on the careful monitoring of the distribution of military capabilities. The balance of power mechanism creates order in the international system not through trust but through “rational” mistrust, i.e. the rational calculation against “taking risks on the behavior of others” (Hoffman 2002). Diplomacy may play an important role, but, as Pouliot argues, whereas in security communities actors argue with diplomacy, in the balance of power they argue about diplomacy (Pouliot 2008).

For some, “balancing requires that states target their military hardware at each other in preparation for a potential war” (Schweller 2006: 9). Others see the balance of power mechanism at work not only through “hard” but also through “soft” balancing (Pape 2005, Paul, Wirtz, and Fortman 2004, Kupchan 2008), defined as the use of “nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine” unilateral policies of the superpower, specifically through the use of international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements (Pape 2005: 10). Including soft balancing practices in the repertoire of the balance of power mechanism, however, is contested because of the difficulty of distinguishing it from routine policy disputes (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, Lieber and Alexander 2005). Since soft balancing denotes arguments among allies within a political/institutional structure about

17 Jack Levy (2003) in fact describes this as the Achilles’ heel of balance of power theory.
substantive and procedural questions concerning the alliance, it could be better construed as a practice in an associational balance of power or a security community; it is a practice that may be seen as indicative of the overlap we are describing here.

2.4.2 Security Community Mechanism and Repertoire of Practices

The security community framework has its roots in the system-level argument that there need not be one universal international order that defines state interaction, but that there might exist different ordering principles across space and time. That is, not all states populate the same international order of anarchic inter-state relations based on self-help and competitive balancing behavior of states in the face of the threat of war. In their refinement of Karl Deutsch’s original framework, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett defined a security community as “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” – where peaceful change means “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30, 34). Thus, security communities do not imply the absence of interstate disputes. The specific difference is rather the systematically peaceful resolution of these disputes. In a fundamental way a security community is the academic expression for the “social fact of interstate peace” (Pouliot 2007a: 375) and the mechanisms that sustain dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Initially, the research program focused on security communities as outcome: The main theoretical and empirical concern was explaining variance in the emergence of security communities. Distinctions between loosely and tightly-coupled pluralistic security communities, phases of emergence (nascent, ascendant, mature) and a three-tiered framework of precipitating conditions, conducive factors, and necessary conditions for dependable expectations of peaceful change to develop provided a heuristic framework applicable to a range of cases and regions (Adler and Barnett 1998). More recently (not least of all triggered by developments in the transatlantic security community), questions about the inner dynamics,\(^1\) the maintenance and decay or breakdown of security

\(^1\) For an early concern with security-community dynamics in the Atlantic alliance, see Risse-Kappen (1995).

Seeing security community as a mechanism of security governance can inform this more recent focus by providing a bridge to the earlier concerns about the overall outcome of dependable expectations of peaceful change: The maintenance as well as decay or breakdown of a security community is rooted in the mechanisms and practices that lie at the heart of dependable expectations of peaceful change.

The basic notion that underlies the security community mechanism is the organization of interstate relations in concentric circles rather than competing centers of power (Wæver 1998). This mental geography is a clear depiction of the key point that power – in its various forms – is not transcended in a security community. But it is enacted differently: If the security community mechanism is at work, material power does not trigger balancing behavior; in fact it can have the opposite effect and attract (Adler and Barnett 1998).¹⁹ Power in security communities is not necessarily benign, however: Understood as the “authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes practices … and the conditions [of] … access to the community” and the “ability to nudge and occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 39), the power politics of identity replaces the threat or deployment of physical force with control of dispositions and practices, which can have very tangible, material consequences. The threat of physical force may also be replaced by the threat of “representational force” in security communities, i.e. by coercing states back into a “we-feeling” through a narrative threat to their identity (Bially Mattern 2000).²⁰

¹⁹ The power of attraction is not the same as bandwagoning: The latter is traditionally reserved for aligning with a rising power that presents a potential security threat. Schweller’s redefinition of bandwagoning as a strategy driven by the “opportunity for gain” is conceptually tied to alignment decisions in conflictual situations or wars (Schweller 1994). Were we to decouple it from that, it would simply denote an interest-based strategy by states, which would render it too broad. Thus, the power of attraction (in non-war, security community situations) remains distinct from bandwagoning for profit. Both concepts can accommodate interest-based behaviour, though. The EU’s power of attraction very much works through material factors (as well as ideational).
²⁰ Such a threat was successfully employed in the Anglo-American security community during the Suez Crisis in 1956, and it worked according to Bially Mattern because large and important parts of both America’s and Britain’s narratives about their own identity were dependent upon the narrative
While power is not absent in a security community, war as an option of managing interstate relations is. A necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the security-community mechanism is the absence of war between states in a security community. War thus signals the breakdown of the community. On the other hand, some scholars juxtapose the internal working of the security-community mechanism (the acceptance of non-violent conflict resolution) with the external dynamic of balance of power where violent conflict remains a possibility (Reese 2006). Yet by “overcoming the old Hobbesian world of wars … by creating a set of political arrangements that simply could not function according to the old-style power-political logic of traditional nation-states” (Hurrell 2007: 139), security communities do not simply fall back into balance-of-power dynamics externally, but also transform the security dynamics on their periphery (Bellamy 2004, Adler 2008 and 1998).

In the context of the security community mechanism, alliances or alignments are rooted in mutual trust and collective identity (even if they might have been a matter of expediency in their origins); this quells the internal and external security dilemma for states within a security community. Yet this does not mean the end of conflict and bargaining over substantive or institutional questions; nor does it imply that the collective identity of the community is free of contestation.

Based on these alternative notions of power, war, and alliances/alignments, we can delineate a repertoire of practices that sustain the security community mechanism and are sustained by it in return:

First, dependable expectations of peaceful change are based on the practice of self-restraint: the abstention from the use of force (Adler 2008). Historically, self-restraint has arguably played an important role in balance-of-power thinking as well: To Bolingbroke “the essential elements in the balance-of-power doctrine [were] restraint and moderation – restraint in entering into armed conflicts, moderation in the formulation and pursuit of war aims” (cited in Maurseth 1964: 124). Yet, in now standard neorealist balance-of-power theory, restraint and moderation (in the name of stability or peace, e.g.) are not political practices pursued by state leaders; restraint and moderation might occur, but only as the

of a joint Anglo-American international identity – “preserving the Self meant sustaining the narrative of the Special Relationship” (Bially Mattern 2005b: 20).
“by-products of the pursuit of narrow self-interest” (Jervis 1992: 717). As part of the security community mechanism, however, “self-restraint is not (only) a political choice for the moment, nor is it just a habit—even though it might start out like that—it is a disposition” (Adler 2008).

Second, actors that constitute security communities align consciousness in the direction of common enterprises, projects, and partnerships, thus turning security community into the day-to-day practice of peace. Third, cooperative security, which is indivisible and comprehensive is the natural security practice of security communities. Fourth, diplomacy is the normal or natural practice, to the exclusion of violent ones (Pouliot 2008), and norms of consultation (Risse-Kappen 1995) and multilateral decision-making practices undergird the security community mechanism. They institutionalize reassurance as opposed to deterrence.

Fifth, the mechanism of security community includes a disposition towards spreading the community outward through explicit or implicit practices of socialization or teaching (Gheciu 2005). These may include the creation of partnerships, transnational security dialogues, or the constitution of regions around a focal point, for example, the Mediterranean or Baltic Seas. Widening the community that practices peace may follow a “logic of securitization” where sustaining the security mechanism is predicated on its spread (through formal or informal inclusion of the periphery). These practices may give security communities an “empire-like quality” (Wæver 1998, Zielonka 2006).

Finally, more specific practices would include changes in military planning and the implementation of confidence building measures (military cooperation, joint planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges, revision of army doctrines from traditional war-fighting to post-conflict reconstruction), policy coordination, and unfortified borders (Adler and Barnett 1998).

2.5 Conceptualizing Overlap of Security Mechanisms

There are four broad ways of thinking about security mechanism overlap: 1) temporal/evolutionary; 2) functional; 3) spatial; and 4) relational. We briefly elaborate on
each in turn and note which theoretical mechanisms help us make the step from variety to overlap, i.e. why and when we see security mechanisms overlap in each dimension.

### 2.5.1 Notions of Temporal/Evolutionary Variety and Overlap

Security orders may vary across time: For example, whereas 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century Europe is seen to have been dominated by balance-of-power and great-power-concert mechanisms, respectively (Schroeder 1994), today’s Europe is usually seen to be governed through security community mechanisms (Wæver 1998, Adler 1998, Adler et al. 2006).

What makes a variety of security mechanisms turn into overlap across time is the notion that change in (international) politics, even when discontinuous, is a process through which the past and the future intersect. Thus, one set of institutions, mechanisms, norms or ideas does not fully replace another in an instant; rather, they coexist. Old practices and mechanisms may still have not disappeared, but the future really has not entirely set in; new practices and mechanisms may still be experimented with and may only be partly institutionalized. Theories that focus on institutionalization, socialization, learning and teaching in international relations (Finnemore 1996, Checkel 2005, Gheciu 2005, Johnston 2001 and 2005) implicitly highlight this temporal/evolutionary dimension of change. Yet, in the end, their focus is often on an unambiguous outcome, namely on the success or failure of socialization, learning or teaching, and not on the temporal overlap. Inquiring into the often slow, ongoing, incomplete and idiosyncratic nature of institutionalization, socialization or learning processes could help us explain temporal/evolutionary overlap: “People learn … new habits [and practices] slowly, as background conditions change” (Adler 2005: 215). And they might learn different lessons and at variable pace: “Mind-sets [and practices] may outlast the conditions that gave rise to them” (Emmerson 2005a: 16).

Temporal overlap can be seen (1) in the process that brought the Cold War to an end and (2) in NATO’s transformation towards cooperative security in the 1990s: The 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki Final Act in retrospect can be seen as key elements in delegitimizing Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. CSCE’s community-building practices, including confidence-building measures, its promotion of human rights, and notions of European security being comprehensive,
indivisible, and cooperative, empowered groups within Eastern and Central Europe and within the Soviet Union itself. CSCE’s practices began to change the international order between 1975 and 1989 when the balance of power was still “the only game in town.” When the Soviet empire finally crumbled, security-community practices were adopted by NATO (Adler 2008), and for at least half a decade, also by Russia (Pouliot 2010).

Without shedding its defense alliance identity, NATO steadily moved into cooperative security in the 1990s. It partly evolved into a security-community-building institution (Adler 2008). Ciută notes the initial tension created by NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program for the still existing self-image of NATO as a military alliance: Such an alliance “does not ‘normally’ do cooperative partnerships” (Ciută 2002: 47). Adler, in turn, highlights the limited experience of NATO leaders with cooperative security as opposed to balance-of-power practices (Adler 2008). The enlargement policy NATO developed in the 1990s toward Eastern and Central Europe, while perhaps originally aimed at strengthening the Alliance’s membership with former adversaries (a balance of power move par excellence), did consist of practices that, together with NATO’s burgeoning security-community-building culture about promoting democracy and human rights in the East, did more than help ensure NATO’s own post-Cold War institutional survival; these practices and this culture also supported the alliance’s transformation into a security community-building institution.

Balance of power discourses and maybe even practices, however, did not disappear. They may be reappearing in the West’s relations with Russia, which went back on its commitment to democratize, and with the Mediterranean area and the Middle East, where security-community practices and mechanisms encountered strong resistance. The return to or continued relevance of balance of power thinking and how it plays itself out in practice in each of these cases may be seen to be conditioned by the strength or weakness of the alternative security community mechanism (and vice versa): This is why even the more pessimistic accounts of the future of the transatlantic alliance do not expect a return to military balancing. Temporal overlap is thus never fully a return to the past since it occurs under present conditions.
If adherence to different security mechanisms/practices is rooted in experience during (politically) formative years, then temporal/evolutionary overlap might also have a generational aspect to it. According to this logic, one would hardly expect a resurgence of balance of power thinking and practice among governments in Western Europe that are now dominated by leaders that were politically socialized after WWII. This generational aspect might conflict with learning understood as adaptation to new situations, however; it might also be overlain by particularities in the history of individual countries and/or political ideology: The resurgence of national-interest thinking among parts of the generation in German foreign policy that grew up with Westintegration and communitarian practices, for example, while hardly constituting a simple return to the past (with a heightened concern for competitive balance-of-power or geopolitical practices based on a revived German Sonderweg), can be seen as an auto-critique of German semi-sovereign Cold War foreign policy (Behnke 2008, Haftendorn 2006).

When is the temporal/evolutionary overlap of security mechanisms and practices expected to be particularly pronounced and politically salient? Periods of generation and experimentation with new practices are obvious candidates. So are periods when security orders become unstable or disintegrate. An example of the former is the development by the European Union of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) as way of dealing with security threats and instability in the Maghreb and the Eastern Mediterranean. The EU began experimenting with the construction of a regional Mediterranean identity and, in order to do so, it went back to the repertoire of security tools that the CSCE had developed during the Cold War. Although the experiment has failed so far (Adler et. al 2006), the EU continues to promote Mediterranean pluralistic integration\(^{21}\) – albeit in conjunction with anti-terrorist measures, including preemptive ones (De Goede 2008), and the development of a European military capability.

In sum, temporal/evolutionary overlap may be partly explained in geological terms: denoting that knowledge-based layers of practices and institutions build upon, without necessarily replacing, the older stratum of practices and institutions. Depending on the

\(^{21}\) The creation of a Mediterranean Union, an international body with 43 members, at a meeting in Paris in July 2008 is the most recent attempt.
circumstances and on historical and cultural contexts, all or some of these layers of institutions and practices may be relevant and have global, regional, or bilateral effects. This is not a linear evolutionary argument: States and other political actors may shuttle back and forth using existing governance systems, may create new hybrid systems, or sometimes create new practices. Rather than arguing about the thorny question of what really constitutes fundamental change (and whether there is such a thing), the key point is that reserving the notion of meaningful change for fundamental gestalt switches is bound to miss important differences over time in the operation of regional security orders based on overlap.

2.5.2 Notions of Functional Variety and Overlap

Second, security mechanisms may vary according to the functional environment: Functional variety can come in (at least) three different forms: a) across sectors or domains, b) across different parts of the (foreign) policy-making bureaucracies of states, and c) across issues.

First, mechanisms and practices can vary across sectors or domains: If we include the economic realm as well as the cultural/societal and the geopolitical/military realm in our definition of security, we can – following Nye’s notion of the three-dimensional chessboard – expect a variety of security mechanisms at work. Nye distinguishes between: a) unipolarity on the military plane, b) multipolarity on the economic plane, and c) disorder on the cultural/societal plane (Nye 2002). Polarity, however, remains indeterminate with regard to mechanisms: balance of power and security community mechanisms can be found in unipolarity and multipolarity – as well as most likely in “disorder.”

We can see this kind of functional overlap in South East Asia: Through the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Asian states have used multilateral community-building measures in the economic realm and have achieved remarkable economic prosperity, which, in time, spilled over to the security and political realms. It is not just scholars, such as Amitav Acharya (2001), but regional leaders themselves who argue that ASEAN countries are in the business of building a security community. In the security realm, ASEAN states have partly successfully used the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), and similar community-building institutions and practices, to entice China away from balance of power practices and to adopt communitarian practices. As the strongest advocates of security community practices acknowledge, however, the balance of power still is critical for South East Asian security relations with the U.S., China, Japan and North Korea (Jones and Smith 2002). Balancing practices are alive and well also with regard to minority and economic issues. Despite ASEAN’s use of multilateral communitarian measures through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Asia- Europe Meeting (ASEM), minority issues and economic crises – the latter in particular during the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s – exposed a background of hostile relations, for example, between Singapore and Malaysia, inconsistent with security community practices.

Second, we can expect to see variety in security thinking and practices across different parts of the (foreign) policy-making bureaucracies of states. All things being equal, we would, for example, expect to see balance-of-power thinking and practices to be more pronounced in ministries of defense and the military establishment than in ministries of foreign affairs, the diplomatic corps, or the part of the bureaucracy responsible for foreign economic relations.22 This is very much an empirical question, of course. In some cases, states may have so deeply internalized security community discourse and practices as taken-for granted, that even the military and defense establishment can hardly be seen to adhere to balance of power thinking and practices in traditional terms, thus preferring to project “normative” rather than military power.23 In these cases, capability aggregation becomes a matter of intra-community debate (rather than balancing concerns). Thus, since the 1990s, it was often the Americans who lobbied European governments to increase their defense spending and modernize their armies in light of the experiences with the interventions in the former Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, some have interpreted the development of an independent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and an EU rapid deployment force as

22 Taking a less state-centered view of this kind of functional overlap, one might expect and inquire into overlap in formal security institutions.
23 This has been the argument of the “civilian power” research program on Germany, for example. See Kirste and Maull (1996), Tewes (2002), Berger (1996).
signifying limits to Euro-Atlantic security community practices: they see an attempt to stop U.S. hegemony at Brussels’ gates and to assert a European great power or superpower status that might ring in “the end of the American era” (Kupchan 2002 and 2008). Other analysts tend to see the Euro-Atlantic security community in crisis and possibly transforming into a new kind of order, but not at the point of breakage with a return to competitive military balancing (Risse 2004).\textsuperscript{24} European forces, strategy, and defense policies, after all, are driven by peace-keeping and peace-building military practices; the repertoire or constellation of practices thus can be seen to make an important difference here. Even Charles Kupchan, who sees “balance-of-threat thinking” making a comeback, notes that since it is not coupled with revisionism, the practical consequence of it is not traditional balancing of U.S. power but “soft” balancing of U.S. behavior (Kupchan 2008).

A third kind of functional variety/overlap is a variation on the first: Mechanisms and practices cannot only be sector/domain-specific, but may be even issue-specific: Krahmann, for example notes that “states as well as organizations like NATO, the CSCE/OSCE or the EU have expanded their security functions after the end of the Cold War” and have devised mechanisms that go beyond the balance of power or security community mechanism (Krahmann 2003): In particular she notes the trend, on both sides of the Atlantic, towards the use of “coalitions of the willing” and/or an increasing utilization of private actors for the management of new security threats. In a way this use of coalitions of the willing is a good example of the overlap of balance of power and security community practices: It combines the practices of highly flexible coalitions with those of collective management of a threat. The flexibility/unstableness of coalitions of the willing does not constitute a threat to those outside of the coalition since the practice of the coalitions of the willing is embedded in a broader security community where cooperation takes place in other institutions at the same time (Krahmann 2005: 542).

Obviously, functional overlap will be greater, the more contested security governance systems and practices are. Moreover, functional overlap may be to some extent dependent on temporal overlap. If regional security governance has not evolved so that it would become amenable to a new set of practices, then the overlap will not exist at all, or

\textsuperscript{24} See also the majority of the chapters in Anderson, Ikenberry, and Risse 2008.
will exist only formally. This is what happened in the Middle East during the Oslo peace process when community-building practices were imported from Europe. Because the region has been engulfed in war, asymmetrical warfare, and state disintegration, and has not adapted culturally to entertain security-community practices, the latter never really found roots in bureaucracies or across sectors and party lines. Thus, if the balance of power may look anachronistic from the perspective of a united Europe, security community practices are tied to a mechanism of security governance whose time has not yet come in the Middle East. However, functional overlap is not entirely dependent on temporal overlap. We may have temporal overlap without much functional differentiation between practices, and we may have functional overlap when two mature sets of security governance systems compete for resources, attention, and policy agendas, even if there is no noticeable movement from one system to another.

2.5.3 Notions of Spatial Variety and Overlap

The third and most traditional way of conceptualizing the variety of international order is spatial: Different geographically defined regions exhibit different conceptions of security orders. This type of variety has received the most theoretical and empirical attention (Buzan and Wæver 2003, Solingen 1998). Spatial variety might also be found on the sub-regional level: Arguably, security community practices are more firmly institutionalized in Western than in Eastern Europe. Rather than just a function of the location of the East European sub-region (so close to its former hegemon who seems less and less willing to shed its balance of power practices), however, the reason for this might as well lie in temporal overlap and the fact that Eastern Europe has not been exposed to security community practices for the same amount of time as Western Europe.

The Western Hemisphere offers a typical example of spatial overlap. To the North, a pluralistic security community exists among the US, Canada and Mexico, which is partly institutionalized in NAFTA (Gonzalez and Haggard 1998, Shore 1998). The southern cone of South America, including Argentina and Brazil, the two regional powers, has recently become a pluralistic security community (Hurrell 1998). Among the most outstanding practical changes from balancing to security community in the region were Argentina and
Brazil’s abandonment of a nuclear power race and these countries’ replacement of economic competition with increasing economic integration through MERCOSUR. However, in spite of the fact that the Organization of American States (OAS) has moved in recent years from hegemonic, balancing, and liberal regime practices to security community building practices, unless we fail to distinguish between hegemony and security community, it would be a stretch of imagination to consider the entire Western hemisphere as a security community. It would be equally difficult to consider Latin America as a whole as a security community. As recently as 2008, Venezuela and Colombia came close to a state of war and Peru and Ecuador are still to develop dependable expectations of peaceful change. Although temporal and functional notions of overlap would be important for analyzing the Western hemisphere, and in particular, Latin America, it is clear that security governance in this case also, and primarily, exhibits spatial overlap.

One way to understand how and why a variety of orders may turn into spatial overlap is by focusing on interregional relations, especially when regional powers, such as in the example above, are constitutive parts of security communities. In such cases, the key question is whether security communities can be expected theoretically and seen empirically to act externally in the same way that they do internally, or whether they simply replicate the security dilemma on a higher level. Reese argues that security communities with great powers in their midst are caught in the dilemma of facing an outside world in which dependable expectations of peaceful change are a chimera and will thus revert to non-security community practices when interacting with the outside (Reese 2006). Reese’s point may be right only with regard to global powers; thus, the U.S.’s relations outside NAFTA may not be the same as within. Argentina and Brazil, however, do not seem to be caught in Reese’s dilemma and behave toward the outside very much as they do toward the inside.

2.5.4 Notions of Relational Variety and Overlap

Finally, a fourth notion of variety and overlap is related to these spatial notions, but the key variable for understanding variety here is not primarily the spatial location of actors, but their varied and overlapping security relations with one another.
An example of relational variety and overlap would be the Greek-Turkish relationship within the NATO alliance. The dyadic, balance-of-power relationship is nested in each of the states’ security-community relationships with the other NATO members: A key priority of Greek foreign policy since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus has been to maintain an “acceptable military balance between Greece and Turkey” and its military expenditures have explicitly been justified by reference to Turkish military capabilities (Moustakis and Sheehan 2002). Nonetheless both countries have remained part of the larger security community (even though Greece briefly left NATO’s integrated military structure in protest against perceived American indifference with regard to the Turkish invasion).

If NATO and EU expansion continue, we might expect to see more of this kind of relational variety and overlap in security mechanisms. This is what critics of enlargement fear when they warn of the “import” of other countries unresolved foreign policy issues by granting them accession to NATO or the EU (Diez 2002, Diez and Tocci 2008). The theoretical and empirical question surrounding this issue is which one of the alternative mechanisms can be expected to have the more pronounced socializing effect (if there is any such effect at all): This might be a function of a) the maturity and institutional set-up of the community that incorporates new members with strong adherence to balance of power practices vis-à-vis one or more of its other members and b) the nature and length of the actual conflicts that spur the balance of power dynamic in these relationships.

2.5.5 Automatic vs. Manual Overlap

The four above-mentioned notions of variety and overlap and the theoretical explanations given for them seem to be of an almost automatic quality in the sense that Inis Claude used it when referring to the balance of power: Thus overlap “may be produced or preserved without being actually willed” (Claude 1962: 46) by the actors involved (i.e. actors might not consciously and deliberately pick and choose from the repertoire of practices with the explicit intention of picking a balance of power practice, e.g.); it is derivative of other interactions. By contrast – and analogously to Claude’s “manual” balance of power that is “contingent upon the motivations and skills of human agents” and requires state actors to direct their policies rationally towards the objective of a balance of power (Claude 1962:
– we can also think of overlap as deriving from conscious reflection and strategic choice; that is, not just as a by-product of actors’ behavior, perhaps due to the sediment-like accumulation of practices in a region, but also as an actual strategy. Goh makes the argument, for example, that “omni-enmeshment” (including all major powers in the region’s strategic affairs, i.e. “superpower entrapment” of the U.S. and “constructive entanglement” of China) and a “complex balance of influence” (beyond the military realm) represent distinct pathways and conscious choices of security management in Southeast Asia: Omni-enmeshment and complex balancing overlap in that “major power competition and balancing are channeled to take place within the constraints of norms and institutions” (Goh 2007/2008: 139). This strategy of weakening the traditional military aspect of balancing (in a region that is self-consciously realist) through overlap lay at the heart of the ARF (ibid.: 143).

Empirically, in most cases we would expect to see a mixture of automatic and manual overlap. The agential/manual side can be expected to dominate at crucial junctures when an overall review of strategy is likely to take place, e.g. after major wars (cf. Ikenberry 2001) or in situations of perceived major change and (epistemic and ontological) uncertainty like after September 11, 2001. Everyday security policymaking is likely to involve less conscious grand strategizing and more of the logic of habit and/or practicality (Pouliot 2008).

2.6 Thinking about Regions

We have already hinted that our argument about the overlap of different security mechanisms can also have implications for how we think about the boundaries of regions: Although, in our view, regions are socially constructed, and thus collective cognitive entities as well as merely territorial ones (Adler 1997), we believe that introducing practice and security mechanism overlap may help spur a debate not only about specific regional boundaries, but also about how regions and their boundaries change. Our argument, in fact, is, first, that cognitive regions are permeated by layers of practical regions. Second, we argue that the boundaries between regions are to a great extent determined not only by the values and norms member states of a region share, but also by the things they do, by what
they practice. Finally, on this point, we argue that even in institutionalized security communities, such as the Euro-Atlantic security community, while states may not balance against material power and may not entertain expectations of organized violence, they nevertheless may balance against practices.

To begin with, the boundaries of practical regions might coincide with those of territorial and/or cognitive regions, but they might also conflict: Thus, for example, we can see the Euro-Atlantic area as a cognitive region that encompasses different practical regions of “doing security.” The fault lines between these practical regions can but do not always lie between the U.S. and Europe: While there is a dividing line between the two when it comes to the role of international institutions in security governance, this has its roots in the way practices are interpreted. Thus, while the practice of multilateralism (while not always followed) is viewed in Europe as an end in itself, and almost works like a social norm there, it is seen more as a means to an end in the U.S. (Drezner 2008). On the other hand, against the prevalent view, preemptive practices in the “Global War on Terror” can be seen to straddle or ‘collapse’ the boundaries between Europe and the U.S. (De Goede 2008). Furthermore, boundaries of practical regions change: in the realm of military interventions, for example, we could see Germany’s policy change at the end of the 1990s with regard to the use of the Bundeswehr in military operations abroad as a movement from one practical region to another – all within the European and transatlantic security community.

Second, regions may be differentiated as much as by what their members do as by what they value or believe. Actually, practices become the indicator of values within a region and whether states may actually be part of “us” or “them.” The elaborate system that the EU and NATO created immediately after the Cold War to enlarge the security community toward the East consisted of practices that aspirants needed to internalize and institutionalize in order to become part of the security community (Adler 2008, Gheciu 2005). Those states that reached a level of proficiency with regard to practices were deemed to be partners, whereas those states that had more or less fully adopted the practices were formally admitted to either/or the EU and NATO. A few states, such as Ukraine, are still waiting “outside” the region. The debate about whether Turkey should be part of the EU, for example, is not only about religion and values, but whether what Turkey does, both
internally and externally, is consistent with EU practices, as defined by the *acquis communitaire*.

Third, a “balance of practice” (Adler et al. 2006) within regions may be as important as balance of (material) power, or balance of interests (Schweller 1998). The balance of practice is particularly important in security communities, where power rests partly in the ability of members of a regional security community to impose their practices on other members. For example, at no point in the controversy regarding how to fight the war on terror and whether or not to go to war with Iraq did the U.S. and Europe balance each other’s material capabilities. And it would be a stretch to argue that they balanced each other’s interests. To the contrary, the U.S. and Europe shared many of the same interests. Where they strongly disagreed, however, was on what practices can and should “we” use. Because what states and people practice is constitutive not just of states’ and people’s identities, but also on regional identities, a deep disagreement about practices can also become a disagreement about who “we” are, thus prompting fears that the security community might be in danger. Empirical work should focus on thresholds, on where disagreement over practices turns into disagreement over interests, sometimes to the point when states start again to balance each other’s capabilities.

Finally, a focus on the boundaries of practical regions might also help illuminate whether, how, and why approaches to security governance can or cannot travel, and what happens when they do. Just as the interregional diffusion of norms involves processes of “localization” and variation (Acharya 2004), security mechanisms and practices might be expected to be modified when transported across space. When and how this occurs are interesting questions for empirical research. One instance of modification might be the particular kind of balancing that Goh detects in Southeast Asia (Goh 2007/2008).

### 2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we introduced two novel notions about security orders. We first conceptualized both the balance of power and security communities as mechanisms of security governance, each with a set of more or less separate and distinctive practices. We then argued that while radically different politically and normatively, as a set of practices
balance of power and security community may not be entirely mutually exclusive, and that, especially at the regional level, they can overlap and coexist. How the different practices relate and interact – what we called the repertoire or constellation of practices – might then be the key question for understanding regional security dynamics. We conceptualized overlap along four dimensions (temporal/evolutionary, functional, spatial, and relational), described the theoretical mechanisms that could explain why and when we would expect to see a given kind of overlap, and provided some illustrations.

We conclude with some reflections on the theoretical and empirical implications of our argument: On the theoretical side, first, this chapter does not suggest any new theory of regional security orders, balance of power, or security community. It shows, however, that as in the classic story of IR as an elephant being described by blind persons, competing theoretical camps may be looking at different parts of the same reality. But they may also be missing the nature of change between security orders. As our theoretical framework shows, change is nonlinear and dynamic; social orders evolve pushed by past practices and pulled by future practices. Second our theoretical framework is sensitive to different functional, spatial and relational ways of analyzing regional security order. While the resulting picture may be more complex than that usually presented by individual IR camps regarding a particular region being ruled either by a balance of power or shared identity, this picture opens a plethora of new ways of studying regional security, for example, from a bureaucratic politics perspective, or by looking at sub-regions and whether they aggregate from a security governance perspective.

Third, our argument is intended to generate debate and try to launch an analytical and normative agenda for studying security communities, not merely as zones of peace, or as the practice of peace at the regional level, but also as an alternative to, although not mutually exclusive mechanism with, the balance of power. An important takeaway here is the notion that security communities rely not only on shared identity, but also on power, albeit defined much differently than in the case of the balance of power. From a normative perspective, however, the security community comes close to representing an improvement in the way security is attained at the regional level and, by extension, also in the human condition. Fourth, our theoretical framework also indicates that one may find the reasons for the success and failure of security communities in the overlap of practices. Thus,
security communities may remain stable or decay due to the dynamic overlap and balance between different sets of practices at the regional level. Finally, this chapter opens a new way of conceptualizing regions as practical layers that may deeply influence security orders and the way regions are differentiated.

This chapter also suggests improved ways of doing empirical research on regional security orders. First, it helps theorize and formalize a debate that has taken place mainly with regard to South East Asia, but which is also applicable to other regions, including Europe, about the mutually exclusive nature, or parallel existence, of regional security governance mechanisms. Our contribution to this debate is mainly to show that scholars, instead of merely trying to prove each other wrong, may be able to attain progress if they only would join forces and add their theoretical comparative advantages to study the overlap between security governance systems and practices. Second, this chapter suggests a new framework for the comparative empirical study of security orders based on the concepts of overlapping security governance mechanisms.

Third, regarding specific regions, this chapter raises interesting questions about the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security community since 9/11 and the possibilities of its meltdown. Our conclusion is that we should be neither optimists nor pessimists on this count. While signs of balance of power showing its face in Europe can easily be explained away by the nature of the overlap, the balance of practices in this region since 9/11 raises questions about whether, without a future convergence of practices, a collective “we” is sustainable in the long run. Understanding security community as a mechanism of security governance may also help shed light on the sturdiness of the EU, the sources of its power, and perhaps also the dynamic nature of its core of strength. Moving east, we may ask whether the overlap between balance of power and security community practices in South East Asia is temporal or functional/relational. Still much more work remains to be done, for example, on ASEAN and China, as security community practices become institutionalized in China’s halls of government and begin competing for attention and resources with classic balance of power practices. With regard to the Western Hemisphere our spatial overlap perspective raises questions about whether episodic and sporadic spots of security community governance in the region can evolve into a security community that covers the
entire region. What policy changes would it take to achieve this feat and is such a security community consistent with a diminished, though still existing regional U.S. hegemony?

Finally, this chapter suggests empirical research on regional boundaries that focuses on practices and their overlap. For example, may a practice perspective make acceptance of Turkish EU membership seem easier or more difficult?

In sum, the theoretical framework presented in this chapter may help to re-define theoretical and empirical problems with regard to regional security orders and give us tools to explain challenges to cohesion in security communities.
3 Ontological Security, the Struggle for Recognition, and the Maintenance of Security Communities*

3.1 Introduction

How can the assumption that states seek ontological security inform our understanding of security communities and help illuminate processes of maintenance or decline? The answer seems obvious: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, in their adaptation of Karl Deutsch’s original formulation, define security communities as “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” -- where peaceful change means “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30, 34).

Expectations of peaceful change are rooted in mutual trust and a sense of “we-ness” (Deutsch et al. 1957). Members of a security community could thus be understood to be in a state of physical asecurity (harbouring no concerns about physical harm from one another; Wæver 1998) and ontological security (experiencing stability and “certainty of being” as part of the community).

However, this is hardly a good description of the transatlantic alliance after the end of the Cold War: First, the continuing evolution of NATO from a military alliance to a security community (Williams and Neumann 2000) suggested the development and strengthening of a collective identity. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the community’s purpose and individual members’ role within it were called into question. In ontological security terms, not only did NATO states have to figure out “who they are” collectively, but this redefinition of the alliance’s purpose also meant that individual members had to reconsider their role within the alliance (Kitchen 2009). For some, this

meant a radical adjustment of available policy options that threatened their identity as an actor on the international scene (see, for example, Zehfuss (2002) on German debates about military involvement abroad). Second, the European-American relationship saw one of the rockiest phases in its history, with the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and especially Iraq challenging its cohesion. The divisions within the alliance during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed resistance by, among others, France and Germany, against a redefinition of the alliance’s purpose to include regime change, the promotion of democracy through military means and the option of preventive war. Especially Germany saw its notions of acceptable foreign policy conduct violated by the leading state within the community; mutual alienation was reflected in an acerbic discourse, symbolic politics and policy decisions that spoke of growing mistrust (Szabo 2004). Whether or not these problems pointed towards a weakening of collective identification and signalled trouble for the community as a whole was strongly debated at the time. As Michael Cox suggested in an article in 2005, a lot of the interventions in this debate remained ad hoc; IR was “intellectually ill-equipped,” because the European-American relationship was seen as the “most predictable of relationships,” based on “ideology, interests and institutions” (Cox 2005: 205).

I will take up Cox’s challenge here and advance a theoretical argument that gives us new tools to understand challenges to cohesion in security communities. Looking at the transatlantic relationship after the end of the Cold War suggests that the relationship between community and ontological security is not as straightforward as it may seem. Regardless of dependable expectations of peaceful change, being part of a security community can provide as well as threaten ontological security. I argue here that an ontological security view suggests that security communities need not only to reinforce a sense of “we-ness” but also to recognize members’ distinctiveness. Denying this recognition threatens the self, undermining trust and eroding “we-ness,” while intersubjective expectations and practices that routinely legitimate members’ distinctiveness allow for a stable sense of self within the community. Thus, processes of (de)legitimation of distinctiveness vis-à-vis a collective identity constitute and maintain communities or explain their breakdown. Specifically, I will argue that the routinization of inter-state relations entails ongoing struggles for recognition during which actors employ
different strategies: adoption, reform, denial or exit. Understanding these strategies sheds light on the political dynamics within security communities.

I aim to make three main contributions. First, regarding the ontological security literature, I put the emphasis on understanding the intersubjective process of routinizing self–other relations. This process involves struggles for recognition that occur not only between but also within communities. Crucially, this is not a one-time event, but an ongoing political process, represented in changing expectations of behaviour over time. Second, regarding the security community literature, I highlight the existence and possible tension between different layers of identity. Collective identity formation changes but does not subsume the identity of the self. The ‘I’ in the ‘We’ remains an ‘I’, even if it may be a changed ‘I’ (Honneth 2010). Third, I suggest that this allows us to understand better the internal dynamics of security communities; while peaceful, they do exhibit periods when cohesion is challenged, with significant policy implications for members as well as non-members.

This paper proceeds as follows. I first highlight the process of routinization of self-other relations that lies at the heart of ontological security arguments. Second, I argue that the routinization of relationships implies struggles for recognition. Drawing on theories of recognition, I explain the inescapable tension between getting recognized both for one’s individuality and for one’s belonging to a community. Third, I suggest a framework for understanding these struggles, based on four ideal-typical strategies that actors may pursue. I then apply my revised account of ontological security seeking to security communities and show how struggles of recognition can help explain challenges to cohesion in these communities. I provide empirical examples throughout mainly from the post-WWII German-American relationship; in a separate section, I illustrate how my argument can help adjudicate the debate about the state of transatlantic relations after the end of the Cold War. I close with considering the implications of my argument and avenues for further research.

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25 For an application of the idea of ontological security to clashing identities within a state and the effect on its foreign policy, see Lupovici (2012).
3.2 Ontological Security

The concept of ontological security describes a set of answers to fundamental questions. How do individuals know who they are? Why does it matter? How do people create order in their world and become capable of acting individually and collectively given the potentially unlimited and overwhelming possibilities?

Anthony Giddens, who brought the idea of ontological security from its psychological roots to bear on sociological questions, defines it as “confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity” (Giddens 1984: 375). Individuals and collectivities need this basic sense of material and social predictability to create a stable sense of self and become capable of acting in the world.

Bringing the idea of ontological security into the study world of politics, Jennifer Mitzen (2006) urges us to look beyond the physical security-seeking assumption in International Relations (IR) and start paying attention to the ontological security needs of states: States may get attached to dangerous routines because they provide them with ontological security. Contra realism, it is not uncertainty that prevents states from getting out of the security dilemma; it is the rigid attachment to the certainty provided by conflictual routines that sustains the dilemma.

Except for two notable exceptions (Berenskoetter and Giegerich 2010, Browning and Joenniemi 2013), the idea of ontological security has so far not been applied to cooperation or cooperative relations between states in international politics. This is a surprising gap in the literature for two reasons. First, if we assume actors’ needs for ontological security as a constant in world politics, we should be able to detect ontological security-seeking behaviour across all kinds of relationships. Second, repeated interaction is a key notion in the study of cooperation. And the idea of ontological security provides an

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26 While Giddens mainly uses Erik Erikson’s ideas for his account of ontological security, concerns with different notions of the self and the social world have a longer history and can also be found in the pragmatist tradition of William James and George Herbert Mead.
alternative micro-foundation for explaining the significance of repeated interaction: cooperation may be sustained not because of actors’ concerns with future payoffs, audience costs and reputation (Keohane 1984; Oye 1985; Martin 1993; Tomz 2007), but because of their attachment to routines. It is this process of routinization – seen here as an ongoing political process that involves struggles for recognition – that provides the centerpiece for my engagement with ontological security seeking in cooperative relationships.

3.3 Constituting a Distinct Self through Routinization

Insofar as the idea of ontological security suggests answers to the questions ‘why do we need to know who we are?’ (in order to be able to act) and ‘how do we know who we are?’ (by interacting and routinizing our relations with significant others), it posits a particular relationship between identity, knowledge, agency and the social context: We cannot act without knowing who we are; nor can we know who we are without interacting with others.

3.3.1 Knowledge and Identity

What is this kind of knowledge that we need in order to act? Richard Jenkins defines identity as “the human capacity [...] to know ‘who’s who’ (and hence ‘what’s what’). This involves knowing who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on: a multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it, as individuals and as members of collectivities” (Jenkins 2008: 5). Based on this capacity to know, we become capable to act.

Identity, however, is not a piece of knowledge that is context independent. Our answer to the question “who are you?” varies with circumstances. We may reference certain things about what we do (“I have been teaching here for 2 years and my main research interests are x/y/z”), why we are in a certain context (“I went to college with the host of this party”), or how we relate to others (“I am Tim’s mother”). Identity is enacted knowledge about ourselves, others and the world around us in various situations that we find ourselves in. Identity makes actions intelligible; it provides reasons for action to ourselves and others. But “self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of
traits, possessed by the individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” (Giddens 1991: 53). And, as Jenkins rightly notes, “[identity] is a process – identification – not a ‘thing.’ It is not something that one can have, or not; it is something that one does” (Jenkins 2008: 5).

Identity and the process of identification are located in what Giddens calls practical consciousness: it “consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression” (Giddens 1984: xxiii). This means that actors do not constantly reflect when identifying; identities are mostly sedimented, taken-for-granted and habitual. Routines stabilize identities and allow for energy to be spent elsewhere. Ontological security suggests that making the process conscious, reflecting on the routines (and the identities anchored by them) and bringing them into the foreground, can be disruptive for individuals and may be anxiety provoking. In Giddens’ words, “the maintaining of habits and routines is a crucial bulwark against threatening anxieties” (Giddens 1991: 39). At the same time, habits and routines have to be continually adapted in order to provide a sense of ontological security: “A blind commitment to established routines, come what may, is a sign of neurotic compulsion […] the practical mastery of how to ‘go on’ in the context of social life is not inimical to creativity, but presumes it” (Giddens 1991: 41). Following routines rigidly, states caught in a security dilemma seem to lack this creativity and flexibility (Mitzen 2006).28 The continuous adaptation of routines, while momentarily disruptive, in the end provides a greater sense of ontological security than rigidly following the same old tracks. Thus, we are never done with Jenkins’ process of identification, of mapping the material and social world and our place in it (both as individuals and as members of collectivities). Complete ontological security is a chimaera. And only such an open-ended take on ontological security seeking and identification allows for change.

28 This suggests that states caught in a security dilemma may not be as ontologically secure as Mitzen argues. Her argument does not have to contradict Giddens’ points about routines and creativity, however, if we see ontological security or insecurity not as a binary but as a continuous variable. Just as we can be more or less physically (in)secure, we can be more or less ontologically (in)secure.
3.3.2 Agency and the Role of the Social Context

We experience the material and social world as enabling and constraining structures; we confront it as agents who reproduce it and change it. The idea of ontological security implies that there is no agency without self-identity. By virtue of acting, our identity is always wrapped up in our actions. We cannot act other than from our own position. We cannot stand outside of ourselves. And even if we try (when role-taking and experiencing empathy, for example), we do it as ourselves, and not from some neutral position. Yet, we are not self-sufficient in a fundamental way; we cannot create our own agency. Therein lies a curious tension. The ontological security drive is inherently self-oriented and driven by selfish needs but can only be satisfied through social interaction – by routinizing relationships with others. Our distinct self needs others to come into being. This tension is inescapable in the process of ontological security-seeking. If we can resist the temptation to analytically resolve it by fiat, it can help us understand the empirical dynamics involved in maintaining community at the international level.

The importance of others and the social context for ontological security is a matter of debate: Whereas Giddens and Mitzen suggest the ontological primacy of the social, Steele cautions against “overstat[ing] the role of others in the ontological security process” (Steele 2008: 59). Giddens comes close to making a causal claim when he writes: “Intersubjectivity does not derive from subjectivity, but the other way around. […] The individual is not a being who at some sudden point encounters others; ‘discovering the other,’ in an emotional-cognitive way, is of key importance in the initial development of self-awareness as such” (Giddens 1991: 51). Mitzen suggests that the social context is so important for the constitution of the self that, if self-identity and socially recognized identity are in tension, this tension “resolves itself” and actors get invested in the socially recognized identity (Mitzen 2006: 359). As I will discuss further below, this is only one way in which such a tension may get resolved.

Actors become invested in identities via routines. Routines create the sought-after predictability of daily life. A routine is a series of habits. A life without routines would be overwhelming. We would be paralyzed by having to make conscious decisions before taking any kind of action. Routines allow for the “bracketing of a potentially almost infinite
range of possibilities open to the individual” (Giddens 1991: 36). Routinizing relationships suggests the development of repetitive practices, an establishment of roles, where the rules and norms of interaction are followed tacitly and habitually. Each one of us is a part of a myriad of such relationships: be it as a wife, employee, teacher, student or customer. Similarly, world politics is structured around routinized relationships of individuals and collectivities. Insofar as NGOs, intergovernmental institutions, terrorist organisations, social movements, corporations or states can be seen to have routinized relationships, they are imbued with agency.

A key concern in scaling up the concept from individuals to collectivities has been whether or not collectivities like states can be said to seek ontological security. For individuals, the need for ontological security is rooted in the psychological drive to avoid existential anxiety. But we do not have to attribute emotional states to collectivities to be able to apply the concept of ontological security to states; we only have to accept that states can be said to have agency and that their agency is predicated on identification and routinization. If an individual’s need for ontological security is rooted in the psychological desire to minimize “unconscious sources of anxiety” (Giddens 1984: 282), a group’s drive to preserve its agency is rooted in the taken-for-grantedness of institutional structures and practices. Threats to established practices of collectivities like states disrupt the predictability of the context in which they operate and require the adaptation of routines. Those acting in the name of collectivities may not be plagued by personal anxieties and individual ontological insecurity if institutional structures, practices and routines get disrupted. But these disruptions may be experienced as threats to a state’s ontological security, if those acting in its name do not know how “to go on” in their role as representatives of the state. They may have to rethink routinized relationships and the identities that they are based on. This kind of social ontological insecurity may (also) be experienced at the individual level, but it cannot be reduced to individuals’ personal needs.

29 See Krolikowski (2008), Roe (2008), Croft (2012), and Steele (2008).
30 But they may. For example, in cases where individuals’ ontological security is influenced by their place within state institutions, such as in totalitarian societies.
31 There may be an emotional component to these disruptions if we consider Jonathan Mercer’s recent argument for social emotions. But he notes that group-level emotions are irreducible to
Collective and individual security seeking may be implicated in one another empirically (Krolikowski 2018), but they are not necessarily causally related. I disagree with Mitzen here who roots a state’s motivation to seek ontological security in the individual needs of its members: “[b]ecause losing a sense of state distinctiveness would threaten the ontological security of its members, states [are] motivated to preserve the national group identity” (Mitzen 2006: 352). Losing a sense of state distinctiveness threatens the ontological security and agency of the state, of that state’s representatives as representatives. It may create problems of personal ontological insecurity for representatives and other citizens or inhabitants – and this overlap may be common empirically, but it is not a logical necessity. Group-level ontological security and individual-level ontological security can and should be distinguished theoretically.

3.4 Routinizing Relationships as Struggles for Recognition

What may push the tacit process of routinization into the foreground? I will argue here that, because routinizing relationships can be understood as ongoing struggles for recognition, denied recognition challenges actors’ ontological security and requires a response. This will likely lead to an adaptation of routines of interaction.

Routines are practical and tacit and not usually discursively expressed or reflected upon (Giddens 1991: 30), unless they become problematic or a matter of contention. Even if tacit, routinizing relationships with others is an intersubjective process. As we have seen above, routinization suggests repetitive practices and established rules and norms of interaction based on certain roles. How could this process be problematic? The ontological security literature is largely silent on this issue and does not analyse in detail how the process of routinization works.

individuals (Mercer 2014). In any case, the key point here is that the experience of emotions is not a necessary condition for accepting ontological security seeking at the group level.  
32 Empirically, we can also think of situations where the loss of a sense of state distinctiveness is welcomed by some members because the state’s existence is experienced as causing ontological insecurity (e.g. secessionist movements).
We can start from the assumption that actors do not get attached to any kind of routine when interacting with others. First, the kind of interaction routines that are available can be expected to differ depending on the social structural, cultural and historical context. This is true both on an individual level and when considering political collectivities like states: Modern inter-state interaction routines are premised on and reinforce the existence of a state system. But specific practices of inter-state conduct also change over time: Marriage as a diplomatic practice, for example, has ceased to play a role between modern democratic states. Second, since ontological security is not a binary concept, different routines likely support different levels of ontological security. We would expect actors to get attached to routines that provide them with more ontological security.33

The theory of recognition, which also investigates the constitution of self and other and the establishment of interaction routines, can provide some helpful hints about the process of routinization. Works on recognition in IR have traditionally been limited to debates about the origins of statehood between descriptive vs. constitutive theories (International Theory 2013: 98). More recently, IR scholars have begun to draw on the literature on recognition from political theory to explain dynamics between states that may be described as struggles of recognition and go beyond the question of statehood (Haacke 2005; Murray 2010; Ringmar 1996, 2012, and 2014; Wendt 2003; Wolf 2011 and 2014).

Based on an interpretation of Hegel and Mead, Axel Honneth (2003) sees struggles for recognition as central for social relations in general. He argues that “when feelings of outrage and indignation over social arrangements take hold, collective struggles are likely to manifest themselves. When claims to recognition are accepted, social arrangements tend to be stable” (Haacke 2005: 187). Honneth distinguishes three types of recognition: love, rights and social esteem. The first refers to emotional support in family upbringing. The second refers to the conference of rights to “participate in public will-formation” (ibid.: 188), such as the right to vote. The third type refers to the recognition of qualities and traits of individuals – which may be reflected in the notions of honour or prestige (ibid.). Honneth suggests that his argument can be transferred to international politics. If we accept

33 The judgement on this may not be possible to make apriori. Routines are not in themselves more or less functional: Objectively dysfunctional interaction routines in abusive relationships, for example, may still provide a measure of ontological security to the actors involved.
the premise that (a) citizens of a state are interested in having their state’s historical narrative accepted by others, and that (b) modern states require legitimacy for their actions, we can argue that struggles for recognition are not just a specific kind of foreign policy action but provide the foundation for state representatives’ actions in international politics (Honneth 2010: 188ff.).

This suggests a significant overlap with the concept of ontological security. But while Mitzen’s account of the routinization of inter-state relations includes references to recognition dynamics, it remains incomplete. Her account of routinization can be summarized as a four-step process:

1. Actor’s self-definition (subjective identity);
2. Perception of actor’s self-definition by significant other(s);
3. Recognition of actor’s subjective identity or rejection thereof (social identity, role);
4. If necessary, adaptation to social identity by actor.

In Mitzen’s argument a “mismatch” between a state’s subjective identity (e.g. security seeker) and its recognized role by others (e.g. potential aggressor) provides the starting point for the security dilemma. From an ontological security standpoint, this mismatch is unstable. Mitzen sees one resolution to this: Through repeated interaction, states get invested in the socially recognized identity – and, in the process, they change their subjective identity to match the recognized one (Mitzen 2006: 359ff.). Thus, they get trapped in a security dilemma. But why would states get invested in the recognized identity as opposed to fighting for their subjective one? One argument could be that state actors take on the role of competitor in a security dilemma because they want to avoid the sucker’s payoff. Arguments about the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the lengthening of the “shadow of the future,” however, have put this into question (Axelrod 1984; Oye 1985). Mitzen’s argument suggests that these rationalist dynamics do not apply here: Her *iterated* ontological security dilemma becomes as inescapable as the original rationalist *non-iterated*...
prisoner’s dilemma. While iteration may provide a way out of the traditional security dilemma, iteration creates and sustains the ontological security dilemma: Routinizing the relationship along competitive lines is the only way to mutual recognition and ontological security.

But the argument that there is only one way out of the mismatch between self and social identity is problematic for several reasons. First, one arguably always goes into an interaction as somebody. Even though there is an ongoing debate about this (see Ringmar 2002 vs. Kompridis 2007, for example), this is assumed by Mitzen as well, since states enter the interaction that leads to the security dilemma with a certain type of self-identity. If we assume that actors enter the kinds of interactions that we are interested in international politics (which are usually not first encounters!) with some sense of themselves, then this would suggest that actors are already invested in the self-identity they bring to the table. Thus, Wolf suggests, “struggles originate, because, in a given situation, actors are quite certain about both their social status and about the fact that it justifies being treated [in a certain way]. Actors start such conflicts to get the treatment that they feel entitled to insist upon” (Wolf 2011: 109). They may thus be resistant to adapting to the recognized social identity if it conflicts with their self-identity. Second, there are other reasons for expecting that actors do not always adapt to their socially recognized role (or that they will try to avoid it as long as possible):

- Actors in international politics know that how others judge their type and other elements of their self-identity is a political process. They can be expected to try and influence this process.
- They may feel compelled to react against a potential loss of agency/power as a result of the social identity that others ascribe to them; or they may try to gain agency/power by getting others to recognize a certain kind of identity.
- They may be worried about their public image or reputation, try to protect their “soft power,” or want to uphold their self-esteem (Wolf 2011) by rejecting adaptation.

34 Possibly, actors with a “flexible” attachment style can find a way out of this.
Thus, it seems warranted to expect variation in how actors react to a mismatch between their subjective identity and their socially recognized identity. Adapting to and getting invested in the socially recognized role à la Mitzen is one, but not the only possible outcome. The process of routinization, as distilled from Mitzen’s argument, should thus be changed as follows:35

1. Actor’s self-definition (subjective identity);
2. Perception of actor’s self-definition by significant other(s);
3. Recognition of actor’s subjective identity or rejection thereof (social identity, role);
4. Reaction.

Erik Ringmar’s work on recognition is a useful guide to understanding the fourth step. In fact, he describes ontological security seeking when he writes:

“We start by telling stories about ourselves which we go on to test on people around us. We let other people know who we believe we are, and they let us know whether or not our account is reasonable. In this way, our stories about ourselves are, or are not, recognized. If our story is recognized, we have a preliminary version of an identity which we, increasingly self-confidently, can go on to use in interaction with others. If our story is not recognized, however, we have to reconsider our options. Maybe we decide to abandon our self-description, or maybe we decide to stick to it, and to fight for it” (Ringmar 2011: 3).

Ringmar notes that, in telling stories about ourselves and seeking recognition, we seek (individually and collectively): acknowledgment (we are being noticed, our existence is acknowledged), respect (equality, rights), individuality (distinctiveness), and affiliation (placing us in an “affective field” of friends and enemies) (Ringmar 2011: 3f. and 2012: 7).

35 This simplified process may wrongly suggest that the subjective identity is fully formed prior to recognition. As I have highlighted before, however, while the self has intrinsic stakes in maintaining an identity, this identity includes relations with others (see Pratt 2017). Even when I talk about the self and its sense of distinctiveness, it is logically a social self. All I assume is that the relational self retains a sense of distinctiveness from others.
The tension between individuality and affiliation is of particular interest for analyzing cooperative relations between states: It suggests that maintaining cooperative routines is a political process that, despite its potential for providing ontological security, may be conflictual. State representatives seek ontological security through claims towards distinctiveness (individuality) as well as belonging (affiliation). These claims may not be validated by others, however. In that case, actors have three options, according to Ringmar (1996: 82; 2012): they can accept others’ stories and “rebrand” themselves (a move that can be expected after a major loss, a war, for example); they can accept the verdict, but stick to their stories and aim to change the verdict based on self-reformation; or they can decide to stand by their stories without reform (and try to convince or force others to accept their original stories).

In variation of Ringmar’s options, I distinguish four strategies in the struggle for recognition: adoption, reform, recalcitrance/denial, and exit.

1. Adoption: Actors change their sense of self and take on the recognized social identity.

2. Reform: Actors acknowledge the mismatch and adapt their behavior to convince others to recognize their self-identity.

3. Recalcitrance/denial: Actors refuse to change their self-identity or deny the mismatch.

4. Exit: Actors remove themselves or are excluded from the relationship and seek recognition elsewhere.

When are we most likely to see internally held and externally recognized roles conflict in existing relations? First, an actor may change (parts of) their self-definition and their

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36 Marilynn Brewer suggests that distinctiveness and belonging tend towards an equilibrium (Brewer 1991 and 1993). My take on the relationship between distinctiveness and belonging differs from hers in two important ways: First, she views the need for belonging to be satisfied within in-groups and the need for distinctiveness to be satisfied through “inter-group comparisons” (1991: 477; 1993: 3). But I am concerned with claims towards distinctiveness and belonging in one and the same in-group. Second, her equilibrium model suggests that distinctiveness and belonging are tightly coupled: less of one, means more of the other, and vice versa. In my account, claims towards distinctiveness are negotiated, struggled over; and the effect of this on the social relationship (i.e., belonging) varies depending on the strategies employed (see next section).
relationship to the community. This could be the result of internal political changes—such as changes of government, ideological changes, or a shifting balance of power between different sections of the foreign policy establishment within a state. For example, recently, the Trump administration announced a turn away from open trade and international engagement under the banner of an “America First” strategy, which suggests an impending, fundamental change in the U.S.’s self-definition and its established relationships, for example. Second, others may change their assessment of an actor. Changes within the international system may provide new information that spurs a rethinking of the relationship. An example of this would be changing perceptions of German power and responsibility after unification. Third, based on this assessment, others may refuse to recognize an actor’s (old or new) subjective identity. An example of this would be the growing refusal of NATO allies to continue to legitimize national caveats and institutional restraints on troop contributions from certain countries.

These kinds of changing expectations that call the existing relational setup into question, initiate a struggle for recognition, the outcome of which depends on the reaction to the mismatch that opens up between members’ self and social identity within the community.

37 A striking example of this was the Polish foreign minister’s speech in Berlin in 2011, when he noted: “I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say this, but here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear its inactivity. You have become Europe’s indispensable nation. You may not fail to lead: not dominate, but to lead in reform.” Radislaw Sikorski, “I fear Germany’s power less than her inactivity,” Financial Times, November 28, 2011. Available at <https://www.ft.com/content/b753cb42-19b3-11e1-ba5d-00144feabdc0>. Last accessed May 22, 2017.

38 In 2007, Robert Gates, the U.S. Defense Secretary, warned that “we must not—we cannot—become a two-tiered alliance of those who are willing to fight and those who are not […]. Such a development, with all its implications for collective security, would effectively destroy the Alliance.” Cited in the U.K.’s House of Commons Select Committee on Defence’s Ninth Report. Available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/111/11102.htm>. Last accessed May 22, 2017.
3.5 Strategies in the Struggle for Recognition

This section elaborates on four ideal-typical reactions. I discuss when and why we are likely to see each of these strategies employed, how they manifest themselves, and what their likely effects are on social relations. Each of the strategies is associated with psychological and political costs and benefits. While we can anticipate these in the abstract, in the end, costs and benefits are context-dependent. And actors may be compelled to follow different strategies at different times, even when facing the same problem.

3.5.1 Adoption

Embracing the recognized social identity is one way to resolve a mismatch between an internally held and externally recognized identity. Even if it removes tension, changing one’s sense of self and taking on a recognized social identity is likely to be psychologically and politically costly: A state’s role identity is reflected in its political practices in domestic and foreign policy and in its institutions; state representatives and others have a stake in these. Thus, outright adoption is going to be relatively rare. Holding on to one’s self-identity has to be untenable, and the other options of reform, denial, and exit have to be seen as foreclosed, for adoption to take place. As Ringmar suggested, acceptance of others’ stories about oneself is most likely in international relations after a major loss.

Given that it probably happens in rather turbulent political circumstances, adoption that is seen as imposed is not a strategy that allows for stable relations over the long run but is going to breed political resentment. Only adoption that happens not solely out of a desperate need to be recognized, but when actors see intrinsic value in changing themselves, is likely to lead to stable relations. In those cases, we can expect actors to employ elements of the strategy of reform as well.

An example that shows both the limits of the strategy of adoption and the importance of coupling it with elements of reform for establishing and maintaining stable relations can be found in early post-WWII West German-American relations: The occupation of Germany and its eventual division into two separate states were accompanied by debates about Germany’s identity and future. Even if it may seem so in retrospect, West
Germany’s integration into “the West” was not a foregone conclusion (Jackson 2006a: 51). Adenauer’s policy of Westbindung remained vulnerable towards opposition complaints about him being the “Chancellor of the Allies” (Kurt Schumacher in a Bundestag debate, November 25, 1949) who had willfully foregone national unity by binding the West German state to the Western alliance. As Jackson has argued convincingly, Adenauer was able to circumvent the charges that he had adopted an imposed role for West Germany which went against its national identity and interest by repeatedly invoking the broader rhetorical commonplace of belonging to a “Western Civilization” (Jackson 2006a and b). Coupled with practices of cooperation and his government’s actions that institutionalized commitments of the new state towards “the West,” this allowed for the integration of West Germany into the Western security community.

3.5.2 Reform

Another strategy to resolve a mismatch between self and socially recognized identity is to acknowledge others’ assessment that one’s aspirations as being seen as a particular kind of actor are not (yet) warranted. In changing one’s behavior, actors then try to achieve recognition at a later point in time. Acknowledging the need for a change in behavior to live up to one’s proclaimed identity, requires a lot of introspection and self-awareness; denial is often easier in life and in politics. Thus, cases of reform are likely to start out with denial.

We can expect to see reform when the actors involved perceive the political costs of denial as too high. A change in government may prompt a rethinking of political practice that allows for reform – based on new ideas about the issue at hand and/or because the new government is less beholden to certain entrenched interests that keep the denial going. Reform can repair a troubled relationship because it is likely to remove some thorny issues of disagreement and allow for better coordination; it may also provide the party that reforms with more leverage with its partners.

An example of reform that started out with denial can be seen in West Germany’s changing position on its relations with East Germany, other Eastern Bloc countries, and the acceptance of post-WWII borders in Europe. The relatively quick and successful
integration of West Germany into the Western European and transatlantic communities notwithstanding, its refusal to recognize the East German state and the Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s Eastern border (and instead insisting on the continued existence of the German state with its 1937 borders) became less sustainable in the 1960s for two reasons: First, the Federal Republic’s rigid position suggested a “collective state of denial” which was increasingly decried by the allies. They had grown weary of making “ritual references to reunification” which curtailed their flexibility in negotiations with the Soviets: The Kennedy administration debated how to keep the American commitment to West Berlin, while at the same time being able to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union and avoiding nuclear war. Concessions to the Soviets in the “German question” in return for the end of Soviet meddling in West Berlin were considered (May 1997). German policymakers, especially Adenauer, feared such a superpower agreement on Germany without German involvement (Granieri 2003). But the German government’s strategy of denial made its own position in terms of foreign policy maneuverability worse and put it increasingly at odds with the U.S. – precisely what it wanted to avoid. Second, the German insistence on a change of the post-war borders complicated its reconciliation with former enemies in the East, and it clashed with its claims of being committed to a European order of peace (Kornprobst 2008: 116f.). Nonetheless, it took until the early 1970s for West Germany to sign treaties with Moscow (1970), Poland (1970), the German Democratic Republic (1972), and Czechoslovakia (December 1973), in which the West German government recognized the existing borders (including the Oder-Neisse line).

One reason why denial had persisted for so long was that West Germany’s major parties found themselves in agreement with and tried to outdo each other in the support of key demands by an important voting bloc: German refugees and expellees from the former East of the Reich. At least in public: By 1959 leaders of the Social Democratic Party’s top leaders “were ready to admit, in a closed meeting, what some of them had concluded years

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39 British Prime Minister Macmillan told President Kennedy “that ‘East Germany exists’ and that it was ‘nonsense for the West Germans to talk as though it doesn’t exist’;” and Kennedy implored Berliners “let us deal with the realities as they actually are, not as they might have been, and not as we wish they were” (quoted in Hofmann 2007: 126f.).
earlier—that they saw ‘no chance’ for a reunified Germany to ‘regain the lost eastern territories’” (Ahonen 1998: 49).

A change of government in 1969 enabled the switch from a strategy of denial to reform: The Social-Liberal coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt started to pursue a new Ostpolitik to mend fences with Eastern Europe and to ease the consequences of the German division. “By accepting the post-war realities in Europe, [this policy] was an attempt to avoid isolation within the Western alliance and to create a modus vivendi with the East” (Niedhart 2003: 118f.).

3.5.3 Recalcitrance/Denial

A third way of ameliorating the tension between self and socially recognized identity is to simply refuse to change oneself and deny that there is a mismatch. This is likely to be a common reaction: People are invested in the stories they tell about themselves, so we should expect a reluctance to change identities. While denial may be the first go-to strategy by actors to alleviate ontological insecurity, it is likely to be an unstable strategy that eventually morphs into either reform or exit. It is unstable both from an ontological security standpoint and because it puts a lot of strain on relationships.

By not addressing the mismatch, denial creates a stalemate in relationships; coordination is likely to be more complicated and costly because of the unacknowledged proverbial elephant in the room. Despite its high psychological and political costs, denial may persist longer than expected if it becomes entrenched in political practices and domestic politics. Some of these elements could be seen in the above-mentioned example of West Germany’s slow move from denial to reform.

3.5.4 Exit

The strategy of reform is one way to move away from the stalemate of denial; exit is another. Actors remove themselves or are excluded from the relationship and seek recognition elsewhere. It is not logically necessary, however, for denial to come before exit. But the more long-lasting and institutionalized a relationship, the more invested actors are
in terms of their sense of self in the relationship, the less likely it is for exit to be the immediate reaction to a recognition mismatch.

Exit fundamentally alters the relationship between current and former members. Even if a generally cooperative stance may remain, it necessitates a complete renegotiation of institutional ties, rights, and obligations. In other cases, a relationship formerly constituted by security community practices may evolve into a more traditional one based on balance of power practices.

Three recent (and ongoing) examples of the use of the exit strategy come to mind. First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace program (1994), which helped institute security community practices between the former enemies. But relations soured over time to a point where civilian and military cooperation were suspended and sanctions introduced in response to Russia’s ongoing intervention in Ukraine. There are various reasons for the failure of the once nascent Russia-NATO security community, but one part of the story is Russia’s “identity search” after the end of the Soviet Union. The view of Russia as a “great power” remains dominant in the country’s foreign policy discourse but was not recognized by NATO members who tried to “steer its course as a junior partner” and thereby inadvertently emboldened anti-NATO sentiment (Pouliot 2007b: 615, 614).

Second, Britain is preparing to start negotiations with the EU for leaving the community. The “Brexit” campaign suggests a re-nationalization, a cry for restoring British control over its economy, borders, and immigration. While there was, in the beginning, an attempt by the British government to use the threat of Brexit to negotiate exceptions to EU laws – a claim to distinctiveness which was promptly rebuked by members of the EU – a “hard” exit which requires a complete renegotiation of the UK-EU relationship now looks more and more likely.40

Third, we may be witnessing the exit strategy being deployed by the core member of the transatlantic community. President Trump’s declaration of NATO as “obsolete” (even if that statement has been somewhat softened), his enthusiastic support for Britain’s

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decision to leave the European Union, his disdain for multilateralism, his call for an “America First” approach to foreign policy, and his open admiration for Russian President Putin’s style of leadership, look like attempts at a redefinition of America’s role in the world where its recognition needs will no longer be fulfilled by the community that it helped build after WWII.\textsuperscript{41} Other members see this as a threat to the relationship and their sense of self: In a remarkable letter sent to EU heads of state on January 31, 2017, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, put the new U.S. administration in line with China, Russia, and radical Islam as geopolitical problems for Europe.\textsuperscript{42} Earlier in January, a number of representatives of Eastern European members of NATO had sent a letter to President-elect Trump, alarmed by his overtures to Putin, appealing to him “to stand firm in the defense of our common goals and interests” and offering the recognition of “American greatness” within the alliance: “Putin does not seek American greatness. As your allies, we do.”\textsuperscript{43} Other than Tusk (who sounded resigned to the exit strategy of Trump and ready to move on), they were still appealing to the new U.S. government’s expressed recognition needs and arguing that they could be met within the existing relationship; possibly this signals denial about the mismatch between the new administration’s definition of self and the community. The outcome of this struggle remains to be seen.

To sum up, the routinization of inter-state relations entails ongoing struggles for recognition with different strategies that neither the ontological security literature nor the security community literature have tackled so far. The next section argues that the revised theory of ontological security based on recognition dynamics can be used to makes sense of discord within security communities that so far has received little theoretical attention.\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[44] Some notable exceptions include Bially Mattern (2005b), Bjola and Kornprobst (2007), and Kitchen (2009), which all focus on a particular crisis.
\end{footnotes}
3.6 Struggles for Recognition in Security Communities

Mitzen is right to note that, as a basic need, ontological security “sheds light on the stability of social relationships, cooperative or conflictual, and the difficulty of effective change” (Mitzen 2006: 343). Similarly, Wendt argues that this need “creates a generalized preference for order and predictability, but of more concrete importance is the internalization of roles in identities, which generates subjective commitments to objective positions in society” (Wendt 1999: 339).

From this perspective, conflict and cooperation are seen as self-reinforcing because actors become invested in the routines and roles that constitute these social relationships. For established cooperative inter-state relationships like security communities, this suggests a healthy spiral of cooperation. Since Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett revived Karl Deutsch’s original concept, this particular kind of cooperative inter-state relationship has spurred considerable theoretical and empirical interest. The original argument as well as subsequent refinements focused on the conditions for the emergence of security communities, yet they refrained from conceptualizing in any detail the dynamics of maintenance of these communities or the conditions for their possible demise. This has begun to change recently; yet it remains the case that, as one recent review concludes, “the security community concept is in desperate need for theories that can explain processes of disintegration and decline” (Koschut 2014: 529).

The textbook case of a security community, the transatlantic alliance with NATO as its core institution, has been pronounced on the verge of collapse by policymakers and observers repeatedly in its 65-year history45, and we have seen that its members have experienced periods of ontological insecurity as part of the community. How do we explain this? The attachment-to-routines argument cannot provide us with the whole story here. We need to turn our attention to ongoing struggles for recognition within security communities to solve this puzzle: The struggle for recognition does not end even in highly institutionalized communities. It can thus help us explain the experience of ontological insecurity in security communities.

45 For a good overview of what he terms the “crisis literature,” see Thies (2009).
Security communities are deeply routinized relationships based on the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the formation of a collective identity. Practices that anchor this identity are self-restraint, cooperative security, diplomacy, consultation and multilateral decision-making, joint military planning and exercise, and unfortified borders (Adler and Greve 2009: 71f.). However, this does not mean “the end of conflict and bargaining over substantive or institutional questions; nor does it imply that the collective identity of the community is free of contestation” (Adler and Greve 2009: 71).

In fact, security communities do not transcend what Wendt describes as the “fundamental problem of collective identity formation: overcoming the fear of being engulfed by the Other” (Wendt 1999: 344). Members need to be accepted both as members of the community (recognition and legitimation of affiliation) and in their individuality to feel ontologically secure. As Bahar Rumelili notes (2011: 21): “Ontological insecurity refers to a state of disruption where the self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity. It arises when the self loses its ability to distinguish itself from significant others, and have those distinctions socially accepted and validated.” The sense of self of members of a security community incorporates elements of the community. But the need to have one’s distinctiveness recognized remains; it would only disappear if the self lost its agency.

An explicit emphasis on the on-going process of routinization of self-other relations through struggles for recognition thus allows us to pay attention to the political dynamics within security communities. And it highlights the power of the community vis-à-vis individual members, especially the power of core states who hold “the authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute the [community]” (Adler and Barnett 1998:39). With the idea of ontological security in mind, this suggests an interesting power dynamic: “precisely because the significant Other is so vital in sustaining a stable sense of Self, it also has the capacity to undermine it” (Berenskoetter 2014: 17). In some cases, the search for ontological security may prove to lead to paradoxical results then: an ongoing struggle for recognition that never settles down into stable routines.

In general, however, the maintenance of security communities can be understood as a process that oscillates between relatively stable routines and struggles for recognition. This suggests an answer to the puzzle of NATO’s permanent crisis literature, and to the
disconnect between accounts of security communities as by definition ontological secure and the empirical picture. Patrick Jackson’s metaphor of the maintenance of a house provides a good illustration for this:

“The snapshot from which a theorist might derive the constitutive properties of a house purposely abstracts from these processes of maintenance so that the analyst can focus on the purely conceptual and definitional aspects of the house as an entity. But this snapshot necessarily selects out one moment in a series of ongoing processes – processes of the maintenance of the house as well as processes of decay and wear which break the house down over time – and privileges it as the ‘essence’ of the house.” (Jackson 2004: 282).

Rather than focusing on the “essence” of security communities and debating how much or how little of that essence (be it collective identity or particular practices) needs to remain intact in order for the community to hold, I suggest here to investigate the processes of maintenance and decline. Expectations and practices routinely legitimate members’ distinctiveness. This allows for a stable sense of self within the larger community to emerge. But, as we have seen theoretically and empirically, these expectations and practices change over time, leading to new struggles of recognition. And the key question then becomes what kind of strategies members of the community use to deal with these struggles, and whether these are conducive to establishing new routines that sustain the community.

3.7 Struggles for Recognition in the Transatlantic Security Community

The transatlantic security community after the end of the Cold War and during the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq may serve as a brief illustration here.

According to Cox, tensions within transatlantic relations were not a function of European weakness (Kagan 2003), but a “sign of assertiveness by a more self-confident, though still deeply divided Europe” in “a world in which the US is finding it increasingly difficult either to assert its rule or to generate loyalty” (Cox 2005: 208). I will suggest here
that, contra Kagan as well as Cox, challenges to cohesion in the European-American relationship after the end of the Cold War and culminating in the lead-up to the Iraq War 2003, were a sign of changing expectations and self-definitions that led to a struggle within the community. The U.S.’s choice of strategy put Europeans in a situation where their reactions were limited to denial or exit, with detrimental effects on the relationship. A new transatlantic bargain, rebuilding and renegotiating the alliance almost from the ground up, may be the best way forward for the community at this point. It is an understatement to point out that the likelihood of that seems slim under the Trump administration and while Europeans are dealing with Britain leaving the Union.

The end of the Cold War “called into question one of the most fundamental premises of the transatlantic relationship itself – namely, that it was required … to maintain the balance of power in Europe” (Cox 2005: 210). But at first no major redefinition of America’s role in Europe took place, neither from the U.S. side, nor as a European challenge. In the wake of German unification, the Bush administration reaffirmed NATO “as the crucial coordinating mechanism in Atlantic relations” (Lundestad 2003: 238). But there were signs that the U.S. was beginning to understand itself as more separate from European problems. When Yugoslavia was starting to fall apart, Secretary of State James Baker famously said that the US had “no dog” in this fight (ibid.: 240). When war broke out in Bosnia, however, and mostly European UN peacekeeping troops were unable to act, the Clinton administration under the motto “multilateral when you can, unilateral when you must,” pushed for a lifting of the UN weapons embargo and ran bombing campaigns against Bosnian Serbs (Lundestad 2003: 251). The impression in the U.S. was that “when push came to shove, on key security questions, the Europeans simply could not be taken seriously” (Holbrooke, cited in Cox 2003: 212).

Even though NATO went to war in Kosovo in 1999 as an alliance, the experience damaged U.S. views of the alliance further, because it highlighted the lack of European military capabilities to effectively contribute to the war effort. And it put the spotlight on the cumbersome process of a “war by committee” where targets were voted on by NATO
The conclusion that the Pentagon drew from the Kosovo experience was that it might want to “avoid to [use NATO] again, especially if it involved fighting alongside allies who not only had limited technical means but whose leaders had to adapt to a public opinion that was far from supportive if fighting an engagement that had not been sanctioned by the UN” (Cox 2005: 213).

Even before September 11 and the George W. Bush administration, the U.S. increasingly perceived a European lack of capabilities and political will. Practices that in the past had legitimized the distinctiveness of members, such as consensual decision-making (effectively giving veto power over targets) and considering domestic legal and political restrictions, came under strain. Unilateralism had gained traction as a practice, if not the preferred practice, in U.S. foreign policy.

Seeing its leadership and effectiveness in pursuing its goals stifled, the U.S. in effect partly exited the relationship, paradoxically exactly at the time when NATO took the unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: While European members of NATO were offering troops and equipment for the war in Afghanistan, the administration briefed NATO defense ministers that it was “not much interested in using NATO structures; nor was it planning to rely heavily on European forces either” (Wolfowitz paraphrased in Cox 2005: 215). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s new doctrine of the mission determining the coalition further highlighted this redefinition of the American relationship with the community. It deeply disturbed European allies because it undermined NATO’s rationale and way of doing things (Cox 2005: 216).

The Iraq crisis only exacerbated tensions further and deeply divided European allies. The U.S. pushed for pre-emptive war and regime change under questionable intelligence on weapons of mass destruction without a second UN resolution and against the veto and staunch opposition of key allies like France and Germany (Lundestad 2003: 275ff.). At the end of 2003, the EU for the first time in its history, decided to publish a common strategic assessment of threats, the “European Security Strategy” (Berenskoetter 2005). Apart from the specifics, the ESS was a sign of Europeans waking up to the reality

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of the U.S. redefining its relationship with its allies; it was a reactive, not an assertive move.

Given the American position as the core state within the community, its decision to partly exit put European members in a position where their options were limited and would all have detrimental effects for the community: One option was to go along with the American exit option, recognize its unsurpassed position, and accept an alliance “à la carte” and the practice of ad hoc coalitions of the willing (Godzimirski, Græger, and Haugevik 2010), possibly making room for a return of balance of power practices within Europe and between Europe and America in the future.47 Another option was to decry the American exit strategy, not accept it as the way forward, and try to reverse it by disrupting U.S. foreign policies and being adamant in re-legitimizing old community practices.48 However, this meant denying the severity of the mismatch between self and community that had opened up in the U.S. – with the possible effect of delaying and taking away resources from an overdue rethinking of the relationship. These two bad options help explain the tensions within the transatlantic security community from the end of the Cold War to the aftermath of the Iraq War.

What is the value added of understanding challenges to cohesion in security communities as struggles for recognition as opposed to seeing tensions primarily as the result of burdensharing and free-riding concerns, for example? Both theoretically and empirically, an unequal distribution of labor among allies is not by itself problematic; burdensharing is bound to be unequal by some measure. It becomes problematic only in the context of broader struggles for recognition. Burdensharing arguments alone cannot explain why particular, long-lasting practices become delegitimized; but this process can be understood in the context of changing self-definitions and expectations among allies: changes which often signal an impending mismatch between self and community that requires a reaction to uphold ontological security and maintain the community.

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47 European states which went along with the U.S. as part of the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq pursued that option.  
48 France and Germany used this approach during the Iraq crisis.
3.8 Conclusion

Security community and ontological security do not align automatically. This is puzzling both for the security community literature (why do members of a highly institutionalized security community, which is built on a collective identity, experience ontological insecurity?) and for the idea of ontological security (why do relationships which experience recurring periods of ontological insecurity last?).

Because of its original focus on the individual level of analysis, the ontological security literature foregrounds the role of self-identity: It is the self that gets attached to social role identities and attendant routines. The security community literature, on the other hand, because it is interested in collective identity formation, tends to imply that the self gets transcended in the process of identification. My arguments here are an attempt to use each literature’s strengths to remedy the weaknesses of the other by highlighting the inescapable tension between individuality and affiliation in social relations.

Taking this tension into account, I have presented here a view of ontological security that understands the process of routinization as an ongoing, political process that is characterized by struggles for recognition.\(^\text{49}\) As members of a community with a collective identity, actors still require the acknowledgment and legitimation of their distinctiveness.

This perspective suggests the following answers to the two-pronged puzzle from above: In answer to the first question, the denial of recognition of distinctiveness can lead to the experience of ontological insecurity even within security communities. In answer to the second question, the argument presented here suggests that the struggle for recognition provides mechanisms for adaptation and change that the relatively apolitical view of routinization in the existing ontological security literature overlooks. It is thus the process of (de)legitimation of distinctiveness \(\text{vis-à-vis}\) a collective identity that constitutes and maintains communities or explains their breakdown.

Future research may further examine and explain the empirical variation when it comes to this process. If ontological security-seeking, routinization and struggles for

\(^{49}\) Even though this paper focuses specifically on security communities, struggles for recognition are part of other kinds of relationships in international relations. How these struggles differ depending on the social context would be an important question to pursue theoretically and empirically.
recognition are constants, what varies? In Mitzen’s account, variation can be found in the kind of attachment to routines (rigid or flexible), which is then used to provide an alternative explanation for the security dilemma. Here, variation is argued to lie in actors’ responses to mismatched claims of recognition. This should help us explain why certain disputes strain security communities more than others. The struggle for recognition is a constant, but the way actors deal with it are not. I have used the idea of the struggle for recognition mainly to address the first question and to explain how tensions between individuality and affiliation may threaten ontological security even in security communities. More work remains to be done with regard to the second question of what makes (or fails to make) communities durable despite the experience of ontological insecurity. Answers to this may also lie in the particular structure and institutional make-up of security communities, which may immunize them to an extent against the fall-out from periods of ontological insecurity and struggles for recognition.

In terms of a practical takeaway from the argument presented here, the maintenance of security communities may depend less on somehow engineering a stronger ‘we-feeling’ (which may prove to be inconsequential at best and counterproductive at worst) than on ensuring a struggle for recognition that provides, \textit{à la} Albert Hirschman, avenues for voice and avoids having actors choose between loyalty or exit.
4 Governing Together: Collective Action and the Management of Expectations in Security Communities

4.1 Introduction

The security communities that are most often dealt with empirically – the transatlantic security community (TSC) with NATO as its main institution; the European Union (EU); and ASEAN\textsuperscript{50} – are more than non-war communities. To be sure, one of the greatest achievements of these communities remains the routinization of peaceful conflict resolution among its members based on a sense of belonging, shared values, and institutions. But they are now also recognized for other things they do.

Take, for example, NATO, which has come a long way from fulfilling Secretary General Lord Ismay’s famous adage of keeping “the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” In March 2001, the Brookings Institution’s Ivo Daalder, who had served as the director for European Affairs on Bill Clinton’s NSC and later became the U.S.’s Permanent Representative to NATO under Barack Obama, envisioned three alternative futures for NATO: First, the alliance could remain focused on collective defense, serving as a hedge against a potentially resurgent Russia. Or it could focus on collective security, promoting stability and the values of the Euro-Atlantic security community throughout Europe. Finally, it could become an alliance of collective interests, defending against security threats facing the community from within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic realm (Daalder 2001b).

17 years later, it looks like NATO’s answer to this menu of choice has been “all of the above.” It’s traditional collective defense orientation never went away; it lay dormant for a while, but “deterrence talk” as well as troop reinforcements and joint exercises in NATO’s periphery have seen a recent upsurge since the Russian annexation of Crimea and its military involvement in eastern Ukraine (von Hlatky and Wenger 2015). With this refocusing on

classic deterrence, promoting stability and democratic values throughout Europe may have taken a bit of a backseat for NATO. The heyday of collective security thinking and institutional attempts at “increasing the space in Europe where wars simply do not happen” (former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow, in 1998, cited in Moore 2007: 27) were arguably the 1990s when NATO created a number of overlapping institutions designed in part to promote stability and democratic values across the continent. Of course, the 1990s also saw war re-appear on European soil, and with its interventions in the Balkans, NATO started to act more according to Daalder’s third scenario. And since 9/11, defending against security threats not only from within but also beyond the Euro-Atlantic realm has only become more important for NATO.

In a different but similar way, the EU has its roots in cautious and rather limited attempts at European integration in the 1950s. But since then it has developed into a continent-spanning governance infrastructure that is closely intertwined with domestic structures in its 28 (27 after Brexit) member states. And it has self-consciously tried to spread its values, institutions, policies in its “neighbourhood” and beyond (Bremberg 2007, 2010, and 2015); and external governance is explicitly codified in EU treaties (cf. Van Vooren, Blockmans, and Wouters 2013). Similarly, while less integrated than the EU, ASEAN members have created a number of instruments to shape the wider region in the realms of trade, security, and society/culture (for an overview, see Cremona et al. 2015).

In sum, the evolution of NATO, the EU, and to an extent ASEAN suggest that they are in the business of global or at least regional governance now. What does that mean for our current understanding of security communities? Traditionally, the primary concern has been with the dependability of expectations of peaceful change among members of a security community. More recent work in the security community literature has taken note of the range of activities and (sometimes implicitly) incorporated them into their research. This remains underdeveloped theoretically, however. If global governance at minimum “requires that

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51 Enlargement was only one element of NATO’s collective security orientation. Institutions created in the 1990s include the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994, the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997. On the socialization practices used by NATO in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, see Gheciu 2005.
participants hold their capacity for violence at bay in their dealings with each other” (Mitzen 2011: 56), security communities by definition should be a fairly easy case. In addition, since security communities are “the species of non-wars that rest on identity and community” (Wæver 1998: 79), making joint commitments and holding each other accountable may be expected to be routine. Maybe this is why the governance function of some of the most established security communities has not received the kind of theoretical attention it deserves from scholars of these communities. They are quick to point out that security communities are not “havens of harmonious relations” (Collins 2013: 16; see also Adler and Barnett 1998: 55) but have otherwise reverted mostly to empirical ad-hoc treatments to explain conflicts within communities.

I argue here that challenges to cohesion in security communities that govern together arise because of misaligned expectations among its members. And I come to the somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that managing predictive (cognitive) and prescriptive (normative) expectations is particularly challenging in security communities because of the problem of complacency; the likelihood of resentment; the expectation of forgiveness; and the problem of recognition needs.

I aim to make two main contributions: First, I propose to conceptualize security communities as governance mechanisms that include but also may go beyond the routinization of peaceful conflict resolution among members: Members of a security community “do things together;” they exhibit collective intentionality – which can be inward- as well as outward-oriented. Bringing in the idea of collective intentionality allows us to treat the inward and outward orientation of security communities as two sides of the same coin. Second, I focus on providing a more nuanced understanding of expectations and their role in collective action of security communities. I provide a novel analytical framework of the management of predictive and prescriptive expectations to enable theoretically informed, comparative empirical analyses over time and space.

This paper proceeds as follows: First, I provide my understanding of collective intentionality and apply it to security communities. Second, I develop my analytical framework and describe five scenarios of the interaction of predictive and prescriptive expectations. Third, I detail the four specific challenges for the alignment of expectations in
security communities. Throughout the paper, I provide examples from the transatlantic security community, especially the German-American relationship. I close with considering implications of my argument and avenues for further research.

4.2 Governance and Collective Intentionality

In this section, I give a brief overview of my understanding of key terms like governance and collective intentionality and apply them to security communities.

4.2.1 Governance as Purposive Collective Action

Since the 1990s, governance has become a ubiquitous term in political science, public administration, and International Relations. Accordingly, three clusters of meaning can be distinguished (cf. Fukuyama 2016): First, it is used to describe governing without government, i.e. the “regulation of social behavior through networks and other non-hierarchical mechanisms” (ibid.: 90). Second, under the moniker “good governance,” it refers to public administration. Third, for some it denotes international cooperation “through non-sovereign bodies outside the state system” (ibid.). In all three cases, governance is deliberately distinguished from government and draws our focus away from purposive collective action by states. This is especially true in the discourse of global governance, which – as one critique pithily put it – “is something that happens; no one, apparently, actually does it” (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell, quoted in Mitzen 2011: 52). Overlooking the agency and politics of global governance comes at a price, however, because then “we can neither participate in it nor fully hold governors responsible for their (in)action on particular problems” (ibid.: 54).

Global governance is usually seen as a bottom-up process, but, as Mitzen argues, it is “not only the eclipsing of the state by private actors or stakeholders; it is also a re-definition and scaling up of the public realm,” which remains less well understood (Mitzen 2011: 53 f.). My focus here on purposive collective action in and by security communities is thus part of understanding collective state agency and the challenges that come with it.

Elsewhere, I have defined (security) governance as “a system of rule conceived by individual and corporate actors, aiming at coordinating, managing, and regulating their
collective existence in response to threats to their physical and ontological security” (Adler and Greve 2009: 64). This definition already suggested agency (“conceived by,” “aiming at”). Drawing on the idea of collective intentionality (next section), I will further clarify my understanding of governance as purposive collective action and security community members as purposive agents (section 4.2.3.).

4.2.2 Collective Intentionality

In International Relations scholarship, intentions are mainly used as a synonym for preferences, but it is useful to keep the two apart, since “we can want many things without intending to do anything about them” (Mitzen 2013: 32). Intentions are commitments to do something, and as such they “help induce and provide an account for actions” in a better way than desires and beliefs can in the traditional rational action model (ibid.: 37).

Most generally, collective intentionality is “the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or values;” it comes in the form of “shared intention, joint attention, shared belief, collective acceptance, and collective emotion.” (Schweikard and Schmid 2013).

Philosophically, the central problem is the tension between the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Thesis. On the one hand, collective intentions cannot be reduced to individual intentionality, because aggregating individual intentions does not give us collective intentions: If we both individually decide to go to the library to get some writing done, it does not mean that we collectively intend to so – even if we assume common knowledge or mutual belief. On the other hand, actually shared intentions can be attributed to individuals and minds are not “somehow fused” (Schweikard and Schmid 2013): If we both decide to go to the library together to get some writing done, we each still bear that intention individually, even if it shared.

Collective intentions thus do not require a unitary agent. What the term does suggest is that “individual agency [becomes] tied to the agency of others,” what Sugden calls “thinking as a team” (cited in Mitzen 2011: 55) and Gilbert calls the “plural subject” (Gilbert 1996). Collective intentions put participants in a particular relationship with one another: A “participant’s intention represents the others as intending to do their parts in some way”
For some this relationship is cognitive (participants have to know what the others are up to, cf. Tuomela and Miller 1988 and Bratman 1999), for others normative (participants have to rely on others – Alonso 2009 – or normatively expect others to do their part, cf. Gilbert 1996), or affective (participants trust others to follow through, cf. Schmid 2012). My framework below combines the cognitive and normative elements.

Following Gilbert, Mitzen (2011, 2013) suggests that collective intentions have two components: first, a joint commitment to do or believe something by two or more actors, and second, that this commitment is public between them. Publicity is both epistemic – common knowledge of the commitment – and “ontic” – meaning the collective intention has to exist in the world and have an empirical referent. The way it exists in the world is through practices (Mitzen 2015: 126). To give a specific example from the European Union, the collective intention of spreading the community is partly instantiated in the practice of following accession criteria, like the so-called Copenhagen criteria (Kahn-Nisser 2010).

In sum, looking at governance through the lens of collective intentions highlights the purposiveness of governance, reminds us that it is a political process (it is willed, negotiated, practiced; not simply an outcome), and that it is not reducible to individual preferences.

### 4.2.3 Security Communities and Purposive Collective Action

Security communities govern – they exhibit collective intentionality and are mechanisms of purposive collective action which is inward as well as outward oriented.

In the most general sense, security communities solve the problem of war among members. Crucially, they not only denote the outcome of non-war, they describe a process of (at least in part) purposive collective action that leads to dependable expectations of peaceful change: In their three-tiered framework, Adler and Barnett suggest that (1) “because of exogenous or endogenous factors states begin to orient themselves in each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 37f., my emphasis); (2) “states and their peoples … become involved in a series of social interactions that [begin] to transform the environment in which they are embedded” through the operation of power and social learning (ibid.: 39); and (3) these interactions “are the wellsprings of both mutual trust
and collective identity, which, in turn, are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change” (ibid.: 45).

Can we thus describe the creation of a security community as intentional? Yes, if not necessarily from beginning to end: A security community may be the by- or end product of actors’ collective intentions to cooperate in a limited way. Yet once a security community relationship exists, it becomes something that members can direct their intentionality towards. The inward-oriented purposive collective action of security community members then becomes upholding dependable expectations of peaceful change and more: Decisions to expand cooperation into more areas may be taken, and governance structures may become more complex. The development of the European Community/Union from its single-issue cooperation beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community with six members in the 1950s to a single market with its own currency, open borders, and more than 20 members in the 2000s is a good example of this.

To what extent the non-war disposition of security communities is mirrored in a more peaceful outward orientation or, rather to the contrary, enables violent interactions with those outside of the community, is a matter of theoretical and empirical debate (cf. Bellamy 2004, Reese 2006, Adler 1998 and 2008).

Independent of one’s take in that debate, the “repertoire of practices” commonly associated with security communities (Adler and Greve 2009: 69-72) suggests a collective intentionality that is directed not only inward, but also outward: First of all, there is a disposition towards spreading the community (Adler 2008). This is rooted, in the case of liberal security communities, in the universalist ethos of liberalism and the Enlightenment as well as self-interest: “since liberal structures and peace are [seen as] mutually reinforcing, it is […] in the interest of liberal security communities to foster liberal orders” (Williams 2001: 544). In the case of NATO, this collective intention was acted upon with the policies of enlargement after the end of the Cold War which included “socializing” political and military elites in Central and Eastern European countries into community practices (Gheciu 2005).

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52 The universalist ethos supports a disciplining, moralizing exercise of power that may lead to worrisome, imperial elements in liberal foreign policy (ibid.) and hinder the success of spreading the community.
Similarly, “common enterprises, projects, and partnerships” (Adler and Greve 2009: 72) suggest a potential outward orientation of security communities. As do the practice of cooperative security and diplomacy (Pouliot 2008). Norms of consultation (Risse-Kappen 1995) are the element that binds the outward and inward orientation together: As we will see below, cohesive collective action by security community members often relies on norms of consultation.

It is important to keep in mind that when actors govern together, they “do not lose their own agency […] But the intentionality of their collective goal […] is separate from their individual intentions and can counter centrifugal [tendencies]” (Mitzen 2011: 65). To what extent and under what circumstances this is more or less likely in security communities is the focus of this paper.

To sum up, we have seen that security communities can intend and act jointly – both inward and outward, and that the concept of collective intentionality allows us to understand both of these elements together. In the next section, I argue that collective intentionality gives rise to expectations; I provide a framework for understanding the interplay of predictive and prescriptive expectations and their effects on relationships and actors’ ability to govern together.

4.3 Expectations

There is a debate whether collective intentions conceptually constitute obligations. Following Searle, Mitzen argues that actors “take on a specific kind of obligation when they intend to do something […] and when they intend to do something together […]” (Mitzen 2013: 32, emphasis in Orig.); there is a “specific normativity of committing together to a goal” (ibid.). Similarly, Gilbert suggests that when people commit to doing something together, “they will understand that each has an obligation to do what he or she can to achieve the relevant goal [and] each one is entitled to rebuke the other for failure to fulfill his obligation.” While these may not be moral obligations and entitlements, they are not simply a matter of self-interest, but a “direct function” of collectively intending to do something, according to Gilbert (1996: 184).
The normativity of committing together to a goal may be empirical more than conceptual, however. Tsohatzidis (2007), for example, makes a convincing case that Searle’s claim that statements of promise always entail statements of obligation (Searle 1969: chap. 8) cannot be deductively derived. There are promises that do not create obligations, especially when the promise involves non-existent entities or vacuous descriptions: A promise to kill Satan does not entail an obligation, neither does the promise to find a wallet that was never lost. Yet, empirically people tend to ascribe obligations based on promises (whereas they do not ascribe obligations based on wishes); they expect follow-through. To resolve this tension somewhat pragmatically, maybe we can say that collective intentions that suggest the ability of follow-through usually create the expectation of follow-through.53

Mitzen aims to show that the obligations that derive from collective intentions produce behavioral effects in international politics: There is “a real, independent pull” of jointly committing – even under conditions of anarchy and in the absence of collective identity. For her, this pull operates specifically through “the power of publicity,” especially public talk of state agents in fora: “appearing in the forum causes speech acts and norms of speech among participants that amount to a sharing of authority over their actions” (Mitzen 2011: 59f.). Independent of these behavioral effects, conceptually and empirically, expectations that state agents have of one another when jointly committing to actions may not always be fulfilled. This is my main focus here: the question of the effect of fulfilled and unfulfilled expectations on inter-state relations, especially security communities.

4.3.1 Predictive and Prescriptive Expectations: Conceptual Issues

On one level, expectations are simply beliefs or mental images of the future: To expect something suggests that we consider it probable or certain. But in the social world expectations are not only of this predictive or cognitive kind (“I expect you to do or not do x” in the sense of “I predict you are going to do or not going to do x”) but also of a prescriptive or normative kind: “I expect you to do or not x” in the sense of “I want you to do or not do x,” because I consider it reasonable or necessary, or because I see you bound by duty or obligation

53 I say “usually” here, because, as will be elaborated on below, there are case where the lack of follow-through is excused or forgiven, without negative consequences.
following from a joint commitment. The prescriptive kind thus carries with it a notion of entitlement: often, it is not only a wish that I want you to do something; rather, in addition, the way I understand our joint commitment, I think I am entitled to expect a certain behavior from you. Prescriptive expectations thus reflect on the normative understanding of the relationship. Below, I present a framework for analysis based on this general distinction between predictive and prescriptive expectations, and I propose that this framework can help us explain challenges to cohesion in security communities.

The concept of expectations has not played a prominent role in arguments about international order; IR has largely side-stepped dealing explicitly with issues surrounding expectations. Implicitly, however, seeing uncertainty as the fundamental challenge to international order and cooperation, particular literatures in IR theory have focused on predictive expectations among actors. Mostly, this has occurred in the literatures on perceptions, threat assessment, credibility, and reputation. Jervis (1976: 145ff.), for example, defines expectations as “perceptual sets [that] represent standing estimates of what the world is like.” They have their origin in a “person’s experiences with his environment.” Expectations “create predispositions that lead actors to notice certain things and to neglect others.” This can be rational in light of otherwise overwhelming amounts of information. There is ample evidence that human judgment and behavior relies on bounded rationality – and that expectations are part of this process (Kahnemann and Tversky 1973, Simon 1956).

When it comes to the security community literature, there are some references to what I would call prescriptive expectations: For example, Adler and Barnett (1998: 44) note that “during their transactions and social exchanges, people communicate to each other their self-understandings, perceptions of reality, and their normative expectations;” and “[t]rust is a social phenomenon and dependent on the assessment that another actor will behave in ways that are consistent with normative expectations” (ibid.: 46). Yet, these normative expectations are not elaborated on, and the notion of dependable expectations remains normatively thin.

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54 Luard, who argues that “every social order is based ultimately on expectations – the expectations of its members about the relationships that should prevail within it” (1988: 13), and that inter-state violence often has its roots in a conflict of expectations, is the exception here.
In fact, social psychological accounts of “expectancy” are the ones most directly concerned with predictive and prescriptive expectations which both have the function to efficiently guide behavior (Roese and Sherman 2007: 92, Burgoon 2016).

A key question with regard to expectations is whether they are automatic or reflective. On the one hand, expectations are non-reflective and automatic and can be thought of as being part of what Searle calls the Background: “Eating lunch in a restaurant, I am surprised when I lift my mug of beer by its near weightlessness. Inspection reveals that the thick mug is not glass but plastic. We would naturally say I believed that the mug was made of glass, and I expected it to be heavy. But that is wrong. In the sense in which I really do believe without ever having explicitly thought about it that interest rates will go down and I really do expect a break in the current heat wave, I had no such expectations and beliefs about the mug; I simply acted” (Searle 1983: 157). This can be the case for expectations about the natural and the social world. For example, I will ‘simply act’ according to my expectation that people listen when I give a talk: If people start to chat while I’m talking, I will likely get annoyed and act in some way to show that annoyance and change the situation. I may stop talking, make a remark, etc. All this will probably happen in a split second without me actually ‘thinking’ about it.

On the other hand, expectations certainly can be and are reflected upon and articulated, most often when they are not met: If asked why he was surprised when lifting the mug, Searle could provide reasons; and these would likely reference unfulfilled expectations (of the predictive kind). Similarly, when asked why I stopped talking, I would give reasons that would have something to do with courtesy and other behavioral norms, i.e. unmet expectations (of the prescriptive kind). The element of surprise jolts expectations from the automatic to the reflective realm: “In normal situations […] expectancies serve to furnish background assumptions, and […] their influence is silently implicit. In abnormal situations, however, expectancies become a jarring reminder of how things ‘ought to have been’ […]” (Roese and Sherman 2007: 93). “When an outcome confirms an expectancy, only the merest gist of information regarding the outcome is abstracted and stored in memory, and the expectancy itself remains relatively inaccessible. By contrast, the very occurrence of expectancy disconfirmation makes the expectancy more accessible and instigates sense-making activity aimed at explaining the discrepancy between what is and what was expected” (ibid.: 96).
Thus, in the analytical framework presented in the next section, expectations are not by definition either automatic or reflective; they may operate automatically in particular cases, but theoretically and empirically remain accessible to thought.55

4.3.2 Predictive and Prescriptive Expectations: A Framework for Analysis

The predictive and prescriptive elements of expectations are inextricably linked empirically (in the sense that actors can be expected to always harbor predictive as well as prescriptive expectations of others). Analytically, however, it makes sense to separate them, as they give rise to different kinds of logics of interaction and different outcomes if expectations are (not) fulfilled:

*Fulfilled* expectations of the *predictive* kind reduce uncertainty. And they lead to positive feedback on the assessment made by actors when making their prediction. *Unfulfilled* expectations of the *predictive* kind, however, may lead to a re-evaluation of assessment methods. The rational take on expectations suggests that predictive expectations change through updating based on experience and new information. Empirically, we can at least expect a time lag here, however: General bureaucratic inertia and a number of social psychological mechanisms privilege holding on to one’s views even in the light of disconfirming evidence much longer than traditional rational actor models would suggest.56 If and when predictive expectations change, they do so by unilateral replacement (actor A changes its predictive expectations about actor B).

*Fulfilled* expectations of the *prescriptive* kind lead to positive feedback on the relationship. *Unfulfilled* expectations of the *prescriptive* kind may lead to a change in the normative understanding of the relationship and/or give rise to resentment and indignation.

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55 I disagree with Hopf (2010) here who would locate expectations (by virtue of them being beliefs) *always* in the reflective area of the brain. Expectations that are non-reflective and function automatically would be an oxymoron for him; they would just be habits. Thus, for him “dependable expectations of peaceful change” would not be expectations at all, but habits. See below.

56 While research “shows that attention is rapidly and automatically directed toward stimuli that are in some way surprising, [o]nce useful expectancies have developed, our cognitive system is rather conservative about altering or replacing them.” Some of these ‘conservative’ mechanisms are “ignoring/trivialization,” “tagging” (for future examination), “bridging” (explaining away), and “revising” (Roese and Sherman 2007: 101ff.).
Prescriptive expectations are unlikely to simply change with experience and new information (the fact that A is not fulfilling its obligations as seen by B is unlikely to result in B quickly retreating from that view). Table 1 summarizes the interplay of predictive and prescriptive expectations.

Table 1: Predictive and Prescriptive Expectations

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<tr>
<th>Prescriptive Expectations</th>
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<th>Unfulfilled</th>
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**Table 1: Predictive and Prescriptive Expectations**

Most of the existing literature on inter-state relations aims to get us to quadrant I or II without being able to distinguish between the two. But predictive expectations alone only tell half the story. The fact that I can accurately predict what you will do, tells us close to nothing about our relationship: it may be one of “dependable expectations,” “forgiveness,” or one that is unraveling into more conflict.

In the following, I will elaborate on each of the five scenarios in the framework; I will explain when we are most likely to see them, describe their effect on the relationship and on
the ability of actors to govern together. I provide empirical illustrations from transatlantic relations.

4.3.2.1 Dependable Expectations

A maximalist account of dependable expectations, following Hopf’s definition of the logic of habit, would erase any conscious reflection, choice, and uncertainty from inter-state relations: “If you habitually cooperate with some other state, there is no uncertainty about their intentions. Their intentions are already taken for granted. […] there is both subjective and intersubjective certainty; people are certain about others, even if objectively they ‘cannot’ be” (Hopf 2010: 549). This suggests that when certain states act together, they would not even reflect on whether their expectations were fulfilled. There would be no perception or assessment or, in fact, agency; just plain habitual behavior.

On the one hand, the security community literature’s take on dependable expectations can be read to be in line with this maximalist version: “Owing to their shared structure of meanings and identity, members of […] security communities expect no bellicose activities from other members and, therefore, consistently practice self-restraint (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30); peaceful change is taken for granted and part of the Background. On the other hand, there is also a more minimalist, less habitual and more agential take on dependable expectations to be found in the literature: It is suggested that institutions and processes of social learning (Adler and Barnett 1998: 41ff.), practices (Pouliot 2008), and specific discourses (Bjola 2011, Kitchen 2009, Bially Mattern 2005b) are key for sustaining dependable expectations, to preserve them in the face of external shocks, or to discipline dissident behavior.

There are two reasons for this tension in the literature: First, the inward orientation is prioritized over the outward-oriented governance function of security communities. Second, predictive expectations are not distinguished from prescriptive expectations; the maximalist take relies on predictive expectations alone. If we want to resolve this tension and get a better handle on challenges to cohesion in security communities, we need to bring in prescriptive expectations.
In my revised version, dependable expectations thus suggest that actors (1) can reliably predict each other’s intentions and behavior (fulfilled predictive expectations), and (2) share views about their own and the other’s role and obligations with regard to joint commitments (fulfilled prescriptive expectations).

In these cases, we will see positive feedback on assessment methods and the relationship, i.e. a high level of cohesion. Crucially, this does not mean that preferences or interests are necessarily shared. But actors involved have to be clear about and accept each other’s roles and obligations with regard to the issue in question.

We are most likely to see cases like this when established institutions and/or practices of consultation are used which allow for a high level of predictability. And, as far as the issues of collective action are concerned, we most likely will see the outcome of “dependable expectations” in cases of relatively routine, ongoing issues that do not have a high international or domestic visibility and potential for conflict.

Examples of this can be found in general, strongly institutionalized NATO cooperation, such the day-to-day workings of the NATO Command Structure, joint military exercises, or cooperation in the field of science and technology via NATO’s Science and Technology Organization. Similarly, transatlantic economic relations are often seen as an area of solidly dependable expectations, a sort of buffer against political volatility or even mitigating political crises.

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57 On the various rounds of military reform within NATO, see Hilde (2015).
58 In the wake of the Iraq War 2003, Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan (2004) presented data on trade, direct investment, and foreign affiliate sales to make this argument, for example. Van Scherpenberg (2008) cautions, however, that trade is “no superglue.” While certain areas of economic activity – even strategic ones – may look like business as usual, in other areas, the U.S. and Europe are acting more like rivals rather than partners (especially in their regional integration policy in other areas of the world).
4.3.2.2 Acceptance of Conflict

Quadrant II describes a situation when there is a high level of predictability among the actors involved (fulfilled predictive expectations), but the roles and obligations with regard to the issue in question were unclear and/or not shared (unfulfilled prescriptive expectations).

We are most likely to see a situation like this in cases when dealing with highly visible, politically charged issues. Actors have a good sense of each other’s positions on issues and how each one is likely to act but could not agree on each other’s responsibilities. A situation like this can arise both when the overall goal of collective action is shared and when there are disagreements.59

This may lead to two different effects on the relationship: First, it could lead to an acceptance of or resignation to more conflictual relations which may manifest itself as growing indifference, lead to an erosion of trust and reduced cooperation on the issue in question.

An example of this would be the U.S. government’s relations with Germany and France in the lead-up to the Iraq War 2003. While there were some elements of surprise (the vehemence with which both France and Germany pursued its opposition and how the U.S. administration pushed for a military solution; how German chancellor Schröder used his opposition to the war for electoral politics and at one point ruled out German involvement even if the UN passed an authorizing resolution; and the acerbic discourse; cf. Szabo 2004), in general it came as no surprise that the German government would not support a pre-emptive war based on questionable intelligence. Resentment was high on both sides, however, and complicated relations despite the fact that Germany allowed the use of U.S. bases during the war (see section 4.4.3 below) and helped in the reconstruction of Iraq after. In the end, relations did not markedly improve until a change in government.60

59 In cases where goals are shared, a renegotiation of roles and obligations is possible and may end up getting actors to “dependable expectations” or at least to “forgiveness” (see below). In cases where goals are not shared, a resignation to more conflictual relations is more likely.
Another example, one that suggests a movement from unpleasant surprise to acceptance of more conflictual relations would be Germany’s relations with its NATO allies after the German abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on an international military operation in Libya in 2011 (see below). After the initial diplomatic shockwaves of the surprise of Germany joining Brazil, China, India, and Russia in abstaining had subsided, German diplomats tried to do damage control and remedy the situation. Their attempts at (over)compensation by subsequently closely aligning their position with the UK and France with regards to Libya and offering to increase its role in surveillance flights over Afghanistan were unsuccessful, however. According to officials, Germany’s influence in NATO suffered as a result; “the damage was done” (quoted in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014: 903).

4.3.2.3 Forgiveness

The second outcome of fulfilled predictive and unfulfilled prescriptive expectations may be termed forgiveness: This is the case when unmet prescriptive expectations do not have a direct negative effect on the relationship.

Two types of theoretical mechanisms may be at work here: First, what in social psychology is called “bridging,” which amounts to explaining away the unmet expectations by, for example, focusing on “external and unstable rather than internal and stable causes” (Roese and Sherman 2007: 103). In effect, this means that one sees the outcome as an oddity or an exception and does not ascribe responsibility for it. Second, another mechanism that may be more common in political, inter-state, and especially security community situations, suggests that actors arrive at forgiveness by acknowledging constraints, pressures and dilemmas that others face and use them to explain and excuse unmet prescriptive expectations. They ascribe responsibility but show understanding.

Two cases may illustrate these dynamics and also show a movement from IIa to IIb, and the other way around: First, inter-allied debates about the German contribution to the war effort during the Gulf War in 1990/1991. No German combat troop contributions to military operations outside of NATO had been a stable prescriptive expectation within the transatlantic alliance during the Cold War. It was, in fact, part of the set of dependable expectations among the allies. As such, no forgiveness was necessary. This changed with the Gulf War, however:
The German reluctance to contribute militarily to the war effort, arguing that the German Constitution prevented the use of the Bundeswehr in out-of-(NATO)-area operations, were not accepted without question by Germany’s allies anymore: Ron Asmus writes, “The Gulf War highlighted how quickly and dramatically the expectations of Germany’s neighbors and allies changed in the aftermath of unification and the collapse of Soviet power in Europe” (Asmus 1992: 1). Germany supported the war effort logistically and financially, and its contribution grew as allied criticism and pressure mounted and questions were raised about Germany’s reliability: “Bonn had originally pledged some $3.5 billion in financial assistance for Operation Desert Shield […]. In late January, following an American request for additional assistance, Bonn announced that it was increasing its financial contribution by an additional $5.5 billion to a total of some $9 billion” (Asmus 1992: 12f.). So, in fact, forgiveness was arguably bought.62

Whereas in this case, the movement was from IIa (more conflictual relations) to IIb (forgiveness), the inter-allied discussions over Germany’s contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, illustrate the opposite movement from IIb to IIa: As casualties of NATO allies stationed in more dangerous areas of Afghanistan mounted, their understanding for restrictions placed on where and how German troops could operate waned. Der Spiegel on its cover on November 20, 2006 cited a member of the U.S. administration with “The Germans have to learn how to kill.”63 While this was surely an extreme way of putting it, the sentiment behind it was not unusual at the time. While Ottawa and Berlin cooperated closely initially to bring NATO to Afghanistan, Canadian criticism of the German contribution increased as well, especially during its deployment in Kandahar 2005-2011.64

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62 Japan was in a similar situation, facing American pressure to contribute troops to the war effort. Cf. Sakai (2016).


and Canadians all suffered significantly higher casualties compared to other members of NATO (Saideman 2016: 16, Kreps 2010: 201).

In the end, both the Gulf War and the Afghanistan cases together actually show that forgiveness is a rather unstable state to be in: Forgiveness is most likely to occur when prescriptive expectations are starting to emerge (Gulf War I example); if the new roles and obligations are accepted by the actors involved, we get to dependable expectations; if they are not accepted as the new normal, it is likely that growing resentment would lead to more strains between allies (as has been the case in Afghanistan).

4.3.2.4 Pleasant Surprise

The final two outcomes of the interplay of predictive and prescriptive expectations – pleasant and unpleasant surprise – can be expected to be relatively rare among security community members. In the case of a pleasant surprise, actors fail to predict each other’s intentions and behavior but fulfill the role or obligation that the other wanted to see – or maybe even go above and beyond what was expected.

This is most likely to occur in situations that are new to the actors involved and have no obvious precedent. Unpredictability would usually be associated with negative effects on stable social relations, but here the surprise element is overridden by the positive valence of the action.65

Examples of this situation are hard to come by, not least because a case of pleasant surprise is bound to be relatively short-lived and unstable – it will likely turn into dependable expectations if prescriptive expectations continue to be exceeded/met and actors adjust their predictive expectations.

A danger of this adjustment, however, may lie in heightened expectations for future behavior: An example of this can be found in German-American relations after the terrorist

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65 Expectancy Violations Theory predicts “that a violation that has a positive valence will typically lead to better interaction outcomes than a non-violation. A violation that has a negative valence will typically lead to worse interaction outcomes than simply meeting expectations (White 2008: 191f.; cf. also Burgoon 2016).
attacks of September 11, 2001: When the German chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised “unconditional solidarity” and described support of the United States as “a self-evident duty,” and his government hosted the Afghan loya jirga in Bonn, expectations for future cooperation may have been heightened. This is at least how U.S. President George W. Bush tells the story in his memoir Decision Points. He describes Schröder as “one of the toughest leaders to figure out” and suggests that the chancellor, “in a small Oval Office meeting, joined by Condi Rice and Andy Card” in January 2002 understood that, while “[t]he military option [in Iraq] was my last choice, … I would use it if necessary.” And he quotes Schröder as replying, “[w]hat is true of Afghanistan is true of Iraq. Nations that sponsor terror must face consequences. If you make it fast and make it decisive, I will be with you” (Bush 2010: 233f.). This was not to be, of course, and Bush suggests that his trust was violated (ibid.: 234). Whether or not his account of the meeting is a correct recollection, what this episode does suggest is that after an outpouring of elite and public support for the US in Germany and other European countries after 9/11, Bush may have had outsized expectations for future cooperation.

4.3.2.5 Unpleasant Surprise

In the case of an unpleasant surprise, actors are stumped by unfulfilled predictive and prescriptive expectations. Not only is there no common understanding of roles and obligations, they also did not see it coming. To put it simply, if dependable expectations suggest certainty, unpleasant surprise suggests uncertainty. This situation has potentially the most negative consequences for the relationship. It is also a rather unstable state, and in cases that fit this description, we will most likely see a movement to quadrant II and either acceptance of conflict or forgiveness.

Unpleasant surprises can be expected to be fairly rare in deeply routinized relations (both of the cooperative and the conflictual kind). We may see them when the actors involved

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are less experienced (less attuned to established practices), when decisions are made under time pressure, or as a result of miscommunication and misperception.

An example of an unpleasant surprise within a security community relationship can be found in the German role during the debates about an international military operation to remove the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011. The German abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing members to take “all necessary measures […] to protect civilians” (UN Doc. S/RES/1973) was described as “surprising” and “shocking” by diplomats involved in the negotiations. Germany was seen as “incompetent,” and one close partner argued the abstention “showed a delay in assuming responsibility for a country that has claimed greater responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security” (quoted in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014: 902f.). Based on interviews with actors involved, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot conclude that “the German UN mission did not fully grasp the course of negotiations and, in particular, the American change of mind. [German] decision-makers and analysts thought that the US would not go for the war and, thus, felt safe in their objection” (ibid.: 903). Disagreements between the German chancellery and the foreign ministry as well as a diplomatic process that was moving maybe unusually fast (ibid.: 898, 901, 903), may have contributed to the German miscalculation. As we have seen above, in the wake of this diplomatically disastrous situation for Germany, where it had lost face and influence with its partners, its representatives tried hard to remedy the situation, but forgiveness was not forthcoming.

In conclusion, in a number of the empirical examples, the interplay of fulfilled and unfulfilled expectations does not always fit neatly into one box. In fact, it may be better to think of the framework as a property space along a continuum. Figure 1 locates the examples and their movement over time in this space.
In the next section, I will elaborate on four specific challenges for the management of expectations in security communities.
4.4 Security Communities and the Alignment of Expectations

Fulfilled or unfulfilled expectations are arguably going to have an effect on any kind of conflictual and cooperative relationship in international relations. While there is no room for an explicitly comparative study here, I suggest that there are specific challenges for aligning expectations in security communities. I focus on four: the problem of complacency; the expectation of forgiveness; the likelihood of resentment; and the problem of recognition needs.

4.4.1 Complacency

The strength of security communities when it comes to cooperation – the fact that they do not operate under the shadow of war – turns out to be a weakness for their cohesion under certain conditions. A complacent attitude towards the possibility of violent conflict among members of a security community can actually fuel conflict. Two mechanisms may be at play here:

First, as Mitzen has recently argued, different types of “unthinkabilities” of war may actually make violence more likely in some cases. Rather than making the idea of war unavailable and unacceptable, “in some contexts […] if we want to minimize political violence and war, we need to think more about them” (Mitzen 2016: 244, emphasis i. Orig.). Second, dependable expectations of peaceful change can lead actors to pursue strategies of conflict because, in effect, they feel ‘safe,’ in that they expect the likelihood of escalation to be small or non-existent. They pursue bounded brinkmanship, in a way.

We may find security community members in such a situation when formerly routine issues of cooperation become politically charged, maybe even re-securitized, be it because of a change in government or some other external developments.

An example for the danger of complacency regarding violent conflict among security community members can be found in a number of militarized fisheries conflicts between members of the transatlantic security community, resulting in several casualties (Hellmann and Herborth 2008).67 Examining the “cod wars” between Iceland and Britain between the

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67 In 1973, in response to casualties, Iceland threatened to “alter its ties with NATO and sever diplomatic relations with Britain” (ibid.: 486).
1950s and the 1970s and the “turbot war” between Canada and Spain in 1995, Hellmann and Herborth argue that “it was […] the presumed impossibility of such an escalation [into full-scale war] which made initiating small-scale violence to use force a viable option in the first place” (ibid.: 482).

Surveying the diplomatic record, Hellmann and Herborth come to the conclusion that “there are clear indications that the militarisation observed was not part of a conflict with a medium or even high potential for escalation, but rather an expression of certainty on the part of some decision-makers that it was not risky at all to use some force to prove a certain point and to improve [their] hand in the negotiations […]. In this sense the cases at hand were not ‘near misses’ but almost ‘guaranteed misses.’” (ibid.: 503). This is only partly reassuring, however, since escalation especially in highly visible, publicized conflict is inherently risky.

4.4.2 Expectation of Forgiveness

The other three challenges are particularly acute among members of security communities, because “their sense of duty and obligation toward each other is framed by their shared identity” (Collins 2013: 17).

Given a high level of institutionalization, established practices of cooperation, and a sense of we-feeling, security community members may assume understanding and forgiveness when they don’t live up to prescriptive expectations. They may expect to be given the benefit of the doubt by their allies and assume that they will interpret any transgressions as situational rather than dispositional. The cooperation of allies is taken for granted. And, ironically, this assumption may then make it actually more likely for security community members to wilfully violate expectations and breed resentment.

For example, given the long-term understanding on the part of NATO allies of German constitutional and cultural limits on troop contributions to out-of-area interventions, it is

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68 This would be the reverse version of the fundamental attribution error which describes the “tendency to discount overwhelming situational constraints on behaviour and exaggerate the importance of disposition” (Mercer 1996: 49).
maybe not surprising that Germans expected this situation to last and were surprised by changing expectations after the end of the Cold War (see above, section 4.3.2.3)

Another example of this dynamic where an ally’s understanding was taken for granted, can be seen in the way the U.S. government went about securing basing access in Germany for the Iraq War: “the entire invasion hinged on the military infrastructure in Germany, and yet administration officials apparently never seriously considered the possibility that the basing access might not be granted. […] Although U.S. administration officials were well aware of the fact that Schröder’s victory [in the September 23, 2002 elections] was largely attributed to his anti-war position, they expected unimpeded access to the bases” (Holmes 2014: 162). Not only that, when the German government finally ended up granting access, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not consider it necessary to acknowledge the German contributions to the war but kept pursuing a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy (ibid.: 169). It was a curious mix of harboring and fuelling resentment while taking German cooperation for granted.

4.4.3 Resentment

Unfulfilled prescriptive expectations are likely to lead to resentment (rather than forgiveness) in security communities when members suspect each other of playing politics and not paying attention to established rules of the game. This is particularly acute when there are disagreements on issues. Forgiveness in these cases is unlikely to be forthcoming because the violation of expectations seems wilful. Resentment then solidifies the mismatch of expectations and makes it harder to get out of more conflictual relations (quadrant II a).

An example of this type of challenge can be found on both the American and the German side during the Iraq crisis 2002/2003. The German government saw norms of consultation being wilfully violated by members of the Bush administration: For example, Chancellor Schröder was “infuriated” by finding out about an apparent shift in U.S. policy favoring regime change in Iraq regardless of the result of weapons inspections from the media (Vice President Cheney had given a speech to a veterans’ association on August 26, 2002). Asked “whether they had considered the impact the speech might have in Germany and the election there,” an aide to Cheney replied: “Why should he care about the reaction in
Germany?” (cited in Holmes 2014: 162). Resentment was high on the American side as well. Drezner (2008) describes how the Bush administration employed the “grim trigger” strategy against Germany after Chancellor Schröder’s intensifying opposition to the war in Iraq during his re-election campaign in the fall of 2002.

In the end, in the Iraq case, taking allies’ support for granted, expecting forgiveness for transgressions, and growing resentment all combined to complicate the management of expectations and damage the cohesion of the community. This provides one possible explanation for why this particular case is seen by many as the worst crisis in German-American relations since the end of the Cold War (Holmes 2014: 162). Whereas the cases of the first Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan, and the intervention in Libya all at one point or another could be located in quadrant IIa or, in the case of Libya, even quadrant IV (see figure 1), only in the case of Iraq did we see such a combination of challenges to aligning of expectations.

Another example of resentment can be seen in German-American relations in the 1960s surrounding the issue of the American troop presence in Germany (the cost of which had become a major issue in Congress): Egon Bahr, Director of the Planning Staff of the German Foreign Office, in a memo to Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, describes a visit of two German journalists, Henri Nannen of Der Stern and Theo Sommer of Die Zeit, to President Johnson’s ranch in July 1967 where they were given a tour and discussed Détente and American troops in Germany. According to Nannen, Johnson stressed his trust in the German government in their attempts at “building bridges to the East.” With regard to the number of American troops in Germany, however, Johnson erupted with anger, according to Nannen: “[Johnson] slammed on the brakes and moved within two centimeters of [my] face: When he goes to the bathroom, he asks the Danes, Belgians and Germans if they’re okay with that. And now he reads in the papers that the Bundeswehr will cut 60,000 troops. What is he supposed to tell the Mansfields and the Fulbrights”?! Johnson’s anger was, according to Nannen, less related to the issue at hand than a reaction to how he learned about it. The German government violated prescriptive expectations by not giving the President advance notice of their

Bundeswehr plans, and left him exposed to his Congressional critics of the large American troop presence in Germany.

Resentment like this can build up over time and lead to an erosion of trust even among close allies; it can be avoided or remedied by remaining sensitive to the domestic political situation in allied states.

4.4.4 Recognition Needs

Finally, a fourth challenge for aligning expectations that may be particularly acute in security communities are recognition needs. I have elaborated elsewhere on the tension between getting recognized both for one’s individuality and for one’s belonging to a community (Greve 2017). These recognition needs may make it hard for members of a security community to adapt to changing expectations that impinge on their sense of self or ontological security.

For example, as long as Germany’s ontological security was tied to excusing itself from committing troops to military interventions, aligning prescriptive expectations with allies, who had grown impatient with what they increasingly began to see as a shirking of responsibilities, was difficult if not impossible and created recurring problems for the cohesion of the community.70

Another particularly telling and colorful description of Germany’s recognition needs (and its own as well as others’ awareness of it) as a reliable partner in the Western alliance after 1945/49, can be seen in an exchange between Egon Bahr and Henry Kissinger in October 1969, shortly before Willy Brandt would assumed the Chancellorship: Bahr announced that the new German government would be more independent and “alluding to the peculiarities that had characterized relations between the U.S. and [West Germany] since the founding of the latter, Bahr added that Bonn would not be asking every two months whether the American allies ‘still love us.’ According to Bahr, Kissinger’s reaction was ‘Thank God!’” (Niedhart 2008: 118).

70 This was particularly acute in the case of the mission in Afghanistan. Cf. Saideman and Auerswald 2012, Stein and Lang 2008.
In conclusion, to minimize the challenges of complacency, resentment, expected forgiveness, and recognition needs, security community members may need to reflect on and explicitly argue about their expectations more not less. Keeping the management of expectations front and center can be better for cohesion than letting it slip into the background.

### 4.5 Conclusion

Security communities govern together – they are outward (not only inward) oriented. This governing together creates challenges for cohesion despite collective identity, shared institutions, and practices.

My answer here as to why this is so has been that governing together is a form of collective intentionality. And collective intentionality gives rise to predictive and prescriptive expectations among actors that need to be managed. I have shown that there are five different scenarios, depending on the specific combination of (un)met expectations – only one of which is “dependable expectations.” On top of that, there are particular challenges to managing expectations in a security community; I have elaborated on four: complacency; the expectation of forgiveness; resentment; and recognition needs.

Thus, one important takeaway from this paper is that the alignment of expectations in security communities is surprisingly hard and requires a conscious effort and sensitivity from the actors involved. This conclusion has an interesting implication for adjudicating when misaligned expectations with regard to particular collective intentions create problems for the relationship or can be contained, with the larger relationship remaining intact: Whereas taken-for-granted-ness is generally seen as a stabilizing factor in social relations, we have seen here that two types of taken-for-granted-ness (namely, complacency and the expectation of forgiveness) can significantly complicate security community cohesion. This is worth exploring in future research.

The main aim of this paper has been to bring into focus two neglected areas in the security community research program: First, the outward orientation and governance function of these communities. Second, the different kinds of expectations that arise from that. The analytical framework presented here opens up some avenues for further research: First, there is
a need for more empirical work on the interplay of expectations, the specific challenges in security communities, and proposed remedies. Second, the framework allows for some comparative research into how the alignment of expectations functions in different kinds of cooperative and conflictual relationships in international relations.
5 Conclusion

In the wake of the Iraq War, Michael Cox declared that he was “at a loss to know how it [the notion of a security community] might help us understand the deep strains now apparent in the transatlantic relationship” (Cox 2006: 131). He expressed confidence that “the two sides will be able to manage these differences without recourse to arms. But we still have to explain why these differences arose in the first place, and, more importantly, why they are now proving far more difficult to resolve” (ibid.). I started this project because I agreed with his assessment—and, at the same time, I saw undeveloped openings in the security community literature that, if pursued, could help explain the deep strains that Cox was referring to.

In this conclusion, I will do two things: First, I will summarize the main arguments and findings here in light of the overall question of the project. Second, I will draw out some theoretical and empirical implications and suggest avenues for further research. Specifically, I will show that my study takes a stance in the debate about stability and change of practices and the relationships that they uphold.

5.1 Summary of Arguments and Findings

This project started with the overall question of why and when we see challenges to cohesion in security communities. Each of three papers provided a particular part of the puzzle. Taken together, they advance a new understanding of security communities that highlights the potential overlap of practices, struggles for recognition, and difficulties aligning expectations.

Rather than seeing the balance of power and security communities primarily as structural or systemic outcomes of state interaction, the first paper conceptualized them as mechanisms of security governance that are based on distinct sets of practices. This implies a process-based understanding of security orders where BOP and SC practices may overlap. We conceptualized this overlap along four dimensions (temporal, functional, spatial, and relational) and described the theoretical mechanisms that could explain why and when we would expect to see a particular kind of overlap.

One takeaway from the first paper is that challenges to cohesion may be a function of the overlap of SC and non-SC practices. A recent example of this can be seen in the discussion
about the EU’s new strategy for the Western Balkans: At the beginning of February 2018, the European Commission presented the strategy which suggested that Serbia and Montenegro could join the bloc by 2025, while Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia could join later.71 This strategy is not only borne out of practices of exporting democracy and stability, but reflects explicit balance of power concerns: The Hungarian foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, pointed out “It is obvious the US has a Western Balkans strategy, Russia has a Western Balkans strategy, Turkey has a Western Balkans strategy; it is only the European Union that is extremely slow,” and suggested that “if the EU wanted to be a winner regarding endeavours in the Western Balkans,” it had to be “much quicker.” The Austrian foreign minister, Karin Kneissl, similarly used BOP language: “There is always this question of who comes first to Belgrade: China or the European Union. And in those situations, we need to counteract because it is our neighbourhood and the European Union invests and is engaged, but everything still needs to be clearer.”72 Additionally, the fact that Hungary is pushing very much for a fast inclusion of Western Balkan countries, which would let leaders and regimes join that are ideologically close to Viktor Orban and keep violating key EU criteria and democratic rules, suggests a concern with the “balance of practices” within the EU.

In the second paper, I focused on the process of identification in security communities. I argued that an ontological security view suggests that security communities need not only to reinforce a sense of “we-ness” but also to recognize members’ distinctiveness. Processes of (de)legitimation of distinctiveness are used to explain challenges to cohesion in security communities. Specifically, I suggested that the routinization of inter-state relations entails ongoing struggles for recognition during which actors employ strategies of adoption, reform, denial, or exit. I elaborated why and when certain strategies are more or less likely to be followed and showed their effect on the security community relationship. One counterintuitive conclusion from the second paper is that the very element that enables security communities is

also problematic: Identity dynamics can make maintaining cohesion in SCs harder than expected.

Whereas the second paper mainly focused on the inward orientation of security communities and explained challenges to cohesion by invoking struggles for recognition, the third paper focused on the outward orientation of security communities and explained challenges to cohesion by showing how expectations can become misaligned when members of a security community govern together. I argued that members of an SC exhibit collective intentionality which gives rise to predictive and prescriptive expectations. I described five scenarios of the interaction of these different kinds of expectations and illustrated their effect on the cohesion of the community. I also suggested that there are four specific challenges for the alignment of expectations in security communities. One important takeaway of this paper is that misaligned expectations in SCs may be more common than we would be led to think.

### 5.2 Implications

They are a number of overall theoretical and empirical implications that can be drawn from this project and that point towards avenues for future research. First, taken together, all three papers suggest that there are reasons for challenges to cohesion that are *specific to security communities*: Whether it is the overlap of practices, struggles for recognition, or the management of expectations, the more or less explicit implication is that these mechanisms function differently or have a particular impact in security communities. The third paper has provided some arguments why this would be the case. But further (comparative) research is needed to develop this theoretically and explore whether this is actually the case empirically.

Second, one key follow-up question from this project would be: how are the three different mechanisms that were used here to explain challenges to cohesion related and how do they influence each other? As we have seen, recognition needs, i.e. ontological security dynamics, can complicate the management of expectations. A similar effect can be expected when security community and non-security community practices overlap: Reliably predicting behavior and/or agreeing on roles and obligations will probably suffer in this case. Recent examples of this may be the row between the European Commission and Hungary over the relocation of migrants, and concerns about the rule of law and democratic rights in Hungary.
and Poland. Third, members of security communities now also govern together in the fields of climate change and the environment, as well as new fields such as digitalization and cybersecurity. Thus, an empirical question following from the arguments presented here would be whether and how particular issues (beyond the more traditional security ones that have been dealt with here) present specific challenges to the cohesion of security communities.

Finally, the main focus of this project was to provide theoretical explanations and frameworks for analysis, in order to help bridge the gap between the ad hoc empiricism of the ‘crisis literature’ and the stability bias of lots of the theoretical security community literature. As such, the three papers here take a stance in the general theoretical debate about the stability and change of practices and the relationships that they uphold: “How fluid and ephemeral is the world?” (Bueger and Gadinger 2015: 455). Bueger and Gadinger criticize the practice turn in IR that it primarily draws on elements of practice theory that highlight reproduction as opposed to contingency and change. Similarly, Duvall and Chowdhury argue that “the focus on practices generates an exaggerated sense of stability and can obscure both the social processes that generate change and the inherent instability of practices themselves” (Duvall and Chowdhury 2011: 337). To be fair, Adler and Pouliot stress that “practices partake in both continuity and change in social and political life. On the one hand, practices are the vehicle of reproduction. Intersubjectivity lives on in and through practice. The performance of practices in socially recognizable ways is the source of ontological stability in social life. At the same time, however, it is also from practices that social change originates” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 16).

Hopf (2010), on the other hand, suggests that “security communities are far more stable than the logic of practice alone would imply” (Hopf 2010: 553). “A security community of habit is less reflective, purposive, agential, and normative than a security community of practice. The logic of habit also expects security communities to be more stable, not to be based on trust, and to be generated more by habitualized identities giving rise to relations of amity than on practices generating transformations of identity” (ibid.).

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73 Patrick Smyth, “Poland and Hungary could threaten the EU more than Brexit does,” The Irish Times, September 7, 2017.
Thus, in my reading, the logic of habit cannot explain challenges to cohesion in security communities, unless they are the result of fundamental external shocks or come from the margins. With my focus on strategies in the struggle for recognition and on collective intentionality, I make room for agency, and especially purposive action that comes not only from the margins but is part and parcel of the everyday politics of security communities.

In the end, the overall takeaway here is that security communities are a political project; as such, their maintenance – the maintenance of dependable expectations of peaceful change and the promise of global governance that flows from that – needs constant work, in good times and in bad.
6 Bibliography


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