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Abstract

This dissertation examines the art of government on the part of the Israeli Municipality in Jerusalem by tracking its rationalization and implementation from the beginning of the occupation in June 1967 until the breakout of the first Palestinian intifada in December 1987. I argue that local policymakers assumed a uniqueness to the history and sociality of Jerusalem and posited a primordial set of political and cultural traditions among Palestinian residents. These preconceptions encouraged them to develop a particular structure for local government and concomitant blueprint for social/administrative relations. Architects of these policies were Mayor Theodore “Teddy” Kollek and an allied group of municipal functionaries who variously identified their policies as “national-pluralist,” “bi-cultural,” and “mosaic” oriented. They believed that an approach towards consolidating political power in Jerusalem that catered to ancient urban forms and norms would stabilize the occupation over time and cultivate cordial social relations between Jews and Arabs. While concern over international scrutiny towards the Israeli occupation was a factor behind the conceptualization of an administrative model emphasizing accommodation, cultural exchange, and “liberalizing” trends, I stress that Kollek’s vision was considered in itself to be an ethnographically sound and humane strategy toward the civic incorporation of Palestinian residents and the procurement of consent to Israeli domination. This dissertation examines the colonial taxonomy informing Kollek’s vision as well as its materialization through a network of
institutions and the ways in which it impacted forms of Palestinian engagement with the post-1967 political reality.

At the same time, this study illustrates that Kollek’s code for administrative and social conduct was anticipated prior to the Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem. Therefore I begin my analysis during the era of military rule over Palestinians citizens of Israel (1948-1966). I outline the conditions that prompted a gradual (albeit incomplete and glacial) shift in state discourse and policy regarding Palestinian citizens by the mid-1950s, where they went from being strictly objects of military control (enemy population) to subjects of sociological observance and civilian oversight (minorities/”marked citizens”). I argue that Kollek drew on projects and institutions that emerged as a result of this shift to craft an art of government in Jerusalem that complemented settler-colonial objectives and the liberal dispositions of the mayor and his allies.
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I don’t want to accept an idea of life where the success of the self is measured by the success of the written page.

-Elena Ferrante
Chapter 1:
Introduction

In December 2012, Nir Hasson, a veteran columnist with the Israeli daily Haaretz, published an expose on the emergence of “unpredictable” social and political dynamics in contemporary, Israeli-occupied Jerusalem. In the article, Hasson argues that these dynamics signal a begrudging but growing acceptance (if not internalization) among Palestinian residents of the colonial status quo.\(^1\) Hasson contends that while a sense of Palestinian national identity is by no means abating among residents of East Jerusalem, over the years there has nonetheless been a measurable increase in applications for Israeli citizenship, the number of high school students taking Israeli matriculation exams and enrolling in Israeli post-secondary institutions, as well as Palestinian youth volunteering for national service. To bolster his argument, Hasson refers to a then recent poll suggesting a preference amongst Palestinians in the city to remain as Israeli residents should a final settlement arise with the Palestinian Authority, in addition to observed but non-quantifiable phenomenon such as an increase in Palestinian consumers and pleasure seekers in West Jerusalem. On the part of Israeli municipal authorities, Hasson suggests that such developments have been encouraged by a revision of attitudes and approaches to local government, specifically from the current Mayor Nir Barkat (2008-present) and his attempts at “bureaucratic flexibility” regarding building permits submitted by Palestinian residents as well as calls for infrastructural projects and improvements to service allocation. Although the situation may not be stable, the degree of Palestinian adjustment (if not consent) to the imposed political and social conditions that Israeli colonial functionaries have long hoped for since June 1967 may have finally arrived. “It is very possible,” Hasson notes, “that Jerusalem has already chosen the binational solution.”\(^2\)

For Hasson, such a social phenomenon, “the likes of which has not been known since the city came under Israeli rule in 1967,” points to a “tectonic shift” that has been taking place in Jerusalem, where a long-held anti-normalization positioning and set of practices is losing ground.

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\(^2\) Ibid. Emphasis mine.
to pragmatic adjustment, if not political acquiescence, amongst a Palestinian population seeking to find their place within the social and economic fabric of a colonized city. To be sure, Hasson’s piece is revealing in that it challenges the still common expectation of perpetual and organized resistance on the part of colonized subjects corresponding to a strictly Manichean apprehension of colonial encounter; an incomplete and persistent framework for analysis long chipped away at by scholars of colonial structures and societies in the attempt to “represent the incoherence” of colonial relations and approaches to rule “rather than write over it with a neater story.” Over the past two decades the academic literature on colonialism has unsettled our understanding of the subject by reflecting the more multi-faceted and fluid socio-political dynamics and relations across and within the departmental, national, and ethno-class divides that structure the political-social order itself. In so doing, this body of literature emphasizes the capacity for transformation and accommodation on the part of both colonizer and colonized that forms the shaky and amenable foundation upon which colonial orders maintain their durability and subjects sustain and protect their presence.

Hasson’s piece is illuminating also in that it underlines, even if indirectly, the “the unique nature of the Palestinian struggle” in contemporary Jerusalem in relation to the rest of the 1967 Israeli occupied Palestinian territories. Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, Israeli authorities have targeted Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem with closure, such as the Orient House and the Arab (Jerusalem) Chamber of Commerce and Industry, while imposing greater restrictions on political activity and mobilization in the city. At the same time, there has been a rise in the “quiet deportation” of Palestinians through the revocation of permanent

3 Ibid.
residency status due to the continuing construction of The Wall in and around the city since 2003. Over the years, The Wall has severed the heart of Jerusalem from Palestinian residents living in its hinterland on the eastern side of the enclosure while further weakening social and economic networks between the city and the West Bank. To the chagrin of Israeli authorities, increasing numbers of Palestinians have moved back to the “Israeli” side of The Wall so to protect their residency status. As a result, Palestinian Jerusalemites have become increasingly (albeit involuntarily) reliant on Israeli institutions and infrastructure; resulting in an escalating feeling of vulnerability and a sense that there is much to lose through armed struggle or complete disassociation from Israeli institutions.

However, if the insights scattered throughout Hasson’s commentary serve to better appreciate the unique and shifting social and political dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian encounter in post-1967 Jerusalem, his conclusion of a “tectonic shift” towards acceptance of the binational solution amongst Palestinians (or their “Israelization”) is less convincing, especially when taking into account the surges of violence throughout the city in the summer of 2014 and again in the fall of 2015, which led several analysts and political representatives to either declare a third intifada or predict one as a likely prospect for the near future. The growing public acceptance

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7 Otherwise known as the separation wall (Homat haHafrada in Hebrew) or apartheid wall (jidar al-fasl al-‘unsuri in Arabic), here I deliberately use the terminology (The Wall) adopted in the Advisory Opinion of the International Criminal Court of Justice in 2004. The term is slightly misleading (although apt in communicating its ultimate function) in that it is made up not only of concrete walls but “fencing, ditches, razor wire, combed sandy paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone.” See Michael Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound: Geography, History, and the Future of the Holy City (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 23.

8 This is not to suggest that revocation of Identity Cards did not occur prior to the construction of the wall. In the decade prior to 2003, most instances of revocation came as a result of Jerusalemites physically moving outside of the territory to another country for a set number of years. The wall, however, works to “remove” Palestinians from the city even though they remain physically present. See Usama Halabi, “The Legal Status of Palestinians in Jerusalem,” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture 4, No. 1 (1997), accessed December 24, 2015, http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=505.


of tactics previously (and popularly) dismissed as a means to normalisation amongst Palestinians in East Jerusalem should be understood not as “Israelization” or a preference for the colonial status quo but rather a result of a shift that has occurred in relation to the gradual socio-political and economic separation of the city from the West Bank throughout the 2000s, an increased vulnerability to the revocation of residency rights, and the collapse of the “moral legitimacy” of the Palestinian Authority and the increasing ineffectiveness of its institutions and networks in Jerusalem since the al-Aqsa intifada.\textsuperscript{11} As a result of these developments, grassroots Palestinian movements have emerged throughout the 1967 Israeli occupied territories characterized by the absence of a coherent political or national goal and a preference for a diffusion of tactics and “new norms of resistance” so as to “improve the Palestinian position.”\textsuperscript{12} In other words, Palestinian adjustment to Israeli social and political designs in contemporary Jerusalem does not reflect the choice for the status quo or an internalisation of (or resignation to) Israeli subjecthood. Rather, it is the consequence of a gradual closure of potential political horizons by a relatively more immediate and imposing colonial-administrative apparatus.

What is more, Hasson’s historical frame of reference is limited, with the al-Aqsa intifada serving as his main point of analytical departure towards understanding contemporary social processes.\textsuperscript{13} In fact, what Hasson suggests to be more recent and unprecedented patterns of adjustment has a larger historical-temporal trajectory obscured by this reference point. While the increasing number of Palestinians applying for Israeli citizenship and taking Israel matriculation exams are developments best understood through a more immediate, post-2000 context,\textsuperscript{14} engagement with Israeli institutions through a fluid configuration of violence-accommodation-steadfastness (sumud) has characterized Palestinian politics in the city since the Israeli conquest;

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
a triad through which political practices and sensibilities are legitimized in accordance with “concomitant structures of opportunity and constraint.”

Unlike in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel carved East Jerusalem out of 70.5 square kilometers of the West Bank (including the 6 square kilometers of Jordanian Jerusalem) and annexed the territory (in effect) following the June 1967 war. At the same time, the 68,000 Palestinians counted towards the Israeli censuses in Jerusalem were given permanent residency status, which although substantially less secure than citizenship provides for various benefits, such as residency and employment in the city, Israeli health insurance, social welfare (retirement, disability), and the right to vote in municipal elections. Social-institutional interactions and affiliation thus became an involuntary and inevitable part of the post-1967 urban reality as Jerusalem was transformed into a contact zone: a space “in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict.” In this structural and social context, Palestinians resorted to diverse and surreptitious forms of strategic accommodation to “carve out a space for a form of subjectivity and politics.” In lacking the formal and functional distance from colonial institutions more characteristic of cities in the West Bank, Palestinian Jerusalemites were pushed towards tactical experimentation that emphasized the heroism of everyday living under an ethnocentric order and preservation of national-cultural histories and subjectivities therein.

Just as relevant for our purposes is Hasson’s reference to Mayor Barkat’s “surprising bureaucratic flexibility” and suggestion of a shift on the part of the Municipality towards fomenting Israelization through more incorporative strategies of rule. However, a broader look at the history of municipal politics in the city illustrates that Barkat’s gestures are not anomalous

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but stem from a larger and more embedded set of administrative strategies derived on the one hand from a sense of obligation towards global sensitivities and governing norms (thereby protecting the Israeli settler-colonial project from scrutiny or potential sanction) and on the other, from “the contradictions that emerged from Israel’s foundation as a liberal settler state.” The tensions that derive from Israel’s formal liberal commitments and its ethnocentric structure led to the development of paradoxical yet complementary strategies of statecraft and colonial management that sought to mediate a racial-hierarchical order with principles of juridical equality and designated rights to ethno-national collectives. The result was experimentation with “associationist” measures of administrative practice and urban development, particularly during Theodore “Teddy” Kollek’s reign as mayor of Jerusalem (1965-1993). Israeli municipal politics in post-1967 Jerusalem can only be understood in all its complexity and totality through these tensions.

I had just begun research for my dissertation in occupied East Jerusalem when Hasson’s article was published. Whatever the merits of the piece, his assumptions regarding the “Israelization” of Palestinian residents and the invocation of a false dichotomy between inclusive and exclusionary strategies of rule prompted a set of questions and from there an engagement with the dynamics of the Israeli Municipal order. What has been the role of the Israeli Municipality in urban development and politics in post-1967 Jerusalem? Even if we dismiss the idea of “Israelization” as a process slowly taking hold of Palestinian residents, has such a policy ever been proposed or implemented by Israeli authorities in the city? Given the symbolic status of Jerusalem in the Zionist imagination, the annexation of its eastern part (thereby differentiating East Jerusalem from the rest of the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories), as well as the limits set to Israeli sovereignty by international institutions therein, would a closer, more localized analysis of politics in the city reveal multiple strategies and dimensions of Israeli rule specific to the territory? If so, in what way are Palestinian responses to domination shaped by such dynamics?

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21 “Associationism” is an approach to colonial theory and policy born from the French colonial venture in North Africa. As opposed to “assimilationism,” which sought to “prescribe a universal civilized way of life” and shape native subjectivities and societies on the model of the French Republican man, associationist models of colonial rule “emphasized difference by advocating that the French dominate colonize societies in ‘association’ with native strong men,” thereby adapting French policy to the perceived “ethnic traits,” traditions, and socio-political hierarchies of colonial subjects. Segella, The Moroccan Soul, 9.
Can a study of municipal politics provide a vantage point through which to contribute to the growing body of work not only on Palestinian resistance but on the cultures of empire and imperial mentalities; that is, “the thought processes of policy makers, administrators, and intellectuals” informing the structure and political economy of colonial ventures?  

My dissertation addresses these questions through a focus on the colonial taxonomy of Israeli municipal practice and associated infrastructural and social projects in post-1967 Jerusalem that sought to transform Palestinian residents from subordinate communities to urban minorities consenting to their domination. More specifically, I will examine the efforts of Mayor Theodore “Teddy” Kollek at realizing a shared (but nonetheless hierarchical) civic culture of ethno-religious co-existence in Jerusalem from the June 1967 annexation to the eruption of the first Palestinian intifada in December 1987 by disseminating his social and political vision of “national-pluralism” through a network of cultural and youth projects/institutions. The temporal structure (from occupation to uprising) reflects the rise and fall of Kollek’s rubric for political management, urban development, and co-existence as it was inspired by the Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem only to receive its official death blow with the eruption of the Palestinian intifada. Through an examination of the inculcation and materialization of Kollek’s paradigm, I will address divergences as well as the interplay between Israeli municipal and state approaches to administration, policy, and development in post-1967 Jerusalem.

In so doing, my dissertation will further illustrate how Kollek’s co-existence institutions and projects impacted Palestinian forms of engagement with colonial structures of rule. While the purpose of co-existence initiatives was in part to bypass the issue of Palestinian sovereignty in favor of representation and to determine the limits of political subjectivity among Palestinian participants, they were instead appropriated and transformed into spaces of collective assertion. Indeed, the failure (or unwillingness) of Israeli officials to recognize and address historical, political, and structural realities and its impact on Palestinian life led to the seizure of these

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spaces by Palestinian residents in ways that undermined co-existence as an art of government, social engineering, and conflict resolution in the city. Thus, my dissertation will illuminate the materiality and experience of inclusive subordination in Jerusalem from 1967-1987 through an analysis of how the Israeli Municipality sought to conquer the city not only through administrative unification and infrastructural development but also by shaping the consciousness of Palestinian residents and accommodating them into the envisioned social and economic life of a liberal-colonial urban order. Through this, my dissertation will inscribe the Israeli Municipality, long ignored in political analyses of contemporary Jerusalem, into the history of Israeli colonial urbanism in the city.

More broadly, I argue that inclusionary and exclusionary modes of rule are best understood as processes existing concurrently; as separate and conflicting yet mutually reinforcing practices existing in a state of compresence. While Kollek’s approach to administrative relations and structure in post-1967 Jerusalem was confined to a modest group of functionaries pitting themselves against what they saw as the more coercive and uncompromising policies of the Prime Minister’s Office, in reality Kollek’s methods animated state designs, as identical political objectives were pursued: the consolidation of Jewish demographic superiority and Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem as well as the pacification of the Palestinian population therein. In other words, while the fissures that formed amongst Israeli state and municipal functionaries over the direction and nature of development and administration in post-1967 Jerusalem were based on “separate methods and functions” of rule, their approaches nonetheless formed “part of a single integrated whole.” Thus, taking a cue from the work of Nimer Sultany, my dissertation will show how “inclusion can produce the effect of subordination no less than exclusion,” thereby reinforcing how relations of domination occur “not only outside but within the natural modern political community and the state.”

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At the same time, Kollek’s administrative approach of inclusive subordination not only animated state-based colonial designs of population management but in a sense reflected them as well, as the philosophical groundwork for his policies in post-1967 Jerusalem were anticipated well before the June 1967 conquest. Therefore, I begin my analysis with the development of Israeli policies directed towards minority communities during the period of military rule over Palestinian citizens of Israel following the 1947-1949 War for Palestine. During this period of military rule (1948-1966/68), I argue that there developed a gradual (yet incomplete) shift in state discourse and policy within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs regarding the status of Palestinian citizens, where they went from being seen as strictly objects of military control to subjects of sociological observance and civilian oversight. This process paralleled the slow dismemberment of the functions of direct military rule and growing anxieties regarding the erosion of the liberal identity and formal democratic structure of the Jewish state. As such, Palestinians became “marked citizens;” that is, accommodated but nonetheless marginalized and hyphenated communities of citizens excluded from “the core (or mainstream) of the nation” and forced to live under “the sign of the question mark.”

I will argue that while Kollek deplored the prospect of instilling an Israeli sensibility on Palestinian residents in Jerusalem, he drew on associationist models, discourses, and projects that developed in the 1950s and 1960s vis-à-vis Palestinian citizens in crafting a particular (or as he saw it, enlightened) art of government in post-1967 Jerusalem under the guise of an administrative rubric he referred to interchangeably as “bi-cultural,” “mosaic,” and “national-pluralist.”

Lastly, it will be stressed that while Kollek drew on policy and institutional precedents developed during the time of military rule in formulating his rubric for administrative and social relations in post-1967 Jerusalem, his vision (as well as his presumptions regarding Palestinian receptivity) was ultimately informed and structured by a specific colonial taxonomy; that is, an abstract mental map that organized Palestinian Jerusalemites into static and ultimately legible categories and transformed them into insulated, apolitical multitude more than willing to forfeit Arab sovereignty over the city. To Kollek, while post-1967 Jerusalem was another Israeli “mixed city” like Haifa, ‘Akka, or Ramle, political subjectivities and socio-cultural dynamics therein

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27 Pandey, 129-130.
were nonetheless shaped by a unique history and set of primordial traditions and cultural habits that required specific institutional arrangements, modes of behavior, and forms of engagement. Through an analysis of what Ann Stoler would call the “imperial formations” upon which the Israeli municipal model developed at the local level,28 my dissertation will examine the circulation of ideas that constructed ethnic difference and supported (municipal) political praxis in post-1967 Jerusalem with the goal of connecting “cultural assumptions with political outcomes.”29

1.1 Marginalization and Minoritization: The Palestinian Citizens of Israel

The 1947-1949 War for Palestine resulted in the expulsion of roughly 750,000 Palestinians. For these Palestinians, forced displacement meant not only exile, the destruction of their communities, and the dead end of the envisioned and proposed independent Arab state in Palestine but severance from their land, which functioned as a primary source of identity and livelihood. As for the roughly 160,000 Palestinians who remained within the borders of what became Israel during the war, they were extended suffrage rights and citizenship as subjects of a formal parliamentary republic.30 However, “the ethnicized nature and structure of Israeli citizenship” and the onset of military rule enforced over most Palestinian communities meant that they were simultaneously disempowered by an ethno-national and settler-colonial project expressed most immediately through the invasive gaze of a security-military apparatus, large-scale land confiscation, exclusion from the emerging national labor market, social fragmentation

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and ethnification (Druze, Muslim, Christian, and Bedouin), and the “political arithmetic” of nationalist biopolitics.\textsuperscript{31}

The demographic purge of Palestine in 1947-1949 and international recognition of a sovereign, Jewish nation state in the territory meant the culmination of the Zionist project. In effect, attention among Israeli leaders shifted from the establishment of a Jewish national home to the consolidation of the Jewish state by means of the nationalization of land and properties, the “conquest of exiles” (encouragement of large-scale Jewish immigration to Israel), the development of a homogenized Hebrew national culture, and the creation of a Jewish national economy and labor market.\textsuperscript{32} With the government thus focused, Palestinian citizens became little more than an afterthought at best and a national threat at worst.\textsuperscript{33} As a result, the majority of Palestinians remained subject to a military government that was enforced during the war in 1948; effectively excluded from an emerging national culture as well as political deliberation and decisions made over structural design.\textsuperscript{34} However, with the hierarchical distribution of rights and duties formally and legally constituted and the state-conquest of land and the labor market more or less fortified by the mid-1950s, attention in the Knesset and National Cabinet gradually began to shift towards questions surrounding the necessity (and potential consequences) of military rule and, by extension, the “minority” question.\textsuperscript{35} The continued existence of the former without a clear commitment or timeline for its dismemberment and the lack of a formulated and mutually elaborated long-term policy regarding the latter became a source of increasing anxiety for those who not only feared international scrutiny but also valued the liberal and democratic identity of


\textsuperscript{35} Aside from the security pretext used to justify non-civilian government, the question of facilitating Jewish settlement in the Galilee became central to the question of military rule in the mid-1950s and throughout the 1960s. Because the Galilee was heavily Palestinian-Arab in terms of demographics, state officials and representatives were reluctant to do away with non-civilian government all-together. “Arab Affairs,” 8 August 1963, ISA 7921/1 A
the state. Thus, another shift occurred (albeit gradually and incompletely) over the question of Palestinian citizens, where select state functionaries sought ways to integrate them while protecting exclusive Jewish rights to the state and without “Palestine” re-emerging as an organizing principle for political engagement and mobilization.

Although a number of in-depth and critical studies have been published on Israeli policy and its impact on Palestinian citizens prior to the June 1967 war, two in particular have become authoritative on account of conceptual intervention and a strong basis in archival sources: Shira Robinson’s *Citizen Strangers* and Yair Bäuml’s *A Blue and White Shadow*. Much like the emergence of the “new historians” in the 1980s who challenged conventional accounts and interpretations of the 1947-1949 War for Palestine, a more critical evaluation of military rule and Israeli government policy regarding Palestinian citizens following the establishment of the state has emerged to set the parameters of academic debate. Challenging apologetic scholarship, which highlighted the modernizing effects of Israeli military rule, as well as critics that reduced government minority policy of the time to little more than a heavy-handed system of surveillance and coercive power, recent interventions have shifted the debate in large part through two modes of inquiry: first, is it possible to speak of a consistent and mutually agreed upon minority policy that was officially formulated and enforced during this era?; and second, to what extent did the formal democratic structure of the state, obligations towards the international community towards enforcing a universal category of citizenship, and the liberal dispositions of military and government functionaries complement settler-colonial prerogatives while influencing state relations with (and approaches towards) Palestinian citizens?


Shira Robinson’s study *Citizen Strangers* is representative of this historiographical shift, offering a comprehensive and solidly researched account on the first decade of Israel’s existence and how its relations with Palestinian citizens were shaped by the inherent tensions of Israel being a liberal-settler state; that is, a state that is formally liberal and ostensibly committed to international governing norms and democratic procedure but at the same time is structurally and ideologically designed to protect the racial privileges demanded of the Zionist project in Palestine.\(^{39}\) In framing Israel as a liberal settler-state, for example, Robinson illustrates how legal infrastructure and the juridical content of citizenship and nationality laws after 1948 did not necessarily contradict but rather worked in tandem with the separatist and ethnocentric impulses of Israeli politics. The 1950 Law of Return (“Israel’s actual nationality law” that grants Jews the world over rights of preference to the state) secured and legalized the permanent subordination of Palestinians to Israeli-Jewish nationals well before the legislative approval of the 1952 Nationality Law (which formally grants/determines Israeli citizenship).\(^{40}\) What is more, in a chapter on the participation of Palestinian citizens in Israeli Independence Day celebrations, Robinson argues that while there were state representatives who sought to build an affinity among Palestinian citizens to the emerging public/civic culture of the Jewish state, a coherent and officially formulated framework towards this end proved elusive. Ultimately, and despite the ideals of unity and cross-cultural engagement that such public celebrations projected, Palestinian inclusion in such spectacles functioned as little more than a disciplinary tool to affirm their minority status to anxious government functionaries and ensure the internalization of their defeat.\(^{41}\) Robinson’s study makes “sense of the coexistence of liberal citizenship and colonial rule” in Israel by providing a framework though which to analyze the messy and seemingly contradictory nature of Israeli state/nation building.\(^{42}\)

Another foundational study on minority policy during Israel’s first decade of existence is Yair Bäuml’s *A Blue and White Shadow*.\(^{43}\) In this study (as well as his numerous articles published that elaborate on its themes and content), Bäuml identifies a default policy of systemic

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\(^{39}\) Robinson, 3; 8-10; 55-58; 69-70.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 111.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 9; 113; 116; 118.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 7.

discrimination and neglect aimed at Palestinian citizens throughout the first decade of Israeli independence, as security concerns (notably the fear of Palestinians acting as agents for neighboring countries) and the imperative of building a Jewish national culture and economy took precedence among government officials.\textsuperscript{44} At the same time, an expectation of (and desire for) Palestinian voluntary departure (or the emergence of exceptional circumstances allowing for and justifying their forced deportation) further nullified the need for government strategies to integrate them into the social, political, and cultural life of the emerging state.\textsuperscript{45} However, Bäuml’s work identifies 1958 in particular as a turning point, as this year marked a significant development: the creation of the Committee for Arab Affairs.\textsuperscript{46} The establishment of the committee led to lively debates as well as shifts in terms of state-Palestinian relations, exemplified by the inclusion of Palestinian local councils into the Center for Local Authorities (1958) and the entry of Palestinians into the Histadrut (1959).

For Bäuml, the massacre of forty-eight Palestinian citizens in the village of Kafr Qasim by Israeli border guards in October 1956 was as a catalyst for this policy shift.\textsuperscript{47} As stated, many government figures were hopeful for a transfer option to settle the Palestinian question. However, the Kafr Qasim massacre and the general atmosphere of war resulting from the Israeli Suez campaign in late 1956 did not lead to a large-scale exodus. As a result, the government resigned itself to begin thinking of Palestinian citizens through a framework of integration with long-term policy goals. Towards this end, the Committee for Arab Affairs was created as an official advisory body for minority issues to the Prime Minister’s Office.\textsuperscript{48} Through extensive deliberation over the formulation of an official establishment policy regarding Palestinian

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\textsuperscript{45} See also Yair Bäuml, "MAPAI Committee for Arab Affairs--The Steering Committee for Construction of Establishment Policy towards Israeli Arabs, 1958-1968,” \textit{Middle Eastern Studies} 47, No. 2 (March 2011): 413-433.
\textsuperscript{46} A Ministry of Minority Affairs previously existed as an office attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. However, this ministry only lasted for 14 months (May 1948-July 1949).
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Although Regional Committees on Arab Affairs were in existence since 1954 as “bodies that coordinated the activities of the security forces in Arab settlements.” According to Hillel Cohen, there were three committees (in the Galilee, the “Triangle,” and the South) subordinate to a Central Committee on Arab Affairs composed of members of the General Security Services, the Police, the military, and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. Unlike the Committee for Arab Affairs established in 1958, which was in part an initiative to rethink and reformulate state relations with minorities, the Regional Committees were an extension of military government and existed to strengthen the regime and enforce the \textit{de facto} government policy at the time to supervise and control Palestinian Arabs, foster a collaborator class, and “channel votes for the Knesset.” See Cohen, \textit{Good Arabs}, 8; 202-230. See also Robinson, 139-140.
\end{flushright}
citizens, an informal divide within the Committee emerged between liberal-integrationists (those who sought to integrate Palestinians, whether via assimilation or associationism) and those who rendered such an approach as unrealistic and potentially threatening to the Jewish national/state project (and thereby opting to maintain a policy of control and supervision). The committee functioned strictly as an advisory body. As such, the approaches discussed operated concurrently through various state branches and not necessarily with sanction from the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, the years 1956-1958 signalled a shift in state discourse and official establishment policy, where Palestinians began to be regarded as minorities beholden to the state.49

Robinson and Bäuml’s explorations of state-minority relations prior to the 1967 war are comprehensive, heavily grounded in archival sources, and conceptually refreshing in making sense of the lack of coherence in government approaches to the “Arab sector.” However, there are nonetheless arguments or points of emphasis worth interrogating. First, according to Robinson the extension of citizenship and suffrage rights to Palestinians was done mainly on account of a “colonial bargain” that Israel was “forced to accept in order to gain international recognition” and meet “their obligations under the UN partition plan” of November 1947.50 At the same time, all expressions of Palestinian inclusion and activities signalling (or showcasing) Jewish-Arab co-existence throughout the 1950s were done mainly to project a commitment to liberal values and post-World War Two international norms while functioning as a means to contain the social and political effects born from the Israel’s structural and ideological contradictions. Of course, it is important not to lose sight of how international recognition of Israel’s wartime gains and the need to secure “a transition to a ‘normal existence’” was a significant factor behind such activities and expressions.51 What is curious, however, is Robinson’s downplaying of the liberal impulses of Zionist officials to a sense of obligation as opposed to it also reflecting a disposition or ideological positioning. Secondly, Robinson discusses at length the idea held by select government functionaries of nurturing Palestinian affinity to the state or Israeli public/civic culture through educational and social initiatives.52 Ultimately, however, Robinson suggests that finding a “working balance between incorporation

49 See also Benziman and Mansour, 68-70.
50 Robinson, 9; 69-70.
51 Ibid., 70.
52 Ibid., 134-152.
and exclusion” of Palestinian citizens proved to be an arduous if not impossible task in this period. Indeed, the idea lacked a clear end goal or program of action and given state priorities at the time of settling the north with Jewish citizens as well as the developing the attributes of a Hebrew national culture (mobilized “around a common enemy:” The Arab), the only realistic approach was the one already in force: that is, “to keep them internally divided, economically dependent, and frightened.” My research posits that an “integrationist” approach was not only formalized and adopted through junior functionaries in the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs by the mid-1950s but also that it was regarded as both an enlightened and complementary means towards consolidating a hierarchical social and political structure as well as the development of a tolerant and ethno-separatist sensibility amongst Israeli youth.

Secondly, the available archival material supports Bäuml’s argument that the years 1956-1958 signalled a turning point in how the state as a whole approached its Palestinian citizens. However, there were state functionaries who did not wait for officially sanctioned or collaborative initiatives to work towards shifts in minority policy in their respective departments. While “there were no obvious pedagogical models to follow” in this regard, I will show that as early as 1954-1955 a small group of emerging orientalists from within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs began to develop programs that aimed to influence other government institutions active in the “Arab sector” to gradually shift towards civilian apparatuses of supervision and controlled civic integration. It was through junior functionaries in the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in the mid-1950s that integrationist strategies were formulated and adopted at an institutional level. In short, while Bäuml is correct in arguing that a broader rupture in state thinking towards Palestinian citizens did not occur until Israel’s Suze campaign in 1956, there were nonetheless tremors indicative of such a shift from within the Arab Affairs Office by the mid-1950s. A Jewish-Arab summer camp initiative was the result of such tremors, representing the first major establishment initiative that sought to reconcile and work through the tensions born from Israel’s liberal-settler nexus.

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53 Ibid., 135; 149; 137.
54 Ibid., 134.
Two factors were at the root of these initiatives. First, as Bäuml’s work illustrates, the years 1956-1958 saw the intensification of parliamentary debate and Zionist opposition to the terms of military rule, notably as a result of the Kafr Qasim massacre and the negative repercussions of military government on economic development (that is, access to Palestinian laborers). However, this was anticipated already in the early to mid-1950s, as military rule had become subject to interrogation within security-military circles and the Knesset (even if to a lesser extent). Prior to the Kafr Qasim massacres there were state functionaries who recognized that a framework had to be formulated to replace military rule, as it was expected to gradually diminish in its duties and functions. Second, I argue that the lack of an establishment policy with a long-term vision regarding minorities provoked a sense of anxiety amongst circles of liberal and leftist Zionists (notably within MAPAM and MAPAI) who feared the erosion of the liberal identity of the nation. Junior officials in the Arab Affairs Office spearheaded initiatives and programs designed to protect Jewish privileges but within a more “inclusionary” framework.

The result was the establishment of a Jewish-Arab summer camp officially launched through the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in the summer of 1956 as part of the “oriental (studies) trend/track,” which was itself adopted by select Israeli high schools by the mid-1950s. The aim of the program was twofold: first, in anticipation of a shift towards civilian apparatuses of control, the program was meant to prepare Israeli-Jewish students in the language, customs, and cultures of minority (Arab) communities so as to develop a cadre of ethnographically sophisticated officers, advisors, and bureaucrats. Secondly, the program was meant to inculcate a disposition of cultural openness and tolerance amongst Israeli participants while also shaping the ideal (depoliticized and subservient) Palestinian minority in preparing for their entry into the civic culture and economy of a Jewish state. Thus, while such initiatives were representative of a gradual shift in perception towards Palestinians as minorities, integrationist approaches did not aim to replace the default policy of supervision and control. Rather, the “minoritization” of Palestinian citizens and their integration into the civic life of the state was a means to animate this approach in such a way as to complement both ethno-national state building objectives as well as the liberal-democratic impulses of government functionaries.

1.2 Mixed City/Colonial City: Teddy Kollek and the Jerusalem Municipality after June 1967

These activities through the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs signaled the beginning of the development of a state-organized co-existence industry that developed by the early 1960s into a network of community centers, cooperative cultural performances, and other social and academic initiatives that encouraged more intimate engagement between Palestinian and Israeli Jewish youth. This industry would have repercussions regarding administrative praxis in post-1967 Jerusalem, as it functioned as a reference point for Mayor Kollek towards the construction of an ideal administrative-social model that was deemed complementary to Zionist objectives, serviceable to the human needs of the Palestinian population, and useful from a public relations standpoint all at once.

Following the June 1967 war and the Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem, there was a consensus within Israeli military and government circles to annex the territory and permanently alter the geographical, juridical, administrative, and spatial realities therein. Almost immediately the Israeli military nullified the April 1949 Green Line that separated Israeli and Jordanian Jerusalem (1949-1967) by removing all physical barriers dividing the city, extending services to Palestinian residents, and creating a legal framework for annexation to the Israeli Municipality of West Jerusalem. Municipal borders were subsequently re-drawn to complement security and demographic prerogatives of the Israeli government and by the end of June, the (Jordanian) Arab City Council was dissolved and its members exiled while three draft laws were ratified in the Knesset that formally (but not explicitly) annexed the territory to the state of Israel. To demonstrate and solidify Israeli sovereignty (and thus subdue the Palestinian population), within a year occupation authorities resorted to various legal pretexts to confiscate vast swaths of Palestinian land and build colonies so as to: a) alter demographic realities in the city; b) fragment and encircle the Palestinian presence; and c) hinder Palestinian continuity and prevent “the natural urban development of Palestinians.”

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The decision to unify Jerusalem came through broad agreement in the Israeli cabinet and military while a consensus emerged over the imperatives of Israeli political, resource, and demographic domination. However, the terms of Palestinian incorporation remained a subject of debate and of a power struggle. As a result, the “minority” question re-emerged with considerable intensity in 1967 and several approaches once again split occupation authorities into informal coalitions. Kollel was part of one such coalition, which sought functional autonomy for Palestinians over religious and cultural affairs in Jerusalem and their incorporation as urban (religious) minorities into a loosely defined civic culture that stressed unity through ethno-religious difference, non-national political identities and subjectivities, and a provider-recipient relationship between the Israeli Municipality and Palestinian residents. As a past supporter and benefactor of co-existence programs that proliferated in Israeli (mixed) cities throughout the country by the 1960s, Kollel recognized in this industry an infrastructural model that could be replicated in Jerusalem so as to normalize this vision and shape social relations therein. The difference, however, is that unlike the co-existence institutions born from the summer camps programs of the mid-1950s, Kollel did not seek the “Israelization” of the Palestinian population but rather the cultivation of a dependence on (or gratitude to) a modern, caretaker regime positioned as a protector of primordial urban forms and social-political norms that developed in the city over millennia.

I argue that Kollel’s governing rubric for Jerusalem reflected a colonial taxonomy; an abstract cognitive framework that essentialized and made static Jerusalem’s history while organizing Palestinian residents into stable, ready-made, and exoticized categories. For Kollel, Palestinian Jerusalemites were politically passive subjects of a heterogeneous society voluntarily separated along ethno-religious lines and conditioned to adjust to conquest on account of a history of successive invasions. These invasions produced a set of insular communities dependent on external forces to formalize spatial/communal separation and protect a primordial pattern of institutional distance and religious/cultural autonomy of ethno-religious quarters while also organizing commercial networks and administrative structures of rule. So long as the Israeli Municipality recognized, catered to, and “protected” these cultural-administrative-political

Dafna (Sheikh Jarrah land), Talpiot Mizrah (Mukaber and Sur Baher lands), Gilo (Beit Jala, Beit Safafa, and Rafat lands), Ramot Alon, and Neve Yaacov.
norms, the Israelis could claim a liberal outlook on account of its accommodative positioning and colonize the city without provoking Palestinian residents or absorbing them as citizens.

Despite the ethno-centric, settler-colonial drive behind Israeli rule in post-1967 Jerusalem, the assumption by Kollek and those in his faction was that Jewish-Arab co-existence and Palestinian resignation to Israeli rule would follow if: a) the Municipality organized administrative structure and development along these lines; b) municipal representatives adjusted and formalized a behavioral code amenable to the socio-cultural norms of the Palestinian population. Kollek pushed for the application of his framework onto successive governments throughout his tenure. However, any and all proposals calling for decentralization or diluted sovereignty were rejected on account of their potential to undermine Israeli rule and signal a willingness to compromise over the future of the city. Nonetheless, Kollek saw in his vision a political and psycho-social blue-print for tax officers, bureaucrats, service providers, and any other Israeli official in direct and daily contact with Palestinian residents. Towards this end, he personally commissioned ethnographic studies on Palestinian Jerusalemites designed to formalize, rationalize, and substantiate his inherent assumptions. In addition, with little financial and political support coming from the national government, the Municipality found some freedom to track this course through Kollek’s Jerusalem Foundation. Indeed, it was through his Foundation that the mayor supported the construction of what he called an “infrastructure of peace” made up of Jewish-Palestinian co-existence programs and youth and cultural centers that disseminated pedagogical models and a structure to social relations that complemented his vision of a “culture of pluralism” in a Jewish city.

1.3 Post-1967 Jerusalem: A Liberal-Settler Colonial Urban Order?

It is tempting to dismiss Kollek’s administrative vision as little more than a ruse perpetuated for international consumption. Considering that Kollek was not only a public relations master but an unapologetic proponent of colonization, demographic transformation, and absolute Israeli power in post-1967 Jerusalem, the sensibilities of tolerance, cultural pluralism, and integration that he championed are commonly cast off as mere words trumped by the obvious results on the ground, which point to marginalization, ethnic cleansing, and political disenfranchisement of the
Palestinian population. However, Kollek’s settler-colonial and liberal outlooks (that is, of consecrating ethnic domination and co-existence; institutionalized/juridical segregation and compulsory civic integration) can be seen not as inherently opposing but complementary strategies of rule. After all, the discrimination and marginalization of populations is not an exclusive potential or consequence of non-liberal orders. Organizing and integrating communities hierarchically through categories of cultural units is part of a typical modern-liberal response to governance.

Modern government generally depends on the measurement, separation, and institutional recognition of populations on the basis of culture, religion, ethnicity, or language. This functions as a “means to organizing and distributing political power.”\(^5^8\) This brand of state arithmetic functions as a technology of rule central to notions of responsible government and its concomitant “vocabulary of electoral and parliamentary politics” built on principles of administrative neutrality, proportional distribution (whether of resources or of parliamentary seats), consensus, and justice.\(^5^9\) At the same time, these principles are meant to accommodate socio-cultural differences as a mechanism to control potential (rival) national ambitions so as to protect the modern polity from subversion, which was a matter of critical concern among nation states following the First World War.\(^6^0\) As a result, populations are commonly measured as and separated into cohesive units to be represented and bound in some capacity to state institutions.

However, thus enumerated communities are hierarchically integrated into mechanisms of state as majority and minority populations. While a majority population is what Gyanendra Pandey calls “the unmarked, the real, obvious, axiomatically natural citizen” whose “marks of internal division” are effaced in the interest of consecrating political power, minorities are groups of “marked citizens;” hyphenated (racialized) social, national, or cultural units designated as inherently different from the dominant and unmarked citizens. In this way, minorities are simultaneously integrated and excluded as recognized socio-cultural units who are institutionally

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\(^{5^8}\) Pandey, 130.


represented and granted special provisions and yet are rendered ‘outside’ a dominating socio-political order by marks of distinction and structural domination.\textsuperscript{61}

Although “minority” as a term is commonly conceived of as a non-ideological, statistical category premised on principles of accommodation, protection, and justice for numerically disadvantaged groups, in the 1940s the work of American sociologist Louis Wirth (1897-1952) challenged this perception by arguing that minority groups are more accurately defined as:

…a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. The existence of a minority in a society implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group enjoying higher social status and greater privileges.\textsuperscript{62}

In recognizing that both majority \textit{and} minority populations occupy positions of dominance in different societies, as a numerical designation the concept of the minority is fundamentally flawed. Since Wirth’s interventions, scholars in the humanities have come to accept that “the relationship of group size to power is weak and inessential.” As such, they have collectively worked towards a theorization of the category of minority as a term denoting the power deficiency of certain groups in relation to others.\textsuperscript{63} This re-conceptualization has allowed for an analysis of the governmental category of ‘minority’ as an ideological-discursive formulation denoting social and political relations of power, where the principles and discourses of institutional accommodation, tolerance, and formal equality function to serve ideological objectives of dominant groups and conceal “actual dynamics of a society.”\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, in extending this mode of analysis to specifically liberal polities and discourses, Wendy Brown and David Theo Goldberg have more recently shown that wrapped in a discourse of tolerance, cultural competence, and diversity, such “liberal” modes of enumeration and civic-institutional incorporation lie at the heart of liberal modernity as a strategy of \textit{managing} difference and to simultaneously conceal and congeal a structure of disenfranchisement by depoliticizing

\textsuperscript{61} Pandey, 129.
\textsuperscript{63} Meyers, 7.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 8.
assertions and aspirations of marginalized communities and shifting it to the terrain of a politics of recognition.65

In this broad analysis of the strategies and structure of modern government and political community, liberal government and its discourses are no exception, despite the primacy of the individual as well as the privatization of ethnicity inherent in its grammar of rule. While liberal governments stress acculturation or assimilation to civic, procedural, and juridical norms deemed neutral and objective by force of enlightened reason, at the same time a declared commitment to values of cultural diversity, multiculturalism, and tolerance has led to the “incorporation of difference into the body politic” of liberal states.66 Thus, even on its own terms modern liberal discourse vacillates “between two equally problematic polarities” of the neutrality of the citizen-individual and “tolerant accommodation” of essential differences.67 Nonetheless, despite the appearance of contradiction, a common endpoint remains: whether through enforced universality or the “tepid celebration of diversity and multiculturalism,” the objective is to bypass historical legacies (and continuities) of dispossession, marginalization, and injustice in favor of formal representation and “the illusion of influence,” thereby discouraging mobilization and organization towards structural and social transformation.68

Extending this argument, Vivienne Jabri contends that liberal orders typically respond to social-political heterogeneity through two inter-related processes: first, populations are cultured (minoritized) by the state and are thus positioned as being ‘other’ to the dominant social group, who themselves are cast as “capable of standing outside all concrete and specific culture or history, and from there apprehending universal values.”69 To “contain the effects of cultural difference” and protect exclusive access and authorship on part of the dominant group to modern political community (the state) and its potentials, such hegemonic articulations or categorizations are then used as “an organizing principle around which and through which individuals and

67 Ibid., 16-17.
68 Ibid., 16; Sultany, “The Joint List.”
populations express their identity, political affiliation, and relationship to others;” as “the subject can never be anything other than the attributed inscriptions determined elsewhere.” As political deliberation and conflict is understood purely through the lens of cultural difference, minoritized or cultured populations are contained by liberal orders through the “abstracted, microcosmic management of biopolitically defined spheres—health, education, the economy.” Indeed, if liberal theory deals with cultural difference and its effects “in terms of toleration and accommodation,” than “liberalism’s dealings with cultural diversity are framed by the imperative to govern populations, to shape communities and their relations, so that difference is not manifest as conflict.”

While this model of modern, liberal government and discourse applies to the experiences of Palestinian citizens of Israel (who gradually became cultured, “marked citizens” of the state), the case of post-1967 Jerusalem at first glance diverges significantly. Like Syrian residents of the Israeli occupied Golan Heights, Palestinian Jerusalemites did not have citizenship imposed upon them after the 1967 war (although they can apply for citizenship, provided certain conditions are met). Rather, those counted towards the Israeli censuses in 1967 were given “permanent residency status,” which is the same status granted to foreign nationals living in the territory. Hence, Palestinian Jerusalemites, while technically granted the same privileges as citizens with the exception of voting in general elections, are not absorbed nationals and are not permitted direct representation in the Knesset. In addition, after the June 1967 war, Kollek himself rejected the idea of Palestinian representation on the city council and sought instead their institutional absorption in the form of sub-councils or advisory boards beholden to the Israeli Municipality.

Nonetheless, for Kollek these decisions were validated on the basis of liberal principles of responsible governance and the institutional recognition and protection of difference. What is more, Kollek used the interpellation of “culture” as a technology of controlled and limited

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71 Ibid., 45-46.
72 Ibid.
74 Segev, 485.
integration of Palestinian residents as *urban* minorities. The construction of an inherently insular and accommodating Palestinian Jerusalemite confined by traditions born from an ancient and uninterrupted history functioned for Kollek as an ideological projection that transformed Palestinian residents to subjects more than willing to forfeit sovereignty and the potential for national existence to Israeli rulers. Indeed, through his administrative framework, Palestinian Jerusalemites are hierarchically positioned and separated by the boundaries of their communities; voluntarily conquered and naturally susceptible to dispossession and domination at the hands of the majority so as long as “essential” everyday needs are met and a degree of autonomy is granted to local institutions and associations. This cultural interpellation further served to justify the “aggressive scramble for strategic space” as well as “discriminatory policies in resource allocation for infrastructure, housing, and welfare services.” For example, the establishment of Jewish colonies in East Jerusalem (deemed as “neighborhoods” in Israeli-Zionist parlance) and the confiscation of Palestinian land was justified not only in the name of demographic dominance and Zionist national-political goals but also as an expression of norms and practices reached by historical consensus. For Kollek, Jewish communities, positioned as the majority and as a significant community in the city throughout history, are just as much part of the urban ‘public’ as others, and residents in general will adjust to and accept this reality as they have for generations prior to the Israeli conquest. The Palestinian urban minority in Jerusalem, with their cultural and administrative traditions thus constructed, recognized, and accommodated, are rendered amendable to the inner-workings of a liberal, settler-colonial state.

1.4 Interventions into the Larger Body of Academic Study on Post-1967 Jerusalem

Given the relevance of Jerusalem to religious sensibilities as well as contemporary geopolitical concerns and aspirations, a large body of research exists on the history, politics, sacredness, and contemporary urban dynamics of the city. The last twenty years in particular has drawn considerable academic interest. This is the result of two interrelated factors. On the one hand, research on cities has gradually gained in popularity across the humanities. The urban has

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emerged as the principal site through which to unpack and interrogate power relations as well as modernization and globalization, nationalism, colonialism, immigration/multiculturalism, social polarization, and other such forces produced and sustained by the modern state and global capitalism. Indeed, such forces are most immediately reflected, reproduced, and challenged in modern urban spaces and through social relations therein. On the other hand, the inauguration of the then promising “peace process” in the fall of 1993 (a process which ultimately depends on resolving the question of sovereignty over Jerusalem) encouraged thought amongst academics and policy makers surrounding potential political formulas and outcomes for the city. Quite naturally then, several questions surround the need for another study on post-1967 Jerusalem. More broadly, what can one add to the already voluminous body of research? More specifically, what can a different angle on the politics of the city tell us about colonial urbanism in the region and the socio-political dynamics of Israeli methods of rule?

My dissertation will make the following interventions: first, my aim is to situate the Israeli Municipality in the political, institutional, and social history of post-1967 Jerusalem through a specific focus on the first twenty years of the Israeli colonial project therein; that is, from the Israeli annexation following the June 1967 war to the first Palestinian intifada that erupted in December 1987. The impulse to analyze Israeli Municipal praxis and discourses and its role in shaping urban development, politics, and socialities in the city is encouraged by the fact that the Municipality is often dismissed (or ignored) in the academic literature on contemporary Jerusalem as a peripheral, if not all together insignificant, political actor. This is primarily the result of an assumed unimportance of local politics given the formal, centralized structure of the Israeli state. However, while local political actors are most certainly limited by financial constraints and the security/military interests and priorities decided at the national level, socio-political dynamics in Jerusalem have been shaped through a labyrinth of national, local, and extra-national actors with often conflicting impulses and designs.

A ground-level point of view can also work to uncover the relational, mutually formative
dynamics between Israeli Municipal projects and Palestinian practices of *sumud* in post-1967
Jerusalem. Although Israel would have preferred the dowry without the bride (that is, the city
without the Palestinians), the Municipality was forced to reckon with the reality of a substantial
Palestinian population; an acknowledgement that was reflected in day-to-day
bureaucratic/municipal praxis as occupation authorities adjusted to this reality.\(^{77}\) At the same
time, given its emphasis on survival and preservation under conditions not of their own making,
Palestinian *sumud* in Jerusalem is malleable in form and application. As such, Palestinian
residents have not simply shunned municipal institutions and projects since June 1967 in the
interest of “staying put” and/or to achieve symbolic victory against Israeli power, as is usually
depicted. They have also participated in and engaged with colonial institutions in ways deemed
advantageous or complementary to their long term goals, whether individual, communal, or
national in nature. Thus, my intention is to introduce the local-institutional element behind the
political labyrinth that constitutes Israeli colonial urbanism by examining how the Municipality
influenced the socio-political dynamics in the city since June 1967.

Secondly, my dissertation is a response to the call among scholars of “new imperial
history” for a more sustained interrogation of the cultures of empire through unpacking “the
mental universe and worldviews of colonial administrators.”\(^{78}\) Organized through a 2007
conference at Exeter University, this group of academics argue that while the imposition of
hierarchical relations and its accompanying violence is necessary in formalizing and supporting
colonial/imperial ventures, objectives, and structures of rule, such a project is legitimized not
only through the imperative to extract and dominate but also a taxonomical foundation; that is,
the ideas, presumptions, and norms organizing and shaping ones worldview and sense of
self/other. This focus does not entail a strict diversion away from material, political, and
economic analysis, however, as all practices of power are made productive through discursive
and ontological systems. As such, colonial mentalities can be a useful focus for analysis that

\(^{77}\) As documented by Avi Raz, following the June 1967 war the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol “coined a
metaphor which adequately encapsulated the Israeli ambition. In the metaphor Israel’s territorial conquests were
a ‘dowry’ and the Arab population a ‘bride.’ The trouble is that the dowry is followed by a bride whom we don’t

\(^{78}\) Thomas, xii.
dovetails and enhances structural, political, and economic inquiry. By shifting attention to the epistemological foundations of Israeli administrative praxis for post-1967 Jerusalem and the intellectual weight supporting it, my dissertation seeks to analyze the structure of knowledge that constituted the “truth” through which the Municipality justified its mastery of the city and, for Kollek and his allies, endowed the Israeli colonial project with a sense of permanence. The aim of this dissertation is to offer an interrogation of the discourses supporting the structures of municipal institutions in Jerusalem and to “unpick the constituent parts” of the attitudes and expectations of government functionaries that helped determine political action.79

Lastly, in emphasizing the links between pre-1967 and post-1967 Israeli policy, I seek to collapse the spatial and temporal distinctions that continue to underpin political commentary and analysis of the territory; dividing Israeli history and colonial praxis into separate, contained periods (that is, between 1948-1967 and 1967-today) by “inscribing a deep division between Israel inside its internationally recognized borders and its settlements in the post-1967 occupied territories.”80 This conceptual and analytical distinction, while in line with the de jure separation between the 1967 Israeli occupied Palestinian territories and Israel proper (Israel as defined by the 1949 armistice lines, or “Green Line”) nonetheless masks the de facto bonds and linkages that exist between the territories under Israeli control while fuelling (directly or indirectly; explicitly or implicitly) a nationalist and romantic-nostalgic discourse where the occupied Palestinian territories are framed as the site of violence, discrimination, and an irrational Zionism embodied in the settler-citizen. This discourse surrounding the 1967 Israeli occupation as sui generis works to reinforce “hegemonic categories of difference” where Israel proper holds the high moral ground as the site of democracy, equality, and purity of the Jewish-democratic state increasingly threatened by policies, approaches, and principles born from post-1967 Israeli territorial expansion.81 By illustrating how colonial praxis in post-1967 Jerusalem drew on

79 Ibid., xvi.
81 Ibid.
policies first formulated and imposed on Palestinian citizens of Israel, I seek to collapse this spatial and temporal binary and conceive of Israel-Palestine as a single, systematic entity.\(^{82}\)

### 1.5 The Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem as Reflected in the Scholarly Discourse

As previously stated, there exists a substantial body of secondary sources devoted to the politics of contemporary Jerusalem. This body of literature grew considerably as a result of the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 between Israel and the PLO. The signing of the Oslo Accords and the onset of the barely functioning and now essentially cosmetic peace process encouraged the emergence of a cottage industry of articles, conferences, policy papers, and (to a lesser extent) academic monographs devoted to the question of Jerusalem’s present and future as it relates to the idea of a two-state solution and the functional re-division of the city that such a solution demands.\(^{83}\) What is more, institutions and departmental divisions have since been established specifically to explore long term policy issues relating to a future peace deal and to publish points of reference for policy makers, such as the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies or the Conflict Management desk associated with the Jerusalem Institute for Israel

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Studies. However, despite the volume of research that exists on contemporary Jerusalem, with few exceptions the Israeli Municipality barely figures in analyses of local politics, social relations, and urban development. When it does, it invariably comes from an insider critical perspective that either conflates national and local imperatives and policies and/or bypasses the question of the Municipality’s impact on local politics in favor of personal reflection over missed (political) opportunities. Taken together, the politics of the Israeli Municipality is not so much discussed and analyzed in the literature on post-1967 Jerusalem as it is periodically evoked and quickly dismissed as a powerless entity acting as little more than a channel for decisions made at the national level.

It is undoubtedly true that proposals and decisions pertaining to policy and development in Jerusalem must pass through the Prime Minister’s Office. Not only are Israeli municipalities generally accountable to the Ministry of Interior but the strategic, symbolic, and political significance of Jerusalem to the Israeli government and national culture renders the Jerusalem Municipality particularly vulnerable to pressures and constraints from various ministries active in the city. At the same time, as a city lacking natural resources and a secure base for industrial growth and investment, Jerusalem is dependent on the state and public sector institutions for employment and economic stability. This formal structural/political reality has discouraged a deeper investigation into local politics, discourses, and urban projects. This is curious, however,

84 The institute, established by Dr. Stephen H. Floersheimer, ran until 2007 only to be replaced by the Floersheimer studies program at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The program continues to publish studies influencing decision makers at the national level. The conflict management desk of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies was established in 2003 to examine the peace process and conflict management strategy in Israel generally and in Jerusalem in particular. Their annual publication of “facts and trends” in Jerusalem is widely read and cited among academics and policy makers in Israel.


for anybody who has walked through the neighborhoods that make up East Jerusalem, where the influence of municipal functionaries on urban development and institutional networks is evident from the flower emblem of Kollek’s Jerusalem Foundation adorning the facades of cultural and youth centers to the symbolic space making up the Palestinian “shadow municipality;” that is, the network of political bodies, institutions, and religious/professional associations functioning, albeit on a more limited and restrictive scale since the al-Aqsa intifada, through informal (if not direct) relations with the city.87

In exploring this gap, I was struck to find how involved figures from within local Israeli government (and associated, quasi-governmental bodies) were in attempting to set their own administrative agenda while orienting the day to day lives and consciousness of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, most notably throughout the first decade following the June 1967 war. Considering the surveys and ethnographic work conducted in the years immediately following the annexation as well as institutions built by a maneuvering and resourceful mayor, it is apparent that unlike the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, who are still considered more an existential challenge to be pacified primarily through withheld (threat of) and eruptive (deadly) violence of direct military rule, the Palestinians of Jerusalem were deemed susceptible to absorption or “minoritization.”88

87 The “shadow municipality” refers to two separate phenomena. On the one hand, it is a reference to Palestinian initiatives during the Oslo years (1993-2000) to prepare for the eventuality of PA control over East Jerusalem. According to Hillel Cohen, this involved training professional staff and preparing for autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, projects, and service provision. However, prior to the 1990s, “shadow municipality” was a local reference to the network of institutions that the Israelis were unable to dismantle after the June 1967 war (or had left intact without formal recognition as a result of strategic concerns and sensitivity to international scrutiny), such as the Muslim Council/Islamic Committee, The East Jerusalem Municipality (in exile), The Jerusalem District Electric Company, The Arab (Jerusalem) Chamber of Commerce, al-Maqsad hospital, The Orient House, and a network of professional, community, and charitable associations. See Cohen, The Rise and Fall of Arab Jerusalem, 95-96; Sami F. Musallam, The Struggle for Jerusalem (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1996), Ch. 3; Anne Latendresse, Jerusalem: Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994), Ch. 4.

In addition, there is a body of literature in which the Municipality is central to the analysis but reduced to more or less celebratory narratives surrounding the figure of Teddy Kollek, who served as mayor of “united Jerusalem” from the June 1967 war until the 1993 municipal elections. In fact, so much has been written on Kollek himself that he has arguably become amongst the world’s most famous mayors. Within this body of literature, his legacy is represented in a more biographical manner and, particularly among secular-liberal Zionist scholars, in strictly glowing terms as a one-man bulwark to the aggressive posturing of the Israeli right-wing, the “divisive” and radical Mizrahi social/housing movements that shook the city (and the Labor-Ashkenazi establishment with it) in the 1970s, and the influence of ultra-orthodox parties and constituencies that have gained increasing leverage and representation in the Jerusalem Municipal Council over the past thirty years. In addition, while it would be a stretch to suggest that Kollek’s reign is remembered fondly amongst Palestinians, it is not unusual to hear his name evoked (notably by those with an employment history with the Municipality) as having been the lesser evil, especially considering the hardening realities that have taken shape since his ousting in 1993, such as the muscle flexing of settler organizations Ateret Cohanim and El Ad in conquering the hearts of Palestinian neighborhoods and quarters. It would appear that Kollek’s legacy is by and large stuck in a nostalgia trap that has limited critical analysis.

A brief foray into some of the most cited and comprehensive studies on post-1967 Jerusalem can serve to support this point of how the Municipality is commonly bypassed (if not explicitly dismissed) as a focus of political analysis. Michael Dumper, a professor of politics at Exeter University, has to date published two of the more in-depth, comprehensive (as opposed to narrowly focused), and empirically grounded (English-language) studies on post-1967 Jerusalem. In The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967, Dumper devotes several chapters to Israeli politics and structures of domination in the city following the June 1967 war, with specific focus

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on demography, housing, urban planning/spatial re-configuration, land confiscation, and service provision. While Dumper devotes considerable time and space to the ways in which the Municipality sought to engage Palestinian residents as well as to the administrative and jurisdictional changes that came with the Israeli conquest, the role of the Municipality in urban development, politics, and social programming is minimized to the point where it appears as an extension of extra-local structures and concerns. While one must acknowledge the congruence of objectives between state and local authorities in Jerusalem, how the Municipality under Kollekt sought to engage the new realities following the 1967 annexation in its own way (and at times even at odds with state priorities and strategies) is lost.

In his most recent study, *Jerusalem Unbound*, which focuses more on contemporary spatial and political realities in the city, Dumper alludes to the conflicting approaches regarding administrative relations with the Palestinians between Kollekt and the state throughout his tenure as mayor but dismisses Kollekt’s approach as superficial and ultimately without social, political, or material impact. Similarly, Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod’s *Living Together Separately* acknowledges the novelty (as well as the inherent limitations and contradictions) of Kollekt’s governing philosophy of controlled accommodation and “quiet pragmatism” and even goes so far as to state that he was a “principle architect” of Israel’s policies, playing a “pivotal role in the political system that evolved since 1967” despite the elevated authority of the national cabinet and state ministries. Nonetheless, it is not made clear exactly where state policy ends and municipal policy begins. What is more, an emphasis on how Kollekt’s governing rubric functioned as a public relations strategy or an “ideological cloak,” while undoubtedly (if only partially) true, does not consider the fact that it also reflected a taxonomy or ontological foundation informing patterns of administrative outreach/relations and institutional structure.

Passing reference to the fissures that developed between local and national authorities over Jerusalem based on conflicting approaches to colonial statecraft is often just that: a fact to mention or allude to with little to no elaboration, except to say (in effect if not explicitly so) that

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93 Ibid., 205.
state policy and design reigned supreme. Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht, for example, briefly discuss Kollek’s “multi-ethnic” ideal for post-1967 Jerusalem in strictly descriptive terms and without critical deconstruction; that is, as a well-intentioned effort crushed by national and party politics as well as a general Palestinian refusal to cooperate with municipal authorities and a wider context of ethno-national struggle that Kollek could not, despite his best efforts, abate.94 At the same time, while Friedland and Hecht correctly argue that Kollek tried to “separate his city from the politics of the West Bank” while constructing a myth of Jerusalem as “an entity somehow different from the other conquered lands,”95 the reader is left wondering about the elements of that myth and how his way of conceptually organizing the history of Jerusalem as well as contemporary social realities manifested through his administrative model as well as infrastructural and institutional projects in East Jerusalem.

Similarly, Gedalia Auerbach and Ira Sharkansky’s work on the heightened role of the state and national-political objectives in urban planning in post-1967 Jerusalem conceives of Israel as a “metropolitan nation state;” that is, a “metropolitan area within the structure of a country” characterized by a highly centralized government and hence greater “convergence between local and national politics.”96 Thus, the theme of overarching state control informs the analysis throughout. However, at the same time the authors emphasize that despite minimal (formal) local autonomy, municipal authorities nonetheless have been able to maneuver (and even manipulate) state diktat and the various ministries active in the city in attempting to undertake and financially support their own projects.97 Kollek’s Jerusalem Foundation is but one example of such creative maneuvering. Established by Kollek in 1965 as a means to bolster the municipal budget through private donations and support a more autonomous approach to urban planning and beautification, the Foundation has been responsible for thousands of cultural and infrastructural projects throughout the city. After the June 1967 war, the Foundation encapsulated Kollek’s vision and priorities for Palestinian East Jerusalem moving forward. Even then, the analysis offered by Auerbach and Sharkansky is more heavily anchored along the theme of convergence between state and local designs. It is not in the author’s interest to analyze

94 Friedland and Hecht, 180-188.
95 Ibid., 190.
96 Auerbach and Sharkansky, 9.
97 Ibid., 14-15. See also Sharkansky, “Policy Making in Jerusalem, 115-124.
the specific effects of policy divergence between central and local authorities vis-à-vis East Jerusalem. As a result, the reader is left unsure as to what variables compelled Kollek’s maneuvering (was it simply a means to add to a limited budget or were there additional concerns relating to policy and development in the “Arab sector?”) and whether the Foundation had any specific impact on institutional and cultural life in East Jerusalem.

Usama Halabi’s study on formal and informal Arab politics in the city from the early modern to contemporary period is the most cited historical account on modern Jerusalem in Arabic and continues to stand alone in that its concern is with the history of the Arab Jerusalem Municipality. Halabi begins with the establishment of a Jerusalem Municipal Council by the Ottomans in 1863 and takes the reader through the British Mandate (1920-1948), Jordanian (1948-1967), and post-1967 Israeli colonial era (until 1993), discussing the major personalities and projects associated with the Arab council and its overall impact on urban politics and development along the way. Halabi's coverage of the post-1967 period in particular starts with a historical overview of the processes that led to the dissolution of the Arab City Council and its Secretariat by Israeli authorities on 29 June 1967 and then focuses his analysis on the discriminatory policies, laws, and practices imposed by Israeli authorities so as to alter the political, geographical, and demographic realities in the city.\textsuperscript{98} This is then used as a contextual backdrop through which to discuss Palestinian non-engagement with colonial institutions and political procedure as well as the various initiatives that arose to challenge the Zionist project and preserve the Palestinian character of East Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{99}

With a focus on Arab politics and concerns and an emphasis on state-municipal convergence of interests, Halabi’s study (as well as subsequent publications that dovetail and update his analysis), while comprehensive in its own right, offers little analytical room for the question of the politics of urban/municipal structure and design specific to local authorities. What is more, while Halabi discusses initiatives that sought to encourage Palestinian incorporation and participation in municipal institutions and affairs (such as Moshe Amirav, Sarah Kaminker and Hillel Bardin’s “Peace for Jerusalem” joint-list initiative proposed for the 1993 municipal elections), an almost exclusive focus on Palestinian non-engagement and a

\textsuperscript{98} Halabi, \textit{Baladiat al-Quds al-'arabia}, 27-42.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 35-37; 47.
strictly binary/binational framework for approaching local politics does not offer much in the way of a more relational analysis, or more specifically how (local) Israeli politics formed in reference to Palestinian practices and sensibilities (however real or imagined).\textsuperscript{100}

Menachem Klein’s most recent study \textit{Lives in Common} is an engaging analysis on how nationalism/national struggle has shaped communal relations, identities, and day-to-day interactions in Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Hebron over the course of the twentieth century. In his chapters relating to modern Jerusalem, Klein offers perhaps one of the more detailed accounts of state-municipal tensions that developed over the Jerusalem question after the Israeli conquest in June 1967. In contrast to Klein’s previous publication \textit{The Contested City}, which emphasized symmetry of Israeli state and local approaches to municipal structure and policy in Jerusalem,\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Lives in Common} acknowledges and discusses at length how such questions worked to divide Israeli offices, administrators, and policy makers into informal camps supporting either a centralized or decentralized structure for municipal administration.\textsuperscript{102} Towards this end, Klein outlines proposals drawn up by Teddy Kollek and Meron Benvenisti immediately following the June 1967 conquest to create Arab sub-committees within semi-autonomous boroughs subordinate to the Israeli Municipality. Klein also shows how such proposals were ultimately rejected by then Prime Minister Levi Eshkol as compromising to Israeli claims of sovereignty. In addition, Klein illustrates how differing strategies of conquest led to rivalry over jurisdiction between state offices and institutions. Until the creation of inter-ministerial committees devoted to the Jerusalem question in the 1970s, competition and lack of coordination meant the application of often contradictory approaches all at once.\textsuperscript{103}

Unlike previous studies on post-1967 Jerusalem, Klein’s \textit{Lives in Common} refreshingly acknowledges how despite the Prime Minister’s Office’s rejection of the proposals for decentralization that were submitted/proposed in the first two years following the June 1967 conquest, municipal personalities nonetheless continued to act with the spirit of their model in mind in the attempt to foster co-existence and structure municipal relations in such a way that

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 41-43.
\textsuperscript{102} Klein, \textit{Lives in Common}, 164-167.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 225-226; 229-230.
would meet local realities and consolidate the Israeli position in East Jerusalem. In other words, Klein illustrates how the push for decentralization and co-existence as a foundational approach to municipal politics was more than just a series of proposals rejected at the national level. They served, in effect, as functioning (even if vague and informal) blueprints for local Israeli authorities. However, in emphasising the inherent naïveté of such schemes and how they ultimately failed to capture the hearts and minds of Palestinian residents, he misses important details. One example is how Kollek’s vision manifested on a more material level beyond informal relations between the Israeli Municipality and Palestinian and Jordanian institutions, notably through infrastructural and developmental projects in the city. At the same time, if according to Kollek Palestinian Jerusalemites were thought to be “different” from West Bank residents, as Klein correctly states, what was the substance of this conceptual divide and how did this perceived difference work to map, structure, and justify municipal policy and politics? Lastly, Klein’s more general analysis on the tense and involuntary nature of Israeli-Palestinian social and institutional relations does not capture how Palestinians creatively engaged Israeli projects and institutions for their own individual or collective ends. Kollek’s administrative vision for the city reflected not only a structural proposition but more broadly a taxonomy that informed administrative praxis, interpersonal relations, and even behavior among municipal functionaries, while also being formative of Palestinian practices of resistance/sumud. In other words, the totality of Kollek’s approach requires further exploration and analysis.

The general tendency to dismiss the role of the Municipality in Israeli colonial urbanism is in large part a result of the formal, structural realities of the Israeli state. At the same time, while much has been written regarding the impact of the Israeli conquest of Jerusalem on the Palestinian population, Israeli administration and power in the city is commonly perceived as a system of coercive apparatuses and mechanisms (from the vantage point of East Jerusalem) that are external to the political and social lives of residents and function strictly to prohibit and exclude them from institutional, political, and social life of the city. This framework is understandable given that the Zionist project in Jerusalem is driven by the twin objectives of demographic and resource domination through large scale building of Jewish colonies on confiscated Palestinian land, the “gerrymandering” of municipal/state borders, and the

104 Ibid., 230.
maintenance of a population ratio favoring Israeli settler-citizens. At the same time, a dominant feature of post-1967 Jerusalem is the “social order of apartness” driven and enforced by a regulated spatial and juridical separation between Palestinians and Jews. Given these realities, policy and planning in the city undoubtedly functions at the expense of Palestinian residents, who are without effective (that is, bottom-up and substantive) and organized avenues of communal protest or representation that could result in meaningful sociopolitical transformation.

Thus, the inherent (if not explicit) assumption is that the subjugation of populations to attain colonial goals functions strictly through coercive power and the legal, social, and institutional exclusion or subordination of a native population. Indeed, the imperative of Israeli demographic and resource domination in Jerusalem reflects the ambitions of an exclusively Jewish national project and this makes it difficult to imagine Israel as a hegemonic power vis-à-vis Palestinian (non-Jewish) subjects; that is, as a system of domination that functions through coercive military and juridical power as well as its corollary strategy of ideological conditioning that works to secure consent to domination on the part of marginalized groups through affiliated institutions, projects, and practices. As a result, gestures of (or political openings for) “inclusion,” “coexistence,” or cooperation on the part of colonial authorities and associated civil society groups are commonly read not as articulations of a specific approach to political dominance but rather as a cynical ruse for international consumption, if not a means to satisfy the appetites of liberal-Zionist constituencies.

However, as studies by Nimer Sultany and Samera Esmeir have most recently shown, colonial orders “need not exclude the colonized in order to subordinate them.” Rather, the

105 Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound, 42.
107 Here I refer to the notion of hegemony as a form of power and societal-ideological configuration as theorized by Antonio Gramsci, although the concept has been applied to many different contexts of asymmetrical power relations and hence exists with multiple connotations. Here, the concept is employed to denote the process whereby the norms, worldviews, and political-economic horizons of a dominant power becomes naturalized and deemed beneficial for all social groups and classes. For an exemplary excavation of the concept and its many applications, see Peter Thomas, The Gramcian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony, and Marxism (London: Haymarket, 2011).
ethnocentric order of exclusion and apartness that characterizes Israeli politics co-exists with strategies of institutional and social absorption of Palestinians to the point where one must conceive of exclusion-inclusion not as strict opposites but as a single and comprehensive field of power. From the development of the modern nation state and the construction of minorities to the bourgeois-liberal era of European colonial expansion (or “the ‘new’ colonialism”) of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the imperative of organizing social and political relations of domination and subordination has long been entangled with the universalizing claims and formal structures of representation and deliberation inherent to modern institutions and discourses of state power. Thus, without losing sight of how political domination is organized and distributed in what is essentially an ethnocentric, hierarchical order in Israel/Palestine, I argue that from 1967-1993, the Israeli Municipality sought to consolidate power in Jerusalem after the 1967 war not only through separation and political exclusion but also through paradigms of “national-pluralism” and “coexistence” that encouraged Palestinian participation and inclusion in the institutional and social life of the city, albeit on terms set by municipal functionaries themselves. Indeed, Kollek’s “separate but equal” formulation supporting his binational vision for post-1967 Jerusalem offers a way to comprehend inclusionary and exclusionary methods of domination on a continuum, whereby inclusionary methods of rule function within an exclusive structure.

Thomas Abowd’s most recent (and welcomed) contribution Colonial Jerusalem is noteworthy for illustrating how a strict framework of separation and exclusion continues to inform academic writing on the organization and functioning of Israeli power in contemporary Jerusalem. Abowd’s study is the first major ethnography on the politics and spatiality of domination in Jerusalem from 1967 to the contemporary period (at least in the English language). In it, Abowd skillfully analyzes Israeli policy, colonial discourse, and space-making in Jerusalem and its impact on Palestinian residents through a number of vantage points: the transformation of the Old City and Israeli politics of preservation and demolition therein; the appropriation of Palestinian residences in West Jerusalem and their function towards

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110 Sultany, “The Joint List.”
reconfiguring space and history through the prism of a Zionist imagination; the intersection between Israeli policy and gender norms/politics in East Jerusalem; and the discriminatory housing policy enforced by the state and Municipality. Although seemingly without a specific focus, all roads taken lead the reader to recognize the racial assumptions and the transformative capacity of Israeli power in post-1967 Jerusalem. What is made abundantly clear is how the spatial and social conditions of separation in the contemporary city are not the result of ancient urban norms or a historical culture of voluntary segregation but rather the political design of a modern colonial power.

Despite its many strengths, as a study that seeks to more intimately investigate national-Israeli politics in the city as well as “the lived dimensions of intercommunal encounters,” *Colonial Jerusalem* is anchored and organized along the theme of segregation and enforced apartness between Palestinians and Jews. At the same time, because the Municipality does not figure into Abowd’s political analysis, the state remains as the only player reconfiguring space and sociality in the city. As a result, the analysis offered on intercommunal relations, while rich in describing the human and lived dimensions of such relations on account of an ethnographic approach, does not substantially venture beyond the framework of formal, Palestinian-Israeli encounter. In addition, while Abowd convincingly illustrates how both racial assumptions and a Zionist historical narrative/imagination play central roles in Israeli colonial urbanism, a more contestatory and fluid reality can be recognized within these ideological domains if the Municipality is more firmly situated into the political analysis. The result is a treatment of Israeli politics, discourse, and epistemology that does not capture the multiple and intersecting forms of domination that has long characterized Israeli rule and political imagination in the city.

Anne Shlay and Gillad Rosen’s recent study *Jerusalem: the Spatial Politics of a Divided Metropolis* seeks to untangle the intersecting political and economic forces that have shaped the city’s urban development, spatial design, and contemporary socio-political realities. The result is a book that serves as an accessible introduction to the politics of post-1967 Jerusalem that demystifies and makes legible these intersecting forces, although significant blind spots render

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111 Abowd, 9.
112 Ibid., 8-9.
the analysis incomplete.\textsuperscript{114} Unlike Abowd’s study, the book suffers from a descriptive and broad approach that fails to offer any particular insight distinguishing it from past publications on society and space in Jerusalem. A similarity, however, lies in an analytical rubric of duality or Israeli-Palestinian apartness that is deployed towards understanding politics and resistance in the city. As a result, the study fails to consider how the presence of Palestinians, and not simply a Zionist-biblical imagination, worked to both limit and shape Israeli policy and urban design or how an ethnocentric politics of exclusion does not preclude strategies of incorporation or associationism. At the same time, a chapter offered on “the Palestinian challenge and resistance in Arab Jerusalem” depicts Palestinian non-engagement with Israeli institutions and armed struggle as emblematic of Palestinian politics and resistance since 1967.\textsuperscript{115} While mention is made of how Israeli non-profit organizations have mobilized Palestinian neighborhoods and quarters in recent years, the result is a monolithic and redundant treatment of Palestinian resistance/\textit{sumud} that fails to capture how municipal institutions/projects and Palestinian resistance have intersected, specifically during Kollek’s tenure as mayor.\textsuperscript{116} Also noteworthy in this regard is the compilation \textit{City of Collision} (2006) edited by a team of critical geographers, architects, and scholars.\textsuperscript{117} This volume stands out on account of its multi-disciplinary and dialectical approach towards deconstructing the socio-political dynamics and multiple fault lines that characterize contemporary Jerusalem. The result is a broad yet theoretically rich collection that offers many new vantage points through which to further analyze the politics of a divided city. However, what ties together the thirty essays is an emphasis on ethnocentric planning and Palestinian-Jewish political and social separation.

Lastly, one can argue that a lack of attention to local institutions in the academic literature is also the result of an assumed insignificance of ministerial or state-municipal divides over colonial design. After all, the results of Israeli policy and practice; that is, the “Judaization” of the city, large-scale confiscation of Palestinian land, and the marginalization of the Palestinian

\textsuperscript{114} For example, a quarter of Palestinian Jerusalemites who currently reside on the “eastern” side of The Wall along the Israel Jerusalem municipal boundaries do not figure into the analysis aside from a brief mention. Shlay and Rosen, 74-79.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 137-163.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 160-162.
\textsuperscript{117} Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets, eds. \textit{City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism} (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006).
population in every conceivable aspect of urban life and politics may work to render an analysis on the different means to reach the same end ultimately superfluous. In addition, Palestinians have been uprooted in both reality and in the representation surrounding contemporary Jerusalem; marginalized through a form of history-writing that privileges exclusivist narratives of belonging (Zionist or otherwise) or the sacrality (and hence veneration) of the city as an ancient “Holy Land” over Jerusalem as a living city of present-day inhabitants. Thus, re-inscribing the historical presence and active contribution of Palestinians in the history, materiality, and contemporary politics of a living, breathing city emphasizes the fact of exclusion, forced displacement, and discursive/material erasure of Palestinian history over the issue of how this is rationalized, planned, and debated among colonial bureaucrats. A major imperative in the literature surrounding Jerusalem, in other words, is to address the silencing of the Palestinian experience and with it, issues of power and representation inherent in the production of history.

For example, history-writing as a vehicle for inscription is undoubtedly a driving force behind more recent academic studies as well as in historical fiction and memoirs produced by Palestinian researchers and writers from Jerusalem. Memoirs published over the last twenty years by Palestinian Jerusalemite authors, such as Issa Boullata, Jacob Nammar, John Rose, John Tleel, Sahar Hamouda, Subhi Ghosheh, and Ghada Karmi, offer intimate portraits of communal life and intercommunal social relations in the (mainly upscale) neighborhoods and quarters of modern Jerusalem as well as personal memories surrounding the transformations that occurred through a century of political upheaval, urban alteration, and social polarization. Alongside


heavy description of the textures, smells, and memories of childhood, these memoirs are careful to expand outside of the private home to speak to Jerusalem’s religious and ethnic diversity, if not the shifts in culture and forms of societal (class) stratification amidst a “modernization” process and the integral, political function of Jerusalem for a burgeoning Palestinian national movement. However, memoirs are not simply nostalgic recollections of stories about childhood and family or merely private perspectives into the effects of radical urban, social, and political change. The Palestinian memoir is meant to situate the author as historical witness to lived injustice as well as discursive erasure; to actively inscribe the author as a historical/contemporary actor with legitimate claims to sovereignty in the city and with historical substance behind the yearning to return.

Through these memoirs, an emphasis is invariably fixed on: 1) the Palestinian role in the development of the “new” city from the mid-eighteenth century onwards; and 2) the fact of domination, displacement, and dispossession at the hands of the Zionist movement and authorities (as opposed to the structures/policies that made/make it possible). The first point of emphasis is an attempt to insinuate Palestinians into the historiography of the development of the modern city, which has been effectively ignored on account of the silences inherent in the dominant source material as well as the political commitments of historians. The second point of emphasis is encouraged by questions of justice and the view that history-writing can function as a form of political praxis to “balance” the historiography and literature towards the side of the oppressed while inspiring a rethinking of contemporary political formulas and dominant discourses that relegate such historical and contemporary realities as unhelpful on account of the need for a political solution acceptable to both sides.

Two edited volumes on the politics of modern/contemporary Jerusalem serve to further illustrate the motivational force of inscription behind contemporary history-writing and the

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imperative of unsilencing the Palestinian past/present. The first is a study edited by Munir Akash and Fouad Moughrabi entitled *The Open Veins of Jerusalem*.\(^{121}\) The eleven contributions that constitute the study offer a broad historical account, interspersed with illustrations, poems, and personal testimonies in the forms of essays and memoirs, of the Palestinian Arabs’ social, national, familial, and religious ties to Jerusalem. Thus, while the volume is an address to Israeli policy in the city and its effects on contemporary Palestinian society, the purpose is to highlight the fact of coerced displacement of Palestinians while interrogating the question of representation in art, literature, and academic study surrounding Jerusalem, thereby firmly situating Palestinian Jerusalemites as historical actors.

A second and more recent volume entitled *Jerusalem Interrupted* is an ambitious, multi-disciplinary study that seeks to 1) document and analyze how Zionism interrupted a process of “indigenous modernity” in Jerusalem (that is, a process initiated by indigenous actors to meet indigenous developmental concerns beginning in the nineteenth century) and led to the fracturing of the social fabric of a cosmopolitan city; and 2) examine the erasure of Palestinian history and culture after the 1967 Israeli conquest through the gradual colonization and reconstruction of the city (physically and discursively) to fit an ideological narrative of exclusive, Jewish belonging.\(^{122}\) In this way, *Jerusalem Interrupted* is similar to *Open Veins* in that it seeks to put “Arabs in the historical record of modern Jerusalem.”\(^{123}\) Much like the aforementioned Palestinian memoirs, both volumes are exemplary of a scholarly approach that seeks to recognize Palestinian history while emphasizing its materiality in the city. As such, there is a necessary de-emphasis surrounding the specifics of Israeli political structure and policy debate as it relates to post-1967 Jerusalem.

1.6 Overview of Thesis Chapters

As a study on the “mental maps” of local administrative practice and co-existence projects, my dissertation necessarily entails a focus on Israeli institutions and personalities. Nonetheless, the intersections among Israeli strategies of rule and Palestinian tactics of steadfastness and collective enunciation will also be examined. Chapter one discusses the emergence of state-run co-existence projects in Israel; notably the establishment of Arab-Jewish summer youth camps in the summer of 1956. I argue that these projects were born at a time of the erosion of the functions of military rule and reflected a gradual but incomplete shift in state thinking towards Palestinian citizens, where they went from being strictly objects of military control (enemy population) to subjects of sociological observance and civilian apparatuses of control (minorities). As such, these projects sought to prepare aspiring orientalists and military functionaries to develop the ethnographic skills necessary for such a shift. At the same time, these programs sought to create a tolerant and enlightened Israeli-Jewish citizen as well as an ideal (depoliticized) set of Arab minorities through controlled social interactions. The chapter ends with case studies of two Palestinian proponents for state-led co-existence activities: Muhammad Hubeishi and Rustam Bastuni. I will argue that while for liberal Zionists such programs represented a more inclusive means towards structuring ethno-national hierarchical relations, both Bastuni and Hubeishi saw the gradual erosion of military rule and emergence of co-existence programs as signalling the possibility for the development of an alternative political horizon altogether: that of a democratic state representing both Jews and Arabs.

The third chapter turns to the construction of Jerusalem through the imagination of its Mayor Teddy Kollek and the basis of his proposed administrative rubric for the city following the Israeli conquest of June 1967. I argue that Kollek’s vision of the city as a potential bastion for peaceful co-existence among historically divided, semi-autonomous, and culturally static ethno-religious units did not simply reflect the basis of a failed administrative proposal or a ruse for international consumption, as it is commonly dismissed. Rather, it reflected a colonial taxonomy that acted as an epistemological basis or reference point for administrative praxis and social/bureaucratic relations in the city until the first intifada of 1987. In elaborating on this point, the fourth chapter focuses on the intellectual work commissioned by Kollek to support his vision for Jewish-Arab co-existence in Jerusalem. In particular, I analyze the studies of Dr.
Gerald Caplan, a medical practitioner from Harvard who from 1969-1977 submitted a series of ethnographic and psycho-social profiles of East Jerusalem to the Municipality. It was through such commissioned academic projects that Kollek’s vision was rationalized and codified.

The fifth and final chapter analyzes the materialization of Kollek's governing, social, and developmental paradigm through an institutional network supported by his Jerusalem Foundation. Towards this end, the chapter will focus particularly on the quarter of Musrara in Jerusalem. Originally a Palestinian neighborhood, its inhabitants were expelled by Israeli forces in 1948. It was subsequently transformed by the Israeli government into a slum quarter for Mizrahi immigrants in forming part of the border zone separating Israeli and Jordanian Jerusalem (1948-1967). Following the June 1967 war, Musrara was targeted by Israeli authorities as part of a seam zone; that is, an urban and social artery expressing the fundamental unity of united Jerusalem while serving as an ideological landscape where Palestinians and Jews would socialize and thus validate the colonial narrative of the city as an open, bi-cultural (albeit Zionist) metropolis. Towards this end, the chapter will examine the activities of Meditran, a Jewish-Palestinian co-existence institution operative in Musrara throughout the 1970s. It will be argued that for liberal Zionists, Meditran was about consuming and performing multiculturalism in the heart of the city against the weight of the twin realities of occupation and colonialism. For Palestinians, however, it became a space of enunciation; that is, a means of articulating personal narratives of identity, history, and national belonging in Jerusalem. As such, Meditran functioned as a location for both the assertion of liberal-Zionist politics as well as resistance to the discursive and material erasure of Palestinian national belonging in Jerusalem.

The chapter ends with the Wadi al-Joz Community Center, which was established in 1970 and exists to the present day. Like Meditran, the Wadi al-Joz center (originally known as "Bet David") was a project funded by Kollek's Jerusalem Foundation and was meant to serve as a space for Jewish-Palestinian interaction and the installation of a sense of civic pride and belonging to a "bi-cultural" city under Israeli sovereignty. However, over time the center gradually put an end to co-existence initiatives and became a distinctly Palestinian institution promoting a nationalist pedagogy and resistance to "normalization" with the Zionist order. While Meditran became a space of enunciation for Palestinian residents, the Wadi al-Joz Center cut off its relations with Israeli citizens and instead established connections with other Palestinian
institutions, thereby forming part of the "shadow municipality" in East Jerusalem. In both cases, Zionist institutions were seized and made operative towards a more contestatory politics among Palestinian residents.
Chapter 2:
The Palestinians Citizens of Israel: from Enemy Population to Minority

In this chapter, I argue that approaches and discourses within state branches dealing with Palestinian citizens of Israel began to shift by the mid-1950s, where they (gradually) went from being seen as strictly enemy populations to be monitored by the coercive power of the military regime and its concomitant permit system, to “marked citizens” who were to be integrated into the civic-economic life of the state albeit “under the sign of the question mark” and subject to sociological observance and civilian oversight.¹ While the prospect of increasing international scrutiny regarding Israel’s treatment of Palestinian citizens played a role in this shift, I argue that it occurred as a result of two intertwining developments. First, with Zionist opposition to the military regime gradually mounting within the Knesset, by 1955 a small but influential group of state functionaries saw the need to develop an alternative security structure to take the place of the military government as its duties and functions were gradually minimized. At the same time, the lack of an unequivocal commitment or timeline for the eradication of military rule led to a corresponding sense of anxiety among these officers regarding the erosion of the formal democratic structure of the Jewish state and liberal identity of the Israeli nation-in-the-making. As a result, an integrationist approach towards Palestinian citizens was envisioned, culminating in the establishment of a Jewish-Arab summer camps program in the summer of 1956 through the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. In analyzing the emergence, growth, and underlying objectives of this program, this chapter will illustrate how the co-existence strategy envisioned by the Israeli Municipality for administrative structure and praxis in post-1967 Jerusalem was anticipated well before the Israeli conquest.

"The paradox of apartheid policies in Israel is that Israel seeks separation between the settlers and the natives, yet it simultaneously seeks expansion which forces interaction, and in some cases, integration.”²

--Ibrahim Halawi

¹ Pandey, 129-132.
Through reference to the territorial, economic, and infrastructural entanglement that currently stitches Israel/Palestine into a single entity under Israeli domination, Ibrahim Halawi brings to light Israel's foundational paradox with roots stretching back to its establishment in May 1948. While the majority of Palestinian Arabs inhabiting the territory that would become Israel were expelled during and after the 1947-1949 war for Palestine, approximately 160,000 remained within its newly imposed borders. As a result, a central question came to occupy Israeli military authorities and state functionaries: as Jewish and formally liberal-democratic, how will the state serve a Jewish state building/settler colonial project as well as realize the democratic-socialist impulses/ideals of the (dominant) Labor Zionist movement? In other words, how does a state establish truly accountable institutions for its citizens and integrate a Palestinian Arab population that it seeks to simultaneously marginalize, if not be rid of, in the name of ethnocentric state-building goals?

Whether on the self-declared left or right of the political spectrum in Israel, Zionist political practice and ideology has been deeply rooted in and centered around the commitment towards the development and maintenance of a Jewish state (both territorially and demographically) while tracking a course of separate development and boundaries of citizenship for its Jewish and Palestinian citizens.\(^3\) However, in response to both external and internal social and political developments, Israeli policy and discourse towards the Palestinian minority has historically tended to shift between “liberalizing” trends---which seeks to normalize the colonial order “by harnessing and directing the energies” of Palestinian socio-political practice and desire towards economic, professional, and productive endeavors as defined by the state--and coercive approaches to control, an oscillating between a sort of soft power and sovereign power in the attempt to devise and enforce a political formula satisfying both ethnocentric and democratic impulses and state-building goals.\(^4\)

Israeli political imagination and practice towards its Palestinian citizens has historically shifted along this spectrum in response to “broader shifts in national intelligibility,” where Israeli

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\(^4\) Gordon, xviii-xix.
political horizons are reworked “in response to the politics of the moment.”5 In November 2014, the Israeli cabinet headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved a version of a bill that would effectively entrench Jewish privilege in Israel/Palestine, legislatively and within the basic laws of the state, by defining Israel as the nation state for the Jewish people. According to the version of the bill approved by Netanyahu himself, the state would legislatively affirm, in accordance with the declaration of independence, that Israel is first and foremost the nation-state of the Jewish people. As such, the symbols, identity, and political objectives of the state must reflect and prioritize Jewish collective and national interests, even if at the expense of equality and democratic procedure and principles, which, as argued in Netanyahu's approved version of the bill, is the realm of individual and not collective claims for Palestinian citizens.

While veteran Zionist politicians such as Shimon Peres and current President Reuven Rivlin have condemned the bill as a threat to Israel's formal democratic character, the reaction from Palestinian communities with Israeli citizenship has by and large been both cynical and dismissive, pointing out that the bill only enshrines the ethnocentric foundation, structure, and ideology of the state.6 According to Haifa-based activist Wa’ad Ghantous:

...for the 1.7 million Palestinians who were forced to take Israeli citizenship and continue living in what became Israel after the Nakba, this bill is nothing more than Israel finally taking off its mask in front of the world... Despite our nominal citizenship, we have always been rendered second-class citizens with limited rights, for no reason other than not being born Jewish.7

For Palestinian citizens of Israel, the proposed bill does not represent a turning point in state-minority relations. Rather, it is a formal declaration; an affirmation of the state's undemocratic character and historical unwillingness to address demands for equality while exposing to the world the experiences of Palestinian citizens since the establishment of a Jewish state.

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The proposed bill and ensuing debate that has erupted within the political establishment over its content and significance worked to destabilize Netanyahu's governing coalition, triggering a national election for March 2015. Several versions of the proposed 2014 “nation-state” bill were also proposed that separated their drafters based on the extent of their democratic commitments. These debates and fissures illustrate not so much a strict divide between liberal-democratic and more explicitly ethno-nationalist Zionist parties on the question of the state’s Jewish-Zionist identity and core of political practice. Rather, they reflect differing approaches towards the consolidation and legal formalization of Jewish privilege and exclusivity in Israel/Palestine. While some Zionist parties seek to continue along the track of reconciling ethnocentric and liberal-democratic impulses and practices, others towards the right of the political spectrum are seeking to do away with democratic ideals all together.

Since the election of the 1992 Rabin-led (“pro-peace”) governing coalition, which was made possible in part through the Palestinian electoral vote, and its formal commitment to negotiations over the question of Palestinian statehood in the 1967 territories, it appeared to many, particularly on the Israeli right, that democratic values were beginning to undermine the exclusive Zionist privilege to determine state and foreign policy in the interests of the (Jewish) public. Rabin’s electoral victory and the looming threat of Palestinian autonomy or statehood in the 1967 territories encouraged a more unabashedly separatist impulse and a push to reaffirm the Jewishness of the state either through a constitutional movement, scrambling for strategic space in the West Bank and Jerusalem, or by proposing (if not passing) discriminatory legislation (if not explicitly than in effect) through the Knesset. Ariel Sharon, then the leader of the right-wing Likud party, captured this mood in his 1993 op-ed for the Israeli daily, Yedioth Ahronoth:

My words at the last Likud congress concerning democracy and the Jewish state raised, as expected, a real storm...'Our grandparents and our parents,' I had said, 'did not come here to build a democracy. It's good that a real democracy was created, but the reason they came here was to build a Jewish state. Remember this.' In fact, the real threat to Israel's existence is from those who swear first and foremost by democracy and peace, at the risk of undermining the foundations of the democratic Jewish state...The declaration of independence...explicitly defines the nature of the state of Israel, in whose name and for what reason it was established in Eretz Israel. In four places, the declaration explains the nature of the state that came into being on 5

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Iyyar 5708 (14 May 1948)...and in none of these places is there any mention either of a "democratic" state or of a "Zionist state" or of a "state for the Jews," but only of a "Jewish" and solely "Jewish" state...

...The apparent contradiction between the return to Zion and the principles of democracy has long been known...Is there a more anti-democratic and discriminatory law than the law of return?...let us recall that, in concrete terms, this law grants automatic citizenship to any Jew (up to a fourth generation) born abroad. At the same time, this law of return is refused to those who lived here before (as well as to their descendants) and who, due to a war which from their point of view was a defensive war against an invader bent on expelling them, either fled or were forced to flee their homes and their lands...The true and primary allegiance of the majority of the Arabs of Israel, of their politicians and their representatives in parliament, naturally goes not to Israel but to the Palestinian Arab interest.9

Sharon's op-ed represented a growing consensus, which held that democracy (or any such purportedly liberal values) was not a historical or unshakable foundation for the Zionist project. If anything, formal democracy was a means towards securing and legitimizing Jewish statehood and sovereignty in Palestine. What is more, Palestinian citizens are a fifth-column. The state does not represent them, as it is structured to work against their collective interests. Thus they cannot be reasonably expected to identify with and depend on state institutions. In the meantime, mounting anti-Palestinian sentiment during the Oslo years and more notably during the (2000) al-Aqsa intifada provided a new context for Palestinian citizens through which to address longstanding and historical grievances, leading to several grassroots initiatives that directly addressed experiences of discrimination while functioning as agendas for national discussion.10 As a result, over the past two decades there has been an increasingly assertive and public unravelling of the Jewish-democratic (state) discourse, with corresponding shifts including a more aggressive posturing over the Jewishness of the state among Zionists as well as increasingly assertive declarations among Palestinians in protest to these realities and developments.

This is not to suggest that Israel's system of ethnic privilege and domination had not previously been the subject of critique. Palestinian citizens of Israel are all too familiar with the tensions inherent in the basic laws, ideology, and practices of the state. Since Israel's dramatic formation, Palestinian individuals, media, and political/community organizations have addressed how to live and/or struggle advantageously through the Jewish-democratic nexus in which they had suddenly found themselves. Likewise, Zionist policy makers have always been aware and anxious of their dual commitments to western-style liberalism and ethnocentrism, drafting laws and building state policy with selective reference to both frameworks in the hopes of preserving Jewish privilege without completely sacrificing formal democratic procedure as well as its central place in the identity of the state (at least according to its Labor Zionist architects).

The Oslo peace process and the al-Aqsa intifada encouraged a feeling of vulnerability regarding the Zionist project. The peace process and the al-Aqsa intifada that sprang from its collapse threatened to destabilize the terms of the status quo. Discussions surrounding the separation and alteration of geographic realities as well as the question of rights and representation among Palestinians meant that for the first time in decades, the very foundations and governing ideologies of Israel became subject to international scrutiny and debate. Moreover, the Oslo process meant an internationally recognized reference point for statehood as well as civil rights claims among disillusioned and disenfranchised Palestinian citizens of Israel, thereby encouraging an increasingly public and assertive posturing over the question of Israel's compatibility with principles of equality given the demographic and geographic realities that came with the territorialisation of the Zionist project.

It should therefore come as no surprise that state-led co-existence initiatives largely dissipated during this time. In the words of Nadim Rouhana and Nimer Sultany, a "new Zionist hegemony" has gradually consolidated among Israeli establishment parties from the left to the right, characterized by a consensus over a separatist, ethnocentric national imagination.\(^\text{11}\) As a result, we may very well be witnessing the slow and steady death of the democratic discourse and identity of the state. However, and although failing to articulate and enforce a coherent policy or set of principles vis-à-vis Palestinian citizens, from the mid-1950s onwards, a small but

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\(^{11}\) Rouhana and Sultany, 5-6.
emerging group of Israeli policy makers and officials dedicated themselves, either passively or with great enthusiasm depending on political affiliation and state-building goals, to organized government initiatives aiming to promote an affinity to the state and an emerging (and ill defined) “Israeli” civic culture among Palestinian citizens, as well as increased inter-communal contact between Palestinians and Jews within the 1949 armistice lines. Such activity was born of the question of how to instigate a shift in thinking about Palestinians from an enemy population to minorities without threatening ethno-centric state building objectives.

2.1 The Palestinian in the aftermath of the *nakba*

The decade immediately following the declaration of Israeli statehood was a particularly euphoric period for the Zionist movement. After the expulsion of the majority of Palestinians from what became Israel, de facto international recognition of Israel's territorial gains during and after the 1947-1949 war, and the influx of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants in the early 1950s, it was a time for territorial consolidation as well as state and (Jewish) national identity building. With respect to the Palestinians who remained within Israel's borders after the war, Israeli authorities generally deemed them a threat to these processes. As such, and despite their (eventual) status as citizens, Palestinians became a captive population subject to geographical segregation, police/military surveillance, and the political co-optation of community figures (particularly mukhtars, mayors and village council members, religious/ecclesiastical authorities, and professionals), which together represented the primary methods of state control. At the same time, state and military functionaries harbored the hope of (and indeed even acted upon) their ultimate removal.

A central mechanism behind this process was the military government. The existence of military government over Palestinian communities in Israel existed from 1948-1966. It was

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14 The military government was a "legal-military-political apparatus" made up of army officers and soldiers. Military governors were under the directive of a Central Security Committee, which was itself made up of members from the General Security Services, the police, and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in addition to the Military Governor Commander. Military rule was in force over Palestinian Arab communities in "the triangle," the Negev,
divided administratively into three zones: the North (mainly the Galilee), Center (the “Arab Triangle”), and the South (Negev desert), each with its own military governor appointed by the Chief of the General Staff and approved by the Ministry of Defense. All government offices in the military zones were coordinated under the direct rule of the military governor, who also advised and assisted the upper echelons of the Ministry of Defense on issues relating to security, development, administration, and “all matters which concern the resumption of civilian life” in the regions under military control. Based upon Britain's Emergency Defense Regulations of 1945, which effectively and legally made the Israeli military the sovereign power over its regions of operation, and supplemented by additional emergency regulations passed by the Knesset after May 1948, the military regime was designed to police the borders of the state (internal and external) and prevent the return (or “infiltration,” according to Israeli authorities) of Palestinian refugees expelled during the war. Just as important, however, was its function towards monitoring political activity among Palestinians (particularly communist and anti-Zionist activism), mobilizing Palestinian support for the ruling MAPAI party, maintaining geographical separation between communities, and ultimately excluding Palestinian citizens as a collective from participation in the development of the state and national economy, specifically by preventing access to properties and farm lands as well as their integration into the emerging labor force. In other words, despite the pretense of the military regime existing solely in the interest of domestic security, it was a means towards normalizing a national state of emergency in order to “nullify almost totally the equality of Israeli citizenship purportedly granted to Arabs.”

By the early to mid-1950s, a small but determined group of Israeli state functionaries began to assess the necessity and effectiveness of military government as well as the state’s attitudes toward the Palestinian minority. Through his studies on the formulation of Israeli government policy vis-à-vis Palestinian citizens of Israel, Yair Bäuml argues that in the state’s formative

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and the Galilee (that is, where the majority of Palestinian Arabs of Israel lived) until December 1966, although emergency regulations were not completely lifted until 1968. Emergency regulations were lifted in the early 1950s in Palestinian Arab urban centers of "mixed cities" such as in Acre and Haifa. See Bäuml, "The Military Government," 48-49.


16 Robinson, 41.

17 Interview with Emmanuel Marx, July 29 2013.

years, the Israeli government neglected to conceive of and implement a coherent and systemic national policy regarding the Palestinian minority outside of a strong-arm, security oriented framework of separation, induced fear, and surveillance.\footnote{See Bäuml, “Eqronot mediniot ha-aflih kelfi ha-‘aravim be-yisra’el,” 391-413.} A general prejudicial outlook cast Palestinians as inherently disloyal and most in government envisioned the mass emigration of Palestinians, if not their forced expulsion (given the right circumstances). Such attitudes nullified the need for programs, policies, or initiatives encouraging socio-cultural development of Palestinian communities and their domestication or integration into Israeli political, economic, and national-cultural life in the making.

According to Bäuml, the Israeli invasion of the Sinai and the massacre of forty-eight Palestinian citizens by Israeli border guards in the village of Kafr Qasim in October 1956 represented a rupture or turning point of sorts in the national-political imagination. Years of police brutality, land confiscation, economic deprivation, and neglect did not entice mass voluntary emigration across the 1949 armistice lines and neither did the general atmosphere of war in the autumn of 1956 and the massacre of unsuspecting and unarmed citizens by state agents in Kafr Qasim.\footnote{According to Uri Lubrani, the Arab Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office from 1957-1961, the government considered forcibly relocating Palestinians from border regions during the Sinai campaign in October 1956. See Ronald R. Krebs, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 217, fn. 53.} As a result, the ruling MAPAI party was compelled for the first time to acknowledge the Palestinian minority as a permanent community of citizens. A Committee for Arab Affairs was thus established in 1958 in order to articulate a coherent set of national policies and principles.\footnote{Bäuml, Tsel kahol lavan, 29-33.} This committee, however short lived (1958-1968) and lacking powers of enforcement as an advisory group to the Prime Minister’s Office, was the first instance of formal and official establishment action regarding state-minority relations as imagined through a framework of “integration.”

Working alongside the Central Security Committee as well as Israeli experts in Arab cultures and societies (mizrahanim or Orientalists), the initiative brought together several sectors of the state, namely the military, General Security Services, the Prime Minister's Office, the police, and the Histadrut (the national labor organization). As a unified (albeit MAPAI-
dominated) committee, it attempted to hash out general policy on how to develop meaningful state contacts/relationships with Arab constituents and carefully force their adjustment to new institutional, political, and economic realities. Thus, an integrationist approach towards Palestinian citizens was hashed out during these sessions, with proponents seeking to liberalize already existing policy in such a way that protected state interests and addressed security concerns while catering to the individual and communal needs of Arab communities. This new approach, however, was not positioned against the perceived necessity of maintaining an intelligence and surveillance system over Palestinian communities and political activity. Indeed, its primary advocates, namely from within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and Histadrut, nonetheless sought to continue enforcing policies of geographical separation (spatial control) and communal (ethnic) divide and rule strategies. Instead, proposals for an integrationist approach represented an attempt to find the right balance between security and state building objectives by gradually shifting away from direct military rule over Palestinian citizens to a system of civilian oversight and observation, thereby animating the already existing policy on control and supervision.

Bäuml’s studies convincingly illustrate that Palestinian citizens were not deemed by Israeli policy-makers writ large to be actual or even potential citizens of the new Zionist order in the decade following the 1947-1949 war. The impetus of consolidating state control over land, ethnic hierarchy, and a modern national Jewish identity in the context of the “ingathering of exiles” in the early 1950s meant the exclusion of Palestinians from the nation-building project and an ambivalence (and hence lack of a coherent and officially formulated policy) towards minorities. However, while the appearance of the first Committee for Arab Affairs in 1958 indeed represented a rupture in that it was the first time state offices came together to agree upon and formalize a minority policy outside of a strictly military framework, this shift in attitude was a reflection of impulses or tremors already felt within state institutions by the mid-1950s, when

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22 Some within the liberalizing/integrationist camp even advocated for Arab assimilation into Israeli society and national culture. Perhaps the most vocal assimilationist was Abba Hushi, who was the chairman of the Committee for Arab Affairs in the 1960s.

calls to restrict the powers of military rule over Palestinian communities in Israel (if not abolish the military government all together) were gradually increasing.\textsuperscript{24}

The following section will illustrate that an integrationist or “liberalizing” establishment positioning vis-a-vis the Palestinian minority first emerged and materialized among a group of state functionaries in the mid-1950s as a response to socio-political anxieties and conceptual shifts within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. I will argue that these anxieties and shifts emerged in response to two developments. First, the military government came under increasing scrutiny from within the Zionist political establishment starting in the early 1950s. Indeed, already in 1955, with the appointment of the Ratner commission by the government to scrutinize military rule and its declared necessity, the military regime scaled back its functions and jurisdictions in the “Arab sector.”\textsuperscript{25} It was at this time that Zionist political parties in the Knesset (notably MAPAM) as well as a small group of MAPAI-affiliated functionaries came to recognize the need to re-think the dominant military paradigm applied towards Palestinian citizens, leading to the first integrationist (establishment) initiative through the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in the form of a Jewish-Arab summer camp in the summer of 1956. For this marginal but determined faction, the gradual unravelling of military rule over Palestinian communities demanded a shift away from a strict military posturing and towards civilian apparatuses of control. Such a shift necessitated intimate knowledge and ethnographic awareness of minority communities among Israeli Jews and state officials, as well as the development of affective ties among Palestinians toward the state, Israeli society, and the still emerging national culture (despite the absence of any meaningful ideological or historical reference point). What is more, the initiative was also a means to reinforce the liberal elements of the Israeli national identity in the making. The primary aim of consolidating Zionist control over land and labor in the immediate aftermath of the 1947-1949 war nurtured a separatist, ethno-nationalist and militaristic Israeli Zionist identity. However, with Zionist control over land and economy felt to have been more or less consolidated by the mid-1950s, a small circle of state functionaries began to fear too strong a de-emphasis of modern, liberal values; an epistemic reference point upon and


\textsuperscript{25} Ozacky-Lazar, “ha-Mimshal ha-tsva’i ke-manganon shlita be-ezrahim ha-’aravim,” 106.
through which the modern Hebrew national (as well as state policy) was to be ideally constructed. The Jewish-Arab summer camps were a manifestation of a “will to knowledge” regarding Palestinian communities that was meant to satisfy the need for a re-formulated surveillance paradigm as well as the construction of the ideal “Arab” minority and enlightened (Israeli Jewish) citizen.26

2.2 State Organized Arab-Jewish Encounter and the Limits to Palestinian Integration

Once the final armistice agreement was signed in 1949, attempts to mobilize Palestinian citizens both socially and politically in the first five years of statehood were limited to the Israeli Communist Party (MAKI, or HaMiflega HaKomunistit HaYisraelit), MAPAI, and youth activities and outreach programs run by leftist-Zionist parties such as MAPAM.27 As stated, the Palestinian minority were deemed a threat to the state and Jewish exclusivity and in the context of a perceived state of war, they were vulnerable to expulsion. Hence, in the immediate years following the 1947-1949 war for Palestine, the government did not generally support or encourage such initiatives at the official level. Shira Robinson argues that any provision of democratic procedural rights granted to Palestinians immediately following the establishment of the state of Israel was part of colonial bargain that the “yishuv was forced to accept in order to gain international recognition of its sovereignty in 1948.”28 Without doubt, it was a time of consolidating Zionist supremacy in the name of “separatist political aspirations.”29 In such a context, Palestinians were subject to control mechanisms as a means toward internalizing their defeat, if not encouraging their expulsion, and were separated from Israeli project of identity construction and territorial consolidation. At the same time, state officials were aware of international discomfort at (and criticism of) Israeli governing practices and they sought to

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29 Ibid., 8-9.
maintain (if not further gain) international alliances to ensure its survival and interests by extending suffrage and procedural rights to Palestinians. Without losing sight of the role of international scrutiny in how Israel dealt with “minority” issues in the 1950s, I argue that shifts in minority policy cannot be reduced to a sense of obligation to international demands alone. The military regime in particular was increasingly challenged in the Knesset by Zionist parties and constituencies from the early to mid-1950s in part because its anti-democratic structure was gradually recognized as a liability among state architects themselves. Once control by the state over land and the labor market was more or less deemed to be consolidated, military government was increasingly seen as an unnecessary contradiction, if not a threat to liberal-democratic ideals of the state and the Liberal-Zionist identity in the making.

Internal (Zionist) dissent towards the military government and a corresponding shift in thinking about minority policy began already in the early 1950s, although it was restricted to small and marginal circles of officials at the time. There was explicit criticism aimed at the military regime on account of it being a political tool for MAPAI to garner votes. At the same time, criticism from the Zionist (labor) left (MAPAM and Ahdut haAvoda after it split from MAPAM in 1955) argued that the military government was detrimental to Israel’s security, as such a system only worked to radicalize Arabs. Moreover, criticism was also directed at the military government because it functioned as an institution outside parliamentary scrutiny as well as a mechanism stifling proletarianization and development in the "Arab sector" (and thereby an obstacle to national economic development). Dissent also focused on whether emergency measures were an effective or even necessary mechanism in service of the twin imperatives of surveilling the Palestinian population and ensuring the ideal conditions for Zionist material and geographical domination. This small oppositional faction was supported also by the General Security Services, who admitted that Palestinian citizens were by and large not aiding and abetting return of refugees. Nor were they in contact with neighboring countries on a large scale. Ultimately, the largest faction supported Prime Minister David Ben Gurion in extending

30"Relations with the Christian Community, 1955-1956," June 1956, ISA 394/2 KHZ.
33 Benzman and Mansour, 104.
the existence of the military regime indefinitely. Palestinians were generally feared as a fifth column by the Jewish public and despite criticism on the margins of the Knesset, the military regime was deemed essential towards consolidating state control over territories seized after the war and aiding in the settlement of the Jewish population in the (Palestinian populated) north of the territory. The travel permit regime of the military government was also integral in keeping Palestinians out of the developing labor market reserved for incoming Jewish (mainly Mizrahi) immigrants.\(^{34}\) What is more, limiting freedom of movement was instrumental in the divide and rule policy of separating Palestinians into distinct communities and isolating them from communist activity and mobilization.\(^ {35}\) Lastly, the military regime provided a flexible (that is, unaccountable) structure of government to act along the borders (or armistice lines) in preventing the return of Palestinian refugees. In the words of Shira Robinson, in the immediate years after the establishment of Israel, the state was still in process of a “military and bureaucratic campaign to reduce further the size of the Palestinian population” and “securing the permanent subordination of Arab citizens to Jewish nationals.”\(^ {36}\) Ben Gurion and his faction saw it best to keep the Palestinian population at the mercy of a military regime.

Nonetheless, opposition continued to grow and on December 6 1955, the Israeli government launched The Ratner Commission (named after its appointed chairman, MAPAI-affiliated former general Yohanan Ratner) to investigate the military government and determine whether it should be abolished or extended. By March 1956 the Ratner Commission ultimately recommended that the military government remain intact; bowing to Ben Gurion's rationale that it was vital for preventing the potential mobilization of Arab citizens by hostile neighboring countries.\(^ {37}\) However, and although the commission recommended that the military government not be abolished or limited in any way (in fact, the staffs of the military commanders were increased for better communications), the functions and jurisdiction of the regime were already being scaled back.\(^ {38}\) For example, the regime reduced the number of “closed areas” after 1954 while allowing

\(^{34}\) Interview with Emmanuel Marx, July 29 2013; Robinson, 40-41.
\(^{35}\) See Ozacky-Lazar, "ha-Mimshal ha-ts'va'i ke-manganon shlita be-ezrahim ha-'aravim," 103-132.
\(^{36}\) Robinson, 115.
\(^{37}\) "Supplement: Military Government in Israel," ISA 5434/2 PM C; “Auster: 'Minorities are not Loyal to the State,'” Haaretz, April 24 1956, ISA 13905/8 GL.
for greater freedom of movement for Palestinians in the north. At the same time, temporary travel permits were extended from two weeks to a month.\textsuperscript{39}

The Ratner commission and the ensuing relaxation of military control was the product of increasing Knesset opposition to the military regime, mainly from MAKI, MAPAM, as well as the more right-wing \textit{Herot} (Freedom).\textsuperscript{40} Each faction had its own rationale for calling for an end to military government. Principally, the military regime was gradually recognized by Zionist opposition parties as a mechanism for MAPAI, the largest and most dominant establishment party, to not only stifle rival political activity and mobilization in the "Arab sector" but also to garner Palestinian support for its own party through its electoral lists.\textsuperscript{41} At the same time, among leftist Labor parties (MAPAM) there was a concern that the hardships and economic development caused by a strong-arm, military-oriented approach to minorities encouraged nationalist chauvinism among Palestinian citizens (and Israeli citizens on account of enforced separation) as well as support among minorities for ethno-nationalist and anti-Zionist ideologies.\textsuperscript{42} For these parties, an alternative security framework and minority policy had to be imagined and implemented. In addition, by the mid-1950s there was increasing demand for cheap labor corresponding with a gradually growing national economy that Palestinian Arab labor could satisfy.\textsuperscript{43} This meant easing the restrictions of movement for Palestinian citizens, which in turn could foster and nurture their dependence on the national economy and the state.\textsuperscript{44} What is more, the question of Zionist (state) domination of the land was by 1954-1955 then the exclusive prerogative of the state lands administration and the Jewish National Fund. The subordination of the Palestinian population was consolidated in two crucial areas of settler-colonial and state-building objectives.

Public and parliamentary protest around these issues increased, leading to the 1958 Rosen Commission that ultimately recommended that the military government be significantly reduced in presence. Although restrictions on movement were again scaled back in 1959, notably in

\textsuperscript{39} Minutes for the Committee for the Affairs of Military Government, April 1956, ISA 13905/8 GL.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ozacky-Lazar, "ha-Mimshal ha-tsva‘i ke-manganon shlita be-ezrahim ha-‘aravim," 104.
\textsuperscript{42} Me’ir Ya’ari, \textit{Mivhanei derehu} (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Po’alim, 1957), 125; Bäuml, \textit{Tsel kahol lavan}, 237.
\textsuperscript{43} Interview with Emmanuel Marx, July 29, 2013.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
northern and central districts under military rule, the government would ultimately reject the conclusions of the report on account of the growing regional power of Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser and the potential appeal of pan-Arab nationalism.\textsuperscript{45} However, the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961, which was widely interpreted as a gradual weakening of Egypt’s regional-ideological dominance, again made it increasingly difficult to justify the existence of military rule.\textsuperscript{46}

The increasing discomfort with military government was again centered in large part around political jockeying against MAPAI domination and concerns regarding economic and social development. As will be shown, at the same time the context of the 1955 Ratner commission and subsequent commissions in ensuing years was in part a product of a then marginal but nonetheless growing internal debate within the Zionist establishment, including within MAPAI dominated branches of the state, over the potential erosion of the democratic ethos and liberal identity of the Zionist establishment.\textsuperscript{47} Although self-styled liberals and socialists saw the need to monitor the Palestinian population, the perceived strength and vitality of the Zionist project by this time and the already ongoing process of limiting the scope of military rule meant that the regime was becoming more of a burden than a necessary security mechanism. This led state functionaries to prepare for the inevitable dismantling of military government, to incorporate Palestinians as a permanent community of minorities, and to emphasize the need for a gradual shift towards civilian bodies of oversight and control.

While the gradual repealing of military rule can be regarded as little more than what Moshe Dayan referred to as a “bureaucratic change” in relation to Palestinian citizens, there were nonetheless significant conceptual shifts occurring within this context.\textsuperscript{48} Although a more significant rupture in state thinking regarding Palestinian citizens did not occur until after the Suez campaign and the Kafr Qasim massacres in the fall of 1956, there were nonetheless tremors indicating potential changes in minority policy before that time. What follows is an analysis of

\textsuperscript{45} “The Ministerial Committee on Military Government, 1958,” undated, ISA 13902/1 GL.
\textsuperscript{46} Bäuml, \textit{Tsel kahol lavan}, 139-143.
\textsuperscript{47} This was also a feature of MAPAM’s dissent towards military government. See Ozacky-Lazar, “ha-Mimshal ha-tsva’i ke-manganon shilta be-ezrahim ha-‘aravim,” 115-118; Ya’ari, \textit{Mivhanei dorenu}, 125-127; Amitay, \textit{Ahavat-Amim ba-mivhan}, 101-105; Cohen, “On the Arab Problem in Israel,” Halamish, 33-34.
\textsuperscript{48} Benziman and Mansour, 113.
such tremors in the form of a Jewish-Arab co-existence/cultural exchange initiative that was conceived in 1955 and launched in 1956. These activities did not reflect a broad, coherent, and mutually agreed-upon policy towards Palestinian citizens among state functionaries. Rather, it was an impulsive reaction to the gradual easing of the functions of military rule among a small faction of officials within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, which ignited internal debates and oscillation between a military approach of direct surveillance and a more liberal, integrationist approach to state security, minority policy, and national identity building. The summer camps project marks the beginning of a shift (however incomplete and contradictory) that culminated in the 1960s, where Palestinian citizens went from being strictly objects of military rule (enemy population) to subjects of sociological observance and civilian oversight (minorities). The gradual influence of integrationist approaches was not intended to replace but rather animate the government's security positioning over Palestinian citizens; allowing for the continuation of surveillance and control over Palestinian communities and a structural context with a greater potential in fostering the model Israeli citizen and the ideal Palestinian minority.

2.3 The Emergence of the Jewish-Arab Summer Camps Program

In the summer of 1956, select Israeli high school students from Haifa and Jerusalem were sent for month-long excursions into Palestinian Druze villages in the north, particularly Buqi'a (Peke'in), 'Isfiya, and Daliat al-Karmil. The trips were an integral part of the "oriental (studies) track" organized and introduced into select Israeli secondary schools by the mid-1950s. This academic track offered approximately eight hours of classes a week for willing Israeli students on topics including Islam and Islamic history as well as Arab history, customs, and language.49 The oriental track was conceived of in 1955 and was the brainchild of Meir Kister, then a Professor of Arabic studies at the Hebrew University, in partnership with functionaries within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, notably Emmanuel Marx and other junior advisors to Shmuel Divon, who was then the chief Arab Affairs Advisor to Prime Minister Ben Gurion.50 The implementation of the oriental track in select Israeli secondary schools corresponded with

50 Interview with Emmanuel Marx, July 29 2013.
programs introduced and designed to acquaint Israeli Jewish employees of state departments, the police, security services, and the military with Arab cultures, history, and languages.51

The oriental track was launched in 1955-1956 as a project organized and executed mainly through the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and Culture as well as Israeli Orientalists from the Hebrew University (with approval from the military authorities).52 The first excursion to Palestinian villages occurred in July 1956 and included about a dozen Israeli students.53 Accompanied by guides and instructors (both Israeli Orientalists as well as Palestinian state employees or local dignitaries handpicked by the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs), students were first given preparatory classes on minority affairs, proper behavior, appropriate dress, as well as sessions on manners suitable in a rural, Arab cultural setting. Students were then divided into groups (women and men) and assigned individual families in the Palestinian Druze villages of 'Isfiya, Buqei'a or Daliat al-Karmil. With each student assigned to an individual family, they would spend mornings and afternoons in the villages, and in many cases evenings as well, for a period of three to four weeks. Following a detailed program of activities, the students spent their time working with the families (such as the tobacco fields in Buqei'a), eating meals and engaging in “cultural cooperation” activities such as song, folk dance, and music.54 Also organized were guided tours of the villages, visits to local (Palestinian) councils and institutions, as well as lectures given by recruited academic, political and social figures offering their perspectives on Arab and Jewish history, citizenship, and civic responsibility.55 In the meantime, students were to keep detailed logs of what they had learned and gradually become more accustomed to the local dialect as well as to habits, beliefs, gender roles, and general ways of life in the villages. In the evening, students returned to either Haifa or Jewish districts of Buq'ea (Pekei'in), however some spent nights in the homes of assigned

54 Office of the Advisor for Arab Affairs, "Sending Students of the Oriental Track to Minority Villages,” 30 May 1956, ISA 17115/36 GL. Although the initial plan was to organize reading groups with villagers on Modern Hebrew literature and grammar, most Palestinians had by that time become familiar, if not fluent, in the language. Interview with Ilai Alon, August 4, 2013.
55 “The Oriental Track, 1958-1961,” undated, ISA 17041/19 GL.
families. From 1957-1959, activities emphasizing cultural exposure and social ties between communities materialized beyond the camps program. Such activities were organized through the Histadrut, including Jewish-Arab youth conventions organized by its Arab Department, as well as MAPAI affiliated Jewish youth organizations.

The choice of engaging with exclusively Palestinian Druze villages in and around Haifa was deliberate. First, the schools participating in the project were largely from Haifa. It was reasoned that as a “mixed city,” Israeli Jewish students were already socially exposed to the Palestinian minority (albeit in a strictly urban setting). Thus, the assumed culture shock would not be as extreme as it would be in other cases. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the initiative emerged in the context of continuing debate over compulsory conscription of Palestinian Druze into the Israeli military. The Palestinians had been subject to an active divide and rule strategy by the Zionist movement, which sought the “provocation of dissention” between religious communities as early as 1920. During the mandate period (1920-1947), the policy materialized when representatives of the Zionist movement in Palestine targeted Druze communities during times of social and inter-communal upheaval in an effort to maintain their neutrality if not active alliance with the yishuv against the emerging Palestinian (Sunni Muslim dominated) national movement. Zionist inroads into Palestinian Druze communities and the mutual connections created during (and after) both the 1929 revolts and the 1936-1939 Palestinian national rebellion marked the beginning of “Druzification” or “de-Arabization” of the Druze community, culminating in the creation of a minorities unit within the Israeli military during the 1947-1949 war for Palestine, in which the Druze served as an integral core. It is thus no coincidence that 'Isfiya and Daliat al-Karmil were seen as natural sites for such initiatives, as families therein had

56 Interview with Ilai Alon, August 4 2013. Ilai Alon was a participant in the initiative when it launched in 1956.
58 Interview with Ori Stendel, July 30 2013.
61 Rhoda Ann Kanaan, Surrounded: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 10. Druze were receptive to Zionist manoeuvring on account of the material benefit that could be gained and/or as a result of inter-communal clashes with Sunni Muslim communities, specifically during the 1936-1939 rebellion.
a history of close relations with the Zionist movement. By January 1956, the conceptual separation of the Druze from the larger Palestinian Arab community was further formalized with the enforcement of compulsory Druze conscription and only a year later, the Ministry of Religious Affairs established the “Druze” as a separate and unique religious and national category.

The reputation of Druze villages and urban centers in and around Haifa as potentially receptive to the initiative on account of this history was undoubtedly a reason for their selection into the program. Other Palestinian communities were deemed too unpredictable on account of a perceived lack of rapprochement with the state. However, despite warmer relations that existed between the state and the Druze, the idea of their compulsory conscription into the Israeli military was contested within the Druze community writ large as well as the Israeli military establishment. As the argument in favor of Druze compulsory military service gained traction within Zionist state and military circles by the mid-1950s, culminating in the official decision to enforce the Compulsory Military Service Law upon Druze in January 1956, it became imperative to convince communities opposed to the initiative to become more open to recruitment and active relations with state institutions. As such, the summer camp program was in part a recruitment initiative in Druze communities in and around Haifa.

Palestinian Druze residents, state employees, and local council members were approached directly by representatives from the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs to act as hosts, translators, and guides for the initiative. Some households and individuals were receptive to the invitation as friends and family members were already serving or employed in either the military establishment or state offices. However, others agreed to the initiative believing that it would bring favor to their families in the eyes of state authorities. Indeed, the activities began in a general context of restriction of movement and land confiscation in Palestinian villages and

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63 Ibid., 61-63.
64 "Summary for the Minority Affairs Committee Meeting, March 18 1957," March 18 1957, ISA 17001/15 GL. During this meeting, Yigal Allon, at the time a retired military figure and member of the Education and Culture Committee, emphasized the need to attract Druze youth in and around Haifa to initiatives meant to encourage acceptance of compulsory recruitment.
65 "Committee for the Affairs of Information and Culture among Minorities: Summary of Meeting, 31.1.57," January 31 1957, ISA 17115/36 GL.
towns (processes to which the Druze were not immune). What is more, in late 1957, Shmuel Divon, at the time the Arab Affairs Advisor and co-architect of the summer camps program, was behind a push through the Prime Minister's Office for accelerating the rate of development projects in rural Palestinian Arab villages. The Galilee region was particularly targeted for improvements to health and educational institutions as well as the introduction of modern technological approaches in the agricultural sector. Maintaining regular, cordial relations with both the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and military establishment was surely appealing for Palestinian villages struggling to survive and adapt to changing economic and political circumstances.

2.4 The Move to ‘Akka (Acre) and the Expansion of the Summer Camps Program

"We said, give him the honor, on one hand, but suspect him on the other hand because he belongs to the enemy. He is part of the Palestinians, the enemy, and this policy proved to be excellent! We'd tell them, don't help us, don't join the army, we don't impose national service but don't be against us! Be neutral in this war between your Palestinian nation and your Israeli country...we don't want them to do for us, we don't want them to do against us, and this, again, was our policy...."

--Shmuel Toledano, Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office (1965-1977).

"I learned three important things from my stay: the language; the fact that there is no essential difference between Jews and Arabs, so much so that I can't tell the difference between them in the old city and the bakery; and that Jews and Arabs live and work together with no difference or differences and no personal hatred."

--Yossi Landman, participant in the June 1962 Jewish-Arab summer camp in Acre.

In June of 1962, the oriental track was revamped with the creation of an annual, ten day Jewish-Arab summer camp. Primarily responsible for this change was Uri Lubrani, who at the time was

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66 Interview with Salmon Natour, August 9 2013; Interview with Emmanuel Marx, 29 July 2013.
67 "Israel has 115 Arab Schools," Canadian Zionist Gazette, November 1957, ISA 17115/36 GL.
68 "L'Elevation du Niveau de vie des Arabes Israéliens," La Tribune Sioniste, December 13 1957, ISA 17115/36 GL.
69 Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013.
70 Ya'acov Friedler, "Jewish Students Meet Acre's Arabs," Jerusalem Post, Friday June 22 1962.
the Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister, and it remained a phenomenon that lasted until the late 1970s. Alongside a team of junior advisors (chief amongst them Moshe Ma’oz, who was the head organizer behind the changes made for the summer of 1962), the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs sought an expansion of activities aimed at fostering mutual understanding between Palestinian and Jewish youth as well as encouraging greater ethnographic intelligence of Palestinians among Israeli Jews. The initiative that began in the summer of 1956 was deemed to be too limited in scope and reach. Only a handful of schools were involved with the oriental track and so the program catered to a few dozen Israeli students at a time who were interested in Islamic and Arabic studies. As a result, alongside expanding the scope of the summer camp initiative, the oriental track was gradually introduced to 12 more Jewish secondary schools. By 1971, Arabic studies were offered in over 200 Jewish schools. It was also decided that Palestinians beyond the Druze community should be targeted as more active participants and not simply serve as guides or hosts. To be sure, the academic and security aspects remained (promoting the oriental track and the importance of understanding spoken Palestinian Arabic and Arab customs among Israeli Jews). However, the annual summer camps in Acre emphasized the development of greater social ties between Palestinians and Jews through an increase in mutual activities and cultural engagement events. It is for this reason that Palestinian participation was more heavily promoted and encouraged through the (Israeli) Arabic language press, such as al-Yawm and al-Anba’, as well as through educational institutions. At the same time, excursions to Palestinian villages and cities were organized throughout the north and not just in and around Haifa. This was decided in part to instill among Israeli youth greater knowledge and familiarity with territories they seldom if ever visited, thereby encouraging not only greater knowledge of the territory of Israel but also “even population dispersal” (Jewish settlement) through tourism in the “Arab sector.”

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74 Letter from the Office on Arab Affairs to the Ministry of Education High School Department, "Visits of Students of the Eastern Trend to Akko," 1962, ISA 13926/24 GL.
75 Press releases were written and media outlets briefed by the Arab Affairs Advisor. "Draft: to Newspapers and Radio," undated, ISA 13926/24 GL.
76 "Developing Tourism in Minority Areas," February 1966, ISA 17019/2 GL.
The city of Acre became the site or home base of the Jewish-Arab summer camp, which took place annually in the spring/summer (June/July) and included anywhere between 80-120 Jewish and Palestinian youth, depending on the year. A formerly Arab city designated as part of a Palestinian state in the November 1947 UN partition resolution, Acre was conquered by Zionist forces during the War for Palestine in the May of 1948. Immediately thereafter, the city (mainly the developing “new city” that surrounded the predominately Arab old city) was gradually populated first by Jewish soldiers of the Zionist brigades that conquered Acre and eventually, through the Jewish Agency’s Absorption Department, Jewish immigrants from North Africa and Eastern Europe. Acre was thus selected for the summer camp program on account of its post-1948 transformation into a “mixed” and semi-industrialized Jewish-Arab city; a living symbol of the integration of Israeli Arabs in the Zionist imagination as well as the possibilities of co-existence within a Zionist state/institutional/ideological framework. An additional lure towards Acre was that the post-1948 municipality was dominated by MAPAI representatives in coalition with their affiliated Arab list. Council members, alongside the Mayor Shmuel Efrat (1962-1965) and his successor, Yosef Katran (1965-1969) were open to educational and cultural events that involved both Palestinians and Jews with the hopes that such activity would attract Jewish tourism (if not settlement) as well as decrease communal tensions surrounding the post-1948 development of the city (which prioritized Jewish settlement and housing) and police violence directed at Palestinian residents. Just as important was the fact that the Israeli Communist party (MAKI) was active in the city at the time while Acre was also the site of Palestinian nationalist activity, first through the establishment of a branch of the Arab Front (or Popular Front, a Palestinian nationalist movement) in the late 1950s and later, al-Ard (the Land). It was reasoned that a MAPAI social initiative could very well stem the tide of such activism in the city and garner support among Palestinian residents for the Municipality. At same time, with the expansion of Acre (northwards) and a corresponding push to transform the city

77 “High School Students to Live, Study in Arab Quarter,” Jerusalem Post, June 14 1962.
79 Letter to Uri Lubrani from Moshe Ma’oz, "A Report on the Studies of Students of the Oriental Track in Akko," July 4 1962, ISA 13926/24 GL. Nazareth was proposed as an alternative given the extent of schools and institutions in the area.
80 Jiryis, 186.
81 Emmanuel HaReuveni, "In Akko there is Hate...in Silence," 1961, ISA 17045/11 GL.
into a tourist hub in the Galilee, it was reasoned that such activities could work to attract non-Jewish tourism. All of these considerations made Acre the ideal site to serve as a home base for a revamped summer Jewish-Arab summer camps initiative.

The launch year of the camp included a day for both Jewish and Palestinian participants to tour schools, institutions (local councils and religious) and private homes in four Palestinian villages: Mazra'a, Mi'ilya, Buqe'i'a, and Julis. Over the years, however, additional Palestinian towns, cities/urban quarters, and villages were incorporated into the itinerary, such as Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Nazareth, Shafa'amr, Abu Snan, al-Tira, Umm al-Fahm, Jerusalem, and al-Ramah. A greater emphasis was placed on adding to the program Palestinian schools in these regions, as well as students and public/professional Palestinian figures. As a result, Hebrew became increasingly utilized as a second language in the program, although most Palestinian participants were already familiar with, if not fluent in, Modern Hebrew. At the same time, similar summer camp initiatives and youth conventions were established to draw in more Jewish and Palestinian youth. The scope of co-existence activities were significantly larger and more ambitious by the early to mid-1960s.

During the 1960s (and prior to the decision by Levi Eshkol to eliminate military rule in December 1966), the minutes of the MAPAI (turned Labor in 1968) Committee for Arab Affairs illustrate how liberalization and cultural/national immersion trends were at times de-emphasized by the Defense Ministry and Prime Minister’s Office, despite the presence of several advocates in the Committee. There were clear tensions inherent in a liberalization program that simultaneously sought to integrate and exclude Palestinians, as they were never envisioned to become (and contribute as) equal citizens. The primary objective of protecting ethnic hierarchy

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82 “Tourism in the Arab Sector,” undated, ISA 17004/10 GL; George Leonof, "Putting Acre on the Tourist Map," Jerusalem Post, October 15 1965, ISA 17004/10 GL.


84 Ya'acov Friedler, "10 Days Passed 'Too Quickly' at Arab-Jewish Youth Camp, Jerusalem Post, July 21 1963; Interview with Ori Stendel, July 30 2013;


86 See Bäuml, "MAPAI Committee for Arab Affairs," 421-422. Initiatives based on "economic assimilation," however, seemed to continue apace. By 1963, Support for the Military Government amongst Zionist establishment figures continued to diminish. However, the decision to maintain its basic functions survived by a single vote. "The Military Government Survived by a single Vote," HaMishmar, February 21 1963.
did not allow for a durable pairing of both impulses. As a result, the integrationist approach was minimized by Committee members as ineffective towards meeting these goals. What is more, in the context of regional destabilization (notably in Syria and Lebanon), the continued influence of the Communist Party in Palestinian regions, and the impact of Nasser and the non-aligned movement in the Middle East, state policy tended to steer once again towards favoring enhanced military supervisory roles in the “Arab sector.” Nonetheless, particular branches of the state, notably the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, the Department of Education and Culture, and the Arab Department of the Histadrut, continued in alliance with municipal functionaries in Haifa and Acre to pursue the objective of further penetrating the consciousness of Jewish and Palestinian youth and stabilizing the “integration” and civilian-based surveillance policy despite its increasing minimization by the Prime Minister's Office and Defense Ministry in the mid-1960s.  

The most vocal and influential advocate of the “integration” and cultural assimilation trend at this time was Shmuel Toledano, the Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office from 1965-1977 and head of the Minorities Committee. As arguably the most powerful personality involved in the day-to-day affairs of Palestinian citizens at the time, Toledano worked closely with the Arab Department of the Histadrut and municipal allies in the effort to eradicate military rule, encourage civic assimilation of Palestinians, and develop a successful and professional cadre of loyal Arab local leaders. Toledano held a chauvinistic and paternalistic point of view when it came to the Palestinian citizens of Israel. For him, when military government was enforced in 1948, it was necessary to not only protect the newly-born Jewish state but also to guide and modernize what he deemed to be a “traditional,” infantile society:

It's like a little boy who needs your help...the Arabs needed such help. Now they don't need such help. If you continue holding their hand, you're not doing the right thing. He is now able to walk himself. He doesn't need me to help him.

87 Most vocal advocates of this trend at this time were representatives Reuven Barkat, Amnon Linn, and (later) Ya'acov Cohen of the Histadrut, Uri Lubrani (1960-1963) and Advisor on Arab Affairs Shmuel Toledano (1965-1977), mayor of Haifa Abba Hushi (1951-1969), and Acre mayors Shmuel Efrat and Yosef Katran (1962-1969).
88 Correspondence between Professor Norman Bentwich and Shmuel Toledano, 1967-1969, ISA 17048/17 GL; Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013. The Minority Committee was headed by Toledano and included representatives from the Shin Bet, the military, as well as the Head of Police.
89 Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013.
90 Ibid.
Once assuming office in 1965, Toledano deemed the military regime no longer necessary given the strides in education and economic development in the “Arab sector” over the previous decade. Instead, he believed that state branches overseeing minority issues should direct their energies towards the continued cultivation a new breed of leadership distinct from the collaborator figures of the past. Such figures were to be successful, professional, sophisticated, loyal to the rule of law, and proudly Arab so as to draw them towards recognizing the benefits of a Zionist order.  

At the same time, with the growth of Arab and Islamic studies amongst Israeli youth, for Toledano a civilian-based apparatus of control was already well developed. Toledano believed that this growth should continue to be nurtured, both for purposes of security and “changing the outlook” of Israeli Jews towards Arabs generally. Upon his appointment, Toledano found a receptive ear in Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and as a result, funds increased from the coffers of the Prime Minister's office for a variety of activities and institutions designed to acclimate Palestinians to the Israeli order and further familiarize Israeli Jews with minority communities.

Toledano was an active supporter of the summer camps program in Acre and sought to encourage contexts and support institutions that promoted further mutual interaction. During his tenure, Toledano, along with the Arab Department of the Histadrut, was heavily involved in establishing Arab-Jewish cooperative youth and cultural movements, a Jewish-Arab youth camp in Netanya and Jerusalem, Jewish-Arab football tournaments, and increased funding for studies on Palestinian communities, culture, social structure and norms, specifically at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where Toledano would not only lecture on the topic of

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91 “Training for Arab Teachers, Teacher Training Seminars, 1970-1975,” ISA 17080/4 GL. Toledano specifically targeted Palestinian educators, funding seminars on educational policy as well as civic issues in Palestinian institutions.
92 Letter from Norman Bentwich to the Prime Minister’s Office, July 18 1966, ISA 17048/17 GL. In this letter, Bentwich declares himself to be in agreement with Toledano in seeking “the integration and cooperation” of the Palestinian population and a “change in outlook” for both Jews and Arabs.
95 After 1967, students from both East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights were invited to attend the camps in the attempt to normalize the Israeli annexation of both territories. See "Youth Camp in Akko," 1971, ISA 13900/7 GL.
96 Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013.
Palestinian citizens and the state but also read and approve research proposals on such issues from aspiring Israeli and Palestinian scholars.\(^97\) In addition to trade fairs and exhibitions celebrating Arab and Bedouin cultures showcased throughout the late 1960s (in mixed cities), the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs encouraged Jewish-Arab youth/"partnership" groups to visit and register in various co-existence institutions devoted to community building and cultural awareness, such as Beit HaGefen in Haifa (established in 1962) and Beit Kedem in Acre (established in 1973). Such cultural institutions, established privately but funded in part by the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and allied MAPAI municipal functionaries such as Abba Hushi (Haifa) and in the case of Beit Kedem, Israel Doron (Acre), were specifically designed for daily Jewish-Arab interaction as a means to whitewash communal tensions.\(^98\) Each and every one of these activities and institutions were involved in the Acre summer camp initiative, either as invitees or in the case of cultural institutions and festivals, serving as sites of contact and learning for summer camp participants.

Thus the introduction of the oriental track in the mid-1950s signaled the beginning of the development of a state-organized co-existence industry that erupted by the early 1960s into a network of cultural centers, cooperative tours, and other social and academic initiatives that encouraged meetings between Palestinian and Jewish youth. The reasoning behind its establishment and expansion are manifold and paradoxical. With increasing protest against the wide reach of the military regime and growing recognition (particularly after October 1956) of the need to incorporate Palestinian communities, the quest for an intimate body of knowledge regarding Palestinians had to go beyond the abstract and strictly "military logic of pure deterrence" that encapsulated Israeli intelligence work in the years immediately following the 1947-1949 war.\(^99\) The imperative became to shift away from a strictly strong arm policy towards a less visible and imposing security paradigm that embraced civilian (as opposed to military)


oversight and surveillance of minority communities. In other words, the summer camps signal the first manifestation of the desire within state institutions to mediate Jewish Israeli encounters with Palestinian Arabs as simultaneously enemies and citizens of the state. Personal encounters between Israeli and Palestinian youth were seen as a way to both force mutual recognition and prepare for the social and political changes that would inevitably arise with the gradual scaling back of militarily enforced separation.

A primary purpose of the oriental track and related initiatives through both Israeli secondary schools and branches of the state/security establishment was to produce more Israeli experts on the Arabic language and cultures and enrich the quality of intelligence work. Ethnographic knowledge and linguistic skills came to be perceived as vital to the inevitable shift of control and oversight of minority communities to civilian bodies, as this necessitated increased sociological and historical knowledge of Palestinian communities by the General Security Services, the police, as well as an informed and in-tune body of Israel civilians. In fact, both the military establishment and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs offered incentives for students and graduates of the oriental track to continue in post-secondary Arabic studies either in the university or the military. Graduates of the oriental track were eligible to be admitted directly into the second year of the Arabic and Islamic studies program in the Hebrew University. As for the military, graduates of oriental track courses and activities bypassed the classification system and were registered directly to the intelligence branch. Thus one of the main drivers behind the organization of the 1956 village excursions as well as its transformation into an annual summer camp in Acre was an emerging security rationale based on the impetus to better “know your enemy.”

Moshe Ma'oz, today a Professor (Emeritus) of Islamic and Arabic studies at the Hebrew University, played an integral role as one in a group of architects that expanded the scope of the oriental track and the summer camp program. Upon obtaining his MA in Arab and Islamic studies from the Hebrew University in 1960, Ma'oz became a junior advisor of Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office until he left to start graduate studies at Oxford in 1962. In describing

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100 Bäuml, "MAPAI Committee for Arab Affairs," 416.
101 Interview with Ilai Alon, August 4 2013; "The Oriental Track," undated, ISA 17041/19 GL.
102 Interview with Ilai Alon, August 4 2013;
the general mood among establishment politicians and the Israeli public more generally, Ma'oz states:

My boss or advisor was (Uri) Lubrani at the time. You know what he said about Arabs? “They cut the wood and they throw the water.” In other words, servants. This was him. And then, you know, they wouldn't talk about it but sometimes yes, as I said, they were a fifth column; a dangerous element because they are related to the Arabs... this was the general mood, except for MAPAM and the communists.103

For Ma'oz, despite the different motivations behind each organizer involved in the project, the primary reason that the camp initiative received support from Uri Lubrani was to gather ethnographic intelligence for purposes of developing a new security paradigm in relation to Palestinian citizens. In reference to the expansion of the oriental track and its related activities in the “Arab sector,” Ma'oz states:

What I did is...the years that I served...was bring high school students or kids to Arab villages or towns. These kids were in what we call the oriental section, where you learn more Arabic and Islam and so on and so forth. It became, unfortunately...it was to “know your enemy.” This was the purpose... because this was the mood of the time, you know. My purpose was really to know culture and habits and customs and so forth.104

Emmanuel Marx, who served as a junior Arab Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister's Office under Shmuel Divon (1955-1959) and was one of the architects of the oriental track program, states that although Palestinians were deemed to be an enemy population by government officials in general, it was gradually becoming recognized at the time that the military government “could only be justified as a temporary measure” and that a gradual shift to the General Security Services and a rule of civilian, academic, and government experts over Palestinian communities was inevitable. In addition, within the military establishment, Marx adds that by 1955 “there was a kind of liberal spirit which you may find unbelievable...(people) felt controls should be abolished, the Arabs integrated, and so on. I don't think it exists anymore but there was a time

103 Interview with Moshe Ma'oz, July 4 2013.
104 Interview with Moshe Ma'oz, July 4 2013. See also Bäuml, "MAPAI Committee for Arab Affairs," 426-427.
when it existed.” It was this concern for a shift away from the structure of military rule that was one of the primary motivations towards organizing cross-cultural encounters and activities.

Ori Stendel, a junior Arab Affairs advisor and organizer for the summer camp initiative from 1963-1965 adds that:

Well, this idea led the concept of what we called “the oriental trend,” that is to say, in the schools there were many pupils but not too many (so) we wanted to enlarge the scale of it. The idea was to prepare pupils to work afterwards in every governmental office, which needed experts in Arabic and so on. Of course! The camp was one of the, how to say it, components of all this.

Thus, government-organized cross-cultural encounter from the mid-1950s to the 1960s had an undeniable, security-based rationale. The oriental track and summer camps initiative was a means towards developing a body of knowledge that would support a civilian-based internal security apparatuses and means of control in a general context of the gradual dismantling of the functions of direct military rule. The excursions into Palestinian villages, towns and urban quarters was meant to supplement the materials studied in the classroom by bringing Israelis into direct contact with the languages, customs and ways of life of Palestinian communities.

At the same time, there was a second purpose behind the initiative: to shape the national consciousness and cultures of both Israeli and Palestinian youth. During a January 30 1958 meeting of the Committee for Arab Affairs, an action plan proposed by Reuven Barkat of the Arab department of the Histadrut references the effects of the military regime on the Palestinians in relation to Israeli national consciousness, stating: “we must prevent the negative influence of such treatment (of Palestinians) on the Jewish people and Jewish education in Israel.” This concern is further reflected in the Committee minutes from 1957-1959, as members feared that the effects of separation and anti-Arab attitudes among Israeli youth could escalate to civil war. What is more, in the context of accelerated debate over military government and the resulting isolation it imposed between Palestinians and Jews (both socially and economically), it was

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105 Interview with Emmanuel Marx, July 29 2013.
106 Interview with Ori Stendel, July 30 2013.
108 Bäuml, "MAPAl Committee for Arab Affairs," 418.
reasoned that proper (or "good") citizenship had to be nurtured among both Israeli and Palestinian youth through direct encounter and first-hand cultural familiarity. The Oriental track and its camps program was a means (however contradictory) to satisfy both security and socio-political/cultural concerns.

When asked about his own motivations behind organizing the initiative, former junior Arab Affairs advisor Emmanuel Marx (1955-1959) stated that:

Well, you see the whole system was a system of suppression for Arabs and...I didn't know exactly how to deal with it. I didn't want to be part of it so the least I could do was to train the people working in the system to appreciate the Arabs as human beings; as people with a history and a wonderful language and literary tradition and (that) they should be treated as human beings. That was a kind of...kind of a short cut towards changing the system...

...there (was) a deep ignorance about Arab culture and part of it was that, I mean, when you want to repress the Arabs and discriminate against them, first of all you have to convince yourself that they are not good people; that they are primitive and therefore easy to displace...students came out with the idea that Arabs are very simple people, uneducated, uncivilized and this tradition of this enormous Arabic culture didn't sink in at all.

Shmuel Toledano concurred that there was a general feeling of anxiety about how Israeli Jews were relating to Palestinians and the Middle East more generally. In explaining his motivation to sponsor co-existence activities under his tenure (and before), Toledano related:

The behavior of the Jews was very important…and they didn't behave properly. The average Israeli Jew did not trust Israeli Arabs and Israeli Arabs feel it...because the Israeli Jew does not know who will plant the bomb. But on the other hand, the Israeli Arabs were not to be blamed. So I made every effort to bring Arabs and Jews together.

Moshe Ma'oz added to these impressions, stating:

I was an assistant advisor to the Arab Affairs Advisor to Prime Minister Ben Gurion and my job was to introduce to the public sector officials, you know, employees and what have you, some

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110Interview with Emmanuel Marx, July 29 2013.

111Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013.
knowledge about the Arabs... they had looked at them as, how can I say it, a fifth column in this period. So, you know, I published some books and we had lectures and discussions and then I thought maybe the young generation is a good target for change.

... what I did (was) bring high school students or kids to Arab villages or towns... these kids from different schools in Israel, we took them to Acre and Nazareth and some other places for two weeks to meet Arab kids and to have discussions and debates and you know, friendship. The idea was that they were potential enemies, we have to guard them, to observe, to supervise, what have you...but it wasn't pure security. It was also politics because they wanted to be involved.\textsuperscript{112}

In 1963, Ori Stendel, then a master's student in Arabic studies at the Hebrew University, replaced Moshe Ma'oz in his task as junior Arab Affairs advisor to the Prime Minister's Office and organizer of the Jewish-Arab summer camp initiative. Stendel similarly regarded cross-cultural activity as crucial towards the development of social ties between Palestinians and Israeli Jews and a more tolerant and liberal Israeli national:

Well, I thought then and I still think now that meeting of youth...is very important for Jews and Arabs in the sphere of personal development. You know, not being always with your circle, only with Jews, and vice versa when I speak with Arabs...it was very complicated but very vital, a very important challenge...

... and of course, we knew that we were living with (an) Arab minority and we had to find ways to cooperate and live together. Yes, this was the concern then and it is the concern now. But I think that at that time, it was stronger than now. Now the situation has changed.\textsuperscript{113}

Ilai Alon, currently a Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University, was among the first Israeli students to participate in the oriental track program and the 1956 summer camp project. He offered his own thoughts of the rationale that led to the establishment of the oriental track and what motivated him personally to participate in the initiative:

I can think of two or three reasons. One, is educational. The problem with Arabic studies in Israel, to the best of my knowledge..., is that if you take Arabic as a kind of classical studies language, like Greek or Latin, you do not know your way around and...you want to buy a loaf of bread, you don't know how to say it, but you are an "expert," you know? It was an attempt to shift a little bit to the more practical aspects of Arabic studies. The other thing is security. The military was very anxious to create a sort of a cadre of Arabic speakers and people who could make out...what it means to know Arabic. To know what is not said... The Third reason is

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Moshe Ma'oz, July 4 2013.
\textsuperscript{113} Interview with Ori Stendel, July 30 2013.
perhaps the social one. There must be connections between the Jews and the Arabs and we cannot go forever in suppression between these two constituencies in the country.\textsuperscript{114}

According to Alon, the third motivation to establish “connections between the Jews and the Arabs” reflected a mood that developed around this time, specifically among a handful of young and aspiring Orientalists at the Hebrew University, where liberal ideals were felt to be in peril. According to Alon, many participants as well as organizers at the Hebrew University were “involved politically:”

... not party politics or not declaratively about politics but sort of, how should I put it, ethically-politically...like, what political stand would you be expected to hold judging from an ethical point of view, from a moral point of view, from a historical point of view?\textsuperscript{115}

For Alon, the security rationale behind the initiative was transparent from the start. However, at the same time, the very existence of military government did not allow for long term and “more ethical” ways of thinking about the so-called minority problem in Israel, which was an issue that resonated among organizers of the initiative from the Hebrew University. The existence of an apparatus of enforced separation and oppression had the potential to isolate Israel internationally as well as threaten the formal liberal identity of the state and its Jewish national body.

With the declaration of the state in 1948 and the influx of close to a million Jews from Africa, the Middle East and Asia beginning in the 1950s (part of what Israeli Zionist discourse refers to as “the ingathering of exiles”), the project of resocializing Jewish citizens and constructing a uniquely “Israeli” Jewish national identity was prioritized alongside the conquest of the territory. However, it was not clear what the parameters of Israeli national culture or the exact attributes of the Israeli nation were, let alone where Palestinians should fit into a Zionist settler-colonial national consciousness.\textsuperscript{116} This ambiguity was reflected within the institutions responsible for transmitting and reproducing what were deemed the national values of the state. On the one hand, when the first Knesset passed the Compulsory Education Law in September 1949, the educational system was endowed by the state with the task of resocializing Jewish

\textsuperscript{114} Interview with Ilai Alon, August 4 2013.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Robinson, 134-135.
youth. However, the division of the education system into separate trends (and hence different points of emphasis on what were considered Jewish and Israeli values) and differing programs and educational standards for Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jewish children meant great difficulty for the state to enforce a standardized curriculum and foster the emergence of a unified and cohesive national and statist consciousness.

Prior to the attempts by the state to reform the education system, the principal means to rectify this issue was through the military. Compulsory service of Israeli youth meant that the military was an integral component in the project of their re-socialization. Considering the domination of MAPAI over the branches of the state, it is no surprise that the military sought to construct the modern/sovereign Jewish citizen in the image of the Labor-Zionist movement. Nonetheless, the values emphasized and transmitted were just as ambiguous. A core of the Jewish Israeli identity in construction through the military was an articulation of the foundational master-narrative of Zionism: the negation of exile (shelilat haGalut). The concept of the negation of exile emphasized both continuity with an ancient Jewish past in Palestine (thereby rationalizing/justifying the creation of a Jewish nation state in the region) and discontinuity with the cultures and histories of the diaspora, which according to this concept represented a sort of interim and ultimately transitory period culminating in the redemptive return to the land of Israel and hence a “return to history.” This followed a nationalist reasoning and understanding of Jewish history, where non-territorial or non-sovereign (exilic) existence was deemed abnormal and inauthentic, resulting in the alienation of the Jewish community from their wider social, cultural and political worlds as well as from history itself. In the Zionist master narrative,

117 Before 1953, the Jewish education system was branched into three trends: General, Mizrahi, and Labor, all with their own pedagogical models. Arab Education existed within a separate system. After 1953, a law was passed standardizing a national curriculum (approved by the Ministry of Education and Culture) and emphasizing the need for a more coherent, statist education.


119 See Gabriel Piterberg, The Returns of Zionism: Myths, Politics and Scholarship in Israel (London: Verso, 2008), Ch. 3.

120 Ibid., 94-95. See also Ella Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims," Social Text 19-20 (Autumn 1988): 1-35. It is important to point out that Israeli state institutions are Ashkenazi-dominated and attitudes towards Jews from the global south/Levant/Arab regions (known as mizrahim) reflected beliefs of Ashkenazi superiority and Mizrahi backwardness. As a result, mizrahim were subject to separate educational streams, which sought to "modernize" mizrahi subjects and subordinate them to the lower social and cultural rungs of an Ashkenazi order. The model Israeli citizen was, in effect, Ashkenazi and western in orientation and worldview.
world Jewry had to overcome this past by “re-rooting” in the territory of Palestine. The national consciousness thus awoken upon this return was embodied in the spirit of the *sabra*: the native and authentic Israeli citizen.

The *sabra* was to be the anti-thesis to the Jews of the diaspora as it was conceived in the nationalist Zionist imagination. The *sabra* was in touch with their Jewish (ethnic) essence, territorial history, and community; exhibiting a commitment to working the land as well as bravery, mainly through protecting the existence of the Jewish state. Thus, the modern Jewish citizen was to be militantly nationalistic, self-sacrificing, and committed to the conquest of land and labor in Palestine. However, at the same time, the “negation of exile” also meant that the new Jew/Israeli citizen was to harbor a modern, Western (European) disposition. Although the ultra-nationalist *sabra* was to negate the cultural values of the Jewish diaspora and dedicate oneself to a nationalist-colonial venture, the *sabra* (at least for socialist-Labor Zionists) nonetheless was to embody humanist values rooted in enlightenment (European) thought. This is on account of the fact that “negating” exile was not only about eradicating the languages and cultures of the diaspora. It was also rooted in the experience of being an oppressed minority during the “transitory” period of Jewish history (that is, the period in exile). Paradoxically, Jewish national identity building entailed not only a militant-separatist impulse but also an embrace of humanist outlooks. This was an aspect of Zionist identity that the existence of military government and enforced separation endangered and was deemed an integral component of both Israeli state posturing at the international level, as well as Zionist national identity for a small but determined group of state functionaries. It was therefore expected that the military program/youth training unit, *Gadna*, would be involved in the camps project in 1956.

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122 Office for Arab Affairs, "Sending Students of the Orientalist Trend to Villages of Minorities," May 30 1956, ISA 17115/36 GL. *Gadna*, an abbreviation for “youth battalions,” is a program/training unit designed for preparing Israeli youth for military service and instilling a statist/national education. Established in the early 1940s by the *Haganah*, at the time of the inauguration of the camps, it emphasized a Labor Zionist statist education.
2.5 Constructing the Ideal Minority: Palestinian Participation in Co-Existence Initiatives

The Israel Arabs: are they with us or are they against us? The bottom line is, they can't be with us...the national army, the flag, and so on. The big interest in the state of Israel is that they not be against us and that they not take their swords. The day the Israeli Arabs will take their swords, it will be a black day for the state of Israel...and that's the policy of all governments: if they are not with us, that they not be against us, that they be neutral. For how long? I don't know.  

--Shmuel Toledano

The re-launch of the summer camps program in the summer of 1962 came with a stronger emphasis on Palestinian participation including students, educators, and state functionaries serving as guides and lecturers. Starting that year, over half of the one hundred or so participants tended to be Palestinians and for the first time, camp organizers emphasized Arab businesses and institutions as the dominant learning and cooperative environments for their activities. Progressively, Palestinian Christian and Sunni Muslim towns, villages, and institutions were incorporated into the itinerary. At the same time, there was a concentrated effort for greater media exposure of the initiative, leading to expanded press coverage in both Hebrew and Arabic in media organs such as Davar, haMishmar, al-Yawm and al-Anba’ (the content of which was closely monitored by the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and the General Security Services).

By 1960, there was a general sense within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs that the camps initiative catered too heavily on the involvement of Jewish youth. With the powers of the military regime scaled back and the steady growth of communist activity in Palestinian communities, there was a greater sense of urgency from within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs for Palestinian integration into/affinity to social and cultural life of the state in order to minimize external criticism of Israeli state practices, re-gain Palestinian support for MAPAI lost

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123 Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013.
124 Letter from the Office for Arab Affairs to the Minorities Committee in the Public Council for Education and Culture, “Summer Camp for Youth for Jewish-Arab Study (Offer Two Year Program),” April 30 1963, ISA 13926/19 GL.
125 Note from the Office for Arab Affairs to the shabak, "Struggles in regards to al-Anba,” June 4 1974, ISA 17085/1 GL. The shabak was entrusted to approve of and monitor articles written in the Arabic language Israeli paper, al-Anba’.
in preceding elections, and to better prepare for an end to military rule through a more ambitious itinerary including more Palestinian communities and participants. For summer camps organizers in the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, the program felt like a missed opportunity, reasoning that it could do well to more effectively (and more broadly) shape the consciousness of both Jews and Arabs. Indeed, in a letter sent by Moshe Ma'oz to the Arab Affairs Advisor Uri Lubrani in July 1962, Ma'oz stressed that “engagement with Arab youth” had to be emphasized in camp programming so to develop a greater affinity among Palestinian youth to the state.126

Beginning in the early 1950s the Israeli Communist Party (MAKI) was the most aggressive and well organized party fighting land confiscation and pushing for full civil and political rights for Palestinians.127 The expansion of the summer camps initiative formed part of a more general effort by MAPAI-dominated state branches and military authorities to counter the appeal of the movement, which also included the use of force (the military and police) to prevent mass mobilization and rallies, exiling or arresting communist activists, and prohibiting the publication of political materials.128 Thus, camps programs were careful to extol the benefits of the status quo. Not only were lectures and activities shaped around statist education (that is, to impart knowledge of development initiatives as well as the structure and objectives of the state branches representing the “Arab sector”) but the lecturers themselves, who were professional, relatively wealthy, and well-connected Palestinians were used as examples of the possibilities inherent in “integration” and acceptance of the contemporary Zionist order. Indeed, the summer camp initiative targeted Palestinian youth in the interest of molding a specific set of values, political commitments, and dispositions.

As the carrot in a larger carrot and stick policy, MAPAI felt it could attract Palestinian support for the party not only with economic incentives but through sponsored tours, youth activities, and the development of interpersonal relationships between Palestinian youth and Israeli Jews. It was no coincidence that ardent anti-communist and founder of one of the first pro-MAPAI Palestinian (government) parliamentary lists, Muhammad Nimar al-Hawwari,

127 Cohen, Good Arabs, 42.
128 Committee for the Affairs of Hasbara and Culture for Minorities. Summary of Meeting 31.1.57, January 31 1957, ISA 17115/36 GL; Cohen, Good Arabs, 44.
collaborated with the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in organizing the camps project in 1955.\textsuperscript{129} Shortly after the Second World War, al-Hawwari established al-Najjadah, an underground Palestinian paramilitary/scout organization, which fought against Zionist forces during the 1947-1949 war. However, he was forced to flee Palestine at the end of 1947 after it was discovered by Palestinian paramilitary factions that he had established direct contact with the Zionist paramilitary unit \textit{Haganah}. Despite a history of anti-Zionist military activity, al-Hawwari was granted a permit by Israeli military authorities to return to his homeland in 1950 “to lead an anti-communist crusade” in favor of MAPAI. Towards this end, al-Hawari had uncompromising state support.\textsuperscript{130}

With Palestinian communities in Israel geographically and politically separated from national-political organizations in exile and still reeling from the effects of the imposition of a colonial-security order, Palestinians, particularly youth, were deemed susceptible not only to radical political philosophies and movements but also to Zionist outreach activities and initiatives.\textsuperscript{131} According to Shmuel Toledano, by the time of his tenure in the Prime Minister's Office in 1965:

These summer camps, it was a pure operation of the Advisor for Arab Affairs. It was different at this time...the behavior of the Israeli Arabs have completely changed...(there was) a huge change of this population. When we captured Israel, 93% of the Israeli Arabs were illiterate because all those who knew, left. Twenty years later, it was exactly the opposite...I can't see any other minority changing so much in such a short time.\textsuperscript{132}

With the imposition of military rule over Palestinian communities after the establishment of Israel in May 1948, the only access Palestinians had to state institutions was through a network made up of local dignitaries (religious authorities, \textit{mukhtars}) and figures affiliated with Zionist Knesset (Arab) lists. Although it was reasoned that this system was integral for the state to maintain some influence over Palestinian communities, gather intelligence, and create a “veneer of legitimacy” for the state, these intermediary figures were not necessarily influential figures in

\textsuperscript{129} Interview with Emmanuel Marx, July 29 2013.
\textsuperscript{131}“Arab Youth,” undated, ISA 17004/24 GL.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013.
their communities.\textsuperscript{133} What is more, over time, many of those holding any sway lost whatever respect they may have had in their communities due to police violence, rising national consciousness, and a lack of material and political progress. By the mid to late 1960s, with more development projects underway in the “Arab sector” and a growing cadre of Palestinian professionals, it was reasoned within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs that the context was ripe to extend their reach and extol the virtues of the status quo to more Palestinian communities (particularly youth).

As a high school student at Ironi Alef in Haifa, the late Palestinian writer and activist Salman Natour (d. February 2016) attended the summer camp in Acre on two separate occasions in 1965 and 1966. When asked to recall the nature of the activities and in particular the lectures, day trips and group discussions to which students were exposed on a daily basis, Natour recalled:

I think that also for the Arabs it was to normalize the relationship; to understand more the Jews because we have also lectures, we went to the kibbutzim, and all the time they spoke about the young state; Israel as a young state and a developed state different from the Arab states. Propaganda, you know. Ten days of propaganda...When we went to visit a kibbutz, to see a kibbutz, they told us about the kibbutz and how people cooperate together... you know, the ideology of the kibbutz and socialism. Also, when we visited Arab villages we heard somebody who was beside the government. He was somebody, maybe the mukhtar or the head of a municipality or somebody who worked in government...you know, somebody who all the time spoke of nice things about Israel and democracy and development of the country. For us, to hear it from Arabs and not from Jews was important.

We understood, maybe from the school and this camp, the dangerous situation of the state...As young people, all the time they spoke about this dangerous situation and we understood it; we thought at that time that yes, the state is in danger from the Arabs and sometime they will attack. Much propaganda but very clever propaganda.\textsuperscript{134}

Of course, considering that the summer camps project was an extension of the oriental track program, the lectures and day trips were meant to familiarize Jewish students with day to day life within the Arab sector and the institutions catering to this sector.\textsuperscript{135} This is precisely why with the expansion of the camps program in 1962, Palestinian Arab institutions and shops as well as

\textsuperscript{133} Sa’di, 79.
\textsuperscript{134} Interview with Salman Natour, August 9 2013.
\textsuperscript{135} “A Report on the Studies of the Students of the Oriental Track in Akko,” Letter to Uri Lubrani from Moshe Ma’oz, July 4 1962, ISA 13926/24 GL; Correspondence between the Office for Arab Affairs and the Minorities Committee in the Public Council for Education and Culture, April 30 1963, ISA 13926/19 GL.
qadis, lawyers, shop keepers, municipal functionaries, educators, and Palestinian Knesset members figured so prominently on the itinerary. An additional motivation was to illustrate to Israeli Jews that Palestinians can indeed be loyal and modernized citizens in an attempt to counter the anti-Arab attitude fueled by enforced separation and Zionist scholarship in general.136

For Palestinian participants, there was a separate but related objective behind the tours to Arab villages as well as the lectures to which they were exposed: to extol the virtues of living under a modern, westernized state while highlighting the possibilities inherent through integration and acceptance of the Zionist order, such as individual success, community development, and the gradual transition from traditional to modern subjects. The objective was to illustrate that the state was the agent for such change and that the issues inherent in the “Arab sector” were rooted not in the ideology, history, and structure of the state but rather a lack of development, education, and modern values among Palestinians themselves.137 This is precisely why the camp's tour itinerary would make a point to stop in the few Palestinian villages/towns/cities where developmental initiatives were taking place.138 For example, in the summer of 1966, students visited Palestinian run factories in Baqa al-Gharbiyye with Faras Hamdan as their guide.139 Hamdan, who was a Knesset member as part of the Agriculture and Development list affiliated with MAPAI from 1951-1959, narrated the history of the city (although careful not to mention a history of Arab political control but rather historical presence) and how the state of Israel was responsible for its development from a small town to a modern city.140 Palestinian Bedouin urban developments in the Galilee were similarly visited with the same goal in mind. Mukhtars and government representatives sang the praises of the state for "civilizing" the Bedouin people and offering opportunities for employment and sedentary living.141

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136 See correspondence between Norman Bentwich and Shmuel Toledano, 1966-1968, ISA 17048/17 GL.
137 “Program of Informational Activities among Minorities for the Budget Year 1956/1957,” March 28 1956, ISA 17115/36 GL. In this document, according to the Office for Arab Affairs the idea was to "bring the (Arab) masses to accept the existence of the state and present their problems in the correct light."
139 “Camp for Arab and Jewish Youth in Akko: Activities Program,” June/July 1966, ISA 17048/14 GL.
140 Interview with Salman Natour, August 9 2013.
141 “Camp for Arab and Jewish Youth in Akko: Activities Program,” June/July 1966, ISA 17048/14 GL; Interview with Salman Natour, August 9 2013.
The lecture circuit itself was crafted and participants carefully selected with the goal of developing a framework of common interests between Palestinians and Jews based on values of progress, development, individual success and prosperity. The Jewish Israeli figures selected as guests of honor each year were to speak at the end of the ten days before the end of camp festivities. They were usually high ranking Jewish officials, such as Abba Eban, who was invited to address the students in July 1963 as well as July 1965 when acting as Deputy Prime Minister, to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. Such lectures were designed to convince participants that the best means for progress and development was to influence legislation and policy from within the system, which despite lived and structural realities was committed to Jewish-Arab “brotherhood” and cooperation while upholding and respecting the existence of separate ethnic, communal or, in the words of Eban, “spiritual” identities. At the same time, the very fact that high ranking government officials participated (and, in fact, spoke in colloquial Arabic) was meant to demonstrate the level of respect and dedication the state had towards its minority communities. Most important, however, were the Palestinian guests invited to speak. With this, the goal was to showcase Arab professionals, educators and municipal, and state functionaries who were at once professional, bilingual, educated, and successful, thereby serving as examples for Palestinian youth of the benefits of integration. This was in line with Toledano's goal of cultivating a cadre of educated and successful Palestinian leaders who were at once loyal to the state and respected within their communities. Indeed, lectures focused on issues of development, education, law, religion, and health while positioning Palestinian state functionaries as those responsible for improvements in these sectors. The idea was to cultivate a positive orientation towards the state and to encourage Palestinian youth to aspire to work within branches of the state serving minorities.

Although political issues inevitably arose in the course of the ten day camp, reference to realities of discrimination (military rule) and the history and existence of the state of Palestine

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142 "The Deputy Prime Minister--To the Arab-Jewish Youth," July 7 1963, ISA 13926/19 GL; Letter from the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Prime Minister's Office, June 22 1965, ISA 17045/11 GL. Eban, when addressing participating youth, stated that "your relations should not be dominated by the present but by future peace...this occasion symbolizes our joint desire to establish a united Israeli society which all its peoples--the Jews, the Arabs and the Druse--will cooperate to safeguard and develop. The various peoples do not have to forego their separate spiritual identity. All of them have something in common, but each of them has something that us peculiarly its own." See also "Arab and Jewish Youth asked to set pattern for peace," Israel Digest VI, No. 16 (undated), ISA 13926/10 GL.
(any topic that would encourage what was referred to as a “defensive posture” among Palestinian participants) was to be carefully avoided.\textsuperscript{143} The historical narratives presented at the camp were written to emphasize Jewish history in the region and to de-emphasize periods of Arab rule. For example, as part of the lecture program on the week-ending party of the June 1965 summer camp, the Mayor of Acre, Shmuel Efrat, as well as Shmuel Toledano and Abba Eban addressed the student participants. The historical narrative presented (presumably by the mayor) was a brief sketch of the history of Acre. Throughout the narrative, the Jewish presence and history in the region (as well as their persecution) is emphasized, from the Canaanites to the Mamluks, as was the “multicultural” nature of societies therein. The Arabs only figure as conquerors (such as the conquest of the region by 'Amr ibn al-'As in 636) and one of many communities who came and went over centuries of history (among them the Greeks, Italians, French, and Syriacs).\textsuperscript{144} The purpose appears to have been to emphasize a historical experience of Arabs as a multitude of minorities, thereby presenting Israel not as an anomaly or injustice towards the Palestinian people but rather a historical continuation of their political and structural position (albeit improved upon by the modern Israeli state). Thus, the lecture circuit was not about the assimilation or “de-othering” of Palestinians but rather developing a sense of adjustment, if not affinity, to a modern, caretaker state as minority communities.\textsuperscript{145}

A concern emerged, however, of how to develop a modern, “Israeli Arab” identity without risking identification among Palestinians with collectivist or pan-Arabist nationalist ideologies then prominent in the region. Again, the focus was to create sensibilities among Palestinian participants centered on individual prosperity, modernity, and economic progress. At the same time, there was an attempt to project an “Arab” identity centered not on a collective, anti-colonial, or nationalist framework (such as that evoked by Nasserism and the Palestinian al-Ard movement) but rather on the virtues of tolerance, understanding, and community development.\textsuperscript{146} Considering that at the time the demands expressed by Palestinian government affiliated leaders “were based mainly on distributive justice and individual liberal philosophy” as opposed to

\textsuperscript{143} Letter from Moshe Ben Haim to Shmuel Toledano, November 13 1966, ISA 17048/14 GL.
\textsuperscript{144} Shmuel Efrat, "Akko in the Past," undated, ISA 17045/11 GL.
\textsuperscript{145} This was the goal also of the Information of Culture and Hasbara for Minorities. "Program of Informational Activities among Minorities for the Budget Year 1956/1957," March 28 1956, ISA 17115/36 GL.
\textsuperscript{146} Eli Nissan, "Bourguibism as an Ideological Support for Israeli Arabs: A Bourguibist is Also a Good Arab," undated, ISA 17012/19 GL.
collective-national rights, Israeli leaders felt that this could be realistically cultivated as the parameters of such an identity. Thus, Rustam Bastuni, a Palestinian architect from Haifa who represented MAPAM in the Knesset from 1951-1955 and had since then become a journalist and consultant to the Ministry of Housing, was invited to speak to summer camp participants on several occasions. As was the common point of departure among speakers, Bastuni's lectures addressed the developmental improvements in Arab districts over the previous decade (particularly “changes in the structure of the Arab village” and the benefits of incorporation into the Israeli economy) and the need for Arabs to modernize and integrate in the social, civic, and political life of the state. Bastuni stood out, however, in his advocacy a particular Arab identity and disposition that complemented the camp's aim of crafting a model minority-citizen.

As an educated and successful professional fluent in three languages and well connected to branches of the state, Bastuni was deemed particularly useful in the eyes of the Arab Affairs Advisor. First, Bastuni was an advocate for molding of Arab national consciousness “within the framework of the existing reality.” For Bastuni, this entailed both the transformation of Israeli Jewish attitude towards Palestinians as well as modernizing their communities, instilling a sense of responsible citizenship, and working for economic and social change through state institutions (primarily education) and initiatives. Bastuni was particularly harsh in his criticisms of what he saw as the persistence of traditional social structures in Palestinian communities as well as pan-Arabist or (Palestinian) nationalist worldviews that he feared would take root therein. For Bastuni, “Arab” identity was not to be understood or translated in nationalist terms, as “the Middle East is not, and never was, a homogenous area of nations and ethnicities.” Instead, Arab identity in Israel was to be embraced in terms of a spiritual and cultural affinity.

147 A notable exception was al-Ard, a Palestinian-Arab nationalist movement that emerged in 1958. As for the Communist movement, while they spoke of a national-collective dimension in their calls for equality between Arabs and Jews, their universalistic ideology did not allow for clearer elaboration on this point. See Amal Jamal, Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: The Politics of Indigeneity (London: Routledge, 2011), 28; 31-32.
148 Letter from Uzi Barak to Rustam Bastuni, July 11 1965, ISA 17045/11 GL; "Program: July 5 1965-July 14 1965, ISA 17045/11 GL; Rustam Bastuni, "The Integration of Israeli Arabs," undated, ISA 17012/19 GL.
149 Rustam Bastuni, "Integrating Israel's Arabs: Rustam Bastuni makes some Specific Suggestions," Jerusalem Post, Friday September 25 1964.
151 Bastuni, "Integrating Israel's Arabs."
and political realms and the points in common between Bastuni’s discourse and the goals set by camp organizers vis-a-vis Palestinian participants.

Most interesting is the fact that Bastuni, in the effort to counter the growing appeal of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser as the embodiment of Arab national identity and liberation, used the first President of the Republic of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), as a regional reference point for the ideals he was attempting to instill in the Palestinian community. The appeal to Bourguiba was meant to not only to separate Arabism from Nasserism but also to construct the model Israeli Arab without further alienating Palestinians from the larger Arab world. “Bourguibism” was an attempt to illustrate that the Israeli Arab, an identity centered on modernism, development, and co-existence, was not a historical anomaly or construction of the Zionist state but rather an authentic and even revolutionary articulation and embodiment of modern Arab identity. In this construction, Bourguiba's anti-democratic legacy was obscured. Instead, he was portrayed as a revolutionary statesman who prioritized economic development, education, neutralism, and, most importantly, “multicultural existence.”\(^{152}\) In particular, the “theory of co-existence” to which Bastuni tied to Bourguiba complemented the historical narrative of Acre presented at the camps by naturalizing and historicizing Arab identity as a modern and law-abiding "minority." “If one is Bourguibist,” so argued Bastuni, “you are a good Arab...no less so than the Nasserist!”\(^{153}\)

### 2.6 Integration or Transformation? The Binational Visions of Rustam Bastuni and Muhammad Hubeishi

The summer camps project can be fairly regarded as an extension of an elaborate propaganda and structural adjustment campaign among MAPAI functionaries designed to normalize ethnic hierarchy and to de-politicize and de-nationalize Palestinian citizens. Most importantly, it was established and took place annually in a context of arbitrary and often brutal military rule, land confiscation, displacement, and enforced unemployment. Considering this, one may be curious


\(^{153}\) Ibid.
as to what can account for Palestinian participation in the camps program. For student participants (who, as Palestinians, were not part of the oriental track), media coverage of the events as well as articles written by Palestinian participants for the camp newsletter confirm Salman Natour’s contention that they were by and large teenagers looking for a means to meet and socialize with other youth. The summer camps were a chance to get away from home for ten days and to visit regions never seen in their lifetime (particularly those Palestinian regions enclosed and under the control of the northern military command).^{154}

As for Palestinians who acted as hosts, organizers, and guest speakers at the summer camps, motivations cannot be reduced to any single variable given the circumstances Palestinian citizens of Israel found themselves in the immediate post-1948 period, which left them intimidated, divided, and insulated by a military-permit system, while deprived of the institutional power necessary to construct a “national interest” and a standardized political program for its realization. Indeed, military rule affected different regions as well as individual families therein differently, depending largely on the nature of their relationships to the military and the general security services. As stated, many of the Palestinian hosts selected for the summer camps were already state or military functionaries and the towns and villages incorporated into the camp itinerary had families therein with longstanding relationships to the state. For some, then, the camps were a means to further integrate into the Zionist order and signal their loyalty to the state. At the same time, coercion must be taken into account. After all, hosts were approached directly by officials in the military and Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs when asked to participate. In a context of mass land confiscation and police intimidation, the consequences of refusal may have been felt to be dire. What is more, the potential benefits of cooperation, such as bypassing the military bureaucracy to acquire travel permits or to be given priority for developmental initiatives, was likely a motivation in itself. This factor may be a way towards understanding why an expanding number of villages and towns agreed to cooperate as hosts in the 1960s, as many were still at the mercy of the military regime.

All of the above were likely the crucial factors behind the extent to which Palestinian citizens participated in the initiative. At the same time, it is also clear that some actively...
participated with political goals in mind that went counter to those declared (and undeclared) by the primary organizers (that is, the military, the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture). It would be easy to dismiss those who actively assisted in organizing the camps and related activities as collaborators. They were by and large Palestinian state functionaries affiliated with (Zionist) Israeli political parties and their presence was instrumental for what was in large part a propaganda campaign. However, through the profiles of two participants who regularly lectured and took part in organizing activities, we can begin to deconstruct the myopic and binary view of collaboration/resistance and show instead how in “between resistance to and fatalistic acceptance of oppression” there is “ample space for coping strategies and creative improvisation.”

The following section will profile two Palestinian participants who were active in the summer camps project throughout the 1960s: Rustam Bastuni and Muhammad Hubeishi. It will illustrate that while the summer camp initiative was meant to integrate Palestinians as subordinate and de-politicized minorities to the Zionist order, in the context of steady structural change (that is, the gradual scaling back of military rule), both Bastuni and Hubeishi saw the potential behind the summer camps towards cultivating a bi-national political vision (and hence a potential bi-national political order).

Although his family was originally from al-Tira, Rustam Bastuni was born in Haifa on March 15 1923. In his later teens, Bastuni studied architecture at the Technion in Haifa, becoming the first Palestinian student to study at the department. During the 1947-1949 war, members of Bastuni’s family fled and were expelled from Haifa, settling in a refugee camp in Nablus in the West Bank. Despite this reality, following a brief stint as a teacher and town planner in Haifa, in 1951 Bastuni became the first Palestinian citizen to represent a Zionist party (MAPAM) in the Knesset (serving as the party’s secretary). As stated, Zionist discourse positioned the existence of military rule as a temporary reality and from the mid-to-late 1950s, it was criticized and its purpose challenged from the margins of the Knesset. For Bastuni, this meant that structural transformation was very much a possibility. Bastuni thus sought to hold Israel accountable to its declared democratic standards and bring about its gradual transformation.

into a binational, Jewish-Arab state. In addition to his position as Knesset member, Bastuni contributed as a journalist and even hosted broadcasts on Israeli radio.\(^{157}\)

Bastuni was an ardent critic of Palestinian Arab society and culture, echoing the paternalistic discourse then common in the Knesset and Israeli establishment writ large. As a solution to what he saw to be insulated tribal and patriarchal social mores, he sought to modernize Palestinian communities through joint/cooperative initiatives (Jewish-Arab), education, as well as urban planning and beautification (even if enforced unilaterally by the state).\(^{158}\) For Bastuni, the “new structures” imposed following the establishment of Israel had to be taken full advantage of in order to develop a modern and egalitarian social structure. What is more, for Bastuni pan-Arab or Palestinian nationalism was a reactionary mindset; a product of the nineteenth century that promised no clear or immediate benefit for Arab societies in the region.\(^{159}\) As opposed to imagining nations as communities united in race, ethnicity, language, shared history, or religion, Bastuni postulated that modern nations should be based on a “spiritual principle;” that is, a societal “will to accomplish great deeds” through a common programme for the mutual goal of social and economic progress.\(^{160}\) Thus, for Bastuni the ideal “Israeli Arab” did not denote assimilation into or separatism from Israeli politics but rather a “synthesis of Israel's general values and Arab ethnic heritage.”\(^{161}\)

At the same time, however, Bastuni was an outspoken critic of Israel’s unwillingness to terminate military rule and function in accordance with its declared, democratic ideals. He insisted that Israeli Jewish citizens should accept Israeli Arabs as equal partners with natural rights to the territory and state.\(^{162}\) In particular, Bastuni was vocal against discriminatory legislation passed through the Knesset, such as the Law of Return (1950), and he was one of several Palestinians called to testify to the 1955 Ratner commission, where he denounced the military regime as an affront to the natural rights of Arabs. Taking on MAPAM’s party line on the military regime, he also argued that it was an oppressive mechanism that only worked to


\(^{159}\) Bastuni, "Integrating Israel's Arabs."

\(^{160}\) Ibid.

\(^{161}\) Ibid; Eli Nissan, "Bourguibism as an Ideological Support for Israeli Arabs,” undated, ISA 17012/19 GL.

\(^{162}\) Ibid.; Bastuni, "Integrating Israel's Arabs."
push the population towards pan-Arabist and separatist nationalist frameworks and imaginations.\textsuperscript{163} Increasingly appalled at the chauvinistic nationalism of the institutionalized Zionist parties, continued land confiscation, and persistence of military rule, with time Bastuni became disillusioned with the lack of progress made towards democratization. As a result, he left the realm of party politics in 1961 to concentrate on a career in journalism and architecture/urban planning. Bastuni became a consultant to the Ministry of Housing, where he was involved in projects such as constructing a mosque in Acre as well as the development of urban settlements for Palestinian Bedouin expelled from their villages in al-Naqab.\textsuperscript{164}

This did not mean a departure from activism all-together, however, as Bastuni maintained his dedication to structural transformation. By May 21 1966, Bastuni was part of a core of Jewish and Palestinian intellectuals and professionals calling themselves the “Arab Israeli Committee for Addressing Peace” (or alternately, the Action Committee for Addressing Peace).\textsuperscript{165} A self-declared “non-political” group that sought to influence state policy (even going so far as sending a delegation of activists to speak on behalf of “Israeli Arabs” at the UN General Assembly), the group was established in response to the impending end of military order over Palestinian communities and the emergence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which Bastuni in particular feared could potentially mobilize Palestinian citizens of Israel.\textsuperscript{166} The objectives of the Committee were two-fold: to immediately “bring about ...a clear cut Government policy aiming at full integration of Israel's Arab community” while also “rejecting the claim of foreign Arab so-called leaders…to any authority to speak in the name and on behalf of Israel's Arabs.”\textsuperscript{167}

According to the Committee, a monolithic nationalist imagination amongst Arabs and Jews, separate and unequal systems such as in the realm of economic planning and education, as well as “the discriminatory expropriation of land” did not allow for genuine co-existence and the full integration of Arabs.\textsuperscript{168} Instead, such policies only worked to “hurt us and each community” in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{164} Bastuni, "Integrating Israel's Arabs."
  \item \textsuperscript{165} Rustam Bastuni, "An End to Ambiguity: Arab-Jewish Relations," \textit{Jerusalem Post}, July 29, 1966.
  \item \textsuperscript{166} “Meeting of the Foreign Minister with the Action Committee for Addressing Peace,” June 29 1966, ISA 17013/22 GL.
  \item \textsuperscript{167} Bastuni, "An End to Ambiguity: Arab-Jewish Relations.” The comment referring to "foreign Arab leaders" was directed in particular to Ahmad Shukeiri, chairman of the PLO at the time.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Thus, the elevation of a concept of statehood based on equal citizenship and responsibilities must cease to be an ambiguous call from the Zionist establishment and be embraced as a foundation of policy that actively trumps ethnic attachments and commitments. For Bastuni and the Committee, a system that treats Arabs as second-class clients as opposed to equal citizens only induces feelings of insecurity, mistrust, a “schizophrenia of a certain type,” where Arab citizens do not know where exactly it is they belong. Without direct and immediate change, the Committee feared Israel would lose whatever influence it had over Palestinian communities and with that, the hope for a democratic future.170

The Action Committee proved to be Bastuni's last attempt at activism from within Israel/Palestine. Bastuni felt that without a shift in ideology within Israel's ruling parties, he could not have a productive or meaningful future in Israel and within his own community.171 By 1969, Bastuni left Israel for New York City where he worked as an architect while teaching courses at the State University of New York. He continued to advocate for a bi-national structure in the region, at first calling for a democratic “greater Israel” (including the Palestinian and Syrian territories conquered in June 1967) and later embracing the idea of a separate Palestinian entity in West Bank but with economic and federal ties to Israel. On April 25 1994, Bastuni died of a heart attack in his New York home.

Muhammad Hubeishi was another Palestinian figure involved with the summer camps lecture circuit once the project was moved to Acre in the summer of 1962. At the time, Hubeishi was the Deputy Mayor of Acre representing MAPAI (through an independent list), where he and several Palestinian members of the municipal council served as intermediaries for the Palestinian population of the city. As a party representative for the Palestinian population in Acre, Hubeishi, along with the Hassan Sirwan, an Assistant town clerk in Acre throughout the 1960s, assisted in organizing summer camp activities and regularly addressed participants on matters relating to municipal development projects in the Arab sectors of the city (notably the Old City), the

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169 "Meeting of the Foreign Minister with the Action Committee for Addressing Peace," June 29 1966, ISA 17013/22 GL.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
importance of Jewish-Arab relations, as well as Islamic traditions and Arab cultures more generally.

As previously stated, the 1960s were a turbulent time in the city of Acre, given the gradual rise in nationalist and communist mobilization amongst Palestinians in the city.\textsuperscript{172} At the same time, in the months following the June 1967 war and Israel’s conquest of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, tensions in the city increased among Palestinian and Jewish residents of Acre, as questions and debates relating to Israel’s territorial and structural future re-emerged.\textsuperscript{173} In this context, a controversy broke out when on November 11 1968, Muhammad Hubeishi and Hassan Sirwan were interviewed by journalist Dov Goldstein for a series in \textit{Ma’ariv} on Palestinian life in Israeli cities.\textsuperscript{174} In the resulting article, published on November 15 1968 and titled “Akko: Together in Peace,” Hubeishi and Sirwan offered their opinions regarding living conditions for Palestinian in Acre as well as the future of the city and the 1967 territories. Both Sirwan and Hubeishi argued that Acre was “an Arab city,” which was precisely why it was designated to be part of a Palestinian state in the November 1947 UN partition plan. On this basis, should a two-state solution come about in the future, both argued that it would not be unreasonable for Acre to be incorporated into a Palestinian state. Ultimately, however, both Hubeishi and Sirwan declared their preference for a democratic, binational arrangement encompassing all of Israel-Palestine; using Acre as an example of how Jews and Arabs can live together in peace, given the right structural and social conditions.\textsuperscript{175} Eight days later, speculation emerged in the Israeli Press of links between Hubeishi and al-Fatah, the Palestinian nationalist resistance movement. \textit{Ma’ariv} was the first paper to publish a story on the alleged links on November 23 1968, arguing that Hubeishi received funds from two PLO-affiliated men from the West Bank under the guise of charitable donations.\textsuperscript{176} The two \textit{Ma’ariv} stories together sparked what was subsequently referred to in the Israeli press as the “Hubeishi affair,” forcing Hubeishi and many of the city’s Palestinian residents into hiding while

\textsuperscript{172} Minutes of a Meeting between Labor Officials of the Committee for Arab Affairs, December 5 1968, ISA 17067/16 GL.
\textsuperscript{173} “Shock,” \textit{Yediot Achronot}, undated, ISA 17067/16 GL; Dov Goldstein, “Akko: Together in Peace,” \textit{Ma’ariv}, November 15, 1968; Emmanuel HaReuveni, “In Akko there is Hate...in Silence,” undated, ISA 17045/11 GL.
\textsuperscript{174} Letter from Muhammad Hubeishi to Shmuel Toledano, December 10 1968, ISA 17067/16 GL.
\textsuperscript{175} Goldstein, “Akko: Together in Peace.”
\textsuperscript{176} Letter from Muhammad Hubeishi to Shmuel Toledano, December 10 1968, ISA 17067/16 GL.
the press, as well as Acre's municipal council, called for his immediate resignation. Hubeishi denied all allegations of links to the al-Fatah movement (in fact he sued *Ma'ariv* for libel in January 1969) and an internal investigation by the Israeli police found no evidence to support the assertion. However, Hubeishi refused to rescind his comments printed in the November 15 1968 article (as demanded by his critics), going so far as to repeat it to the press (as well as in private correspondence with Labor officials) while adding that not only Acre but all of the Galilee was historically and rightfully Arab.

On December 1 1968, Hubeishi met with Amnon Linn of the Arab Department for the Labor party in Haifa, where he was told that Yosef Katran, the Mayor of Acre, was seeking his resignation due to high-level pressure from the municipal council and Labor party functionaries. Linn, who sought to protect Hubeishi, promised to stall such action until Hubeishi held a press conference “to clarify things” (via a prepared statement) and after Labor ministers met to agree on a course of action. On December 5 1968, the Arab Affairs Committee of the Labor Party met to discuss the fate of Hubeishi. On the one hand, the representatives present saw Hubeishi’s comments regarding Acre and the Galilee as unacceptable and inflammatory. However, they were also careful not to make a “martyr” out of him, as it was reasoned it would only embolden opposition parties, such as *Herut*, as well as drive Hubeishi and the Arab population of Acre as a whole towards the Communist party. After deliberation, it was decided that Hubeishi should resign as deputy mayor (as opposed to being “ousted”) while retaining his council seat. Shortly following the meeting, Yosef Katran and Amnon Linn met with Muhammad Hubeishi in Haifa and informed him of the decision while promising him a council seat if not an “equally

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177 Minutes of a Meeting between Labor Officials of the Committee for Arab Affairs, December 5 1968, ISA 17067/16 GL. The press that followed the story extensively includes: *Ha'aretz, Davar, Ma'ariv and HaMishmar.*

178 Although Amnon Linn publicly claimed that an investigation against Hubeishi was unnecessary, he did in fact consult the police to look into the matter. "Amnon Linn: There is No Investigation on the Suspicions against Hubeishi," *Maariv,* November 26, 1968; Letter from Muhammad Hubeishi to Shmuel Toledano, ISA 17067/16 GL.

179 Minutes of a Meeting between Labor Officials of the Committee for Arab Affairs, undated, ISA 17067/16 GL; "Hubeishi Returns to his Suggestion to Found a Bi-national State," *Davar,* December 3, 1968, ISA 17067/16 GL.

180 Letter from Muhammad Hubeishi to Shmuel Toledano, December 10 1968, ISA 17067/16 GL.

181 Minutes of a Meeting between Labor Officials of the Committee for Arab Affairs, December 5 1968, ISA 17067/16 GL. *Herut* was a right-wing party in the Knesset at the time and a successor to the *Irgun* (or *Etzel*), a Revisionist Zionist paramilitary organization that was active during the British Mandate of Palestine from 1931-1948.

182 The dismissal of Hassan Sirwan was also sought. However, the controversy was centered more on Hubeishi given his senior position in the Municipal Council.
respectable” position. Hubeishi resigned himself to his fate. Later that evening, he officially announced his resignation as deputy mayor of Acre.

Both Hubeishi and Bastuni were undoubtedly complex figures. On the one hand, both worked in alliance with Zionist political parties and bolstered a system that ultimately sought the permanent subordination of the communities they aspired to represent. What is more, both Hubeishi and Bastuni were active figures in programs and policies aiming to normalize dispossession and the nationalist-colonial chauvinism that they so lamented. On the other hand, more than a cursory look at their political profiles illustrates how both sought to utilize their positions to work towards social change and the transformation of an ethno-centric system of government. In fact, it was on account of this activity and outspokenness that both got onto the radar screens of those within the upper echelons of the state. Despite the military-security logic that drove the summer camps program, the values and ideas disseminated in their speeches, from within the summer camps and the press, did not see integration and co-existence as a means to normalize Zionist ideological and material domination but rather as paths towards structural transformation, social change, and ideological overhaul in the context of gradually diminishing powers of military government.

183 “Meeting of the Foreign Minister with the Action Committee for Addressing Peace,” June 29 1966, ISA 17013/22 GL.
184 “Action Committee for Addressing Peace,” undated (1966), ISA 17013/22 GL.
Chapter 3: 
Teddy Kollek's Jerusalem

In November 1965, (West) Jerusalem welcomed Teddy Kollek as its new mayor following a municipal election and weeks of coalition negotiations. Having previously served the Prime Minister’s Office as Director General (1952-1965), Kollek was initially indifferent if not hostile to the idea of serving in the mayoral office, dismissing it as a provincial and relatively unimportant political post. In fact, Kollek himself credits his decision to run not on a desire to be mayor but rather out of a sense of loyalty towards David Ben Gurion, who by 1965 had split from the labor-Zionist MAPAI to form RAFI and was thus in need of a candidate to contest the MAPAI ticket in Jerusalem and bolster his party at the national level. As a result, upon taking office in December 1965 Kollek maintained a low profile in a city that can be described up to that point as a neglected frontier zone. However, following the Israeli conquest and de facto annexation of East Jerusalem in June 1967, Kollek quickly became amongst the most important and recognized Israeli political functionaries as the city was transformed overnight into the jewel of post-1967 Israel. At the same time, Israel’s expansion and the incorporation of close to 70,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites renewed tensions within the military and government branches over the question of how to effectively protect and consolidate Israeli sovereignty without provoking the ire of Palestinian residents and the international community.

The focus of this chapter is on the (Israeli) municipal art of government as it developed in post-1967 Jerusalem. First, the “national-pluralist” governing rubric championed by a group of municipal functionaries as a foundation for administrative policy in the city will be discussed with particular attention to its main visionary, Teddy Kollek. Kollek’s paradigm for incorporating what became East Jerusalem as a network of autonomous, ethno-national boroughs was believed to be self-justifying, as it was thought to reflect centuries-old governing traditions and civic cultures (albeit through a modern, liberal-pluralist articulation). To be sure, the projection of the Israeli Municipality as protectors of and heirs to ancient urban traditions as well as catalysts for modern-liberal government was in part a strategic policy and discourse meant to more effectively bind the Palestinian population to a colonial order and legitimate an annexation declared illegal by the United Nations on the basis of international law. However, this chapter will illustrate how Kollek’s rubric reflected a colonial taxonomy based on notions of primordial
differences between forms of humanity. As such, it will be argued that municipal strategies of inclusive subordination in post-1967 Jerusalem were re-constituted on the basis of Kollek’s understanding of a Palestinian population embodying social and political norms unique to the history and sociality of Jerusalem.

On June 27 1967, the Israeli Knesset passed several pieces of legislation that in effect annexed Jordanian Jerusalem as well as twenty-eight Palestinian villages conquered during the June 1967 war to the jurisdiction of the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality (amounting to the annexation of 71 sq. km of land in total).\(^1\) Although considerable debate occurred over the route and porousness of municipal boundaries separating what became East Jerusalem from the West Bank, the decision to unify West and East Jerusalem came through broad agreement in the Israeli cabinet, the Planning Department, and the Military. However, the question of what to do with the Palestinians of Jerusalem and the terms of their incorporation remained a subject of debate and power struggle between the military and local and central tiers of government as a result of a shared eagerness to determine policy in the city.\(^2\)

Although several options were discussed in regards to the administration of the Palestinian population, two broad approaches divided Israeli government/military functionaries into informal coalitions: One approach, which was favored by the ministerial committee established to determine the boundaries of post-1967 Jerusalem, by figures in the military establishment, as well as by a number of acting ministers in the Israeli cabinet, sought to close off East Jerusalem from the West Bank and “Israelize” the population of East Jerusalem in the same manner as the Palestinian citizens of Israel had been in the decade following the 1947-1949 war for Palestine.\(^3\) Champions of this approach believed that only in this way could Israel cement and protect its sovereignty over East Jerusalem, as legal inconsistencies or concessions made to

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\(^1\) The June 27 1967 Knesset session passed amendments to the Law and Administration Ordinance, the Municipal Cooperation Ordinance, and the Protection of Holy Places Law. Only a single Jewish MK opposed the three bills. In order to avoid increased international scrutiny, Israel claimed that its actions indicated not annexation but the “integration of services” in Jerusalem.

\(^2\) Darren C.E. Fisher, “The Role of the Jerusalem Municipality in the Conflict over the City: Volume One” (PhD Diss., University of Exeter, 1999), 136.

\(^3\) Ibid., 137-138; Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11, 2013.
the occupied population could signal weakness on the part of the Israeli regime and encourage nationalist separatism and/or insurgency.  

A second approach, supported by then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan as well as Teddy Kollek, pushed for a policy of limited integration; envisioning a system of functional autonomy for Palestinian residents as well as for economic and social contacts to remain open between East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Deemed to be a more enlightened framework with a stronger potential to forge a peaceful routine between Israeli authorities and a conquered population, this governing vision sought to tactfully ease Palestinian Jerusalemites into life under Israeli rule through the gradual cultivation of economic and social relations between communities in the city, access to city services and benefits, and the formalization of a semi-autonomous system of governance of Palestinian notables over local, cultural, and religious affairs (albeit beholden to an Israeli Municipal Council). What this meant in effect was the depoliticization of Palestinian municipal power, as the Jordanian Jerusalem Municipality was to be dissolved and mediatory authority invested instead in a dependent and institutionally subordinate class of local dignitaries. In complementing the Israeli decision to enforce permanent residency status as opposed to Israeli citizenship on East Jerusalem's Palestinian population, it was reasoned that this framework would allow for a measure of distance between residents and Israeli authorities and institutions, however symbolic and limited in scope, while crushing a potential locus for political protest (the Jordanian Municipal Council) and encouraging dependence on (if not an affinity to) the Israeli Municipality as a provider (and protector) of essential needs.

Israeli functionaries would ultimately fail to agree on a shared and consistent policy or developmental initiative for East Jerusalem and the Palestinian population therein. Internal clashes over budgetary allocations, the provision of municipal services, aesthetic and spatial development, as well as prioritization of national security concerns continued to divide Israeli authorities and offices operative in the city despite the formation of ministerial committees

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4 Fisher, 138.

5 A full and comprehensive municipal absorption of local Arab elites and institutions in Jerusalem was deemed a potential threat to Israeli authority. Institutions seen to be particularly threatening to the consolidation of Israeli sovereignty were dissolved, such as the Jordanian Municipal Council, while charitable, religious and cultural institutions established formal relations with the municipality. See Halabi, *Baladiat al-Quds al-'arabia*, Ch. 1 and Ch. 2.
specifically devoted to Jerusalem. What is more, Israel faced limitations to its declared and enforced sovereignty by international bodies (notably religious organizations and the United Nations) as well as Jordanian institutions present in the city. For example, Israel was forced to turn a blind eye to the electrical services supplied by the Jordanian District Electric Company in East Jerusalem after the June 1967 war while also permitting the continued existence of Jordanian-registered companies and professional/commercial institutions (although these were unilaterally re-registered as Israeli companies). What is more, while Israel declared sovereignty over holy sites in Jerusalem, Muslim religious bodies were permitted to exist outside the regulation of the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs, in effect establishing a two-tier system of oversight and administration.

Although Kollek did not hold unilateral power in designing and enforcing administrative policy in the city (all major decisions regarding Jerusalem were and are made at the national level), he was a dominant political figure who ultimately gained some freedom to track his own administrative course in Jerusalem. To be sure, in the words of Tom Segev, Kollek “would have been glad to see the city empty of Arabs.” However, approximately 68,000 Palestinians remained in what became East Jerusalem following the June 1967 war, forcing Kollek to recognize, perhaps reluctantly, that they were “connected to Jerusalem no less than we are” and that an appropriate framework had to be drawn that would solidify Israeli sovereignty while adjusting to the demographic and political realities in the city. Kollek’s resulting vision was referred to interchangeably as the “nationalist-pluralist,” “bi-cultural,” or “mosaic” policy, which sought Palestinian functional autonomy and measured distance between Palestinian residents/institutions and Israeli authorities. For Kollek, this policy was the only means through which Israel could protect its sovereignty over the city in the face of increased international criticism, attain Palestinian docility toward the new status quo, and cultivate an atmosphere of social tranquility between Palestinians and Israeli citizens and institutions. While it was not

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6 Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound, 146-185.
9 Benziman, Yerushalayim, 61.
adopted as an official policy at the national level, it manifested itself in several significant ways throughout Kollek’s tenure.

For example, immediately after the 1967 war the Israeli government permitted the continued existence of Jordanian-run private educational institutions in Jerusalem but decided to enforce the Israeli (“Arab sector”) curriculum in public schools. Kollek saw this as an unnecessary provocation and lobbied for the Jordanian curriculum to remain with stipulations concerning the Hebrew language and civics courses as well as the right to monitor/censor “propaganda” in educational texts. Indeed, the Israeli state decision led to a mass exodus of Palestinian residents to the private school system as well as an atmosphere of continued protests and strikes. As a result, Kollek got his way and by 1974 the Israeli government reversed the initial decision and the Jordanian curriculum became the standard in public (Arab) schools.

Kollek also spearheaded the effort to integrate Palestinian institutions and local leaders into the municipal structure under a brokerage system, where political contacts with the Municipality over political and day-to-day affairs and enforcement of regulations were mediated through patron personalities or institutions. For example, in 1968 the mukhtar system was resurrected in Palestinian villages, quarters, and neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. Part of an older system of local headmen that existed during the latter part of the Ottoman era, the mukhtar system was adopted by British (1920-1948) and Jordanian (1948-1967) authorities in Jerusalem. However, the importance of the mukhtars declined dramatically throughout the first half of the twentieth century as a result of increased centralization of government and socioeconomic changes undermining older structures of authority. In the attempt to claim (indirectly) Palestinian recognition of Israeli sovereignty (and without any direct power via the Municipality), around sixty mukhtars were appointed as a type of rubber stamp authoritative body responsible for communicating local issues to the mayor while performing banal and informal functions such as resolving disputes, registering marriage and birth licenses, and delivering the mail. This

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11 Ibid., 101-115.
12 Romann and Weingrod, 196-207.
13 Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, 73.
institution lasted until the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 and the emergence of youth and professional movements opposed to the mukhtar system.

In addition, Kollek solidified relations with a number of Palestinian and Jordanian institutions to act as local liaisons between the Palestinian community and the Israeli Municipality. In response to demonstrations and strikes against the Israeli occupation that erupted immediately after the June 1967 war, the government stopped short of completely dismantling Palestinian/Jordanian institutions in the city and permitted the Municipality to establish informal working relations. As such, the Islamic Committee established by Palestinian religious dignitaries in July 1967 was recognized and permitted authority over religious affairs with limited interference from Israeli ministries. In addition, the Arab (Jerusalem) Chamber of Commerce, which represents the commercial interests of Palestinian residents, resumed administrative tasks such as facilitating travel of goods and persons from Jerusalem to the West Bank/Jordan while functioning as a mediating link to the Municipality for Palestinian merchants and commercial associations.

These institutions, alongside the Jerusalem District Electric Company, al-Maqasid hospital, the Arab Studies Society, the Orient House, as well as private schools, charities, service centers, and professional associations, formed what Palestinians continue to refer to today as a “shadow municipality;” an institutional network that is part and parcel of a strategy of sumud (steadfastness) to protect Palestinian presence in the city and resist municipal incorporation. For Kollek, however, this network was a means towards institutionalizing his administrative model and ultimately gaining the acquiescence of Palestinian residents to Israeli rule. Nonetheless, Kollek faced obstacles in enforcing this blueprint of administrative relations and praxis due to a power struggle with government branches operative in the city as well as the Prime Minister’s Office. The following section will address the turf war that emerged between

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16 Interview with Hala A’mas, Manager at the Wadi al-Joz Community Center, September 9, 2013. See also Latendresse, Jerusalem: The Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 29-39.
Israeli state offices and the Municipality over Jerusalem in the years immediately following the Israeli conquest. I will argue that while Kollek was an enthusiastic supporter of the integrationist strategies vis-à-vis Palestinian citizens as it developed through the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs from the mid-1950s onwards, disagreement over administrative models and policy were based in part on opposing taxonomies of the history of the city and cultures therein.

3.1 “Population Centric” Counter-Insurgency and the Colonial Taxonomy of Palestinian Jerusalem.

“...only by first projecting an idea of Jerusalem could Israel then proceed to the changes on the ground [which] would then correspond to the images and projections.”

--Edward Said.

In his 2009 book Jerusalem Syndrome, Moshe Amirav, who worked closely with Kollek and the Jerusalem Municipality from 1981-1993, outlines the five national goals (and failures, in his assessment) set by Israeli policy-makers for what became united Jerusalem immediately following the June 1967 war: the territorial goal, the demographic goal, the political goal, the diplomatic goal, and the inter-religious goal. The exercise of territorial and demographic goals was to be achieved through border gerrymandering and urban planning/infrastructural development (settlement building). This was meant to maximize the state’s hold over land in order to restrict Palestinian development and stabilize a comfortable Jewish majority. The diplomatic goal was to seek and secure international recognition and legitimacy of Israeli control and the inter-religious objective was to somehow separate the issue of holy sites from the larger political conflict over the city. The concern here, however, is with the political goals of Israeli municipal agents; that is, the formulation and enforcement of a particular policy of normalization.

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18 Amirav, Jerusalem Syndrome, x, 21-28.
in occupied Jerusalem, or what Amirav refers to as the “Israelization” of the city and its inhabitants.

Israelization as a concept and praxis differs from “Judaization” (a form of “ethnicization” particular to Israel) in that while the latter refers to a process of demographic engineering and spatial transformation to ensure Israeli-Jewish dominance, Israelization involves the enforcement of (and adaptation to) state legal, political, bureaucratic, and economic norms in a given territory. The strategy is integrationist in a limited sense in that it does not aim to necessarily encourage assimilation or devotion towards the state on the part of the Palestinian population but rather a sense of goodwill or passivity to conquest; a functional dependence on a type of caretaker state allocating particular rights, benefits, and civic status. As such, the target of the policy is not political-demographic arithmetic but rather the non-Jewish subject population therein, although both Israelization and Judaization/ethnicization are complementary and enforced simultaneously in Israel/Palestine. Nonetheless, in the context of post-1967 Jerusalem the process (or processes) of Israelization took on more contested and fluid meanings, as different state branches active in the city approached the policy based on fundamentally opposed political reasoning as well as conflicting conceptual and ontological bases. Indeed, although Amirav contends that both the Prime Minister's Office and the Municipality shared a similar attitude and policy of Israelization in East Jerusalem, the objective was shared (the normalization of Israeli control over East Jerusalem) but not necessarily the means and the ontological bases of regulatory mechanisms employed.

As stated, the Israeli conquest of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem in 1967 ignited a debate over the proper framework for governing (and absorbing, in the case of Jerusalem) the territories. This led to a power struggle between colonial functionaries over their

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20 Amirav, Jerusalem Syndrome, 24.
22 For example, see Latendresse, Jerusalem: The Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 17-18. Latendresse outlines two components of 'Israelisation' in post-1967 Jerusalem: geographic (and administrative) incorporation of the territory and the creation of a Jewish demographic majority, so as to make the "re-division of the city impossible." However, these two objectives are more accurately understood through the prism of "Judaization," or the territorial and demographic objectives of the state, as it aims towards the establishment of material and demographic facts on the ground. As an ideological frame of reference, "Israelization" must be measured differently, as it is meant to absorb non-Jewish persons by familiarizing and attracting them to the inner-workings of Israeli law, bureaucracy, and labor/consumer markets by granting particular provisions and rights.
effective jurisdictions. From 1948 until the termination of military rule over Palestinian regions
in Israel (1966-1968), authority over Palestinian citizens was concentrated in the
military/security establishment as well as the Minority/Arab Affairs Offices. With the gradual
dismemberment of military government over the majority of Palestinian citizens of Israel
beginning in 1966, Palestinian affairs were placed in the hands of the Office of the Advisor on
Arab Affairs and its regime of experts, both military and civilian, in conjunction with the Israeli
Security Agency and the several departments, branches, and government committees dealing
with minority affairs, such as in education, labor, religion, and development.

The conquests of the 1967 Palestinian territories unsettled this arrangement by further
dividing Palestinian subjects under separate authorities and departments. While policy regarding
Palestinians citizens of Israel was to remain tied to the advisory authority of the Arab Affairs
Advisor, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were ruled by Israeli military diktat,
security agencies, and the Minister of Police, Shlomo Hillel. Up to this point, there was little
controversy amongst Israeli colonial administrators. However, where did this leave the
Palestinians of East Jerusalem, who despite residing in the 1967 occupied territories were
residents of a city absorbed by the state of Israel? For Shmuel Toledano, the “municipal
incorporation” (that is, annexation) of Jerusalem meant that the Arabs of East Jerusalem were “to
be regarded similarly to the Arab minority in Israel” and this attitude was shared by personalities
within the Ministry of Interior.23 Thus for the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, the June
1967 war in effect transformed Palestinian Jerusalemites into Israeli citizens, although it was
decided that actual citizenship would not be imposed. As a result, Jerusalem was to fall under the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and Palestinian Jerusalemites were to be
incorporated into the Israeli body politic (“Israelized”) and detached from the West Bank
territorially, administratively, and socio-culturally. For Police Chief Shlomo Hillel, however,
they were Jordanians or simply Arab residents of Judea and Samaria under the authority of the
police, security, and military establishments.24

23 Letter from Shmuel Toledano to Golda Meir, March 5 1972, ISA 13908/2 GL.
24 Translation of an al-Quds newspaper article from Arabic to Hebrew, “Curb Your Enthusiasm,” al-Quds, April 24
1972, ISA 13908/2 GL. According to Toledano, Hillel initially agreed that East Jerusalem affairs should fall within the
purview of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. However, over time Hillel began to criticize Toledano’s office
for “treading on his turf.” Letter from Shmuel Toledano to Golda Meir, March 5 1972, ISA 13908/2 GL.
As early as 1970, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir sided with the position of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. According to Shmuel Toledano, Meir provided the green light for his office to employ in East Jerusalem the strategies developed and directed at Palestinian citizens of Israel over the previous two decades.\footnote{Letter from Shmuel Toledano to Golda Meir, March 5 1972, ISA 13908/2 GL.} However, the military establishment by and large felt that the experience of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs was not appropriate in the context of Jerusalem. For one, such an arrangement could potentially undermine Israeli claims that uniting Jerusalem was not annexation but rather “municipal incorporation,” thereby leaving the state vulnerable to increased international scrutiny. At the same time, the military establishment (specifically Moshe Dayan) felt that East Jerusalemites were more connected historically, economically, and culturally to residents of the West Bank than with Palestinian citizens of Israel.\footnote{Interview with Meron Benvenisti, August 14 2013. Part of the logic behind the idea of open borders between Jerusalem and the West Bank was to maintain a sense of continuity and normalcy in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian territories.} Allying with the position of the military was Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, albeit with specific caveats. Kollek also felt that Jerusalemites should not be governed by the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. However, it was not because he preferred military authority in East Jerusalem. Rather, Kollek believed that Palestinian Jerusalemites should fall under local (municipal) jurisdiction as a localized and unique population, albeit with social and economic ties to the West Bank maintained.

Teddy Kollek held particular disdain for how the central state functioned. Although an ally to leading figures of the ruling MAPAI party and after 1965, a member of RAFI (a MAPAI splinter party formed around the personality of David Ben Gurion), Kollek believed that party politics played “too great a part in the country’s affairs.”\footnote{Teddy Kollek and Amos Kollek, \textit{For Jerusalem: A Life} (New York: Random House, 1978), 171.} With political parties centered on loyalties to personalities, Kollek believed (ironically) that this acted against the nation’s interests by negatively effecting coordination (and hence a unity of policy and objective) between state branches. According to Kollek, this phenomenon, paired with the overall feeling of invincibility that overcame the political establishment with the conquest of East Jerusalem during the 1967 war, clouded the judgements of the state regarding the correct course of action to pursue so to ensure Israeli sovereignty and quell domestic and international criticism. For Kollek, the state
should recognize Jerusalem’s unique historical and social character and grant the Municipality the freedom to track a gradual, localized approach to civic and urban integration.\(^{28}\)

Thus, for Kollek the intervention of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in post-1967 Jerusalem was a potentially dangerous development. Jerusalem was a unique, multi-ethnic, and religiously sensitive city with specific social patterns, subjectivities, and habits held and practiced by communities therein. As such, the city needed a gradually imposed yet flexible administrative framework that recognized and reflected its unique socio-historical character. The Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs approached the city’s population through an “Israeli Arab” point of reference and was particularly aggressive in their aim to incorporate the population. Hence for Kollek they were at best unhelpful and at worst destructive to the process of normalization. What is more, the interventions of the Advisor on Arab Affairs would expose the annexation of East Jerusalem to the international community and leave Israel vulnerable to increased criticism. It is for this reason that the Municipality established the position of the Advisor on East Jerusalem Affairs. Although modeled on the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and the perceived necessity of a brokerage system for Israeli intermediaries to assist in policy recommendations regarding the “Arab sector,” the Advisor on East Jerusalem affairs was appointed by and under the immediate direction of the mayor, rendering the Arab Affairs office redundant.\(^{29}\)

The division between the Municipality and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs over jurisdiction and minority affairs in Jerusalem manifested itself in various ways. For example, both pushed for the circulation of separate Arabic language newspapers amongst Palestinian residents that reflected their conflicting governing approaches. The Advisor on Arab Affairs preferred that the “Arab street” in the 1967 territories be exposed to the Israeli Arabic-language daily, \textit{al-Anba’} (“The News”).\(^{30}\) Until it folded in the early 1980s, \textit{al-Anba’}, alongside the Israeli communist organ \textit{al-Ittihad}, was one of the more widely distributed and read Arabic-

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 173-181; 249; Cheshin, Hutman and Melamed, 21.
\(^{29}\) Romann and Weingrod, 201-203.
\(^{30}\) “From the Summary of the Limited Committee Meeting on the day of November 29 1968,” November 29 1968, ISA 13906/22 GL.
language dailies among elite/professional Palestinian citizens of Israel. Unlike al-Ittihad, which carried a more critical tone that over time became “pro-National” in terms of the Palestinian question, al-Anba’ was produced by Zionist parties (it was pro-Labor party and explicitly anti-Palestinian/Arab nationalist) and its content was closely monitored by the Israeli Security Agency to ensure that “it only explains the position of the government.” Thus, in the eyes of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, al-Anba’ was the preferential publication for circulation and it first appeared in East Jerusalem in 1968. As an accommodative Zionist media organ that featured editorials by and for Palestinian citizens, it was instrumental in orienting Palestinian residents of Jerusalem towards the Zionist project politically and westward (towards Israeli Palestinian communities) socially.

The Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem in June 1967 brought about the immediate halt of existing media publication and circulation as a result of Israeli prohibitions. This was also because many Palestinian professionals observed a strike against resuming work under the occupation. However, by 1968, al-Quds, the most widely read newspaper among Palestinians in Jerusalem, became the first Arabic language daily to resume publication and obtain permission to circulate throughout the city by the Israeli government. To be sure, al-Quds was monitored and censored for its content. However, it was favored by Israeli municipal and military authorities not only for what they deemed to be its more moderate tone (in addition to the fact that it focused mainly on international news over local developments) but also as a complementary feature of the Israeli strategy to stimulate a sense of normalcy and continuity amongst Palestinians. Just as important was the fact that for the Municipality, its circulation was a way to undermine the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in the city.

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32 “Memorandum: Internal Correspondence among Government Offices: Employees in the Newspaper ‘al-Anba,’” Internal correspondence between the Office of Arab Affairs and Shabak, June 4 1974, ISA 17085/1 GL.
33 “Arabic Newspapers,” unauthored report submitted to the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, undated, ISA 13906/22 GL.
34 Letter from Ori Mor to Shmuel Toledano, March 7 1972, ISA 13908/2 GL; “al-Anba’ Newspaper,” 1969, ISA 17033/6 GL.
36 Abdel Fattah, “Palestinian Newspapers,” 8.
37 Ibid., 9.
This period of turf war over Jerusalem led to the establishment of a Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs (which was headed by the Prime Minister’s Office and included various government ministries with portfolios in the city). Despite this development, tensions remained between Israeli institutions over the formulation and execution of a coherent and mutually agreed upon policy vis-à-vis Palestinian residents in the city. What is curious is that on the surface, there appears to have been much in common between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Municipality in terms of the strategies and approaches conceived, if not enforced, so as to normalize the status quo. Most certainly there was congruence in colonial objectives in East Jerusalem; that is, to enforce Israeli sovereignty and create a demographic Jewish majority so as to prevent future re-partition and to protect Israeli hegemony in the city. In fact, despite his misgivings towards state approaches to administration in Jerusalem, Kollek was more than aware of a national policy aiming to restrict Palestinian growth in the city and ensure that their demographic percentage did not exceed June 1967 numbers (28.8% of the population), going so far as to act as an integral figure behind land expropriation schemes while also expelling residents from the Old City in June 1967 and approving projects designed to encourage Palestinian out-migration to the outskirts of the city boundaries. What is more, Kollek bears the marks of his Labor Zionist allies and progenitors within MAPAI as an enthusiastic supporter of the strategies of inclusive subordination towards Palestinian citizens of Israel introduced in the mid-1950s. Indeed, as Director General Kollek financially contributed to the establishment and maintenance of institutions borne from the initiatives carried out by the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs to this effect, such as Jewish-Arab community centers and social programs in Haifa (Beit HaGefen in particular); an institutional and pedagogical model which Kollek would later apply in the context of Jerusalem through projects supported by his Jerusalem Foundation.

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38 Interview with Meron Benvenisti, August 14 2013; Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem to the Office of the Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin, April 1976, ISA 6754/24 G.
39 “Protecting the Interests of the Jewish Population,” undated, un-authored handwritten note, ISA 8451/4 GL. According to this note, which addresses the percentage of Jewish residents in the city in the early to mid-1970s, “in order to reach 74%...we need within the next ten years 10,000 [new] residents...in order to preserve the 72.4%, we need to move 3000-3500 every year; which is something that is not done today although it is possible.” For Kollek’s involvement in and tacit support of demographic engineering schemes, see Cheshin, Hutman and Melamed, 30-34, 38-44, 63-64.
40 Letter to Teddy Kollek from the Barnett and Pauline Polanksy Arab-Jewish Cultural Community and Youth Center (Bet HaGefen), March 1968, ISA 17032/13 GL.; Interview with Ori Stendel, July 30 2013; Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013. Kollek also supported ethnographic/”scientific” intelligence work on Israeli Arabs that formed the pillars of Israeli strategies of inclusive subordination. See Shay Hazkani, “Catastrophic Thinking: Did
one instance of co-operation in Jerusalem between the Municipality and the Advisor on Arab Affairs, the Jewish-Arab summer camps project was permitted by Kollek to take place in the city after the June 1967 war with added funds from the Jerusalem Municipality as a means to facilitate Jewish-Arab co-existence.\(^{41}\)

Kollek’s vision for post-1967 Jerusalem appears at first glance to mirror the integration strategy proposed for Jerusalem by the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in the first few years following the June 1967 war. In a letter drafted on March 7 1972 by Uri Mor, then a junior staffer in the Office, and sent to his boss and Arab Affairs Advisor Shmuel Toledano, we can delineate a basic outline of the policy recommendations of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs to “psychologically prepare” Palestinian residents towards formally recognizing the authority of Israeli institutions as well as schemes to encourage “multi-layered” cross-communal interactions between Palestinians and Israelis.\(^{42}\) In the letter, Mor begins by arguing that administrative and social unification of the city can only be measured as a success once Palestinians accept state institutions as the sole authorities and purveyors of services and when Jews and Arabs “naturally” decide on their own that they want to live together; that is, when social and administrative relations proceed beyond basic commercial transactions and administrative relations between state organs and Arab notables (such as mukhtars). To MOR, this characterized the state of unification by 1972 (an underhanded critique of municipal policy) and it threatened the process of Palestinian integration.\(^{43}\)

\(^{41}\) West Jerusalem was incorporated into the itinerary of the mixed summer camps project and students in select schools therein were permitted to participate when the project was re-booted in the early 1960s. The camps project continued in Jerusalem the year following the June 1967 war. Letter from Moshe Ben Haim of the Office for Arab Affairs to Eliezer Shmueli of the Department of Education and Culture, 8 September 1966, ISA 17080/2 GL; Judy Siegel, “Learning to Live Together in Harmony,” The Jerusalem Post, Tuesday August 28, 1978, ISA 17080/1 GL. The extension of the summer camps project was made possible through the sponsorship of the Jerusalem Municipality, the Jerusalem Foundation, the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, and the Arab Education Department.

\(^{42}\) Letter from Ori Mor to Shmuel Toledano, March 7 1972, ISA 13908/2 GL. The letter is not an outline of an “official” policy of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. However, it does reveal the mind-set, attitudes, and desired direction for state policy among functionaries working on the unification of Jerusalem within the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs at the time.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.
In order to rehabilitate the integration process and achieve “organic” administrative and social unification in Jerusalem, Mor proposed a more efficient policy of normalization centralized in the Prime Minister’s Office. The pillars of his proposed road map were as follows: encouraging economic development in the Arab sector (specifically in tourism and services), compensation for a select number of Palestinian residents for properties confiscated by Israel after the war (a good will gesture to stifle a general movement for compensation), mobilizing a cadre of accommodative activists and local clients (who would ideally run for municipal council), maintaining open and consistent communications with a “broader circle” of Palestinian institutions and social figures (as opposed to the narrow circle of the old guard of local notables and dignitaries), political “neutralization” of Palestinian professionals (most notably educators) in exchange for increased communications and state benefits, emboldening and nurturing better relations with Islamic institutions (who would, in turn, vouch for Israeli authority in the city), and increasing social contacts between “Arab Israelis” and Palestinian Jerusalemites.44

Kollek’s governing rubric did not differ drastically from the proposals outlined above. Indeed, while Kollek had his fair share of differences with the central government over matters of policy and jurisdiction, he shared with both the Prime Minister’s Office as well as the military/security establishment an imperative to enforce what Laleh Khalili would call a “population-centric” model of counter-insurgency and governance, notably through a developmentalist agenda and by maintaining if not empowering already existing socio-political institutions and networks. What “population-centric” counterinsurgency alludes to is an emotionally and ethnographically intelligent form of warfare and/or colonial governance where the political and social structures enforced or absorbed by the invading power are made to cater to and reflect the perceived cultural and political norms, habits, customs, values and expectations of the colonized, which in turn secures the “goodwill and acquiescence of the civilian population.”45 Enforcing such a model was a means to nurture a form of enlightened colonial rule acceptable to the liberal sensibilities of Labor-Zionist functionaries as well as the

44 Ibid.
45 Khalili, 45-52. “Population-centric” counter-insurgency does not mean the suspension of the use of coercive force or violence. It does mean, however, that said force be “carefully adjusted in a particular context,” such as when the invading power seeks to “remain in place for a long time” (if not permanently, which is the case with the Israeli presence in East Jerusalem). In this way, “population-centric” counterinsurgency is the opposite of “enemy centric” counter-insurgency, which “depends on coercive or punitive measures” and “kinetic—or lethal—force.”
expectations and desires of domestic constituents and international agencies such as the United Nations. At the same time, an administrative model of pragmatism and accommodation could work to herald an era of peaceful social relations and exchange between Palestinians and Jews therein.

While this general objective was shared, a population-centric model of governance and/or counter-insurgency relies on a particular idea or socio-cultural model of the “population” in question. It should be noted that in part, the Israeli turf war over Jerusalem was the result of a power struggle, as state branches competed to become the primary players in Jerusalem’s development and incorporation.\textsuperscript{46} What is more, debate also ensued over what policy was most appropriate to assuage international criticism over the Israeli occupation. However, differing colonial taxonomies regarding the historical and socio-cultural characteristics of the Palestinian population of Jerusalem was a fundamental basis for disagreement over matters of policy and strategy between state branches and functionaries. To Kollek, Palestinian Jerusalemites were socially and culturally distinct from both residents of the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories and Palestinian citizens of Israel. His views illustrate a conception of Palestinian Jerusalem that assumes static urban arrangements and a politically passive and heterogeneous society conditioned to adjust to conquest as long as particular demands are met: the provision of basic municipal services, strengthening of commercial relations in the city, semi-autonomous arrangements for Palestinian neighborhoods and quarters over developmental, cultural and religious matters, and a respect for a historical pattern of voluntary separation and mediated distance on the part of governing authorities. This was believed by Kollek to be the result of a history of perpetual conquest in Jerusalem, which produced a set of insular communities that were pre-modern and fundamentally localized in terms of social and political consciousness and were thereby dependent on invading forces to organize commercial networks, urban development, and administrative structures on the condition that a historically grounded framework nurturing primordial urban forms and cultural norms is respected and institutionalized.

\textsuperscript{46} Interview with Shmuel Toledano, July 11 2013.
For the Municipality, then, Israelization in Jerusalem was an objective shared with the Prime Minister’s Office but it differed substantially from the models conceived of and proposed through Toledano and the Arab Affairs team after the 1967 war. From the municipal point of view, Israelization did not mean the production or imposition of an “Israeli” subjectivity or political point of reference among Palestinian residents but rather the normalization of Israeli rule through a national-pluralist caretaker state characterized by a worldview and administrative structure espousing the ethics of accommodation, cultural preservation and autonomy, and (controlled) cosmopolitanism. By controlled cosmopolitanism, I refer to a critical caveat of this discourse and municipal vision. For Kollek, to be liberal and modern, which for him were essential pillars to the Israeli state-building project and critical towards justifying the Israeli annexation to the international community, meant to position oneself as a rational, enlightened individual willing to explore, accept, and accommodate cultural difference but *not* competing political claims. In fact, equality between Israelis and Palestinians is not registered as part of the national-pluralist schema for Jerusalem. As the following section will show, for Kollek Zionist Israelis had rights to power over the city on account of privileged historical claims and as champions of a modern, liberal worldview whereas Palestinian communities, as historically subordinated subjects unable to envision “freedom” let alone manage a modern bureaucracy and administration, had limited rights as subordinates conditional on conforming to the norms expected of them. Despite the ethno-supremacist and settler-colonial reality, the assumption of Kollek and his allies in local government was that social tranquility and co-existence would follow if the state embraced a particular ontological and institutional-administrative framework. Failure to support policy and development along these lines would mean the perpetual threat of insurrection, sustained international criticism, a betrayal of liberal ideals, and ultimately the undermining of Zionist hegemony.

What the following section will show is that Kollek’s administrative vision reflected a specific colonial taxonomy, or an abstract cognitive framework that organized the Palestinians into unique, stable, and ready-made categories while functioning as an epistemic basis for a population-centric model of governance and counter-insurgency. The Palestinian Jerusalemite thus determined is a cultural production of power; an exoticized and hierarchically inscribed subject sealed off from historical processes and developments while denied autonomy of voice, a sense of collective belonging, and any meaningful reference point to governing institutions. The
possibility that Palestinian Jerusalemites could relate their experiences to Palestinian, Arab or anti-colonial histories was not simply something to suppress or deny for the sake of the Zionist project. For Kollek, so long as Israeli policy maintained a strict adherence to his governing rubric, such a development was unthinkable.

3.2. Palestinian Adjustment and the ‘Psychological Unification’ of Jerusalem

On July 14 1967, Teddy Kollek sat down for an interview with the Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot. The interview is revealing in that it outlined Kollek’s optimistic expectations regarding Israeli and Palestinian co-existence in the immediate weeks following the June 1967 war and the emergence of a pattern of social relations in the city to serve as an example for inter-ethnic cooperation in conflict zones the world over. In response to a question of whether Jerusalem would become a mixed city or simply an “agglomeration of little ‘ghettoes,’” Kollek insisted that the unification of Jerusalem represented “the first and only meeting of Arabs and Jews in the whole world;” differentiating Jerusalem from other Israeli mixed cities such as Haifa or Tel Aviv-Jaffa on account of the sheer numbers of Palestinians in Jerusalem and the fact that the professional and intellectual classes by and large remained in the city following the war. He added that Jerusalem was the “only place where there is physical contact between the two peoples” and that “if our experiment is successful it will be a great thing and might also have an impact on Israeli-Arab relations.”

The “experiment” alluded to by Kollek was the attempt to instill a culture and administrative model of co-existence and controlled cosmopolitanism in Jerusalem. During the interview, Kollek asserted that the feeling of uncertainty among Palestinian residents, which he attributed not to the Israeli occupation but rather a fear of a return to Jordanian rule, will wane with time once “they see real things—government offices being transferred to Jerusalem, investments being made in new schools in the Old City, etc.” Indeed, he met potential

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47 Interview with Teddy Kollek in Yediot Aharonot, July 14 1967, ISA 8211/7 HZ.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
consequences resulting from enforced unification raised by the reporter with arguments that through commercial and social contact between different cultural groups, respect for the local autonomy of Jerusalem’s ethno-religious communities, and by “raising the standard of the Arabs,” the Palestinians would undoubtedly seek to become a positive element in a united city. For Kollek, “something fantastic has happened here. This must be made good use of. The Jews accepted the Arabs and the Arabs came to us after having for twenty years been brought up to slaughter the Jews. They were staggered by the friendly reception that was accorded to them here.”

Kollek asserted the need for contact and social proximity between Jews and Palestinians several times in the duration of the interview; he conceptualized it as a gradual and guarded process already underway in hospitals and schools as well as through civil society and charitable organizations. At the same time, however, Kollek was clear that these interactions were best kept at a quotidian and professional level as he envisioned a separation in residential patterns as well as the establishment of autonomous institutional arrangements to deal with cultural-religious traditions and ways of life in Palestinian neighborhoods, villages, and quarters. There was no room for common civic identities or residential patterns in the city as imagined by its mayor, as Kollek believed that there was neither historical precedent nor contemporary desire for such a development.

Kollek’s enthusiastic and optimistic projections regarding Palestinian attitudes towards the Israeli occupation were not confined to this initial period, which was characterized by a nationalist euphoria on the part of Israeli military and government officials and feelings of fear, withdrawal and indifference due to the shock of the June 1967 defeat on the part of the Palestinian population in the city. By November 1968, Kollek was the focus of a renewed international media campaign and a trip to the United States was arranged in coordination with various Israeli information ministers, the American Consul General in Israel, the American-Israel

50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 An eyewitness account from within the Old City of the days and weeks following the June 1967 war is provided by John N. Tleel. See Tleel, 174-188. Dr. Gerald Caplan, who conducted research in Jerusalem shortly after the 1967 war, offered similar observations. Gerald Caplan, “Problems of Communication between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem. Fifth Working Paper. The Process of Personal and Social Adjustment,” May 7 1970, JMA 5977.
Cultural Foundation of New York, and Shlomo Argov, then posted at the Israeli embassy in Washington. Kollek arrived on November 15 1968 and spent ten days in the United States meeting with the press, American officials, and benefactors to his Jerusalem Foundation. As part of his diplomatic tour, on November 17 1968, he appeared in Washington for the national broadcast television program “Meet the Press.” In order to actively strategize and prepare his presentation and talking points, Kollek was given extensive briefings on themes as well as pre-prepared questions. A letter from Teddy Kollek to Shlomo Argov, November 5 1968, ISA 6556/19 HZ; Letter to Teddy Kollek, sender unnamed, November 7 1968, ISA 6556/19 HZ.

Kollek was also advised to focus on the theme of co-existence and what were deemed to be the more positive aspects of life in post-1967 Jerusalem. As a result, Kollek skillfully took command of the interview.

The interviewers at Meet the Press concentrated on the state of war between Israel and neighboring Arab states as well as the political, diplomatic, and demographic consequences of the Israeli occupation of the 1967 Palestinian territories. One interviewer even challenged the notion of the Israeli occupation as a “gentle occupation,” as it was commonly characterized by Israeli officials, citing statistics on house demolitions, arrests, expulsions, as well as the lack of political rights for Palestinians in Jerusalem. However, Kollek used every opportunity to not only separate the question of Jerusalem from concerns regarding the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza but also to insist that life had actually improved for Palestinians since June 1967. Kollek countered concerns of human rights violations by emphasizing the improved level of services for the Arab sector. To stress this point, Jordanian rule in the city was used as a negative reference point. Most important, however, were Kollek's re-iterations of Jerusalem as a potential example of the development of peaceful inter-ethnic relations in conflict zones.

According to Kollek, the melting pot ideal did not work in Jerusalem and there was no interest on the part of Israeli authorities to “turn Jews into Arabs or Arabs into Jews.” Instead, Jerusalem was to be governed as a bi-cultural city more along the lines of Montreal, where different ethno-cultural groups preserve their traditions through autonomous institutional arrangements while working together socially and economically in mutual recognition and pursuit of commercial/economic and other day to day interests. Kollek believed that in time, with

53 Letter from Teddy Kollek to Shlomo Argov, November 5 1968, ISA 6556/19 HZ; Letter to Teddy Kollek, sender unnamed, November 7 1968, ISA 6556/19 HZ.
54 Transcript of Teddy Kollek's appearance on Meet the Press, November 17 1968, ISA 6556/19 HZ.
growing employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, as well as administrative and social initiatives cultivating a respect for the “cultural independence” of various ethnic and religious groups, the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem would “establish social and cultural patterns of the greatest significance for the future.” For Kollek this administrative structure was not only the most enlightened Jerusalem has seen but also historically grounded in a multi-ethnic and eternally divided Jerusalem. So long as local institutions reflected the specific cultural and historical characteristics of the territory governed, peace was inevitable.

Considering that Kollek’s media appearances were part of a coordinated public relations campaign, it would be easy to dismiss his vision of Palestinian-Israeli co-existence and Israeli accommodation in post-1967 Jerusalem as a ruse to appease the international community, especially considering the reality of spatial and juridical separation in the city, the construction of the first Israeli colonies of Ramat Eshkol and Ma’alot Dafna in occupied Jerusalem by 1968, and large-scale land confiscation by the Israeli government within the first year following the June war. No doubt a key element that made the occupation of East Jerusalem particularly troublesome and unique for the Israeli government was the fact that the 1967 war sparked a revival of the question of sovereignty over the city; a question which had lain dormant in the preceding nineteen years as a result of the de facto division of the city under Israeli and Jordanian rule. The United Nations was especially vocal in this regard, condemning Israeli claims to sovereignty and acknowledging East Jerusalem as part of the 1967 Palestinian territories. At the same time, the revival of the Jerusalem question reflected not only the recognized legal status of East Jerusalem but also the sensitive nature of governing a city central to three major world faiths. In order to scale international condemnation down to a minimal roar, Israeli diplomatic personalities, most notably Abba Eban who acted as Israel’s Foreign Minister at the time, made sure to declare to the world the Israeli intention to respect international sensitivities over Jerusalem as well as local cultural and religious traditions (notably access to and limited autonomy over holy sites) while persistently referencing the civic rights and services

55 Ibid.
56 This arrangement did not gain international consensus. However, most governments accepted this as a de facto reality and as a result, attention shifted away from questions of sovereignty and territory towards the administration of holy places. See Benvenisti, City of Stone, 214-215.
granted to the conquered population.\textsuperscript{57} Through the implementation of facts on the ground via Israeli colonies and infrastructure as well as diplomatic campaigns projecting the Israeli Municipality as efficient, benevolent and accommodating, it was believed that international condemnation of the occupation would dissipate with time, much as it did when Israel declared West Jerusalem as its capital following the 1947-1949 war for Palestine in direct contravention to the stipulations inherent in the November 1947 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181.

Kollek was a welcome and willing participant in what was essentially an Israeli public relations campaign.\textsuperscript{58} His stature among friends and colleagues as a relatable, diplomatic, and liberal personality made him the perfect symbol and spokesperson to appease international critics, effectively projecting a folklore of the Israeli occupation as the only regional power with the foresight and knowledge necessary for administering Jerusalem and maintaining social tranquility therein. Although not officially a diplomatic personality like his fellow international campaigner Abba Eban, Kollek had public relations experience as a long-serving “emissary for the Zionist cause.”\textsuperscript{59} As Director-General to the Prime Minister prior to his election as mayor of West Jerusalem in 1965, he was an integral figure behind the establishment of a special tourism department attached to the Prime Minister’s office in the mid-1950s. This is notable as tourism was of utmost importance to Kollek not only in terms of potential revenue but as a public relations tool serving “to explain Israel to the world.”\textsuperscript{60} It was for this reason that the transfer of tourism from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to the Prime Minister’s office and its subsequent development as a department and industry in its own right became Kollek’s personal pet project. However, despite a commitment to the development and success of an Israeli public relations industry, it would be a mistake to dismiss Kollek’s discourse regarding Jerusalem as solely a propaganda ploy directed to the international community writ large.

Kollek’s optimistic projections regarding co-existence in Jerusalem and eventual Palestinian acquiescence to Israeli rule had ontological foundations rooted in a colonial

\textsuperscript{58} Letter to Teddy Kollek from Ram Haviv, August 14 1968, ISA 6556/19 HZ.
\textsuperscript{59} Kollek and Kollek, 125.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
taxonomy that caricatured Palestinian residents in such a way that the administration could deny them a political role and yet claim to meet communal needs and embody the national/political aspirations of all communities. Although his earliest interviews and public relations campaigns allude to this taxonomy and accompanying governing structure of cultural autonomy and functional division of authority, over the years it developed beyond a structural vision into administrative schema and practice. For Kollek, so long as the state did not interfere while providing for the Municipality the space and resources to administer the city according to his framework, Jerusalem would inevitably grow into a thriving bicultural city under Israeli sovereignty.

As stated, despite Kollek’s declared distain towards party politics in Israel, he was a member of RAFI “as a matter of conviction;” aligned with the Labor-Zionist vision for the state in terms of ideological character, state-building objectives, and minority relations. At the same time, Kollek’s experiences coming of age in Fin-de-siècle Vienna and as a settler in Ein Gev in predominately Arab northern Palestine during the British Mandate in the 1930s, led to his belief in pragmatism and dialogue with Palestinian Arabs. No surprise, then, that Kollek was an enthusiastic supporter of the policies adopted within MAPAI-dominated branches of the state in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. He was dedicated towards fostering greater inter-communal relations between Arabs and Jews as well as an exponent of the gradual integration of Palestinians into the social body of the state. However, while aligned with the basic principles of inclusive subordination and the institutional and social mechanisms associated with a more pragmatic politics of control as imagined by his Labor Zionist progenitors, Kollek believed that a governing paradigm for integration that was particular to Jerusalem had to be conceived of and gradually applied by all state branches and state/military functionaries active in post-1967 Jerusalem.

Kollek’s vision for Israeli municipal administration in post-1967 Jerusalem was immediately voiced in the weeks following the June 1967 at council and committee meetings as well as interviews with the Israeli and international press. However, there does not appear to have been a clearly articulated and formulated plan at this time. We can nonetheless recognize a

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61 Ibid., 171.
foundation of principles for a framework and philosophy for local rule. Kollek insisted that administrative unification of Jerusalem must entail parity in the distribution of municipal services, safeguarding the traditions of segregated communal living patterns, economic interdependence between Arabs and Jews, and most importantly, a stable order of functional autonomy; that is, the limited self-administration for ethno-religious collectives within their respective quarters, villages and neighborhoods as well as over religious sites and institutions. This proposed arrangement envisions spatial, administrative, and cultural separation while simultaneously working to normalize a level of social and commercial interaction enabling economic and commercial networking as well as cordial day-to-day relations between ethno-national groups. The goal was the development of a spirit of mutual respect, dependence, and understanding between communities while maintaining communal autonomy and spatial separation under an Israeli municipal umbrella.

This notion of Jerusalem as a city eternally divided both socially and administratively into separate spaces, institutions, and inward-looking communities was not novel but rather a principle articulated in a report submitted in the summer of 1945 by Sir William Fitzgerald, then the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Palestine, based on his boroughs plan for municipal structure and administration. Fitzgerald was appointed by the British High Commissioner in Palestine in July 1945 in order to study the historical and contemporary dynamics of Jerusalem. In so doing, Fitzgerald was to endorse an administrative structure for the city that would be acceptable to all parties concerned: the British Mandate authorities, the international community, as well as Palestinian and Jewish residents. Fitzgerald ultimately recommended that the British should remain as the Mandatory power, municipal structure and administrative practice in the city should resemble the borough system of London at the time. What this meant was the division of the city into two borough councils, one Jewish and one Arab, accountable to a larger, administrative body. According to the plan, the councils would be made up of figures directly elected by taxpayers in each borough and headed by an appointed mayor (appointed by the councillors albeit vetted by the High Commissioner). The boroughs would exercise “the greatest possible measure of autonomy,” with power of oversight over education, health, and social

services. Ultimately, however, the borough councils would fall under supervisory authority of the administrative council (and in particular the High Commissioner-in-council); wielding power of approval over urban planning, allocation of services and resources, as well as “all matters relating to the Holy places.”63

Although not specifically or publicly referenced by Kollek himself, it is reasonable to assume that Fitzgerald’s boroughs plan served as a foundation for his early administrative model for a Zionist, multi-confessional Jerusalem. With this foundation, a more detailed paradigm was gradually conceived through discussions between select Israeli officials and foreign dignitaries shortly after the June 1967 war.64 The discussions, which were formal, semi-secret and took place privately until Kollek lost the 1993 municipal elections, were dedicated to envisioning a governing structure ensuring Jerusalem’s future under Israeli sovereignty without sacrificing the goodwill of Palestinian residents or encouraging protest from the international community. At the same time, proposals for Jerusalem pitched during these meetings were refined through negotiations between Meron Benvenisti (a close aide and friend to Kollek who served as both Advisor for East Jerusalem Affairs and Deputy Mayor in the 1970s) and Palestinian interlocutors, such as Anwar Nusseibeh (at the time an unofficial representative of King Hussein and member of the National Guidance Committee) and Fa’iq Barakat (head of the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry) beginning in the spring of 1968.65 The deliberations centered on the idea of a rehabilitated Arab sub-municipality (made up of members of the former Jordanian city council) beholden to an Israeli Municipality (and possibly even a military governor). As a sub-municipality, funds would be received from both Jordan and Israel and channeled through an Israeli municipal functionary, ultimately serving to support municipal projects and services in East Jerusalem with the approval of Israeli authorities. The project envisioned a system that reconciled Palestinian calls for “joint sovereignty” and Israeli demands for the pre-eminence of Israeli institutions in Jerusalem.66

In one of the semi-regular and semi-private meetings between Israeli municipal representatives and foreign emissaries in the late 1968, Meron Benvenisti presented a clear and

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63 Ibid., 30-31.
64 Cheshin, Hutman and Melamed, 225-227.
65 Meeting between Anwar Nusseibeh and Abba Eban, September 8 1968, ISA 7052/12 A.
constructed governing schema and philosophy for Jerusalem complementing and building on the vision for a boroughs system devised through meetings with Palestinian interlocutors. In the proposal, Benvenisti suggested that the area of Jerusalem be carved into five sub-municipalities representing Jerusalem’s different communities, thereby guaranteeing limited self-rule for Palestinian residents over strictly local affairs (specifically religious, cultural, and commercial affairs). These sub-municipalities would be answerable to a joint Arab-Israeli umbrella council for the city (albeit with a Jewish majority). The proposal was detailed and even involved the re-definition of Jerusalem’s post-1967 eastern boundaries as declared and imposed by the Israeli state immediately after the June war.

Predictably, the plan was not seriously considered by the national government. It was reasoned that the extent of accommodation to Palestinian demands amounted to serious (and potentially dangerous) limitations on Israeli sovereignty in the city. In addition, while Kollek himself was keen on the idea of Palestinian representation in some capacity within the city, he proposed instead that they organize advisory boards subordinate to an exclusively Israeli Municipality. As a result, Benvenisti’s proposal was largely forgotten (although a July 1968 plan involving a “Greater Jerusalem” split between Jordanian and Israeli sovereignty was leaked to the press in April 1971 and caused a momentary media stir in Israel). However, the principles inherent in the plan, such as the establishment of Arab sub-councils and a decentralized system of institutional networking and mediated distance between the Municipality and Jerusalem’s communities (or boroughs), became the backbone of the administrative vision that Kollek would push onto successive national governments throughout his tenure as mayor while acting as a foundation guiding his administration of day-to-day affairs in East Jerusalem.

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67 Cheshin, Hutman and Melamed, 228.
68 The idea of re-instating the Jordanian municipal council as a subordinate body to the Israeli municipality was first suggested almost immediately following the 1967 war by Anwar Khatib, a lawyer and former mayor of Jordanian Jerusalem. However, the idea was not taken seriously by Israeli negotiators at the time while others felt it would become a spring board for PLO infiltration and activism in the city. See Raz, Ch. 1.
69 Segev, 485. According to Segev, the Israeli Minister of Justice was the first to propose Arab representation in city council. Kollek, however, felt that it would only serve as a platform to voice objections to Israeli rule, given that most council members would be either Jordanian civil servants or former municipal functionaries. Instead, Kollek suggested the formation of an advisory board in East Jerusalem subordinate to the municipality and made up of members vetted by the state.
70 Klein, Lives in Common, 167.
For Kollek, the administration of Jerusalem thus became a personal project for peaceful inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, forming the core of several articles, books, and book chapters published throughout his tenure as mayor. However, the most succinct articulation of his vision is found in a pair of *Foreign Affairs* articles featured in the magazine in 1977 and again in 1981. These articles were written and published at a time of great anxiety for the Israeli government regarding the future of the city. In May of 1977, the Likud bloc won the elections for the ninth Knesset, in effect ending the twenty-nine year rule and hegemony of Labor Zionist parties over state institutions. For Labor Zionist politicians, the electoral victory of a right-wing and unabashedly pro-settler party prompted fears of radical policy shifts and the undermining of the status quo in the city, which could potentially provoke Palestinian residents as well as the ire of international organizations and observers.71 At the same time, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat became the first head of an Arab state to visit occupied Jerusalem in 1977 and agree to a peace deal with Israel in 1979 involving the exchange of land (the Sinai peninsula conquered by Israel during the June 1967 war) for Egyptian recognition of Israel, peace between the two states (that is, the disengagement of Egypt from military activity, independently or coordinated, against Israel) and the normalization of diplomatic relations.

Since becoming mayor of “united Jerusalem” in June 1967, Kollek enforced his administrative vision of functional autonomy and urban development in a piecemeal fashion, as the most important decisions regarding the city were decided at a national level and through the recommendations of Ministerial Committees for Jerusalem beholden to the Prime Minister’s Office. The victory of the Likud bloc and the possibility of a future peace deal with the Palestinians (if not Jordanians) involving Jerusalem provoked Kollek to undertake not only a renewed public relations campaign (thereby assuring international audiences of continued Israeli

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71 Kollek was against the right-wing bloc in the Knesset not only because “they represented a radically different foreign policy and stood to the right even on social matters” but most importantly because Likud’s leader, Menachem Begin, sought to undermine the status quo in Israeli occupied Jerusalem in particular. For instance, in 1961 and again in 1971, Menachem Begin pushed for the Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital bill through the Knesset, which sought to declaratively annex East Jerusalem to Israel. Because East Jerusalem was already annexed in effect, Kollek believed the bill to be an unnecessary provocation inviting increased international criticism. What is more, the Likud government after 1977, specifically through Ariel Sharon who served as the Housing Minister, allied with settler groups within Jerusalem to purchase Arab homes within Palestinian neighborhoods and urban quarters for the purposes of Jewish settlement and expansion. See Kollek and Kollek, 176-177; Tamar Mayer, “Jerusalem in and out of Focus: The City in Zionist Ideology,” in *Jerusalem: Idea and Reality*, ed. Tamar Mayer and Suleiman A. Mourad (London: Routledge, 2008), 239.
sensitivity towards international concerns regarding the status quo in Jerusalem despite the
election of the Likud bloc) but also a campaign directed towards the state advocating for his own
long-standing vision for the administration of the city as the best way to ensure Israeli
sovereignty against the threat of a future peace deal, if not outright internationalization of the
city. It was this sense of urgency that encouraged the publication of his *Foreign Affairs* articles
in 1977 and again in 1981, where Kollek outlines his core governing and philosophical vision for
Jerusalem. In both articles, Kollek shares his “four principles” serving as the basis for a
pragmatic, accommodative and historically sanctioned administrative model, which Kollek
argues is validated by a consensus of all communities in the city.  

The principles are as follows:

There shall be free access to all the Holy Places irrespective of nationality and they shall
be administered by their adherents.

Everything possible shall be done to ensure unhindered development of the Arab way of
life in the Arab sections of the city and ensure Muslims and Christians a practical
religious, cultural and commercial governance over their own daily lives.

Everything possible shall be done to ensure equal governmental, municipal and social
services in all parts of the city.

Continuing efforts should be made to increase cultural, social and economic contacts
among the various elements of Jerusalem’s population, while preserving the cultural and
even national identity of each group.  

Through these principles we can delineate the substance of Kollek’s governing model for
Jerusalem. Noticeable is the fact that it does not contain within it a notion of common citizenship
and equal responsibilities for Palestinians and Jews in the city but rather a functional division of
authority between a sovereign municipality (Israelis) and subordinate self-administering
minority communities (Palestinians) over religious, cultural, educational, and other day-to-day
affairs. What is more, the social and political fragmentation that his structure of government in
effect sanctions and rationalizes is not recognized as the reflection of structural realities, such as
uneven development and service allocations, Palestinian depoliticization and unequal distribution

Kollek, “Jerusalem,” 704. Kollek’s four principles are re-stated in other publications of the time. For example, see
York: Praeger, 1980), 1-16.
of municipal power and representation, and large-scale land confiscation, but rather the embodiment of a primordial desire for voluntary separation and distance between communities and mediated relations with governing authorities. For Kollek, Jerusalem’s communities are to be kept in a condition of “separate but equal;” with Palestinians accommodated into political and social life but as subordinate and unrepresented subjects as a result of “age-old and deeply felt emotions” and a desire to be left alone in their affairs. In identifying social divisions and hierarchical distribution of power as ethnographic and historical facts (as opposed to a result of contemporary politics and structures of rule), the Israeli administration is thus cast as the best option for maintaining peace in the absence of a bilateral agreement. Indeed, to Kollek, Israel has been unfairly criticized. To his mind, Israeli conduct in East Jerusalem does not threaten instability in the region, nor is it primarily responsible for social tensions and political grievances. Instead, the Israeli Municipality should be lauded for its efforts in creating a “city of tolerant co-existence,” which effectively translates to the self-sacrifice of Israeli sovereignty in the interest of local consensus and international sensitivities.

Previous studies have alluded to Jerusalem’s post-1967 municipal structure and Kollek’s discourse and administrative model as a means to encourage a more docile stance on the part of the international community. To be sure, it can be reasonably argued that because Kollek’s administrative design did not entirely measure up to the reality, this in itself is emblematic of a diplomatic and political ruse on the part of Israeli officials. However, this does not tell the whole story. Kollek’s “national-pluralist” model for civic union and Palestinian integration is a product of what he believed to be primordial social, cultural, and urban forms in the city; a reflection, and not simply an abstract aberration in the service of ideology and a settler-colonial project, of the desires and aspirations of all of Jerusalem’s historic communities. In other words, municipal policy in post-1967 Jerusalem reflected a colonial taxonomy; that is, an “implicit organization of the world and its inhabitants” where juridical, spatial, and political separation is rationalized on the basis of communal essences and primordial urban traditions. As a result, to Kollek, the Israeli municipal model is not a colonial imposition operating at the expense of its Palestinian

74 Kollek, “Jerusalem,” 701; 703; 706-707.  
76 Romann and Weingrod, 194; Cheshin, Hutmed, and Melamed, 8.  
77 Trouillot, 73.
residents but rather the historical climax of a history of conquest and the mirror image to an
eternally held consensus between communities sanctioning the partition between sovereign and
subject and the distribution of rights. Both the history and reality of colonial subjugation vis-à-
vis the Palestinian people was not something to hide for Kollek. It was unthinkable as it stood in
tension with his historical narrative of Jerusalem, the exoticization of Palestinians therein, and
his belief in the Israeli administration as an accommodative and enlightened beacon of human
rights in an otherwise intolerant region. Michel-Rolph Trouillot perhaps best captures the
essence of this phenomenon and how Kollek reconciled seemingly contradictory political
impulses: “when reality does not coincide with deeply held beliefs, human beings tend to phrase
interpretations that force reality within the scope of these beliefs. They devise formulas to
repress the unthinkable and to bring it back within the realm of accepted discourse.”

As related by Meron Benvenisti, Kollek’s administrative activity and approach was based
“on a classical Zionist worldview,” where the necessity of settling and building Jerusalem, the
essence and heart of Eretz Israel, took absolute precedence in the interest of the collective return
to history by Jews the world over. At the same time, Kollek’s ideological commitments to
tenets of liberalism in his mind distinguished the state of Israel from neighboring polities.
Indeed, any obstacle to the fulfilment of the colonial project or which produced tensions with
Kollek’s formally liberal commitments had to be rationalized and explained away; to be made to
fit and coincide with his political-ideological commitments and worldviews. The Palestinians of
Jerusalem were thus discursively and conceptually dismissed by Kollek as legitimate claimants
to sovereignty over the city, exoticized as provincial, fragmented, and inward looking religious
minorities “removed from the noise and tempo of modern life” and conditioned to adjust to the
rule of conquerors. Kollek’s narrative of the history of Jerusalem simply did not allow for him
see the reality of an intensely divided city ravaged by a settler-colonial enterprise, forming a

79 Trouillot, 72.
80 Meron Benvenisti, “Teddy Kollek: The Last Optimist,” Eretz-Israel: Archeological, Historical and Geographical
81 Kollek and Kollek, 2-4.
82 Ibid., 220.
foundation for the rationalization of his municipal policies and the socio-political partition of the urban order.

If Kollek’s administrative model was considered to be validated by a historically held consensus in Jerusalem, a question remains over how consensus can be claimed without input or affirmation from the Palestinian population writ large. The work of philosopher Jacques Rancière is useful in further illuminating the mental universe of Teddy Kollek in this regard. In his work *Dissensus*, Rancière argues that the core of normative democratic politics is consensus. However, Rancière does not evoke the notion of consensus as an exchange of ideas or discussion among equal parties in the interest of peace and compromise, as it is more commonly conceived or reduced (particularly in classical liberal thought). Rather, consensus is the realm and discourse of those permitted to be seen, heard and therefore rule through a “symbolic constitution of the social,” or rather a police order (“the police”) that denotes, partitions, and sanctions social and political participation of a larger social body in contraries. By ‘the police,’ Rancière is referring to an order of exclusion that shrinks political space by sanctioning a hierarchical distribution of a given population into assigned domains and functions that are subsequently rationalized and protected. Indeed, for Rancière the police order is the opposite of politics (or democracy), which is made up of those who are included and excluded. Where the essence of the police order and consensus is division and exclusion, the essence of (real) politics/democracy is *dissensus*, “a form of social and political life” where those rendered invisible (‘the people, the workers, the citizens’) disrupt the partitioning of the social order by making themselves both perceptible and heard. Politics, then, is the disruption of the police order through “the appearance of the subject” and the claiming of a part by “those who have no part.”

This partitioning by the police occurs through two modes of operation: first, the capacity to rule is protected for a class of professionals and experts (police order) with a declared (and normatively objective) right to rule; and second, those who partake in *being* ruled are partitioned and dissolved into the category of population or *demos* in a strictly social domain; a sociological and factual status of being ruled or acted upon with particular functions and capacity for speech.

84 Ibid., 38; 47.
85 Ibid., 37; 11.
(for Rancière, they are the “uncounted” making up “the part that has no part”). This act of partition is itself obscured by an appeal to and discourse of equality and social wholeness/completeness on the part of the police order as well as distributive theories of justice, where the “uncounted” do not participate in the process of partitioning the socio-political order but rather in deliberations over the apportioning and circulation of resources. Thus, the politics of consensus is the assignation by a dominant group between the proper and improper; the political realm and the social/private realm; between those who allot and those who are allotted; between those who rule and those who partake in being ruled; and those who have speech and those who are unheard. As such, consensus of the police order depends on a specific field of perception or rationality underpinning the distribution of the hierarchical order into social and political domains. The hierarchical order inherent in Kollek’s administrative vision, which he argued reflected of age-old cultural practices and norms of Palestinian communities resident in the city (or “consensus”), depended on its own rationality or particular field of perception. In his published books, chapters, and articles, Kollek rationalized his administrative and policy principles of separation, coexistence, and Palestinian depoliticization through a broader, historicized reading of the sociality and politics of Jerusalem.

3.3 The History of Jerusalem according to Kollek

The partitioning between those who rule and those who partake in being ruled depends on a field of perception functioning as a conceptual or epistemological foundation. This section will illustrate that the field of perception or rationality of Israeli municipal rule can be recognized in the discursive formation or structure of knowledge that constituted the “truth” through which Kollek and the Israeli Municipality justified claims of mastery over the city and ethno-supremacist planning therein. Kollek wrote extensively and enthusiastically on the past and present of Jerusalem as an amateur historian and diplomatic personality dedicated to the development of the city and the preservation of its most cherished traditions and structures. To Kollek, Jerusalem stands unique in the world. Despite not being blessed with “special economic” or “topographical virtues,” the city has a recorded history of conquest and settlement going back
This history of successive conquest is the result of both Jerusalem’s central geographical location between three continents as well as a spiritual and religious significance for three of the world’s major monotheistic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), which in turn produced a contemporary city of rich complexity, diversity, as well as rival claimants.\(^{87}\) Indeed, for Kollek, Jerusalem is truly “the city of mankind” and the myriad of historical, spiritual, and communal connections to the city must be recognized as a reality and translated into a sensitive and inclusive approach to governance and urban planning.\(^{88}\)

A history of successive conquest and domination by powers external to the immediate region is a central theme for Kollek towards explaining patterns of settlement and socio-political sensibilities in the city. With this narrative foundation, Kollek argues that Jerusalem has been voluntarily split both spatially and socially into sealed and homogenous ethno-religious enclaves for centuries; a fact that is reflected in the “multi-cultural mosaic” and segregated living arrangements discernable in the contemporary period.\(^{89}\) This self-segregation is the result not only of the consecration of identities around kinship, tribal bonds, and religion in a spiritually intense and significant city but also the administrative instability that accompanies persistent foreign conquest. In discussing Jerusalem throughout centuries of its history, Kollek narrates on how invading forces allowed for the limited self-administration of communities so to protect military, political, and commercial interests in the city. At the same time, depending on the military prerogative or religious identity/ideology of the conquering power, certain communities were privileged by the ruling order, leading to the increased protection of select communities and oppression and/or out-migration for others.\(^{90}\) Such historical patterns of administrative rule led to the congealing of the already existing soft borders of communal separation based on socio-cultural and religious differences into the “self-segregation of independent, organic and historical communities.”\(^{91}\) At the same time, this does not mean that social contacts between ethno-national collectives were non-existent. According to Kollek, while ethno-religious communities lived


\(^{88}\) Kollek and Kollek, 221.

\(^{89}\) Kollek, “Jerusalem,” 706.

\(^{90}\) Kollek and Pearlman, 165-166; 219.

“without much social contact” and harbored a mutual sense of resentment if not communal superiority, commercial and other cordial day-to-day social relations were (and are) necessary for the sustenance of communities and the well-being of the city. Thus, so long as primordial and communally defined norms of spatial and cultural separation/autonomy are mutually recognized and respected, co-existence is a natural and necessary outcome.

In addition, this history of domination and separation produced ethno-national collectives unfamiliar, if not hostile to, modern administrative standards and structures based on collective deliberation and direct accountability to a single body of citizenry. As a result, there is a need and historical precedent for an outside or foreign power to care for the development and administration of the city while protecting the well-being and traditions of its inhabitants at a strategic distance. Thus, for Kollek Jerusalem’s communities harbor an intrinsic and intense distrust of government and as a result are accustomed to tackling their own affairs through local (religious) institutions and networks as well as communal and kinship bonds. In lieu of identification with (and history under) state governing institutions, as a mechanism of communal survival Jerusalem’s communities are inherently inward-looking and to the extent in which they look outwards for leadership or a locus of identity, it is with religious institutions, such as the Vatican for the city’s Catholics. In fact, if communities profess a national identity outside the boundaries of their immediate community or religious sensibilities, it is dismissed by Kollek as tactical and transitory in the interests of communal survival. Kollek cites the city’s Christian communities as an example to support this assertion, claiming that Christian Jerusalemites “measure every government by the freedom given to them, to run their affairs undisturbed. That is their loyalty.” According to Kollek, those Christians professing an Arab national identity only do so as a result of Jordanian Muslim domination in the city from 1948-1967; that is, as the result of a psychological and historical imperative among minorities “to try to give proof of stronger loyalties than secure majorities.”

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93 Kollek and Moskin, 7-8.
95 Ibid., 706-707.
As for Muslim Arab communities, their “fundamental goal is to stay in Jerusalem and maintain the Arab character of their part of the city.” At the same time, as a result of strictly religious (and not nationalist) sensibilities, their loyalty or sense of attachment to Jerusalem is determinant on and directed towards the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque atop al-Haram ash-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). According to Kollek feelings of enmity towards the Israeli conquest on the part of Muslim communities in Jerusalem are simply the result of a “psychological strain between a majority and a minority” exacerbated by two factors: first, the sovereignty of an “infidel” community over territory that includes the Noble Sanctuary; and second, the purposeful stirring of the population by outside elements, notably the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Like their Christian counterparts, Muslim Jerusalemites historically do not like being ruled and demand only “independence of decision in their own area.” As a result, Muslims have no real or substantive loyalty to the PLO or any other Arab or nationalist organization, despite pronunciations to the contrary. In fact, any support for nationalist or Palestinian organizations in exile is dismissed by Kollek as a result of the growing pains of adjusting to a new order and bearing the accompanying anxieties regarding autonomy over the Noble Sanctuary as well as everyday, local affairs as a minority under a Jewish administration. At the same time, Palestinian residents feel threatened by externally imposed activists. As a result, public declarations of national loyalty are little more than a tactical ploy to appease militants and apply pressure on the Israeli administration to further decentralize power. Privately, Kollek maintains that Muslim Jerusalemites understand that nationalist organizations will only work to limit, if not obliterate, structures and traditions of local autonomy in the name of monolithic “Palestinian” or “Arab” identity while sowing the seeds of sectarianism, as had occurred in Jerusalem in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, the Palestinians may publicly throw their lot in with Israel’s adversaries but in reality, they do not trust Palestinian or Arab nationalist organizations any more than they do the Israeli administration. Enmity towards foreign conquest and the imposition of a new order will wane with time, as was the case in the past, and residents will adjust to the circumstances once they recognize the administration’s willingness to secure

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96 Ibid., 707.
the well-being of the city and honor traditions of limited local autonomy, self-segregation, and institutional distance from governing authorities.

Thus, Kollek’s vision for a decentralized municipal system in Jerusalem is a result of a historical consensus in the city and a reflection of an accommodative and ethnographically informed administration. However, how does Kollek then justify the rule and supremacy of a Jewish state over a multi-cultural city of perpetual minorities? Did not the Jews of Jerusalem similarly inherit a static set of socio-cultural and political traditions over the centuries? Noticeable is the fact that in Kollek’s schema the Jewish population of Jerusalem are conspicuously absent from direct address within his four principles. This is because the four principles are meant as a map for minority rights; a category that excludes Jewish residents as the rightful inheritors of the city. Indeed, for Kollek, this hierarchical order is a natural result of the religious importance and centrality of Jerusalem in Jewish tradition, memory, and historiography (an importance which Kollek believes is unrivalled by Christian and Muslim traditions) as well as a consequence of the fact that it was only under Israelite rule that Jerusalem was united, prosperous, and given a spiritual significance later claimed by subsequent monotheistic traditions. In other words, the Jewish people are the historical pioneers of development in the city, pivotal in transforming Jerusalem into a spiritual and cultural center for all of mankind. As a result, they are entitled the privileged status as both inhabitants and sovereign administrators.

Kollek’s historical narrative of Jerusalem begins with the first recorded settlement in the third millennium B.C. However, it is during the rule of David, the second King of the United Kingdom of Israel (tenth century B.C.), when the history of the city truly begins. This is because according to Kollek it was during David’s reign that the city was first unified and stabilized, with prior periods in history characterized by social division and war between “an agglomeration of semi-nomadic confederacies” as well as “internal political dissention and weakness.” Where Saul, the first Israelite King of united Israel and Judah, was “more soldier than statesman” and

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101 Kollek, “Jerusalem,” 702-703. According to Kollek, Mohammed, “whose roots were in Mecca and Medina,” traveled to Jerusalem according to Muslim traditions because of inherited views from Jewish and Christian traditions. The importance of Jerusalem to Muslim traditions and history is acknowledged by Kollek but dismissed as secondary, as Mohammed, whose roots lie in Arabia, was in a way an imitator who drew on primary Jewish traditions.

102 Kollek and Pearlman, 15; 17.
drew only the loyalty of the northern tribes, David was first to fashion a coherent nation by defeating the Philistines and Jebusites, uniting the settled tribes of Israel, and declaring Jerusalem the capital of his kingdom.\textsuperscript{103} What is more, David was the first to anoint Jerusalem with a significance beyond military and political concerns by moving the Ark of the Law to the city and thereby transforming Jerusalem into a spiritual and religious center.\textsuperscript{104} In this way, Zionist political supremacy in Jerusalem is historically and objectively justified. According to Kollek’s biblically rooted schema, it was only under Jewish rule that the city was united, stabilized, and transformed into a city of great religious and national significance.\textsuperscript{105} In fact, it is due to the golden Davidian era and the King’s prominence in the Old Testament that the “Jews have fought more for this city than for anything else” and despite a history of successive conquests, the “golden thread” running through this history is the unshakable association of the Jewish people to Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{106} For Kollek, no other ruler or empire have ever been able to succeed in such a fashion, and with such care and dedication, in the administration of the city than the historical Israelites. As a function of an eternal spiritual, cultural, and historical dedication towards the unity and prosperity of Jerusalem, the Jewish population inherit the exclusive and unconditional right as its legitimate rulers in the form of the contemporary Israeli Municipality.\textsuperscript{107}

At the same time, Jewish rule in Jerusalem is justified to Kollek not only on account of a privileged historical and spiritual claim to the city but also on the progressive disposition of the contemporary Jewish nation; rendering them more inclined to modern, accommodative principles of rule. Kollek emphasizes this point by way of contrasts. First, although stating that Muslim rulers of the past were at times tolerant of other communities (what he deems as a strategy of “practical tolerance” so to maintain the population for purposes of taxation) and while acknowledging life as vibrant in the city at specific points of history during the Islamic era, Muslim rule throughout the centuries is generally characterized by Kollek as neglectful and sectarian, if not tyrannical.\textsuperscript{108} What is more, while Jerusalem admittedly carries a “special

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 22;27.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 11; Kollek and Moskin, 7.
\textsuperscript{107} Kollek, “Jerusalem,” 703.
\textsuperscript{108} Kollek and Pearlman, 162; 168-169; 155-156; 196; 217-219.
significance” in Muslim traditions, its spiritual importance is secondary as it was coveted by Islamic empires primarily for “reasons other than religion” (that is, political, commercial, and military purposes). It so follows then that Muslim rule over the city, from the Caliph Omar (634-644) to the Ottomans (1517-1917), was the result of a succession of invaders who generally did not develop the city (aside from Muslim and strictly religious infrastructure), condemned non-Muslims to secondary status, and cared only for Jerusalem as a political symbol justifying claims to rule.

True to the history and sociality of Jerusalem imagined by Kollek, this attitude towards the city and its inhabitants has carried over to contemporary Arab (specifically Muslim) societies in the Middle East. The Jordanians are emphasized in particular as a negative reference point to the historical greatness of Jewish rule. According to Kollek, it was Jordan that condemned the modern city to a “backwater” by failing to preserve ancient historical sites in the city, neglecting its development in favor of Amman, and refusing to recognize and honor religious and civic rights for non-Muslims. As a result, the Jordanians encouraged emigration, thus further failing in caring for and preserving the city’s fundamental and historical demographic character. Indeed, according to Kollek “we have no reason to think the Arabs would act differently in the future.” Thus contemporary Muslim states, societies, and organizations are generally (and essentially) intolerant if not unmerciful towards minorities and are therefore unfit to rule over any portion of the city. As a tolerant enclave in an intolerant region, Zionist rule is further justified to Kollek as the Jewish nation are the exclusive carriers of enlightened, developmentalist and modern dispositions in the region.

109 Ibid., 155; 223-224.
110 Ibid., 191-196.
111 The reality, however, was not as depicted by Kollek. The Hashemite Kingdom did not neglect Jerusalem. Rather, the kingdom centralized its rule and ensured a relatively efficient administration in the attempt to incorporate Jerusalem into its national identity and placate local Palestinian elites. See Kimberly Katz, *Jordanian Jerusalem: Holy Spaces and National Spaces* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005); Michael Dumper, *Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994); Usama Halabi, *Baladiyat al-Quds al-‘Arabi*.
112 Kollek, “Jerusalem,” 707; Kollel and Pearlman, 252. According to Kollek and Pearlman, the extent of Jordanian development was confined to the tourist sector, as the city was only important for the Kingdom in terms of tourism revenue.
113 Ibid., 704; 708. Kollek tends to conflate “Muslim” and “Arab,” even going so far as denying an Arab ethnic identity for Christian minorities with the exception of Uniates and Protestants.
114 Ibid., 708.
Thus, the “golden age” in the history of Jerusalem is a product of an accommodative and stabilizing Jewish rule whereas the city generally suffered under successive Muslim rulers and empires. This Jewish past is a reflection of the possibilities of a future renaissance in the city under a contemporary Jewish administration willing to adapt to new ideas and modern standards of governance. Unlike Muslim and Christian communities of Jerusalem, who are the products or caricatures of an ancient heritage, the Jews of the city are shaped by the more intimate social history of the city as well as modern historical processes that affected the Jewish community as a whole. Referring specifically to Jewish communities in Jerusalem, Kollek has this to say in an article submitted to *Foreign Affairs* in 1988:

Today, among the Jewish population, we see clear signs of change: hailing from 103 diasporas, so vastly different, the Jews are gradually but steadily forming one cohesive, national group. Even so, almost a third of the Jewish population live in strictly separate ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods. Among the Arabs a similar process is taking place. People from the outlying Arab villages of Jerusalem show more signs of adjustment to the urban Arab society, but they are still known to each other as Jozi, “from Wadi Joz,” or Turi, “from Abu Tor.” They identify with their village communities and do not speak of themselves as Qudsi, “from the Holy City.” Christians identify with one of forty denominations present in Jerusalem, and one cannot speak of a single Christian community...Jerusalem is not a melting pot, nor does anybody see integration or uniformity as desirable or even theoretically possible, except within an individual community.\(^{115}\)

Kollek’s objective here is to demonstrate how the Israeli administration balances social progress and preservation in Jerusalem through ethnographic foresight, sensitivity, and intelligence. If social change is to occur, it must happen gradually and at the pace and limitations set by traditional communities therein. However, at the same time Kollek wishes to make clear that as products of *modern* history, Jewish communities have been able to construct a shared sense of national belonging out of a set of diverse histories and experiences (both abroad and in a self-segregated Jerusalem). By contrast, Palestinian communities are only capable of identifying with locality or, at most, a larger, ‘Arab’ urban order (what Kollek elsewhere refers to as “local Arab nationalism”).\(^{116}\) Nationalist expressions of belonging among Palestinian Jerusalemites, to the extent recognized by Kollek, are strictly and naturally limited by the boundaries of village,

\(^{116}\) Kollek, “Jerusalem,” 707.
quarter, and kinship and this inherent parochialism restricts the socio-political consciousness and imagination among Palestinians to the confines of their immediate surroundings and narrow social boundaries. Seeking only survival in the city in line with individual and local/communal interests, the Palestinians are in effect unable to envision let alone lead in the administration, development, and preservation of a diverse and modern urban order.

3.4 Conclusion

Similar to the construction of the Israeli Arab minority by Israeli orientalists and functionaries working through the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs in the 1950s, the assumptions supporting Kollek’s mental map of Jerusalem illustrate the interpellation of culture as a technology of control, where governed subjects are exoticized and as such are subsequently recognized, integrated, and subsumed into a larger political-hierarchical order by those with the power to represent and be heard. It is in this way also that Kollek can claim the Israeli administrative order in Jerusalem as the articulation of a historically conditioned consensus, as consensus consists only of the voices permitted to be heard: the Zionist sovereigns and those Palestinians with sanctioned speech, such as the functionaries working with the patronage structure of the administration (mukhtars and representatives of permitted institutions). Thus, the notion of Palestinian urban minorities inherent in Kollek’s national-pluralist administrative model is an external projection that transforms subjects into cultural groups bound to state machinations through special provisions and protections based on the needs and desires expected of them by the ruling order.

As such, Palestinian Jerusalemites are inscribed hierarchically in relation to the modern Israeli Jewish citizen. While the Jews of Jerusalem are part of this history and taxonomy they are nonetheless unbound by a historical essence. Rather, they are active historical actors and part of a larger nation and collective consciousness shaped by historical processes throughout the centuries. Thus there is a separate pattern and assumed momentum inherent in Kollek’s narrative structure of Jewish history in the city that is denied to the Palestinians: the collective repression

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117 Jabri, 45-46.
of a nation and their subsequent alienation (Jewish exilic experience after their expulsion from Roman Palestine); ‘rediscovery’ or awakening of national consciousness (the emergence of Zionism); mobilization and the gradual building of nationalist struggle with all the regressions and reversals this entails (the experiences of the Jewish yishuv in British Palestine); and finally, collective emancipation through the realization of a common, objective (and inevitable) horizon: the liberated Jewish nation-state. As for Muslim and Christian Palestinians in Jerusalem, their histories are straight-lined and confined to religious tradition and the social and material parameters of their quarters and neighborhoods. Denied the changes in consciousness and sense of collective belonging that accompany historical and structural dynamics and shifts, the Palestinians are perpetual minorities who somehow embody the history of the city while at the same time existing outside of it. As a result, the Palestinians are viewed through the prism of “well-being;” granted a minority status and allotted the right to certain privileges such as religious and cultural (private) rights, limited freedoms in the realms of speech, education, and movement, and the institutionalization of a kind of decentralized patronage system in the form of neighborhood councils and institutions beholden to an Israeli municipal body.\footnote{Kollek, “Jerusalem: Present and Future,” 1043.}
Chapter 4:
Ethnopsychiatry and the Jerusalem Municipality

As illustrated in the previous chapter, Israel’s conquest and de facto annexation of Palestinian Jerusalem in June 1967 encouraged a debate amongst military and state functionaries. The debate centered on the development of a national strategy that would work to unify the city and integrate the Palestinian population in such a way that complemented the state’s formal (and declared) commitments without threatening the settler-colonial project and its corresponding socio-political order in Jerusalem. In this context, and much like the aftermath of the 1947-1949 war that left the Jewish state with a substantial Palestinian minority, the Israeli conquest of additional Palestinian territory during the June 1967 war encouraged the construction and normalization of a body of knowledge regarding Palestinian history and cultures amongst state branches and institutions active in the city, as it became imperative to provide empirical support and scientific credence to strategies of incorporation and subordination.

This chapter will analyze the contributions of English-American psychiatrist Dr. Gerald Caplan, who wrote and submitted a series of ethno-psychiatric profiles of Palestinian society in Jerusalem to the Municipality from 1969-1977. I will argue that Caplan’s studies were commissioned by Kollek to reflect and rationalize his framework for social and administrative relations in the city, thereby providing a scientific veneer to his governing blueprint where Palestinian Jerusalemites were characterized as naturally subordinate subjects conditioned to adjust to conquest through an ancient and static set of cultural norms. At the same time, this chapter will show that Caplan’s work not only served to rationalize Kollek’s administrative vision for Jerusalem but also played a significant role in bringing it to life. As a self-styled professional consultant for social change and administrative efficiency, Caplan provided a psycho-social canvas of East Jerusalem that was meant to serve as a reference for Israeli city officials and functionaries working towards achieving a “psychological” unification in the city and the gradual adjustment to powerlessness on the part of Palestinian residents under Kollek’s framework. As such, this chapter will illustrate how Caplan’s reports signal the persistence of ethnopsychiatry as a colonial discipline while situating his body of work within the power-knowledge complex of post-1967 Jerusalem.
Israeli authorities' self-fashioning as modern, rational, and enlightened entailed that the Palestinians be studied, categorized, and known in an emotionally and ethnographically intelligent way. In Chapter two, the analysis of the Arab Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office situated Israeli mizrahanim (orientalists) as an integral part of the complex of knowledge and practices central to the development of the idealized "Israeli Arab" citizen and the mediation of Israeli Jewish encounter with Palestinian society. Orientalists, trained specifically at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and affiliated institutions such as the Shiloah Institute, were in persistent contact with governing institutions, the military establishment, and intelligence bodies (if not working for such bodies at the same time), functioning as sources of information and consultation regarding Palestinian societies and cultures throughout the 1950s and 1960s.¹ Following the June 1967 war, orientalists continued to be consulted on matters relating to the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, as both the Prime Minister’s Office and the Jerusalem Municipality sought expertise on local societies, customs and cultures. However, additional institutions were included into this network, as other Arab, Islamic and Middle East studies units were by then well established and networked with the IDF’s intelligence corps, specifically within Tel Aviv University (by 1965, the Shiloah Institute came under “the auspices of Tel Aviv University” and in 1983 changed its name to the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies).²

The role of experts was to provide academic and professional credence to the ideological projections of the state as well as to its national and security objectives. As mediators of political-ideological power, Israeli historians, sociologists, as well as journalists, pundits, and intelligence officers formed a core component of the way Israelis perceived themselves and “the world around them,”³ shaping national policy vis a vis Palestinian Arab citizens, residents, and subjects of Israel. However, it was not only Israeli orientalists who helped construct the "Arab" and "Israeli" within government discourse and imagination. Non-Israeli academics and professionals found their place and role in the production of knowledge on Palestinian societies and history as well. One such academic was Dr. Gerald Caplan, a psychiatrist and mental health

¹ The Shiloah Institute, named after the first Director of the Mossad Reuven Shiloah, was established “in conjunction with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Israel Oriental Society.” See Hazkani, “Catastrophic Thinking.”
² Ibid.; Eyal, 206.
³ Eyal, 3.
professional at Harvard University Medical School who submitted a series of reports to the Jerusalem Municipality as well as the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs from 1969-1977. The reports reveal Caplan’s role as an expert consultant on Palestinian (particularly Arab) community and psycho-social structure as well as a mediator on behalf of the Municipality and his Palestinian interlocutors in Jerusalem. Caplan's utility on the part of the Municipality (and to a lesser extent the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs) illustrates the role of ethnopsychiatry in Israeli colonial urbanism. Before analyzing the reports submitted by Gerald Caplan, a discussion of the historical role of mental health experts in the mediation and propagation of colonial power is necessary.

Psychiatry as a discipline and practice has always existed alongside a corresponding intellectual tradition of critique, particularly towards methods and modes of analysis. However, more comprehensive inquiries into the alliance between mental health discourse and governing ideologies have more recently emerged. Although the work of Frantz Fanon in the 1950s and early 1960s forcefully emphasized the link between mental illness and the practice of therapy to political conditions of exploitation and oppression (thereby exposing the intimate relation between the individual and the socio-political context), western medical histories and the psychiatric profession came under increased scrutiny following the publication of Michel Foucault’s 1961 study Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (later translated to English as Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason) and the subsequent surge within the "anti-psychiatry" movement, perhaps most prominent among them being R.D Laing, David Cooper and Thomas Szasz. Foucault's interventions and the insistence by psychiatric professionals associated with the anti-psychiatric movement of placing diagnosed illnesses and clinical practices within a wider social and political context encouraged critical attention towards a sociology of knowledge; building connections between the practice of psychiatry and political power by illuminating “the ways that medical technologies have

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4 Fanon had a decisively larger impact outside the psychiatric discipline for his political revolutionary work; specifically his role in inspiring (and participating in) anti-colonial movements throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and his place within nationalist and civil rights movements in the Americas.

5 The ‘anti-psychiatric’ movement was and remains controversial within the discipline. However, the movement spurred vigorous debate among detractors and supporters alike of the socio-political links to mental illness and professionalized methods of treatment.
combined with social policies to enhance psychiatry’s coercive power in the twentieth century.”

While early critiques within this tradition tended to privilege a western focus, with time, and particularly after the publication of Edward Said’s *Orientalism* in 1978, Eurocentric scholarship was countered with a shift towards the interrogation of the relationship between medical knowledge and *colonial* power. It was through this shift that psychiatry came under closer scrutiny as a discipline developing in part through colonial contexts and encounters.

As early as 1976, Irene Gendzier warned that it is important not to overemphasize the role of psychoanalysis in the machinations of colonial rule so as to overshadow the primacy of “economic and political categories of explanation.” The irony is that despite the volume of academic work devoted to the link between knowledge production and colonial praxis, the history of colonial psychiatry remains understudied. In recent years, more work has been published that sheds greater light on the place of psychiatry within the power-knowledge nexus that fueled and propagated colonial ventures, as well as its contribution towards shaping the parameters of debate on colonialism within metropole societies.

Notable in this regard on account of its comprehensiveness and scope is Jock McCulloch’s study on colonial psychiatry and scientific racism in British colonial Africa.

Jock McCulloch’s *Colonial Psychiatry and ‘the African Mind’* examines the work of mental health professionals in British-controlled African territories throughout the first half of the twentieth century, specifically South Rhodesia, South Africa, and Kenya. The professional discourses profiled by McColloch are tracked so as to determine the extent in which psychiatric discourses reflected and reinforced colonial praxis and taxonomies of the African ‘native.’ Taken together, the disciplinary directions in psychiatry as it developed in British colonial Africa formed a distinct sub-field that McColloch refers to as ethnopsychiatry, which he argues

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7 Ibid., 296.
occupied a "small and uncomfortable niche" between the social sciences (particularly social anthropology) and human/natural sciences (psychoanalysis).\textsuperscript{11} According to McCulloch, ethnopsychiatry had a limited academic and professional duration (1900-1960) and never became a mainstream or recognized scientific discipline. The amateurs and professionals analyzed in the study did not refer to themselves as ethnopsychiatrists and worked in isolation from each other with little social and academic engagement. Moreover, conferences, institutions and academic journals devoted to ethnopsychiatry as a clearly defined discipline were nonexistent. Finally, and despite common antecedents with social anthropology (most notably theories on race and human diversity prominent in the mid-to-late nineteenth century), those practicing ethnopsychiatry were by and large ostracized by contemporary social anthropologists due to an absence of methodological precision, a lack of empathy for their subjects, and a Eurocentric outlook.\textsuperscript{12} By the early twentieth century, social anthropologists had by and large rejected theories based on or related to eugenics, which was influential in the development of ethnopsychiatry.

Considering the lack of (academic) institutional support as well as the absence of a common self-referential term or professional status between practitioners, it is not altogether clear whether ethnopsychiatry could be regarded as a coherent and distinguishable discipline. McCulloch nonetheless makes the case for ethnopsychiatry as a sub-discipline on account of shared attitudes towards native subjects and the fact that it was a distinctly colonial phenomenon developed by white, settler mental health workers committed to British presence and rule in Africa. The amateur and professional psychiatrists profiled in McColloch’s study (notably John Colin Carothers, Antoine Porot, B.J.F. Laubscher, Wulf Sachs, and Dominique-Octave Mannoni) were connected through a set of central assumptions; namely the mental inferiority of non-whites, which was either biologically and/or culturally determined. At the same time, although working in different geographical contexts they were white, bourgeois and middle class settlers employed by colonial institutions (particularly asylums). As a result, their clinical reports reflected the prejudices and concerns of bourgeois middle class settlers loyal to empire and devoted to the protection of white settler communities throughout Africa. Indeed, because it was

\begin{itemize}
  \item[Ibid., 1.]
  \item[Ibid., 5-6.]
\end{itemize}
a colonial phenomenon the tradition more or less disappeared by the 1970s with the climax of "decolonization," as ethnopsychiatrists lost the political structures and social conditions that gave the discipline both life and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, a commonality in structural context, social position, and political loyalty produced a shared outlook determined by a biologically and/or culturally determined inferiority of Black Africans as well as a tendency to examine subjects as part of a psycho-social group regardless of class, gender, and spatial location.

Professionally, methodologically and in terms of disciplinary background, ethnopsychiatrists were a heterogeneous group. However, most were influenced by popular disciplinary tendencies and intellectual movements within neurophysiology, which dominated British psychiatric practice at the time, as well as racial science trends that made the case for African inferiority as a biological abnormality. In addition, through the influence of psychoanalytical thought as well as late nineteenth century social anthropology (notable of which is the 1898 expedition to the Torres Strait Islands by anthropologist A.C. Haddon, resulting in the first major anthropological study to legitimize psychological approaches to "primitive" minds and cultures), by the early twentieth century colonial psychiatrists came to approach the notion of African backwardness primarily through cultural (as opposed to biological) determinism, although reference to biological and physical characteristics remained a feature in clinical reports and studies. It is from within this structural/socio-political context and methodological nexus that ethnopsychiatry was born.

On account of the colonial taxonomies and methodological approaches shared by McColloch's ethnopsychiatrists, the result was cultural and communitarian diagnoses that played a part in stabilizing colonial rule and rationalizing the inscription of a colonial social-political hierarchy with the white, European male in control over governing institutions and African subjects positioned as communities to be cared for and efficiently governed.\textsuperscript{14} While mirroring and rationalizing colonial discourses, ethnopsychiatry also played a role in the inner workings of

\textsuperscript{13} Although McCulloch argues that the discipline died by the 1960s, articles by practitioners and theorists within the "enormously influential" Algiers school of psychology on the "psychopathology" of Africans continued to be published in clinical manuals until the 1970s. See David Macey, "Frantz Fanon 1925-1961," \textit{History of Psychiatry} 7, No. 28 (1996): 492.

\textsuperscript{14} See also Megan Vaughan, \textit{Curing their IIs: Colonial Power and African Illness} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), Ch. 1 and Ch. 5.
colonial administration and setting the parameters of debate over the British colonial enterprise in Africa. For example, McCulloch devotes two chapters to Dr. John Colin Carothers, perhaps the most prolific of the ethnopsychiatrists. South African born and British educated, Carothers went to Kenya in 1929 to take up a minor medical post until becoming the supervisor of the Mathari Mental Hospital in Nairobi in 1938. Carothers spent most of his time in Kenya inspecting hospitals and psychiatric institutions while writing reports on day to day administration. In the meantime, Carothers published articles on the "African mind" and culture. His published work reflected a belief in the fundamental inferiority of Africans, oscillating between biological arguments (emphasizing the influence of eugenics, neurophysiology, and brain morphology in his disciplinary approach/methodology) and culture-based analyses of the "African mind." A common feature in mental health studies of the time, the white (European) middle class male served as a reference point and measure of African civilizations and societies.

After years of service in the colonies, Carothers was called upon by the WHO and British colonial authorities in Nairobi to head a commission on the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and recommend measures for preventing uprisings in the future. The resulting study, The Psychology of the Mau Mau, ignored the underlying issue of the uprising, which was the appropriation of Kikuyu land, by arguing that rebels were fundamentally "child-like;" that is, self-serving, emotional, and spontaneous on account of a culture of magic, animism, and fantasy that restricted individual growth, intellectual curiosity and the ability to cope with change. Although the only contemporary work of its kind, it became a landmark in ethnopsychiatry; shaping later studies on the Mau Mau as well as the parameters of debate over the colonial order and ‘counter-insurgency’ among British colonial administrators.\(^\text{15}\)

The strict attention devoted to Carothers by McCulloch should not imply that he represented the only instance in which colonial governments tapped into psychiatric discourse for purposes of counter-insurgency and the rationalization of colonial rule. Sloan Mahone’s study on the 1911 insurrections in the Kamba region of Kenya further illustrates the role of anthropology and psychiatric ideas in colonial discourses regarding natives.\(^\text{16}\) In response to

\(^{15}\) McCulloch, Ch. 5.
what the British District Commissioner of Machakos called the "mania of 1911," a corpus of literature on the pathologization of Africans was drawn upon to understand and crush anti-colonial dissent in the region. As a body of knowledge, it served to support if not construct the argument that the 1911 "events" were simply an outbreak of infectious religious hysteria; representing "mass psychological symptoms" brought upon by rapid acculturation and detribalization, which was then animated and mobilized by "epileptic" leaders. According to mental health professionals of the time, the "events" of 1911 as well as anti-tax revolts in the 1920s reflected the African psychological profile and more specifically the notion of a collective mental instability of African communities. Psychiatric discourse has a long history and intimate relationship with colonial praxis and discourses.

This overview of the relationship between colonialism and psychiatric thought sheds light on a number of points relevant to the chapter at hand. First, mental health professionals reflected and reinforced discourses of the non-West already prevalent in settler societies. This worked to rationalize the prejudices inherent in the epistemological foundations of colonial rule. The persistence of a realist ideology within science and technology studies maintained a stubborn commitment to science as being the result of “transparent and objective empirical and experimental methods,” thereby separating the “domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and politics.” Indeed, it is this assumption that made scientific analyses of non-western societies a desirable resource for modern colonial governments formally dedicated to principles of rationality, scientific knowledge, and objectivity. For this reason it is important to emphasize the social-political dimensions of scientific production and to illustrate how natural and political orders are in fact produced together; a process akin to what Sheila Jasanoff refers to as "co-production," which is "the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we chose to live in it." As such, by tracking

19 Ibid., 2-3.
histories of psychiatry in colonial contexts, the discipline can be analyzed as an application of colonial ideology.

Secondly, mental health experts were called upon or accepted as mediators and consultants to colonial authorities. The projections from these experts were based on tropes and assumptions already institutionalized by governing powers, where the understanding of the "Other" was constructed through abstracted, essentialist terms that broke down social complexity, structural-material factors, and historical processes in favor of an intuition of absolute "Otherness." Finally, experts formalized the “community” (national, cultural, tribal, or religious) as a coherent unit of study, reinforcing essentialisms and inscribed hierarchies inherent in colonial discourses and structures of rule. The following section will turn to post-1967 occupied Jerusalem and the relationship between mental health discourse and Israeli colonial urbanism. It will be shown that ethnopsychiatry did not disappear with the climax of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s, as McCulloch argues. Instead, through an analysis of psychiatric reports and profiles submitted to the Israeli Municipality from 1969-1977, the following section will illustrate the persistence and utility of ethnopsychiatry in the context of a contemporary settler-colonial order.

4.1 Gerald Caplan Goes to Jerusalem

In the summer of 1968, Dr. Gerald Caplan, then a Professor of Psychiatry and mental health expert at the Harvard Medical School Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, arrived in Jerusalem with the intention of studying the “psychological aspects of community conflicts and of the feasible contribution of a community psychiatrist to the identification and possible remedy of communication gaps and distortions.”20 Academically trained in child psychology, psychoanalysis, community health, and analytic group psychotherapy, Caplan saw post-1967 Jerusalem as the ideal laboratory to explore urban social conflict. 21 Caplan believed that his findings could be applicable to the Israeli administration in Jerusalem and analogous to other

cities experiencing what he referred to as "socio-cultural dissonance" between ethno-national groups. What is more, Caplan sought to construct a role for mental health experts outside of the clinical context and “beyond the domain of dealing explicitly with people suffering from actual or suspected mental disorder.” Caplan’s declared goal in this capacity was to “collect scientific data and make practical recommendations to community leaders, policy makers and administrators that may reduce unwanted friction,” specifically towards satisfying the psychological and social needs of subordinated populations. In other words, Caplan envisioned a more public, interventionist approach for mental health workers, where they could act as consultants or mediators in the political realm and formulate preventative policies and projects in contexts of socio-political polarization and conflict.

Although Caplan did not identify as an ethnopsychiatrist, his submitted reports to the Municipality illustrated strong parallels to the political utility and methodologies of ethnopsychiatry. As a self-proclaimed liberal and dedicated Zionist with little prior experience in Palestine/Israel, Caplan’s reports both reflected and rationalized Teddy Kollek’s taxonomy of Palestinian-Arab society in Jerusalem as well as his “pluralist” approach towards local government therein. What is more, through what he referred to as a “clinical-style ethnographic approach,” Caplan conceived of Palestinian Jerusalemites as a collective with shared and innate psycho-cultural features. For Caplan, tensions felt amongst Palestinians towards the Israeli occupation were primarily the result of a socio-cultural dissonance experienced by a community with specific cultural characteristics and expectations that had yet to be understood and accommodated efficiently and coherently. In what follows, I will illustrate how Caplan’s reports not only gave Kollek’s understanding of Palestinian Arab society in Jerusalem a scientific apparatus but also created a psycho-social blueprint for municipal functionaries so as to “project a feeling of mastery and autonomy” on the part of Palestinian Jerusalemites and more effectively stimulate their "adjustment to powerlessness" under Israeli authority. In so doing, I will situate

22 Caplan and Caplan, 2.
23 Ibid., 281.
25 Ibid., 273.
Caplan’s confidential reports within the history and tradition of ethnospsychiatry while identifying its role in reflecting and rationalizing (Israeli) municipal colonial discourses.

Born in England in March of 1917, Gerald Caplan received his BSc in 1937 from Manchester University in Anatomy and Physiology. He would remain at Manchester until 1940 to earn his M.B. and Ch.B before moving on to complete his diploma in psychological medicine in London by 1942. Caplan then completed his M.D. back at Manchester by 1945 and finally his M.A. at Harvard University in 1970. In addition to his academic credentials, Caplan was trained in and worked in a professional and advisory capacity for several psychiatric and medical institutions in both London and Boston; particularly as a specialist in community and child psychology. In the meantime, Caplan moved to Israel shortly after its establishment in 1948 to act as an advisor in psychiatry for the Israeli Ministry of Health (1948-1949). By 1949, he moved on to accept a post as psychiatric director at the Lasker Mental Hygiene and Child Guidance Center at Hadassah hospital in Jerusalem (1949-1952). After a period of four years, Caplan returned to Boston, where by 1958 he became a naturalized U.S. citizen while working in various positions at Harvard and Boston-area clinics. He also served in the United States army as a psychiatric consultant. Towards the completion of his M.A. at Harvard in the late 1960s, Caplan returned to Jerusalem to conduct a community mental health study. Caplan conceived of this venture as an extension of other crisis studies he was involved with as a researcher at the time, specifically projects dealing with racial-urban conflict in U.S. cities.

Caplan was not warmly received during his initial reconnaissance with the Israeli Municipality and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. Both had their own network of experts. As such, there was no perceived need for an outsider, especially one with little to no background on the history of the city, no knowledge of Arabic, and only moderate skills in...
spoken Hebrew. Caplan was also perceived by several Israeli administrators as a potential activist for Palestinian rights. However, Kollek ultimately agreed to work with Caplan through his Jerusalem Foundation in the summer of 1968, commissioning him to study problems of communication between Palestinians and Jews in the city and submit a scientific account of (Palestinian) cultural codes and community demands. With Kollek’s patronage, Caplan gradually built good working relations with a number of government offices as well as city officials administering the main service programs in Palestinian Jerusalem. According to Caplan’s submitted papers, his main pillars of institutional support came mainly from Kollek and the Jerusalem Foundation as well as Meyer Silverstone (Director General of the Ministry of Interior), Zvi Terlo (Director General of the Ministry of Justice), Shmuel Toledano (Arab Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office), Moshe Sasson (Advisor for Arab Affairs to the Foreign Ministry), Moshe Kol (Minister of Tourism), Shlomo Hillel (Minister of Police), Shimon Peres (then the Acting Minister of Absorption in charge of development in the Occupied Territories), Salman Falah (inspector of Arab Education in the Ministry of Education) as well as Professors and directors of various departments at the Hebrew University and Hadassah hospital. His residency in Jerusalem, as well as his research team made up of a network of Israeli orientalists, social workers, and municipal employees was supported in large part by the Jerusalem Foundation, alongside Harvard Medical School, the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, and the Maurice Falk Medical Fund.

It is clear through the submitted reports that Kollek was prompted to support Caplan’s research proposal as a means to gain scientific validity for his administrative model. In addition, Kollek sought an additional mediating personality to improve relations with Palestinian residents. At the same time, Kollek was known to be personally concerned about social (and not strictly administrative) relations between Jewish and Palestinian communities in Jerusalem. A

32 Former Deputy Mayor Meron Benvenisti recalls that he did not personally take to Caplan’s proposed project, as his academic and professional background bore little to no relation to the socio-political dynamics specific to the city. Interview with Meron Benvenisti, August 14 2013. Dr. Caplan did not have any knowledge of Arabic and by his own admission, a very ‘moderate’ level of Hebrew. See Caplan and Caplan, 9.
33 Caplan and Caplan, 10.
35 Ibid.
36 The Van Leer Institute provided office space for Caplan and his team.
survey commissioned by the Municipality shortly after the June 1967 war found that a majority of Jewish residents held negative attitudes towards Palestinians and did not wish to live, work, or interact with them on a day to day level. Dismayed at the findings, Kollek “ordered to destroy all copies” of the survey, as it did not reflect well on his political objectives and projects in the city. Indeed, his Jerusalem Foundation, as well as institutions in the city on which Kollek sat as a board member (such as the Israel Museum), made it amongst its primary missions to develop cordial relations between ethno-religious communities. In order to achieve this vision, more had to be known about the desires, behavioral patterns, and expectations of the Palestinian population so as to accommodate accordingly and strategically. It is no wonder, then, that Caplan’s first commissioned project was to examine problems of communications between ethno-national communities.

After convincing enough Israeli administrators that his work would not be used as a political platform (Caplan insisted that he would avoid an "active role in shaping the political future of Jerusalem"), Caplan was sanctioned to first build contacts with Palestinian community leaders before beginning his exploratory two-year research period on Arab-Jewish communication. Considering the absence of meaningful, direct relations between the Municipality and the Palestinian Jerusalemite population outside of already institutionalized mediators, it is reasonable to conclude that Kollek and others found Caplan’s outsider status useful towards expanding and improving upon the municipal patronage system. Caplan was not an Israeli citizen or (officially) an employee of the Jerusalem Municipality (he was hired and paid through the Jerusalem Foundation). Hence, it was reasoned that his status as a seemingly neutral analyst could potentially work to infiltrate Palestinian communities and provide information to the authorities on the emerging intellectual class of journalists, teachers, lawyers, doctors and other professionals in the city, many of whom were respecting a strike against cooperation with Israeli institutions at the time. What is more, Caplan’s academic credentials and his reputation in the scientific community may have attracted the attention of some city officials.

38 Caplan and Caplan, 255; 266-267; 10.
as well as the Interior Ministry, the Prime Minister’s Office, and those on the board of the Jerusalem Foundation.39

The nature of the material available forces speculation on this matter. What is clear, however, is that while Kollek approached the inhabitants of Palestinian Jerusalem through a set of expectations informed by a particular historical narrative and taxonomy, there was still the issue of identifying contemporary needs and patterns of thought as a means through which to develop a more steady and working relationship between the Municipality and Palestinian communities. Considering the depth and duration of Caplan’s study on Palestinian Jerusalem and the fact that he remained for years after the completion of his project as a special consultant to the Municipality on matters of health, education and welfare, it is clear that he came to be regarded as an asset.40 As his own reports illustrate, Caplan was a regular at the offices of the Jerusalem Foundation, Israeli income tax authorities, and municipal employees. He also attended council meetings throughout his years as a working professional in the city.41 He was close enough to governing authorities that he proposed and helped administer a number of projects throughout Palestinian Jerusalem ranging from a vocational education program to the establishment of a mental health clinic.

Working alongside a group of Israeli social workers and Orientalists, Caplan spent on average of 2-4 months per year in Jerusalem from 1968-1977. In this time, he submitted dozens of confidential reports, even publishing parts of his findings through Harvard University Press in 1980. In both his published work and confidential reports, Caplan insisted that he was an honest broker between the Palestinian community in Jerusalem and the Israeli Municipality and saw himself as both a "communication bridge" (mediator) and a dispassionate analyst.42 As a “communication bridge,” Caplan channelled information between the two parties (local government and Palestinian communities). As an analyst, Caplan interpreted the information and

39 Interview with Eliezer Yafi, August 18 2013. Eliezer Yafi was the Director of the Welfare Department for the municipality from 1970-1973.
40 Caplan and Caplan, 12.
offered recommendations, specifically on how the Municipality could accommodate administratively and strategically towards essential community needs and expectations in Palestinian Jerusalem. In order to avoid “taking a political stand,” Caplan insisted that he focused on identifying and exploiting only what he called the common "subordinate goals" of parties involved.43 Caplan identified the "subordinate" goals as: building communication channels, implementing joint programs focusing on self-help and autonomous community organization, and "the satisfaction of the basic human needs of individuals and their families, such as the provision of food, shelter, and medical services."44 Caplan sought to create a working relationship between municipal authorities and Palestinian communities through cooperative projects established to meet the common, subordinate goals identified.

Despite pretensions of functioning as a non-political mediator, Caplan identified and worked towards the primary goals of Kollek and the Jerusalem Municipality. His submitted reports illustrated that the aim of Kollek’s policies in East Jerusalem was to promote a sense of communal development as well as security, autonomy, and administrative partnership between the city and Palestinian communities.45 To Kollek, identifying the proper channels through which to pursue these goals would serve as a bulwark against nationalist activism and reinforce what he saw as the age-old social and urban patterns in the city.46 Thus, a psycho-social profile identifying cultural codes and community desires was necessary in order to integrate Palestinian residents and stabilize a paternalistic structure of government based strictly on a provider-recipient model.

Caplan’s published work on his Jerusalem project does not include all of the reports he submitted to the Municipality. The subtractions are notable, resulting in a public record that obscures the extent of Caplan’s political role as an advisor and mediator for the Israeli Municipality. The reports dealing with “mutual help projects” throughout the early 1970s, for example, are left entirely out of his published work. Caplan explained that this was mainly due to

44 Caplan and Caplan, 278.
46 Ibid.
reasons of confidentiality, as the existence of joint municipal-Palestinian community projects were (and still are) a contentious issue. However, it is in his confidential reports (submitted but not published) on community projects that Caplan was most explicit in the political role he came to adopt in service to the Municipality. The end result was a series of studies that read as counter-insurgency manuals for how to deal with perceived Arab behavioral deficiencies and integrate the population through a system of incentives based on "liberal" precepts and tenets (such as local development, movement of both goods and bodies, autonomous institutional arrangements accommodating to cultural "difference," and adherence to law), thereby situating Caplan and the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality in the tradition of "population-centric" counterinsurgency and exposing Caplan in particular as a theoretician of micro-practices of control designed to transform "political conflicts and contestations" into "technical problems to be solved." Critical omissions in Caplan’s published work, done in the interest of reinforcing a neutral (and hence professional) position and tone to the reader, obscures the extent of his connections and political commitments. Caplan’s submitted and confidential reports more accurately illustrate the extent to which Caplan was dedicated to the achievement of municipal visions and how his work reflected, rationalized, and reinforced Israeli discourses and strategies of conquest.

4.2 Colonial Power and the "Change Agent."

In a report submitted to the Israeli Municipality on October 16 1972, Caplan outlined the progress reached in a number of community projects initiated, encouraged or approved by the Municipality in East Jerusalem. Caplan argued that to allow for projects to be run by Palestinians themselves (albeit tied financially and administratively to the Jerusalem Foundation) would promote psychological ease in the ongoing and gradual adjustment to Israeli rule, notably through the establishment of administrative links and professional relations with the Municipality. The report outlined pitched and (sometimes) defeated projects in the early to

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47 Khalili, 5.
mid-1970s including: a cooperative housing project in Beit Hanina and Shu’fat initiated by Palestinian teachers in north-east Jerusalem in conjunction with the Jerusalem Foundation; an independent West Bank Bar Association allowing Palestinian lawyers and judges in Jerusalem to work in courts without joining the Israeli bar association; a West Bank Engineering Cooperative; mental health and medical facilities in the city; a children’s hospital on the Mount of Olives, and the building of an Arab university campus in Jerusalem (al-Quds University) through the Nusseibeh family (after gaining assurance that it would be geared towards technical training so as not to become a hot bed of “Palestinian radicalism”).

There was a dual objective in Caplan’s October 1972 report on mutual help and development projects. The first was to urge the Municipality to support community projects in East Jerusalem as a means of strengthening administrative and cooperative linkages between administrators and Palestinian residents. The second was to insist that city officials (including Caplan himself) become active “change agents;” that is, professional consultants or state functionaries dedicated to "raising the ceiling" of native development and working towards the satisfaction of essential human needs. According to Caplan, the change agent was the anti-thesis to the traditional, paternalistic approach to colonial rule. He argued that while colonial orders of the past “demonstrated benevolence” and “made contributions to the welfare of the people they ruled,” they were not accountable to native populations; initiating projects “entirely on the basis of their own judgement of what was needed.” By imposing community projects from above, setting low ceilings on local development, and ignoring cultural sensitivities and norms, colonialists of the past failed “to stimulate the aspirations of the natives” and this system of subservience and underdevelopment had negative effects on the “self-respect and autonomy of individuals.”

As the anti-thesis to colonial functionaries of the past, change agents were to raise the ceiling of native community development and encourage cooperative relations by tactfully learning and responding to cultural/behavioral norms while tolerating institutionalized outlets for self-expression and autonomy (such as professional, charitable, and religious institutions). In this

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
manner, the Municipality could maintain the political status quo as well as initiate a transition in Palestinian Jerusalem from a “traditional, hierarchical” society to a modern, egalitarian culture without alienating or assimilating the population. In order to “help them help themselves,” Caplan proposed a “two-pronged approach:” stimulate and support bottom-up (Palestinian) community-building initiatives while simultaneously competing at a “low level intensity” through municipal or jointly-administered services and institutions. It was reasoned that this would arouse further local development and popular support for the "functional autonomy" model in Jerusalem.53

Caplan insisted that Israel differentiate itself from the paternalism of past colonial powers by embracing the characteristics and functions of the change agent. A fundamental premise of the mutual help and development reports submitted by Caplan was that Palestinian Jerusalemites were in need of outside stimulation so to compel them learn “new organizational skills” and “enable them to maintain a healthy Arab community in a unified Israeli Jerusalem.”54 For Caplan, like the colonial paternalists of the past, Israel should produce “change in people's ideas, attitudes, and behavior patterns” to attain these goals.55 However, as change agents the goal of the Municipality should be to act as “catalysts” and not as “executors” for socio-cultural and economic development.56 In other words, Israeli administrators were not to impose programs and development projects. Rather, they were to respond to, if not stimulate or convince the Palestinians of community needs while encouraging initiatives towards these goals even though it was linked to the city and shored up its authority.57

Caplan advised in his reports that as change agents, municipal offices and service providers should embody the following in their policies and practices: a) stimulate an awareness among Palestinian Jerusalemites of community needs and goals; b) encourage their own efforts towards realizing these goals without the imposition of a stringent development ceiling by the Municipality; c) be sensitive and respectful to articulated and felt needs of the Palestinian population; d) learn from their cultural values tactfully so to more effectively acclimate the

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
population to Israeli bureaucracy and rule; e) increase the autonomy and independence of the Palestinians so as to arouse a sense of communal and individual self-respect; and f) ensure a “true congruence” between the concrete goals of Palestinian Jerusalemites and those of the Municipality. For Caplan, Israeli administrators had to make Palestinian Jerusalemites conscious of their essential needs and work to attain specific goals in either an independent or joint (municipal-Palestinian) framework. In following this rubric, Palestinian Jerusalemites could gradually come to appreciate “the realities of the situation” and accept the Israeli Municipality as a partner for communal development and stability.\(^{58}\)

Caplan’s advocacy for a benign (as he understood it) and more effective colonial order depended on cross-cultural communication and awareness. Towards this end, Caplan produced a psycho-social profile of Palestinian (particularly Arab) communities in Jerusalem. The following section will examine Caplan’s earliest reports submitted to the Municipality from 1969-1972, which together formed a research project on the problems of communications between Palestinians and Jews. Through an analysis of the reports, it will be shown that Caplan provided a scientific veneer to the ideological production of the Palestinian community inherent in Kollek’s national-pluralist governing rubric by projecting an image of a Palestinian cultural community existing from time immemorial and addressing primordial cultural differences as the primary site of intervention towards conflict resolution.\(^{59}\)

### 4.3 Gerald Caplan’s Psycho-Social profile of Palestinian Jerusalem

Although an accomplished mental health professional, Caplan admittedly knew little about the modern history of Jerusalem and Palestinian society therein.\(^{60}\) Therefore, in order to create the psycho-social profile he sought, it was necessary to adopt or develop a historical and social narrative through which to approach his interlocutors and support his recommendations. Caplan already supported the Israeli annexation of the city after the June 1967 war and rallied behind

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58 Ibid.
60 Caplan and Caplan, 287.
Kollek’s vision for Jerusalem as a bi-cultural network of semi-autonomous boroughs.\footnote{Ibid., 258.} Considering his ideological commitments, it is not surprising that Caplan reproduced the notion of Palestinian Jerusalem shaped by a history of conquest and insularity and the population therein as a disassembled, primitive multitude in need of modern leadership and bureaucracy.

Perhaps the most important factor in the development of his knowledge of Jerusalem was the fact that Caplan depended on municipal social workers, Histadrut officials, and Israeli orientalists to forge the narratives through which he came to understand the history of the city and the social-cultural dynamics on the ground. Caplan’s published work on his psycho-social project in Jerusalem was prefaced with the statement that he did \textit{not} believe that Jerusalem’s Arabs have a "special mentality."\footnote{Ibid., 1.} Even within his working papers submitted in August 1969 and October 1972, Caplan went so far as to dismiss what he called "the stereotype" of the "Oriental mind" that he felt lingered in the publications of Israeli Orientalists.\footnote{Gerald Caplan, “Communication between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem: Second Working Paper,” August 8 1969, JMA 5977; “Improving Human Services in East Jerusalem. Special Report. Developments in Mutual Help Projects,” October 16 1972, JMA 5977.} However, although Caplan acknowledged the importance of structural and socio-political context to cultural analysis, the psycho-social profile he created through his submitted reports did not reflect this stated recognition but rather the taxonomies of Israeli Orientalists he so lamented. In fact, it is clear through his submitted reports that Israeli Orientalists and municipal functionaries were employed as consultants, translators, mediators, as well as interviewers and researchers who worked on the project while Caplan spent most of the year in Boston. What is more, the information on the politics, history and cultures in Palestinian Jerusalem in the reports were provided in large part by Israeli Orientalists from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.\footnote{Gerald Caplan, “Improving Human Services in East Jerusalem: Special Report. Summary of Research Findings and Problematic Implications,” 25 September 1972, JMA 5977; “Sanction,” undated, JMA 5977. According to Caplan’s reports, Ori Stendel and Yusuf Binya collected information on the social structure of Palestinian Jerusalem on Caplan’s behalf. Alongside Stendel and Binya, among the Orientalists and functionaries listed are: Danny Avidan, Jona Rosenfeld, Shimon Shamir, Samir Seikaly, Salman Falah, Ed Sofer, Steven Cohen, and Muhammad Abu Bakr. Jona Rosenfeld, then a lecturer in social work at Hebrew University, is listed as a supervisor to the field work of Samir Seikaly, a social worker and probation officer working for the municipality who focused on education and the adjustment of Palestinian school teachers to Israeli rule. He is also listed as an author of a report on Arab students at the Hebrew University. Rosenfeld, however, does not recall any active participation in the project. Shimon Shamir is also listed as a consultant but similarly denies any active involvement. Interview with Jona Rosenfeld, August 14 2013; Shimon Shamir, Email message to author, August 7 2013.} For
these reasons, as well as Caplan’s academic training as a community psychologist, his research was driven to relate behaviors of his interlocutors in essentialist and communitarian terms, reflecting the ontological foundations of the bi-cultural vision he was committed to both politically and emotionally.

With his project sanctioned by Kollek in the summer of 1968, Caplan spent on average of anywhere between two to six months per year in Jerusalem from June 1969 until the winter of 1977. The first phase of his research (1968-1969) was referred to by Caplan as "the preliminary reconnaissance of the local field," which entailed the building of relationships between both the Municipality and “key figures” in the Palestinian Arab community. After the "reconnaissance" period, Caplan was then commissioned to spend two years analyzing the “sources of inter-ethnic tension” in the city, the “psychological structure” of Arab communities, and their attitudes, patterns of thinking, and general way of life. In doing so, Caplan ultimately sought a mental-cultural analysis while mapping “the human condition of Arabs,” points of “dissonance and friction,” perceptions of identity, needs and desires regarding urban services, attitudes towards the Israeli state, as well as the “patterns of adjustment of Arab individuals, families, and institutions to Israeli rule.” Together the reports were meant to serve as a means towards reducing communal frictions and improving understanding and communication between Jewish administrators and Palestinian Jerusalemites. Thus, Caplan’s first four years involved collecting observational and ethnographic data on living and adjustment patterns while also developing in-depth, psycho-social profiles of Arab Jerusalem so to provide a framework for municipal intervention. Although recognizing in passing that tensions between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem were “fundamentally based upon political conflicts,” the research team targeted instead what they called the "exacerbating frictions" in day to day relations, which were assumed to be a consequence not of the political situation but rather cultural miscommunication and

65 Caplan and Caplan, 13.
To meet with and attain sanction from Palestinian Jerusalemites for his study, Caplan sought several routes. Caplan first contacted Palestinian professionals to introduce him to “leading figures” of the Arab community in Jerusalem, namely an (unnamed) “Israeli Arab journalist” as well as a Palestinian social worker and probation officer employed by the Municipality in the belief that formal and informal Arab leaders were community experts. They proved to be integral towards developing the contacts necessary for Caplan’s ethnographic research, which over time consisted of hundreds of unstructured interviews with city inhabitants and day to day observation of Palestinian (Arab) life in coffee houses, restaurants, and markets. Caplan soon discovered the absence of formal leadership in the city that could speak on behalf of the Palestinians and provide a more intimate understanding of urban cultures and community life. Caplan did not attribute this to the dissolution of the Jordanian Municipality and expulsion of its functionaries by the Israeli government in late June 1967. Nor did Caplan reference the active divide and rule policy in force by the Israeli administration through the institutionalized relationships with village/neighborhood mukhtars. Rather, Caplan attributed the lack of leadership at the local level to a “family and clan-oriented culture” as well as a history of conquest in Jerusalem that suppressed the emergence of “supra-clan” leaders.

Nonetheless, by 1970 Caplan tapped into a network of Palestinian professionals and former administrators that included not only the heads of religious institutions, journalists, and lawyers but also representatives of the Jordanian Jerusalem Municipality and remnants of the pre-1967 Palestinian commercial bourgeoisie. However, despite Caplan’s relationships with some notable Palestinian figures in the city, it is clear that he was never fully trusted as an

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72 Ibid.
73 Gerald Caplan, “Sanction,” undated, JMA 5977. Those credited include Anwar Nusseibeh, Anwar al-Khatib, Hazem al-Khalidi, Aziz Shehadeh, Aref al-Aref, Mohammad Abu Shilbaya, Mahmoud Abu Zuluf, Ibrahim Kamal, Yusef Majaj, Rashid Nashashibi, Mahmoud Dajani and Ibrahim Tleel. These figures acted as consultants for community projects pitched and initiated by Caplan from the 1970s onwards as well as personal contacts through which Caplan connected with other Palestinians in Jerusalem.
unbiased observer and mediator. In one report submitted to the Municipality, Caplan stated that his Palestinian interlocutors believed him to be an undercover agent, either for American or Israeli intelligence bodies, engaging in psychological warfare against the population. After the spring of 1970, nationalist student groups in the city also cut off contacts with Caplan and his research group based on similar suspicions.\(^{74}\) Caplan insisted that these attitudes “almost disappeared with time,” in the belief that most Palestinians came to accept him “in good faith” not only due to his Harvard education and his efforts towards the materialization of community projects over the years but also on account of a “hunger for contact with Jews” and normalcy in the city.\(^{75}\)

Nonetheless, according to Caplan distrust among Palestinian Jerusalemites never completely dissipated because suspicion was “a prominent aspect of their culture” as a result of a history of subordination that produced a population “accustomed to being coerced and manipulated” by groups wielding power over them.\(^{76}\) Indeed, Caplan’s submitted reports mentioned that Palestinian Jerusalemites outside of his immediate network warned others in the community to keep their distance from his research team. Those who did collaborate on the project were popularly dismissed as “quislings” aiding a foreign mission.\(^{77}\) On account of the suspicions held by many within the Palestinian community, Caplan was left to rely on Israeli academics and municipal functionaries for historical and ethnographic knowledge of the city.

Caplan submitted several working papers to the Municipality that together formed a historical and psycho-social profile of Palestinian Jerusalem. The papers sought to rationalize the idea that Palestinian Jerusalemites lacked a political culture and hence any desire for representation or identification through national (Palestinian/Arab) institutions. Rather, it was

\(^{74}\) Ibid.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.; Caplan and Caplan, 289.

\(^{76}\) Caplan and Caplan, 260.

\(^{77}\) Gerald Caplan, “Tenth Working Paper: Improving Services to East Jerusalem. General Adjustment,” April 25 1972, JMA 5977; “Sanction,” undated, JMA 5977. In his published work, Caplan states that after “about three years,” Palestinian Jerusalemites no longer suspected him of being a foreign agent. See Caplan and Caplan, 11. However, submitted reports to the Israeli municipality make clear that throughout his stay, his interlocutors knew of Caplan’s close connections to the mayor, as they would communicate their complaints and desires to the authorities through Caplan himself. If his interlocutors appeared to be more open in discussing civic, cultural, and community matters with Caplan over time, this may have more to do with the realization that they can utilize his position as an agent/mediator to their advantage as opposed to the acceptance of the idea that he was a neutral outsider.
The author reasoned that Palestinian Jerusalem was comprised of a collection of insular socio-cultural communities who have historically strived to adjust to conquest for the sake of communal survival and economic well-being. In the seventh paper submitted in the series, Caplan discussed Palestinian reactions to the August 1970 cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. Caplan argued that despite a widely held resentment towards the occupation of East Jerusalem, residents were increasingly coming to terms with Israeli rule on account of a stabilizing economy, lack of faith in neighboring Arab states to liberate the city, and a growing appreciation for services.\(^78\)

With this confidence in what he saw as a gradual process towards political and social stabilization, Caplan cautiously added that:

Not many Arabs and Jews who have gotten to know each other in their occupational life have made friends and spend their leisure time together. Apart from a few exceptions, some of which seem almost contrived, there is very little social visiting between Arab and Jewish families...perhaps we should not be surprised that with progressive stabilization of life in Jerusalem, Arabs and Jews should not mix much in social gatherings. This has, after all, always been the pattern of interaction in the city made up of many separate religions and ethnic subgroups, each of which have been culturally self-sufficient...People tell us that the lack of such social relationships is caused by the unresolved aftermath of the war...but our impression in July 1970 was that in regard to leisure time interaction, we were approaching the normative age-old pluralistic social pattern in Jerusalem, in which Jews from England never make friends with Jews from Rumania...Christian or Greek Orthodox Arabs do not make friends with Jerusalemite Moslems or Hebronite Moslems.\(^79\)

Caplan approached communal divisions and the social dynamics in post-1967 Jerusalem more generally outside of the immediate structural and political context; preferring instead to bear witness to a city as it related to a series of essentialist tropes. In the same report, Caplan expressed surprise when his interlocutors denoted a sense of hostility towards Arab leaders, such as King Hussein of Jordan, as opposed to the Israelis. If it was widely believed by Palestinian Jerusalemites that Caplan was working on behalf of the Israeli or United States government, it should not be surprising that he encountered little in terms of open and vocal hostility from an occupied population towards the authorities. However, Caplan’s surprise was based on the belief that “what sticks in the Arab’s throat is that Jews, whom for centuries they have despised as


\(^79\) Ibid.
constitutionally inferior, should have had the effrontery to beat Arabs."\(^{80}\)

For Caplan, the true feeling of Palestinian Arabs towards Jews was one of contempt shaped by centuries of communal insularity and a sense of religious superiority. At the same time, however, what Caplan saw as culturally and historically determined sense of derision among Palestinian Arabs towards Jews could be expected to gradually dissipate through a socio-cultural imperative to adjust for the sake of economic and communal/individual survival. In a report submitted in September 1972, Caplan elaborated on his theory of Arab adjustment as an inherent cultural tendency, adding that “East Jerusalemites have been ruled by outsiders for centuries, and in consequence they have developed effective ways of coping with the human problems involved. These coping patterns have become a traditional way of life.”\(^{81}\) He elaborated further in a November 1971 report, arguing that psychological withdrawal among Arab Jerusalemites into a “world of ideologies and fantasies” (namely identification with what Caplan calls “the Arab cause”) was part of a “cultural mechanism of survival” emphatic on asserting distance from governing power while at the same time pleasing “social influencers.”\(^{82}\)

In a report submitted about a year later in September 1972, Caplan’s misunderstanding of what he saw as the “cultural mechanisms of adjustment” in Jerusalem were finally more fully elaborated. Caplan described these mechanisms as follows: developed skills in interpreting danger towards the well-being of one’s immediate community and family; acting through a “pragmatic philosophy” that the supreme good was individual, and not collective, well-being; moving and living cautiously; looking to social “influentials” to guide one’s life and movement; a sophisticated intra-community awareness; and the use of intermediaries between community and government.\(^{83}\)

Caplan happened to begin his research at a time when nationalist ideologies amongst residents in East Jerusalem were already widespread and discernible, whether Palestinian,

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\(^{80}\) Ibid.


Jordanian, or pan-Arabist (particularly Nasserist). In fact, Caplan recognized as much in his submitted reports. However, if the natural, culturally determined pattern among Palestinian Jerusalemites was to adjust to conquest and act strictly in the name of communal and individual well-being, this notion would presumably be undermined by Caplan's stated recognition of nationalist ideologies in the city. In the same September 1972 report, when discussing “social structure, patterns of thinking, and ways of life," Caplan commented on the “nationalist revival” after 1967 among Palestinians in Jerusalem, stating:

The rise in Palestinian national consciousness and ideology which has been more marked since 1967 has evoked no deep or lasting motivations within the population of East Jerusalem. It has been mainly the product of émigré’s—an Arab "Galut" phenomenon (sic), akin to Jewish diaspora Zionism, but with more superficial roots…East Jerusalem has never been a significant socio-cultural or political entity…The boundaries drawn by Israel in 1967 further weakened its collective identity, but even before then its inhabitants had little feeling of locality patriotism (sic) and hardly any distinctive culture…

Thus, according to Caplan, what he saw as the fractious, insular, and nomadic nature of Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem meant that attempts of émigré intellectuals to “nationalize” the community would have no long lasting effects. Palestinian Jerusalemites were a “residual population” who had come and gone throughout history depending on the level of security maintained or the potential for wealth or income. For Caplan, “the dominance of sentiments of self-interest over supra-clan nationalist identity” would eventually overpower nationalist sentiment, as it was the natural expression of the socio-cultural and political history in the city. The nature of psychological and cultural adjustment amongst Palestinians was such that as long as Israeli institutions could maintain symbolic distance from their neighborhoods as well as the necessary conditions to foster a sense of personal and economic security, a stable socio-cultural and political equilibrium could be achieved.

Thus, Palestinian “adjustment” to a colonial order and the development of task-oriented

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86 Ibid.
relationships with the Municipality and other ethno-cultural communities reflected a natural separatism and antagonism as well as a pragmatism rooted in age-old traditions and cultural patterns and not the social dynamics of asymmetrical national-political conflict. In this way, the history through which Caplan understood the social-political dynamics in the city worked to remove his subjects from the present. By narrating a predetermined historical script that conceived of colonial encounter as a familiar, time-tested fact, Caplan depoliticized and naturalized conquest and removed criticism of the settler-colonial enterprise in Jerusalem from its temporal present. On account of this cyclical, uninterrupted history of a conquered Jerusalem, separation and domination was part of a natural urban order. The strategy of sumud among the Palestinians of the city, which developed in the 1970s in response to the failure of outside powers and international institutions to force Israel’s withdrawal from the 1967 Occupied Territories, was captured by Caplan as a cultural-traditional imperative of "adjusting to powerlessness." Indeed, in Caplan’s understanding, Israeli settlers in the city fulfilled a sort of historical prophecy while the Israeli occupying authorities were positioned as the inevitable conqueror enforcing and maintaining order over Palestinian Jerusalemites, who were themselves unable to politically organize on account of their natural submissiveness.

4.4 The May 1970 Tax Strike: A Case Study into the "Arab Mentality."

Caplan’s report on the May 1970 tax strike in Palestinian Jerusalem is a prime example of his misunderstanding of a distinct and inherent mentality that he believed developed amongst Palestinian Arabs over centuries in the city. By ignoring structural and social context all together, Caplan’s studies reflected less the scientific vigour that he championed and more the vulgar and sweeping generalizations common in the now outdated and dismissed discipline of national character studies popular in the (American) social sciences throughout the 1940s and the 1950s.87 In April of 1970, a tax law was introduced by Israeli authorities in the city that raised the rates of income tax and supplementary taxes collected by the tax office.88 Income tax assessments were

drastically raised in order to cover advance payments for the year 1970-1971. Moreover, the
defense tax added to the basic income tax was raised from 10% to 15%, in addition to two
compulsory defense loans that amounted to a further 12%. This amounted to a 27% contribution to the compulsory supplement taxes that had to be paid in addition to increasing income taxes and already burdensome municipal taxes. The defense taxes in particular became the focal point of a public outcry across Palestinian Jerusalem that was expressed through radio, newspapers, and institutions such as the Arab (Jerusalem) Chamber of Commerce and Industry. As a result, a general strike was called for the morning of 30 May 1970 and shops were requested to be shut down.

Well before the strike of 30 May 1970, representatives of the Israeli income tax authorities and Jerusalem Municipality met with the Arab Chamber of Congress and Industry (henceforth known as the Chamber) for a series of meetings that were meant to resolve the issue of tax levels once and for all. An institution that survived the transition to Israeli rule, the Chamber was “comprised of leading Arab business figures in the community” and were closely associated with the Jordanian government. Indeed, the institution was often described by Israeli authorities as a “Jordanian consulate.” Despite this point of view, the Chamber was nonetheless permitted by Israeli occupation authorities to facilitate travel between East Jerusalem and Jordan after June 1967 in addition to regulating the flow of goods and services and providing powers of attorney. This arrangement was an expression of Kollek’s objective of incorporating select (non-political) Palestinian institutions into the governing framework of the Israeli Municipality as well as developing economic ties between Jews and Arabs.

While rejecting the annexation of Palestinian Jerusalem and officially refusing to incorporate itself into the organizational structure of the Municipality, the Chamber nonetheless

89 Ibid.
92 Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, 163.
94 Benvenisti, Jerusalem: The Torn City, 55.
95 Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, 163.
developed an intermediary relationship with local Israeli authorities. From September 1967 to June 11 1968, it established advisory committees to assist Israeli tax authorities “in making reasonable assessments of the tax situation in East Jerusalem,” as Jordanian records were often incomplete or lost.\(^{96}\) While acting as an institution and symbol of Palestinian resilience and at times, protest to the Israeli occupation (the Chamber urged protests of the merchant and business-owner community as a pressure valve on tax authorities), the Chamber recognized city hall as their only possible Israeli interlocutor through which to channel the concerns and interests of the professional business classes/merchants in particular and the occupied population in general.\(^{97}\) Kollek’s framework provided a window to establish a working, if not always stable, relationship.

In a study of the strike submitted by his research team in October of 1970, Caplan offers an insider perspective to the tax strikes on account of his participation in the negotiation process immediately following the protests among the income tax authorities, the Ministry of Interior, the Municipality, and the Chamber. From May to September of 1970, Caplan was present during negotiations between the Chamber and the Israeli authorities so to document the negotiation process, explain its emergence, and offer a socio-psychological profile of Arab negotiation behavior and tactics. According to Caplan, a new series of formal negotiations commenced soon after the strike on 31 May 1970. After weeks of consultation with legal advisors and, presumably, Jordanian authorities, the Chamber issued a three-page memorandum to the Israeli Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Finance protesting the tax increases (particularly the supplementary defense taxes) while urging the Israelis to respect Jordanian civil and tax laws in place prior to the June 1967 war. The reasoning behind this latter demand was that the annexation of East Jerusalem was a unilateral act by an occupying power. As such, unless done within a framework of a mutually agreed peace, the occupying power could not change the status of a territory and was obliged to rule the population “according to the civil laws of its previous legally accredited government.”\(^{98}\) Thus, according to the Chamber, the

\(^{96}\) Caplan and Caplan, 101.
\(^{97}\) Latendresse, Jerusalem: Palestinian Dynamics of Resistance and Urban Change, 31; Cheshin, Municipal Policies in Jerusalem, 40.
supplementary defense taxes were an illegal imposition on Palestinian residents.

The Israeli Municipality responded to this document through a series of informal meetings in late June and early July of 1970, which led to another series of face-to-face formal negotiations on 12 July and 17 July, respectively. During the more formal meetings in July 1970, the Chamber officially presented three suggestions as points of discussion: first, the Chamber proposed that Palestinian residents pay the level of income tax prescribed by Jordanian law; second, if feasible, they wished for residents to only pay the income tax without the defense supplements; and third, if the second condition was rejected, the Chamber sought the “exemption from the specific itemization of the defense taxes and loans on their tax assessments and receipt forms.” According to Caplan, this last proposal was suggested by Israeli negotiators during the preliminary meetings in May and June 1970 immediately following the strike. Because it was illegal under Israeli law to not pay the defense tax (even as residents), it was suggested that the Palestinians of Jerusalem pay a single, non-itemized sum from which the defense tax can be subtracted without reference in the official forms. As for the Israeli negotiators, they stuck to one demand during the July negotiations: if the Chamber wanted any flexibility at all on the part of the Municipality, they had to revive the advisory committees active from September 1967 to June 1968 that assisted Israeli authorities in the assessment of tax levels on particular branches of commerce.

At the 12 July 1970 meeting, the Israeli team refused to accede to the second proposal from the Chamber, which called for Palestinian residents to pay only the income tax. The Israeli team focused their energies on the third suggestion from the Chamber; that is, the payment of a general, non-itemized sum to be divided as the authorities wished but without reference in the official forms. According to Caplan, the Chamber stated that they would agree to form the advisory committees should this request be respected and the Israeli Income Tax Authorities ultimately agreed to this. However, for “tactical reasons,” they decided not to “give in” too quickly, as to do so would potentially encourage the preparation of further demands on the part of the Chamber. As a result, the tax authorities argued that non-itemization was illegal and

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
requested additional time to discuss the issue. By the meeting held on 17 July 1970, the Chamber was informed that the tax authorities had agreed to use non-itemized forms for taxing Jordanian passport holders in Jerusalem. According to Caplan, the Chamber agreed to the payment but non-itemization of the defense tax but nonetheless continued to push for the second proposal they initially tabled: that of exempting all Palestinian residents from the defense taxes all together.

Having not been present at the formal July meetings, Caplan had only oral and written reports from participants. After this point, retrospective reports diverge over what the agreement of 17 July 1970 actually entailed. Although all parties involved claimed that the negotiations ended with a compromise, according to the Israeli participants the Chamber agreed to the payment but non-itemization of the defense supplementary taxes in exchange for the establishment of Arab advisory committees working under Israeli tax authorities. The Chamber, however, claimed that the Municipality never specified the amount of the exact sum and that it was open to negotiating further on the question of non-payment of the defense taxes all together. What exactly occurred in these meetings is not clear, as the reports on which Caplan based his analysis were prepared by conflicting parties with interest in the matter. However, what is important is that Caplan’s belief in the existence of an ‘Arab’ personality or mentality in Jerusalem led him to think that an agreement was indeed struck between the two parties during the 17 July meeting but that the terms were understood differently. According to Caplan, Arabs had “culturally determined” ways of negotiating and Israeli representatives simply misunderstood and thus “handled” it ineffectively. It was this misunderstanding that led to the initial breakdown of negotiations in July of 1970. Caplan’s notes illustrate that it was indeed possible that the decisions reached at the 17 July meeting were simply miscommunicated.

According to Caplan:

the Arabs believed that since the main issue was whether or not the Israelis would allow them to pay taxes as a global sum, the actual amount of which to be negotiated with each individual in accordance with his ability to pay, it was an insignificant semantic issue whether to name this sum 100% (income tax) or 127% (income tax plus defense taxes and loans). Since the Israelis had agreed to the non-itemized global sum concept, and therefore to subsequently dividing up this amount in the privacy of their own offices, they had in effect agreed to the Arab’s basic demand.103

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
Thus, according to Caplan’s notes it was possible that the exact amount of the global sum (100% or 127%) was not specified explicitly and that negotiators on behalf of the Chamber saw this as a way towards further discussion and clarification. What is more, in the preliminary meetings that took place prior to the strike in May 1970, Caplan stated that the tax authorities made clear to the negotiating team that “the level of an individual’s tax assessment was a matter of negotiation between the individual and the assessor” and that the initial notification was only a “first step in the bargaining process” towards a mutually agreed upon tax estimate.\textsuperscript{104} Israeli representatives informed Palestinian negotiators “not to be frightened by initial figures” because it was “customary for tax assessors to exaggerate their first demand” as a means to force negotiation with the individual tax payer. As such, the preliminary negotiations were understood to be “opening gambits of a bargaining episode” and if the exact rate of the total sum was never specified (100% or 127%) during the negotiations, it is reasonable to conclude that the Chamber believed that there was indeed room for negotiation.\textsuperscript{105}

Despite this, Caplan interpreted the breakdown in negotiations as the result of the Palestinians in Jerusalem never developing a concept of “compromise” that paralleled “Western” Jewish understandings of the term. After the 17 July meeting, Caplan stated that while an agreement was reached with the Israelis, negotiators on behalf of the Chamber interpreted the 17 July meeting as part of an ongoing discussion. The Israelis, on the other hand, interpreted the meeting and the decisions reached as a final compromise between both sides. Although Chamber representatives explicitly used the word “compromise” in their reports to both Caplan and the Municipality, Caplan insisted that the Chamber simply mistranslated the Arabic term 	extit{teswiye}. Caplan interpreted 	extit{teswiye} as a distinct cultural term denoting a mutually-agreed temporary interruption of a dispute with no immediate likelihood of a settlement or judgment.\textsuperscript{106} This had more of a parallel meaning to “settling out of court” than it did “compromise,” which to Caplan (and Westerners generally) meant striking a final agreement acceptable to both sides without necessarily determining fault:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Caplan and Caplan, 102.
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
A Westerner tends to think in more or less circumscribed episodes in human affairs, consisting of

time-limited chain of events. It appears that to the Arab mind life takes place in merging patterns

that continues endlessly, and to the Arab who seeks to modify what is happening must patiently

work over an indefinite period dealing with one aspect after another. He cannot hope that

something delimited and concrete can be permanently accomplished but that eventually that

pattern may be temporarily influenced to shift its quality. 107

To Caplan, the implied permanence within the concept of compromise was lost on the

Arab mind, as its closest parallel in meaning in the Arabic language (teswiyeh) embodied a

cultural and ethical imperative “to forever fight” for what was right.”108 Taking this further,

Caplan argued that teswiyeh was part of “an age old” cultural pattern with its origins in “the code

of Islam.”109 Caplan stated that:

Apparently, the permanent ending of a conflict can only be envisaged by an Arab if a higher

value takes precedence over the ideal for which he is fighting. This higher value for a religious

Arab comes from surrender to Allah and the code of Islam, and hence from a binding judgment

of the ultimate justice of one’s case made by a religiously accredited judge or arbitrator. If such a

judgment is not possible, for example if the contender is not a believer who would accept a

Moslem ruling, it is envisaged that the conflict will continue, or it will be ended by coercive

power, or it will from time to time be shelved as ‘teswiye.’110

Caplan added that the pattern of negotiation corresponding to the notion of teswiyeh had

roots in bargaining techniques perfected in business/administrative interactions and the

marketplace over centuries. Based in part on observational field notes, Caplan stated the

following:

Among our findings has been that when a Jerusalem Arab bargains for a major item, such as

buying a house or renting business premises, he uses a special set of social skills and procedures

which have become traditional in his culture. One important aspect of this process, which is

particularly relevant to our analysis of the tax negotiations, is that he puts in a great deal of effort

before the matter comes up for face-to-face negotiation in preparing his opposite number to be

maximally amenable to granting him concessions. This he does by utilizing the services of third

parties who have influence on the person with whom he will be negotiating. One or more of

these other people act as his main intercessors and a variable number of others act as a kind of

Greek chorus, claque, or reference group, whose role it is to “see fair play” during

107 Ibid
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
negotiations…

In the interest of prolonging negotiation and working towards an outcome in their favor (teswiye), Caplan added that third party intercessors deployed by Arab negotiators applied three techniques: first, intercessors moved slowly when conducting lead-up negotiations so to develop and maintain good relations; second, the intercessor relied on other third-party sources of information to confirm what had already been agreed to or said; and third, intercessors ultimately unleashed what Caplan called a “main leverage point in influencing each of the negotiating parties,” which was to “stimulate pity or solicitude.” According to Caplan, for Arab Jerusalemites “the arousal of pity” was their technique of choice, supplemented by the stimulation of shame and/or guilt amidst discussion or negotiation. While for “Western” cultures, this technique was ineffectual as it typically aroused “envy and resentment” for Arabs the technique was employed to evoke sympathy and identification.

Caplan argued that the Chamber utilized intercessors precisely in this way, notably the District Commissioner, sympathetic Israeli professionals and journalists, a representative (unnamed) of the Municipality, and even Caplan himself in order to “drive a wedge” into the opposition “like a child” trying “to turn father against mother in order to evade parental control.” According to Caplan, intercessors were seduced by Arab Jerusalemites through emotional manipulation. When such behavioral tactics were applied to non-Jews, the goal was to project a hospitable personality so that the target was made to feel welcome and appreciated. When “seducing” an Israeli Jew, the goal was to impart on them the feeling that they were “one of the good ones,” which Caplan compared to a “child who has difficulty coming to terms with the complexities of his own feelings and who “splits the ambivalence” by separating his feelings into purely good or bad categories.”

To Caplan, arousing the sympathy and cooperation of intercessors (or what he called a “campaign of emotional seduction”) was a weapon used by a population culturally adapted to

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111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
subservience to empire. As such, it was “designed to equalize the power situation by psychosocial maneuver.”\textsuperscript{116} In addition, Caplan identified its roots in Arabic poetry, which he believed encouraged the evocation of pity, as well as in religious texts. For example, Caplan concluded his October 1970 report on the tax negotiations with a series of Qur’anic and biblical verses he believed supported his proposition that Arab Jerusalemites had a historically and culturally determined set of rules and patterns of negotiating behavior. Caplan selected verses from the Qu’ran to support the notion that Arabs generally did not honor oaths, notably with non-Muslims (Sura IX verse 12). A story in the book of Genesis describing the process through which Abraham purchased the cave of Machpela from Efron was used as a point of comparison to the “bargaining techniques” Caplan believed to be in use by the Chamber.\textsuperscript{117}

This was the primary explanation given by Caplan in his submitted reports for the initial breakdown of negotiations after the May 1970 strike as well as the ongoing insistence on the part of the Chamber that the option of not paying the supplementary loans was still on the table after the 17 July meeting. For Caplan, compromise, or “finding a middle ground where both can agree on relative justice,” was an alien concept to Arab Jerusalemites.\textsuperscript{118} According to his reports, not only did the Israeli authorities fail to appreciate the nature of the miscommunication, they simply did not understand the bargaining techniques used by the Chamber, which according to Caplan developed over centuries through religious-social codes and life under perpetual domination of external powers. Arabs had a culturally and historically determined way of handling disputes that involved a specific “set of expectations of the adversary and techniques to overcome them.”\textsuperscript{119}

In Caplan’s submissions, Arab Jerusalemites were generally depicted as fundamentally child-like. They were master manipulators (“fabulators”), unable to compromise, prone to exaggeration and in need of a paternalist administration to ease the community into a more contemporary institutional and bureaucratic order, as was done in the past under previous conquerors.\textsuperscript{120} When discussing what Caplan called the negotiating tactic of seducing interlocutors, he added that not only was this an age-old mental and behavioral pattern but an

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
expression of fundamental self-absorption that rendered Arabs “strangely insensitive to the sufferings of others.”\textsuperscript{121} As such, they were prone to emotionally manipulating potential interlocutors for their own gain; behaving like “children” who did “not seem to know the most elementary of things.”\textsuperscript{122} In addition, Caplan added that on account of a historical experience as subjects under numerous empires, Arabs suffered from a “culture-based tendency to deal with obstacles by passive withdrawal, manifested by inactivity and procrastination” as well as a “passive view on life molded by fate” to which one had no responsibility.\textsuperscript{123} On account of such cultural traits, the Arabs had yet to learn how to appreciate the abstract relationship between democratic institutions and the public.\textsuperscript{124} Yet still, the authorities had to respect local cultures and hide what he referred to as the “unspoken condescension” that a Western authority may harbor towards such a culture.\textsuperscript{125}

Caplan’s analysis thus trapped Palestinian Jerusalem within an essentialist, racial-cultural paradigm. The reports produced a psycho-social profile that reinforced the notion of “the Arab” in Jerusalem as emotionally, politically, and mentally underdeveloped and supported the Israeli imperative to dominate the city and determine its future. This cultural canvas, however, was not simply a reflection and rationalization of the construction of the Palestinian Jerusalemite within Kollek’s administrative paradigm. The following section will examine how Caplan’s reports also served as reference points for Israeli “change agents,” whose job it was to accommodate to and manipulate Arab cultural and behavioral traits so as to more efficiently stabilize the Israeli colonial order.

4.5 Ethnopsychiatry and Israeli Colonial Praxis

In his submitted reports, Caplan argued that the relationship between change agents and

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
conquered populations was not coercive but rather an administrative partnership articulating a “congruence of needs.” As a self-described change agent himself, Caplan pushed for joint socio-development projects throughout Jerusalem. One example involved a Palestinian educator’s cooperative in Beit Hanina. In June of 1972, Joshua Palmon, then the Arab Affairs Advisor to Teddy Kollek, pitched the idea of a housing development and community center in North-East Jerusalem. Palmon proposed, however, that a cooperative composed of Palestinian residents from the area should acquire the land and contract its construction themselves. According to Caplan, towards this end Palmon initiated contact with a Palestinian educator from a boy’s school in Shu’fat and by mid-June 1972, a tentative agreement was reached where Palmon’s contact would form a cooperative of local Palestinian educators to take on the initiative while the Israeli Bank and the Ministry of Housing secured the necessary loans and construction permits. A community center and housing project was initially planned, as well as the enlargement of the Bet David Community Center in the neighborhood of Wadi al-Joz. However, Caplan suggested instead that the project be located in Beit Hanina so as to separate the project from Bet David, which was already a successful joint-initiative between the International Youth Culture Center and Palestinian administrators.

The group of twenty Palestinian residents from Shu’fat and Beit Hanina who formed the proposed teachers cooperative called themselves “the pioneers” on account of the fact that this was the first housing project of its kind in East Jerusalem since the Israeli conquest in June 1967. Within weeks, however, negotiations broke down. This was the result of the fact that Palmon insisted on absolute fiscal control and ownership by the Jerusalem Foundation over the land on which the proposed project was to be built. The active participation in the sale of private Palestinian land to an Israeli institution was clearly a red line for the cooperative and both Caplan and Palmon failed to appreciate the political and social ramifications of such a project.

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127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Although pitched as an independent, ”Arab” project where local residents exercise administrative control over programs and planning, Palmon insisted that the Jerusalem Foundation buy nine of the twenty-one shares and hold title to the land; leasing it to the cooperative for a 49 year term with possibility of renewal. What is more, Palmon sought fiscal control by the Jerusalem Foundation as well as open acknowledgement of their role in the development of the project.
According to Caplan, although recognizing the validity of the cooperative’s reluctance to agree to Palmon's terms the negotiations dragged on account of the fact that Arab Jerusalemites were “not used to this type of business.” As a consequence of a history of successive domination, Arabs in Jerusalem were “naturally insecure” and simply unable to complete business transactions. Palmon, on the other hand, blamed the lack of progress in negotiations on the "natural inefficiency" of Arabs, who in his mind were generally passive and/or corrupt.

Nonetheless, the failed negotiations were considered by both Palmon and Caplan as a success, even if only a partial one. Embracing the role of the change agent, Palmon himself felt that his primary goal as an Israeli official was to expose Palestinian Jerusalemites to a variety of challenges to overcome with limited guidance. Indeed, the “lesson learned” from the housing project negotiations was more important than the completion of the project itself. For Palmon, the “game-like” atmosphere produced by the negotiations was “arousing” for Palestinians involved, as they did not have historical experience interacting with government authorities. If Israeli officials continued down this path of mediated, “mutual” development projects, Palestinians could begin to gradually acclimate themselves to a modern, bureaucratic order. As for Caplan, who also considered himself to be a change agent in the service of the Municipality, he concurred, while adding that negotiations of this nature, even if failing to reach consensus and the declared end goal, were nonetheless an important step towards the development of a stronger measure of trust and cooperation between the Municipality and Palestinian Jerusalemites.

For Caplan, the change agent could operate through a variety of contexts and initiatives; not limited to “joint” or mutual projects with Palestinian individuals/cooperatives but also in strategic relations with semi-independent Palestinian institutions as well as social-bureaucratic interactions in government offices. As previously stated, an important role of change agent was to project the feeling of “mastery and autonomy” on the part of the Palestinians as a way to “adjust to powerlessness” under an Israeli order. Thus the change agent should not only work to convince or stimulate Palestinians of their needs but also instill a sense that these needs could be

131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
met by a municipality that was simultaneously flexible and familiar. Towards this end, Caplan’s earliest reports submitted to the Municipality from 1969-1972 outlined a broader strategy for Palestinian “psychological adjustment” to what he called a “mechanism of co-existence.”

According to Caplan’s reports, instilling a sense of mastery and morale among Palestinian Jerusalemites could be achieved through strategic behavioral and spatial modifications on the part of state employees and institutions. In a report submitted in November 1971, Caplan argued that the Israel National Security offices and the Ministry of Interior had “the greatest effect on how the Arabs see Israel.” The two offices were the most frequented by Palestinians in order to obtain travel permits, identity cards, birth certificates, family unification requests, or in the case of the national security offices, to obtain financial payments. As such, these spaces could provide services as well as an educational function on modern, bureaucratic procedures. At the same time, Jewish clerks could familiarize themselves with Arab behavioral norms and act as catalysts for improved communications. By mixing modern, Israeli bureaucratic procedure with an atmosphere welcoming of “Arab traditions,” Caplan believed that administrative space can be both “civilizing” and familiar to Arab residents; working to both tutor and accommodate to Arab civic culture in Jerusalem.

Bureaucratic procedure was framed by Caplan as a “public education responsibility” providing “social security mindedness” for Palestinians and “an understanding of their rights as contributors.” As a crucial component of Palestinian adjustment to Israeli rule, a new uniformity and regularity of procedure could become a basis of authoritativeness in itself. At the same time, the differences in culture, styles of communication, and understanding of bureaucratic structure and operation between Jews and Palestinians were to be acknowledged and understood by Israeli bureaucrats. Through a more empathetic and informed approach to cross-cultural communication, methods and procedure in government offices could meet the expectations and behavioral norms of the Palestinian population; familiarizing them with Israeli governing institutions while at the same time teaching Palestinians how to navigate a modern

138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
bureaucratic order and “learn the Jewish (modern) methods.”

According to Caplan, there were several problems in administrative communications between Israeli officials and Palestinian residents. Not only were most forms and papers strictly in Hebrew, Palestinians were also not generally aware of the locations of most government offices. What is more, formal bureaucratic procedure was deeply impersonal and often resulted in miscommunications and tensions due to what Caplan saw as an inability to accommodate to and understand Palestinian cultural norms and expectations. In his reports, Caplan highlighted two problems in particular: first, because Palestinians regarded the Israelis as “oppressive conquerors,” visiting government offices “was an overt reminder of their dependency on Israel and stimulated their continued feelings of hostility.” Secondly, Arab Jerusalemites were not accustomed to modern bureaucracy and the idea of government clerks as public figures accountable to tax payers. The sense of hostility mixed with a basic unfamiliarity with modern bureaucratic procedure meant that Palestinian residents would only visit government offices when absolutely necessary. To address this issue and open up a potential avenue for cross-cultural communications, Caplan suggested that Israeli clerks not only learn and become familiar with Palestinian approaches to government but also adapt to Arab cultural norms and “perform the part” so as to ease them into Israeli bureaucratic norms. Differences in norms and behaviors between the two communities was a “needless irritation” that could be overcome. Thus, Caplan recommended that Jewish clerks be trained in “human relations techniques” to learn how to respond to Arabs “as they were accustomed to.”

In a series of reports submitted in August and December of 1969, Caplan emphasized several irritants born from what he perceived to be a clash of cultural norms between Palestinians and Jews in government offices. The first of such was what Caplan called “Arab fabulation.” Coined by Caplan “in order to give it a name devoid of moral judgement,” he described “Arab

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141 Caplan and Caplan, 61.
“fabulation” as the telling of elaborate stories, usually deviating from the truth, to substantiate requests and complaints. After six weeks of participant observation in Israeli offices, Caplan and his research team identified several variants of this, which they saw as an ingrained cultural phenomenon. The first and “most primitive” articulation of “Arab fabulation” was the (“probably conscious”) use of false pretense to gain something to which one was not entitled (or what a “westerner” would call a “swindle”). The second type was the use of a detailed story, “imagined” or real, to substantiate an already legitimate claim. To Caplan, this was a cultural trait meant to arouse sympathy and pity on the part of the bureaucrat. The third type offered by Caplan was the invention of a story in order to “save face” and the fourth was described as developing a story to impress the listener so to “maintain his interest in or admiration for the speaker.” Caplan argued that the frustrations on the part of the Israeli clerks observed was born from the fact that “after a while the Arab begins to believe his own concocted story” and because most Israeli clerks were not highly paid or trained in human relations, they commonly reacted with anger or disdain for the client.

Caplan identified what he saw as two common and ineffective reactions to “fabulation” on the part of Israeli clerks: first, once realizing that the Arab client was “stretching the truth,” the clerk commonly sought to verify the story through cross-examination. This, however, was not helpful as cross-examination not only led to verbal conflict and discomfort on the part of the client, it also exposed their dishonesty and “injured their pride.” The second common reaction to “fabulation” listed by Caplan was replying with sarcasm or “humorously debunking the client’s story,” which meant a “loss of face” on the part of the client. Against these “common reactions” of Israeli clerks, Caplan advised the Municipality to train them in dealing with “fabulation” more effectively and sensitively by approaching it as an ingrained cultural trait. Towards this end, he recommended two “efficient” measures: first, officials and clerks should be taught to appreciate a client’s story not as factual but as a means of expressing genuine feelings.

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146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
Indeed, story-telling should be understood as an “artistic production” articulating a range of emotions that were real and legitimate. The clerk should recognize the basic themes of the story as well as the emotions expressed and empathize with their client on these grounds. Second, the clerk or official was not to fixate on the details of a story but rather talk about “the actual situation of the request.” In other words, Caplan advised that Israeli bureaucrats respond to and engage “Arab fabulation” as he imagined any other Palestinian would.

In addition to adapting to Arab “cultural” traits, Caplan also advised Israeli clerks to tactfully humor older Palestinian notables accustomed to a system of immunity and entitlement. Caplan called this the clash between “Israeli egalitarianism and Arab privilege.” Prior to the Israeli conquest, Caplan argued that the Jordanian government catered more to the privileged of society, where they were largely exempt from permits and licenses in exchange for bribes or other advantages. As a result, Palestinian bourgeoisie, religious dignitaries, and other notable figures in Jerusalem expected preferential treatment from government functionaries. What is more, the culture of the “lower strata” was such that they were not familiar with modern bureaucratic routine. Not only were Arab Jerusalemites by and large not used to appointments (according to Caplan, Arabs have an “interesting orientation to time”), they were unfamiliar with the practice of interacting through lower-level government functionaries. Instead, they desired to speak with “the big boss” to address their issues at all times or to discuss matters informally in an open and casual setting. By contrast, Israeli bureaucratic tradition was “egalitarian” in nature, where high status persons were treated on an equal footing to the “lower strata” of society. What is more, Israeli bureaucratic tradition was structured and disciplined; dependent on appointments, orderly line-ups, administrative hierarchy, and other specific routines. Caplan insisted that Israelis relax their behavioral code or procedure by tactfully humoring advances and claims to preferential treatment from notables and dignitaries. Of course, the demand to meet with the highest possible authority could not always be met. However, Caplan recommended that somebody of a higher status should act as a “mediator between the individual Arab and the
system” whenever possible.\textsuperscript{157}

As for dealing with Arab “time habits” and what he believed to be a general unfamiliarity with modern bureaucratic routine, Caplan supported the idea of adapting a “Middle Eastern pattern of reception” in government offices.\textsuperscript{158} The report targeted the office itself, specifically spatial arrangements, ventilation, and even furnishings.\textsuperscript{159} In order to create an atmosphere of efficiency, professionalism, and cultural sensitivity, Caplan suggested a bureaucratic space that could “cater to a large number of clients,” as Caplan believed was “customary” in Arab tradition, as well as provide adequate ventilation for general comfort and the “handling of men and women in separate sections.”\textsuperscript{160} Most notable was Caplan’s suggestion of implementing what he referred to as the “divan principle.” Some Israeli officials had already adopted this technique by this time (notably Teddy Kollek) where a large number of visitors were received at once without prearrangements in a large room “furnished with many comfortable chairs arranged around the walls… as though it were a social ‘at home.’”\textsuperscript{161} Within this type of setting, clerks would allow Palestinians to proceed with a customary “social warm up” prior to discussing the bureaucratic matters at hand, which consisted of talking about daily affairs.\textsuperscript{162} If the principal matter was discussed too rapidly, Caplan argued that the client would not be satisfied, as it was their goal to “build up a warm relationship” with a representative of government authority.\textsuperscript{163} Through strategic behavioral modifications on the part of Israeli bureaucrats and officials and the manipulation of office space, the “psychological struggle” among Palestinian Jerusalemites to maintain a sense of self-respect and morale under Israeli rule could be satisfied. For Caplan, changes in administrative procedure and space could result in Palestinian residents adjusting themselves to modern and “egalitarian” bureaucracy with greater ease. At the same time, Jewish city officials could familiarize themselves with Arab traditions and customs.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Caplan and Caplan, 77.
The second part of Caplan’s strategy of catering to the “psychological needs of the Arabs” was to allow for “maneuvering” and protest on the part of Palestinians through their own institutions.\textsuperscript{164} The reasoning offered by Caplan was that if Israel allowed for “opportunities to maneuver psychologically,” Palestinian residents could maintain a sense of “poise and self-respect.”\textsuperscript{165} According to Caplan, this was out of basic humanitarian concern but it more importantly functioned as a strategy to avoid “forcing Arabs into a psychological corner” where they would become “depressed, apathetic and ineffectual” in managing their own lives.\textsuperscript{166} For Caplan, this standard had to be applied to relations with Palestinian institutions as well as individual tax payers. Because the payment of municipal and income taxes were a source of friction, the strategy of Israeli tax offices was to gradually increase rates so that within a fifteen year period, tax levels for Palestinian residents in Jerusalem would be on par with tax rates for Israeli citizens.\textsuperscript{167} Caplan supported this approach and recommended that this be done in such a way as to make it \textit{appear} to be the result of negotiation. For example, Caplan reported that in the tax year for 1968-1969, with the support of the inter-ministerial committee the representative of the Israeli income tax authorities in occupied Jerusalem deliberately mailed out income tax assessments that were double the figure intended to be collected.

The intention behind the strategy was to draw Palestinian residents to Israeli tax offices in order to complain and subsequently negotiate new terms. During the negotiation, the tax official would feign sympathy and flexibility; allowing Palestinian residents to “talk down” the original figure by 50\%, with the resulting amount more or less what the tax office sought to collect in the first place.\textsuperscript{168} Another strategy reported by Caplan was for Israeli tax officials to allow Palestinians to file their tax payments as payable to the Jordanian administration as well as to register tax monies as an exchange for essential services. In this way, the Palestinian tax payer symbolically distanced themselves from the Israeli Municipality while conforming to the rule of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Immediately after the Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem, part of the strategy of municipal integration was to dismantle independent Palestinian institutions and organizations so to protect and reinforce Israeli sovereignty. However, after protest on the part of the Palestinian population (including strikes, demonstrations, and attacks on Israeli institutions), City Hall cemented relations with a number of local institutions such as the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Jerusalem District Electric Corporation, the *Maqasid* Hospital, and the Muslim *waqf*/Islamic Committee. For Palestinian residents, the preservation of a network of local institutions was part of a strategy of resistance to Israeli municipal integration. The Palestinian population sought to create as much distance as possible from Israeli authorities and preserve institutions dedicated to protesting the occupation and defending their land, traditions, physical presence, and identities.

Under Israeli law, some of these institutions were technically illegal, notably those elected and functioning under Jordanian law (such as the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry). However, the continued functioning of Palestinian institutions for religious, charitable and administrative tasks worked towards Kollek’s policy of controlled integration of East Jerusalem. Caplan himself believed in "the humanity" that the policy embodied but more importantly he cited its efficiency and effectiveness. In fact, to Caplan the existence of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem was crucial to “make up to the Arabs psychologically for their deprivation in the field of the existential political and military reality in Jerusalem.” This semi-autonomous network allowed for some institutional distance from the Municipality and independent control over non-political affairs, as well as a relatively safe vehicle through which to protest the Israeli occupation. Indeed, to Caplan, it was crucial that Palestinians were able to “maneuver” Israeli norms and regulations but also “have the freedom to reject the municipality”

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169 Ibid.
170 Meron Benvenisti, *The Torn City*, 129.
171 Ibid., 216-217.
At a symbolic and non-violent level. In return, the Israelis gained additional (albeit unofficial) intermediaries for East Jerusalem affairs and a more confident population.

Another example of “psychological maneuvering” through Palestinian institutions was featured in his third working paper on “communications between Arabs and Jews” submitted to the Municipality in August 1969. In this report, Caplan chronicled the 1969 fire at al-Aqsa mosque. On the morning of August 21 1969, a man named Michael Dennis Rohan set a fire inside al-Aqsa mosque, destroying the carved pulpit, the minbar of Salah ad-Din, as well as part of a prayer niche while damaging the south-east corner of the mosque. Caplan’s report focused on its effects on Arab-Jewish relations and how it was widely believed among Palestinians to have been an attempt by either the Israeli government or religious-fundamentalist Zionists to destroy al-Aqsa and arouse mass protest as a pretext to eject Muslims from the city.

Through this context of sustained Palestinian protest, Caplan identified what he believed to be a crucial part of an overall “working pattern of co-existence.” The nature of the target aroused religious and national sentiments, which helped place Sheikh Muhtasib and the Islamic Council as the main (institutionalized) spokespersons for the Palestinian population. Under Israeli law, the waqf system and shari’a courts were to be administered by the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs and the land under the stewardship of the Custodian for Absentee Property. However, this was resisted by the administrators of awqaf and the shari’a courts. In the interest of acclimating the Palestinian of Jerusalem to Israeli control, the Municipality established informal relations with the administration of Muslim religious affairs in Jerusalem and permitted religious authorities to carry out basic functions and exercise a measure of control over the al-Aqsa compound. Caplan strongly encouraged this approach amongst Israeli administrators. Caplan described the demonstrations, strikes and protests as “passive” and “impotent” on

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175 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 The Israelis never recognized the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank. As such, the Israelis do not recognize the authority of any Jordanian body over waqf property in Jerusalem. Under Israeli law, waqf land in Jerusalem is thus absentee property. See Michael Dumper, Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State (Washington: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1994), 107-109.
account of “traditions emerging from centuries of political oppression,” which “apparently led to considerable skill in determining limits” on the part of community leaders. Thus, Caplan saw the utility of such institutions in acting as a pressure valve for repressed expressions of hostility towards the occupation. By allowing for demonstrations to take place, Arabs would “feel” as if they have autonomy and the means to pressure the Israelis to adjust to their terms. The al-Aqsa fire and its aftermath illustrated to Caplan that semi-autonomous Palestinian organizations, so long as ties of dependence were maintained with Israeli authorities, could act as an effective and legitimate means to channel Palestinian grievances and protest without overtly threatening the Israeli position in the city.

Caplan re-visited the importance of “psychological maneuver” towards the “consolidation of adjustment” in his report on the May 1970 tax strike in East Jerusalem. Particularly important to note was Caplan’s revelation that the May 30 demonstrations and Chamber of Commerce negotiations were used by the Israeli administration as a way to meet three objectives: first, by allowing for the strike and protests to proceed with minimal police intervention, the Municipality sought to demonstrate to the world that “united Jerusalem” could “function without great upheaval.” Second, the Israelis sought an active partner through the Chamber to “improve communications” and interpersonal and commercial relationships between Palestinians and Jews. In so doing, the Israeli administration could de-politicize the Chamber by fostering an informal partnership regarding commercial affairs. Third and most importantly, through the Chamber and the commercial strike, Israeli officials sought to provide “opportunities to maneuver psychologically…to allow Arabs to act in such a way that they might subjectively interpret interchanges with Israelis to their own advantage.” Caplan continued:

…the Israelis were willing to accept Arab gambits, to play the game according to Arab rules, and to lose in some rounds, because the Arabs were more skilled in such intrigues. Nobody likes to lose a game, but these Israeli officials were more than willing to operate at a disadvantage in order to make up to the Arabs psychologically for their deprivation in the field of existential political and military reality in Jerusalem.

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181 Caplan and Caplan, 44.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
Like the idea of “psychological adjustment” taken on by the Israeli tax authorities, this “unofficial” and informal arrangement between the Municipality and a network of Arab institutions in Jerusalem was meant to create a sense of continuity with pre-1967 Jerusalem, symbolize Palestinian autonomy and freedom in the Israeli administrative framework, and provide for the occasional release of everyday frustrations that inevitably come with adjusting a new administrative order. In so doing, the Municipality hoped to appease community grievances by creating an institutional context and set of procedures that accommodated to the needs and expectations of the population, thereby lessening the potential for insurrection.

4.6 Conclusion

The previous chapter offered a gateway into the “mental universe and worldview” of the most influential administrator of post-1967 Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek. It argued that the production of the Palestinian Jerusalemite inherent within Kollek’s administrative vision did not reflect a social reality but rather the interests, perspectives, and values of a dominant force and the order it sought to impose and justify. In so doing, the purpose was to show how the colonial mind could be an analytical tool to unpack the foundations of Israeli municipal policy. This chapter builds on that argument by illustrating how the production of difference (as well as the means towards its administrative accommodation) relied on academic engagement “to lend intellectual weight to colonial projects” and its social/administrative designs. The reports of Dr. Gerald Caplan show how the role of mental health discourse and ethnopsychiatric thought in particular worked towards the rationalization of the presumptions supporting Kollek’s administrative model. As such, ethnopsychiatry did not disappear with the climax of decolonization in the 1960s. Caplan’s work illustrates its persistence and utility in the context of a contemporary colonial order. Where this chapter addressed the construction of a scientific veneer for Israeli patterns of rule, the

185 Thomas, “Introduction,” xii.
following chapter will show how the nationalist-pluralist model was brought to life through Teddy Kollek’s Jerusalem Foundation and how it impacted Palestinian society in Jerusalem and forms of engagement with colonial structures of rule.
Chapter 5:  
The Jerusalem Foundation and the "City of Peace"

In recognizing that thought precedes action, previous chapters explored Kollek’s political-mental universe as well as academic engagement with his administrative-social project in Jerusalem that served to reflect and rationalize his worldview. This chapter shifts attention towards the materialization of Kollek’s social and administrative paradigm through a network of co-existence institutions supported by his Jerusalem Foundation, a not-for-profit established to supplement the municipal budget through private donations and fund cultural and beautification projects throughout the city. The chapter will begin with an examination of institution building in (and spatial refashioning of) Musrara following the June 1967 annexation, as Israeli authorities sought to transform the neighborhood from a peripheral zone into a central, ideological landscape validating Israeli claims to the city. The chapter will then examine co-existence institutions within Musrara and beyond. I will argue that for Israeli participants, these institutions were a means to consume and perform a Zionist-humanist disposition against the weight of the Israeli colonial venture in the 1967 Palestinian occupied territories. For Palestinians in Jerusalem, however, these institutions were appropriated and transformed into spaces of protest and collective assertion, whereby members articulated personal narratives of identity, history, and national belonging. As such, co-existence institutions in Jerusalem functioned as locations for both the assertion of liberal-Zionist politics as well as resistance to the discursive and material erasure of Palestinian national belonging in the city.

“Let’s get together, the rest will sort itself out.”¹

From July 17-28 2013, a collective of over one hundred Israeli volunteers organized and hosted a festival and interdisciplinary art project in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Musrara (or Morasha in Hebrew) entitled “The Meeting Point: between Green and Red.”² Referring to the demarcation

¹Muslala Group, “The Meeting Point: Between Green and Red,” Muslala Group, July 2013, 1.
² After the expulsion of Arab residents from Musrara during and after the 1947-1949 war for Palestine, the neighborhood was incorporated into what became thereafter Israeli (West) Jerusalem. As such, it was renamed
lines that once separated Israeli West Jerusalem and Jordanian East Jerusalem, the event, conceived of and launched in the summer of 2012 by the Muslala group as an annual summer celebration of Jewish-Arab co-existence and its possibilities, features almost two weeks of poetry readings, live musical performances, cultural workshops, yoga classes, and films open to the public from both sides of the city. Central to the festival and its overall aesthetic and social goals, however, was the basta project. Designed by Musrara resident and architect Alona Lifshitz, the basta is a makeshift watermelon and salted cheese stand serving as the site and main attraction of the festival. For its duration, the basta stands on 2.5 dunams of land between Ha A’yin Chet street and Notre Dame de France in Musrara; a neighborhood which, incidentally, formed part of the “no man’s land” along the 1949 armistice line that functioned as part of a buffer zone of mines, fences, and walls separating Israeli and Jordanian Jerusalem from 1948-1967. What is more, the open lot also functioned as a site for shack dwellings built by poor North African Jewish (Mizrahi) immigrants who settled the neighborhood throughout the 1950s after the expulsion of its Palestinian residents during and after the 1947-1949 war for Palestine.

A not-for-profit art project developed and organized by the Muslala group and funded in part by The Jerusalem Foundation, the Jewish Agency, and the Jerusalem Municipality, the basta builds on and refers to the produce market organized and run by Mizrahi residents of Musrara and Palestinians from the Old City in the 1970s until it was shut down by police and municipal authorities in the early 1980s. The memory of the basta was re-appropriated by organizers to

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4 Basta is a colloquial Arabic (and Hebrew) term for “shed” or produce/fruit stand. It combines the Arabic word basit (‘simple’) and the verb bassat (to spread). According to festival organizers, the term denotes the central theme of the project, which is to “present products and ideas in the most simple way possible.” See “Between Green and Red,” accessed August 29, 2013, http://www.muslala.org/en/content/between-green-and-red.
5 Interview with Reuven Abergel, July 17 2013. Reuven Abergel is a Moroccan-Israeli social worker and political activist now living in Talpiot, Jerusalem. A former resident of Musrara, Abergel was an active and founding member of the Israeli Black Panthers when they were established in the neighborhood in the early 1970s. As a resident of the former slum area that supports the ‘revitalized’ watermelon stand, Abergel was a witness to the original basta market, which he argues was an organic initiative by residents from both sides of the city to reclaim city space and determine its function.
6 Accounts as to why the stands were shut down differ. According to festival organizers, it was shut down not only due to mutual suspicions and hatred that had developed between Palestinians and Jews but also because the stands were operating without licenses. Thus, by the 1980s the city began to more heavily regulate the area. According to Matan Israeli, a festival organizer, the emergence of fruit markets just north of Jaffa Rd. in the 1980s also contributed to the demise of the Musrara fruit market. However, according to a number of residents of
stand as a symbol of cross-cultural interaction as well as a public monument commemorating the Israeli Black Panthers and their struggle for housing and equality in the city throughout the 1970s. The physical site for the festival was purposefully targeted and meant to serve as a symbol of a lost bi-cultural, interactive, and radical moment that festival organizers believe can be re-claimed through joint initiatives. In doing so, however, organizers were not simply communicating a desire for new ways of thinking about forms of sociability in the city. They were also re-enacting the post-1967 socio-political and symbolic function of the neighborhood.

Following the Israel conquest of East Jerusalem in the June 1967 war, Musrara was targeted as a “seam zone” by the Israeli Municipality. In the political and spatial shift from peripheral zone to city center, the aim of developing the seam zone was two-fold: first, the initiative to build new (connecting) roads, infrastructure, parks, and commercial centers along the 1949 armistice line was meant to physically and materially stitch together the city, thereby expressing its fundamental unity, (unilaterally) determining united Jerusalem as a single urban entity under Israeli sovereignty, and ultimately preventing re-partition. Nonetheless, the plan was executed only partially and in haste in the years following the 1967 war. The development of the artery road connecting the north and south to the city center did not fully materialize until the early 1990s as a result of an absence of consensus of how to develop the area, resistance to development on the part of Musrara residents (as development was understood to be a synonym for displacement), and difficulty of access to the north and eastern parts of Jerusalem caused by the 1987 intifada.7

More importantly, as an urban and social artery the second function of the seam zone, at least for municipal functionaries devoted to Kollek’s bi-cultural social and administrative framework for the city, was to serve as a cultural center and meeting point in an otherwise divided city. To be sure, a demographic motivation inspired the renewal of the seam zone, as Musrara was targeted specifically for increased Jewish housing and investment so as to promote a stronger Jewish demographic presence in the city center. At the same time, however, and although recognizing the principle of voluntary separation as part of a fundamental and

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historically determined cultural-social code in the city, Kollek's office nonetheless sought to instill “neighborly relations” between the two populations. Musrara was projected to serve as the symbol glorifying the re-unification of Jerusalem and its transformation into a united and bi-cultural metropolis, despite the lived reality of discrimination and juridical and spatial separation between east and west; Jewish citizen and Palestinian resident. The “Between Green and Red” festival illustrates the survival of this trope in Musrara to the present day. Indeed, according to the organizers of the event, as the juncture between West and East Jerusalem, Musrara represents “an arena of fresh possibilities and gathering for members of societies that were separated by a wall and a border for over 19 years.” The lot for the basta was chosen not only due to the fact that it was where the original Palestinian and Mizrahi markets once stood but also because “both symbolically and practically there is no better place to encounter Jerusalem at its most colorful diversity and singularity.”

Musrara as a space of cultural exchange, tolerance, and mutual understanding between east and west/Arab and Jew is reflected in all aspects of the festival, from the eastern music ensembles to the art installations adorning the reconstructed basta. The main gate to the lot, as well as the stand itself, supports the logo for the meeting point. Inspired by the peace flag created by Russian artist Nicholas Roerich (1874-1947). The four circle design stands for “an international treaty for world peace,” as according to festival organizers, the symbol was used to designate cultural heritage sites such as museums and archives during wartime so to avoid destruction. Further atop the watermelon stand sits the “white flags” (hadegelim halevanim) project conceived by American artist Aaron Fein in the wake of the September 11 2001 attacks in New York. A collection of sixteen national flags, the removal of color from each represented is meant to encourage spectators to “look forward to a time when all the world’s flags have lost their color, and the divisions that separate us—be they national, racial or religious—are no longer so discrete.” However, despite the declared intention of creating a neutral space for civic unity and historical remembrance, few Palestinian Jerusalemites attended the events or visited

10 Ibid., 3. Emphasis added.
11 Ibid., 3.
12 Ibid., 6.
the grounds. The signs adorning the fence surrounding the site features but one sign in Arabic and the official promotional publication for the festival is offered only in English and Hebrew. What is more, the history of Musrara as originally an Arab neighborhood is featured nowhere at the event, while guest speakers narrating the historical moment of the original bastā stands were entirely made up of Israeli Jews, notably former members of the Israeli Black Panthers Koko Deri and Reuven Abergel.

After attending the festival the night before, on the evening of July 22, 2013 I spoke with Matan Israeli, an Israeli artist and resident of Musrara as well as an artistic coordinator for the Muslala project. Established in 2009, Muslala is a registered non-governmental, non-profit organization made up of approximately twenty artists and activists; most of whom are from Musrara. The group hosts art exhibitions and workshops, guided tours, a community garden, as well as a study/exhibition center in the neighborhood. Through the medium of art, which the group believes is vital towards creating dialogue with different sectors of Jerusalem society and “healing” the wounds of 1948 and 1967, Muslala aims to “alter ways of thinking” and create a more “open and creative society” in Jerusalem; whether between Arabs and Jews; Mizrahim and Ashkenazim; or between secular and religious Jewish citizens.13

When asked about how the initiative has been received by different sectors of the city, Matan Israeli first reiterated the purpose of the two-week event and went on to explain the reason for its shortcomings. According to Israeli, tensions in the neighborhood were high leading up to the event, as a good portion of the neighborhood council took issue with the declared goals of the project. “Part of it relates to the fact that it brings together Jews and Arabs…it’s a very sensitive issue, especially in a neighborhood like this,”14 Israeli adds. “We had to make small adjustments in the way we worked this year; to make it a bit more towards one side.”15 To be sure, the striking absence of Palestinian attendees, narrators, and histories is partly explained by an indifference or hostility among Palestinian Jerusalemites towards initiatives that promote normalization with the status quo, notably those associated with or funded by the Israeli Municipality. It can also be attributed in part to the fact that many residents of East Jerusalem do

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14 Interview with Matan Israeli, July 22 2013.
15 Ibid.
not generally socialize in the western part of the city. However, Israeli explains that as part of a compromise with detractors from the neighborhood, organizers limited the use of the Arabic language in festival signs, events, and promotions. In addition, the Muslala group agreed to ensure that no context was nurtured allowing for intimate engagement between attendees. In other words, while the events are open to Palestinians, they are not to be encouraged to attend or made to feel welcome. “It’s sad to hear,” Israeli adds, “but this is the reality.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Whatever the intentions of the organizers, the result was a celebration of bi-culturalism while ensuring its absence. At the same time, it represented the consumption of a nostalgia for cultural exchange and historical pluralism while ignoring the political realities and historical processes responsible for its relegation to a “past.” The production and representation of history, whether through academic study, exhibits, public commemorations, or architecture, is always an uneven process. Those with access to the means of producing history bear control in shaping the narrative. What is more, such narratives are always mediated by contemporary experiences, concerns, prejudices and political objectives. It is therefore without surprise that colonial societies assemble, produce, and represent historical narratives not only through the careful selection and omission of historical events and processes but also “upon a foundation of elaborate and refined myths;” selecting (or re-imagining) moments in history so to construct entirely new narratives of belonging, entitlement, history, self and other.\footnote{Thomas Abowd, “Present and Absent: Historical Invention and the Politics of Place in Colonial Jerusalem,” in Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel-Palestine, eds. Sandy Sufian and Mark Levine (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 244.} Indeed, and similar to Michel-Rolph Trouillot's skillful analysis of public historical commemorations of “the discovery” of the Americas by Christopher Columbus, the organizers from Muslala reduced the history of the neighborhood from a process (that is, a process that included Palestinian expulsion from West Jerusalem and the gentrification of Musrara) to a single event or moment; that of the \textit{basta} stands.\footnote{Trouillot, 114.} In sacrificing the processual character of Musrara's history and ignoring the politics behind the contemporary moment of urban division, organizers can talk about “lost” histories, attempts to revive a civic tradition of multi-cultural exchange, as well as “removing the tensions” that exist in Jerusalem while reducing the structural, political, and historical processes
that render such relations implausible to a simple and dismissive catch phrase: “it's complicated.”

However, such commemorations do not simply sanitize what are in fact messy histories so as to conceal political, ideological, and structural problems. They are also implemented as instruments of identity construction. The organizers of the festival are enacting and consuming a national, liberal Zionist identity and ideology championing an ethic of tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and co-existence. What is more, this ethic was institutionalized by the Kollek administration in post-1967 Jerusalem, notably through his Jerusalem Foundation, and communicated (and consumed) spatially in an idealized Musrara, which since the late 1970s was transformed from a slum neighborhood into a gentrified symbol of cosmopolitan life. However, what is to be made of the performance and institutionalization of identities of tolerance and co-existence in a colonial city, which Zionists (including Kollek and festival organizers) claim to be Jewish and where Palestinians exist as residents who are discriminated against and under threat of expulsion?

According to Wendy Brown, tolerance is a “politically promiscuous” term with different modalities, meanings, and deployments throughout history and “across the nations and cultures that have valued, practiced or debated it.” Tolerance (and to this can be added co-existence) is attached to “different objects in different national contexts,” according to specific historical lineages and perceived social and political issues and interests. Thus, tolerance must be recognized not only as variable in meaning and purpose but also “politically discursive in character.” Tolerance is not so much a moral practice or personal ethic/commitment with a universal meaning, as may be more commonly conceived, but rather a political practice; always entangled with, instrumentalized, and contoured by power. The call for tolerance, cultural accommodation, and co-existence by Kollek and his municipal functionaries was an act of depoliticization; an epistemic foundation for Israeli colonial urbanism on the part of the

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19 Muslala Group, ‘The Meeting Point: Between Green and Red,’ 5. Organizers distributed postcards with the words “it’s complicated” hole-punched into the surface.
20 Trouillot, 116.
21 Brown, 3.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 4.
Municipality that obscured a deeper history of political conflict by framing the subordination of Palestinians as a cultural issue, if not the result of “an ontologically natural hostility,” that had to be properly understood, engaged with, and regulated.24

What is more, despite its fluid meanings and attachments, tolerance is nonetheless considered a virtue and source of legitimization among self-styled liberal states, institutions, and individuals; a point of character where by positioning oneself against the intolerant and embracing differing cultural norms and practices, one is bestowed with an authority and “access to superiority” that bears an entitlement to certain privileges as well as actions “when the limits of tolerance are breached” by those deemed intolerant.25 Liberalism as a disposition, political vision, and national identity in Israel is as young as the state itself, serving to bolster and justify Zionist claims to land and sovereignty in Palestine. Israelis who identify as liberals espouse tolerance as a cornerstone of their individual/national identities as well as a foundation of the history of the state, while finding their tolerance instrumental towards justifying colonialism, occupation, and breaches in international law. As such, in the case of Israel and post-67 Jerusalem, co-existence and the discourse of tolerance can be appreciated “as a mode of incorporating and regulating the presence of the threatening Other” while also functioning as a discourse instrumental to constructing and positioning the liberal subject (that is, the one who is doing the tolerating) in an authoritative position. Thus, the performance and deployment of tolerance and co-existence in Jerusalem among and upon Israelis is not about seeking this ethic or recognizing its potentialities towards mapping a more just political future. It is about consuming and performing a liberal disposition encompassing cultural exchange and mutual understanding; an attempt to maintain a liberal national and personal sense of self against the weight of the twin realities of occupation and colonialism. To echo Amy Mill's study on the relationship between cosmopolitan nostalgia and nationalism, in Israel/Palestine colonial cosmopolitanism and its accompanying silences ultimately serves to bolster an ultra-nationalist and colonial order.26

24 Ibid., 15
25 Ibid., 14.
The construction of the enlightened, tolerant liberal-national is made possible through the dissemination of its discourse. As explored in the previous chapter on Gerald Caplan and the foundations of Israeli (municipal) rule in post-1967 Jerusalem, Kollek sought to instill in the urban and social fabric of Jerusalem a modern, liberal city where people from all religious and ethnic communities could live together peacefully and with their communal interests protected. By constructing Palestinian Jerusalemites as a historically insulated and depoliticized multitude of sects and communities, Kollek was able to personally reconcile Zionist colonization and an exclusionary right to politics with an ethic of co-existence. However, at the same time he was well aware of the tensions that existed between communities as a result of the Israeli conquest. This chapter will explore the institutionalization and materialization of Kollek's municipal paradigm through the activities and projects sponsored through his Jerusalem Foundation; specifically Arab-Jewish co-existence/cultural exchange institutions. The chapter will then explore two institutions in particular: Meditran (Musrara) and the Wadi al-Joz Community Center (Wadi al-Joz), and how Palestinians seized these institutions for their own political, individual, and community needs. But first, we turn to the history of Musrara and the ways in which it served as a symbol of Kollek's vision in the heart of the colonial city.

5.1 Musrara and the ‘New City’

The neighborhood of Musrara is located to the north Bab al-Amoud (Damascus Gate) and Bab al-Jadid (New Gate) of the Old City of Jerusalem; bordering Mea’ Shearim and Sa’ad wa-Said/al-Mas’udiyya in the south, al-Muskubiyya (the Russian compound) to the west, and Shaykh Jarrah and the main transport link connecting the north and south of the city to the east (road no.1). Although now an upscale neighborhood home to approximately 4,500 (predominately) Ashkenazi middle to upper class Israelis as well as international residents including journalists, academics, and UN workers, the first homes in Musrara were built by

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27 Route No. 1 runs roughly on what used to be the 1949 armistice line, which formed the border between Israel and Jordan until June 1967. As the main transport link in the city, its purpose is to connect the downtown area to the Jewish settlements in the north and south.
Christian Arabs from the Old City in the late nineteenth century and were some of the earliest residences built outside of the Old City walls.²⁸

Until the mid-nineteenth century, Jerusalem referred only to the walled city, as construction outside of the walls was limited to cemeteries, religious institutions, shrines, hospices and a number of summer homes.²⁹ Beginning in the 1850s, however, the city changed drastically, albeit gradually, in terms of demography, infrastructure, and physical layout, as a result of several interconnected push and pull factors beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. The impetus for residents, citizens, and foreign nationals to build outside of the Old City walls at this time was primarily sanitation issues, the availability of water, and overcrowding due to a population increase of Jewish immigrants, foreign nationals, and Ottoman subjects migrating from the countryside as well as other cities in the region to seek work and educational opportunities.³⁰ The conditions that allowed for such a move outside of the Old City on such a large scale came about as a result of two major developments. First, as documented by Alexander Schölch, the period during and immediately following the invasion and occupation of the geographical region of Ottoman Syria by the armies of Muhammad ‘Ali (1831-1840) encouraged European powers to act on their political and religious-cultural interests in the “Holy Land.” In his attempt to secure the goodwill of Britain, Russia, France, and Prussia, Muhammad ‘Ali allowed for the establishment of European government institutions in the region (such as consulates) and the expansion of "the philanthropic, cultural, and missionary activities” of their citizens (what is commonly referred to as the “peaceful crusade’), who were increasingly settling in the region throughout the nineteenth century.³¹ The conclusion of the Crimean War in 1856, which saw the British and the French ally with the Ottomans against Russia, further opened up avenues for European powers to play out the “Eastern question” and assert their (competing) influence in the region. The result of the war forced the Ottomans to “cede jurisdictions and powers to the consuls of the victorious powers” and foreign loans agreements only served to

increase the influence already granted to foreign consuls. With the increasing influence of European states over their nationals in Jerusalem as well as connections with local clergies during this period functioned as a means towards asserting political power in the region. Although they were unanimous on the position of protecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, European powers nonetheless sought to push for their political and economic interests in the region in competition with one another.

It is crucial to note that the institutionalization and materialization of an increased European presence in Jerusalem was made possible by a series of Ottoman reforms. Ottoman initiatives to strengthen the central government and modernize in the face of European expansion (collectively part of a process known as tanzimat) included a reformed land code in 1858 intended to extend and clarify rights of land possession and a law in 1867 that allowed for non-Ottoman residents to own land. Coupled with Ottoman land reforms came changes in the administrative status of Jerusalem. In 1840, Jerusalem was granted its own governor along with a new status as the administrative capital of the sanjaq (district) of Jerusalem and in 1874, as part of an Ottoman effort to once again reinforce and centralize its rule in the Arab provinces, the governor in Jerusalem was made directly accountable to the Sultan in Istanbul as opposed to the provincial governor in Damascus. These shifts and reforms led to an increase in security and the administrative presence of the Ottomans outside the Old City, which in turn made it appear safer for Ottoman subjects as well as non-Ottoman nationals to build outside of the wall. What is more, the re-zoning of Jerusalem as a province independent of bilad al-Sham encouraged a number of Ottoman-led infrastructural and geographical changes. Istanbul and the municipal

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33 Ibid., 25. The effort to reinforce Ottoman rule in the area came as a result of the Muhammad ‘Ali invasions into Bilad ash-Sham in the 1830s as well as an increased international interest in Palestine or the “Holy Land” during the nineteenth century. This interest has its roots in a religious revival (notably in England and the Americas), an increase in archeological enthusiasm, and European imperial ambitions in the region. See Butrus Abu Manneh, “The Rise of the Sanjak of Jerusalem in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in The Israel/Palestine Question, ed. Ilan Pappe (London: Routledge, 1999), 41-52.
34 This change in administrative status meant that Jerusalem was under the full control of Istanbul and not the wali in Syria, as was the previous arrangement prior to the invasion of Muhammad ‘Ali, where Jerusalem was a sanjaq, or ‘province’ administratively attached to Bilad ash-Sham. It was re-zoned in 1864 and again in 1874 as part of an effort by the central government to restrict the power of Beirut and Damascus as administrative centers and to create a southern buffer zone against the Wahhabiyya in the Arabian Peninsula and the Egyptian state. See Davis, “Ottoman Jerusalem,” 19, 27; Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 26.
council of Jerusalem, itself established amidst the administration reforms of 1863, began building connecting roads, highways, and a railway line linking the Old City and New City to Jaffa, Ramallah, Nablus, and Hebron. With this emerged new commercial districts and educational institutions, which further made moving to the new city an attractive option for those able to do so.

Thus, interconnected processes initiated by European expansion and Ottoman reform made possible the foundations for the New City by the mid-1850s. The first organized neighborhood established outside the Old City walls was Mishkenot Sha'ananim; a Jewish housing project initiated in 1855 by British-Jewish financier and philanthropist, Moses Montefiori. At the same time, a number of missionary projects and private institutions were established, such as the Russian Compound in 1860 (the heart of al-Muskubiyya), the Schneller Orphanage, and the Gobat school on Mt. Zion. However, most studies on the development of the New City focus solely on planned/organized neighborhoods by Jewish and international communities and networks due to the detailed property and development records available. Arab, Armenian, and Greek-Palestinian building initiatives from the mid to late nineteenth century were informal and largely unregulated; undertaken as individual or family-based projects such as the building of summer (or garden) villas in Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi al-Joz, and Musrara to the north of the Old City, Qatamon and Ba'qa in the east, as well as Wa'riyyeh south of the German Colony. What is more, religious institutions leased their endowment (waqf) properties (mainly the Greek Orthodox Church) outside of the Old City to members of the denomination in exchange for payment or services. Thus, in official maps and records, such construction activities are listed as Church properties as opposed to residential complexes. Arab, Armenian, and Greek

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35 Once Jerusalem became a provincial capital, there were three active councils in the city: the municipal council (Majlis Baladiya), the administrative council, and by 1914 the general council of the province (Majlis ‘Umumi). From the establishment of the municipal council in 1863 until the British occupation of 1917, the municipality was run by twenty-three Muslim mayors and one Greek Ottoman mayor. See Abigail Jacobson, From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 5.

36 Bashir ‘Abd al-Ghani Barakat, Mubahith al-tarikh al-maqdisi al-hadith (Jerusalem: ‘Abd al-Ghani Barakat, 2010), 119-128. Other changes included new telegraph lines (1870s), a sewage system (1870s), a police force, fire brigade, and regular garbage collection (1890s).


Jerusalemites are as a result largely left outside of the historical narrative of the development of the New City.\(^{39}\)

The use of memoirs, diaries, and a closer reading of Ottoman property records in more recent historical studies reveal the extent of building activity among Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks towards the development of the ‘New City,’ ranging from private villas to family neighborhoods and quarters built either on family (or \textit{waqf}) land (at times Ottoman ‘state land’ transferred at the request of established and affluent families) or properties leased from a religious institution, such as the Greek Orthodox church. Indeed, the earliest documented Arab family neighborhoods are the Nammari and Wa’ri quarters in upper and lower Baq’a in the mid to late nineteenth century, while other established families from the city (such as the Husseini, Nashashibi, Dajani, Jarallah, Khatib, ’Afifi, Ghosneh, Hidmi, Dweik, and Jabsheh families) began building summer residences to the north of the Old City (Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi al-Joz) at around the same time as the Jewish quarters Yemin Moshe and Mea’ Shearim emerged.\(^{40}\)

Building and living outside of the Old City was mainly (but not solely) an endeavor that indicated upward social mobility and bourgeois modernity.\(^{41}\) In a few of the new suburban complexes and quarters, such as in Romeima and Baq’a, the composition of the population was mixed between Arab, Greek, and Armenian Jerusalemites (and in the case of Musrara, Sheikh Jarrah, and Sa’ad wa-Sa’id, foreign nationals and Jews were also present). What is more, new city suburbs attracted merchants, tradespeople, and young entrepreneurs from all over Palestine, who sold products and services in new commercial districts in these areas. So while the new city residential complexes can be said to have been homogenous in class character (if not ethnic/religious character), this was only the case in terms of residential arrangements.


\(^{40}\) Although more extensive building in Wadi al-Joz began to take place in the late nineteenth century, the first Arab summer residence was allegedly erected by the Khatib family in the seventeenth century. See Dalia Habash, “Wadi al-Joz: In Focus,” Jerusalem Quarterly No. 1 (1998): 43-50; Salim Tamari, "Introduction: The Phantom City," in \textit{Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighborhoods and their Fate in the War}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, ed. Salim Tamari (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002), 3.

\(^{41}\) Although more affluent families were behind the building-up of Arab, Armenian, and Greek estates and neighborhoods, residences were also rented out to residents and citizens who did not own land or could not afford such construction efforts. See Habash, “Wadi al-Joz: In Focus,” 44-45.
Commercial and social interaction with less-affluent residents as well as among religious and ethnic communities was commonplace.\(^{42}\)

It is important not to perceive these social shifts in too stark terms, or to proclaim a new urban identity in the New City by the late nineteenth century completely distinct from that of the Old City. As was the case with residential patterns in the Old City and other parts of Palestine at the time, for the most part the new neighborhoods were formed “based on shared features, be they common religion, place of origin, tribe, ethnicity, or group,” as these new quarters, villas, and neighborhoods were built on agricultural land owned by specific families and/or religious institutions.\(^{43}\) Thus, while there existed mixed neighborhoods and quarters outside of the Old City, this was not the general trend. Communal, religious, and class residential boundaries persisted despite the social and political changes that accompanied late Ottoman reform efforts and the rise of notions of modern, de-sectarianized citizenship.

In the case of Musrara, the emergence of manorial residences began in the 1880s through wealthy Christian families (such as the Sakakini and Tleel families) from the Old City.\(^{44}\) Part of a general phenomenon of moving into the New City, Musrara was a blanketed space immediately north of Damascus gate and close to the Russian compound and the growing Jaffa Road district. This attracted dozens of Arab, Greek, and Jewish middle class families by the end of the century.\(^{45}\) However, the shift from a site of few manorial residences to a more populated neighborhood was a process that began around the turn of the century. According to the diaries of Wasif Jawhariyyeh (1904-1948), which discusses the growth of Musrara and al-Muskubiyya within a larger narrative of Jerusalem’s Ottoman modernity, the development of a new connecting road between the Old City and Musrara in 1906 attracted hundreds of families away from the Old City and into tiled mansions in the Musrara quarter.\(^{46}\) What is more, it was around the same time that modern amenities were introduced in the immediate neighborhoods surrounding the Old City, such as electricity (which first appeared at Notre Dame de France only

\(^{42}\) Davis, "The Growth of the Western Communities," 37.
\(^{43}\) Davis, "Ottoman Jerusalem," 18.
\(^{44}\) Davis, "Ottoman Jerusalem," 19; Tleel, 8. Others trace the origins of the neighborhood to the mid-1870s. See Caridi, 30.
\(^{45}\) Caridi, 30-31.
to “spread gradually to many other grand buildings”) as well as the cinematograph and the phonograph, which made living in the Musrara quarter that much more attractive.\(^{47}\) Among those who moved from the Old City into the quarter include some of the more prominent Arab Jerusalemite families of the time, such as the al-Turjman, al-Khalidi, al-Ansari, al-Najjar, al-Daruti, al-Ikrimawi, al-Mutawali, al-Alami and al-Nashashibi, families. Their relocation helping to expand the quarter all the way north to Mea’ Shearim and Sa'ad wa-Said.\(^{48}\)

Musrara was adjacent to a burgeoning city center, commercial districts, the municipal park (to the east of al-Muskubiyya), and emerging social and leisure spaces, such as the promenade in Sa'ad wa-Said (which, according to Jawhariyyeh hosted the “only public promenade for Jerusalemites at the time”).\(^{49}\) On the eve of the November 1947 UN partition resolution, it was home to hundreds of Jerusalemites with over three hundred homes and a number of prominent institutions, such as the Dusturiyyeh national school.\(^{50}\) The UN vote to partition Palestine into two states (one Arab, one Jewish) and to grant international custodianship over Jerusalem in November 1947 ignited waves of civil unrest and violent attacks between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Periodic episodes of violence escalated into an all-out war between the Zionist forces of haHagana, Irgun Zvei Leumi and Lehi on one side and Palestinian and Arab irregular militias as well as the militaries of five neighboring Arab states (after the British evacuation on May 14, 1948) on the other. Between 1947-1949, the war for Palestine, referred to as an-Nakba ('the catastrophe') in Arabic or milkhet ha’atzma’ut (the "war of independence") in Hebrew, ended with the expulsion of approximately 750,000 Palestinians into neighboring Arab states and the occupied territories of Gaza (Egypt), East Jerusalem, and the West Bank (Jordan). Approximately 60,000 Palestinian Arabs were expelled from West Jerusalem while 2,000 Jewish residents were driven from Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem into the Western part of the city.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{47}\) Ibid., 39; 80-81. The fact that Musrara was located next to al-Muskubiyya also served as an attraction. The Russian pilgrims were depended on for a living by families in surrounding districts (as far away as ‘Ayn Karim), who would sell tea, sugar, bread, cheese and meat.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 42.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 61.

\(^{50}\) “The Quarter of Musrara: 1900-1948,” undated, JMA 4918. The school was built after the 1908 revolution by Khalil al-Sakakini, Ali Jarullah, Aftim al-Moushabeck, and Jamil al-Khalidi.

During the war, Zionist forces conducted thirteen operations within four main phases of fighting in Jerusalem between December 1947 to November 1948 with the goal of capturing the city (by cleansing the Western part of Jerusalem of Arab villages and quarters so to link it to the UN-proposed Jewish state) and clearing the Tel Aviv-Jaffa-Jerusalem highway for the free movement of supplies and forces. The irregular Palestinian forces of *al-Jihad al-Muqaddas* (led by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini on the Jerusalem front) were virtually alone in defending Jerusalem against the better-equipped and organized Zionist forces; assisted only by local volunteers and village/suburban militias until the arrival of an ALA (Arab Liberation Army) contingent after the withdrawal of the British in May 1948.

The lack of defense and coordination between Palestinian militias as well as attacks by *Irgun, Lehi*, and civilian groups in and around the city prompted hundreds of Palestinian families to flee West Jerusalem beginning in late 1947. Musrara, of course, was no exception. Located at the center of the town, it slowly began to empty by late 1947 as families feared escalation of tit-for-tat acts of sabotage and violence. However, most decisive in the fall of Musrara to Zionist forces were two military confrontations: the battle for al-Qastal (an Arab village overlooking the strategic Jaffa-Jerusalem highway at its highest point) and the massacre at Deir Yassin by the combined forces of *Irgun* and *Lehi* (in coordination with *haHaganah*) in April 1948 within the general framework of Operation Nachshon. The battle for Qastal led to the death of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini and the loss of strategic terrain to Zionist forces and the murder of Arab civilians in Deir Yassin (widely reported by Zionist and Palestinian political leaders) provoked a widespread spirit of defeatism and panic in the city. As a result, by May

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53 Bahjat Abu Gharbiyeh, *Fi Khidamm al-nidal al-‘arabi al-filastini, mudhakkarat al-munadil Bahjat Abu Gharbiyeh, 1916-1949* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993), 250. The Arab Liberation Army was an army of Arab volunteers established by the Military Committee of the Arab League in October 1947 with the goal of defending Palestine.

54 Tamari and Nassar, 244-246.

55 Ibid.; Tleel, 31-33.

56 Tamari, "The City and Its Rural Hinterland," 76-77. According to Benny Morris, Operation Nachshon (March 30-April 1 1948) itself was launched with the intention of clearing whole areas of "Arab villages and hostile or potentially hostile villagers." Benny Morris, *Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 111-115.

57 Tamari, "The City and Its Rural Hinterland," 76-77.
1948 mass evacuations from the villages and urban quarters of Musrara, Qatamon, Baq'a, Mamillah, Lifta, 'Ayn Karim, and Malha were close to complete. Although many families from Musrara found refuge as far as the West Bank, Amman, or Beirut, many left their homes for the Old City or areas just east of Jerusalem, which after May 1948 had a presence of Arab Legion (Jordanian) soldiers. In the words of former Musrara resident John Tleel, many families from the quarter became “fifty meter” refugees by locating to Jordanian-occupied areas of the city and being declared “absentees” by the Israeli state by war’s end.

After the signing of the last armistice agreement in 1949, Palestine was wiped off of the map and Jerusalem was effectively cut into two: West Jerusalem and the New City was captured and declared the capital of Israel while the Old City and surrounding environs in the east came under the rule of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. With this, the Israeli state set out to consolidate the territorial and demographic gains made during the war. While most Palestinian villages and townships were destroyed between 1947-1949, the properties within those that remained (such as the formerly Arab urban quarters of Jerusalem) were leased by the state, notably through the Committee for Arab property and later, the Custodian of Absentee Property, for the purpose of absorbing Jewish settlers/immigrants; most of whom beginning in the 1950s came from Levantine countries. Referred to collectively by wider Israeli society at the time as Edot HaMizrahi (eastern ethnic communities), a paternalistic and prejudicial ontology of a self-styled western (Ashkenazi) Jewish state towards eastern Jews was reflected not only though state discourse but in housing, economic structure (division of labor), and schooling. This prejudice of mizrahim seeking only a most simple life, as well as the need to “Judaize” formerly Palestinian regions and alleviate the housing shortage created by mass immigration following the war, led to the state dispersal of most Mizrahi Jews not only to designated transit camps (Ma'aborot) but to peripheral areas of established cities (thus serving as a reservoir of cheap

58 Ibid. See also Walid Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 (Washington DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992), 278-279.
59 Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.
60 From 1948-1956, approximately 450,000 Jews from Asia and Africa arrived in the country, according to the Israeli Central Bureau of statistics. However, this number is disputed on account of the fact that Sephardic Jews from Europe were counted not as "Mizrahi" but 'European.' See Shlomo Swirski, "The Oriental Jews in Israel," Dissent 30 (Winter 1984): 79.
labor) and to development towns (Ayarot Pituah), cooperative villages (Moshavim) as well as Arab homes along the 1949 lines in the name of the state imperative to strengthen borders.

Post-1948 West Jerusalem is a striking example of a more general state housing and settlement policy as it relates to Mizrahi Jews. While the choice of spoils in the Jerusalem neighborhoods of Baq’a, the German Colony, the Greek Colony, and Talbiyah went to government officials and other such connected persons, North African and Middle Eastern Jewish immigrants were placed in the peripheral (and underprivileged) housing projects of Ir Ganim, Katamon Tet, Katamonim Alef to vav, and Shmuel HaNavi, as well as emptied Arab homes and buildings in partially destroyed areas of southern Baq’a, ‘Ayn Karim, Mamillah, and Musrara. Although this entire urban belt can be characterized by poor services, low housing standards and infrastructural disrepair after the war's end, Musrara was perhaps the most vulnerable as the principal frontier neighborhood in the city; situated directly on the “no-man's land” separating occupied Israeli and Jordanian Jerusalem. Residents were forced to live with the exchange of bullets shooting east-west from Jordanian and Israeli snipers stationed at their posts along the walls and trenches dividing the city. Similar to other housing projects in Jerusalem after the 1947-1949 war, Musrara's post-1949 residents; mainly Moroccan Jewish immigrants as well as a small minority of Iraqi, German, and eastern European Jews, lived within dilapidated (formerly) Arab homes (with the exception of five apartment blocks erected in the neighborhood in the 1960s) and with severe overcrowding, chronic unemployment, low ownership levels, and a lack of services and institutions. By the 1960s, with over 500 families or 4,000 persons squeezed into approximately 620 apartment units, about a third of residents

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63 Until the June 1967 war, The Jerusalem Municipality defined the parameters of Musrara as such: Mendelbaum gate at its most northern end; Israel Shivtei St. (Russian Compound) to its west; Jordanian military lines to the east (no man's land), and the Old City walls to the south.

64 Avidan Mashiah (Hebrew), "Morasha in Jerusalem--A Neighborhood under Fire," Herut, June 4 1965, JMA 4918.

65 Dani Bloch (Hebrew), "The People of Musrara are sticking to their neighborhood," Davar, June 4 1965, JMA 4918. Most German and Eastern European residents left Musrara after a short period of residence in the 1950s due to (German) reparations and government assistance programs. See Claudia De Martino, "Mizrahi Voices In Musrara: An Inter-Jewish Discriminative Spatial Pattern," EchoGeo 25 (July-September 2013): 3-4.

66 Ozzie Samuels, "An Evaluation of Project Renewal in Morasha, Jerusalem: 1981-1985," July 1 1986, JMA 4918. With the exception of five apartment blocks erected in the 1960s, the city and the state neglected needs for reconstruction in Musrara resulting from damages incurred during the war.
relied on welfare allowances and most of the youth in the neighborhood did not work or attend school. What is more, residents of Musrara rarely met with or interacted with state or social assistance representatives outside of election campaigns. It was often the case that the only other Israelis that residents regularly interacted with were military personnel patrolling the armistice line. In other words, almost overnight Musrara was transformed from an affluent and bustling residential and social space before the 1947-1949 war to an overcrowded, isolated, neglected and impoverished frontier neighborhood.

Following the Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, Musrara once again experienced a period of spatial and political transformation as it transitioned from a frontier zone to the very core of the city. In the determination to consolidate political sovereignty over occupied Jerusalem and beautify the area in the context of a growing tourism industry, Musrara was targeted as part of a "seam" zone by the Municipality in dire need of redemption; that is, increased social assistance, physical repair, Jewish settlement, and infrastructural and commercial development connecting the area to the occupied parts of the city to the east. Although the perceived need to “mend the gap” with a new commercial area along the empty space of the partition line between Nablus road and Musrara was taken up by the Municipality immediately following the war, financial assistance from the government was not immediately forthcoming. The government as well as the various departments and ministries involved in urban planning in the city prioritized Jewish settlement projects along the gap to the north linking West Jerusalem to Mount Scopus (Ramat Eshkol, Givat Hamivkar, French Hill, Ma'alot Daphna). By the 1970s, as a means to further pre-empt any possibility of an Israeli withdrawal

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67 “Survey of the Neighborhood of Musrara, Jerusalem,” Amidar, December 1961, JMA 4918. Only two schools existed in the area, one religious and one state school; both of which were in poor condition and unable to accommodate the youth population.
68 De Martino, 4-5.
69 “Establishment of Arab Hotels in Shaykh Jarrah,” undated, JMA 5979. The program of "mending the gaps" with commercial and housing developments targeted spaces between Shmuel HaNavi and Sheikh Jarrah; Musrara and Nablus Road; and the Mamilla quarter just south of Jaffa gate of the Old City. Musrara was envisioned as a hotel/tourist space given its location adjacent to the Old City. The city sought to encourage Arab entrepreneurs to manage hotels in the city center so as to: 1) “mitigate the ill feelings in the Arab sector” aroused by state confiscation of Palestinian land and properties after the June 1967 war; 2) to showcase the existence of a mixed population for internationals.
70 Dumper, The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967, 98-101; 111-112. The Various bodies involved included local, national, and district planning commissions under the aegis of the interior ministry and composed of individuals from various ministries, such as housing, trade and industry, transportation and tourism.
from East Jerusalem as well as to fracture Palestinian residential space in the East Jerusalem hinterland and metropolitan area with residential and industrial spaces, government priority shifted towards settlement construction along the outer ridges surrounding the city to the north and south (Ramot, Neve Ya’akov, Gilo and East Talpiot). Thus, after the 1967 war, the residents of Musrara experienced a modest increase in employment opportunities and class mobility with the unification of the city, notably with jobs opening in construction. However, a more drastic transformation came with the Project Renewal initiative that began in 1978.71

The elections of 1977 saw the rise to power of the Likud party and a new partner for the Municipality towards developing the spatial gap between Musrara and Nablus Road. Coming to power along a wave of popular support from Mizrahi who felt neglected and discriminated against by the Labor-Zionist government, one of the first socio-political ventures of the Likud government was the initiation of the Project Renewal Program in late 1977, which was implemented in over eighty neighborhoods across the country by 1982 with the aim of improving physical, social, and economic conditions of “distressed” neighborhoods and, through the establishment of local steering committees made up in part by residents, to encourage civic engagement and responsibility.72 Project Renewal was an ambitious program that included the input of various Israeli ministries, municipal authorities, and service providers, as well as private and state agencies such as Amidar (the Israeli state housing agency, which owned much of the homes targeted for repair), the Israeli Lands Authority, and the Jewish Agency.73 Hence, the structure of the project was complex and the ultimate objectives of each party involved differed.

The central location of Musrara (and notably in a context of record-level numbers of tourists coming to the city after '67) led municipal and state representatives to express the need for increased social assistance to discourage “youth delinquency” and for physical repair and beautification of the neighborhood. However, the neglected and impoverished zones and housing projects in Jerusalem were home to a number of Mizrahi social and political movements that emerged throughout the city in the early to late 1970s, including Ohalim (the "tent" movement of

71 De Martino, 8.
72 Alan Elsner, "Project Renewal Bureaucracy Hit," Jerusalem Post, undated press clipping, JMA 4918. Neighborhood Steering Committees were made up of 8-10 residents as well as government and city representatives. The Committee would meet to discuss budgets, funding sources, and construction priorities.
73 “Musrara,” 1978, ISA 14529/15 GL.
1973 in Katamon Tet and by 1977 in Shmuel HaNavi and Baq'a), *haPanterim haShorim* (the Israeli Black Panthers by 1971 in Musrara) and *Dai* ("enough" by the early 1980s in Musrara). A thorn in the side of the Municipality as well as the Minister of police, who by and large regarded these movements as the work of "hoodlums" encouraged by radical Professors and activists from the Hebrew University, Musrara was home base to arguably the most vocal and confrontational of such movements against ethnic deprivation and police brutality: *haPanterim haShorim* and *Dai* (the latter of which emerged in part due to local resentment towards Project Renewal). As a result, not only were spots in the local steering committees of Project Renewal in Jerusalem neighborhoods purposefully filled to act as a bulwark to the rising power of *Mizrahi* social movements, but more generally the neighborhood was targeted by a process referred to by city officials as "social rehabilitation" (or "spiritual rehabilitation," to adopt the language of Orthodox Jewish organizations in the city), which translated on the ground as a process of ethnic gentrification and property speculation. While the area was first targeted for upgrades to existing housing conditions, prices rose dramatically to attract investment opportunities in the city center. As a result, and despite early commitments from Israeli state bodies ensuring that those in Musrara would benefit from urban renovation projects, residents were increasingly pressured by state functionaries to move out of the neighborhood and into the Israeli colonies of Talpiot, French Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Ma'aleh Adumim, and Givat HaMivtar.

For municipal and state functionaries, the ultimate objective of Project Renewal in the city center was the transformation of Musrara into an attractive and upscale cultural-political axis as well as a meeting point for Arabs and Jews; a place where residents as well as tourists could appreciate Israeli efforts toward creating an open and modern metropolis. One such report

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74 The *Mizrahi* social movements of Jerusalem emerged as a result of decades of neglect, deprivation, and discrimination. However, they emerged in the 1970s as a result of precipitating factors such as the incoming of Eastern European Jewry, who were subject to more advantageous conditions for "absorption" from the state, and as a result of the 1967 war, which saw large sums of money invested in settlement construction in the city and at the expense of existing neighborhoods. Other movements, such as *Dai*, emerged in the late seventies/early eighties as a result of resident objections to the goals of Project Renewal.

75 Letter from Shlomo Hillel to Golda Meir, June 3 1971, ISA 119.1/A4479/2; Interview with Reuben Abergel, July 17 2013.

76 Daniel Bloch, "Youth Aspirations in a Frontier Neighborhood," undated, JMA 4918; Hasson, 122-123. Local steering committees were staffed by members loyal to the "local boss," who was the primary means of contact with external power centers involved in Project Renewal, notably the Mayor's office and the Ministry of Housing.


78 Interview with Reuven Abergel, July 17 2013.
submitted to the city in 1982 by the Jerusalem Committee for the Municipality and entitled “the seam area development plans” outlines four main objectives regarding the “rehabilitation” of Musrara through Project Renewal: 1) “mending the liason between the two parts of Jerusalem by incorporating it into a unified urban system; 2) developing an integrated road system in the area and ensuring accessibility to the city center; 3) designing a pattern of intended land use; 4) establishing built form and design principles in the area.” 79 “Mending the liason” is cited as a primary objective expressed by two specific courses of action. The first is “healing the gash” of the municipal fabric through the development of connecting infrastructure, which would then create an “unbroken urban web.” The second is “municipal construction of the sort which will prevent the emergence of diametrically opposed national communities.” 80 The first course of action involved the development of a continuity of buildings, thoroughfares, public transportation lines, and an arterial road system (what is now route no. 1) connecting east-west beyond the partition line as well as north-south, thereby linking Israeli settlements to the city center. The second course of action involved the development of Musrara into a focal point of municipal and leisure activity through which “Jerusalem's two communities will find the opportunity to meet and know each other.” 81

Within the development plan for the seam area, route no. 1 is to serve as the main northern approach artery as well as an axis for public transit and a system of crossroads. Running east-west, for example, the purpose of the proposed crossroads system was to integrate Eshkol Boulevard, Shim'on haTzadik Road (Sheikh Jarrah), Nablus Road, and the Mount Scopus area in the east as well as Shmuel haNavi (north of Musrara) in the west directly to a newly developed and beautified city center. At the same time, Palestinian neighborhoods were to be linked to Jewish residential and commercial centers (for example, the proposed street system would join Wadi al-Joz with HaNevi'im Road via Bab al-Zahra). 82 Although it would take decades to complete the "functional axis" in the city center linking West Jerusalem and the occupied territories east and north-east in occupied Jerusalem, the complementary project of transforming

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
the city center into a political, commercial and cultural meeting point between Arab and Jewish Jerusalemites was already well underway under the auspices of Kollek's Jerusalem Foundation.83

5.2 From "No Man's Land" to "Meeting Point"

The Jerusalem Foundation (HaKeren LiYerushalayim) was established in 1966 as a personal project to Teddy Kollek as a means to transform the city according his own vision. Prior to the 1967 occupation of Jordanian (East) Jerusalem, Israeli West Jerusalem was not a priority for the state and government bodies in terms of development. For Kollek, the funding received from the state was inadequate towards meeting his expectations of beautifying the city and developing the necessary infrastructure to attract residents and build a capital city worthy of its designation. It was reasoned that a private solution outside of a government framework was necessary. A further motivation for Kollek was the perceived need to foster cultural-political connections between Israel and the Jewish diaspora. Thus, the Jerusalem Foundation was established to network with diaspora Jewry and solicit private donations so to attract Jewish investment (and perhaps even settlement in Israel) and more effectively (and rapidly) transform Jerusalem, in the words of the Foundation, from "a village-like," "sleepy," overcrowded city to a thriving modern metropolis.84 In 1966, Kollek, along with the appointed director general of the Foundation, Ruth Cheshin and other supporters within the city (Moshe Pearlman, Meir Sherman, Ze'ev Weil and Ya'akov Yanai among them) secured the establishment of the Foundation through a colleague in New York City, Nachum Bernstein.85 Bernstein, a lawyer and philanthropist, provided the initial

83 Ibid.
funding to assist the newly elected mayor in his vision.\textsuperscript{86} Within five years, additional boards of trustees were established in the UK, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland.

Declared by Kollek as an independent non-profit functioning as a private solution to the problem of a limited municipal budget, the Foundation in fact represented a complex “interface of private and public bodies,” as Kollek was both the chairman of the Foundation council as well as a public official at the head of the Municipality.\textsuperscript{87} Members of the council at the head of the Foundation were drawn from Israeli government bodies as well as from banking, and industry.\textsuperscript{88} In addition, while Kollek saw the Foundation as a means towards pushing projects without the approval of the city council, municipal functionaries and planning units had considerable input in the activities of the Foundation; as many of its activities involved land acquisition, construction, education, youth, culture and sports, which are all under the purview of municipal departments as well as planning and engineering units.\textsuperscript{89}

Following the June 1967 war, the activities of the Foundation remained centered upon urban beautification (parks and gardens), archaeological excavation, and the creation of and support for educational, health, cultural, recreational, and religious facilities (including restoration efforts). However, the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem brought with it a new sense of urgency for members of the Foundation fully committed to maintaining Israel’s declared sovereignty over the territory. Kollek and his Foundation thus sought to promote a Zionist as well as a multi-cultural vision in the city, which was felt to be more humane, inclusive, and constructive with respect to the stabilization of the Israeli colonial project therein. What is more, with the United Nations opposing Israeli claims to sovereignty over East Jerusalem, it was important to demonstrate Israeli justification of its control beyond historical claims. The Foundation set out to substantiate Israeli claims of establishing an enlightened and accommodative administration fit to rule a contested city like Jerusalem.

\textsuperscript{87} Sharkansky, “Mayor Teddy Kollek and the Jerusalem Foundation,” 300.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 299.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 301; Ira Sharkansky, \textit{The Political Economy of Israel} (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1987), 11.
After June 1967, the Foundation became a driving force towards developing the infrastructure necessary to attract Jewish settlers in the quickly emerging colonies in east and north-east Jerusalem. Towards this end, it funded integration measures in the form of educational, cultural, social, and recreational activities and the development of communal facilities in what they referred to as the new Jewish neighborhoods or suburbs of occupied Jerusalem. In the words of Kollek, taking on immigration absorption projects was crucial in order to “maintain the demographic balance” in the city. At the same time, the Foundation balanced their commitment to Israeli colonization and accommodation of settlers with the goal of promoting civic co-existence, economic development, cultural exchange, and the “equalization of services” between Jewish colonies and Arab neighborhoods. Hence, the Jerusalem Foundation shifted their mandate after 1967 by promoting a different image of Jerusalem as a multi-cultural metropolis.

The Foundation immediately began promoting joint activities and projects targeting Jewish and Arab youth. Cultural and infrastructural development in the so-called 'Arab sector' was deemed to be particularly urgent due to the fact that the Israeli government typically refused to fund such projects for Palestinian residents, prioritizing instead the consolidation of a belt of Jewish colonies surrounding East Jerusalem in order to create facts on the ground in the 1967 occupied territories, as well as industrial development to curb Jewish emigration from Jerusalem. To the government, if the Palestinian community factored at all in development schemes, it was limited to maintaining or upgrading already existing institutions. While Kollek was a critic of the state’s inaction regarding development in East Jerusalem, he did not consider his program to be in tension with Zionist objectives. In fact, it was felt to be supplementary, since an approach emphasizing “care, sensitivity and thoughtfulness” towards Palestinian cultural and developmental needs could effectively work to integrate what he perceived to be an ancient minority and help discourage a resistance movement against the Zionist colonisation project in Greater Jerusalem. Towards that end, when funds were particularly scarce in the

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91 Ibid.
92 Cheshin, Hutman and Melamed, 191.
93 “Six Day War: Neutralize and Maintain Existing Institutions,” July 1967, ISA 6423/8 G.
1980s (a period of slow economic growth), the Foundation established an endowment fund in 1981 that declared as its special focus the strengthening of joint Arab-Jewish youth activities and educational facilities in the city.\textsuperscript{95}

As explored in previous chapters, Kollek’s paradigm for incorporating East Jerusalem as a network of autonomous boroughs was believed to be self-justifying, as it was thought to reflect centuries-old governing traditions and civic cultures. Kollek assumed static urban arrangements and a politically passive and heterogeneous society in East Jerusalem; conditioned to adjust to conquest so long as particular demands are met and cultural norms recognized. Thus, according to publications from the Foundation, the resentment towards the Israeli state and Municipality that existed within Palestinian communities was not the result of political concerns and the collective experience under a colonial order but rather the result of “cultural differences” or “social (cultural) gaps” experienced by a community in a diverse city that does not yet understand or appreciate Jewish culture and what a Zionist order could provide.\textsuperscript{96} Indeed, the historical and collective experience under previous “caretakers,” notably the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which according to Kollek did not sufficiently cater to the social, economic, and cultural needs of Jerusalemites, is primarily to blame for what he saw as a deprived community who by and large had "no tradition of participating in organized cultural events."\textsuperscript{97} As a result, the Foundation emphasized joint cultural projects developing "mutual understanding" between Arabs and Jews that would instill an ethic of tolerance to "bridge the social and physical differences"\textsuperscript{98} and create a society where "Jews, Christians and Moslems live together in harmony."\textsuperscript{99} The Foundation did not seek to create a common civic identity or promote equal rights to the city but rather “good neighborly relations” based on a sense of goodwill and a shared appreciation for the Municipality’s commitment towards preserving the "natural beauty" and ancient "historical heritage" of the city.\textsuperscript{100} As such, Palestinian Jerusalemites were engaged

\textsuperscript{98} The Jerusalem Foundation, "Projects of the Jerusalem Foundation: statement from Chairperson Mrs. J.E. Sieff," October 1979, JMA 9050.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
with through the Municipality in such a manner so as to ensure Israeli domination in the city and by catering to what were believed to be the immediate, everyday social and cultural needs of Palestinian neighborhoods.

Thus, through the goal of promoting “proper behavior” necessary for a civic culture of co-existence in post-1967 Jerusalem, the Foundation ignored political issues and tensions born from the Israeli appropriation of land and Palestinian demunicipalization in favor of the construction of institutions, educational retreats, and workshops devoted to dialogue, cultural enrichment and elevation, and social exchange primarily among Arab and Jewish youth (like the Jewish-Arab summer camps initiative launched by the Arab Affairs Office, the focus on youth was to encourage the development of a cadre of community leaders grateful for the political status quo). For example, subsidizing retreats for Arab schoolchildren (at least those attending schools under an Israeli curriculum) became a top priority for the Foundation. As part of the “art and culture program for schoolchildren,” by 1981 the Foundation sponsored the visits of approximately 15,000 Arab schoolchildren between the ages of 5-18 per year to drama, folklore, musical and theatrical productions at the Khan, the Jerusalem Theater, Omariyyeh Hall (the Old City), as well as the Israel Museum, Natural History Museum, and Paley Center. The retreats typically sought to expose schoolchildren to Israeli, Western, and Arab history as well as classics in music, theater, and literature (in Hebrew and Arabic), such as the works of Arthur Miller, Shalom Aleichem, and Tawfiq al-Hakim. Joint courses in arts and civic leadership were also organized by the Foundation, while recreational (sports) facilities were created in frontier settlements (such as French Hill) to encourage Jewish-Arab (youth) interaction. In making the trips to (predominately) Israeli institutions an annual event, settler infrastructure to the west could become a natural extension of everyday life for Palestinian Jerusalemites and obliterate the green line (the 1949 armistice line in Jerusalem) from the urban consciousness of the city’s inhabitants. The Foundation further sponsored vocational training for Arab youth, the

103 The Jerusalem Foundation, “Project for Arts and Culture in the Neighborhoods of Jerusalem: Programs, November 1975, JMA 9050.  
104 The Jerusalem Foundation, "A Sports Center in Northeastern Jerusalem (Givat Ha-Takhmoshet),” undated, MA 9050.
construction of libraries in East Jerusalem (including the Shu'fat school library and Bab al-Zahra library, the latter of which included language courses for Jews and Arabs and classes in Islamic and Arab history),\textsuperscript{105} the establishment of community youth clubs (thirteen such youth clubs in East Jerusalem were established through the foundation by 1973, such as the Arab scout troops),\textsuperscript{106} dramatic arts institutions (al-Kasaba) and local theatrical and dramatic productions in Arabic, and finally the renovation/restoration of mosques.\textsuperscript{107}

Perhaps the most ambitious project sponsored by the Foundation in East Jerusalem was the construction of the Sheikh Jarrah Arab health center. Completed in December 1982 and located in Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood just north of the Old City, the construction of the four-level polyclinic was made possible through the Foundation, the Histadrut's Kupat Holim Clalit Health Fund, European (notably German, Swiss, UK and Austrian) municipalities and foundations, as well as private donations.\textsuperscript{108} The polyclinic was conceived as part of an overall comprehensive health plan for East Jerusalem after the Municipality was approached by a number of the city's \textit{mukhtars} in September 1979 requesting immediate assistance in developing localized public health facilities.\textsuperscript{109} By the mid to late 1970s, there were only three public local clinics serving Arab residents in the immediate area (at the time numbering around 100,000), most of which were ill-equipped to service a growing population and ailing in terms of physical condition. What is more, the outpatient departments in Hadassah facilities on Mount Scopus and ‘Ayn Karim were overcrowded, too far away for most in the eastern quarters/neighborhoods, limited in terms of their Arabic-speaking staff, and generally unaccommodating to dietary norms and cultural-religious customs of Palestinian Jerusalemites.\textsuperscript{110} Complementary to this goal of more effectively catering to the health needs of Palestinian residents and raising the level of essential services in the east of the city (which the Municipality refused to do) was the desire of the Foundation to: 1) normalize relations between Palestinian residents, the city and the state (the

\textsuperscript{107} Performing Arts Division (Arabic), "Theater in the Glass House," undated, JMA 9050.
\textsuperscript{108} The Jerusalem Foundation, "The Sheikh Jarrach Health Center, Jerusalem," 1979, JMA 9051
\textsuperscript{109} ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} ibid. A letter from several \textit{mukhtars} in East Jerusalem, for example, complained that Jewish facilities did not respect Muslim dietary restrictions and that women and men did not have the immediate option of refusing service from opposite-sex practitioners.
hospital was maintained by the Ministry of Health and administered by both the Kupat Holim sick fund and the Municipality) with specialized services provided by the Hadassah University Hospital personnel; 2) facilitate social encounters with Palestinian Jerusalemites and instill a sense of appreciation for modern medicine and medical care (thereby introducing a civilizing measure); and 3) serve as a “cornerstone in the building of inter-communal understanding and cooperation.”  

The latter objective was expressed through the fact that while the center’s first director was an East Jerusalemite and the staff were mainly Arabic speaking (including Israeli practitioners and professionals who were required to understand and speak Arabic as well as possess a knowledge of Arab cultures and customs), patients requiring more specialized services were transferred to other (Israeli) area hospitals in the city. In addition, mirroring the caretaker, provider-recipient structure that characterized Kollek’s administrative vision for post-1967 Jerusalem, Israeli doctors frequented the clinic to advise medical staff and to hold discussion sessions with Palestinian doctors and patients.  

As both an “Arab” institution as well as a joint Jewish-Arab venture, the Foundation sought to "create an atmosphere of peaceful cooperation and understanding" as well as "communal harmony" between Arabs and Jews.

Despite a commitment to Israeli demographic engineering as well as absolute Israeli control over all of what became Jerusalem after the June 1967 war, the Foundation referred to their projects in East Jerusalem and the city center as the "infrastructure of peace." This network was to prepare the population for the inevitability of international recognition of Israeli rule and the “eventuality of peace.”  

Although the Foundation emblem can be found throughout occupied Jerusalem, the following section will focus on a particular institution called Meditran, which functioned in Musrara for the better part of the 1970s. The section will then move on to another case study, the Wadi Joz Community Center (or Bet David/Beit Daoud) in the Palestinian neighborhood of Wadi al-Joz. In so doing, the following section will discuss

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112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 To further illustrate Kollek’s commitment to both Jewish demographic dominance in Jerusalem as well as 'neighborly relations' between Jews and Arabs, the Foundation sponsored research initiatives through the Institute for Jerusalem Studies' academic committee on demographic trends and inter-sectorial cooperation in the city. Institute for Jerusalem Studies, "Research Projects," undated, JMA 9050.
Palestinian participation in co-existence institutions and the ways in which the population utilized these spaces to suit their own individual, communal, or national objectives.

As previously noted, Musrara was targeted by the Municipality as a natural space for Jewish-Arab contact given its location in the city center; a kind of mediating, neutral area between east and west through which Palestinians and Israelis could develop casual social relations. Located just north of the top tourist attraction in Jerusalem (the Old City), the former "no man's land" was also the ideal site to promote the Municipal colonial narrative for international visitors. Thus, by the late 1970s and the commencement of Project Renewal, Musrara became an ideological landscape meant to both “settle and silence Palestine” in that it served as the ground for a network of government and cultural institutions devoted to the celebration of Israeli colonial power and achievement. At the same time, this landscape sought the re-articulation of Palestinian cultural-political history in the city by shifting the narrative from a history of colonialism and dispossession to one of national conflict and cultural differences. For example, the site of the Museum on the Seam located in Sa'ad wa Said (a few dozen meters south of Musrara) was seized by Israel following the 1947-1949 war. Formerly the property of the Baramki family, the three-story home was constructed in 1934 by Andoni Baramki to serve as a familial household. The family fled their home in 1948 in fear of escalating violence in the city and by war's end, the Baramki family were declared absentees by the Israeli government and their properties seized as they sought haven in what became “enemy territory” in East Jerusalem. As the home straddled the border between what became West and East Jerusalem, it was transformed from a familial home into an army post alongside Mandelbaum Gate for Israeli forces patrolling the no man's land to secure the newly formed armistice line. Discursively, the structure was redefined as the “Torjeman post” and functioned as a military monument to Israeli triumph in the city.

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116 Ibid., 52.
117 The Baramki family built the home on land belonging to the Turjman family; referring specifically to Hasan Bey Turjman who lived on the site. For more on the Turjman family, see Salim Tamari, *Year of the Locust: A Soldier's Diary and the Erasure of Palestine's Ottoman Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
As part of the general renewal plan for the seam zone, by 1981 the Baramki house was once again transformed. However, this time it was transformed from a military monument into a public museum symbolizing the unification of the city and Israeli modernity. From its inception until the present day, the museum (known today as the Museum on the Seam) offered public exhibitions devoted to the nineteen years of violent division in the city and the "redeeming" years of Israeli rule after 1967, emphasizing human rights, tolerance, development, coexistence and possibilities for peace under Israeli rule. According to the official webpage, “the museum is committed to examining the social reality within our regional conflict, to advancing dialogue in the face of discord and to encouraging social responsibility that is based on what we all have in common rather than what keeps us apart.” The history of the Baramki family and the dispossession of Palestinian Jerusalemites is nowhere to be found in the narrative offered. In addition to the museum, the Jerusalem Foundation also had a hand in supporting programs at the Center for Classical Middle Eastern Music and Dance in Musrara (to promote “classical Middle Eastern music and dance”) and by 1993, city hall itself was moved closer to the city center (Safra Square).

The following section, however, will focus on a particular cultural institution that by 1972 was established through the Foundation in the heart of the city-center: Meditran.

5.3 Meditran: The Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem

"People can get along better than governments.”

In the summer of 1969, Dr. Lev Schwartz immigrated to Israel with his family from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to serve as advisor to the National Council for Research and

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119 Ibid.
121 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "Meditran Newsletter,” 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
Development, namely on issues related to science policy. Having spent the better part of the previous decade as an advisor to various international organizations, governmental agencies and research institutions, Schwartz found himself jaded yet “inspired by the historical assemblage in Jerusalem of some of the world’s most ancient communities.” He believed that it was his mission to devote his time to replace the mutual fears of Arabs and Jews by recapturing “the cosmopolitan spirit that once prevailed in our area.” The problem, according to Schwartz in a 1974 interview with the *Kansas City Jewish Chronicle*, was that “most Jerusalem Jews and Arabs are still living apart, with the social and cultural gap between the two peoples as wide as ever. Relationships between Jew and Arab are often superficial.” The resulting “insecurity and familiarity on both sides” has sown a suffocating prejudice and impediment to a lasting peace.

According to Schwartz, he was inspired to act upon his “first encounter with Arabs,” notably a Palestinian man from Nazareth named Abdullah Habibullah. It was Habibullah who introduced him to a group of Palestinian students studying at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Through them, he discovered that many East Jerusalemites were anxious to learn Hebrew, acquire better jobs, and become acquainted “with more people from all parts of the city.” Following this encounter, by January 1971 Schwartz “sensed the potential for cultural enrichment” and allowed for his contract with the National Council for Research to run out. He immediately began networking with like-minded Israelis and Palestinians. The result was the establishment of Meditran in April 1971; a public organization dedicated to enabling Jerusalemites to “become better acquainted with each other,” increase awareness of a common “cultural heritage,” and ultimately to draw “Semitic brothers and cousins together” towards “new forms of multi-cultural and social relations” that could serve as a “model for Mediterranean

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123 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem "Meditran Manifesto," 1971, ISA 17081/3 GL.
124 Ibid.
125 Debbie Dunn, "People Can Get Along Better Than Governments," *The Kansas City Jewish Chronicle*, July 12 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
126 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem "Patrons and Supporters/Meditran Story," 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
127 Ibid.
128 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem "Meditran Story," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.
harmony.” Schwartz became the official convener, director, and organizer of Meditran. Alongside several other founding members forming a board of advisors, including Salim Nammari, an engineer from Wadi Joz and the official East Jerusalem representative of the organization, Meditran made its public debut on 17 April 1971 at 4 Balfour St. in Rehavia, West Jerusalem.

Just as decisive to the establishment of Meditran, however, were Schwartz's connections to other Israeli co-existence institutions, such as Neve Shalom/Wahat as-Salam, as well as the Prime Minister's Office and the Municipality. These relationships were formed during his stint as an advisor to the National Council for Research and Development. Neve Shalom/Wahat as-Salam ("Oasis of Peace") is a 'bi-national' community located midway between Jerusalem and Jaffa-Tel Aviv. Established in 1970, the community was conceived of by Rina Geftman, Anne le Meignen and most notably Father Bruno Hussar, an Egyptian-born Catholic convert whose parents were assimilated Jews. Fr. Hussar sought to create a depoliticized experiment of direct co-existence between Jews, Christians and Muslims. Indeed, members of Neve Shalom would be present for Meditran's debut in the spring of 1971 to provide flowers and sweets for a gathering celebrating the end of Passover.

While Schwartz regarded Neve Shalom as a model for his own project, the Prime Minister's Office, principally the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, was a source of moral as well as material support. Correspondence between Schwartz and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs illustrate the friendly and professional relations that had developed between Meditran and Shmuel Toledano (the Minister for Arab Affairs, 1965-1977), and his staff more generally. In a letter dated July 7 1975 to then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Schwartz

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129 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "Meditran Manifesto," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.
130 "Organization for the Encouragement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem," April 21 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
132 Debbie Dunn, "People Can Get Along Better Than Governments," The Kansas City Jewish Chronicle, July 12 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
attempted to convince Rabin to urge Toledano to reconsider his alleged upcoming resignation, writing:

We came to know Shmuel Toledano four years ago when we first began our association…There was never a time that Mr. Toledano failed to help us. Besides material help, he gave us moral encouragement. All of us, Israeli and Arab, were impressed with the sincere interest of Shmuel Toledano in finding a way for our peoples to live together.  

Throughout Meditran's short existence, Toledano provided significant financial assistance to the organization (going so far as to double the office's contributions after the 1973 war) and made appearances there as a guest speaker on Israeli-Arab relations. Through the office's connections with the Israel Land Authority, Toledano was integral towards Meditran's relocation from Balfour St. to Prophet's St. just north of Damascus Gate in 1972 and again its move to central Musrara (Ha Ayin Chet) in 1973-1974, providing rent support when requested. The relationship between Meditran and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs was strong enough to compel Schwartz to suggest to Toledano additional initiatives towards improving Arab-Jewish relations. For example, in the winter of 1974 Schwartz recommended that in the absence of direct negotiations among Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, the Advisor for Arab Affairs should push for engagement with “Israel's other neighbors, her nearest, the Palestinians” of Jerusalem and the West Bank, arguing that “there are many moderate Palestinians who want a better life….not all Palestinians are represented by ex-patriates Arafat, Hawatmeh, Jabrill, or Habash.” Schwartz believed that violence becomes an option only when moderates are not formally recognized and by initiating dialogue, Israel can encourage developments “within her control” and can become “the master of her own destiny.” Much like Toledano’s efforts supporting the Jewish-Arab summer camps initiative, part of Meditran's

133 Letter from Dr. Lev Yakir-am to Yitzhak Rabin, July 7 1975, ISA 17081/3 GL. 
134 Letter from Shmuel Toledano to Finance Department, May 30 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL; Letter from Lev Schwartz to Shmuel Toledano, April 1 1973, ISA 17081/3 GL. 
135 Letter from Lev Schwartz to Aluf Zorea and the Israel Lands Authority, undated, ISA 17081/3 GL. 
136 Letter from Shmuel Toledano to the Finance Department, May 30 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL; Letter from Lev Schwartz to Shmuel Toledano, April 1 1973, ISA 17081/3 GL; Letter from Lev Schwartz to Shmuel Toledano, February 27 1973, ISA 17081/3 GL. 
137 Meditran, "Meeting of Israelis and West Bank Palestinians," August 12 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
official mission was to foster a new generation of Arab and Israeli "leaders" to work towards social equilibrium in the city.\textsuperscript{138}

The relationship between Meditran and Teddy Kollek was equally strong, if not as personal. The affinity towards Kollek appears to be more about a common ideological orientation towards post-1967 Jerusalem and a shared conception of cultural difference as a central, organizing principle for the city as well as a cause for conflict. Considering the fact that Schwartz's diagnosis and declared remedy for existing social and cultural relations in the city echoed that of Teddy Kollek's (that is, communal divisions being a result of a "cultural gap" or misunderstanding as opposed to a political problem), the Jerusalem Foundation became one of Meditran's principal financial supporters shortly after receiving the legal status of an “Ottoman (social) Society” from the state.\textsuperscript{139} In its favor was also the fact that Meditran's presence along the seam line (from Prophet's Street to central Musrara) was important towards the gradual transformation of the city center into an embodiment of Israeli multi-culturalism and its consumption by Jews, Arabs, and tourists alike. Although Meditran was officially declared to be a public, non-political body, during the 1973 municipal elections members of Meditran offered their support for Teddy Kollek as an individual while criticizing his party's overall record in East Jerusalem (notably the level of taxes in East Jerusalem, the use of Hebrew as opposed to Arabic in municipal correspondence, and a lack of technical schools and teacher's training institutions in the area).\textsuperscript{140} Meditran also hosted lectures devoted to the idea of transforming Jerusalem into a network of boroughs; a policy favored by Teddy Kollek as well as other independent candidates.

\textsuperscript{138} Meditran, "Report on North American Trip--6 January-6 March 1971," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.

\textsuperscript{139} Letter from Lev Schwartz to Shmuel Toledano, April 1 1973, ISA 17081/3 GL. It is not altogether clear when this occurred but Meditran newsletters indicate that the Foundation began financially supporting the organization as early as 1972. In correspondence with Toledano, Schwartz claims that financial support from the Foundation followed official recognition from the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs.

\textsuperscript{140} Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "In the Opinion of Meditran," March 8 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
in the 1973 municipal election such as Uri Huppert.\footnote{Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "Boroughs for Jerusalem," Summer 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL. The idea of Jerusalem as a set of boroughs proposes that the city be cut into 10 separate quarters along ethnic-religious lines. Each borough would elect a representative to serve on a Central Borough Council, which would then elect an Arab Deputy, while the Mayor would be elected by popular vote. The Borough would play a role in setting tax rates and having a say in city planning and local, religious affairs.} The affinity felt towards Kollek and his vision for Jerusalem helped secure funds from the Jerusalem Foundation by 1972-1973.\footnote{Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "Jerusalem Counselors," June 20 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL}

Upon securing initial financial support from private local donors, North American colleagues, and (soon after) the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, Meditran officially made its debut with a Passover celebration on April 17 1971 in Beit Hillel, West Jerusalem.\footnote{Correspondence between Mordechai Ben-Haim of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and Max Nurock of the Foreign Office, September 6 1971, ISA 17081/3 GL. From January to March 1971, Schwartz visited both Canada and the United States to secure funding for his initiative. See "Report on North American Trip--6 January-6 March 1971," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL} According to Meditran's newsletters, approximately one hundred people gathered to celebrate in "the spirit of Maimouna, the North African tradition by which Arabs bring their closest Jewish friends delicacies of food and drink to ease the ending of Passover."\footnote{Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "Meditran's Debut," 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL} Tables were set in Beit Hillel with sweets and matzah cakes while Palestinian musicians from the Old City as well as a dance troupe from Shu'fat performed classical songs and folk dances. Despite the festive atmosphere described by Schwartz, the organization initially maintained a low public profile, with activities limited to symbolic gestures and small public celebrations and gatherings before starting its official newsletter in the later months of 1973.\footnote{Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem Meditran Newsletter, May 24 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL} In the first five months of its existence, depending solely on personal networking, limited press coverage, and word-of-mouth, the organization gained fifty official members and (according to the organization), anywhere between 30-170 people attended their public gatherings and lectures each week.\footnote{Meditran was featured in short, largely biographical pieces in several Hebrew and Arabic-language Israeli newspapers in the early 1970s. "Meditran," Jerusalem Post, August 22, 1971; "Id al-Fitr," Jerusalem Post, November 19, 1971; "Arab-Jewish Friendship," al-Anba', December 8, 1971; "Meditran," al-Anba', February 2, 1972; "Id el-Adha," Haaretz, January 1972. All found in ISA 17081/3 GL.} Attendees were mainly of Israeli Jews but also included Arab, Greek, and Armenian Jerusalemites.\footnote{Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "Meditran's Organizational Meeting: 14 September 1971," September 14 1971, ISA 17081/3 GL.}
Although the insistence on maintaining a low profile can be explained in part by the fact that Meditran was one of the first organizations of its kind in the city and surrounding region (after the Sisters of Zion Arab-Jewish ulpan in the Old City and Neve Shalom), Schwartz also felt vulnerable due to popular opposition in East Jerusalem to normalization measures initiated or supported by Israelis. What is more, the organization was not initially trusted to be a “non-political” organization, leading to suspicions from figures attached to the Prime Minister's Office (particularly the Foreign Office) regarding the objectives of the association. It was not until the autumn of 1971, when the Advisor on Arab Affairs vouched for Schwartz and assured the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister that their objectives were in line with Toledano's general policy towards Arabs under Israeli control, that initial suspicions were calmed (although even the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs, with the exception of Toledano, were skeptical that Meditran could succeed in a city like Jerusalem). The organization was also limited in terms of funding until 1972-1973, when Meditran secured donations from the Jerusalem Foundation, the World Council of Churches, the Israeli Ministry of Religion, the American Jewish Committee and additional sectors attached to the Prime Minister's office. As a result, the organization was restricted to occasional public gatherings (namely celebrations for religious holidays) and visits to Arab and Jewish homes in Jerusalem, poetry readings, folk performances, and small-scale events.

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148 Tleel, 229-230. The Ulpan was initiated at the Sisters of Zion convent shortly after the 1967 in partnership with the Martin Buber Center and the Adult Education Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Ulpan was both a school of languages as well as a center for "promoting Arab-Jewish understanding."


150 Telegram from Max Nurock to Shmuel Toledano, August 8 1971, ISA 17081/3. Max Nurock was associated with the Foreign Office in Jerusalem and served as the Israeli consul-general to Australia. He would also serve as Israel's first Ambassador to Australia. In the letter, Nurock says that although the stated aims of the organization are to be encouraged, he asks whether "the sponsors and organizers (of Meditran) deserve encouragement, and if so, in what form."

151 Correspondence between Mordechai Ben-Haim of the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs to Max Nurock of the Foreign Office, September 6, 1971, ISA 17081/3 GL. By 1973, Nurock would himself donate funds to the organization. See Meditran Fundraising Campaign, "Sadiqi al-'Aziz!," 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.

152 Letter from Lev Schwartz to Shmuel Toledano, April 1 1973, ISA 17081/3 GL; "Organization for the Encouragement of cultural and social relations in Jerusalem," April 21 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
social and cultural activities such as tours to Muslim, Christian and Jewish holy sites in the city.\textsuperscript{153}

Increased funding by the spring of 1972 helped the organization to establish its offices on 18 Prophets St. just north of Damascus gate and bordering Musrara along the former “no man's land.”\textsuperscript{154} Musrara was targeted by the organization, as well as the area surrounding the Rockefeller Museum in East Jerusalem, on account of the fact that Meditran needed an office that was conveniently located and accessible to Palestinians, Jews, and international visitors.\textsuperscript{155} Musrara was particularly coveted, however, as Schwartz saw the restored Mandelbaum gate area as particularly symbolic for efforts towards unification and cross-cultural understanding.\textsuperscript{156} With the help of the Israel Lands Authority as well as the East Jerusalem Office of the Municipality,\textsuperscript{157} Meditran moved into the area of Musrara (later, by 1974, the organization moved to a larger space in central Musrara on Ha Ayin Chet St.) and subsequently Meditran began to print its own monthly newsletter. As such, the public profile of the organization was raised, allowing for Meditran to extend its activities. By 1973, Meditran was hosting its own Arabic-Hebrew \textit{ulpan} (language classes), lectures on the cultures of Jerusalem, the history of Israel and the Arab world, Arab customs and heritage, as well as Islam, Christianity and Judaism.\textsuperscript{158}

By mid-1972 to early 1973, with an increased public profile and additional funding, membership in the organization rose to 200 members.\textsuperscript{159} As a result, Meditran was able to extend its networks throughout East Jerusalem and the West Bank, establishing contacts with the Tantur Ecumenical Institute near Bethlehem and educational institutions in Sur Baher and Abu Dis.


\textsuperscript{154} Meditran was forced to vacate its offices at Beit Hillel in May 1972 as a result of issues regarding rent. Letter from Lev Schwartz to members of the Meditran prospective member list, April 6 1972, ISA 17081/3 GL.

\textsuperscript{155} Letter from Lev Schwartz to Aluf Zorea and the Israel Lands Authority, May 17 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.

\textsuperscript{156} Lev Schwartz, Meditran update for mailing list, October 21 1973, ISA 17081/3 GL.

\textsuperscript{157} Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem "Jerusalem Counselors," June 20 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.

\textsuperscript{158} Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem "Arabic-Hebrew Ulpanim," Spring 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.

\textsuperscript{159} Debbie Dunn, "People Can Get Along Better Than Governments," \textit{The Kansas City Jewish Chronicle}, July 12 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL. According to government documents, membership rose as high as 400 people by the spring of 1974. See "Organization for the Encouragement of cultural and social relations in Jerusalem," April 21 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
Meditran also formed a business partnership with Arab Jerusalemite merchants.\(^{160}\) As a result, Meditran offered a richer roster of activities with a wider geographical scope, including:

- Arab-Jewish exchange visits (what the organization referred to as "cultural archaeology"); where Meditran members visit homes throughout Jerusalem
- Weekly open house sessions
- Tours and excursions both inside and outside of Jerusalem
- Additional lectures on Israel, Islam and the "Arab world;" featuring locals as guest lecturers
- Special guest lectures with public officials, including Shmuel Toledano and the Palestinian mayor of al-‘Eizariya, Mahmund Abu Re‘esh; "Get to know Jerusalem’s leaders” lecture series initiated.
- A "kibbutz exchange" with residents of kibbutzim and representatives of Givat Haviva’s Institute for Arabic Studies.
- Joint Succoth-Ramadan celebrations
- Film screenings
- Participation in international conference dealing with issues pertaining to Jerusalem
- An Israel-Cyprus association
- Day trips to al-Jalil (the Galilee)
- Delegation of members visiting Arab and Jewish institutions with gift packages (such as the "Club for the Blind" in Kiryat Moshe and the "Home for the Crippled" in al-‘Eizariya
- Sponsoring an Arab Culture Club at the Hebrew University in partnership with the Israeli branch of the United Synagogue of America and the Hebrew University school for overseas students.
- Formation of a standing committee with the Anglican Archbishop of Jerusalem

The increase in activities, membership, and institutional connections even emboldened members of Meditran to create a political advocacy group referred to as The Jerusalem Counselors.

\(^{160}\) Meditran mailing list update sent from Schwartz to Toledano, April 1 1973, ISA 17081/3 GL; Letter from Lev Schwartz to members of the Meditran “prospective member list,” April 6 1972, ISA 17081/3 GL. According to Schwartz, through a mutual connection Meditran worked out a prospective deal with merchants and professional associations, where Meditran and its members would be offered discounts on goods and services as well as a modest contribution to the center itself, provided needed services were to go through them exclusively. Schwartz referred to this business deal as "the Meditran Merchant-Consumer Association."
1973. Aside from acting as an internal directorial body, the group was set up as “a channel for citizen complaints and suggestions on how to...strengthen democratic expression in Jerusalem, raise mutual confidence, and improve the quality of life.” In effect, the Counselors were a lobbying group that acted on “mutually agreed upon” directives. The Counselors would contact officials working within the Municipality and follow up with volunteer action and media coverage. It is important to note, however, that the only directives accepted by the Counselors appeared to have been those who were accommodating to the political-institutional status quo in post-1967 Jerusalem. The Counselors did not accept delegitimization of the Municipality and Israeli rule in the city but rather reform and advocacy for increased Palestinian participation in municipal, institutional life.

The year 1973 proved to be a watershed one for the organization. Not only did Meditran receive news of its imminent relocation to Ha A'yin Chet St. in central Musrara, but according to Schwartz the October war between Israel, Egypt, and Syria nearly tore the organization apart. Tensions and suspicions in the city, as well as in the organization, were at an all-time high to the point where members of Meditran feared reprisals. In a letter to the Israel Land's Authority, Schwartz admitted that "recent events have made the challenge (of improving relations between Jerusalemites) even more difficult...But somehow, we must persevere; somehow, we must be stronger then (sic) those who oppose us." Amidst the increased social tensions that gripped the city with the October war, Meditran decided that the best way to persevere was to embark on their boldest and most public project yet: donating their blood to Syrian, Egyptian, Iraqi and Israeli prisoners of war. On November 13, 1973, approximately forty members and affiliates of Meditran gathered in the Old City to donate blood for the six hundred or so wounded Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian and Israeli soldiers being held inside and outside of Israel/Palestine. In

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161 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "News and Notes on Meditran Members," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.
162 Debbie Dunn, "People Can Get Along Better Than Governments," The Kansas City Jewish Chronicle, July 12 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
163 Ibid.
164 Letter from Lev Schwartz to the Prime Minister's Office, January 21 1975, ISA 17081/3 GL.
165 Letter from Lev Schwartz to Aluf Zorea of the Israel Land's Authority, May 17 1974, ISA 17081/3 GL.
166 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem "Sharing of Life," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL. Other documents suggest that the number of soldiers held was more around 750. "Wounded Syrians Egyptians and Israelis Given Gefts (sic) by Israeli, Palestinian and International Members of Jerusalem Group," Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.
addition, visiting teams from Meditran collected funds and gifts from private individuals, ecclesiastical authorities, and businesses/professional associations in East Jerusalem; including hand-engraved copies of the Qur'an as well as bibles, magazines, toiletries, and puzzles.167 Through Schwartz's connections to the Prime Minister's Office, a special delegation made up of eight members from Meditran became the first public body to be allowed direct access to Arab PoW's held in two government hospitals in Tel Aviv on December 21, 1973.168 As for Israeli soldiers held in Arab states, Schwartz was able to make a deal with the International Red Cross in Nicosia, Cyprus to have their donated blood delivered prior an upcoming prisoner exchange in late 1973. This deal, however, fell apart as the Red Cross failed to gain the permission of Syrian authorities for the exchange.169

Although members recall initial “surprised,” “hostile” and “difficult” reactions from the nineteen Arab POWs they were able to visit, Meditran capitalized on the press coverage surrounding the gesture in order to deliver the message that “good relations prevail in Jerusalem,” thereby demonstrating that despite an atmosphere of war peaceful relations can exist between Arabs and Jews.170 The press junket was also used to glorify Israeli humanitarianism and to illustrate internationally that it is the Arab governments, first and foremost, who are responsible for the lack of peace in the region. Indeed, in an interview with the Jerusalem Post, Schwartz chastised the Syrian government while hailing Israeli authorities for treating Arab PoWs “not as enemies but simply as human beings.” Despite the reality that the men visited were prisoners of the state, Meditran hoped to show that Israel as a nation was committed to a “deeply humanitarian attitude towards their fellow men.”171

Although the PoW campaign raised the public profile of the group on a national level, by 1976 all traces of the organization had vanished from the record and Schwartz himself allegedly

167 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem, "Wounded Syrians Egyptians and Israelis Given Gefts (sic) by Israeli, Palestinian and International Members of Jerusalem Group," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.
168 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations in Jerusalem Meditran newsletter, undated ISA 17081/3 GL.
169 George Leonof, "Enemy Prisoners and Human Beings," The Jerusalem Post, Friday December 28 1973, 11. Meditran members then sought to deliver donations to Israeli PoWs through ecclesiastical circles in Damascus. The outcome of this gesture is not preserved in the surviving records available.
170 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations, Meditran and the December 1973 PoW campaign, undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.
171 George Leonof, "Enemy Prisoners and Human Beings," The Jerusalem Post, Friday December 28 1973, 11
moved out from the city. The reasons for Meditran’s collapse are uncertain and in part subject to speculation. Meditran's newsletter and communications indicate that Palestinian Jerusalemites were overwhelmingly approached by Israelis with a mixture of suspicion and hostility; perceived not as neighbors with legitimate historical claims but rather as rival claimants to Israel's most coveted and symbolic city. The October 1973 war appears to have strengthened these convictions, as Meditran's own communications acknowledge a greater sense of hostility towards Palestinians. As for Palestinian Jerusalemites, it is clear that some members, and most non-members who were aware of the organizations existence, were (or became) either apathetic or dismissive of its declared goals and political orientation, which sought Palestinian integration while refusing to address questions of justice, rights, and land confiscation in East Jerusalem. According to one former participant in Meditran's activities, "co-existence" initiatives were viewed as tools to facilitate the occupation in the city or a means to force Palestinians to “swallow the pill” of Israeli rule while dismissing or ignoring the tensions boiling under the surface. It may also be that the 1973 war and the advances made by the Egyptian military revived the hope of an imminent liberation amongst Palestinian Jerusalemites. According to Gerald Caplan's ethnographic work as well as to John Tleel, a former participant in Meditran activities, the hope that the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem was temporary gradually dissipated following the 1970 truce between Egypt and Israel that ended the war of attrition. This feeling of overall helplessness initially caused many to seek a variety of avenues to survive and gain some level of comfort and belonging in the city. The widespread interpretation of an Egyptian victory during the 1973 war in the Arab world, however, reinvigorated the hope for liberation in the near future and rendered integration activities ultimately meaningless.

Much like the Jerusalem Foundation and Kollek's administration of the city more generally, Meditran's goals were inherently contradictory. While Meditran was officially an “apolitical” body, its founder Lev Schwartz was committed to what he referred to as the “rebirth of Israel” in Jerusalem after the 1967 war, going so far as to support American campaigns to

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172 Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.
173 Ibid.
175 Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations, "Meditran Manifesto," undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.
promote *aliya* (or "immigration") among Jewish Americans in Boston, New York and Washington.\textsuperscript{176} What is more, while the "Jerusalem Counselors" of Meditran functioned as a lobby/protest group for members of the organization, they did not articulate demands for political transformation of (or liberation from) the colonial order. Rather, they were concerned with how to more *effectively* and humanely integrate and pacify an occupied population. In other words, Meditran complemented municipal goals in the city by seeking bi-culturalism while supporting Zionist aims and claims in the city. Meditran's fundamentally Zionist commitments were simply alienating (or became alienating) for many of Jerusalem's Palestinian residents.

However, while Meditran's registered membership was composed of mainly Israeli Jews and Internationals, Palestinian Jerusalemites served on the board of advisors and many participated in Meditran's activities throughout the city. What can best explain Palestinian participation in the organization, despite a general feeling of apathy and/or hostility to Meditran and its affiliation to Israeli governing institutions? Meditran's own publications show that its two most high-profile members, Salim Nammari and Wajeh Nusseibeh, certainly believed that political change could only occur from the ground-up. In the absence of organized, unified political leadership in the city among Palestinians and inaction (or ineffectiveness) on the part of neighboring Arab governments prior to the October 1973 war, board members believed that building a better society had to start beyond politics and through face-to-face encounters with Israeli citizens and Jerusalem residents more generally. Indeed, with members visiting Palestinian homes and hosting guest lecturers on topics pertinent to Palestinian culture and politics, Israeli members were exposed to narratives of identity, history, and belonging in Jerusalem that were otherwise suppressed by Israeli nationalist discourses.\textsuperscript{177} What is more, although Meditran adopted a sectarian discourse vis-a-vis Palestinian Jerusalemites in its early years (referring to Jerusalemites in religious terms), later records dated to 1973-1974 show that the organization began to refer to non-Jewish Jerusalemites collectively as Palestinians. This may illustrate a greater assertion among Palestinian members to adopt a more inclusive terminology, thereby recognizing collective claims to the city on the part of East Jerusalemites.

\textsuperscript{176} Lev Schwartz, Report on 1971 North American funding campaign, undated, ISA 17081/3 GL.

\textsuperscript{177} Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.
In the absence of distinctly Palestinian institutions in the city, this in itself may have served as an attractive quality for some.

Although the affiliations and connections that existed between Meditran, the State and the Municipality were a basis of dismissal or mistrust for many Palestinian Jerusalemites, others appear to have seen these connections as a way to protect their land from seizure and to more effectively achieve individual goals in an often uncompromising, colonial context. For example, Israeli government documents reveal how one Palestinian man from Jabel Mukaber channelled Schwartz's connections to the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs and the Israel Land Authority in order to schedule a meeting to re-gain legal claim to his ancestral land lost to the state following the 1967 war. The issue is narrated in a hand-delivered letter from the resident of Jabel Mukaber to the Advisor on Arab Affairs and dated May 22, 1972. In the letter, the resident appeals to Shmuel Toledano to “help correct a wrong that has been done (to) my family” and requests his assistance upon recounting his story of dispossession:

Someone, not from our parts, stole his way into our house situated on Mount Mukaber, in a forceful manner. Moreover, each time we approached the house, he threatened us with a revolver, including our womenfolk. We would like him removed.

My family....has resided on Mount Mukaber for generations....all branches and individuals of the family have maintained traditional residence on this area. My father...registered our lands on Mount Mukaber from the time of the Ottoman administration. In the presence of the Mukhtars, he bequeathed the land to his sons...

The house mentioned above was in fact built by the hands of my father and his three sons, of whom I am one. The house was completed in 1936 and continuous residence was maintained thereafter by my father, brothers and myself.

In 1948, when the conflict broke out, the house was caught in the crossfire. Shells scored a direct hit on the house. All of the family was forced to flee. Meanwhile, other members of the....families, who lived in houses out of the line of fire, kept watch on the house for us. From 1948, our house and all our lands surrounding it were under "no man's land" jurisdiction. This fact can be attested to by consulting Map 2, Annex I of United Nations' Security Council document (1902?) (Rev. 1) of April, 1956.

In 1951, Israeli sentries made their way into the house and used it as a guard post. Protests were filed with the U.N. Mixed Armistice Commission, the Jordanian side then being represented by Muhamed Daud. Notwithstanding the submission
of this and additional complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission, the Israeli sentries stayed on.

On several occasions, my cousin...tried to visit the house and determine its condition. Each time, he was met with rifle shots by the sentries.

In 1967, after the Six-Day Siege, my brother...returned to the house to ensure that in fact it had been vacated by the sentries. His inspection revealed that in fact it had been vacated by the sentries. His inspection revealed that the house had been badly bruised inside and out. The extent of the damage was disheartening requiring more money for repairs and restoration than my brothers and I were able to afford.

It was, in fact, while we were inquiring about a loan of money to put in the house into liveable condition for our three families, that the aforementioned person stole into the house...this occupant (whose name was later revealed as Zeev Ram) even pulled the pistol on women members of the family that approached anywhere near the house or even the public road above the house.

Frightened by this repeated usage of force, I went to seek assistance from a lawyer in West Jerusalem, who led me to believe that this intruder would be removed from my house and everything restored to me and my family as it was before the war. Each time I visited the lawyer, he gave me another story and fresh hope.

In this way, time passed while my family was deprived usage of the house. Part of the family was forced to live in an extension of a cave nearby, while this one man lived in a house designed for three families. Despite these conditions, our family continued to farm the lands, prune the trees and nourish the soil as best as we could and as close to the house as Mr. Ram's revolver would permit us...

But, we try not to let such experiences embitter us. Our family wants to live in peace, and, if possible, develop good relations between Arabs and Jews. My son...is a member of an organization called Meditran, which tries to improve cultural relations between all groups in Jerusalem...he explained to me that this organization needs new quarters...my son...proposed to me and my brothers that we share the house with Meditran. My brothers and I have discussed this proposal, and we have decided that in the name of good relations we would be willing to turn over the entire upper story to Meditran.

We hope that this will encourage other members of our families throughout Mount Mukaber to participate in the widening of Arab-Jewish communal relations. My brothers and I also hope that this spirit of good will is reciprocated by the Government of Israel. A good action on your part would resound throughout our families...\(^{178}\)

\(^{178}\) Letter addressed to Shmuel Toledano, May 22 1972, ISA 17081/3 GL.
From the letter we can gather that out of frustration of multiple and failed attempts to secure state recognition of family ownership over their home and lands, the family appealed directly to Meditran as a means to provoke greater interest on the part of the government in their case. Four days later, in the absence of a prompt response the resident from Jabel Mukaber solicited the help of Schwartz to personally schedule a meeting between the family and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. In a letter from Schwartz to Toledano dated May 26, 1972, Schwartz writes:

Dear Shmuel Toledano,

(the resident) informed me about writing you for your assistance in restoring full usage of his house and lands to him and his family. As convenor of Meditran, I should like to add our support...for a successful and expeditious resolution of his situation.

You are well aware of our need for an appropriate center and indeed all of us in Meditran appreciate Uri's efforts in helping us and are impressed both by his sincerity and seriousness. While the place offered us in Armon Hanatziv would be difficult to convert into a center (because of its inaccessibility to transportation), it would be a symbol for all the depth of warm relations that has been achieved between Arabs and Jews…

It would appear that the family in question decided to offer the top story of their home for the offices of Meditran in exchange for using Schwartz's connections so as to gain a meeting with the Office of Arab Affairs. Although Schwartz would ultimately reject the offer of moving to Jabel Mukaber (or as he refers to the area, Armon Hanatziv) for the more symbolic and accessible Musrara, the gesture was enough to entice him to act. It would also appear that Schwartz's intervention worked. Only days later, in a letter dated June 4, 1972 and addressed to the family in Jabel Mukaber, the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs proposed a meeting between Uri Mor, then a junior assistant to Shmuel Toledano, and the family from Jabel Mukaber for June 11 1972. The gesture would be reciprocated in March 1973, when a member

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179 Letter from Lev Schwartz to Shmuel Toledano, May 26 1972, ISA 17081/3 GL.
180 "Maqabala" (meeting), June 4 1972, ISA 17081/3 GL.
of the family was featured as a guest lecturer at Meditran to speak to the membership on “the origins of Islam” and its meaning in the city of Jerusalem.\footnote{Meditran: Association for the Enhancement of Cultural and Social Relations, “Programs and Activities,” September 1972, ISA 17081/3 GL. Whether or not the land was returned to its owners is not addressed in the records.}

5.4 Israeli Co-Existence Institutions as Spaces of Enunciation

“\textit{Stories matter. Many stories matter. Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign, but stories can also be used to empower and to humanize. Stories can break the dignity of a people, but stories can also repair that broken dignity.}\textquote{182}

\textit{--Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie}

The motivations behind Palestinian participation in co-existence activities and institutions are complex and varied, to be sure. In order to come to a greater understanding of this phenomenon, it is necessary to seek out former participants. One such former participant was Dr. John N. Tleel; a Greek-Palestinian author and retired dental surgeon who has spent most of his life in Musrara and the Christian quarter of the Old City in Jerusalem. A cousin of the former deputy mayor of Jordanian Jerusalem, John Tleel is a Palestinian refugee from 1948 and a witness to the 1967 occupation of East Jerusalem. Tleel was also active in some of the first co-existence institutions established in the city after the 1967 occupation.

Immediately following the June 1967 war, the Convent of the Sisters of Zion in the Old City, which prior to the war was an elite girl's school, was transformed into an institution “for building bridges between Arabs and Jews.”\footnote{\textquote{\textit{Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie: ‘The Danger of a Single Story,’” TEDGlobal, July 2009, accessed January 3 2016, http://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story.}}\textquote{183} Together with Kalman Yaron of the Martin Buber Center and the Adult Education Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Sisters established the first Arabic-Hebrew \textit{ulpan} in post-1967 Jerusalem, hosting evening classes twice a week for both Palestinians and Jews while also organizing tours and joint social activities

\textquote{\textit{Tleel, 229. According to Tleel, the Sisters of Zion were able to open the first \textit{ulpan} immediately following the 1967 war due to their Zionist orientation and willingness to work with municipal officials on “social issues” in the city. Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.}}\textquote{183}
throughout Israel and the 1967 Territories. Tleel joined the ulpan in 1968, despite initial reservations, and remained until 1971 as a student, the chairman of the Hebrew-Arabic Ulpan Students' Committee, and contributor to the Ulpan's publication, Akhwa/Ukhwa (Brotherhood). In addition, Tleel was a colleague of Lev Schwartz and remembers fondly their friendship as well as his participation in various Meditran activities. In fact, in 1971, on the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, Schwartz hosted a party in Tleel's honor. From then on, Tleel was a regular participant in Meditran's activities until 1974.

In August 2013, I visited Tleel's residence in the Christian quarter of the Old City. Having exchanged words on the telephone only days earlier, Tleel anticipated my questions regarding his participation in co-existence organizations following the 1967 war. Thus, upon my arrival he promptly sat me down in his living room and presented to me a book published in 1987 entitled Jerusalem: City of the Ages. The book is an out-of-print collection of essays on Jerusalem published by the American Academic Association for Peace and edited by Dr. Alice L. Eckhardt (at the time a Professor of Religious Studies at Lehigh University, Pennsylvania). Eckhardt and Tleel first met when Eckhardt and her partner, Roy, were invited to speak at the ulpan in 1971. This encounter led to “an acquaintance characterized by mutual respect” and, eventually, academic collaboration. Tleel immediately earmarked two essays featured in the book: one by Teddy Kollek and the other by Tleel himself, entitled “The Meaning of Jerusalem to Christians.” It was then that Tleel smiled and with great excitement stated: “you see, this is one of the few great things about (organizations like) the ulpan. Here we have voices of the indigenous and occupied peoples of Jerusalem in the same book as Teddy Kollek!”

The significance of Tleel's comment was not immediately apparent to me. Luckily, he took the time to elaborate. Tleel first explained that a principal motivation for him as well as his Palestinian colleagues to attend the ulpan and ally with organizations like Meditran, Neve Shalom, and the Israel Interfaith Committee was not necessarily out of acceptance of the status quo. Surey for some it was motivated by a desire to integrate while for others it was a means to convince Israelis on an individual level to act against their government (“instead of them

184 Ibid., 230.
185 Ibid.
186 Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.
187 Tleel, 233.
changing us, there was the opposite possibility: we can change them”). However, according to Tleel the primary reasoning behind joining such organizations was the result of an impulse to survive in an occupied city and to assert a sense of collective belonging and history to a state that sought its eradication. To provide context, Tleel argues that the early 1970s were a time when many Palestinians within the city were expecting either the United Nations or neighboring Arab states to intervene (militarily or otherwise) and compel Israel to push itself back to the boundaries in place prior to 1967. Indeed, “there was no single master in Jerusalem, and the same is true today,” Tleel explained. “Israel, Jordan, The United Nations, the European Union, the United States...they all have political influence in the city...so we believed the occupation was temporary. Conquerors come and go...they will get burned and, as always, we will remain.”189 In the meantime, it was important for Palestinians to learn the Hebrew language. For some, it was to prepare for employment in the city, particularly in municipal/governing institutions, while for others it was to simply carry on with their day to day lives. “I was a dentist,” explained Tleel, and “Hebrew was necessary for business and day-to-day interactions. You don't want to feel illiterate or isolated in your own city!”190 Thus, the imperative was to adjust to an ethno-centric order and to find ways to survive until the right conditions were set for national liberation.

Tleel then returned to his point about the publication, which he used to explain his primary motivation for participating in joint Arab-Jewish institutions and ventures. “It was known that such organizations and activities existed to facilitate the occupation, to help us swallow the pill. They thought they could fool us... but they failed to see the tensions boiling under the surface.”191 Indeed, in his self-published memoir Tleel writes that “under the fresh climate of the Israeli occupation and mixed with our Arab-Jordanian-Palestinian national feelings,” participation was often difficult. For many “as time passed they were compelled by the circumstances and the uncompromising behavior of the Israelis to change into hardliners.”192 However, for Tleel such organizations were nonetheless important not only because they were a means to learn a language and survive under the existing conditions but because it “provided an

188 Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Tleel, 231.
avenue through which we can assert ourselves.” In other words, in the absence of organized Palestinian-Arab national institutions in the city, it became the responsibility of individuals to “refuse to put our heads down while they occupy and take away land.”193 For Palestinians, organizations like the ulpan, Neve Shalom and Meditran, despite their public pronouncements and official positions vis-a-vis the occupation, provided an avenue through which Palestinians could “air grievances;” to remind Israelis that “we're still here, it's not over...don't be too comfortable...(Meditran) wanted to know and understand us on a cultural level. What they learned was that we had political claims, that we were not aliens.”194

In his book I am Jerusalem, Tleel elaborates on this point, writing briefly on the importance of Arab-Jewish social forums and its political utility. Referring specifically to the Sisters of Zion ulpan, notably their sponsored tours and excursions, Tleel writes:

the social activities on the side constituted the part that was most interesting and beneficial, forming a forum for free discussions and a center for human encounters. Although the program clearly served the Israeli agenda, there was still room for some democratic maneuverability. I used to have a feeling of gratification when on certain occasions, I— as well as other classmates could raise our voices and let out our grievances— this applied mostly to the occupation and the prevailing political situation.

Once we were on a tour of the North and the Golan Heights, organized by the Ulpan's administration. We enjoyed the excursion until we reached the Syrian city of Kuneitra. It was not easy to visit Kuneitra but the Ulpan had obtained special permission. The deserted city had been totally bombed from the air, and the Israeli Air Force pilots had used all their professionalism not to leave one alone standing upright during the 1967 war. The sight was so terrible that it aroused strong feelings of resentment on the Arab students' side. After that experience, the atmosphere and the mood changed for the duration of the excursion and for quite some time after that. Our Hebrew teachers and the organizers of the trip, sensing the Arab students' collective stance, were unable to look us in the face. These kinds of impressions and experiences usually remain deeply engraved in our minds. 195

Therein lies the significance of Tleel's gesture. Despite high-profile Israeli figures like Kollek asserting the legitimacy of Israeli domination of Jerusalem through an exclusivist, nationalist

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193 Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.
194 Ibid.
195 Tleel, 231.
historical narrative, through the same book Tleel and other Palestinian writers were able to offer counter-narratives through co-existence institutions, both vocally and in writing, in saying that “(Jerusalem) is not your city!” For Tleel, the fact that through these initiatives he was able to proclaim Palestinian existence, political aspirations and entitlement to the city on the same pages as Kollek was a symbolic victory; a victory that unsettled the institutionalized narrative of Palestinian Jerusalemites as a passive, insular, and depoliticized minority. “For (many) Israelis,” Tleel adds, “cultural exchange groups were for publicity” and to feel better about the political conditions in which they found themselves.196 For many Palestinians, however, it was about pointing out the limits of political community and social unity in the Israeli imagination; it was about creating a space for the assertion of contesting political claims.

Organizations such as Meditran and the reconstitution of Musrara as both a symbol and space for co-existence and interaction illustrate the use of culture and co-existence as an epistemological framework and organizing principle among ordinary Israeli citizens and municipal functionaries; an inscription that acts as a “technology of control” that is deployed simultaneously with the direct, sovereign violence of colonial militaries and institutions to negate, pacify, and depoliticize colonized subjects while governing collective political aspirations.197 The purpose of co-existence initiatives and urban planning was to determine the limits of identity and political subjectivity among Palestinian residents. However, the failure of these organizations to recognize actual historical, political, and social realities and address questions of justice led to the seizure of these spaces in ways that undermined co-existence as an art of government and social engineering in Jerusalem.

To be sure, emphasizing instances where Palestinians creatively adapt to situations of oppression or deploy diverse subtle and surreptitious forms of protest in the city should not shift focus away from the asymmetrical relationship that nonetheless exists between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem, however much these actions may force adjustment on the part of occupiers. As Salim Tamari insists, such acts “will never accumulate to real qualitative improvements. The problem has to do with the helplessness of ordinary people against a colonial system that creates

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196 Interview with John Tleel, August 23 2013.
197 Jabri, 45.
a regime of discrimination.” However, the purpose of this section is not to romanticize Palestinian steadfastness and gestures of contestation or even to claim that collective, qualitative improvements resulted from participation in such institutions (although one can make this claim in individual cases, as seen in the relationship between the family in Jabel Mukaber and Lev Schwartz). Rather, the purpose is to highlight how Palestinian residents of Jerusalem claimed and shaped their own narratives, identities, and political subjectivities through these institutions while asserting a “right to politics” and articulating a collective presence without (directly) entering the realm of colonial institutional arrangements and in a structural and ideological environment that sought to deny or suppress such claims. Vivienne Jabri’s work on postcolonial agency and resistance appears pertinent to these issues. In the book *The Postcolonial Subject*, Jabri’s chapter on “resistance as the claim to the political” centers on a late modern articulation of resistance she refers to as claiming “the right to politics,” which Jabri argues is the distinct and creative means towards “re-capturing the political” and re-shaping the limits of political community among contemporary postcolonial populations. To be sure, Palestinians are not living in a "postcolonial" moment like neighboring Arab states but rather remain in a settler-colonial/anti-colonial moment, in that Palestinians have not gone beyond the stage of a successful struggle for national liberation. As such, the analysis has its limitations in this spatial and temporal context. However, Jabri’s conception of presence as a core to political action and resistance and "the right to politics" as an "enunciated move" or moment of declarative intervention to re-shape political horizons as opposed to integration into the realm of existing institutional arrangements, is relevant insofar that it captures Palestinian engagement with colonial institutions as discussed in the previous section and will be further elaborated in the following section on Bet David/Wadi Joz Community Center.

In conceptualizing late modern postcolonial resistance as a declaration or claim to the political, Jabri is careful not to interpret such a declaration and related claims in a liberal, “positivistic, legal sense, suggestive of the institutional arrangements that enable citizens to express their views, variously through regular elections and a public sphere of deliberation.”

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199 Jabri, 59.
Instead, following Etienne Balibar Jabri suggests that it is an “enunciated move, one that makes a declaration claiming a presence in the space of the political.”200 For Jabri the political is distinct from politics. Whereas politics denotes a realm of institutional, juridical arrangements, the political is the realm of contested claims; of agonism and antagonism, all moves “suggestive of a 'declaration' or an 'enunciation' and hence action.”201 To claim the political, then, is not to be understood in a Westphalian sense or as a claim to discursive and juridical-political institutional arrangements as they exist. The political is instead constituted by a declarative, oppositional, and imaginative gesture; an autonomous re-inscription of self and community which seeks to challenge the limits of any particular discursive and juridical-political (in this case, colonial) order.

Again, Jabri is engaging specifically with postcolonial orders and how such enunciation or claims to the political can serve as harbingers of a new body politic while working to redeem the potentialities of anti-colonial struggles and contestations long since suppressed by postcolonial orders.202 However, despite a differing temporality and structural/historical context to Jabri's analysis, the act of enunciation; or “steeping out” of (however symbolically) oppressive discursive and political arrangements is nonetheless applicable to the context of colonial Jerusalem and Palestinian engagement with institutions associated with the Israeli Municipality. Palestinian participation in Zionist co-existence institutions (and, as we will see in the following section, their transformation from joint institutional projects into distinctly Palestinian or Arab institutions) may not constitute “foundational moments of postcoloniality” and if the focus is on structural results, Palestinian participation cannot be claimed to be a successful model in itself for anti-colonial resistance.203 However, it can be understood and appreciated nonetheless as a means of asserting and re-constituting the meaning of collective/individual identities, histories, community, and rights in a colonial city. Whether by directly addressing the shortcomings of co-existence institutions and initiatives, as in the case of Tleel and his colleagues, or by sharing individual and collectives stories and histories through Meditran's weekly tours, lectures, and joint activities with Israelis, as a series of acts, however fragmentary, these gestures constitute...

200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid., 68.
203 Ibid.
moments of political emergence and a declaration and reconstitution of history and the present, which carry in themselves the potential for political contestation and structural adjustment (if not transformation).

While Jabri is careful to distinguish between politics and the political, there is nonetheless an intersection between the two, as action (or enunciation) is “always constitutively related to what we might refer to as ‘spaces of the political.’”\textsuperscript{204} In other words, there is always a spatial/material element to enunciation, which is itself constituted by it, and acts as a landscape for its circulation. Unlike spaces of politics, political spaces through which Palestinians enunciate their collective and political desires in post-1967 Jerusalem are not buildings that symbolize political authority, sovereign power, and the rationalized space of administrative government\textsuperscript{205} but rather captured colonial spaces that are then used to serve as realms for political claims, asserted presences, and dissenting interactions.

### 5.5 Seizing Space in Palestinian Jerusalem

To better appreciate the relationship between enunciation and spaces of the political (in this case, seized colonial spaces) in post-1967 Jerusalem, the following section will shift its focus to another co-existence institution supported by the Jerusalem Foundation: The Bet David/Wadi Joz Community Center in the Palestinian neighborhood of Wadi al-Joz just north of the Old City and East of Sheikh Jarrah. The history of the Bet David center begins with the emergence of the International Cultural Center for Youth (I.C.C.Y.). The center was established in 1960 in Emek Refaim, the main residential and commercial street in the German Colony of West Jerusalem.

The center was founded through an initiative proposed by several Hadassah leaders and Moshe Kol, who pitched the project to interfaith humanitarian/charitable organizations such as “Children to Palestine” based in New York City and led by Dorothy and Murray Silverstone, as well as “Youth Aliyah of Israel.”\textsuperscript{206} The motivation behind establishing an educational

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{206} Moshe Kol was a member of Knesset for the Israeli Liberal Party, among other political factions such as the Independent Liberals throughout the 1960s and 1970s. He also served as chairman on the Board of Directors for the I.C.C.Y while also serving as the Minister of Tourism and Minister of Development by 1965.
institution for youth in Jerusalem was two-fold: first, with the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Jews from North Africa and the Middle East throughout the 1950s, the center was envisioned as a pedagogical tool to infuse into Israeli youth a common national culture and sense of heritage. A second motivation behind the center was to “bring Israeli youth...close to the cultural stream and life of other nations” since the legacy of the Nazi Holocaust, in the words of Moshe Kol, risked compelling Jewish survivors to lose faith “in the civilized world” and push the Jewish community towards nationalist chauvinism.

The center opened with the allocations received from the Silverstone's and the New York based Committee for Children in Palestine. However, as the center grew so did its budget requirements and the Silverstones stopped financing the institution in 1969-1970. As a result, the center approached the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Jerusalem Municipal Council, international foundations and cultural/educational organizations, as well as private donors throughout the United States and Europe for funding. Avraham Yekel (1922-1976), a charismatic idealist well-connected to state functionaries and ministers, became the director of the center and was a pivotal force behind the expansion of the center's many educational, cultural, and sporting programs as well as its sponsored youth clubs in 1963. Indeed, it was Yekel who expanded the center's activities again after 1967 by shifting its focus away from a more international scope to local traditions and cultures. With the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, Yekel approached it as a new challenge towards “combating prejudice” and set out to include within the scope of the center joint 'Arab-Jewish' co-existence and educational initiatives in an attempt to bring together Jewish and Arab youth from both sides of the city. For Yekel:

June 7 1967 was a historic day for Jerusalem, which became reunited as one city after years of separation by a wall manned by the soldiers of two hostile countries. The people from both sides - Jews and Arabs--who for years, although living in the same city, had been totally ignorant of the lives of one another, met on the crowded streets of the city, on buses and in shops. For us, it was also filled with meaning, carrying implications for the future...While the complex situation in pre-1967 Israel made it difficult for adult students and teachers to identify themselves with our aims, it was not too difficult to teach youngsters to understand, and even to feel sympathy with people living for (sic) away with whom they had no daily contact, and of course, no conflict.

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208 Ibid.
However, to teach Jewish and Arab youth to understand one another—especially immediately after June 1967—was an entirely different matter.210

Although the I.C.C.Y had organized joint programs with Palestinian-Israeli citizens prior to the 1967 war, the post-1967 situation was more formidable a challenge. Whereas I.C.C.Y joint programs prior to 1967 focused on "Arabs as neighbors" and were conducted in Hebrew, the post-1967 period enforced a spatial and social proximity with Arabs who had until 1967 been living in a separate country. What is more, in order for the center to serve Palestinian-Arab youth, the Arabic language was necessary for its activities and instruction. Thus, immediately following the June 1967 war, the center offered some of its services to the youth of East Jerusalem by partnering with already existing youth and sporting clubs in Palestinian neighborhoods. The center first contacted the Armenian religious authorities and established a partnership with an Armenian Catholic youth Club211 in the Old City to host "Around the World" educational events as well as a dance study group.212 By August of 1967, contacts with a number of East Jerusalem schools were established and joint educational initiatives slowly began. However, it was not enough to reach the population. The problem, Yekel states, was that Palestinian schools refused to include such activities in an already crowded curriculum (not to mention the political ramifications of doing so). What was needed was a supplementary educational framework including more community centers and youth clubs.213

Hence, such programs could not be confined to one building or youth/sporting club but had to radiate outward. In order to reach more children throughout the city, Yekel sought to establish satellite community centers and youth clubs. The Ministry of Education and Culture, the Jerusalem Foundation, and the Jerusalem Municipality (principally Teddy Kollek, who Yekel states was most receptive to the idea) agreed and partnered with the I.C.C.Y to establish such a center. While Kollek himself believed that “a cultural program could not be imported from the Jewish part but had to be one fitting the needs and interests of Arabs,” he did not believe that the

210 Ibid., 27.
211 Ibid., 29.
212 Avraham Yekel, "Two Community Centers for the Arab Population in Jerusalem (1967-1974)," 1974, ISA 17686/6 GL. "Around the World" was a program based on "talks on countries and peoples, accompanied by slides, music and small exhibits."
213 Yekel, Towards a Better Tomorrow, 29. JMA 5224/87.
right professional personnel or cultural institutions existed in East Jerusalem to carry out such a project.\textsuperscript{214} Considering the educational, sporting, and youth institutions that already existed in pre-1967 East Jerusalem (and persisted in the post-1967 era), this may not have been entirely the case. In fact, Yekel, upon receiving confirmation of a building available for a community center in Wadi al-Joz in 1969, writes that “both in Jerusalem itself, and in nearby towns in Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron, there were experts in those fields (that is, Arabic instruction, drama and music) who had studied in Egypt, Lebanon, or the U.S.A. willing to take part...”\textsuperscript{215} Kollek's Foundation was about creating co-existence institutions catering to specific religious and cultural communities and not nationalist institutions. Thus, when he looked to the I.C.C.Y to develop a youth program for Palestinian Jerusalemites and to Yekel himself on account of his previous experiences with Arab youth, it was because he did not want to risk creating a community center that could fall under the purview of Arab, Jordanian, or Palestinian nationalists.\textsuperscript{216} In other words, cultural programs and educational professionals already existed in East Jerusalem. To Kollek, however, they could potentially serve purposes not in line with municipal goals.

By 1969, Kollek and his Jerusalem Foundation approached the I.C.C.Y with the idea of setting up a Palestinian youth center in a residential building in Wadi al-Joz. Although the I.C.C.Y was initially skeptical of the offer considering the poor condition of the building and the feeling that people would not attend due to “political reasons” and a “conservative culture” in the neighborhood, an Arab teachers’ cooperative was found through municipal channels willing to take on the project with funds from the Jerusalem Foundation, the municipal council, and the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{217} Although the cooperative as well as the Foundation insisted that instruction and professional staff be entirely made of Arabic speakers (preferably Palestinian Arabs themselves), after failing to find a suitable candidate the I.C.C.Y decided “that it did not matter whether the director was an Arab or Jew if his professional and personal qualities were suitable.”\textsuperscript{218} Thus, the I.C.C.Y assumed the role of “foster parent” by assuming responsibility of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[214] Ibid., 31.
\item[215] Ibid., 33.
\item[216] Ministry of Culture and Education, “Educators and Schools in Wadi-al-Joz,” 1970, ISA 17725/1 GL; Elad Peled, “Arab Education in East Jerusalem,” 1972, ISA 6799/8 GL. Both the municipality and the Office of the Advisor on Arab Affairs kept a close eye on educational institutions and programs catering to youth in East Jerusalem so to ensure that the curriculum and books assigned did not agitate against the Israeli authorities.
\item[217] Yekel, \textit{Towards a Better Tomorrow}, 32. JMA 5224/87.
\item[218] Ibid., 33.
\end{footnotes}
developing and activating the project. A senior member of the I.C.C.Y staff (the deputy director, to be exact) assumed directorship of the center despite protest from locals and a general atmosphere of “suspicion and hesitation.”

On February 1, 1970, The Bet David Cultural and Community Center for Arab Youth and Adults (Beit Daoud in Arabic) was opened to the public in Wadi al-Joz. The center catered mainly to the populations of Wadi al-Joz, Sheikh Jarrah, and residents just east of Musrara near the commercial center opposite Bab al-Amoud (Damascus Gate). The building was named after its previous occupant, Pension David, who gained permission from the Municipality to run a hostel from the building in the summer of 1967. However, the building has a much longer and richer history as a former property of Faisal Husseini, who was a member of a prominent Palestinian Jerusalemite family, seized by Israeli authorities following the 1967 war. The center was initially funded by five bodies: the Jerusalem Foundation, the Jerusalem Municipality, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the I.C.C.Y, and the Women’s International Zionist Organization. The staff was a mix of Jewish professionals (mainly affiliated with I.C.C.Y), Palestinian citizens from Israel “who had had their training in Israeli institutions,” and to a lesser extent, “young local Arabs who would, in the course of time, obtain the experience and knowledge of taking over, eventually, the management of the center and professional work there.”

Within the first year, the programs offered were limited to study circles for languages, art, and music as well as lectures, film screenings, sports and organized excursions. However, this was enough for approximately 1,000 Palestinians to enroll at the center within weeks of its opening. With the perceived success of the program, folk dancing sessions, dramatic arts workshops, child care services, nutrition classes, and even hairdressing instruction were added. Most drastic, however, was the gradual introduction of joint social activities with Jewish youth from the I.C.C.Y (including drama, film screenings and educational lectures/pavilions), “sports

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221 Interview with Hala A’mas, September 9 2013.
223 Ibid.
competitions with Jewish youth clubs and schools, and meetings with Jewish youth in places outside Jerusalem, such as the Ben Shemen Youth Village” in Haifa. By 1971, specialized activities for boys and girls were organized according to their immediate interests and in the spring of 1972 a separate facility neighboring Beit Daoud was made available on most weekday afternoons, specifically for activities catering to girls and women until an extension to the community center was completed in 1974. By 1973, programs were developed enough that dancing, drama, music groups, as well as a community center football team began to play and perform throughout the city as well as in Palestinian towns and villages outside of Jerusalem. A partner program was also established in two local schools in Shu'fat (September 1973) as well as in the Muslim quarter of the Old City (both staffed locally but also with I.C.C.Y liaisons) so as to expand its activities and services to other areas and neighborhoods in occupied Jerusalem.

Much like what had happened with Meditran, the October 1973 war threatened the existence of the community center. According to a report concerning the center and sent to the Advisor on Arab Affairs:

…the war had aroused many emotions among the Arab population and created a new situation. There were elements in East Jerusalem who felt that the time was ripe for incitement against cooperation with Jewish organizations and against activities and projects which manifest the will of the Arab population in Jerusalem to coexist and cooperate with the Jewish population.

Although the center continued in its programs and its affiliation to the I.C.C.Y, it was clear that changes had to be made. The direction of the center and its activities thus came under review, leading to the formation of a local advising committee made up of “fifteen local people, primarily (local) teachers.” It was then decided that Bet David/Beit Daoud should hire more Palestinians for the center (preferably those educated in Israeli institutions, according to the

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224 Ibid.
226 Ibid., 37. The Shu'fat center came as a result of a request made in 1971 by teachers in Shu'fat and Beit Hanina for funds to build a new community center. The shortage of available funds meant that it would take a few years to complete. In the meantime, the I.C.C.Y and the Jerusalem Foundation proposed a joint program with Bet David in an already existing structure. The center was opened in September 1973 and to maintain the daily contact between Shu’fat and the ICCY, a special assistant to the director of the ICCY was appointed.
227 Avraham Yekel, "Two Community Centers for the Arab Population in Jerusalem (1967-1974),” 1974, ISA 17686/6 GL.
228 Ibid.
wishes of the Jerusalem Foundation and the I.C.C.Y) and orient its programs more towards local needs.

Joint activities with Israeli Jewish youth and institutions were maintained after the October 1973 war, as this was the very spirit the I.C.C.Y sought to instill through the project. Joint activities with Israeli Jewish youth and institutions were maintained after the October 1973 war, as this was the very spirit the I.C.C.Y sought to instill through the project. In line with the changes recommended following the post-October war review, a Palestinian social worker from Abu Ghosh and graduate of the Hebrew University was hired as a trainee to the director. By late 1973 he was appointed the new director for the center. In addition, more Palestinian part-time teachers were hired as guides and group leaders. As a result, the programs gradually became “much more suited to local needs and customs,” including special religious activities during Ramadan and other religious (Muslim and Christian) holidays. While the I.C.C.Y continued in its role as a parent body with members of its senior staff acting as full-time advisors and trainers, by late 1973 the entire staff was made up of Palestinians.

By 1974, membership rose to 2,000 as the center and its affiliate branches in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City and Shu'fat began to offer morning pre-school education, courses/day programs for women and mothers, as well as vocational guidance programs. As a result, The Jerusalem Foundation came to consider Bet David/Bet Daoud as “one of the greatest successes since the unification of the city.” Its range of educational, recreational, and cultural activities served the Palestinian community well, as indicated by increasing enrolment numbers, and by all appearances relations between the I.C.C.Y. and the Arab youth center were beginning to stabilize. However, the I.C.C.Y had a different assessment as by the later 1970s contacts between 

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229 'Co-existence' was the foundation of the Bet David/Bet Daoud project however it became particularly urgent as the center expanded its membership to 1,500-2,000 members by late 1973. I.C.C.Y staff believed that learning in a positive and interactive manner could work to change perceptions not only in Jerusalem but in neighboring Arab countries as well. According to Yekel, "quite often during the summer months Arab children, whose parents are living in Arab countries, are able to visit their relatives in Jerusalem, and they come to Bet David and later relate of their experiences in their home towns and countries...a number of the staff at Bet David and its members are external students at Beirut or Amman universities, and from time to time go there for special courses and exams. Similarly, many members of Bet David visit their relatives in Arab countries, and thus they both acquaint Arabs outside of Israel with the activities of Bet David and bring to their Jewish friends the experience of present-day life in Arab countries." Avraham Yekel, "Two Community Centers for the Arab Population in Jerusalem (1967-1974),” 1974, ISA 17686/6 GL.

230 Interview with Hala A'mas, September 9 2013.

231 Avraham Yekel, "Two Community Centers for the Arab Population in Jerusalem (1967-1974),” 1974, ISA 17686/6 GL.

232 The Jerusalem Foundation, Foundation Newsletter, undated, JMA 9050.
the Arab community centers and the I.C.C.Y became “very limited” and hopes to develop a joint Arab-Jewish institution (as opposed to a partnership between branches) were shelved.\footnote{Avraham Yekel, “Two Community Centers for the Arab Population in Jerusalem (1967-1974),” 1974, ISA 17686/6 GL.} According to Yekel, despite the expansion of programs and activities, “a proper interchange and joint program of activities for Jewish and Arab youth and adults” did not exist, which Yekel attributed to both political divisions and still existing cultural divides.\footnote{Ibid.} While the objective of instilling a culture of co-existence through Bet David/Beit Daoud did not appear immediately successful in the eyes of the I.C.C.Y, Yekel remained optimistic that with time, and as the staff of Bet David/Beit Daoud developed their skills at community building, the two community centers could maintain a strong relationship and continue building towards peaceful relations.

5.6 From Bet David/Beit Daoud to the Wadi Joz Community Center

While I.C.C.Y played the role of “foster parent” for the community center throughout the first decade of its existence, it was understood to be a temporary arrangement until the center could stand on its own and join the Israel Federation of Community Centers as an independent institution.\footnote{Avraham Yekel, “Two Community Centers for the Arab Population in Jerusalem (1967-1974),” 1974, ISA 17686/6 GL.} By the time of the first Palestinian \textit{intifada}, the center had indeed severed its institutional relationship with the I.C.C.Y, joined the Federation of Community Centers and attained its own committee and board of directors. However, the 'spirit of co-existence' that both the I.C.C.Y and the Municipality/Jerusalem Foundation hoped to instill in Bet David/Beit Daoud did not carry over with this shift. Today, the community center is not locally (or officially, for that matter) known as Beit Daoud but rather the Wadi Joz Community Center (although it is locally referred to also as Beit Husseini). This change in the name of the community center did not only reflect the shift from partner to independent institution but also a fundamental change in its pedagogical orientation and community objectives.

Today, the Wadi Joz Community Center is managed and directed by Hala A'mas, who has held the position since 1997. Its activities continue to be organized and operated by an
entirely Palestinian staff. Although the center continues to be affiliated to and supported by the Jerusalem Foundation, the Ministry of Culture and Education, as well as the Municipality, the Palestinian national flags that drape the interior of the building do not suggest a co-existence institution but rather a distinctly Palestinian community center. Indeed, upon meeting Hala A'mas, I am immediately told the Palestinian history behind the building. “This building used to be known as Beit Daoud,” A'mas explains, “but in reality, it is a house that belonged to the Husseini family.” In the community, the name Beit Daoud has long been forgotten with many even unaware that the center was once named as such.

When asked how its continued association and dependency on the Municipality is perceived by the community at large, A’mas is quick to point out that while this is a source of resentment for some in the community, the partnership is necessary for funding. “We generally keep a low profile about sources of funding,” A'mas explains, but “we don't have a choice. We are not allowed to obtain funding from the PA or the EU and so on...it is terrible that we are forced to beg for resources from occupiers in our own city.” A’mas explains that although an independent institution that is part of the Israeli Association of Community Centers, funding from the city and Ministry of Education makes up 70% of its budget. As a result, representatives from the Municipality continue to “keep an eye on developments,” demand annual meetings and at times even attempt to influence the activities offered at the center.

According to A’mas, joint activities and general relations with the I.C.C.Y were effectively cut off by the 1987 intifada and officially halted after program director Farid Abu Ghosh left his post in 1994 after twenty-five years at the position. In fact, once Abu Ghosh, vacated his post, “some appeared to want to stop the flow of money” to the institution. This is allegedly due to the fact that Abu Ghosh was “very good at working both sides,” ensuring that the center catered specifically to local social needs while effectively suppressing national-political articulation in the centers’ programming. Indeed, once Abu Ghosh stepped down there was worry that the center would become politicized and affiliate itself with other Palestinian institutions in the city, such as Orient House. However, funding was not cut off given the

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236 Interview with Hala A’amas, September 9 2013.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
importance of the institution for the local community. Today, the funding received is the minimum average, with just enough to cover electricity costs but not additional salaries for secretaries, cleaning staff, and the increased need for child care services in a growing neighborhood. These costs are instead covered by fundraising efforts by A'mas and others working at the center.  

For A'mas, the attempt to create a co-existence institution in the heart of East Jerusalem was a fantasy; a photo-opportunity for Israeli officials “who do not care about the actual interests of Arabs” but only want to portray the occupation as mutually agreed-upon and humane. A'mas adds that every co-existence activity that took place in the neighborhood featured “the same fifteen people;” that is, Israelis and a hand-full of “yes men’ who roll out the red carpet" for city functionaries. With the intifada, the departure of Abu Ghosh, and a new generation of Palestinians working at the center, the center immediately shifted its orientation and pedagogical emphasis towards Palestinian nationalism and “the Arab character” of the institution and the population it served. “You can't have co-existence while the Israelis are destroying Palestinian homes...there is no need for co-existence, we do not believe in it,” A'mas explains, “but we do need a Palestinian center serving its community.”

A'mas is quick to emphasize that the center was and continues to be a much needed institution for families in the immediate area. Not only is the Wadi al-Joz Center a source of local employment and social/leisure activity, the youth programs (notably those offered on Fridays and Sundays when local schools are closed) offer relief for families in need of child care programs. What is more, the center serves as a symbol of Palestinian history and community building in the city. For A'mas and program directors, the Wadi Joz Community Center draws its inspiration and narrates its history not in reference to the I.C.C.Y but rather to the charitable and community-oriented work done by the women of the Husseini family in Wadi al-Joz/Sheikh Jarrah prior to the 1947-1949 war for Palestine. The center is a space through which to teach the children of the area “their national history;” functioning as a “heritage project” of sorts that protects Palestinian identity and stands as a testament to their historical existence in the city.

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240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
In addition, according to a presentation given by A'mas at the Hebrew University in 2006 on Palestinian civil society entitled “Community Care Institution,” the Wadi al-Joz Center considers itself as part of a larger network of (quasi) independent Palestinian institutions that she refers to as a “shadow municipality;” an assemblage of local institutions including Orient House/Arab Studies Society, the Higher Islamic Council, PASSIA, the Arab Chamber of Commerce, schools that remain independent from those administered by the Israeli Municipality as well as the charitable, health, social and youth organizations run by Palestinians in the city. For A'mas, the shadow municipality is a crucial sociopolitical network that resists Israeli attempts to dissolve Palestinian national culture and offers social services for a community neglected by Israeli governing institutions (needs that have become more urgent after the al-Aqsa intifada of 2000, which brought about the collapse of the tourism sector, an increase in house demolitions, and the slow down or, in some areas, the cutting off of municipal services). With many subject to Israeli closures during and after the 2000 intifada (the Orient House, Chamber of Commerce, the Small Projects Office, the Department of Land and Mapping, and the Old City Rehabilitation Committee were all shut down following the emergence of the al-Aqsa intifada), the Wadi al-Joz Community Center sees itself as playing its own role in reviving this network instrumental for purposes of community organization, information dissemination, and resistance to complete political annexation and cultural dissolution.243

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The first Palestinian intifada began in December 1987 when an Israeli truck driver struck a line of vehicles carrying Palestinian workers from the occupied Gaza Strip to Israel proper. Widely perceived by Palestinians to be an intentional act, demonstrations and strikes erupted in refugee camps across the Gaza strip and quickly spread throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where popular committees as well as organizations representing labor, women, students and professional social classes formed the main pillars of a mass movement of resistance and civil disobedience.1 While short lived, the uprising transformed the nature of Palestinian resistance of the previous decade from sporadic and local confrontations against Israeli settlers and military personnel into a more cohesive, mass-based challenge to occupation and colonialism.

Despite Israeli attempts to suppress the uprising through curfews, arrests, deportations, and military violence, the intifada prompted a re-assessment of the status quo on the part of Israeli authorities.2 On the part of Palestinians, although the local national leadership that arose during the intifada recognized the PLO abroad as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” it quickly became clear to the Palestinian leadership in Tunis that they were not in control of events on the ground.3 Taking advantage of the opportunity created by the uprising (and King Hussein’s disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, which effectively put an end to the Jordanian option to resolve the Palestinian question), the PLO thus embarked on a diplomatic initiative to re-consolidate power on the “inside” and compel Israel and the United States to concede to a Palestinian state in the 1967 Palestinian Territories.

The intifada ultimately forced an opening for dialogue between Israel and Palestinian representatives, leading to the 1991 Madrid conference and from there, a back channel to the

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1 The first Palestinian intifada is usually dated from its outbreak in December 1987 until the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO in September 1993, if not the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.
3 Cohen, The Rise and Fall of Arab Jerusalem, 15.
PLO that culminated with the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993. At the same time, the intifada undermined the notion of a “united” Jerusalem and eventually (but effectively) crushed Kollek’s long-held vision for local administration in the city based on a model of civic co-existence under Israeli hegemony; a vision he stubbornly held onto until his final days in office. Indeed, during the early stages of the uprising Kollek insisted that social unrest in the city was the result not of the tensions between Israeli supremacy and national-pluralism and the naïve projections inherent in his governing vision. Rather, it was the result of “psychological barriers” that persisted on account of: 1) the failure of the Palestinian residents in fully developing modern, democratic traditions and thus conforming to new pluralist realities; and 2) emotionally charged and ultimately self-defeating national government policies that pursued demographic and territorial domination with too heavy a hand and at the expense of efficient service allocation, support for co-existence activities, a decentralized administrative structure, and a stable municipal budget. So long as Kollek was mayor, he simply refused to approach social and political tensions in Jerusalem as an extension of a larger national struggle and thus failed to recognize that most Palestinian Jerusalemites did not consider their day to day issues as the result of birth pangs of a new order that required time for adjustment and administrative functionality but rather in colonial terms and in relation to a wider, national framework. The persistence of Palestinian disobedience during the intifada and Kollek’s removal from office through the 1993 municipal elections resulted in a conceptual shift for Kollek while at the same time signalling the ultimate death of his administrative rubric and vision of civic unity and co-existence in an Israeli-dominated Jerusalem.

Co-existence and cultural encounter as a state discourse and strategy for conflict management had generally exhausted itself with the outbreak of the 1987 intifada, despite periodic surges of such activity in times of greater optimism, such as the commencement of the Oslo Peace Process in 1993. Today, an emphasis on dialogue, cooperation, and bottom up peace building through cultural understanding over political reconciliation and historical recognition is more a feature of Western (mainly European Union) funded NGOs and civil society

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5 Benvenisti, City of Stone, 128; Amirav, Jerusalem Syndrome, 31-33.
6 Benvenisti, “Planned Polarisation of Jerusalem,” 8; Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, 189.
organizations, which remain peripheral to both Palestinian and Israeli societies despite their proliferation throughout the territory since 1993. As Palestinians in the 1967 Territories were emboldened by the intifada and the prospect of realizing their national aspirations through the Oslo Accords, a renewed anti-normalization sentiment led to an outright rejection of a peace industry that had long sidelined the question of Palestinian self-determination and trivialized the structural realities and power dynamics inherent in “an abnormal situation between two unequal sides.” As for Israelis, the initiation of direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO signalled for some a political resolution and in turn, a rejuvenation (however short lived) of initiatives emphasizing cultural understanding and economic collaboration dormant since the 1987 intifada. However, the peace process placed Palestinian national and civic rights on domestic and international agendas, even if these issues were (and continue to be) generally subordinated to Israeli security and demographic concerns. This in turn “led to a larger strategic change” in Israeli policy and discourse that became most pronounced with the second Palestinian intifada (2000); a shift that can be characterized as a retreat from “liberalizing trends” of the Zionist left towards a “new hegemony” of ethnocentrism and pan-Jewish entitlement to Palestine as “the most important ideological pillar guiding Israeli domestic and foreign policies.” The humanist pretences of the Zionist project in Palestine that have long been a feature of Labor Zionism has lost ground to the more “unapologetic ethno-religious chauvinism” characteristic of the Israeli right-wing.

This shift generally (and gradually) manifested itself in Israeli public opinion, state discourse, the legal realm as well as in the scramble for strategic space perceived to be under potential threat by the two-state formula. In Jerusalem, which is considered across the Zionist political spectrum to be the geographical, national, and biblical heart of Israel, this scramble materialized on the ground following the 1993 municipal elections in the form of nationalist

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7 Zena Tahhan, “Palestine-Israel: Is peace activism serving occupation?,” Al Jazeera, May 5 2016, accessed May 5 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/palestine-israel-peace-activism-serving-occupation-160502124739652.html?fb_action_ids=10153597199135060&fb_action_types=og.shares&fb_source=other_multiline&action_object_map=%5B86869460419846866%5D&action_type_map=%5B8%22og.shares%22%5D&action_ref_map=%5B8%5D.
8 Ibid.
9 Rouhana and Sultany, 8
10 Ibid., 6.
competition over the city and unilateral Israeli moves that effectively undermined the status quo of separate and divided development between Palestinians and Jews more or less held for nearly three decades under Kollek. Just prior to the 1993 municipal elections, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the Labor Party, who “himself put Jerusalem into play” (at least theoretically) through agreement to include Jerusalem among the issues to be negotiated in final status talks with the PLO, declared the elections to be a “plebiscite on his diplomacy.” Thus on account of his stature in the city (and the lack of an equally attractive alternative at the local level), Rabin pushed Kollek (who was planning to retire) to run for mayor once again in a bid to stall the national re-emergence of territorial maximalists on the Israeli right, shore up political support for negotiations with the PLO and in the process maintain the status quo in Jerusalem.

Kollek reluctantly agreed and ran on an ostensibly independent “One Jerusalem” ticket, although generally aligned with Labor policies. Kollec’s main opponent, the Likud candidate for mayor and emerging frontrunner Ehud Olmert, campaigned on a platform asserting toughness towards Palestinian claims to Jerusalem; declaring Kollek unfit to deal with the post-Oslo reality given his attempts to appeal to Palestinian voters during the election (which for Olmert and allied councillors signalled a willingness to compromise) as well as his developing communications with Palestinian figures and institutions entrenching their authority in the city, such as Faisal Husseini and the Orient House, which by that time had in effect become the local headquarters of the PLO. According to Olmert and the right wing bloc of the Knesset and Jerusalem municipal council, by relegating Jerusalem as a topic of negotiation (albeit as a “final status” issue) and formally recognizing the PLO, the Oslo Accords emboldened Palestinian nationalists and rendered Jerusalem a matter of urgent national importance. It was reasoned that a type of local leadership was needed to re-enforce Israeli sovereignty in the city without the liberal affectations of Palestinian civic rights and through a program of ultra-nationalist urban planning eliminating all signs of partition or diluted sovereignty. In other words, the 1993 municipal elections were a vote of confidence for the Labor party and the peace process at the national level and Kollek’s administrative philosophy at the local level. This tough line on the peace process and Palestinian

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12 Fisher, 336.
13 Friedland and Hecht, 447.
15 Fisher, 332.
claims to the city resonated with Israeli voters in Jerusalem, where public opinion and political loyalty had already been shifting to the right over the previous decade. Most importantly, ultra-orthodox councillors and rabbis (representing a dominant demographic faction of society in Jerusalem) found common ground with Olmert’s platform and a right-wing alliance was formed that effectively ousted Kollek from office in November 1993. Gradually, the voices of Zionist centrist (Labor) and leftist (notably Meretz) counsellors asserting the need to tread carefully and strategically to realize Zionist ambitions in Jerusalem were drowned out as the city entered into a full partnership with national government ministers to the right over the direction of development and local administration in Jerusalem.16

The decline of Kollek’s doctrine of “peaceful co-existence” (*dukiyum beshalom*) accelerated within a year, as the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in the West Bank in 1994 as part of the interim agreements with Israel. Although the PLO agreed to leave Jerusalem outside of its jurisdiction, as the metropolitan center of the West Bank and intended capital of their state-in-the-making the PA nonetheless worked to establish an institutional presence within the city.17 The PLO achieved this by networking with Palestinian merchant and professional associations and coordinating their activities through the Orient House in the Palestinian neighborhood of Wadi al-Joz in East Jerusalem. Mainly, however, this was done through the establishment of a security body affiliated to the Palestinian security apparatus of the PA (the Preventative Security Force), which was to replace Israeli police in Palestinian neighborhoods and villages and act as a governing body enforcing national principles in the city.18

This new geopolitical reality encouraged the majority of Israeli city councillors and their allies in the national government to re-assert Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem with a heavier hand. They did so by increasing Israeli police presence in East Jerusalem and gradually cutting the city off from the West Bank by reinforcing the municipal boundaries and closing off

16 Ibid., 335.
18 Ibid., 27-35. Although this was in many ways a continuation of a policy of institutional entrenchment that took off in the city during the 1987 *intifada*, where local committees and institutions came under the auspices of PLO organizations in the effort to control developments on the ground and diminish the reliance of Palestinian residents on Israeli institutions for jobs and services.
Palestinian neighborhoods and villages throughout the city with military checkpoints.\textsuperscript{19} To mitigate the pain of Israeli incursion into Palestinian districts and enforced separation between Jerusalem and the West Bank, Olmert pressured the national government to channel additional funds into the budget for East Jerusalem in an attempt to pacify Palestinian residents by improving service provision and infrastructural standards.\textsuperscript{20} However, the government transferred but a fraction of the funds it promised by the late 1990s, opting instead to focus on curbing Jewish out-migration from Jerusalem and strengthening their overall demographic standing in the city. Towards this end, in December 1995 the Ministry of Interior introduced a “center of life” policy, which granted the Ministry full authority to “cancel the resident status of those who are registered but for whom the ‘center of life’ is not in the city.”\textsuperscript{21} What this meant in effect was a “legalized cleansing” of Palestinian Jerusalemites living outside of the Israeli municipal boundaries, as any resident unable to prove continuous residence in the city would have their residency status revoked.\textsuperscript{22} All the while, as a function of the 1950 Law of Return “another branch of the same ministry was granting instant citizenship to individuals from all over the world who could establish a claim to being Jewish.”\textsuperscript{23} This policy impacted tens of thousands of Palestinians, mainly those who beginning in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s had settled in the Jerusalem outskirts/hinterland in the West Bank as a result of land shortages, the high cost of living, and a planning system that deliberately failed to meet Palestinian demographic growth and infrastructural needs.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed, according to Palestinian


\textsuperscript{20} Amirav, \textit{Jerusalem Syndrome}, 116-117.

\textsuperscript{21} Halabi, “The Legal Status of Palestinians in Jerusalem.”

\textsuperscript{22} Danielle C. Jefferis, “The ‘Center of Life’ Policy: Institutionalizing Statelessness in East Jerusalem,” \textit{Jerusalem Quarterly} 50 (Summer 2012): 94.


\textsuperscript{24} Rami Nasrallah, “Jerusalem and its Suburbs: The Decline of the Palestinian City,” in \textit{Jerusalem and Its Hinterland}, eds. Omar Yousef, Rassem Khamaisi, Abdalla Owais, and Rami Nasrallah (Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center, 2008), 46-48. According to Nasrallah, anywhere between 40-60% of Palestinian Jerusalemites were forced to reside outside the municipal boundaries from 1985-1996. This housing crisis is the result of planning and zoning restrictions and a general inability for Palestinians to obtain building permits through a politicized Israeli bureaucracy that deliberately “traps” Palestinian urban growth. Home demolitions, which disproportionally target Palestinian homes and extensions built without permits, have also contributed to Palestinian exodus to the Jerusalem hinterland. See Nathan Marom, \textit{Milkud tikhnuni: Mediniyot tikhnun, he-sder karka’ot, heterey bniyah ve-harisa batim be-Mizrakh Yerushalayim} (Jerusalem: Bimkom and Ir Shalem, 2004).
human rights NGO al-Haq, more than ten thousand Palestinian residents were removed from Israel’s population registry from 1995-2010. In addition, family unification applications submitted by Palestinian residents were affected by the blanket closure of Jerusalem from the West Bank, rendering it increasingly difficult for spouses of Palestinian Jerusalemites without residency status (as well as children born to a couple where one is not a Jerusalem resident) to obtain the necessary permits and ID numbers to live in the city.

At the same time, a two-pronged strategy of political planning was pushed for and approved by local and district planners in concert with national and municipal representatives (and pursued with considerable force after the election of a right-wing national government in 1996). The first aspect of this strategy was the construction and expansion of an outer-ring of Israeli colonies in the north, east, and south of Jerusalem. This process was initiated in 1995 in the attempt to create a “greater” Jerusalem that secured Israeli domination over the central West Bank and East Jerusalem while severing Arab villages and neighborhoods in the city from the rest of the 1967 occupied territories. To be sure, the approach to urban planning in Jerusalem (namely housing/infrastructure projects) as a means to dissect and enclose Palestinian regions, strengthen Jewish demography, and foreclose possibility of withdrawal is hardly novel to Israeli political practice. The municipal boundaries drawn up immediately following the June 1967 war and major territorial expansions and land expropriations since that time were all based on demographic and military-strategic considerations, while urban planning and zoning since June 1967 has consistently worked hand in hand with bureaucratic means to prevent Palestinian urban continuity and growth. In fact, the establishment of a territorial belt to consolidate and protect the Israeli municipal border (and to expand the functional boundaries of Jerusalem) was done already by the early 1970s in response to the 1969 Rogers Plan, leading to “the construction of

26 Ibid., 16. This policy hardened after 2003, when a law was enacted that prohibited completely the spouses of Palestinian residents from obtaining residency status in the city. The law did not affect at all Jewish settlers in the West Bank “or immigrant Jewish spouses of Israeli citizens.” See also Makdisi, 116.
four large urban settlements in four corners of the annexed areas” (Ramot, Neve Ya’acov, Gilo and East Talpiot). At the same time, Ma’ale Adumim (east), Givon (North), and Efrat (south) were constructed specifically to “inject an Israeli Jewish population” into these areas and limit or disrupt (Palestinian) demographic continuity.

However, this process was revisited once again in 1995 as the Israeli government adopted both the “Greater Jerusalem” and “Metropolitan Jerusalem” Master Plans. The former in particular revamped the drive to consolidate Israeli power over areas adjacent to the municipal borders with considerable intensity, reinforcing an “outer ring” of Israeli power around Jerusalem by enlarging already existing colonies and establishing new ones in the process (all the while extending even further into the West Bank). The Master Plan included construction in settlements such as Givat Ze’ev and Givon HaHadasha as well as the establishment of Ramat Shlomo to the north and the expansion of Ma’ale Adumim to the east in 1995. Most significant for the development of the south of the outer ring came in 1997 with the approval of the construction of Har Homa. Unlike the Greater Jerusalem Master Plan, the Metropolitan Jerusalem plan (in reference to an area of 950 sq. km encompassing large settlement blocs and accompanying/interconnecting infrastructure in the West Bank) was intended not to target areas for direct annexation to the city but to extend Jerusalem’s functional boundaries towards outlying satellite colonies (expanding to Beit Shemesh to the west, Mitzpe Yericho to the east, Ofra to the north and Gush Etzion to the south). However, similar to its counterpart the plan’s purpose was to strengthen Jewish connection to the city and “determine the parameters of negotiations” over the West Bank by establishing functional relations and networks that would render the boundaries separating the city from outlying districts irrelevant.

The second aspect of the two-pronged political strategy was to establish a Jewish presence within (as opposed to outside and between) Palestinian villages, neighborhoods and

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29 Dumper, The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967, 114. The Rogers Plan was a framework for a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt and for the implementation of UN SC Resolution 242 made by the US Secretary of State William Rogers in December 1969. The proposal was particularly threatening to the Israelis because it called for Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from territories occupied since the June 1967 war.
30 Ibid., 117.
32 Fisher, 314-316.
quarters so to socially and geographically fragment Palestinian space in the core of the city. Like the plans to expand Jerusalem’s municipal and functional boundaries, this too had precedence in the decades prior to the Oslo era. During his time as mayor, Teddy Kollek was undoubtedly and consistently in favor of strengthening and maintaining a strong Jewish demographic majority in Jerusalem. However, he opposed the movement of Israelis into the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods and quarters, preferring instead the beautification, development, and expansion of Israeli colonies making up the “inner ring” within Israeli Municipal boundaries and improvements in service and industrial infrastructure so to attract Israeli settlers and curb Jewish out-migration to the coast and the West Bank colonies of “Greater” and “Metropolitan” Jerusalem. Although the Israeli Lands Administration established an arm to purchase homes in the Muslim quarter of the Old City in 1973, it had only limited success and in accordance with Kollek’s approach to development in Jerusalem, the use of such buildings were restricted to Jewish organizations and institutions as opposed to private residents. Indeed, Kollek found common ground with successive Labor governments on the importance and integrity of separate residential patterns in the city on the grounds that the intrusion of Jewish residents into Palestinian spaces threatened a fragile status quo by potentially provoking the international community and shaking what was believed to be a historical consensus between communities based on the paradigm of unity through separation.

However, the emergence of the Likud party on the national level in 1977 led to several major policy changes (both foreign and domestic), including an attempt to shake Kollek’s status quo in Jerusalem. By the 1980s Likud ministers were working in tandem with private settler organizations in the city (initially Ateret LeYoshna followed by Ateret Cohanim and Elad in the late 1980s) to buy Palestinian properties or claim them through the Israeli Absentees Property

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34 Cheshin, Hutman and Melamed, 30-34.
35 The “inner ring” of colonies is in reference to those suburban Jewish settlements within the June 1967 Israeli municipal boundaries. The out-migration of Jewish residents, mainly secular and professional couples, stepped up in the 1980s in large part as a result of the growth in the haredim (ultra-Orthodox) population in the city, which has led to the expansion of ultra-Orthodox quarters and suburbs and hence a greater imposition of religious values and norms. Out-migration to the West Bank in particular is because “land is less expensive on the fringes of the metropolitan area than it is in the center” of Jerusalem and “typically, better housing conditions are available in the periphery.” See Maya Chosen, “Jerusalem in our Time,” in Jerusalem: A City and its Future, ed. Marshall J. Breger and Ora Ahimeir (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 59; Dumper, The Politics of Jerusalem since 1967, 78-79.
36 Klein, Lives in Common, 260.
Law in the Muslim quarter of the Old City as well as the “The Holy Basin;” that is, territories adjacent to the Old City in the south and south-east such as the Palestinian villages of Silwan and Ras al-‘Amud. The purpose of such settlement activity was to disrupt Palestinian territorial and social continuity in East Jerusalem with concentrations of Jewish settlement. Kollek sought to curb this push from the right by appealing to peace/activist groups and most crucially Labor ministers, Knesset members, and other allies occupying the relevant ministerial and legal posts, culminating in the 1992 Klugman inquiry on the matter and the subsequent suspension of the transfer of assets in East Jerusalem from the Custodian of Absentee Property. However, with Kollek out of office in 1993 and amidst an emerging geopolitical reality where Jerusalem was increasingly bifurcated between two political entities (the PNA and the Israeli Municipality), the city council and the Local Planning and Building Committee in particular came increasingly into a more overt alliance with private settler groups; an alliance consecrated through a shared objective to break Palestinian residential continuity and pre-emptively determine East Jerusalem as demographically Israeli (Jewish) in character prior to final status talks with the PA. For example, a proposal to build housing units for Jewish residents on 14.7 dunams in the heart of the Palestinian village of Ras al-‘Amud was submitted by Irving Muskowitz of Miami, Florida in the early 1990s upon purchasing the plot. As a village situated between the Old City and the Palestinian district of Abu Dis to the east just beyond the Israeli municipal borders (Abu Dis was declared during the early phases of the Oslo agreements as the possible location for a Palestinian capital), Ras al-‘Amud became increasingly important to Israeli geopolitical calculus.

37 Michael Dumper, “Israeli Settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem,” Journal of Palestine Studies 21, No. 4 (Summer 1992): 32-33. Beginning in 1967 and continuing throughout the 1970s, Kollek supported the expropriation (or demolition in the case of the Maghribi quarter in June 1967) of Palestinian properties in the Jewish quarter of the Old City, evicting Palestinian residents and replacing them with Jewish ones. To Kollek’s mind, however, this was in keeping with the ancient social contract of residential separation in the Old City that he believed to be disrupted from 1948-1967, when Jordanian authorities allowed for Palestinians to settle properties in the Jewish quarter of the Old City.
38 Meir Margalit, Seizing Control of Space in East Jerusalem (Tel Aviv: Sifrei Aliat Gag, 2010), 52-57.
39 Klein, Lives in Common, 263.
40 Dumper, Israeli Settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem, 32.
42 Fisher, 338.
result, in 1993 the plans to build were approved by the Local and Planning Committee and supported by a sympathetic mayor.

The project was repeatedly blocked by Labor representatives heading the Interior Ministry until the election of Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) as Prime Minister in 1996. With the changing of the guard in the Interior Ministry (Eli Yishai of SHAS, which was allied to Likud, took over the position) and a new political environment at the national level, the project was finally approved in 1996, although it was strategically postponed until 1998 and the scale of development adjusted as a result of international pressure. With the Muslim Quarter of the Old City and immediate districts to the south infiltrated by the late 1990s, by the 2000s the settler movement stepped up its attempts to gain legal recognition to property claims in the Palestinian neighborhoods of Sheikh Jarrah and Wadi al-Joz to the north (Shimon HaTzadik and the Shepherd’s Hotel) as well as At-Tur and Abu Dis to the east in the attempt to completely envelope the Old City with a belt of “Jewish islands” made up of residential pockets and, with the help of allies in planning and construction offices, public state institutions.

Unilateral actions taken by Israel throughout the interim phase of the Accords were integral towards the breakdown of trust (and hence negotiations) at the Camp David summit of 2000. As Ariel Sharon, then the leader of Likud and champion of the Israeli settler movement in the 1967 territories, descended upon al-Haram al-Sharif in September of that year, the second Palestinian intifada erupted throughout Israel/Palestine and with considerable force in Jerusalem. The violence of the second intifada (2000-2005) further entrenched the “new Zionist hegemony” at the national and local levels, providing the pretense for a closure campaign against Palestinian political and social institutions within the municipal boundaries (most notably the Arab Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and the Orient House) and leading to the approval of the first stage of construction in June 2002 for what has arguably become the most devastating Israeli measures against Palestinian urbanity in Jerusalem to date: The Wall.

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 343-344.
45 Margalit, 66-67; 94-96.
46 According to a report from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, from September 2000 to November 2004, there were 600 attacks claimed by Palestinian militants in Jerusalem. Cited in Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound, 20.
47 Sultany and Rouhana, 10; Molavi, Stateless Citizenship, 177.
While the declared intention of The Wall is to protect Israel from suicide bombers coming in from the West Bank, its route (both planned and realized) as well as its fragmenting spatial and social effects on Palestinians illustrates its function “as an object of exclusion” that works to unilaterally impose Israel designs onto the West Bank and change the physical character and demographic composition of Jerusalem.\footnote{48 Tovi Fenster and Oren Shlomo, “The Shadow of the Wall and Separation: Everyday Life in East Jerusalem,” \textit{Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture} 17, No. 12 (2011/Jerusalem in the Eye of the Storm), http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=1362.}

The construction of The Wall began in 2003 and continues to this day. According to UNOCHA, as of 2013-2014 the estimated route of the barrier will be roughly 712 km (more than twice the length of the 1949 Armistice Lines or Green Line) with only 15\% of it on Israel’s \textit{de facto} border with the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories (some 85\% of the route will be in the territories once completed as currently projected).\footnote{49 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Occupied Palestinian Territory, “The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier,” July 2013, accessed January 7 2016, https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_barrier_factsheet_july_2013_english.pdf.} In this way, The Wall acts as a mechanism to absorb not only East Jerusalem but major Israeli settlement blocks and fertile land outside the Israeli municipal boundary while pre-emptively setting the borders and the territorial and political congruity of a future Palestinian state in the West Bank. In Jerusalem in particular, The Wall’s utility in Israel’s demographic war is made apparent by what it has included/excluded from Jerusalem as a municipal and functional entity. As currently projected, The Wall will be roughly 142 km in length in and around the city (with only four km of the route along the armistice lines) and while it swallows the major Israeli settlement blocs in the West Bank (such as Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev) it has already worked to dissect and negatively transform the geography, economy, and social life for Palestinian residents within the Israeli municipal boundary as well as the wider metropolitan area.\footnote{50 Ibid.}

As a result of the Wall’s development, today an excess of 100,000 Palestinian residency card holders are isolated from Jerusalem on the West Bank side of the barrier in the suburbs surrounding the Israeli municipal boundary (notably a-Ram, Dahiyat al-Barid, Hizma, 'Anata, al-'Eizariya, Abu Dis, Sawahreh al-Sharqiya, and Sheikh Sa'ad).\footnote{51 B'Tselem, “Route of the Barrier around East Jerusalem,” January 1 2011, accessed February 3 2016, http://www.btselem.org/separation_barrier/jerusalem.} The barrier and its permit/gate...
regime have severely disrupted the social-familial, institutional and economic relations that have developed over the years between the city and its eastern hinterland while threatening the residency rights of Israeli ID holders in the suburbs and reducing their access to farmland, employment, and services in Jerusalem (notably medical and educational services, which are lacking in the suburbs themselves). In addition, Palestinian communities within the Israeli Jerusalem municipal boundaries have been forced to the West Bank side of the barrier, such as Kufr ‘Aqab and the Shu’fat refugee camp. Numbering approximately 55,000 people, these residency permit holders and tax payers to the Municipality have in effect been severed from the city. Lastly, The Wall’s route has also created a spatial entity referred to by the Israeli security establishment as the “Seam Zone;” a closed military area that lies between the Green Line and The Wall (a result of divergences from the 1967 de facto border in order to incorporate West Bank settlement blocs and areas planned for future expansion). The Seam Zone incorporates Israeli settlements and Palestinian villages in the West Bank (according to OCHA up to 10,000 West Bank Palestinians with a potential of 25,000-50,000 once the route is completed on its current trajectory) but its potential to hinder day-to-day living depend on ones status as a citizen, permanent resident, or non-resident in the area. To be sure, the Seam Zone has had the greatest overall impact on West Bank Palestinians. Not only are they severed from both the West Bank and Jerusalem but as non-residents they must also continuously apply for permits to enter, leave, and even live within their own homes in the Zone. Nonetheless, its relevance for Palestinian Jerusalemites lies in the fact that even as permanent residents, they reside on territory (East Jerusalem) that is itself located between the Green Line and the route of The Wall, thereby technically falling into the legal category of the “Seam Zone.” In the words of Michael Dumper, The Wall thus reinforces “the ambiguity of their status as Jerusalem residents living in a legal

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52 Ibid. According to B’TSelem, “Israel contends that gates in the barriers will enable residents to cross from one side to the other and to maintain the existing fabric of life. However, experience regarding the operation of the gates in the northern West Bank section of the barrier raises grave doubts about the ability of the gates to provide a workable solution: crossing through the gate requires a permit, and many persons wanting to cross are listed as "prevented" for varied reasons; most of the gates are open only a few hours a day, far less than is needed to meet the residents' needs; residents must often wait a long time at the gates, sometimes because the gates do not open on time, and sometimes because of long lines.”

53 Makdisi, 70-71.

grey area” and in a context where their status is already increasingly under threat by Israeli spatial engineering and supplementary processes of bureaucratic and legal maneuvering.

### 6.1 The Oslo Era and the Spectrum of Violence in Post-1967 Jerusalem

“For as long as I can remember, they have killed us in the cities with decrees, not with bullets.” --Gabriel Garcia Marquez

As a result of these political and spatial processes that have taken hold in the city since the early-to-mid 1990s, Jerusalem stands today as what many contemporary scholars describe as a “many bordered city” dissected by multiple, overlapping, and constantly shifting functional, political, and social barriers. At the same time, segregation on a social and day-to-day level has intensified between Jews and Palestinians as Israeli power has been unleashed virtually unchecked as a result of U.S. protection at the international level and without the mitigating effect of the minority rights discourse and inclusive approach to political subordination characteristic of the Kollek administration. It is tempting, however, to dismiss this mode of analysis when approaching the shifts in the social, political, and spatial dynamics that have since taken shape in the city. After all, while Jerusalem was a relatively porous city under Kollek when compared to the contemporary reality, planning and administration at both the national and local levels was nonetheless rooted in a settler-colonial praxis of Israeli political-territorial-demographic domination. Thus, the rise of the Israeli right and their brand of politics in the city during the Oslo years may represent little more than a clearer reflection of Israeli objectives and the power/national asymmetry long obscured by a façade of normalcy during the Kollek years and muzzled by the humanist pretences of those on the center-left of the Israeli political spectrum. However much this rings true, an imperative nonetheless lies in recognizing the continuity between different expressions of violence while at the same time defining the

55 Dumper, Jerusalem Unbound, 27.
attributes of its different forms and articulations. Developments in Jerusalem since the signing of the Oslo Accords represent an intensification of “rooted ideological and political components of Zionism” as well as a critical disruption of a particular mode of statecraft and socio-political exclusion that differentiated itself as a guardian of Israeli liberal tradition and a civil expression of territorial entitlement and political hegemony; a form of power where its coercive nature and exclusionary effects were rendered inaudible by a discourse of universal humanism and civic inclusivity.

In April 2015, Teju Cole, a prominent American author, historian, and photographer, wrote a powerful piece for The Guardian on East Jerusalem and the less visible but nonetheless pervasive forms of violence that has characterized the Israeli occupation since June 1967. Based on the contention that violence be recognized as an enduring or routine “social fact” built into the structure of institutions themselves, Cole begins his piece by distinguishing between two different manifestations of state violence in occupied Jerusalem: “hot” and “cold” violence:

Not all violence is hot. There’s cold violence too, which takes its time and finally gets its way…Putting a people into deep uncertainty about the fundamentals of life, over years and decades, is a form of cold violence…This slow violence, this cold violence, no less than the other kind, ought to be looked at and understood.

Where “hot” violence is spectacular, crude, and easily perceptible by virtue of its unconcealed aggressiveness, “cold” violence is its slow and more refined expression; “a dizzying assemblage of laws and bylaws, contracts, ancient documents, force, amendments, customs, religion, conventions and sudden irrational moves, all mixed together and imposed with the greatest care.”

Echoing previous deconstructions of the relationship between violence and the state (from Franz Fanon, Hanna Arendt, and Zygmunt Bauman to Achille Mbembe and more recently Gyanendra Pandey), Cole’s spectrum of violence powerfully extends our conceptual boundaries of the term in such a way as to expose its totality and provoke the reader in taking greater care towards recognizing violence as an embedded social/political phenomenon that is banally

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58 Rouhana and Sultany, 6; Molavi, Stateless Citizenship, 177.
59 Pandey, 8.
61 Ibid.
expressed through different structural and administrative forms and often hidden within its grammar of rule.

The shift in the articulation of Israeli strategy in Jerusalem since the 1987 Palestinian intifada illustrates a transition from the “cold” violence of Kollek’s tenure towards the “hot” violence of the Oslo era characterized by an emphasis on military/police repression and the elimination of Palestinian space all together. This is not to say that “hot” violence or more overtly coercive mechanisms of control, repression, and exclusion was not a feature of the politics and administration of Jerusalem from 1967-1987. Indeed, since June 1967 Israeli policy in the city has been shaped by a spectrum of overlapping and reinforcing mechanisms of violence and exclusion, ranging from home demolitions, expulsions, and detention to the bureaucratic apparatuses, discourses, and social/administrative practices that “operate on the individual and the population in order to produce new modes of behavior, habits, interests, tastes, and aspirations.” Nonetheless, the Oslo years illustrate a significant shift in emphasis at the local administrative level, where an approach of inclusive subordination that limited Palestinian space and political horizons in the city has collapsed and given way to more unbridled, zero-sum efforts towards the absolute domination of territory and the suffocation of the Palestinian national question. This transition has resulted in its own set of consequences, manifesting itself through an “emerging landscape of social and territorial separation” via the proliferation of checkpoints, gates, and now concrete barriers where Palestinian residents are hemmed into “the new ghetto walls” of Jerusalem. In other words, as this dissertation has emphasized, Kollek’s administrative approach for Jerusalem from 1967-1987 should not to be understood as an opposing strategy and set of national priorities to long-held national principles and objectives at the national level (that is, the Judaization of space and the inculcation of Israeli political, territorial, and demographic hegemony) but rather as a particular expression of said principles and objectives rooted in its own strategic and ontological frameworks; an expression of violence and structure of rule that that should be identified and scrutinized on its own terms.

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62 Gordon, 3.
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