Fiscal Policy in an Italian Commune:
A Study of the Lucchese

*Gabella Maggiore*, 1373-1410

by

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Abstract
This thesis presents an economic analysis of late medieval Lucca in the context of its political culture and an evolving legislative tradition. In the thirty years following Lucca’s emancipation from Pisa in 1369, the constituents of this nominally popular republic gradually accepted the hegemony of a single clan of silk merchants and international bankers, the Guinigi family. The evident acquiescence to disenfranchisement on the part of middle and upper class citizens flies in the face of assumptions about political struggle and honor exchange in the premodern Italian republics. In this study, I work towards a better understanding of the nature of this quiet revolution from the perspective of the city’s economic fortunes during that thirty-year period, as viewed through the records of its central customs house. To that end, I have focused on the documentary output of a single institution, the tax office called the court of the gabella maggiore. The gabella maggiore was the tariff on most goods entering or leaving the city; notaries working at the central clearing house registered manifests for every shipment that passed its threshold, the counterparts of the physical licenses issued to taxpayers for safe conduct. My approach relies on the rich survival of customs registers between 1373 and 1410, whose entries collectively provide a profile of urban commercial and industrial activity at the turn of the fifteenth century. By observing Lucchese commerce through the lens of fiscal policy, a topic has rightly received so much attention as a nexus of public and private interests in neighboring Florence and
northern Italy in general, I aim to present a narrative that runs parallel to and informs the political history of the city in this period. The majority of the thesis, however, presents an institutional history of the *gabella maggiore* and a thorough analysis of three urban industries and the fiscal legislation designed to foster them. Ultimately, I found that my material describes an ever-weakening market for local products, a picture completed by contemporary laments about failing businesses and poor fiscal health in the minutes of the city’s republican government. In the eyes of Lucca’s merchant-oligarchs, this economic decline threatened to destroy the precious independence of Lucca by fostering emigration, decreasing production, and consequently lowering the revenues of the customs tariff. The governing councils were often slow to respond to these threats because of constitutional obstacles and what I describe as a lack of confidence and consensus within the inner oligarchy. Operating under high pressure in an environment that discouraged experimentation, the councilors more readily reacted to the advice of expert bureaucrats, including the chief magistrate of the *gabella maggiore*, and “invited” advisors not currently serving on the high councils. In the end, I suggest that there may be an informative link between these informal modes of ceding authority and the formal devolution of the state upon Paolo Guinigi in 1400.
Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Lawrin Armstrong (University of Toronto). He has helped direct my project from my first steps to the finish line, and I have always found in him an accessible and genial mentor, generous with his advice and his time. My thanks also go to Drs. Nicholas Terpstra (U of T) and Mark Jurdjevic (York University), my committee advisors, both of whom have aided in the development of my research portfolio outside of the doctoral program. All three have been encouraging and dedicated to my success throughout this process, and I will miss the collegiality of our committee meetings.

Next, I would like to thank Dr. Christine Meek (Emeritus, Trinity College Dublin), who first pointed me to the *gabella maggiore* fonds and helped introduce me to the archive in Lucca. Whenever we found ourselves in the reading room together, I relied on her absolute mastery of the medieval collection to help advance my own research. Since then, she has been a reliable source of advice for my project and its various twists and turns. I would also like to thank Dr. Julius Kirshner (Emeritus, University of Chicago), who heard about my interest in Lucca early on and directed me to Dr. Meek.

I also want to thank the staff at the Archivio di Stato in Lucca, including Dr. Sergio Nelli, supervisor of the Sala di Studio; I especially thank Giovanni Rasa and Valentina Simonetti, who supplied my constant requests for more *gabella maggiore* registers with few comments on my broken Italian. The warm welcome I received at the archive was itself a strong motivation for my research.

Finally, my most heartfelt thanks go to my partner, Terri, without whose patience and support the completion of this dissertation would not have been possible. To the extent that the following is readable, credit her editing skills – where it is not, blame my stubbornness.
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### Abbreviations

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<td>ASLu</td>
<td>Archivio di Stato di Lucca</td>
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<td>AAL</td>
<td>Anziani Avanti la Libertà</td>
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<td>AaTdL</td>
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<td>ASpi</td>
<td>Archivio di Stato di Pisa</td>
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### Notes on Citations

1) Where possible, I have provided the date of an entry and the officiating body in square brackets; for the *Riformagioni*, this may also include the following abbreviations for the council within which a given petition or ordinance was delivered:

- **Az:** Anziani (alone, or with *invitati*)
- **CG:** Consiglio Generale or General Council (usually of 180)
- **Sp:** Special committee, such as a *balìa* committee meeting
- **Thirty-Six:** Council of Thirty Six
- **Twenty-Four:** Committee of Twenty Four on *Balia*, elected in May 1392

2) If the Latin text of a citation is absent, it may be found in the appendix to that chapter under the number given in the footnote.
Introduction

Lucca, was a former Roman colony that had served as the seat of a Lombard duchy and was a significant player in the early communal period. It sits in a wide plain below the lower valley of the Serchio, which winds through the mountainous Garfagnana before cutting westwards towards an innavigable mouth on the Tyrrhenian Sea. The population of Lucca and its hinterland in this period have been the subject of some disagreement; Christine Meek favors an estimate of around ten thousand inhabitants at the end of the Trecento, roughly a quarter the size of Florence.\(^1\) In terms of its industrial profile, Lucca had been an important center of silk cloth production since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and managing this industry remained a central preoccupation for the entrepreneurial merchant-bankers who continued to hold a dominant position within the local hierarchy.\(^2\) Besides silk, Lucca exported iron and timber to the Pisan shipyards, large quantities of oranges and pine nuts to Florence, and governed an internationally renowned swordsmithy in Villabasilica. Like any city of its size, it imported large quantities of cheese, salt fish, wine, and oil from its hinterland and from abroad via Genoa and Pisa.

In March 1369, the leaders of Lucca purchased their autonomy from Pisa by bribing the emperor Charles IV, relying on the aid of creditors in Florence, Padua, and Venice. With this decision, taken at great expense, the Lucchesi turned their backs on despotism, represented by the city of Pisa and its ruler Giovanni dell’Agnello, and chose Libertas. They were very proud of what they had done, and the next year they inaugurated an altar “to those lord saints who had been there on that day when our most gracious lord, Charles the Fourth, emperor of the Romans, freed this city from Pisan tyranny.”\(^3\) Despite the intercession of these anonymous saints, the common term for this

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\(^{1}\) Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400, 24–25. The population of the contado is also difficult to gauge during this period, largely because of rapid depopulation and repopulation occasioned by plague, famine, and military activity: see Bratchel, Medieval Lucca and the Evolution of the Renaissance State, 84–98. See also Leverotti, Popolazione, famiglie, insediamento.

\(^{2}\) Del Punta, “Lucca E Il Commercio Della Seta Nel Duecento.”

\(^{3}\) CG 1, p. 287 (29/3/1370 | Sp)
shrine was “the Altar of Liberty” (*altar libertatis*): in their cathedral church of San Martino, the Lucchesi had built a space for the worship of political freedom.⁴

The political constitution of the Lucchese republic after 1369 was *a commune* until 1372 and *a popolo* afterwards, a transition marked by the removal of several magnate families from the higher offices. Those offices consisted of: a 180-man General Council, elected for six-month terms, which had authority over any changes to the statutes promulgated in 1372; a nine-man priorate called the Anziani, led by the Standardbearer of Justice, elected for two-month terms via sortition; and the senatorial Thirty-Six, which sat for six-month terms and, alongside the Anzianate, assisted in most of the electoral processes. As Meek has shown, these offices, even accounting for mandatory vacation periods, could be filled by a relatively small number of individuals that overly represented an even smaller number of families, a group she termed the inner oligarchy.⁵ The *popolo minuto* was never represented to any significant decree in these inner councils, nor in the numerous *balie* and special committees to which these councils periodically delegated their power. This study of political engagement and responsibility, therefore, is highly specific to a small group of families, mostly silk merchants, over a thirty-year period.

But in October 1400, thirty years after purchasing the freedom of Lucca at high cost, this same governing class of silk entrepreneurs and international merchants packed up the constitutional furniture of their “reconstructed republic”. They handed the keys to the city over to the Guinigi family, whose supporters then held a dominant share in the councils of the declining republic, and named Paolo Guinigi the Captain and Protector of their city. In Latin, his honorific was framed as *magnificus et potens dominus, lucanus dominus*: the magnificent and mighty lord, the Lord of Lucca. Three decades separated subordination to Pisa and outright subjection to a prince.

The interesting part of this story for me is not the loss of liberty. One might say that absorption and accession are the main themes of late medieval and early Renaissance Tuscany. Just looking around Lucca, we can see independent states falling like dominoes as Florence devours Pescia (1339), San Miniato (1347), Prato (1351), and even Pisa.

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⁴ E.g. CG 7, p. 104 (14/6/1379)
(1406), before itself accepting Medici hegemony (1434). On its own, not even the
dramatic disconnect between the Altar of Liberty and the Lord of Lucca is terribly
unique. Florentinists have a troubling dichotomy of their own: the republican ideology of
Salutati and Bruni sitting alongside the reality of Cosimo and the territorial state. Self-
contradiction was hardly a Lucchese monopoly in this period.

Rather, the striking feature here is the relative calm with which the Lucchesi
witnessed the crowning of their new prince and their own disenfranchisement. As
Christine Meek has noted, they were hardly in need of salvation from some immediate
threat. On the contrary, in the year 1400, Lucca was at peace and no more indebted than
it had been a year before; Paolo Guinigi was pro-Visconti, but that was the leaning of the
entire state by dint of his family’s influence. Moreover, the Guinigi were hardly in a
strong position at the time of Paolo’s accession. The first blow to their power was the
February 1400 assassination of Paolo’s brother Lazzare, the head of the family since the
death of their father Francesco in 1385; the death of Paolo’s uncles Michele and
Bartolomeo and his cousins Lazzare and Giovanni over the next eight months continued
to erode their control of the republic. Regardless, in October, Paolo got himself elected as
Captain and Defender of Lucca, and soon after promoted to Signore.

Christine Meek, in her magisterial history of the restored republic of 1369, rightly
notes the ambivalence felt towards Paolo in Lucca, a vague recognition of his
unworthiness to be Lazzare di Francesco’s successor that pervaded not only the oligarchy
as a whole but even, apparently, the Guinigi family itself. He was young, barely as old as
Lucca’s newfound Libertas, and unpopular, but somehow he took full control of the city
by New Year’s day 1401. The alteration to the constitution was swift and severe: he had
dissolved the priorate of nine “Ancients” – the Anziani – the senatorial council of Thirty-
Six, and the 180-man General Council. Overnight, the avenues to political participation
enjoyed up to that point by the merchant oligarchy of Lucca had vanished, replaced by
representation on the basis of access to the prince. The transition cost only a single man
his life, and that victim had been part of a plot led by Paolo’s cousin.

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9 Ibid., 343. Besides anonymous complaints before his accession, in late 1400 Paolo was opposed by a
conspiracy led by his own cousin Niccolò – the bishop of Lucca, to add insult to injury. This led to the
execution of Bartolomeo da Aramo, the sole casualty described below.
To be sure, Paolo had the support of the Visconti and armed men in the countryside, but he won his title through a vote, not conquest. The Guinigi supremacy began with a bit more blood, on 12 May 1392, when their faction eliminated all its rivals over the course of a single day of street fighting and murder. By the morning after, Forteguerra Forteguerra had been defenestrated from the Palazzo dei Signori – at the time, he was the Standardbearer of Justice, leader of the priorate, whatever that was worth –, his brother Bartolomeo, a judge, had been decapitated by Guinigi hirelings, and their allies, the Rapondi brothers, were making for the countryside. Besides these leaders of the enemy faction, an emergency council banned six men from office, condemned six others to exile, and over the next few months business got back to usual under Lazzare Guinigi’s close eye.

This pruning of the merchant elite ruined lives and destroyed companies, but it did not cause a long-term breakdown of public order. The General Council immediately granted its authority to the reform committee assembled after the streetfighting died down. This kind of delegation of super-constitutional power was called the balìa – a term used interchangeably by contemporaries and historians for both a certain type of emergency power and the committees that wielded it. After receiving this, the Guinigi-backed balìa of Twenty-Four effectively operated in a state of exception, robust enough to draft new electoral lists and purge the government of hostile elements.\(^\text{10}\) The head of the family at the time, Lazzare, was content to function as a primus inter pares, personally occupying positions of power only when strips of paper bearing his name were drawn in sortition. To be sure, his name was on every electoral list after 1392, but it was also true that at least a few Guinigi men had been on every list since 1369.

When Lazzare was murdered in February 1400, the Guinigi were in no immediate danger of losing control of the republican government, although matters got worse with the death of other influential family members that summer and the early fall. As Meek notes, Lucchesi at the time were expecting the diminution of Guinigi influence due to this

\(^{10}\) The ratification of the Twenty-Four by the General Council recalls the “commissarial dictatorship” described in Carl Schmitt’s Die Diktatur (as described by Agamben: 9/15/17 4:00:00 PM). By turning to balìa in its times of need, the Lucchese government was constantly toggling into this ‘exceptional’ mode of decision-making. The emergence of the Guinigi as a sovereign power in this period was not an unexpected consequence of this model of governance.
rapid die-off, a return to the *status quo ante* 1392. But Paolo, Lazzare’s young brother, defied them all and summoned a friendly *balìa* committee to elect him Captain and Defender in October 1400. The only expression of opposition, according to Meek, was “grumbling” – the idea of a Lord of Lucca evidently seemed, for lack of a better word, a bit *gauche*, but nothing to get too upset over.

To paraphrase an apt formulation by Paolo Cammarosano, there never really was a medieval commune that did not recognize a superior authority. Lucca may have gone too far in the opposite direction, in fact. While it enjoyed its independence, Lucca consistently emphasized its weakness and poverty in official correspondence with the pope, the emperor, neighboring republics, and proto-Renaissance princes. The Guinigi family, from a certain perspective, emerged from the ranks of the inner oligarchy as a kind of ‘internal’ superior to the republican government, and it certainly occupied a commanding role after May 1392. But the Guinigi principate was not a foregone conclusion from the start. It would have been unthinkable in the heady days after March 1369, when the merchants and wealthy artisans were clearly enthusiastic about managing their newly emancipated city.

For me, the central question that arises from this story is: How did the Lucchesi go from shouting “*Libertas!*” in 1369 to praising “*Signore!*” in 1400? In other words, what had shifted within the political culture of the city that the urban elite was willing to accept the annihilation of a republic that had cost them so much to restore? And, on the other hand, how had a young man who had been born just before the first Liberty Day Parade come to consider the republican government a negotiable quantity? Eventually, I would like to better understand why the rise of this prince, a single head which took the place of many heads of household by dissolving the priorate and the governing councils of the city, was by no means unthinkable in Lucca at the end of the fourteenth century.

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12 Ibid., 342.
13 Cammarosano, “Le subordinazioni delle città toscane a Firenze fra tardo medioevo e prima età moderna,” 26.: “Ciò che ci induce a ricordare come nel medioevo delle città non siano mai esistite pie autonomie totali, non sia mai realmente esistita una entità comunale “superiorem non recognoscens”, ma si siano sempre riconosciute alte sovranità, certo qualificate nel tempo in base al carattere più o meno formale, più o meno condizionante, più o meno continuo nel tempo, della loro superiorità politica. Le comunità cittadine si sentirono costantemente inserite entro una gerarchia di poteri, che nemmeno fu sempre chiaramente definita.”
This study is primarily an analysis of the Lucchese economy after the restoration of the republic, but I consider it to be a first step towards this goal. The merchant-bankers who ran Lucca were heavily invested in local silk production, which they managed by importing raw silk from abroad. The products of this industry were then marketed abroad as part of family banking operations, primarily in France and the Low Countries. Besides the private interests of its oligarchs, the government of Lucca also depended for its revenues on the economic well-being of a variety of other industrial establishments, such as the tannery and the rural foundries, and the steady consumption of mundane and luxury goods on the part of its citizenry. Understanding the vitality of the Lucchese marketplace during this period, therefore, is fundamental to understanding the pressures on members of the city’s governing class in their private and public lives.

In order to investigate the local and regional economy, I have catalogued a sample of the city’s customs registers, thirteen semesters spread over the forty years between 1370 and 1410. In the years covered by my sample – 1373, 1378, 1385, 1387, 1392, 1397, 1401, and 1410 – these registers contain records for the bulk of trade that entered or left the city of Lucca as well as the major shipments passing through the Lucchesia. These entries were produced by tax officials administering a broad-based tariff called the *gabella maggiore*, the “major toll” of the city, paid by both major merchants and minor artisans trafficking in goods over a certain value, and each brief contains a manifest tabulating the items in a given shipment. My focus on this *gabella maggiore*, an indirect tax on commerce with analogues in most contemporary Italian city-states, seemed a sensible avenue of inquiry into the political culture of the city for two reasons. First, political power in Lucca rested in the hands of merchants and well-to-do artisans, primarily those associated with the silk industry, and this was an area of administration in which they would have been materially interested. Second, the records of the *gabella maggiore* compiled between 1369 and 1414 have survived at an exceptional rate.

Lucca’s *gabella maggiore* was essentially a gate toll or tax on commercial activity, a specific type of contract fee that has not received much attention in and of
itself.\textsuperscript{15} In some places and at some times, the gate gabelle was farmed out to private collectors, but Lucca’s public customs administration appears to have been a permanent fixture since at least the mid-\textit{Trecento}.\textsuperscript{16} Its entry-books, which list in detail the contents of each shipment coming and going from the central customs house, have also survived at a uniquely high rate. The closest comparison, the books of the Roman \textit{dogana} studied by Arnold Esch, date to nearly a century later.\textsuperscript{17} According to Salvatore Bongi, the survival between 1339 and 1414 of so many \textit{gabella maggiore} registers owes to the fact that these were mistakenly stored in the public notarial archive, whereas all gabelle registers from after the deposition of Paolo Guinigi in 1430 have been lost.\textsuperscript{18} My sample is largely random, and it contains major gaps owing to the spotty survival of registers in the 1380s and the poor state of some of the registers from the 1370s. The trend-lines from year to year are therefore somewhat weak, so I have focused on presenting the salient features of commerce in each year rather than establishing firm diachronic trends.

Beyond the customs registers, my sources also include a broad survey of the \textit{Riformagioni}, the published reforms of the Anziani and Lucca’s legislative and executive councils, among them the Council of Thirty-Six, the General Council, and various \textit{balie}. To sort through this significant body of information, I focused on legislation and petitions touching on the Lucchese economy, and in particular items that affected the \textit{gabella maggiore} itself. By transcribing this material into a relational database, I have been able to develop an image of the economy with which to contextualize the economic policy drafted by the councils represented in the \textit{Riformagioni}. I supplemented this research by tabulating neighborhood censuses (\textit{Estimi}), staff rosters declared at the Court of Merchants (\textit{Corte de’ Mercanti}), and lists of elected officials and council rosters in the \textit{Riformagioni}. My goal in this thesis is a total review of the \textit{gabella maggiore} as a piece of legislation and an urban magistracy.

\textsuperscript{15} The gate gabelle, when discussed, tends to be associated with taxes on butchered meat, retail wine, and oil; the gate gabelle was different from these insofar as it touched on a much wider variety of goods and therefore relied on much more complicated calculations of price and taxable value.


\textsuperscript{17} Esch, \textit{Aspetti della vita economica e culturale a Roma nel quattrocento}.

\textsuperscript{18} Bongi, \textit{Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca}, vol. 2, 35–36.
From the start, I did not plan this study as an overview of foreign policy or dynastic disputes, although these are interesting topics in the history of late medieval and early Renaissance Lucca. The quintessential source on such material for my period is Christine Meek’s *Lucca 1369-1400*, upon which I have relied heavily. But nor does the importance I place on the records of the *gabella maggiore* or documents regarding fiscal policy in general mean that this study concerns itself solely with political economy or material culture. In fact, the registers of the *gabella maggiore* deserve much more attention than they will receive in this dissertation; they are an excellent source on a number of topics only loosely related to my thesis, such as the commercial and industrial integration of Lucca and its wide-ranging hinterland. In particular, the iron trade, whose rural workers were seemingly integrated by urban merchants under duress during this period, demands further investigation; I have also omitted my research into alimentary policy and the consumption of foreign fats and spices, since it fell outside the remit of this study.

My work on the *gabella maggiore*, too, builds on the strong historiographical tradition for premodern Italian institutions. Most relevant in this category is the research of Arnold Esch, who has published several studies on the Roman customs tariff in the sixteenth century on the basis of registers very similar to those of the *gabella maggiore*. Broadly speaking, the most definitive research on the material constitution of a medieval Italian city-state is the grand thèse of Charles M. de la Roncière, published in three volumes: the first two in French; the third, which specifically concerns roads, commercial activity, and planned markets, in Italian. De la Roncière’s article on medieval Florentine tariffs is one of the few works completely devoted to the gabelles, although almost every monograph touching on finances in the Italian communes discusses the indirect tax system.

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19 I initially intended to study the market integration of city and *contado* in the manner of Epstein’s *An Island for Itself*; the material is present in the records of the *gabella maggiore* for such an inquiry.
20 E.g. Esch, *Economia e società a Roma tra Medioevo e Rinascimento*.
21 De La Roncière, *Prix et salaires à Florence au XIVe siècle (1280-1380)*, vols. 1–2; ibid., *Firenze e le sue campagne nel Trecento*.
22 De La Roncière, “Indirect Taxes or ‘Gabelles’ at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs and Problems of Collection.”
Besides material culture, fiscal policy is one of the central objects of this inquiry, but I am not primarily interested in the longue durée implications of the choices made by the Lucchese high councils. This thesis does not deal extensively with the Tilly thesis about state development and the pressures of war, nor will I discuss the development of a self-reinforcing efficient (‘Weberian’) bureaucracy as an antecedent to Renaissance state-building. The relationship between regime choice and fiscal policy is certainly worth studying over a broader geographical and temporal span, but this is a more narrow study, limited to forty years of republican Lucca. Comparisons to Florence during this period, while unavoidable, are especially inappropriate with reference to state formation; late Trecento Lucca was not equipped to rule over a large territorial state, as its inner oligarchy knew only too well.

Rather, my research on the legislative tradition of the city’s governing councils has focused on where it intersected with that material culture revealed by the records of the gabella maggiore, in particular when those bodies directly modified the rates or application of indirect taxes. With this, my study aims to understand how Lucchese merchant-councilors informed themselves about issues related to the economy and to what extent they engaged proactively with the process of legislation. By proactively, I mean whether they attempted to craft legislation to prevent future predicted crises or as a response to current crises. Beyond that, again with regards to communication, I have attempted to determine whether the governing elites of the republic were able to rely on their own expertise, as a technocracy of merchants, within the realm of commerce and industry. Finally, I have tried to see if and to what extent the activities of this group changed over time. With regard to my long-term research goals, I wanted to get a sense of whether or not their effective renunciation of self-representation in November 1400 was an event along a continuum or a sudden break with the previous tendencies of the merchant elite.

Assigning praise and blame is not my goal in this study, and I make no judgments as to the moral quantity of responsibility or irresponsibility with respect to serving the

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23 Although the person of ser Giovanni Linelli, the tax official who appears in each chapter of this text, does serve as a sort of ‘anti-Chabodian’ bureaucrat. His effective management of the gabella maggiore paved the way to a position from which to do harm to the republic.
Lucchese republic. But I want to follow along a thread put forward half a century ago by Donald Queller. Writing about the public service tradition of the Venetian nobility, he concluded that the richest members of the patriciate were more likely to shirk ambassadorships and supervisory roles at home and abroad than their less wealthy peers.\footnote{Queller, “The Civic Irresponsibility of the Venetian Nobility,” 231–32.} Queller’s admission that the Venetian nobility was capable of “self-sacrifice” in moments of necessity seems an attempt to soften his stark interpretation, which sits among more optimistic theories of Renaissance civic virtue bound up in contemporary politics. Living amidst the compound financial crises that began in 2008, we are that much more prepared to call into question the responsibility of oligarchs, and their ability to fulfill those responsibilities, towards the societies that protect them. As Wolfgang Streeck wrote in 2013, “Never since the Second World War have the governments of the capitalist West looked so clueless; never behind the façades of equanimity and tried political craftsmanship have there been so many indications of blind panic.”\footnote{Streeck, \textit{Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism}, 10.} It may be an opportune moment to continue the dissection of political engagement and aptitude in the premodern world, along the lines of Anthony Molho’s theory that internal dynamics, rather than external pressures, determined the shape of a state’s administrative program.\footnote{Molho, \textit{Firenze nel Quattrocento}, 165–202.}

The results of my research are presented here in four interconnected chapters, which together serve as both an institutional history of the \textit{gabella maggiore} and an analysis of political culture in Lucca over the last thirty years of the fourteenth century through the lens of the tariff. Chapter one, entitled “The Gates and the Court”, covers the physical positioning of the office and officials of the \textit{gabella maggiore} within the late medieval city and provides a description of the process of levying the tax on goods in transit. Chapter two, “The Statutes”, recounts the history of the customs tariff in Lucca and its importance as a piece of policy within the fiscal administration of the restored republic; the end of this chapter presents a comparative analysis of a statute of the \textit{gabella maggiore} from 1372 and the statutes of Florence, Bologna, and Pisa. Next, in “The Shape of Trade”, I clarify the limits of the \textit{gabella maggiore} registers as a record of the contemporary economy, and there follows a full review of trends observed in my
sample of eight years between 1373 and 1410. Finally, chapter four, “Legislating for Lucchese Industry”, brings the themes of the previous three chapters together to provide a discursive study of three industries in late medieval Lucca – the tannery, the wool cloth industry, and the silk cloth industry – as subjects of legislation. Finally, I offer my conclusions concerning the legislative activity of Lucchese politicians during the restored republic and what I believe to be the implications of their growing reliance on ‘expert’ advice from outside the inner circle of the oligarchy.

To end this introduction, I would like to present a quotation from the *Riformagioni* that the reader might want to keep in mind throughout this study. This is part of a prologue to a set of austerity measures proposed in 1388:

> Considering how much it cost us to purchase the hope of liberty, and having seen how costly a thing it is to retain liberty as we have done, and how it would be such an accursed act to let it go that one would rather be shorn of life, these citizens have examined all ways forward. But, considering on the other hand that preserving the unity of our citizens is itself a worthy cause, and seeing how much we ought to take care lest a direct tax or forced loan create from this a division among our citizens, we should take care to rebuild the commune not in that way but by more appropriate and less hateful means – as a commune that can sustain and safeguard its own independence, as seems to be necessary at the moment. The following seem to be those means.36

This tension, between the sweetness of liberty and the material cost of maintaining it, is the central theme of this study. In the political environment of late medieval Lucca, there was no sugarcoating the fact that the autonomy of the communal government demanded significant expenditure of both time and money. Most of the inner oligarchy dithered about how exactly to split this burden or whether or not the costs outweighed the benefits

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36 CG 10, p. 485 (19/6/1388 | CG): *Et considerato quanto la speranza de la liberta ci gosto a ricomprare, et veduto quanto caracosa e posseder liberta come faciamo, et quanto sare da biasmare lo lassarla perdere che prima si vorebbe esser di vita privo. Onde ricercate per quelli citadini tutte levie et raguardato che lo conservar de l unita de citadini e sufficiente cagione del contrario, et per tanto sia da levare che ne imposta ne presto si facesse a cio divisione intra citadini non sia ma per piu abile modo et meno odioso si provenga reintegrare lo comune che possa sostenere et salvare sua liberta come necessariamente si vede esser di bisogno, et li modi parebeno questi.*
of freedom. The value of authoritative or otherwise expert advice in the council chamber rose precipitously as the external pressures of war and economic decline drove those costs higher, ever higher. And, eventually, those willing to invest in the state found that some of their peers were more than willing to divest themselves of their responsibilities to avoid those same costs.
On February 21st, 1373, “the treasurer [of the gabella maggiore] received, in the place of fifteen lire, eighteen soldi, the sum of four florins, one lira, eighteen soldi, six denari, all from Opizo Onesti, for six-hundred and thirty-five pounds of silk manufactures in three bales, which arrived from Bologna on the 13th of February and were to be shipped today to Motrone.” Before talking about what the record can tell us about this particular merchant, before discussing the reasons for which this Bolognese silk came through Lucca, and well before addressing how Opizo Onesti felt about paying the gabella maggiore and how that affected his decision-making when he sat in the highest governmental councils – all important topics for this study – we need to understand how this statement came down to us from the moment that it describes. In the introduction I presented what is known, largely through Salvatore Bongi, about the provenance of the gabella maggiore registers. Here I begin to tackle their contents with a critical eye: who wrote these records, where did they write them, and what standards did they employ? The answers to these questions will indicate how well we can trust the records of the gabella maggiore, and, to the extent that we can determine this, where their creators’ biases are likely to muddle our findings.

Despite the fact that it defines such matters for other tax farms (proventus or proventi), the 1372 statutes of the gabella maggiore make no mention of how many officials were to man its customs house or their duties. An image of this fiscal institution has to be reconstructed from oblique references in petitions, protocols, and proclamations. The story that emerges from these documents lays bare the power dynamic between the merchant-oligarchy controlling the city’s governing councils and the officials who administered its will. Although the members of the governing councils held theoretical control over the court of the gabella maggiore and its protocols, they proved unwilling to embrace their role as supervisors. And even after the court came to

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1 GM 13, f. 44v: Ab Opiso de Honestis pro libris vi` xxv laborerii de seta in tribus ballis conductis de bononia die xiii februarii et conducendis hodie de civitate lucana ad motronem habuit pro libris xv s.xviii – flor. iii, l. i, s.xviii, d.vi. Several members of the Onesti family, including Opizo, were well-established and politically influential silk merchants; Opizo himself was the head of a silk firm recorded in 1372 and 1381: ASLu, Corte de’ Mercanti 83, p. 12; Corte de’ Mercanti 84, f. 9v.
be managed by less prestigious individuals – notaries rather than trained jurists – the elite were happy to cede ever more authority to the court’s administrators.

But to better situate the court and its appendages within the urban geography, I will first present an overview of the streetscape of medieval Lucca. The layout of the city and the location of the court are not trivial details in this study, since each entry in the registers of the *gabella maggiore* describes a discrete historical event bounded both spatially and temporally. At its core, this study addresses the political and social impact of the *gabella maggiore*, but its records are unique precisely because of the difficulties involved in accounting for all taxable commercial activity in the late fourteenth century. The logistics of applying customs tariffs like the *gabella maggiore*, down to the location of the city gates and the streets along which muleteers and peddlars passed, determined the specificity and ‘catch-rate’ of our written records. More importantly, such details also affected the lived experience of all people who occupied the city in the late Trecento.

1.1 Entering the City

The customs tariff is a relatively simple fiscal mechanism. It relies on consumption or production necessitating local or interregional transportation of goods and, applied as a per-transaction fee, delivers some percentage of the value of this traffic to the fisc. Ideally, the state thereby guarantees certain protections for the taxpayer and his or her merchandise, but the tax is an arbitrary impost. Variations to this tax exist, many of which became the subject of experiments carried out by the elite of fourteenth-century Lucca. Rather than a flat rate, a tariff may be modulated using a sliding scale based on the value or local context of the trafficked goods, or it might be applied differently based on the persons, nations, or economic sectors involved in the transaction.\(^2\) A state might, as Lucca did, attempt to harness the industrial and alimentary demands of foreign polities by taxing traffic along roads through its territory, rather than

\(^2\) The Lucchese system, which relied on personnel attached to the gates and a central clearing house for shipments, was not the only way of administering a tariff. Smaller communes, such as Empoli (see Guerrini’s description of the *gabella della piazza* in *Ricerche su l’affermazione e lo sviluppo dell’economia Empolese del Rinascimento: 1429-1528*, 4:98–100), applied the tariff at the place of transaction in addition to any contract fees.
solely taxing goods produced or consumed by its subjects. The Lucchese government constructed this complex of privileges, revenue targets, and legal ideals on the capacity of a taxing agency to capture and assess commercial traffic, but the intensity of that traffic reflected the physical situation of the city within the interregional framework of roads, rivers, and other conduits of trade.³

Many roads passed through medieval Lucca, but the most famous was certainly the Via Francigena.⁴ Originally a sequence of several Roman viae publicae, by the turn of the first millennium it had become known as a convenient path for ultramontane pilgrims travelling to Rome.⁵ A terse travelogue of the tenth century, written from the perspective of an archbishop wending his way north to England after his formal investiture, lists Lucca among the safe havens along this road.⁶ The popularity of the Volto Santo, a cruciform reliquary housed in the cathedral of San Martino, presumably grew during the early medieval period as the result of a steady stream of French and English peregrini making a sojourn in the city.⁷ Of course, the highway to the seat of Christendom was not always a source of safety for those living along its path, particularly when unemployed mercenary companies followed the pilgrim’s trail south during the Hundred Years War. Caferro, for example, has suggested that the downfall of Siena, an otherwise prosperous city-state before the fourteenth century, was precipitated by its status as an age-old stop on the francigena.⁸ To be sure, Siena was situated just to the south of territory that

³ Bratchel, Medieval Lucca and the Evolution of the Renaissance State. For a ‘pre-history’ of the Lucchese contado, see Wickham, The Mountains and the City: The Tuscan Appennines in the Early Middle Ages, 90–133.
⁴ Stopani’s dedicated monograph, La Via Francigena: Una strada europea nell’Italia del Medioevo., provides a concise history of the road from its Roman origins into a major commercial artery. Cf. Esch, Wege nach Rom, 19–21.
⁵ As Louis Green has noted, unlike coastal Massa, Lucca also benefited from the gradual derangement of the Roman road network. “Lucca was strategically placed on what was, after the malarial swamps led the old Roman coast road of the Via Aurelia to fall into disuse, the most direct and convenient means of communication by land between Rome and north-western Europe”: Green, Castruccio Castracani, 13..
⁶ Sigeric of Canterbury (d. 994), who was travelling from Rome, stayed in Lucca between San Genesio and Luni. His account is preserved in the British Library, Cotton Tiberius B V/1, ff. 23v-24r (digitized).
⁷ By the mid-twelfth century, the miracles of the Volto Santo were evidently well-known enough to find their way into the via francigena travelogue of an Icelander, Nikolus of Munkathvera, the abbot of Thingor: Stopani, La Via Francigena: Una strada europea nell’Italia del Medioevo, 57–59. It was also during this period, according to Nubia Salani, that the principal churches and cathedral expanded their hostels for pilgrims: Salani, “La via Francigena, Itinerario storico da Altopascio a Lucca. Ospitalità ed assistenza sulla via del pellegrinaggio.”
⁸ Caferro, Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena.
witnessed the ‘other’ Hundred Years’ War between Florence and Milan, whereas the Lucchesia saw far less fighting in the last quarter of the fourteenth century than it had in the first. But Lucca still had to deal with the porosity of its borders, which lay open to travellers on all sides; wide plains spread from the Valdinievole to the coast, and the Garfagnana mountain range, which stretched well beyond a day’s travel from the city that owned it, is shot through with smaller river valleys. Some of these, like the Valdilima, which follows the Lima river as it branched off the Serchio, provided wide avenues for traffic between Lucca and its neighbors but were costly to manage and defend.⁹

Lucca itself occupied a central position on the wide plain separating the Garfagnana from the Alpi Pisani, bounded on the east by the Montagne Pistolesi and on the west by rolling hills leading down to the Tyrrhenian Sea. The Serchio itself, which turned westwards just a few kilometers north of the city, did not have the depth or breadth of the Arno to the south; prone to both flooding and drought, it ended in swampy flats along the sea rather than anything to rival the Porto Pisano. Although the river proved insufficient for large-scale transport to the sea, it did serve as the conduit for a lively lumber industry.¹⁰ Lucca did enjoy the use of a small port at Motrone, which served as a stepping-stone to Genoa, the main entrepôt for Lucchese silk cloth. But the city itself was situated on flat land with no bounding river or slopes, its location reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of the entire territory. Lucca was open to access for merchants and mercenaries travelling along the via francigena, with no natural fortifications to add to its artificial ones.

The modern walls of Lucca, completed in the seventeenth century, circumscribe an area larger than the medieval city but similar in shape. The main difference between the two forms lies on the eastern side, where the medieval walls separated the city and the suburbs (suburgi or sobborghi in contemporary records) along a north-south line. At the heart of the city, then as now, is the squared plot of the Roman town; at the nexus of this second-century grid is the market church of San Michele in Foro. North of this, on the east side of the arterial Via Fillungo, lies a circular piazza whose bounds incorporate the

remains of the Roman amphitheatre. The medieval city sprawled to include this ruin and
generous strips along the other three sides of the ancient zone.

Lucca’s geography of power changed dramatically over the course of the
fourteenth century. Up to the early fourteenth century, the seat of government was the
neighborhood surrounding the church of San Romano, a large basilica in the southwest
corner of the city. But the republican regime was driven from this primordial locus of
power after the rise of Castruccio Castracani, who gradually seized power in Lucca after
the city fell to Uguccione della Faggiuola in 1314. In the 1320s, Castracani built a
citadel, dubbed the *Augusta*, to serve as his own base of operations. This district
occupied the southwest quarter of the medieval city, and the warlord appropriated whole
blocks of private real estate to accomplish this. In the years to come, the remains of
Lucca’s communal government – the executive priorate (called the Anzianate in Lucca)
and its councils – moved to a complex on the north side of the Piazza San Michele.

The Augusta was only a few hundred meters south of San Michele in Foro, but,
with its own bell-tower, its own gates, and its own churches, it functioned as a city within
a city – a natural base of operations. It came to serve non-Lucchese overlords in that
very function in the decades after Castracani’s early death; indeed, the anonymous Pisan
chronicler identified the Augusta as not only the symbol but the primary tool of Lucchese
subjection. By the time the city’s elite purchased its freedom in 1369, the Augusta had
acquired the indelible stain of domination, and it could hardly revert to a residential
district. Therefore, the palace complex near San Michele in Foro, which housed the
Anziani during the Pisan occupation, was left to the revived office of the podestà, while

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11 As Onori has recently noted, the district taken over by the Augusta was originally home to the Consiglio
del Popolo and the public archive cum armory (the Terzanaia), so this move was also a homecoming of
sorts for the republican government; see Onori, “Città del potere, poteri in città. La fortezza Augusta e
l’organizzazione dello spazio urbano in Lucca nel primo Trecento,” 215.
12 The most complete history of this period is Green, *Castruccio Castracani*.
13 Ibid., 106–12.
14 Appropriated, but did not destroy outright; for a summary, see Rubinstein, “Fortified Enclosures in
Italian Cities under Signori,” 3–4.
15 It was not really a castle, according to Louis Green, but rather “an inner city” or “a walled-in section”
that secured the section of town within which Castracani himself was already resident: *Castruccio
Castracani*, 106.
16 *Cronica Di Pisa*, 237: *E per questo castello sempre sine a qui funno poi sottoposti ad altri, come per
inanssi è ditto, e chiamavasi questo castello lo castello l’Ogosta;* this is the reason cited by the chronicler
for its immediate destruction after the departure of the imperial vicar, Guy of Boulogne.
the priors and their legislative councils took over the heart of the old Augusta. As they tore down the walls separating the citadel from the rest of Lucca, they invested themselves with its robe of authority. They established or relocated a number of urban magistracies, including the court of the *gabella maggiore*, within its precinct.

Unlike the city’s internal dynamic, the urban perimeter remained more or less static throughout the fourteenth century. Traffic into Lucca flowed through four main gates: the Porta San Donato in the west; the Porta San Piero in the southwest; the Porta San Gervasio in the east; and the Porta di Borgo or Porta dei Borghi in the northeast. The latter two are still standing, engulfed by the modern city but visible; the Porta San Piero was incorporated into the early modern Porta San Piero, while the medieval Porta San Donato probably stood not far from the isolated Renaissance gate standing in the field north of the Piazza Verdi, a remnant of the 1491 walls. Other gates in the medieval walls did exist, but they remained low-traffic or were kept shut. In 1373, for example, the Franciscans petitioned the General Council to reopen a gate called the “Ponte della Fracta”, situated most likely on the west side of the modern Piazza San Francesco some two hundred metres north of the Porta San Gervasio. They intended to alleviate their impoverished state by collecting a fee for passage through this gate, but the plan is never mentioned again.

Two of the main gates were assigned a specific purpose within the late-medieval government’s plan to control and tax commerce. Tariffs on grain and butchered meat were paid at Porta San Piero, while Porta San Donato was the only gate through which

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17 For a thorough overview of this transfer, see Altavista, *Lucca e Paolo Guinigi, 1400-1430*, 8–12.
18 Andrea Zorzi, introducing Sercambi’s passage describing the destruction of the Augusta, notes that the urban citadel represented the rejection on the part of the *dominante* of the “ideologia civica dello spazio pubblica,” which the Anziani in turn reaffirmed by tearing down the walls in 1370: see Zorzi, *Le signorie cittadine in Italia (secoli XIII-XV)*, 129–31.
19 Naturally, Paolo Guinigi would choose the southwest corner of this zone for a new citadel in 1401; see Belli Barsali, *Guida di Lucca*, 22–23.
20 ASLu, CG 4, p. 37 (14/2/1373 | CG); it’s possible that part of the urban moat, the fossa, entered the city or fed a pool at this point: one Lodovico di messer Galvano Bovi’s scheme to dry, repair, and purchase fishing rights to the moat for 70 florins a year in 1387 mentions a spot called la fracta somewhere north of the Porta San Gervasio (CG 10.259 [10/5/1387 | CG]).
21 ASLu, ATL 2, p. 6 [17/4/1371 | Eighteen super Balia]; the responsibilities of Porta San Piero's *gabellieri* were sometimes passed around, as in ASLu, CG 13, p. 349 (29/7/1400 | special council), when the official at Porta San Donato was assigned a raise to tally grain in addition to his normal duties.
livestock were allowed to enter the city. These two gates presumably came to acquire this special status because of the direction assumed by Lucchese commerce: the former is oriented towards the pass to Pisa through the Alpi Pisani, while the latter looks to the bridges over the Serchio and the Tyrrhenian littoral. In other words, rather than redirect corn and animals to a dedicated gate, the fiscal authority instead expanded personnel at the two gates through which most trade was already flowing. The following chart indicates the level of traffic at the city’s four gates in the first half of 1392.

![Figure 1.1: Count of Shipments Entering Lucca, by Gate, Early 1392](image)

Figure 1.1 gives the total number of shipments imported through each gate. Well over three quarters of the porters entering Lucca in this semester came through the Porte San Piero and San Donato. For another perspective, the following chart presents the total pack animal loads (salme) brought in through each gate over the same period.

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22 ASLu, G.M. 1, f. 20v; with the promulgation of the 1399 statute, this duty was shifted to the Porta San Piero: ASLu, G.M. 2, p. 53; ibid., G.M. 3, p. 55.

23 Sources: ASLu, G.M. 54, 59, 64, 70.
While more traffic certainly passed through the Porta San Piero, which faced fertile hillsides and a major road to Pisa, the largest shipments came in through the Porta San Donato, that is, from the direction of the coast. In both charts, of course, traffic through the Porte di Borgo and San Gervasio lags far behind.\textsuperscript{25}

The strong southwest orientation of Lucchese traffic was not the product of central planning. Rather, as will be explored more fully in later chapters, Lucca's international merchants traditionally directed their merchandise to Genoa, particularly through the port at Motrone, or to Pisa, whether south along the littoral or through the gap in the Alpi Pisani. As the charts indicate, these routes were just as lively for imported goods, and the streets leading north from the Porta San Piero and east from San Donato to the market square at San Michele in Foro were the natural routes along which merchandise travelled through the city streets. The old Augusta, cradled between these two roads – roughly aligned to the modern Via San Paolino and Via Vittorio Veneto – was the ideal location for the headquarters of the \textit{gabella maggiore}, the magistracy

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} It must be noted that early 1392 was a period of plague, which suppressed commercial activity generally, and the Lucchesia was recovering from the damage dealt by Giangaleazzo Visconti’s discharged troops, who rampaged through the Garfagnana valley and the Val di Lima over the winter; see, for example, a special remission of taxes granted to the communes affected by an “invasion of unleashed armed companies” (\textit{invasione effrenarum gentium armorum}): ASLu, CG 12, p. 51 (20/2/1392 | CG)
designed to tax this traffic for the profit of the fisc. Moreover, it seems likely that the two gates nearer to the court of the *gabella maggiore* were especially convenient for special activities like tallying grain and butchered meat precisely because of their physical proximity to the court.\(^\text{26}\) The Porta di Borgo or San Gervasio may have been natural entry-points for grain and livestock, since both faced wide stretches of the Lucchese grain belt and the summer pastures of the Garfagnana mountains, but they were on the opposite side of town from the Augusta.\(^\text{27}\)

The charts above were not based on the master records written at the court of the *gabella maggiore*. Those registers contain the official copies of shipping licenses (*apodixa/e* or *apodissa/e*), and those licenses had no reason to list gates of entry and exit; after all, only a few foodstuffs were restricted to specific gates. Rather, the evidence for gate traffic comes from records left by the *portonarii* or *portonai*, also known as the *officiales portarum* – the gate officials.\(^\text{28}\) Each gate had one such official, almost always a notary, and he was tasked with policing outgoing trade by checking shipping licenses for all outgoing loads.\(^\text{29}\) He also directed incoming shipments to the court of the *gabella maggiore* upon arrival, and it was these imports that he noted in his handbook (the *libro di portonaio*).\(^\text{30}\) Each entry listed the name of a porter entering the city and the total number of loads (*salme*) in his shipment. The *libri di portonai* served primarily as a guarantee against illegal offloading before arrival at the court of the *gabella maggiore* –

\(^{26}\) Other offices linked to commercial activity were also located in the same area; for example, one discussion from the council records preceding Lucchese emancipation mentions a public grain store in the Augusta (*granum castri auguste*): AAL 41, p. 22 (11/2/1361 | Council of Fifty).

\(^{27}\) The north-facing Porta di Borgo, moreover, opened onto the Contrada San Leonardo, home to a number of abattoirs as indicated by a petition in 1383 by butchers complaining about sanitary regulations (CG 8, pp. 494-5 [28/4/1383 | Az]; again, in 1388, the urban butchers petitioned to have their traditional rights to pasturage along the Serchio north of the city as far as Matraia and Boveglio, two communes to the northeast: CG 11, p. 464 (22/4/1388 | Thirty-Six).

\(^{28}\) ASLu, GM 52-72, divided by gate.

\(^{29}\) Only seven out of 287 officiales portarum between 1370 and 1410 lacked the *ser* honorific; a decree from 1373 clarifies that these officials had to “look at all goods exported with licenses from the gabelle... mark his name in witness of this inspection, and note how they exited” (CG 3, p. 495 [20/1/1373 | Sp]: *Item quod officiales portarum debant omnes res deferendas cum apodixis gabelle modo superscripto ipsas res videre et apodixis in testimonium visionis suum nomen subscribere et notare qualiter exiverunt. Et aliter deferri non possint*).

\(^{30}\) This function is described in the Statute of 1372: “The officials are to make note and a written entry for goods sent to the court of the Gabella Maggiore in the book ordained for this purpose at the gate through which the goods were admitted” (GM 1, f. 44r: *Statuimus... quod portonarii... teneantur et debeant... de talibus mercantii et rebus que mitterentur ad dictam curiam notam et scripturam facere ad portam per quam mitterentur in libro propterarea ordinato*).
hence each entry names the messenger (*famulus* or *famulo*) who escorted the porter. Unfortunately, the first semester of 1392 is the only period for which all four officials’ handbooks survive, a fact that severely limits their usefulness.

Each gate official relied on the assistance of two lay aides to collect money (*superstites*) and a small band of messengers who watched the gates, inspected shipments, and guarded against premature, and thus fraudulent, offloading. The 1372 statute of the *gabella maggiore* lists their responsibilities as checking licenses for exports, collecting taxes on a few particular items, and sending larger shipments to the court of the *gabella maggiore*. But a statutory revision from 1389 is more specific about these duties, and it emphasizes the threat of smugglers entering and leaving the city without paying the toll on merchandise.\(^{31}\) The *portonarius* and his men were to interrogate carters and inspect their loads carefully; in order to perform these searches without unloading anything, they were given “a long iron tool designed for searching through bundles.”\(^{32}\)

Besides this pole, the gate officials had two tools with which to keep their agents motivated: the proverbial stick, a twenty-*soldi* fine for every time a communal agent neglected to thoroughly interrogate a traveler; and the proverbial carrot, namely a quarter of the fine paid by every smuggler they caught.\(^{33}\) As an extra incentive to keep a tight command of the situation at the gates, the statute of 1389 permitted the official himself to skim half of the rewards paid to his minions. The process must have been invasive for travellers, and it undoubtedly involved its share of verbal violence, and worse. In the spring of 1370, for example, a man named Luporino di Panci hit Guido Tomasini in the face with a stick at the Porta di Borgo; Guido, a *famulus* of the gate official, was in the process of exacting the toll for his cart of myrtle leaves.\(^{34}\)

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31 The statutes of the *officiale portarum* were revised by a small committee in January 1389, with the stated goal of making the officials “attend more diligently to the exaction [of the gabelle]” (CG 11, p. 18 [5/1/1389 | Sp]: ...volentes providere discrete et mature circa officiales portarum lucane civitatis, ut in exactione diligentius advertantur...).

32 Ibid.: *Habeant dicti officiales a comuni lucano unum instrumentum de ferro longum aptum ad perquirendum in dictis salmis cum quo famuli et certi deputati ad dicta deveta custodienda operari officium exercere possint*.

33 The twenty-*soldi* fine was added in 1389: CG 11, p. 19; the bounty was standard and could be claimed by anyone who made a successful denunciation: GM 1, f. 44v.

34 CG 1, p. 384 (5/6/1370 | Thirty-Six); in another instance, a gate aide named Giovanni Ricoveri seized one Martino Mondini by the beard when he contested the gabelle, scratching him with his fingernails and
As the circumstances of this brawl indicate, although the gate officials directed many shipments to the court of the *gabella maggiore*, some tax payments could be settled at the gates themselves. Each gate, not just the Porte San Piero and San Donato, had its own station called a *gabella*, complete with a desk and a collections box.  

This was the case as early as September 1369, when the exact shape of the central clearinghouse was not yet determined. The aforementioned special taxes on butchered meat, grain, cooked bread, and livestock were assessed and paid at these peripheral offices. But the registers produced at the gate gabelles were never combined with the main records of the court of the *gabella maggiore*. Unfortunately, at least for our purposes, it seems that these ‘lost records’ concerned a good deal of traffic beyond the grain or meat markets. One of my main sources of worry throughout this study is this unknown quantity of commercial activity; as we shall see, quite a few shipments never reached the court of the *gabella maggiore* due to time- and cost-saving procedures followed by the gate gabelles.

In his introduction to the inventory of the *gabella maggiore* fonds, Salvatore Bongi states that certain payments beyond the aforementioned alimentary taxes would have been made at the gates, namely on small shipments of low value goods. The 1372 statute of the *gabella maggiore* specifically states that payments could be made at the gates for any goods assessed a tax under thirty *soldi*. Safeguarding this, a reform of
1390 dictated that “the tolls at the gates, namely the tolls on those kinds of merchandise which can be taxed at the gates, should be collected and exacted on each kind of merchandise at the same rates used at the court of the gabella maggiore and no higher." 40 In fact, then, people could pay their taxes at the gate gabelles for any items they wished, provided that the total sum owed was under a certain threshold. Since the records of these transactions have been lost, we need to determine precisely what imports and exports are missing from the main registers of the gabella maggiore.

To put this tax threshold into perspective, thirty soldi would have been sufficient for the tax on about fifteen kilograms of linen cloth or thirty kilograms of fresh fish, and it corresponded to more than a day's wages for a master carpenter or mason. 41 However, it seems unlikely that many people actually paid tolls as high as thirty soldi at the gates. The literal heavy lifting in this system of entry- and exit-taxes was better done at a central location, where large numbers of handcarts, wagons, and pack animals, or at the very least their loads, could be assembled, weighed, and securely stored. Happily, the evidence suggests that some merchants did prefer to pay their taxes at the court, even if those payments fell below the 30-soldi limit permissible at the gates.

In the first half of 1392, notaries at the court of the gabella maggiore recorded 2391 entries for shipments entering the city or passing through it. More than a fifth of the registered entries, 520 out of 2391, record payments of less than thirty soldi that could have been made at the gates. 42 The libri di portonai for this year record only 1850 shipments sent to the court of the gabella maggiore over the same period, but this is because many shipments were broken up between separate merchants in the court of the gabella maggiore itself; indeed, it is impossible to arrive at a one-to-one correspondence

40 CG 11, p. 167 (10/12/1389 | CG): Le gabelle si ricoglino et exigarsi aleporti equalmente dogni mercantia come alagabella magiore et non piu, cioe di quelle cose che aledicte porte si ponno sgabellare.
Coming, as this does, before a series of modifications to alimentary gabelles (wine, flour, oil, greens), this seems to refer to foodstuffs not covered at the Porte San Donato and San Piero.
41 Roughly speaking, carpenters and masons in the period were paid 1.25 lire for a day's work by the commune at a rate of about 5 lire to the florin – i.e., the 'small money' – which was the same rate defined in the statute for the 30-soldi limit (see the previous note). Normally, the gabelle was paid at a rate of 3.5 or 3.75 lire to the florin, depending on the year. For the wages of the magistri lapidum et lignaminis, see the rates in the records of the public overseers (massai) (e.g. Bene e Fabbriche Pubbliche 12, f. 6r), or the wages guaranteed by the commune in response to a petition at CG 8, p. 295 (23/10/1382 | Thirty-Six).
42 This figure takes into account the distinction between the money in which the gabelle was paid, i.e. 3.75 lire to the florin in 1392, and the 'small currency' used to define the 30-soldi limit in 1372.
between the gate books and the records of the court. But a number of the taxpayers named in these entries are the same individuals recorded in the *libri di portonai* as being sent to the *gabella maggiore*; in the first week of January, for example, Michele di Leone, Gherardino d’Andruccio da Boveglio, and Giovanni Fiammi appear on both lists, and each of them owed less than thirty *soldi* in tax.

In other words, these men entered via the gates and chose to be escorted to the court of the *gabella maggiore* despite owing less than thirty *soldi* in taxes. Such extra trips meant more work for both the runners, who accompanied merchants, and the officials, who had to make a special note on each such occasion, and the *officiales portarum* may indeed have tried to discourage this inefficient use of time. Perhaps responding to such resentment, the aforementioned gate statute of 1389 specifically notes that those who could pay at the gate, but wanted to go to the court of the *gabella maggiore*, had the explicit right to be sent there despite the inconvenience this represented to the staff.\(^{43}\) Over a third of the payments found in my survey of the *gabella maggiore* could have been settled at the gates had their payers so wished.\(^{44}\)

It therefore seems likely that the gate gabelles were only responsible for collecting taxes for very small quantities of goods from individuals who would not be described as merchants. Formal licenses for such items were probably not issued, since the fee for writing these could have exceeded the tax itself. Rather than being lost, these records may never have existed. If they never made written records, the gate officials had nothing to submit to the court of the *gabella maggiore* for incorporation among the master records consulted for this project.\(^{45}\) In fact, not a single entry in my sample indicates payment of less than one *soldo*, and only 0.1\% of all entries – fifty-four payments out of nearly fifty-thousand – fell between one and two *soldi*.\(^{46}\) The payment of a few *soldi* at the gates,
however, could have accounted for many of the goods consumed by individual households. A few linen shirts, a few pounds of fresh cheese, or an ounce or two of pepper would have entailed a tax within this low range.

One example of a minor toll like this appears in a petition from 1382, when Domenico Orbicciani, an aide (superstes) to the official at the Porta di Borgo was fined 100 lire for attempting to steal from the chest of the gate gabelle. Domenico's defense was that, rather than stealing, he had simply received “two soldi in his palm from someone for the toll that the fellow had to pay.” The case was brought to court because Domenico's fellow aide, Civallino di Stefano, had him take the money by hand and place it into the chest, rather than receive it “on the plate (tabula) in use at that gabelle”, which he was evidently meant to then tip into the chest. Beyond indicating the delicate scruples of Lucca's tax collectors and the particularities of paying at the gates, this case also indicates the kind of payment that I suspect was most common at the gates: tolls amounting to no more than a few soldi. Those transporting food for the day, small quantities of textiles, or other minor purchases would have had little reason not to pay at the gates. Moreover, unlike merchants travelling to Lucca and businessmen meeting never recorded, damaged entries, and sub-entries regarding the cost of enumerating large herds of sheep, which entailed a fee recorded separately in certain years.

47 CG 8, p. 351 (21/12/1382 | CG): Dominicus de Orbiccianis civis de contrata sancti michaelis in foro, olim superstites ad exigendum gabellam ad portam burgi [etc., was condemned by the sindic for 100 lire] quia scenter dolose et appensate animo et intentione furandi et furtum committendi accept et furtive subtraxit tune de et super capsam generali dicti officii gabelle predicte in qua ponuntur pro lucano comuni denari... soldi xviii... Dominicus tamquam inscius et ignarus de ordine denariaorum... recepit a quodam pro gabella quam solvere debebat circa soldos duos super manu eius quos recipere debebat super quadam tabula ibi ad dictam gabellam ordinatam non animo furandi ne fraudem committendi, et cum dictus Dominicus sic in et super manus eius recipere dictam gabellam seu denarios Civallinii Stefani alius superstes ad dictam gabellam exigendam statim sibi dixit Ego te domino sindico denuntiabo quia denarios non ponis in capsam. De quibus verbis non curans quia ipsos duos soldos ut habuit posuit in capsam et non meditatus fuit quod allud sequi debet unde inmediate dictus Civallinii dictum Dominicum prefecto domino sindico denuntiavit.

48 This case may suggest the close watch under which public employees scrutinized each other; they were entitled to considerable rewards, from a quarter to a third of the total penalty, in the case of successful prosecutions. Alternately, Civallino di Stefano may have had a particular grudge against Domenico Orbicciani – the case is an isolate, after all. Regardless, the case was a serious one and Orbicciani successfully threw himself on the Yuletide mercy of the General Council to escape the fate of “being driven to wander the world as a beggar in his old age,” claiming that “God knew well the truth of the matter – namely that he [Domenico] would rather have suffered his hands to rot away from hunger than commit such a crime” (CG 3, ibid.: ... ut non cogatur ire mendicando per mundum tempore senectutis, et bene deus huius veritatem novit quia potius manus corroedere fame passus... quan pati tale scelus perpetrare.). Orbicciani's professed poverty, if real and not rhetorical, may have made him a convincing target for Civallino's denunciation.
shipments and partners at the court of the *gabella maggiore*, most people had no other incentive to visit the court.

The total weight of this unrecorded but legal commercial activity is considerable. In the second semester of 1378, the treasury recorded the receipt of just over 30,000 *lire* from the court of the *gabella maggiore*, which saw just over 4,500 payments according to my database, while the gates sent about 10,000 *lire*, evidence of at least 6,500 payments – i.e., at the 30- *soldi* limit – and most likely a great many more.⁴⁹ No records of the latter traffic were ever created, because the gate officials were evidently not required to issue *apodixe*. In any case, they do not survive. It is therefore very important to note that the records of the *gabella maggiore* cannot be considered a reliable source for small-scale commerce and the city’s consumption of local products. The consequences of this will be examined in chapter three.

To summarize: most traffic that made its way to the court of the *gabella maggiore* flowed through the Porte San Piero and San Donato, which were oriented towards the primary routes for international trade and received additional staff to tally a few basic commodities like grain and meat. The rest passed through the Porte di Borgo and San Gervasio, which sat at the end of the northern and eastern arterial roads, respectively (i.e. the modern – and medieval – Via Fillungo and modern Via Roma/Santa Croce). Each main gate had a customs booth staffed by a notary called the *portonarius* or *officialis portarum* and aides who checked licenses for outgoing shipments; each also had a crew of messengers (*famuli*) to interrogate travellers and escort carriers. Most of those entering with small amounts of taxable goods paid their tolls of a few *soldi* and *denari* at the gates themselves, but these transactions were not recorded. The larger shipments were tallied and escorted by messengers to the customs court.

Having explored Lucca's geography and described the outer gears of this tax system, we can pass from the gates and head to the court itself.

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⁴⁹ Cam. Gen. 82, c.f. (7th binding, f. 1r): from 12 July to 27 December 1378, 4,547 florins (at a rate of 5 *lire*, 2-3 *soldi* per florin), 7,704 *lire*, 19 *soldi* (*parvorum denario rum*) from the *gabella maggiore*; 10,148 *lire*, 11 *soldi*, 1 *denaro* (*parvorum denario rum*) from the gates, not including the gate taxes on wine, grain, and meat.
1.2 Tax Procedures at the Court

The geography of power and activity in post-occupation Lucca favored the transfer of governmental offices to the site of the old Augusta. Many of the buildings within the curtain had served as offices under the Pisans and their predecessors, and it seems that the restored republic occupied these immediately.\(^{50}\) One building, which had served as the chancery for the Pisan vicars and rectors under the occupation, suited the needs of the *gabella maggiore* perfectly: it had a large courtyard, in which goods could be stored, as well as a second story and a tower.\(^{51}\) It was also located in the Piazza San Pietro in Cortina, located in the corner of the precinct nearest to the crossroads at San Michele in Foro; this piazza was ultimately incorporated into the Palazzo Ducale. Given its felicitous location, it seems possible that the Pisans had used this building to house their customs house as well, although I found no evidence to support or contradict this.\(^{52}\)

Of course, the entire precinct was not up for grabs; because the fortress had been constructed on and around private property in the 1320s, the Anziani had to contend with numerous property claims when they began demolishing the walls.\(^{53}\) The treasury was therefore constrained to rent this property from its nominal owner, Niccolò Pinelli, until 1392, when he finally sold it to the commune for 600 florins to raise a dowry for his offspring.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{50}\) As appears to be the case for at least the Pinelli house, which was home to the *gabella maggiore*; the rental contract drawn up in 1371 stipulated that the property "had been occupied and detained by the predecessors of the current Anziani" (*per vestros dominos antecessores antianos occupate et detente fuerunt*), presumably in March 1370 when the administration moved (CG 3, p. 121 [19/11/1371 | Thirty-Six]).

\(^{51}\) For the use of the Pinelli house under the Pisan occupation, see AAL 41, p. 96 (11/5/1361), where a note from the vicars is described as written *in castro auguste in apotheca turris filiorum pinelli in qua residet cancellaria dominorum vicariorum et rectorum*; an investigator in 1371 said the Pinelli claim was justified "by many public documents, written and seen by me... and from titles published during the time of the Pisans" (*ex quamplurimus infrascriptis publicis per me visis et lectis... ac etiam ex titulis celebratis tempore pisanorum publicatis*) (CG 3, p. 121 [19/11/1371 | Thirty-Six]; the latter citation also includes a description of the house.

\(^{52}\) The method of applying broad-based taxes on commercial goods under the Pisans cannot be determined from the extant evidence; the only evidence I found of something like the Gabella Maggiore are the titles of a few officials from a list of 1362 – "overseer" (*provisor...*), "guard" (*custos...*), and "court notary (*curie notarius...*) of the gabelle" (*gabelle*) – which carry over as titles in the Gabella Maggiore after 1369: AAL 42, p. 88 (30/5/1362). Most likely, these titles indicate similar roles within the tax administration.

\(^{53}\) Literally demolishing: the Anziani had to discuss the complexities of tearing down the curtain wall and towers surrounding the precinct, since the towers themselves “belonged to individual people” (*sint singularium personarum*). (CG 1, pp. 291-2 [3/4/1370 | Anziani]); the work continued for years, and as late as 1373 the church of Santa Anna de Plageis was requesting a charitable gift of building supplies from the “bricks of the walls of the Augusta” (*matones murorum castri auguste*) (CG 4, p. 116 [2/5/1373 | Thirty-Six]).
daughter.\textsuperscript{54} Pinelli proved himself an attentive landlord, repairing and outfitting the property for the magistrates’ needs, but presumably it was more convenient to own the property outright.\textsuperscript{55} The Pinelli house continued to house the court of the \textit{gabella maggiore} into the fifteenth century.

The inner workings of the Pinelli house concerned three interlocking goals: first, to assess the taxable value of shipments brought to the courtyard and issue the appropriate licenses to merchants; second, to inquire into and try cases of fraud against this system of payments and scrips; and third, to funnel moneys from the \textit{gabella maggiore}, the gate gabelles, and the gabelles collected in the hinterlands to the treasury, the \textit{Camera Generale}.\textsuperscript{56} Despite these many tasks, the court had a relatively small working staff: two notaries, two lay assessors (\textit{provisores}), and a lay ‘guard’ (\textit{custos}), all appointed by the General Council for six-month terms beginning in January and July. A complete record of these appointments is available from 1372 onwards, but their duties are not explicitly outlined in the statute published in that year, like much of what went on at the court. All of these positions appeared on an election list from 1362, during the Pisan occupation, although again with no description of their capacities.\textsuperscript{57} Some positions in the communal administration were allotted through sortition, but the Anziani and the Council of Thirty-Six voted for each of the officials in the \textit{gabella maggiore} system as part of a lengthy annual election, a process that took place each year at the end of November or early in December.

\textsuperscript{54} See the previous note for the contract; a note that property was sold is found at CG 12, p. 77 (30/3/1392 | Thirty-Six); the rent, listed in different locations as either 12 or 16 florins yearly, i.e. 2% or 2.5% return based on the selling price, was quite low, which suggests three possibilities: the rent reflected the \textit{de facto} weakness of Pinelli’s claim to official-use property; the rent was fair and the selling price reflected the commune’s gratitude for Pinelli’s service; or some mix of these two.

\textsuperscript{55} For example, in December 1385 Pinelli reinforced a section of the house to serve as the storehouse for grain belonging to the public granary, the \textit{Abondanza}: CG 9, p. 457 (30/12/1385 | Thirty-Six); it is difficult to get a sense of the house’s dimensions, but sections of it must have been very capacious.

\textsuperscript{56} One might see in these activities, and especially in the nature of the customs house as a place of justice, the semblance of a ‘service’ provided by the communal government to the merchants who paid the \textit{gabella maggiore}. As Herlihy noted, the notional connection between the feudal \textit{bannum} and indirect taxes – the latter being reimbursement for the costs of exercising the former – survived in the communes into the fourteenth century: Herlihy, \textit{Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study in Urban Growth}, 80ff, esp. 81-2.

\textsuperscript{57} AaTdL 42, p. 88: Ser Piero da Vecchiano, a Pisan, is listed as the \textit{provisor lucane gabelle et notarius domini sindici}; ser Niccolò Dombellinghi is the \textit{notarius curie dicte gabelle}, while Matteo Sartori is the \textit{provisor et custos gabelle}. \textit{Custodes} are listed for a few customs posts in the vicariates as well.
We can compare the size of the staff of the court of the gabella maggiore to that of the mid-fifteenth century Pisan Dogana through the evolution of its gabelle delle porte, as described in the work of Marcello Berti.\(^{58}\) As in Lucca, the Dogana had four peripheral gatehouses, complete with four “cashiers” (cassieri), eight guards (stradieri), and four notaries. But in the Dogana itself, standing at the dockside, worked the Doganiere, a supervisor analogous to the officialis maior gabelle in Lucca, seven more scribes, four aides (famigli or, according to Berti, garzoni), and someone to double-check the accounts (the ragioniere). This staff of thirteen does not include the numerous porters tasked with ferrying merchandise to the warehouses of the Dogana. All in all, mid-Quattrocento Pisa employed over thirty individuals in the Dogana, compared to eighteen in the Lucchese gabella maggiore between the Pinelli house and the gates. But note that the staff of the central customs house in Pisa was over three times as large as that of the court in Lucca, which clearly reflects the difference between a major port and an inland crossroads: the gates necessitated a certain irreducible cost in terms of personnel between both cities, but the clearing house in Lucca simply did not require that many hands on deck.

Just like the seven scrivani in the Pisan Dogana, the two notaries of the gabella maggiore drew up licenses for merchants and carriers in the customs house; in the course of doing so, they entered copies of those licenses into the registers that form the backbone of this study.\(^{59}\) A number of transcription errors and the evidence of partial apodixe, a few of which were felicitously trapped inside the nineteenth-century bindings of the series, indicate the differing formats of these two documents. The register entries record payment, and therefore state that the court “received [a sum] from [the taxpayer] for [the

\(^{58}\) Berti, Lana, panni e strumenti contabili nella Toscana bassomedievale e della prima età moderna, 54–57. To be sure, as Berti notes, the 1452 statutes were the product of downsizing on the part of Florence, so the following describes a smaller court than what it was in prior years. See also the description of one these gates, the Porta della Degazia, in Chapter Two: Casini, “Il ‘breve’ delle gabelle della porta della Degazia del Mare di Pisa del 1362.”

\(^{59}\) They were also responsible for transcribing actions at the judicial court of the gabella maggiore, although this sat irregularly and infrequently. Ser Niccolò dello Strego and ser Niccolò Minecche Berettani, notaries at the court of the Gabella Maggiore for the second semester of 1377, recorded twelve sessions of the court, usually two per month (GM 80, pp. 7-100), while ser Bartolomeo Bianchi and ser Ubaldo Perfettucci, who held the posts the following semester, only saw three sessions in six months (GM 80, pp. 109-123), and the second half of 1378 had four. Although the courts were sometimes prorogued in emergency circumstances, this did not happen in 1378.
enumerated goods]”; almost all entries also indicate the place to which the shipment was destined, and some notaries recorded additional information beyond this, such as the origin of the goods, how they were organized (e.g., into how many bales or animal loads), and whether the date of arrival at the court differed from the date of payment. Licenses, on the other hand, took the form of a safe-conduct, and stated, “On behalf of [the taxpayer], the bearer of the present documents can transport [along an indicated route] [the enumerated goods].” It is notable that the license’s form, with the preposition ‘for’ (pro) accounts for the reality that the taxpayer and the carrier were often different people. The licenses were written on small strips of paper and sealed shut with a few dots of red wax, while the entries were written into the fifty-folio paper handbooks described in the introduction. The notaries typically summarized earnings at the bottom of each page and recorded the total at the end of the week.

Both notaries appear to have been on duty simultaneously, since it is by no means uncommon to find two hands switching off on a single day; on 15 June 1373, ser Giovanni di Lotto wrote three entries, handed the book over to ser Giovanni Bertini, who wrote four – back to the first Giovanni for nine, to Bertini for five, with his partner finishing out the day with three entries. It seems very unlikely, however, that they were simultaneously writing licenses and updating the registers; each volume of the gabella maggiore records contains entries cancelled because of duplication or misplacement: in one case, two entries from a Sunday, i.e. from the next business week, were added at the end of a Saturday, and the notary had to cancel them before totaling the week’s receipts. For each payment at the gabella maggiore, then, the notaries were required to produce a license, a fair copy for the ledger, and some sort of intermediary note that could be converted to the register form when business was slow or after the gates were shut. A few erroneous entries, which begin, “the bearer of the present documents...” (lator presentium), suggest that this intermediary document was a copy, likely the abbreviated

60 See, for example, a partially cancelled entry from 1401 (GM 38, f. 73r), which states: a pro Gerardo pieruccii lator presentium possit portare de branalo pisas − pro salmis duabus vini die xiii mai conductis de branalo pisas.
61 GM 14, ff. 98r-98v.
62 GM 30, f. 83v (27/4/1392); the two cancelled entries were from the next day, and can be found on ibid., f. 84r (28/4/1392).
notarial draft, of the license that taxpayer received; in most cases, the notary spotted the error, cancelled the words, and continued with the registral form.  

The notaries of the *gabella maggiore* during my period could be citizens or *contadini*, although none were out-and-out foreigners from outside the Lucchesia, at least as far as their toponyms indicate. Before the turn of the fifteenth century, no notary held the position for more than a single term in a row; but, while seventeen men held the position only once, the nineteen other men who served as notaries through 1400 appear in the election lists an average of five times. Not all were specialists, of course: the customs court was a staple on the circuit of institutions through which the urban administration rotated their squad of regular notaries. One Taddeo Malpigli held nine positions between 1372 and the end of 1377, during which he was a notary at the *gabella maggiore*, the *Macello*, the vicar’s court at Pietrasanta, the office of public health (the *Fondaco*, which regulated industrial pollution and commercial food preparation), the office of the public accountant (*rationerius*), and the criminal court. But those with a more narrow preference or specialty could stay entirely within the fiscal system, as did ser Bartolomeo Bianchi. He received twenty-one appointments between 1372 and 1390.

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63 Both of these forms were likely in use in Pisa as well, given their lengthy fiscal union during the fourteenth century. Otherwise, I expect this form emerged from usage of local notaries and did not mimic the licenses produced in other areas with which Lucchese merchants had contact. In fourteenth-century Exeter, for example, the licenses used the verb *applicare* rather than *conducere* and the taxpayer’s name came towards the end of the entry (for one such entry, see Kowaleski, *Local Customs Accounts of the Port of Exeter: 1266-1321*, 1–20.: *Navis que vocatur Benvenut de Seint Walry applicat' cum iiiii fraell' de oignouns et Wald que omnia sunt Willemi le Brewer et Waleri le War’ et est magister Johannes de Goseford*); at Jaca and Canfranc in fifteenth century Aragon, the scribes used the unrelated verb *saquar* to describe transport of material in their registers (see Sesma Muñoz, *La vía del Somport en el comercio medieval de Aragón: Los registros de las aduanas de Jaca y Canfranc de mediados del siglo XV*, 53.: *Ramonet de Bonlauch, saqua del regno media onz. caffran; mas 1 lib. media de pebre por 3 s. 9 d.; mas hun quartaron de claus de gilofre por 4 s.; mas gingebre en 1 s. 4 d.; mas 3 alas de boltuero por 3 s. 6 d. Pago ... – lb. – s. 9*). And although *conduerre* (i.e. *conducere*) was used in fifteenth-century Rome, there too the registers eschew the inverted format of the Lucchese registers and list the taxpayer as the active subject (for example, see Esch, *Economia, cultura materiale ed arte nella Roma del Rinascimento*, 82., Fig. 7: *Matthia delamagna conduxe a di stoe’ cc lanelle de ottone cum vetri contrafacti . xiiii acore . L peze de carte pente sono XV mappamondi . e perle contrafate . cxi filze de paternostri . c cordoni de filo pago: f 0 s 39 d 8*). While I do not think a study of the dispersal of license types would contribute anything to this discussion (although to that end, cf. Galassi, “Bargaining Power and Institutional Change: Seven Centuries of Italian Sharecropping Contracts, 821-1517 AD.”), they do demonstrate the diversity of formats that could be used to convey essentially the same information.

64 Out of 111 total appointments between 1372 and 1400, including the notaries assigned to replace others removed from office. This is based on the elections lists in CG 1-13, which do not cover the period from 1394-1397.
all writing for the tax farms (proventus), the tax on butchered meat (Macello), or the 
gabella maggiore.

After the ascendance of Paolo Guinigi, the stable of notaries employed at the 
gabella maggiore became even more restricted. In 1403, two positions, the notary of the 
gabella maggiore and the notary of the tax farms (proventus), were combined, and the 
work previously carried out by four notaries total was assigned to three men with dual 
responsibilities. Ser Leonardo di ser Francesco da Massa Lunigiana, whose name 
indicates a family origin in the Lucchesia, served continuously in this position from 1403 
to the middle of 1410. The other thirty semester-long appointments, besides the 15 
occupied by Leonardo, were split between six other notaries, only one of whom held the 
post for less than a total of two years. In some ways this simply reflects the relatively 
common practice before 1402, by which notaries of the gabella maggiore also served in 
the office of the tax farms: in the 1380s, for example, a third (8) of the twenty-five men 
who worked for these offices worked in both. The administrators of the proventus were, 
in any case, under the aegis of the gabella maggiore. On the other hand, the consecutive 
appointments of ser Leonardo and his coworkers indicate that the mandatory vacation 
period between elections (vacanza), supposedly a check against corruption, had been 
jeffisoned in favor of a consistent and expert staff. As we will see, the triumph of 
convenience over statute was restricted neither to this office nor to the years of the 
Guinigi principate.

In the court of the gabella maggiore, two assessors (provisores) and a ‘guard’ 
(custos), who was clearly not a security guard or watchman, worked alongside the

65 Based on the elections lists in ASLu, GPG 1; the only notary who served both after 1403 and before 1400 
was Aldibrando Luporini, whose first appointment was in 1384.
66 The principle of vacanze was common for both political and administrative postings, and it aimed to 
deter corruption; in Lucca, this was seen as coming from both without and within: note, for example, a 
speech before the General Council in 1379, which, advocating longer vacanze for vicars and their notaries, 
warns, “It is the case that subjects do not respect these officers and, due to a certain knowledge and 
familiarity which they contract with those men, they do not fear them, and the officers, on the other hand, 
perform the tasks committed to them less attentively” (...sine eveniat subditos non ita vereri officiales et, 
quadam notitia et familiaritate quam contrahunt cum officialibus, non ita eos timere, et officiales versa vice 
minus actente officia sibi commissa tractare...; CG 7, p. 14 [16/1/1379]).
67 Nor indeed to Lucca; as A. I. Pini noted, the breakdown of anti-corruption mechanisms within the 
electoral system of the Italian city-state derived from the bipartite nature of that system: rigorous, 
frequently byzantine procedures for the citizen councils and high magistracies – “a mano” – but ad hoc, 
acclamatory systems – “a voce” – for judges, notaries, and lower offices. See Pini, “La ‘burocrazia’ 
comunale nella Toscana del Trecento.”
notaries. These three laymen were responsible for the main business of the court: receiving, processing, and releasing goods. The assessors (provisores) presumably determined the tax owed on a given shipment, which involved two steps: first, determining the weight, estimated value, or tally of the items to be taxed; second, assigning a specific tax by applying the rate contained in the statutes to this statistic. The superstites who worked at the gate gabelles must have performed similar tasks, which may be why many assessors in the central clearinghouse also received appointments at the gates. The total process would have required both scales and a strong sense of the market value of commodities and specialty items, which suggests that assessors may have had the benefit of the skills imparted by the abachists (maestri del abaco), the petty-masters of mathematics who ran schools in many Italian cities. Such skills were prized in a fiscal system that depended so heavily on estimation and convoluted arithmetic; Lucca's own abachist, maestro Giovanni d’Andrea da Firenze, who ran a school from at least 1393, was permanently employed as the wine assessor and communal accountant from 1403 onwards. One assessor at the gabella maggiore, Iacopo di Francesco Martini, who held eight appointments at the turn of the fifteenth century, was described as a professional broker (pattiere) in one of his elections, and most other assessors must have been similarly proficient in commercial arithmetic.

No extant petitions or statutes define the responsibilities of the ‘guard’ as separate from those of the assessors. This ambiguity is not limited to the court itself but extends to titles throughout the fiscal system. Over forty years of election lists, the gate official’s aide is described interchangeably as superstes and provisor; similarly, the assistants to

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68 It should be noted that the assessment process made allowance for certain amounts of wrappings, rope, and other packaging material. Certain entries for silk cloth exports from 1397 and 1401 state explicitly that the registered weight of the goods in question was ‘net weight’ (ponderis necti), i.e. free of these deductions: see, for example, GM 38, f. 2r: a Guido Honesti pro una balla laborerii sete ponderis necti librarum xxviii extractorum de luca et missis bononiam habuit idem camerarius. But it seems probable that this practice was followed in other years, even if the assessors did not use nectus to indicate it.

69 The quantities involved at the gate gabelles, however, would have required less equipment, and small bundles may have been appraised on sight rather than weighed.

70 For more on the history of this maestri d’abaco and the place of mathematics education within early modern Italy, see also Franci, “Antonio De’ Mazzinghi”; Ekholm, “Tartaglia’s Ragioni.”

71 First mentioned as refirmatus in 1393 (CG 12, p. 271 [20/2/1393]); first employed as ratiocinator and sugumator vini venalis in 1403 (GPG 1, p. 153 [1/12/1402]).

72 On the subject, see also Goldthwaite, “Schools and Teachers of Commercial Arithmetic in Renaissance Florence,” 418–21.
the provincial customs houses at Pietrasanta or Montecarlo are called either _provisores_ or _custodes_. It is only in the court of the _gabella maggiore_ itself that the division between two assessors and one guard remains consistent throughout the entire period.

If this division does indicate a genuine separation of duties, I expect that the _custos_ was primarily responsible for the court’s function as a warehouse. Starting in July 1369, councilors worked to define a separate bracket of tolls for shipments passing through the city, as opposed to entering it, in order to encourage the flow of commerce through the Lucchesia. By 1371, this system of passage fees (_pedaggio, pedaggium_) required that merchants taking advantage of this flexible system, namely scouting for buyers in Lucca and moving on after a few months, had to keep their goods in limbo “at the _gabella maggiore_” itself. The _custos_ may have been the man responsible for accounting for these goods, but, if he did keep written records for this purpose, these do not survive. Such records would have been produced for temporary use at the court itself, unlike the main registers, which were used to double-check receipts at the treasury.

The assessors and guards may have had separate responsibilities, but a number of men held both positions over the course of their lives; of the 42 individuals who were _custodes_ between 1370 and 1410, about half (20) also worked as _provisores_. But, as with notaries, some people appear to have specialized in one or the other role. The fourteen _provisores_ who received five or more appointments had only eight elections as _custodes_ between them, and the most frequent _custos_, Piero di Nicolao Lorenzi, never

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73 CG 1, p. 7 (19/7/1371 | Council of Fifty); CG 2, p. 336 (3/7/1371 | Az): “We decree that in the case of all goods which have entered or will enter the city of Lucca from outside the territory of the Lucchese state, from wherever or by whomever they happen to be brought, and have been unloaded at the Gabella Maggiore of the city of Lucca, the person transporting them and unloading them, or the person whose goods they are, may, whenever he wants, send them or have them sent outside the city and district to whichever places he wants to send or conduct them by paying the gabelle ordained for passage, provided that he did not remove those goods from the gabelle, but they always remained in it” (_Quod omnes mercantie que venerunt sive venient in futurum de extra territorii lucane civitatis undecunque et per quoscunque advelli contingat, ad civitatem lucanam, et exoneretur apud gabellam maiorem civitatis lucani, que conducens exonerans sive ille cuius tales mercantie, forent quandocunque voluerit possit eas portare seu portari facere extra civitatem et dictum lucanum, ad quascunque partes portare aut conducere voluerit. Solvendo gabellam passagii ordinatom. Si tamen tales mercantias de dicta gabella non extraxerit, sed semper apud illam remanserint contrarietate aliqua non ostante_).

74 And vice versa, 20 out of 81 _provisores_ also worked as _custodes_.

served as assessor. Both offices were frequently staffed by men of somewhat elevated social status, as about a fifth of the guards (7 out of 42) and a quarter of the assessors (21 out of 81) achieved the Anzianate. This is unsurprising, given that the governing class in Lucca was composed of merchants well-suited to assessing and estimating shipments; Nicolao di Lando Diversi, for example, provisor eleven times in our period, registered with the Corte de' Mercanti as head of a silk company in 1381.

The proximity of so much commercial activity may have been even more advantageous for the two notaries on staff. Far from being banned from drawing up private commercial contracts during the workday, they indeed must have conducted a fair bit of business in the court itself. But, for the provisores and custos, the combination of a tidy salary and a seat in the middle of the action would surely have been attractive to merchants and tradesmen. As noted above, goods being conducted through the Lucchesia had to be stored in the Pinelli courtyard, and the gabella maggiore statute of 1372 specifically states that these items could be sold on the spot:

“Anyone who is transporting [the aforementioned goods paying pedaggium] can unload some of the licensed goods in the gabelle of the city of Lucca, store them there to his pleasure, exhibit them for the sake of sale in the gabelle itself, and send them out of the city and Lucchesia by paying the aforementioned passage-fee – except that, if he sells those goods or some of them, he should pay the requisite tariff according to the form of the statutes of the gabelle for those things which he happened to sell.”

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75 The fourteen provisores with more than five appointments received 123 out of a total of 235 recorded elections; only three custodes had more than five appointments: Cosciornino Dardagnini was custos five times and provisor four times, and Terio Incapestra twelve and two times, respectively.

76 Six and twenty-one, respectively, were members of the Council of Thirty-Six.

77 CM 84, f. 5v. One Giovanni di Niccolò Diversi was exiled in 1392 and his sentence was renewed in 1396; if this is Niccolò di Lando Diversi’s son, then Niccolò may have been in his 50s around that time: see Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400., p. 296 n. 112. Niccolò Diversi died in 1409, as evinced by cancelled elections from that year (GPG 1, p. 521 [21/5/1409]).

78 The provisores and custodes appear to have earned a slightly smaller salary than most notaries in the communal employ, whose salaries hovered around four florins monthly for most of our period; the monthly salary for the custos is described as 2.5 florins in 1379 (CG 7, p. 5 [5/1/1379]), three florins in 1382 (CG 8, p. 220 [12/8/1382]), finally reaching four florins in 1403 (GPG 1, p. 179 [9/6/1403]).

79 GM 1, f. 46v-47r: Et quilibet qui conduceret de dictis rebus concessit possit [f. 47r] ipsis de ipsis exonerare in gabella civitatis lucani ibique dimittere ad eius voluntatem et ostendere causa vendendi in dicta gabella, et illas mittere extra civitatem et territorium lucanum solvendo dictum passagium, Salvo
Clearly, for professional brokers (pacterii, pattieri), serving as court officials would have been advantageous for conducting their own business. That being said, the manual labor and writing required to process dozens of shipments would have occupied much of the day, and I think it likely that the laymen working at the gabella maggiore were at least temporarily underemployed in their main line of work outside the court.

Both assessors and guards were entitled to a certain sum for each shipment they measured and taxed. Although I could not find the exact amounts for weighing and assessing incoming or outgoing shipments in general, the fees involved in navigating the gabella maggiore were not inconsiderable. For example, some importers paid their fees at Pietrasanta, the vicariate capital nearest the port at Motrone, and came to Lucca with licenses in hand; the court collected a fee, capped at 12 denari per shipment, for checking these licenses against the shipments when they arrived in Lucca. Since this maximum of 12 denari was prescribed in direct response to a petition complaining of abuses in the customs system, it is possible that officials in Lucca were prone to overcharging.

The provision from 1392 including the twelve-denari cap also indicates that the assessors and guard were required “to keep a tally of licenses and shipments in the book ordained for that purpose, and to register the licenses and shipments in a summary manner therein, so that it is always possible to consult the organized tally and account.” This was not a new system, but rather a description of the court’s customary record-keeping practices in use since at least the early 1370s. The fact that this duty had to be enshrined in an official provision may suggest that standards had been slipping at the

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*quod si dictas res vel aliquam earum venderet solvat de illis quas venderet debitam gabellam secundum formam statutorum gabelle.*

80 CG 13, p. 132 (26/6/1398 | Sp): *Et demum in maiori lucana gabelle providerunt quod provisores et custodes dicte maioris gabelle pro apodixis que per vectorales portantur pro mercantiis et rebus quas conducunt, quas ipsi provisores signant eo quod inmissi et portate sunt res et mercantie de quibus in apodixis fit mentio, non possint capere ultra denarios duodecim dicte monete parvorum pro qualibet apodixa sicut hactenus consueverunt qui denarii dividi debeant equaliter pro rata inter ipsos provisores et custodes ibidem deputatos. Teneantur tamen dicti provisores et custodes de dictis apodixis et salmis in eis declaratis tenere computum in libro proptererea ordinando et in illo ipsas salmas et apodixas summarie registrare ita quod semper videri possit ratio et computus ordinatus.*

81 Perhaps more likely, the Anziani wanted to prescribe a separate fee, lower than what the assessors and guards at Lucca were normally entitled to charge, for merchants who already paid hefty surcharges at Pietrasanta. This suggests that 12 denari was on the lower end of what these officials could charge for drafting licenses from scratch.
court of the *gabella maggiore*. In any case, it also indicates that the official responsibility for weighing, assessing, and even recording shipments fell entirely on the shoulders of the court’s lay staff. The notaries simply put pen to paper at their direction.

Election to the offices of notary, assessor, and guard was a matter of petition more than arbitrary selection. It is certainly true that Lucca’s notaries travelled through the various departments of the commune in a circuit, but the fact that some men served a few times while others received a dozen or more appointments suggests that a notary’s preferences were considered; the same can be said for the men who worked as assessors and guards year after year. The court also required all members to be sufficiently versed in commercial practices, measures, and terms to maintain a uniform process of assessment and documentation, but, as we will see, not all were up to the task.

Lucca’s governing councilors were not in the best position to know the talents of every eligible man in the rotation, which is why they responded quickly when the major official supervising the *gabella maggiore* proposed changes to the election lists. On January 12th, 1377, this administrator advised that ser Taddeo Malpigli was “neither fully instructed nor adept at the office of the gabelle”; he suggested the Council of Thirty-Six replace him with Nicolao Berettani, and they did. But this was not the first time that the council had elected ser Taddeo to the *gabella maggiore*; he had served part of a term there in 1372, and was actually switched out of the court on another occasion in 1374.

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82 After 1376, the authority of the notarial consuls over elections was revoked, and all notarial positions were elected through the Anziani and the Council of Thirty-Six, working in tandem; however, it seems that the notaries serving in the *gabella maggiore*, as those in other fiscal offices, were elected by the governing councils from 1372: (CG 6, p. 38 [13/8/1376 | Sp]).

83 Pini has explained how the “part time” communal system of elections, designed to distance office-holders from the office through vacations and the like, actually kept the same men in office on a more or less permanent basis: see Pini, “La ‘burocrazia’ comunale nella Toscana del Trecento,” 228–31. The tendency for personnel retention within the Lucchese *gabella maggiore* is an extreme example of this, since many of its occupants did not even rotate through other administrations.

84 CG 6, p. 166 (12/1/1377 | Thirty-Six): Ser Taddeo was neque plene structum neque expertum ad officium gabelle cui paulo ante fuit electus, while ser Niccolò was utiliter doctus et praticus in exercitio officii gabelle.

85 CG 4, p. 336 (24/2/1374) has him switched with ser Opizo Dombellinghi, who was originally assigned to the grain and butchered meat toll; his first appointment is on CG 3, p. 351 (1/7/1372), where he was, curiously enough, switched *into* the customs house to replace ser Opizo Dombellinghi, who took his position at the criminal court. This may indicate the challenges involved in these various offices, with the criminal court being more complex than the *gabella Maggiore*, which was harder in turn than the *Macello*, where only a few types of animals were being recorded. In any case, Ser Taddeo might have been young or just poorly trained, but he received at least ten other appointments after 1374, many of them under the same
If, despite this experience in the court, ser Taddeo truly was incompetent, this was something the councils either did not remember or were ready to forgive, unlike his supervisor. The court’s staff could also be removed for misconduct, as happened in April 1372, when the two notaries of the court, sers Giovanni Lotti and Nicolao dello Strego, had to be replaced because of their constant arguments and disagreements; again, the request came from the court's supervisor.\(^86\)

This supervisor presiding over the other functionaries of the court was called the greater official of the gabelle and tax farms (\emph{maior officialis gabelle et proventuum}). His title was originally included in a package of responsibilities including the duties of major sindic and judge of appeals.\(^87\) As a result, the early officials of the gabelle also had to qualify as judges, and Corrado da Montepulciano, Lodovigo Florani da Palazzo di Recanati, and Giovanni di Niccolò Bencivenni da Siena, all officials of the gabelle in the first half of the 1370s, were all ‘lords’ (\emph{domini}) because of their status as juridical doctors (\emph{doctores legum}).\(^88\) Like the podestà, these men were foreigners elected for their expected impartiality, a trait just as desirable in a judge as in an official charged with applying tariffs. And yet, Lucca’s last composite sindic-judge-official in the fourteenth century was the one who closed out the year 1376, one don Guglielmo di ser Bernardo da Castiglione Aretino.\(^89\) By 1378, notaries began to run an independent office of the gabelle, and the position remained separate from that of the major sindic and appeals judge until 1406.\(^90\)

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\(^86\) CG 3, p. 272 (19/4/1372 | Thirty-Six): “Since the gabelle is being harmed by the arguments and insults with which ser Johannes locti and ser Nicolaus streghi notarii maioris gabelle assidue invicem increpantur gabella recipiat lexionem et petitum sit tam per maiorem officialem gabelle quam per plures bonos cives et mercatores oportuno provideri remedio). Both men were elected to the \emph{gabella maggiore} again, albeit not together. A few other isolated cases occurred, including another dismissal in 1372 for a \emph{superstes} at the Porta San Piero (CG 3, p. 383 [25/8/1372 | Thirty-Six]) and two dismissals, for both an assessor and a notary, in July 1400 (CG 13, p. 348 [10/7/1400]).

\(^87\) The ‘greater’ (\emph{maior}) evidently distinguished this official from the many lesser \emph{officiales gabelle} who ran the provincial customs houses.

\(^88\) CG 3, p. 131; CG 4, p. 382; \emph{ibid.}, p. 405

\(^89\) CG 5, p. 302.

\(^90\) When don Mignanello Mignanelli da Siena was appointed to the threefold post: see GPG 1, p. 411.
One of these notary-officials, ser Giovanni di ser Bartolomeo Linelli da Castiglione di Garfagnana, deserves special attention. His career is emblematic of the \textit{ad hoc} decision-making that underlay the smooth prescriptions of the communal statutes, because it violated many of the latter. Ser Giovanni was neither a citizen of Lucca nor a genuine foreigner; his hometown, Castiglione di Garfagnana, sits astride the Serchio at the northern end of the Lucchesia, making him a subject (\textit{contadino} or \textit{comitatinus}) of the city. He attained citizenship in 1383 after several terms as \textit{maior officialis gabelle}, at which time he also declared his intention of selling “a great part of the property which he held in Castiglione, so as to remove from his sons the reason for staying there and give them cause to live at Lucca.”\footnote{The successful petition is found at CG 8, p. 567 (20/7/1383 | CG).} This was in the middle of his long career in Lucca, recorded from 1371 through the 1390s, during much of which he served as major official of the \textit{gabella maggiore} without the requisite vacation between terms.

In sum, ser Giovanni Linelli certainly lacked the impartiality of a foreign judge on a short-term contract, and he ended up losing both citizenship and property as a result of ill-timed military adventures in the 1390s. But he also got the job done; when ser Giovanni became the first non-judge official of the gabelle in 1378, this was a reward for service as an effective vice-official.\footnote{Ser Giovanni served as official of the \textit{fondaco} (an office concerned with maintaining the quality of food and goods consumed and produced in Lucca) in 1371, then official of duties in 1372 (\textit{officialis proventuum}, who managed a number of indirect taxes besides the Gabella Maggiore), before being appointed the \textit{coadiutor officialis gabelle} in that same year. His career up to 1377 is hard to track, but not all of his appointments as a \textit{coadiutor} were tracked in the official list of elections in the \textit{Riformagioni}; he was evidently still in this role in 1373, when the people of Villabasilica complained about his officiousness (CG 4, p. 125 [12/5/1373 | CG]) and he was named as \textit{officialis maior} in the protocol to the 1373 Gabella Maggiore records (GM 13, f. 1r). In both semesters of 1377, ser Giovanni was listed as major official alongside don Guglielmo da Castiglione Aretino in the protocol to two books of smuggling cases, indicating that the invocation of an actual judge at a tribunal was \textit{de rigueur} even if most of the work was in ser Giovanni's hands – perhaps tellingly, don Guglielmo's name is a later addition in the first of these two protocols, where it has been crammed into a margin (GM 79, p. 129; GM 80, p. 7).} The Anziani and their councilors lauded his experience and “probity” as they bent the rules to reelect him over and over.\footnote{At CG 6, p. 558, he is reelected in the face of a mandatory \textit{vacanza} by a two-thirds majority of the Council of Thirty Six “due to his skills and upstanding nature” (\textit{consideratis virtutibus et probitate}). His situation is reminiscent of ser Piero del fu ser Grifo da Pratovecchio and ser Viviano di Neri, notaries of the Florentine \textit{riformagioni}, both of whom exceeded mandatory vacations due to their popularity: Pini, “La ‘burocrazia’ comunale nella Toscana del Trecento,” 232–33.} Ser Giovanni’s influence extended beyond the court of the \textit{gabella maggiore} because the responsibilities of the major official were not clearly circumscribed by statute;
consequently, he and other men who occupied the office had a certain freedom to investigate the flow of goods and people around the Lucchesia. Mixed with ambition, this expertise gave the contadino notary a clear path to the council chamber, whose occupants regularly sought his advice. He resembles in a way the ambitious Sienese notaries described by Bowsky, whose “access to information” served as a foundation for political and economic advancement; Bowsky was referring to successful bids on tax farms, but ser Giovanni did something perhaps more impressive: he leveraged his experience into a permanent posting technically above his qualifications. His contributions to tax legislation over his twenty-year career will feature prominently in later chapters.

The power developed by ser Giovanni is best understood in relation to the apathy demonstrated by the men who served as the court’s general treasurers, the last role involved in the daily operations of the court. This treasurer (camerarius generalis gabelle) was a Lucchese citizen appointed for a one-week term through a “customary” system, likely an election by the major official himself. The statute of 1372 indicates that the treasurer may have been physically present in the court from time to time. The notaries wrote his name in their protocols, and, as stated above, the unabbreviated formula for each registered payment ran, “The aforementioned treasurer received [a sum] from [the taxpayer] for [the enumerated goods].” In reality, the general treasurer may not have been present at all hours, but he bore ultimate responsibility for handing over each week’s revenues to the treasury, and his totals were checked against the books produced at the gabella maggiore. The accounting was precise enough that a deficit of

94 Bowsky, A Medieval Italian Commune, 68–69.
95 At CG 11, p. 454 (22/4/1391 | Thirty-Six), where the original election system was abolished, the bill states that election to the office was run “according to a custom respected up to the present” (officium camerariatus lucane gabelle quod secundum consuetudinem hactenus observatam... fieri et reformari solet).
96 GM 1, f. 44r: [goods ought not be exported] absque solutione gabelle facta in dicta curia gabelle camerario dicte gabelle.
97 A [name]... pro [shipment summary]... libras... soldos... denarios... idem camerarius habuit et recepit; a few entries in each register preserve the entire formula, particularly towards the beginning of the year, but the last five words tended to drop out entirely, distorting the grammatical form of the entry.
98 The treasurer of the gabella maggiore only made single deposit to the general treasurer once per week, i.e. once a term; this was fixed to Monday or Tuesday after 1379 (CG 7, p. 28 [16/2/1379 | Az]). However, since the term ran from Sunday to Saturday, and there are, albeit infrequently, records dated to Sunday, this meant that, if the chest at the gabelle were delivered on Monday or Tuesday, it would contain moneys paid under two different treasurers. It is therefore likely that the treasurers took physical possession of the moneys in the chest at the court and delivered them personally, since a decree in 1381 describes a “chest
two florins could spark an investigation, as it did in November 1390.\textsuperscript{99} However, the authorities did not always persecute minor offenses to the fullest extent of the law, such that the consequences for mismanagement could be small indeed. For example, the defendant in the 1390 case was able to attain a pardon by admitting nothing more than that “an error had occurred.”\textsuperscript{100}

One complication in the 1390 case was that the defendant was not the elected treasurer, Biagio Ricci, but his substitute, Berto Bianchi. In fact, those elected to the office of treasurer declined often enough that the majority of my records from the 1380s were written under substitutes; these replacements were responsible for 17 out of 24 weeks in the first half of 1385 and 41 out of 53 weeks in 1387.\textsuperscript{101} No substitutes were listed in 1373 and 1378, which could mean that the treasurers were more enthusiastic in the early years of the restored *gabella maggiore*, but it seems more likely, given the rate of refusal in later years, that the notaries did not list substitutes at the time.\textsuperscript{102} Receiving the treasurership was without a doubt disruptive, since the treasurer sat for a mere week at a time and did not receive a salary; merchants and tradesmen, however much they appreciated representation in the tax system that governed their affairs, had little reason not to avoid this extra responsibility.

Several individuals in the orbit of the court of the *gabella maggiore* made for suitable replacements, and it seems that the major official had a short-list of substitutes. So three men – Gabriele Gonnella, Luigi Tegrimi, and the 1390 defendant Berto Bianchi – account for 15 of the 17 substitutes from 1385; four others – the same Gabriele and Luigi, along with Bonturello di Bonifazio and Piero di Nicolao Lorenzi – account for 32

\textsuperscript{99} To put this into perspective, weekly revenues in 1392 ranged between 44 and 474 florins.

\textsuperscript{100} CG 11, p. 518 [8/9/1391 | CG]: “He handed over the consignment of his account and gave the money which was found in the proper chest... but an error had occurred” (*consignationem sui calculi consignavit et dedit pecuniam que in ordinata capsa reperta fuit...quidem error processit*) – a vague but successful plea.

\textsuperscript{101} Three protocols from 1385 are defective and do not list the name of the treasurer or his substitute.

\textsuperscript{102} Alternately, it is possible that the all-out revolt against the office didn’t begin until the 1380s. One man, ser Niccolò di Luto Micheli, served as treasurer for the first week of January and again for four straight weeks in October 1378, while no other man appears more than once. He may have held the office several more times in the first semester of 1378, but the notaries only listed the first treasurer for that period. This may mean that ser Niccolò was a substitute, and, if substitutes were indeed being recorded, he was the only ‘career’ replacement in that year.
out of 41 replacements made in 1387. All five of these frequent substitutes served as ‘guards’ or assessors in the court and aides (*superstites*) at the gate gabelles, with over 45 appointments between them. I found no evidence of remuneration for this work, and it is possible that substitutes received none. Frequent employees of the *gabella maggiore*, they may have felt more responsible for the court’s smooth operation than the appointed treasurers; the latter, as frequent taxpayers themselves, normally found themselves on the other side of the table. In any case, none had appointments simultaneous with their work as replacement treasurers. It is probably because of his affiliation with the court that Berto Bianchi was not held accountable for the two missing florins in 1390, despite the fact that his professional expertise would have made the disappearance all the more suspicious.

In April 1391, after two decades of mounting delinquency, the Council of Thirty-Six did away with this cumbersome and clearly malfunctioning system of weekly treasurers, replacing it with a semester-long tenure for a Lucchese citizen. The new treasurers of the gabelle received salaries like other communal treasurers, such as those of the controlled meat and grain markets (the *Macello* and *Abondanza*), and they put up large bonds as securities against their performance. The petition to reject the old system cited the “labor and tedium for the officials who managed [the weekly elections]” as well as the fact that citizens “bemoaned and complained about the inequality [*inequalitatem*] maintained in [the weekly election].” Whatever these latter complaints, they could not have been about unequal representation. Silk merchants, cheesemongers, cloth magnates, painters, butchers, tanners, and shoemakers were all elected and all

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103 Of the eleven men listed as substitutes besides these five, two, Niccolò Piumentani and Tomaso Ricciardi, were filling in after their original (missed) appointment, and one, Michele Sbarra, was replacing his father Iacopo; this may indicate a certain squeamishness at passing up the position, but I have found no evidence of monetary penalties for failing to fulfill the office.

104 CG 11, p. 454 (22/4/1391 | Thirty-Six).

105 This is not listed in the initial election, but the appointee, Stefano Buzolini, complained that he was not allowed free access to the records of his account in the treasury. He told the Anziani that either they should appoint someone else or, as he put it, “I want to see my account when it pleases me, since I've already given a large security of one thousand florins” (...*elegere uno altro camarlingo che faccia questo officio o io voglio potere vedere mio conto quando mi piace avendo dato buona pagaria di fiorini mille*): CG 11, p. 474 (26/5/1392 | Thirty-Six).

106 CG 11, p. 454, loc. cit.: *Cum officium camerariatus lucane gabelle... difficulter et non sine labore ac tedium officialium ad quos id spectat reformetur, et etiam cives propter inegualitatem que ibi servatur doleant et conquerantur, quid videatur...?*
turned down the opportunity to become treasurer-for-a-week. “Inequality” probably meant unfairness of a different sort – the unfairness of being distracted from one's business for a profitless week of service to the commune.

The slow decline of the weekly *camerariatus* followed the same timeline as the decline in legislative activity related to the *gabella maggiore*, as we shall see in chapters two and four. It may seem trivial to correlate the two, but both trends suggest a gradual disengagement of merchants and wealthy artisans from the task of administering the fiscal system. In the case of the treasurerships, the duty was first handed over, on an *ad hoc* basis, to a rotating corps of underemployed public servants; after 1391, the government entrusted the position to a salaried official with a six-month tenure. After a burst of activity on the part of *balìa* councils and the General Council in the early 1370s, the councillors began to turn to the *maior officialis* of the *gabella maggiore* for economic advice. He, sometimes with the three-man research committee called the “citizens on revenues” (*cives super introitibus*), delivered his conclusions in lengthy ‘petitions’ to the General Council and Thirty-Six – ser Giovanni Linelli’s ‘requests’ tended to be heeded. The collective responsibility for fiscal legislation, devolved temporarily on the official of the gabelle, was finally vested in a single man in 1400, the Lord of Lucca.

1.3 Conclusion

The reams of paper, stained with gallons of ink, surviving from this late-Trecento customs house bear witness to a robust system designed to absorb some of the profits of the private sphere. While local consumption, production, and an advantageous geographical situation promoted a constant flow of commerce through the Lucchesia, the *gabella maggiore*, like a hydraulic dam on the river of trade, tapped this energy for the benefit of the fisc. Now that we have examined the machinery, most of which predated the emancipation of Lucca in 1369, we can turn to the engineers who maintained it over the course of our period. Hoping to generate as much revenue from this system without deleteriously damming up the city’s economic vigor, legislators anxiously tweaked the rates and practices employed at Lucchese customs posts on a nigh-constant basis. The next chapter explores the motivations behind one major work of fiscal policy, the statute
of the *gabella maggiore* published in 1372, and addresses the conflicting influences of tradition and innovation in late medieval statute-writing.

Before moving on, however, I want to reiterate a few points that have complicated my analysis of the *gabella maggiore* system. First, much commercial activity fell outside the purview of the registers of the Lucchese *gabella maggiore*. It is of primary importance that we advance to the statistics in chapter three with an appreciation of this issue, since, in Esch’s words, “partial survival rates do not simply mean that fewer documents survive, but that those which do survive produce a distorted effect.” As mentioned above, there were additional customs houses located throughout the countryside, typically in the major town of each vicariate. So we can read of officials manning distinct ‘gabelles’ at Coreglia, Montecarlo, Pietrasanta, Motrone, Castiglione della Garfagnana, and several other locations, but we know far less about these posts than we do about the organization of the court in Lucca. Most goods imported directly into the vicariates or exported from the hinterland along some route that did not pass through Lucca, however, would have paid the gabelle at these locations and would not have appeared in the records of the Lucchese *gabella maggiore*. Finally, guard posts of some sort existed at the edges of the district; the only reference I found for these stations, which one would think to be necessary for controlling licensed traffic, indicates only that they were to collect *pedaggium* licenses at the border. Although some scattered records

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108 In Pietrasanta, for example, we know that the gabelle was administered “in the house or shop called the *loggia* of the commune, in the communal square beside the house once known as the property of the heirs of Asquino,” but such references are isolates without context and do not permit us to reconstruct the system with any certainty: ASLu, *Gabella del Contado* 50, s.f. (eleventh binding): *...in domo seu apotheca domus que dicitur loicus [sic.] comunis posita in comuni petrasancte in platea comunis iuxta domus que dicitur olim heredium Absquini de Luca et ab alia alias dicta platea comunitis et ab alia alias domum pauperum Christi... vel similares sunt confines.*
109 CG 3, p. 492 [20/1/1373 | Sp]: “Lest the Lucchese gabelle be defrauded or harmed by goods passing through the city of Luca (i.e. paying *pedaggium*) ... and so that those transporting them do not unload them in the Lucchesia, let guards be set up at the borders of Lucchese territory and in those places in which passage has been permitted; these guards should receive the licenses presented by those individuals who are transporting those goods in passage, and they should see if the things which are listed in the licenses are being transported, and they ought to present those licenses each month to the Lucchese gabelle” (*Item statuerunt ne de rebus transeuntibus per civitatem lucanam que disagabellantur luce per passagium lucana gabella fraudem vel lesionem recipiat et quod deferentes tales res eas non demicant super territorio lucano. Quod deputentur ad confines lucani territorii in illis partibus in quibus passagia sunt concessa Custodes qui recipiant apodixas quas habebunt ille persone que portabunt ipsas res per passagium. Et*
of these separate customs posts survive in the Gabella del Contado series at the Archivio di Stato in Lucca, these survivors contain little more than summarized totals of the receipts at the gabelle.\(^\text{110}\) Even for the few years represented in these documents, therefore, we cannot gain a sense of the type or quantity of commercial activity passing through the rural customs posts.

Second, the registers employed in this study do not even encompass all commercial activity passing through the Sei Miglia, the suburbs, and the city of Lucca itself. Although every individual transporting goods through, into, or from these areas paid tariffs in the city, those responsible for small quantities of goods owing less than thirty soldi in tax could and did pay at the gates rather than the central court. Records of these transactions do not survive, since writing down every small payment would have been economically inefficient given the payments involved; moreover, those importing a few items to consume in the city would have had little need of an official license. While some merchants did choose to pay minor taxes of this sort at the court of the *gabella maggiore*, we must assume that most taxpayers did not. This obviously limits what conclusions I can draw concerning alimentation and the city’s consumption habits, and my findings are restricted to goods shipped in large quantities. Large-scale importers did control the large market in imported Sardinian, Corsican, and Sicilian cheese, most of the salt- and fresh-fish market, and dried fruit, among other things – but the *gabella maggiore* records mention fresh fruit, produce like onions, and local cheeses on only rare occasions. I will return to these two problems and their ramifications in chapter three, but I want to emphasize that it has its roots in the peculiar division of labour between the central and peripheral customs posts.

Although the majority of this chapter has been descriptive, I believe that the structure and daily operation of the *gabella maggiore* indicate an important characteristic of the city’s legislative councils in the last third of the fourteenth century. As the next chapter will show, members of the upper classes in Lucca were far from uninterested in

\(^{110}\) E.g. ASLu, Gabella del Contado 6 (Camaiore: 1369-1370, 1372, 1376, 1383), 24 (Coreglia: 1369), 32 (Gallicano: 1384, 1385, 1398), 44 (Montecarlo: 1370, 1385), 50 (Pietrasanta: 1372, 1375, 1376, 1380); for more on these, see Bratchel, *Medieval Lucca and the Evolution of the Renaissance State*, 188–95.
indirect taxation, even though it had only a small impact on their prosperity. The councils controlled by the inner oligarchy issued about two hundred major and minor alterations to the statutes of the *gabella maggiore* over only forty years. But these changes concerned almost exclusively the rates of taxation alone, not methods of exaction or even personnel at the court. In fact, while retaining control over the city’s fiscal legislation, the urban elite seemed willing to cede all authority over day-to-day operations to the major official of the *gabella maggiore*.

One can certainly appreciate the value of delegation in technical matters, but this reliance on technocrats drawn from outside the governing class appears to have created a situation in which Lucca’s councils contained few members with direct experience of the macroeconomic trends witnessed by the officers of the *gabella maggiore*. We will see in future chapters how the major official came to serve as the chief economic advisor of the commune on matters outside the limited – albeit incredibly important – silk and wool cloth industries. Moreover, as the position of weekly treasurer transformed into one with a standard six-month tenure, fewer and fewer Lucchesi had first-hand knowledge of how the court of the *gabella maggiore* operated, at least from the other side of the collection booth. Most of the city’s merchant-oligarchs, perennially caught between their professional and political careers, did not fight against this transition but rather embraced it. Their apathy helps to explain the importance of customary practice, alongside statutes and ordinances, within institutions like the *gabella maggiore*, as well as the statute-violating careers of bureaucrats like ser Giovanni Linelli.
Chapter Two: The Statute

On almost every day of the period covered by this study, the courtyard of the Pinelli house played host to a cacophony of creaking scales, clacking abacuses, and grumbling livestock. Despite this activity, the records left by the court of the *gabella maggiore* contain little vitality. Entry by entry, the names of individuals appear beside itemized shipments and totaled payments. The occasional mention of the merchant’s origin or destination lends some colour to the spare list and occasionally offers a glimpse of the contours of a regional market. And, in the end, one must remember that the creators of this remarkable economic record never expected it to be consulted as a map of the local economy.

With that being said, I would argue that it *is* possible to exploit the registers of the *gabella maggiore* for an image of the regional economy.¹ Moreover, this sort of overview provides a useful context for the decisions made by Lucchese legislators with regards to the economy over the course of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The statistical analysis in chapters three and four of this study may work against the grain of its source material, but it does not strain. But before attempting this reading, we must establish what the documentary record of the court was meant to convey to its contemporaries. The previous chapter described the practical circumstances of the registers’ creation, and this chapter will address the statutes that governed the creation of this written record.

While some people entering Lucca with goods were assessed at the gates themselves, all merchants with large shipments were sent to the court of the *gabella maggiore*. The process of assessment at the court involved unpacking, weighing, and appraising, all of which meant a certain inconvenience for the taxpayer. The logistics of taxation also presented certain inconveniences to the state, since the *gabella maggiore* required a paid staff of at least nineteen salaried men: at the gates, eight aides and four gate officials, not counting numerous runners; at the court itself, two assessors, one

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¹ Not that this is a revolutionary step; the records of the *gabella maggiore* have been mined for this kind of information by historians of Lucca like Green and Meek, while others, for example Becker, have used the receipts of the Florentine *gabella portarum* as an economic barometer: e.g. Becker, *Florentine Essays*, 182–83.
'guard', two notaries, the major official, and the general treasurer (a paid position after 1391). These officers’ wages cost the commune at least 700 florins a year, and maintaining the court entailed an even higher cost.2

Expenditures of this nature were constantly piling up; the gabella maggiore was a single department in a city-state that required well over a hundred paid positions to manage its affairs.3 The price tag on this complex administration was reasonable compared to the cost of self-defense – mercenaries, fortifications, and, of course, bribes to men like John Hawkwood.4 The people who shaped Lucca’s fiscal policy were looking at their balance sheet from this angle, from which ‘in the red’ meant the end of Lucchese independence.5 Taxation was their lifeline, and diligent application of indirect taxes like the gabelles was a more popular solution to insolvency than increasing the estimo or other direct taxes on wealth, at least for the oligarchs who served most frequently on the nominally ‘popular’ councils. But the gabella maggiore was fundamentally different from other consumption taxes, such as the lucrative gabelles on wine, grain, and meat. Its scope was rather broad, designed to encompass all consumer and industrial goods not covered under those specific tariffs. It also offered a unique opportunity to profit from consumption occurring outside the Lucchesia, since merchants passing through the district were required to pay a passage-fee called pedaggio.6

But these features made the gabella maggiore doubly difficult to design as a piece of fiscal legislation. Lucca’s geographical location made it convenient for commerce, especially given the instabilities in eastern Tuscany in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, but unreasonable rates could force foreign merchants towards different routes or markets elsewhere. At the same time, the gabelles eroded profit

2 Assuming an average monthly salary of 3 florins, low for the notaries (typically 5 florins) and far too low for the major official, we arrive at 684 florins yearly, but this does not account for the rent or amortized purchase price of the Pinelli house, nor the salaries of the famuli, the cost of paper, ink, and wax, etc.
3 The election-list for the first semester of 1372, for example, runs to 102 position, many of which – vicars, judges, and podestà – entailed salaries several orders of magnitude above 3 florins per month (CG 3, p. 164 [21/12/1371]).
4 For example, Hawkwood appeared in 1375 to demand 7,000 florins (CG 5, p. 90 [9/7/1375 | CG]) – this was neither the first nor the last time that the post-emancipation Lucchesia played host to celebrity condottieri; see, for example, Meek, Lucca, 1369–1400, 58–59, 69, 167–68.
5 This was the exact tenor of the prologue to a series of measures in 1388 meant to shore up revenues. See the introduction, XX–XX.
6 Pedaggio accounts for just over 6% of the revenues of the gabella maggiore over the years of my sample (~4,100 of ~66,000 florins).
margins in Lucca’s main industries – silk cloth production, metalwork, tanning, etc. – whose vitality was as important for the lives of urban taxpayers as those taxpayers were to the survival of the state. In this chapter I will discuss the statutes of the *gabella maggiore* in 1372, the first extant statutes of Lucca’s customs house, which were the recently emancipated commune’s first attempt to achieve an equilibrium between fiscal solvency and the health of the local economy.

Taking it at face value, one might look at the statute of 1372 and expect that it was the product of careful deliberation. Each tax rate would then represent a conscious legislative decision, one that reflects assumptions about the relative value, commercial-industrial importance, or local availability of the trade good in question. But my evidence suggests that the statute-writers of 1372 borrowed heavily from earlier statutes that have not survived. Compared with the statutes published by its neighbors, Lucca’s statute follows an idiosyncratic format derived from a local tradition of rate lists. Beyond the layout of the document itself, it seems likely that many of the individual tax rates were not set in 1372 but rather inherited, like the unwritten regulations of the court itself, from the customs houses that existed during the Pisan occupation and earlier.

Merely tracing the history of this legislative tradition does not address the central issue. If the statute of 1372 copied its rates – or at least the estimated values upon which rates were based – from earlier statutes, its authors were clearly not actively engaged in a process of price assessment and economic surveying. And if the elected framers of an official statute lacked the motivation or acumen required to draft original fiscal legislation, the possibility emerges that the political elite that they represented either did not value or did not know how to judge the quality of such legislation. In this chapter, I discuss tendencies towards a kind of stagnation in the legislative tradition leading up to the statute of 1372, and in chapters three and four I will present an analysis of the economy starting with the *gabella maggiore* records produced in 1373.

2.1 Tracing the Origins of the *Gabella Maggiore*, 1308-72

The terms *gabella maggiore* and *gabella maior* are not attested before the 1340s, but a broad-based gate toll on commercial goods existed at Lucca since at least the early
fourteenth century. Its roots, however, remain somewhat obscure. The statute of 1308, Lucca’s earliest extant statute, contains only a few references to fiscal matters, and the word *gabella* appears only once in an exemption from certain qualifications prescribed for the “keeper of the registers and pawns belonging to the *intrata* and *gabella* of the Lucchese commune.” A later chapter in the same document refers to a tariff on merchandise from which merchants from Prato were exempt, and vice versa for Lucchese merchants. For the purpose of maintaining good relations, and in the expectation of similar treatment in Prato, “no *pedaggium* or *collecta* can be exacted or taken from anyone from Prato or its territory... on any merchandise or possessions... and this does not include the *intrata*.” In the late fourteenth century, the term *pedaggium* (later *pedaggio* or *passagium*) refers to the toll charged on goods that passed through the Lucchesia; unlike the *gabella maggiore*, this passage-toll was levied per load rather than by weight, tally, or value. The *intrata* referenced in these two passages must have been another tax on merchandise in 1308, one that differed from the *pedaggium*; its name suggests a toll on imported goods in the manner of the *gabella maggiore*.

Although these isolated citations suggest the existence of a fully-fledged system of commercial tariffs, no contemporary statutes describing the rates or method of application of the *intrata* or *pedaggium* have survived. A clearer picture of these taxes, or at least the format and content of the lost statutes that established them, derives from a document that was produced a few years after the statute of 1308: the statutes of...
pedaggium for the community of Lucchese merchants at Genoa.\(^\text{12}\) Genoese creditors could, after receiving authorization, treat any of their debtors’ countrymen as liable in case of default, and the resulting confiscatory raids strained relations between the two cities. In 1314, six Lucchese merchants resident in Genoa were authorized to draft the statutes of a pedaggerium, or toll-booth, with whose revenues the Lucchese government could reimburse dissatisfied creditors before they had recourse to official reprisals.\(^\text{13}\) As the surviving document attests, their community appointed a sworn consul (consul) to collect a pedaggium on all goods exported by their colleagues to Lucca, Pisa, and Lombardy.\(^\text{14}\) For each departing shipment, the consul was responsible for exacting the tariff and drawing up a license (apodixa) as proof of payment; he was also to serve as a general procurator and syndic (procuratorem et sindicum) for the community (generalitas) of Lucchese merchants at Genoa.\(^\text{15}\) The consul had to submit his receipts, minus his own salary, to a treasurer in Lucca, and by some mechanism these moneys would go to pay down defaulted debts to Genoese citizens.

The pedaggium instituted in 1314 was clearly not the first of its kind. While explaining the particulars of fines and obligations, the handbook refers obliquely to an

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\(^\text{12}\) ASLu, Raccolte Speciali, Giovambattista Orsucci 44, ff. 210r-18v. The document is a nine-folio parchment handbook, now found in a collection assembled by the seventeenth-century antiquarian Giovambatista Orsucci; its provenance is therefore unknown.

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., f. 210r: …ut satisfieri possit creditoribus Januensis debentibus recipere a civibus et districtualibus lucanis habentibus contra lucanum comune vel districtuales ipsius locum sive represalias vel non habentibus pro ipsorum creditis de his quae recipere debent vel petere possunt grave causa vel iure quocumque.

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., 210r-v: ...quilibet lucanus civis districtualis vel comitatus qui concurdet vel conduci faciet Lucam vel ad partes lucanas vel versus partes ipsas vel Pisas vel ad partes pisanas de Janua vel partibus Janue infrascriptas res vel mercationes vel aliquas earum solvat et solvere debebat pedageryo per nos [210v] ordinato vel ordinando moraturo Janue infrascriptas quantitates pecuniarum per paratam pro quibuslibet mercationibus et rebus pro pedagio ut infra continentur videlicet...; Lombardy is included at the end of the document (f. 216r): Item quod de omnibus mercationibus et mercadantiliis lucanis que per lucanos ementur Janue et mientur ad partes ultramontanas vel in Lombardiam solvetur per ementes vel alio titulo acquirentes et mictentes eam dicto pedaggio medalliam unam Januinam pro qualibet libra denariorum. Note that, despite the term Januinam, it does not appear that the tax on shipments sent to Lombardy was assessed in genovini, the Genoese gold trade coins (see Spufford, Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe, 176ff.); the few references to medallia in contemporary Italian sources seems to refer to half a denarius, so the medallia Januina would presumably have been half a Genoese denarius (Du Cange et al., Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, s.v. Medalia(2): monetae minutoris species, quarum duae denarium valebant). If this is true, merchants were expected to pay half a denarius per lira of the exported goods’ value for each shipment they conveyed or transferred to Lombardy and north of the Alps, i.e. just over 0.2% of its value. For another use of medalia, a rare term, to refer to half a coin, see Filangieri di Candida, I registri della cancelleria angioina. Bd. 40, 40: 1291-1292:17–19., where a document describing the 1292 issue of denari from the mints of Charles II of Naples refers to the medalia as half a denarius.

\(^\text{15}\) ASLu, Giovambattista Orsucci 44, 217r.
earlier tax on the Lucchese community at Genoa called the *arca*. The *arca* had employed its own consul, and it, too, relied on the authority of the Court of the Merchants in Lucca for enforcement. It is certainly possible that the *pedaggium* outlined in the document was also extraordinary and temporary, driven perhaps by a rash of Lucchese bankruptcies in unstable times. Unfortunately, no evidence for the enforcement of this tax survives in the archive due to acts of arson in the early fourteenth century that consumed most of Lucca’s official documents.

The Genoese handbook, our only witness to Lucca’s tariff legislation before the death of Castracani, contains rates for 232 separate trade goods organized into twelve categories. Every tax in this system was applied per load (*salma*) or per hundredweight (*centenarium*), easy quantities to estimate, and the consul may have been expected to assess shipments by sight. While employing the system may have been simple enough for the assessor, determining its many rates must have presented a certain challenge for the legislators. Rather than determining fair rates for hundreds of items, the six merchants appointed for this task presumably turned to other official documents, such as the contemporary statutes of the Lucchese *gabella* or *intrata*. Copying would certainly explain the inclusion of a discursive list of eighty spices; no one would have been shipping entire loads of cassia bark, gum arabic, or white lead, but the *pedaggium* statute contains only the per load rate for these and many other rare substances. These items were likely copied from the list of spices in Lucca’s *gabella* statutes, where they would have been paired with more precise rates assessed by a smaller volume. It seems unlikely that the assessor was meant to pro-rate partial shipments of spices based on the per-load

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16 Ibid., 216v: *Item stantiamus providemus et ordinamus quod consul lucanus civis moraturus Janue occasione dicti pedaggii habeat et habere intelligatur et tempore habere volumus illam eandem et similem jurifactionem autoritatem et honores et bailiam et officium quam et quod et prout melius et licius habuit Ser Johanne Bosse consul olim sive officialis constitutus in civitate Janue pro mercadantia civitatis Lucane pro pedaggio illo quod dicebant arca*; ibid., 217v: *Item ordinamus quod Iudex curie mercatorum lucane civitatis haberit et habere […]datur illam et eandem autoritatem contra defraudentes dictum pedaggium quam et prout habebat olim iudex dicte curie secundum ordinamenta pedaggii quod dicebat arca et maiorem et aliam ut ordinabimus.*

17 The last page (ibid., 218v) of the parchment handbook contains the subscriptions of tax collectors (*pedagerii*), who presumably helped the consul in his duties. The last dated subscription is from 3 June 1314, less than three months after the *pedaggium* was ratified by the community at Genoa (28 April 1314). Without knowing the provenance of this handbook, however, it is impossible to say for sure whether the tax itself was of such a short duration. The upheaval in Lucca that June, when it was conquered by Uguccione della Faggiuola, must have affected the city’s fiscal policies drastically; see Green, *Castruccio Castracani*.  

18 Ibid., 214v-216r.
The Statute

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tariff; the pedaggium makes no mention of such a system in any case. Furthermore, a number of other items, such as silk cloth, would have been exports to Genoa from Lucca, rather than vice versa; assuming that this document imitates the contemporary statutes for Lucca’s domestic customs tariff explains the otherwise puzzling inclusion of such items.

Beyond this, two decrees included in the 1314 handbook help to clarify the form of the early-fourteenth-century tariff employed in Lucca itself. The pedaggium statute formed part of a larger piece of fiscal legislation, and the handbook copies several ordinances not directly relevant to the community at Genoa. Among these mandates, one finds these direct references to a tariff exacted in the city of Lucca:

In the case of silk or merchandise imported from outside the Luchesia by a foreigner and then sold to a Lucchese citizen, districtual, or subject, the buyer is obligated to pay the same gabelle for those goods that he would have paid if he had himself imported them from abroad. 19

In the case of any unworked silk from overseas that is directed to or imported to Lucca or its territory from the cities of Pistoia, Florence, Bologna, Ancona, Venica, or their territories, a sum should paid for gabelle or pedaggium as if the silk had been imported from Genoa 20

The wording of these decrees clarifies the nature of the institution called the gabella in the statute of 1308; it was a customs tax applied to goods imported to Lucca, if not also exports. Interestingly, the wording of the first passage suggests that foreign merchants were not expected to pay this gabella for goods they brought into the city, which created a tax loophole for their Lucchese customers that the statute subsequently closed. 21

The second passage appears to extend a geographically-limited tax on unworked silk, the

19 A loose translation for ibid., 216v: Item pro quolibet sirico sive mercantiiis et mercimoniiis que per aliquem forrensem de extra lucanum civitatem vel comitatum vel districtum conducetur undeunque vel conducte fuerint de aliqua vel ab aliqua dictarum partium ad civitatem vel comitatum aut districtum lucanum et eas vel ea venderet aliiui lucano civi districtuali vel comitatino talis lucanus civis districtialis vel comitatimus emens vel qui emit ea vel eas solvat et solvere teneatur et debeat illam et eandem gabellam pro dictis mercationibus et aliis superscriptis quam et prout soluisset et solvere debuisset si ea vel eas conduct fecisset de aliqua dictarum partium.

20 My translation for ibid., 217v: Item quod de quolibet sirico de ultramari quod rediceretur vel conducetur lucam vel ad partes lucanas a civitate pistorii vel florentie vel bononie ancone venetiis vel eorum partibus vel aliunde solvatur pro gabella sive pedagio ac si conducetur de Janua.

21 It is certainly possible that this passage instead institutes a double gabelle on merchandise imported by foreigners – paid once by the importer, then again by the purchaser – but this seems very unlikely.
mainstay of the city’s cloth industry, which would mean that this item had not been taxed beforehand; it also lists the other trade centers from which Lucca imported raw silk, Pisa being a noteworthy absence.

The purpose and probable impact of these two changes deserve further investigation, but I will limit myself to what the statute of 1308 and the Genoese pedaggium statutes of 1314 reveal about customs taxes in early-fourteenth-century Lucca. The pedaggium at the time was some kind of toll charged on shipments passing through Lucca’s territory; this was paid by Lucchesi, at least by the community at Genoa in 1314, as well as foreigners, hence the exemption for the merchants of Prato in the statute of 1308. The *gabella*, on the other hand, was a tax on imports and possibly exports, and the evidence suggests that only Lucchese citizens and subjects paid this tax. Merchants from outside Lucca may have been entirely exempt from this tariff, perhaps under a system of exemptions arranged with their city of origin. Despite the above categorization, the terms *gabella* and *pedaggium* – not to mention *entrata* and *collecta* – appear somewhat interchangeable in these references, and it is possible that they had not yet acquired a precise definition in the Lucchese fiscal system.

The tumultuous thirty years that followed were the crucible of Lucchese fiscal institutions. Whether victorious under Castruccio Castracani or subject to foreign powers after his death in 1328, Lucca faced a steady stream of expenses. As the city’s government, independent or otherwise, struggled under this pressure, successive waves of emigration reduced its tax base.22 The overlords that took hold of Lucca in succession after Castracani’s death saw the city as an investment from which to draw revenue.23 But

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22 Green, relying largely on the work of Blomquist and the notarial records of ser Rabbito Toringhelli, has convincingly argued that the reign of Castruccio Castracani actually helped to revitalize the Lucchese economy by improving the status of the merchant oligarchy *vis-à-vis* the pre-1314 popular government: *Castruccio Castracani*, 112–22. The catastrophe of Castracani’s death and the ensuing capture of Lucca cancelled most of these gains but did not result in a return to the political *status quo ante*: the main families of my period, the Rapondi, Sbarra, Guinigi, and Forteguerra, were some of the winners of that brief commercial boom.

23 An investment at best – at worst, a piggybank to be smashed. Mallett’s somewhat lyrical description of the 1329 siege of Lucca by the Visconti-Imperial army evokes the right mood: “To the loot from the city they were able to add an additional gain by selling Lucca to the Genoese for 30,000 florins. This no doubt seemed the limit of the possible achievements of this small group and so they divided up their booty and dispersed,” *Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy*, 28. As Green has noted, however, most of Lucca’s temporary lords allowed the fiscal administration to continue in the hands of the
the intense pressures on Lucchese finances in this period might have incentivized the reorganization and streamlining of the fisc.\textsuperscript{24} By the mid-1330s, many of the features of Lucca’s late medieval fiscal system were already in place, such as the division between a native-run salt monopoly and a foreign-run office of the gabelles and tax farms.\textsuperscript{25} It was also during this period that the gate *gabella* assumed an additional descriptor; by 1345, three years after the start of the long-term Pisan occupation (1342-1369), Lucca had a customs tariff called the *gabella maggiore*.\textsuperscript{26}

The *gabella maggiore* under the Pisan occupation must have been something very different from the various tariffs and passage-fees charged in the early fourteenth century. Reciprocal toll exemptions with neighboring city-states, as suggested in the 1314 decree noted above, may not have survived the death of the Castracani or the loss of Lucchese independence. Moreover, political unification under Uguccione della Faggiuola with Genoa and Pisa, Lucca’s principal ports and trading partners, drastically altered the situation in which the *pedaggium* of 1314 and similar tariffs were drafted. Like the empire carved out by Castracani, this union between Lucca and her neighbors proved temporary, but it must have changed the terms of commercial activity and consequently taxation of that activity.

It seems unlikely that Lucca’s occupiers had a more direct influence on the administration of the *gabella maggiore*. Between 1329 and 1342, successive occupiers of the city wisely left Lucchesi in charge of the tax-collecting apparatus.\textsuperscript{27} To be sure, Pisan officials were directly responsible for managing this indirect tax and its revenues from 1342 to 1345, the first three years of the Pisan occupation; work experience in their native city must have informed how they managed Lucca’s toll system.\textsuperscript{28} But, unlike

\textsuperscript{24} Florence’s system of indirect taxation was overhauled during a period of similar fiscal strain; see De La Roncière, “Indirect Taxes or ‘Gabelles’ at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs and Problems of Collection.”

\textsuperscript{25} Green, *Lucca under Many Masters*, 224–25.

\textsuperscript{26} Meek, *The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-1369*, 40.

\textsuperscript{27} Green, *Lucca under Many Masters*, 221–22.

\textsuperscript{28} Meek, *The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-1369*, 40–41. As Meek notes, the Pisan government was technically entitled to appoint the treasurer of the *gabella maggiore* under the composition made in October 1345, but the personnel lists indicate that Lucchesi filled this position in practice – with one exception noted below.
indirect taxes in Lucca’s stripped-away hinterland, the urban gabelles remained under the control of the subject Lucchese government, which used the revenues of the *gabella maggiore*, among other things, to pay the annual sum owed to Pisa during the occupation. After 1345, moreover, all officials at the court of the *gabella maggiore* were supposed to be Lucchesi, not Pisans.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the customs administrators during this period had titles identical to those used after 1369, and the court of the gabelle may have been stationed in the Pinelli house. Since so many of the court’s day-to-day practices were customary and not prescribed by written law, the method of taxing shipments was presumably similar to the process employed after the city achieved its independence. And although the statute used by officials during the occupation does not survive, it was probably very similar in structure to the statute of 1372. As we shall see, the general communal statutes were revised in 1333 and 1342, and it seems likely that the tariffs were revised at the same time. The strong likeness shared by the *pedaggium* ordinance of 1314 and the statute of 1372 would indicate that the tariff lists in use during the Pisan occupation belonged to a common tradition transmitting organizational principles, at the very least. As we shall see later in this chapter, the 1372 statutes of the *gabella maggiore* share little in common with the Pisan *breve gabellarum* of the mid-1360s.

Although the *gabella maggiore* under the Pisans was administered by Lucchese citizens following a document deriving from their own legislative tradition, and despite

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29 Ibid., 63–72. Note that this indemnity changed over the course of the Pisan occupation; before 1348, the Pisans simply collected all revenue and paid the Lucchese government a set amount for its operating expenses – a much better deal for Lucca in a time of economic contraction – and after 1348 the sums owed to Pisa ranged between 35,000 and 40,000 florins, not accounting for extraordinary imposts. According to Judith Brown, in the first quarter of the fifteenth century, neighboring Pescia was expected to transfer around 7,500 and 8,000 florins to Florence, its *dominante*, on an annual basis – and this with a population perhaps a fifth that of Lucca: Brown, *In the Shadow of Florence: Provincial Society in Renaissance Pescia*, 219. See also Molho, *Firenze nel Quattrocento*, vol. 2, 186–7.

30 A Pisan was elected to the office of *maior officialis* as late as 1357; given Sercambi’s curious statement about Pisan gabelle officials, quoted below, I think the *dominante* had a strong, if latent, influence in the administration of the *gabella maggiore*. See Meek, *The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-1369*, 41, n. 32.

31 AAL 42, p. 88 (30/5/1362).

32 The existence of these statutes is evinced in one of the first meetings of the Consiglio Maggiore after Lucca achieved its independence; legislators, making adjustments to tariff rates, make multiple formulaic references to the “statutes and ordinances of the Lucchese gabelle made by the Lucchese commune” (*statuta et ordinamenta lucane gabelle facta per communem lucanum*) (AAL 45, pp. 1-7 [24-30/3/1369]).

33 See Table 2.3 below.
the fact that revenue from the gabelles offset the direct taxation necessary to satisfy the dominante’s demands, these indirect taxes came to be seen as part of common system of oppression. Giovanni Sercambi noted that Holy Week in 1369 was especially joyous because the commune had regained control of the gabelles on the preceding Palm Sunday, and the feast days were marked by spontaneous processions and merrymaking to celebrate Lucca’s fiscal emancipation at the emperor’s hands. Sercambi continues, “The gabelles were a strong foundation for Lucchese liberty, except for the fact that, on account of them, many Pisans and officials had settled in Lucca.” Clearly, in Sercambi’s mind, the government of Lucca did not control the exaction of indirect taxes during the occupation; rather, the gabelles served to justify a large staff of unwelcome Pisan administrators. How can one explain Sercambi’s description in light of the fact that the court of the gabella maggiore, at least, was run by Lucchese citizens – possibly using a Lucchese statute – during this period?

The answer seems to be that the fiscal system of the subject city was forced to adapt to new demands from Pisa in the 1360s, demands that progressively eroded Lucchese independence in this sphere and reinforced the sense of oppression described by Sercambi, himself a young man in that decade. Christine Meek’s exhaustive survey of the Pisan occupation determined that the accession of doge Giovanni dell’Agnello in 1364 marked the turning point in Lucca’s relationship with its overlord. Doge Agnello was remembered in Lucca as a rapacious tyrant, a reputation due in no small part to the higher taxes imposed under his regime to recover from a disastrous war with Florence. As Meek notes, Pisa ordered the imposition of higher gabelle rates in 1364 and again in 1365 after Giovanni dell’Agnello’s accession, and there is no evidence that these rates

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34 Sercambi, Croniche, vol. 19, vol. 1: 161–2: “On Palm Sunday, 25 March 1369, the commune of Lucca regained the gabelles of the city of Lucca, which up to that point had been held by the Pisans... All the citizens took great comfort from this recovery, singing Te deum laudiamo with branches of blessed olivewood in their hands.” (Anno .MCCCLXVIII. a di .xxv. marzo, la domenica d’ ulivo, il comune di Lucch a riebbe le gabelle della ciptà di Luccha, che in fine a quel punto erano state de’ Pisani... Del quale riavenimento tucti i ciptadini presero grandissimo conforto, cantando Te Deum laudiamo, con rami dell’ulivo benedecto in mano.)


37 Meek, The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-1369, 111–4; the war with Florence, which carried dell’Agnello to the dogeship, broke out in 1362 and lasted for just over two years: see Ibid., 99–101.
were ever lowered during his rule.\textsuperscript{38} The Lucchesi sent embassies on many occasions to protest increases and negotiate over the particulars of entry tariffs, citing on at least one occasion the inability of the urban poor and artisans to sustain themselves.\textsuperscript{39} But while the subject government expressed a sense of proprietary knowledge in the area of local taxation and begged that Pisa respect its expertise, the rates themselves – as opposed to the system of collection – were under the control of the dominante. And without recourse to over-taxing its contado, the urban population was forced to face these taxes independently.\textsuperscript{40} As for the Pisan tax officials described by Sercambi, it is possible that the fiscal system had become crowded with special treasurers; these emergency officials were appointed to redirect revenue from gabelles and tax farms to the repayment of forced loans, which multiplied under doge Agnello, and it may be the case that Pisans held these temporary positions more often during the 1360s.\textsuperscript{41}

Whether justifiably or not, correcting the abuses of the Pisan occupation became the theme of Lucca’s legislative program after 1369. Coluccio Salutati, serving as chancellor of the city, announced the launch of major statutory reforms in November 1370 by lamenting the decline of Lucca’s legal tradition, which had declined from the principles established during its Roman history to the utter corruption of the Pisan administration:

\begin{quote}
Nor was it enough for them [the Pisans] to afflict Lucchese citizens with insults, but they also established with quasi-legal coercion the kinds of laws that abused rather than protected a sad and impoverished people, by which means evil men might more readily fatten themselves upon the good; ordinances were announced on a daily basis that served the interests of the tyrants rather than the people, and many windfalls went to Pisan citizens, both as a group and individually.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} Meek, \textit{The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-1369}, 108–9.
\textsuperscript{39} ASLu, Ragionieri 10, cited by Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{40} Unlike, for example, in Quattrocento Brescia, which retained fiscal control of its contado to help absorb the impact of Venetian taxes: see Bowd, \textit{Venice’s Most Loyal City}, 48–49.
\textsuperscript{41} For a description of this practice, see Meek, \textit{The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-1369}, 68–70.
\textsuperscript{42} ASLu, CG 2, pp. 137-8: Nec satis erat iniuriis cives lucanos afficere, nisi etiam legitimo quasi vire sancirent, que lugubrem ac miserum populum, non tuerentur sed lederent quibusque mali in bonos facilius crassarent, plurima que quotidie firmarentur, que tirannorum non populi commoda dispensarent, multa etiampisans concessa civibus tum universim tum singulis statuerentur. This speech was also reproduced by Ronald Witt in Witt, “Coluccio Salutati, Chancellor and Citizen of Lucca (1370-1372).”
Ultimately, Salutati argued, Lucchese liberty could not be avenged until every mention of the Pisan name had been stricken from their codices; this stain justified a massive, top-to-bottom constitutional reform, which would include the publication of the first surviving statute of the *gabella maggiore* in 1372.\(^{43}\)

This formal *damnatio memoriae*, and the enormous legislative effort that underlay it, was not feasible in the spring of 1369, when the Lucchese regained their independence. Heavily indebted to the Florentines, the papacy, and a number of other creditors (including Francesco da Carrara of Padua) for a total of one hundred thousand florins, the commune first had to set its revenues in order. In particular, a few structural issues necessitated an immediate overhaul of fiscal policy. Most obviously, the newly independent state needed to reintegrate the vicariates and other subject territories within an urban tax system, since these formerly Lucchese holdings had been answering directly to foreign vicars since the 1340s. Beyond that, the recapture in the summer of 1369 of Motrone, the only commercial port along Lucca’s stretch of the Tyrrhenian coast, meant that the government had to develop a strategy for managing – and profiting from – both land and sea routes through the Lucchesia.\(^{44}\)

The government of 1369-70 had to accomplish these tasks while demonstrating the immediate benefits of independence to the citizenry. Given the tenuousness of the city’s newfound freedom and the intensity of taxation under the loathed Pisans, the Anziani and their legislative councils courted disaster if they added new burdens to their injured tax base. And so, on 24 March 1369, the day before the joyful Palm Sunday on which the emperor officially returned the gabelles to the commune, the General Council elected a committee to address tax rates that were “up to that point unfair and

\[^{43}\] Ibid.: “…everything must be destroyed which recalls the memory of that lamentable time… and ultimately every mention whatsoever of the Pisan name…” (*abolenda sunt omnia quibus illius deflendi temporis memoria renovantur… omne denique pisanis nominis monimentum quicquod*).

\[^{44}\] ASLu, CG 1, p. 17 [27/7/1369 | Council of 50]: This decree specifically concerns rewards for Iacopo Cinelli da Pietrasanta (near Motrone), who helped recover the city’s “special possession and principal appendage” (*rem singularem et membrum principalem*) from the Pisans. Sercambi dates the recapture to 12 April 1369: see *Croniche*, vol. 1: 166–9.
This was the first of a series of meetings that operated more or less in a supraconstitutional capacity defined by the requirements of necessitas and utilitas, a kind of state of exception that is difficult to classify due to the disappearance of those same statutes that they sought to modify. These eighteen citizens immediately issued amendments to the tariffs on wine, grain, beans, and oil; over the following week, the group met three more times to elect gabelle officials, lower the tariffs on firewood and cloth sales, and halve a toll at the Ponte San Quirico, which spanned the Serchio west of Lucca. Their reforms began, therefore, with a relaxation of the city’s most regressive taxes, a move with evident political value regardless of its economic necessity.

The commune obviously needed new sources of revenue, not cuts to existing ones, but its governing class also needed to secure the good will of the people; reducing select indirect taxes was an obvious and evidently reliable tool to this end. During periods of economic or political stress in the years to come, taxes affecting basic sustenance—the media oncia tax on cooked bread, the gabelles on wine, grain, and fish—would typically be lowered or temporarily cancelled, often with specific references to the hardships faced by the poor. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the gabella maggiore affected every aspect of urban life, only those taxes related to alimentation and, more rarely, heating were lowered as part of these general relief packages; Lucca’s governing councils could and did alter other rates, but, as we shall see, they tended to do so only in response to petitions addressing specific items and suggesting specific remedies.

Over the next few months, however, the governing councils determined that several untapped areas of commercial activity could be brought under the heading of the gabella maggiore. In June, the Anziani established a tax on silver and gold imports and

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46 Tanzini’s discussion of this strategy in Lucca begins in 1370, but the renewed republic’s state of exception really began in March 1369; from then until the promulgation of the statutes of 1372, and afterwards in the form of the ubiquitous balia committees, the state relied on extraordinary legislators and the executive power of the Anzianate for the sake of both celerity and convenience. See Tanzini, “Emergenza, eccezione, deroga: tecniche e retoriche del potere nei comuni toscani del XIV secolo,” 152–4, 158ff.

47 ASLu, AAL 45, pp. 1-7 [24/3/1369-30/3/1369 | CG (of 200)].

48 See chapter four.

49 A few non-luxury foodstuffs were taxed under the gabella maggiore, including oil, cheese, and fish, and these were also lowered on a regular basis.
exports, set at 0.8% of the imports’ estimated value, in response to a petition warning that “no tax was being paid for the grande gabella” on these items.\textsuperscript{50} It seems that the subject government under the Pisans had not levied a tariff on gold and silver, despite the fact that precious metal thread was a mainstay of the Lucchese silk industry and was imported with some regularity. Also during June, the government decreed a flat two-florin tax on each load of silk manufactures passing from Lombardy through Lucchese territory; this flat tax was soon replaced with a graded tax based on the estimated weight of the shipments in question.\textsuperscript{51} We will return to this tax, and the lucrative trade in foreign-produced silk managed by Lucchese companies, in chapter four.

But more fundamental changes were also in the works. Lucchese legislators recognized that there were two other areas in which potential revenue was being turned away at the gates: first, some merchants who would have brought goods to Lucca to find buyers were deterred by the prospect of paying a double tariff if the admitted shipments were not sold and had to be exported again; second, merchants intending to pass through the Luchesia chose a different route to avoid paying the same double taxes, and this especially prejudiced the newly-recovered port at Motrone.\textsuperscript{52} In both cases, higher rates were an obstacle to higher revenues. To solve both problems, the commune created a special category of tariffs paid under the gabella maggiore, which came to be called the pedaggium or passage-fee.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} ASLu, AAL 45, p. 43: Dinanti a voi signori antiani del comune di lucca et al voto consilio, notificasi che si provegga sopra la intrata del oro et del ariento filato fino et non filato... et simile si intenda della 'scita delle dicte cose, concio sia cosa che quante si ne metta in della citta di lucca niente se ne paga di gabella per la grande gabelle, se ne paga et per dicta cagione si mette senza pagare...; the Anziani consulted with a different group of special advisers on this matter (the Cives super introitibus, elected semi-regularly through the Guinigi principate), which had largely replaced the original eighteen legislators appointed in March.

\textsuperscript{51} ASLu, AAL 45, p. 43; ibid. p. 52 [29/6/1369 | Az]; the two-florin passage fee affected all silk-based merchandise and, specifically, veils. It was a higher tax than that charged under the name of pedagium, being developed at the same time, and presumably reflected the importance of Lucca as a clearinghouse for silk cloth produced in Bologna and other cities to the north, where Lucchese silk weavers had settled over the course of the fourteenth century; see Molà, The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice.

\textsuperscript{52} Motrone was a convenient alternative for Florentine traffic avoiding the Porto Pisano, and it would become particularly important for them in the closing years of the fourteenth century, as will be discussed in chapter three; see also Melis, Industria e commercio nella toscana medievale, 67ff.

\textsuperscript{53} The inclusion of this ‘passage fee’ within the gabella maggiore is perhaps noteworthy, since other cities assigned this to a separate administrator; in fifteenth-century Empoli, for example, the subject commune collected a separate gabelle called passaggere for the Florentine Dogana that amounted to a transport license, but this was separate from the gabelle delle Porti: Guerrini, Ricerche su l’affermazione e lo sviluppo dell’economia Empolese del Rinascimento: 1429-1528, 4:10, 70.
Typical of the patchwork legislative changes made in 1369, this new system took form out of three separate decrees made between May and December.\(^54\) Taken as a whole, these ordinances prescribed that shipments brought through the port at Motrone and, after December, along the coastal road from Pisa could travel through Lucchese territory towards Pistoia or Florence by paying a flat rate dependent on the size of the shipment: between four and twenty *soldi* for foodstuffs; or between eight and forty *soldi* for general merchandise.\(^55\) Considering the subsequent extension of this *pedaggium* category to other destinations and origins, and its eventual application to any shipments transiting through the Lucchesia regardless of their trajectory, it seems clear that this version of *pedaggium* was deemed a useful source of revenue; whether it actually increased traffic through the Lucchesia is more difficult to determine.\(^56\) Moreover, the successful implementation of *pedaggium* indicates that the functionaries who administered the *gabella maggiore* – the gate officials, assessors, and ‘guards’ – were quick to adapt to new modes of taxation as well as new rates.

These first eight months of *libertas* would set the tone for fiscal legislation until the rise of Paolo Guinigi. The kinds of language used during this period echo through the succeeding registers of the *Riformagioni*, the published minutes of Lucca’s council meetings.\(^57\) The mechanisms by which the legislators were alerted to excessive or undervalued rates and then informed themselves about the correct path forward, however, were and would remain opaque. Some changes responded to petitions read before one of the councils, but others emerged spontaneously from the college of the Anziani, acting

\(^54\) ASLu, AAL 45, p. 27 (30/5/1369 | Az): goods are permitted entrance to Lucca for the normal entry gabelle and, if unsold within two months, may be exported without the exit gabelle; ASLu, CG 1, pp. 7-13 (19/7/1369 | Council of Fifty): goods passing from Motrone to the Valdinievole and the Valdarno can pay flat per-load rates to transport them without paying the entry gabelle, and those admitted under the 30 May ordinance can have their 2-month terms extended by the major official of the *gabella maggiore*; ASLu, CG 1, p. 151 (10/12/1369 | Az): the 19 July ordinance is extended to shipments heading from Pisa towards Florence and Pistoia, which would have been unthinkable before the accession of the “pacific” Pietro Gambacorta to the Pisan dogeship in the early fall (Ibid., 116).

\(^55\) In March 1371, the ordinance of 19 July 1369 was extended to merchandise from Lombardy going south or north along the land route: ASLu, CG 2, p. 229 (13/3/1371 | Thirty-Six).

\(^56\) *Pedagium* was not included in the 1372 statute of the *gabella maggiore*, but the decrees of 1369 and 1371 were still in effect; these latter ordinances would be reissued, in condensed form, in 1373, where the list of origins and destinations valid for *pedagium* concludes, “and [those shipments travelling] from or to other foreign parts” (...deferendis... de Bononia vel aliis partibus extraneis... eundo ad partes extraneas...): ASLu, CG 3, p. 494 (20/1/1373 | Az).

\(^57\) A fuller discussion of this language, and the categorization of all changes made to *gabella maggiore* rates, features in chapter four.
either alone or alongside one of their advisory committees, like the “Citizens for Revenues” (*cives super introitibus*). Both before and after July 1370, when certain magnate families were banned from the offices open to all Lucchese citizens, policy decisions were guided by a fairly tight group of individuals from the top tier of Lucchese society; this “inner oligarchy” of families, as they are described by Meek, were the city’s true political class.\(^58\) For the most part, the advisors, petitioners, and special delegates that spoke on fiscal matters were members of this group, but no consistent ‘think-tank’ on tax policy appeared in these early years.

For example, if one examines two early groups of fiscal legislators, the original eighteen citizens elected to lower tariffs in 1369 and the nine *statutarii* who drafted the 1372 statute of the *gabella maggiore*, only three individuals appear to have been elected to both groups.\(^59\) Not many of these twenty-four, moreover, were elected to another advisory committee that addressed gabelles and tax farms, the *cives super introitibus*, or “citizens in charge of revenues”. The *cives super introitibus* were only one of the committees elected to perform research and report to the Anziani on the subject of fiscal policy, but, unlike *ad hoc* groups like the one elected when Motrone was recovered, it was renewed regularly for three-month terms beginning in the middle of 1370.\(^60\) Nearly fifty different people were chosen for this committee over the course of two-and-a-half years, yet only five of these had been elected to lower the gabelles in March 1369 or rewrite the city’s statutes, including that of the *gabella maggiore*, in December 1371.

\(^{58}\) The transition from a *de facto* ‘*a comune*’ republic, one in which magnate families (the *casatici*) like the Di Poggio, Antelminelli, and Opizi could hold high offices, to an explicitly ‘*a popolo*’ republic, which excluded them, was accomplished without blood.

\(^{59}\) ASLu, AAL 45, p. 2 (24/3/1369); ASLu, CG 3, p. 137 (7/12/1371 | CG); ASLu, GM 1, f. 4r; as far as I have been able to ascertain, none of the March 1369 group had died by the beginning of 1372, and the inclusion of messers Lodovigo Mercati and Simone da Barga in the group of *statutarii* was obligatory because of their legal qualifications and personal status.

\(^{60}\) The first election was in July 1370: ASLu, CG 1, p. 430 [13/7/1370]; the citizens elected to regulate trade coming through Motrone are listed at ASLu, CG 1, p. 7 [23/7/1369].
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<th>Authors of the 1372 Statute of the G.M.</th>
<th>Elections to the cives super introitus, 1370-1372</th>
<th>Registered silk merchants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lodovigo Mercati, <em>doctor legum</em></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simone da Barga, <em>doctor legum</em></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrado da Poggio</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni di dom Franceschino Onesti</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ser Marchese Gigli, <em>notarius</em></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Luigi Boccella</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicolao del Caro</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo Faitinelli</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X*</td>
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<td>Iacopo Rapondi</td>
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<td>Nicoloso Bartolomei</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo Micheli (Moccindenti)</td>
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<td>Puccinello Galganetti</td>
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<td>X*</td>
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<td>Davinuccio Brunelli</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlandino Volpelli</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giannino Spada</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betto Buzolini</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo Forteguerra, <em>doctor legum</em></td>
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<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ser Guido Onesti, <em>notarius</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamberto Coluccini</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ser Andrea Bellomi, <em>notarius</em></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Luigi Balbani</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Betti Baronzini</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>52 (41 individuals)</td>
<td>X (18 out of 41)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Roster of Legislators for Early Tariff Ordinances

An asterisk (*) denotes that immediate family members were silk merchants; this data comes from the 1371, 1372, and 1381 *Libri di Mercadanti*: ASLu, Corte de’ Mercanti 82 (1371), 83 (1372), 84 (1381), published as Pelu, *I libri dei mercanti Lucchesi degli anni 1371-1372-1381-1407-1488*.
The main qualification shared by members of all three groups of councilors was experience in the silk trade (see Table 2.1). Seventeen of the twenty-four men elected in March 1369 and December 1371 were either registered silk merchants themselves or close relatives of silk merchants; of the seven others, Davinuccio Brunelli was a dyer who specialized in silk, and Nicolao del Caro’s brother was a major banker. Two of the three doctores legum on this list, presumably responsible for assessing the legality of the new statutes, had brothers in the silk trade. Of the forty-six men elected to the cives super introitus up to the end of 1372, twenty-two were silk merchants, while a further four were dyers or goldbeaters specializing in precious metal thread; twenty-six out of forty-six, then, were directly connected to the silk industry. The majority of these legislators would have had a personal interest in the health of Lucca’s silk industry, even leaving out ties of blood and marriage.

The disproportionate representation of silk merchants on these committees would not have surprised contemporaries, and not merely because these international merchants were the wealthiest members of an undisguised oligarchy. Men like Iacopo Rapondi and Francesco Buzolini certainly derived prestige and political power from their immense fortunes, but their vigorous activity as advisors and legislators also indicates a certain proprietary interest, a sense of ownership more literal than metaphorical. But why did these men have such a strong interest in tariffs and tax policy?

Drawing an analogy to the activity of oligarchs in modern society, we might expect them to meddle in fiscal policy to get a better deal for themselves, in which case we would see very low tariffs on silk cloth exports. But an analogy to the modern world is fundamentally flawed because modern oligarchs enjoy a relatively free transfer of assets across national borders. It is certainly true that the Guinigi, Rapondi, and Forteguerra fortunes were spread across Italy, France, and the Low Countries, but their

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62 Bartolomeo Forteguerra’s brother Forteguerra Forteguerra, the Standardbearer of Justice defenestrated in May 1392, was head of a series of silk companies and had extensive holdings in the Low Countries.

63 Study of the inner oligarchy of fourteenth century Lucca benefits from a rich historiographical tradition. For the origins of this class of non-magnate merchants in the thirteenth century, see Alma Poloni, Lucca Nel Duecento, esp. 145-55, and the work of Thomas Blomquist (i.e. Blomquist, Merchant Families, Banking and Money in Medieval Lucca); for the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Berengo, Nobili e mercanti nella Lucca del Cinquecento. Bratchel has covered the development of the sixteenth-century closed nobility in Lucca, 1430-1494. For the period from the late thirteenth century through 1342, see Green, Castruccio Castracani, and Green, Lucca under Many Masters, 201–318.
political ambitions and patrimonial estates were rooted in Lucca. More concretely, they were bound to Lucca through nontransferable credits in the public debt; due to these investments, the members of the inner oligarchy stood to profit from maintaining the city’s fiscal health in lieu of granting themself special favors. Although many of them paid large tariffs for the exportation of luxury silks and damasks, it was not to their ultimate benefit to cut themselves a break.64

It certainly helped that the debt-credit bond between the oligarchy and the state was rooted in a heroic moment. In 1369, Charles IV charged one hundred thousand florins for the emancipation of Lucca from Pisan control or, rather, for the recognition of Lucchese independence and territorial rights.65 The loans entailed by this enormous outlay were either provided by or secured through Lucchese merchant-bankers in the city and abroad.66 After March 1369, silk merchants continued to furnish coin to the cash-starved commune, this time to help it avoid defaulting on those original loans.67 Voluntary and forced loans from wealthy citizens continued to be Lucca’s lifeline through the mid-1370s, while the government directed important revenue streams like the salt monopoly towards paying down its accumulated debt.68 And without denying the possibility of selfless patriotism, I would suggest that the investments of silk merchants in the survival of the Lucchese state must be understood as precisely that: investments, with expected payouts of both money and prestige.69 One could argue that political

64 In the same vein, see the following comment by Bowsky, *The Finance of the Commune of Siena, 1287-1355*, 192: “Yet overall, the nonpropertied and wage-earning residents of the city suffered more than the wealthier businessmen and magnates, men who could pass on to consumers in the form of higher prices the costs of the numerous gabelles on food, clothing, and the many unavoidable expenses of daily living.” This also accords with De la Roncière’s conclusions: “Indirect Taxes or ‘Gabelles’ at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs and Problems of Collection.”

65 A hundred thousand florins, a hefty sum by any standards, seems to have been a fair price for Lucca. Florence had purchased Lucca from Mastino della Scala for an initial price of 250,000 florins in 1341, but Pisa besieged Lucca before Florence could invest it with troops; Pisa was bound to pay 100,000 florins as an indemnity to Florence thereafter, and presumably this was around what the Florentines had paid to the Scaligeri. In a sense, Lucchesi citizens were purchasing the city back from the emperor at market value, although the emperor had obviously never paid for his rights to the city. See Meek, *Lucca, 1369-1400*, 3–4.

66 The 10,000 Florins from Francesco da Carrara, for example, had been lent through fifteen Lucchesi living abroad in Venice; see Ibid., 53–58.

67 Meek cites 17,000 florins from Simone Boccella, Dino Guinigi, and Bartolomeo Moccindenti in 1369: *Ibid.*, 45.; naturally, Bartolomeo was one of the advisors of March 1369, as was Simone’s kinsman Luigi.

68 For the direction of the *dovana salis* to the newly formed *massa creditorum*, see Ibid., 55–59, 63–69.

69 Ciccaglioni notes a similar tendency towards fiscal conservatism in the political culture of Pisa, where the creditors of the *massa* were the same men who controlled the Anzianate, leading to a “controllo sempre
participation and responsibility for success in this system were intertwined. As a group and as individuals, the silk merchants and other merchant-bankers who controlled the urban government also contributed the most money to securing and maintaining independence.

Even setting aside the extraordinary outlays required to secure Lucca’s freedom, some ordinary fiscal mechanisms enabled this kind of investment in the state. After 1369, revenue often came in the form of forced loans, in lieu of direct taxes like the *estimo*, such that even unwilling contributors to the fisc could anticipate some annual return. Full repayment of these forced loans was rare in Lucca, although its government did make a more concerted effort to pay down the ‘mountain’ of debt than, for example, Florence. But members of the Lucchese elite, much as their contemporaries elsewhere in Tuscany, found these credits in the public debt far more palatable than simple imposts. As a result, after the city regained its independence the governing councils rarely applied the *seca* or *taxa*, an irredeemable tax determined on the basis of a census of taxable wealth called the *estimo*. Even setting aside the extraordinary outlays required to secure Lucca’s freedom, some ordinary fiscal mechanisms enabled this kind of investment in the state. After 1369, revenue often came in the form of forced loans, in lieu of direct taxes like the *estimo*, such that even unwilling contributors to the fisc could anticipate some annual return. Full repayment of these forced loans was rare in Lucca, although its government did make a more concerted effort to pay down the ‘mountain’ of debt than, for example, Florence. But members of the Lucchese elite, much as their contemporaries elsewhere in Tuscany, found these credits in the public debt far more palatable than simple imposts. As a result, after the city regained its independence the governing councils rarely applied the *seca* or *taxa*, an irredeemable tax determined on the basis of a census of taxable wealth called the *estimo*. It goes without saying that indirect taxes, like the salt tax, gabelles, and tax farms, did not reward the payer with shares in the public debt. The lower classes paid proportionally more of their taxes in a form that never came back to them; when they ate bread, the state had a bite.

After the consolidation of the public debt into the *massa creditorum* in 1371, the Lucchese fiscal situation resembled that of contemporary Florence, where the oligarchs held more paper in the consolidated debt than the rest of the citizen body. To be sure, the *massa* explicitly banned foreign investment and credit transfers, prerequisites for the

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70 The *estimo* was also the basis for forced loans; one such survey was drawn up in October 1370: Meek, *Lucca, 1369–1400*, 55.
71 It would not resemble the situation in Florence for long: Lucca did not become exponentially more indebted over the next forty years, despite war with Pisa in the late 1390s and attacks by mercenary captains throughout; the interest rate was retroactively lowered from 10% to 5% in 1378; and the Lucchese government was very aggressive with schemes to buy back credits. Christine Meek estimated that the *massa* rose from 60–70,000 florins in the early 1370s to just over 90,000 florins: significantly indebted given the city’s annual revenues of perhaps 60,000 florins minus the *dovana salis*, but not comparable to Florence’s contemporary debt of four to five million florins. See Ibid., 75–76. For a comparative survey of consolidated debts, see Ginatempo, *Prima del debito*, 126ff.
intense speculation observed in the case of the Florentine *monte*. But the effect on political culture and consequently fiscal policy was nonetheless similar insofar as it turned the urban elite into literal shareholders in the public weal. The upper classes laid out large sums for the use of the Lucchese government, but whether these would truly qualify as ‘tax payments’ depended on the stability of the state and its ability to direct revenue to repayment. That silk merchants chose to be activist shareholders in such a context is hardly surprising.

Their hope for consistent interest payments rested in the salt monopoly, the *dovana salis*, whose revenues were specifically earmarked to pay the creditors of the *massa creditorum*. The *dovana* was considered the most delicate and dangerous subject in the area of fiscal policy, such that not even the General Council, which normally had the right to override other legislative bans, could address the issue without first securing permission through a preliminary vote. Even this preliminary vote could be divisive; in June 1378, for example, a single proposal to discuss the *dovana* was defeated four times in one council meeting and three times a few days later. In the eighth and final proposal, which seems to have passed, the proponent, a silk merchant named Guglielmo Benettoni, had to stipulate, “No commission would be formed in prejudice of any specific citizens or wherein there might be a discussion of repaying the creditors of the massa.” Clearly, the *dovana* was a delicate subject, concerning which the councilors were unsure of their

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72 The *massa* was in this sense somewhat more similar to the Pisan *massa delle prestanze*, which had been assembled in 1348; like the Lucchese *massa*, the Pisan consolidated debt was also oriented towards the reabsorption of credits, with strong restrictions suppressing the market in credit transfers. See Cammarosano, “Il sistema fiscale delle città toscane,” 208–9. the Pisan *savi*, in assembling the *massa delle prestanze*, were certainly aware of the Florentine experience: Ciccaglioni, *Poteri e spazi politici a Pisa nella prima metà del Trecento*, 145–47.

73 From the late 1370s, revenues from the *dovana salis* were also directed towards a cash reserve called the *deposita*

74 Outside of the realm of fiscality, the management of the *dovana* was far less regimented; for example, in January 1379 the officers of the *dovana*, along with the Anziani, exercised their power to authorize the general sale of salt to foreign merchants from the overstocked salt supply (CG 7, p. 7 [9/1/1379 | Sp]). In the same way, the *Riformagioni* contain no public discussions about salt sources or pricing schemes, except when the *dovana* had to organize a general sale; besides local sources, it seems possible that the Lucchesi brought in salt from Sardinia or the Kingdom of Naples, with which they had a vigorous trade in tunny and cheese: see Aloisi, “Salt and Royal Finance in the Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous,” 11–13.

75 AaTdL 2, pp. 373-5 (15/6/1378 | Thirty-Six), pp. 376ff (23/6/1378 | CG); it is also worth noting that over sixty *invitati* were present at the meeting of the Thirty-Six, a truly remarkable number that dwarfed both the actual council and the attendant Anziani.
colleagues’ ability to govern with impartiality. Although major reforms to the massa creditorum were necessary by the end of the 1370s, it was difficult to broach a topic that had been studiously avoided for so long.

It is hard not to see these careful safeguards against any alteration to the public debt as a sop to both sides of an intra-class divide affecting the city’s oligarchy. The wealthiest Lucchesi, the city’s inner oligarchy that dominated the Anziani or the senatorial Council of Thirty-Six, had a clear motivation to ensure that the revenues of the dovana salis continued to go towards the carrying cost of the public debt. Any legislation that lowered the rate of return on shares or affected the regularity of payments would have prejudiced these investors more than anyone else in Lucca. The one hundred and eighty members of the General Council, on the other hand, represented a slightly wider set of interests, and some of its members may have held only a few shares in the public debt. Although the popolo minuto hardly had a strong voice in the great council, men on the middle rungs of the city’s economic ladder might have been suspicious about any proposed changes to the dovana salis, particularly those proposed by members of the inner oligarchy. Each councilor had a strong motivation to mind his peers and prevent any changes deleterious to his own interests.

Revenues from the salt monopoly were thus directed to specific uses, namely paying down the consolidated debt and, later, maintaining a certain level of cash in an emergency deposita. As a result, the ability of the state to cover its annual budget without recourse to new imposts or forced loans depended on the gabelles and tax farms.

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76 Ibid.: …ita quod nulla commissio fiat in aliquos speciales cives et ubi tractaretur de restitutione creditoribus dicte masse.
77 Election-lists to the Anziani and Thirty-Six needed no more than 120 and 72 names, respectively, to maintain the constitutionally-mandated vacations (two years for the ten-man Anzianate, six months for the Council of Thirty-Six); these numbers could easily be filled from the city’s inner oligarchy of silk merchants, bankers, and judges/notaries: see Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400, 187.
78 ‘A few’ compared to the thousands and tens of thousands of florins loaned by the city’s wealthiest silk merchants; see n. 67 above. Meek notes that “the General Council was a slightly different matter” from the purely oligarchic Anziani and Thirty-Six, but with an emphasis on “slightly”; with a requisite election-list of only 360 men – one year terms, one year vacations – even the General Council featured but a small number of artisans on average; see Ibid., 188–89.
79 Meek has estimated that the dovana salis was yielding around 10,000 florins yearly in the early 1370s, while the carrying cost of the debt was presumably around 6,000 florins based on a 10% interest rate and Lucca’s indebtedness at the time; in the 1380s, the carrying cost was lower because of the 5% rate mandated in 1378, but Meek also notes that the revenues from the salt monopoly had also fallen by around 1,000 florins: Ibid., 50–51. Any surplus after 1378 was presumably fed into the deposita.
The *gabella maggiore* was chief among these, since it contributed about as much to the fisc as the *dovana salis*; in 1377, for example, revenues from the *gabella maggiore* made up around a sixth of the city’s disposable funds.\(^8^0\) The remainder came from a number of other taxes, called “seals” (*sigilla*) in contemporary statutes, including those on butchered meat, baked bread, and wine sold at retail, each of which garnered several thousand florins each semester; some smaller gabelles, such as those charged for gambling, prostitution, or incarceration, were farmed out to private individuals.\(^8^1\) The import-export duties administered by the officials at the Pinelli house were the single highest-grossing category of revenue among the gabelles, dwarfing any other individual category.

The *gabella maggiore* helped prop up a state run by men who considered direct taxation anathema, but its revenues varied a great deal between the years covered by my survey. As a tax, it possessed a unique flaw in the form of its taxpaying base, insofar as those who engaged in trade within or through the Lucchesia could avoid the city when trouble struck the district. Cohn’s studies of the Florentine highlands demonstrate that oppressive application of direct taxes, poll taxes, like the *dovana salis* in Lucca, and taxes on subsistence, such as Lucca’s *media oncia* on bread, could drive rural communities towards emigration.\(^8^2\) Merchants possessed even greater mobility, and Lucca’s port at Motrone would never become so attractive that the city could afford to alienate traders with unreasonably high tariffs. If inconvenience and high taxes drove off trade, so too did open threats like banditry and pestilence, such that the revenues of the *gabella maggiore* were adversely affected by the very situations that demanded extra expenditures from the state. In other words, plague, war, and famine burned the fisc’s candle at both ends. The

\(^{80}\) 11,302 out of 65,571 florins reported by the general treasury: see Ibid., 51. The totals from other years could be even higher: in 1383, the *camarlingo generale* reported just under three thousand florins over only two months from the court of the *gabella maggiore* and its gate chests (ASLu, Camarlingo Generale 83, s.f. [first binding, ff. 4r-7r] [Nov.-Dec. 1383]), and just over thirty-five hundred florins over the last three months of 1389 (ASLu, Camarlingo Generale 83, s.f. [last binding, ff. 3r-7v] [Oct.-Dec. 1389]) – indicating annual receipts of around 17,000 and 15,000 respectively. Because the gate chests were not included in the main registers of the court of the *gabella maggiore*, the records of the *camarlingo generale* are the only source for the total receipts from this tax.

\(^{81}\) For a very brief overview of these various gabelles, see Ibid., 51–52. A more extensive treatment of mid-fourteenth century *proventus*, see Meek, “Public Policy and Private Profit: Tax Farming in Fourteenth-Century Lucca.”

\(^{82}\) Cohn, *Creating the Florentine State*. 
structural weaknesses inherent to this system therefore exacerbated the deleterious effects of any local or regional instability.

We can now return to the question of why Lucchese silk merchants and other members of the city’s political elite initially involved themselves so eagerly in the management of the *gabella maggiore*. Clearly, whatever money they laid out for customs duty at the Pinelli house, members of the inner oligarchy had much more to lose if the state defaulted on its debts or, after the debt was consolidated, delayed payments to the shareholders of the *massa creditorum*. Although ultimately only the salt monopoly was directly assigned to financing this debt, the fiscal pyramid rested on a base of indirect taxes; the gabelles and tax farms absorbed budgetary pressures that would otherwise demand wealth-based levies. All the major players in 1369 had a strong motivation to be in the room when discussion turned to the gabelles, so the advisory committees teemed with international silk merchants and their close relatives. And, initially at least, this interest translated into policy decisions. Over the three energetic years after Lucca achieved its independence, these councilors redesigned an old tax, the *pedaggio*, to attract merchants to the city, modulated the rates on cloth, transhumant herds, and the abattoir, and repeatedly issued temporary cancellations of alimentary gabelles for the relief of the local population.\(^83\) Between March 1369 and the end of 1410, there were 222 separate decrees that changed the rates of the *gabella maggiore* or suspended them, and over a fifth (45) saw issue between 1369 and 1371.\(^84\) The new statute of the *gabella maggiore* published in 1372 was the culmination of this initial burst of fiscal legislation.

### 2.2 Creation and Adaptation in the Statute of 1372

In December 1371, the General Council finally elected a committee of legislators, *statutarii*, to rewrite the city’s statutes and accomplish the *damnatio memoriae* of the

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83 For *pedaggio*, see above, but the final change came at ASLu, CG 2, pp. 336ff (3/7/1371 | Az); butchered animals, e.g. ASLu, CG 1, pp. 393ff. (15/6/1370 | Az); on cloth, ASLu, AaTdL 105 (25/10/1371 | Az); alimentary gabelles, e.g. ASLu, CG 3, p. 296 (3/5/1372 | Thirty-Six).

84 These are 222 separate decrees, each of which could and often did affect more than one rate or one or more gabelles besides the *gabella maggiore*. For more on these, see chapter 5.
Pisan name suggested by Salutati’s speech over a year earlier.\textsuperscript{85} The proposal echoes the former chancellor in its calls for a purge, and gently chastises the councilors for dragging their feet:

“Our changing times and the promising recovery of our sweet freedom necessitate these things: first, that those numerous laws and customs which the city used while crushed under the tyrants’ yoke – designed for the overbearing Pisans\textsuperscript{8} whim and pleasure and to the prejudice of that sweet freedom – must be completely excised; afterwards, that the city should observe new laws and statutes through which the state shall distribute to each man his own rights, through which the strength and constancy of its blossoming liberty shall be augmented and, once drawn to this city, shall be maintained forever, and through which the city shall possess honest customs designed for living well and laudably. Although at another time, during other meetings, the election of new statute-writers has been announced and carried out, up to this point we have not, due to certain obstructions, arrived at any action on the aforementioned points.”\textsuperscript{86}

Although the petition does not describe these “obstructions” in detail, it surely refers to the disruptions caused in Lucchese territory by Bernabò Visconti and his two local henchmen, the Garfanino lord Alderigo Antelminelli and the doge-turned-condottiere Giovanni dell’Agnello. But the commune had outlasted all these threats by late 1371: Dell’Agnello vanished from Visconti employ by the end of 1370, and Antelminelli was in the process of selling some captured castles back to Lucca.\textsuperscript{87} As for the Visconti, Christine Meek provides an indicative quotation from a letter of Bernabò’s son Ambrogio, written a month before this speech, where he insisted to the Anziani that his father wanted “his friends and adherents to hold peace with those who held peace with him,” evidently regardless of their nominal inclusion in the anti-Visconti league.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{85} ASLu, CG 2, p. 137-8 (14/11/1370 | CG)
\textsuperscript{86} The translation is mine, and I have elided some of the unusual impersonal usages in the speech. ASLu, CG 3, p. 137: Temporum varietas et alme libertatis recuperatio gratiosa exigit ut moribus et statutis non nullis, quibus, dum lucana civitas iugo tirannico premebatis, utebatur, ad placitum et dispositionem presidentium pisanorum in ipsius libertatis pernitiem, penitus resecatis, novis deinceps fungatur legibus et statutis per que unicuique tribuat jus suum et florentis libertatis robur et firmitas augeatur, et in perpetuum conservetur illexa [sic.], ac honestis et moderatis in bene et laudabiliter vivendo moribus potiatur; licet aliter super hac materia fuerit per alia consilia reformata novorum statutariorum electio factaque ad effectum, ex certis obstaculis hucusque minime vero ad actum aliquem devenierit in predictis agendis.
\textsuperscript{87} For the sources, see Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400, 130–32, 59 n. 60.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 133 n. 23.: ...quod amici ipsius et adherentes habeant pacem cum habentibus pacem cum ipso (my translation).
Spurred by both the speech and this climate of relative peace, the Anziani chose nine men to serve as electors and, in turn, elect nine others to rewrite the statutes; notably, at least eight out of the initial nine electors personally registered as silk merchants at the Corte de’ Mercanti. As Meek notes, one proposal suggested that the statutarii be a mixed group of artisans, merchants, and the requisite legal professionals; this was not passed, but it indicates that some wanted the committee to be explicitly representative of both middle and upper class citizens. In any case, the elections moved swiftly once the Anziani decided to relaunch the process in earnest, and the names of the nine statutarii were published four days later. It would indeed have been surprising if the election had taken longer, since the qualifications of these statutarii had been discussed more than enough before the speech in December 1371; the class restrictions mentioned above, for example, had been proposed in May. Moreover, the original “election” described in the speech above had indeed been carried out in November 1370, soon after Salutati’s speech and the original proposal for statutory reforms. A second election of statutarii occurred in June 1371, but once again without any effect. The governing councils provide no explanation for why they disbanded the first two groups, since only one among their number appears to have died over the course of the year.

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89 ASLu, CG 3, p. 149 [10/12/1371]. The electors were Nuccio Berlescia, Iacopo di Poggio, Piero Brilla, Francesco Guidiccioni, Martino Martini, Matteo Cattani, Lando Moriconi, Dino Guinigi, and Simone Bonaunti. All but Nuccio were registered as mercatores sete at the Corte de’ Mercanti in 1371 or 1372: ASLu, Corte de’ Mercanti 82 (1371), ff. 7v [Brilla, Guidiccioni, Bonagiunte], 9r [Moriconi], 10v [Guinigi], 12v [di Poggio, Martini]; Corte de’ Mercanti 83 (1372), p. 9 [Cattani]. Quite possibly, Nuccio Berlesia had also been in the trade but had retired; he is listed as inabile in the estimo from 1371: ASLu, Biblioteca Manoscritta 176, s.f., listed under Contrada di Santi Antonio e Paulino.

90 ASLu, AaTdL 2, p. 42 (4/5/1371), cited at Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400, 186 n. 28.

91 ASLu, CG 3, p. 154 (14/12/1371): those elected were domino Ludovico Mercati, Betto Buzolini, Francesco di Betto Baroncini, domino Bartolomeo Forteguerra, ser Andrea Bellomi, ser Guido Onesti, domino Simone da Barga, Luigi Balbani, and Lamberto di Coluccino Giuntori.

92 ASLu, CG 2, p. 151 (23/11/1370): the statutarii were domino Corrado da Podio, Orso Barzellotti, Betto Buzolini, Luigi Boccella, messer Bartolomeo Forteguerra, ser Bartolomeo di messer Bommes, Francesco Guinigi, messer Simone da Barga, and Guglielmo Benettoni: all of these were silk merchants or had brothers who were, excepting messer Simone da Barga and ser Bartolomeo di messer Bommes.

93 ASLu, CG 2, p. 318 (18/6/1371): these were messer Matteo Gigli, ser Guglielmo Guidi da Ponte San Piero (in the Sei Miglia, just west of Lucca), Orlandino Volpelli, messer Bartolomeo Forteguerra, ser Bartolomeo di messer Bommes, Giovanni di messer Franceschino Onesti, Iacopo Ronghi, Guglielmo Benettoni, and ser Niccolò Parpaglioni – a slightly more diverse list, but no artisans in sight.

94 Ser Bartolomeo di messer Bommes does not appear in any election list after 1371; it is possible he emigrated to Barga rather than dying, since a relative, either his widow or his daughter, appears in 1401 shipping goods from Lucca to that place: GM 38, f. 78r (21/5/1401, shipment paid by domina Becchina ser Bartholomei domine Bommessis). Ser Bartolomeo’s father bore the toponym “da Barga”: see n. 98 below.
The final committee of statutarii elected in December 1371 consisted of three doctores legum, two notaries, and four laymen, whose names are also noted in Figure 1 above as the authors of the statute of the gabella maggiore. Unsurprisingly, two laymen and one notary – Onesti, Balbani, and Buzolini – were silk merchants, and two more had close relatives who were silk merchants; messer Bartolomeo’s brother Forteguerra and messer Lodovigo’s kinsman Fazino Mercati were themselves the heads of silk firms. But other industries and markets were also represented. Francesco Baroncini was a grain merchant (biadaiolo), and perhaps he contributed his experience with the other half of that dynamic central to medieval Italian urbanization: luxury exports and alimentary imports. One of Baroncini’s kinsmen, Piero, was a shoemaker (calzolaio) who exported and imported significant quantities of leather on several occasions. An election list describes Lamberto di Coluccino Giuntori as a smith (fabbro), but he was more accurately the city’s dominant ironmonger trading with Florence, Pisa, and the Valdinievole. In 1373, he paid the gabella maggiore for over 170 shipments containing iron, typically unworked, either entering or leaving the city; these shipments contained just under half the total tonnage of unworked iron handled by Lucchesi merchants in that year. The final two, messer Simone da Barga and ser Andrea Bellomi, may not have had personal, or rather family, interests in a particular sector of Lucca’s economy; if they did, I have not been able to identify the links. Simone’s qualification as a doctor of laws

95 ASLu, GM 14, f. 131r (27/10/1373), GM 18, f. 235v (18/12/1378), GM 30, f. 59v (26/3/1392), for example.
96 Lamberto di Coluccino’s surname can be found in ASLu, Biblioteca Manoscritta 176, s.f., a residency estimo undertaken by neighborhood consuls for the pennonieri who were periodically elected to lead them: Lamberto is listed as a resident of Braccio degli Figlioli Giordani. He was described as a faber when elected as one of the cives super quie te lucano, a committee assigned to tame any restlessness remaining in the city after the July 1370 transition to an a popolo government: ASLu, CG 2, p. 22 [5/8/1370].
97 ASLu, GM 13-14, s.f. In 1373, Lamberto Giuntori moved 165,903 libbre of unworked iron in 142 separate shipments, compared with the year’s total of 345,598 libbre in 431 separate shipments; he also moved significant quantities of nails (10,848 libbre out of 37,654 total libbre in 1373). Two caveats apply here: at least some of this iron was imported and subsequently exported raw, and obviously my data cannot pinpoint unique allotments; second, these figures only reflect the shipments that Giuntori paid for at the Pinelli house, and it is certainly possible that he owned or trafficked in more than these quantities – if others paid for him – or less – if he was paying for others. Giuntori also dealt in iron in 1378 and 1385, but in much reduced quantities; it seems that two of his fellow citizens, Domenico di Matteo and Filippo di Iacopo had absorbed most of this business. Giuntori does not appear in the records of the gabella maggiore after 1385, but he continued to serve on the Thirty-Six and college of Anziani into the 1390s.
98 For the Bellomi family, the only explicit professional connection I found was in 1407, probably years after ser Andrea’s death (his last two appointments were in the first half of 1384 [CG 8, pp. 663-665]), when two young members of the Bellomi family were garzoni for silk firms in the early fifteenth century:
lent him the same status as messers Forteguerra and Mercati; besides serving as a judge in the circuit of Lucchese courts, he was Standardbearer of Justice in mid-1370 and was elected to the council Thirty-Six and several other balìa committees before his death in 1373.\(^{99}\)

Although they were not silk merchants, one would certainly not describe either Baroncini or Giuntori as middle-class artisans; both dealt in interregional and possibly international markets. Among the notaries, ser Guido Onesti was really a silk merchant, and even ser Andrea Bellomi, perhaps the least well-connected member of the committee, hardly represented Lucchese notaries as a professional class; for one, he never worked as a mere scribe in any of the city courts or magistracies, and his most ‘notarial’ appointment was to the officium viarum, where he served as major officialis for several terms in the 1370s.\(^{100}\) Ser Andrea was also drawn for the Anzianate eight times between 1370 and his death in 1384, which means he had been included in eight out of the nine eighteen-month election lists (tasche) drawn up over that period.\(^{101}\) His peers were similarly distinguished. Without a doubt, the statutarii of December 1371 – much like the two groups that preceded them – represented only a thin band of Lucchese society that dominated the city’s executive and legislative councils: an upper crust of merchants and high-ranking bureaucrats.

The nine statutarii of December 1371 were considered sufficient to the task of reviewing, revising, and republishing the city’s legislative foundation.\(^{102}\) To be sure, five of their number had formal legal training, and perhaps the only real change from the

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Corte de’ Mercanti 85, f. 4v (Andrea Bellomi, garzone in the Bernardini firm), f. 6r (Lorenzo Bellomi, garzone in the Bandini firm). Christine Meek puts ser Andrea Bellomi’s death in early 1384, although the Riformagioni make no mention of substitutions for the two offices he held in that semester: Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400, 246 n. 58.

99 Simone da Barga died in 1373, presumably during the bout of plague that struck the city that year; he was listed as mortuus in a substitution made in December 1373 in response to his recent sortition as Anziano: CG 4, p. 276 (23/12/1373). But the secret election list that bore his name (the tasca) had been drawn up in late 1372, so it’s not clear when he died – he was still alive in June 1373, at least, when he was personally elected to assign urban confines to certain troublemakers from the vicariates: CG 4, p. 171 (12/6/1373).

100 E.g. ASLu, CG 4, p. 383 [26/4/1374], reaffirmed in CG 6, p. 100 [2/12/1376]. This posting to the curia viarum seemed no strict term limit, and he was still in office in 1377 (ASLu, Curia delle Vie 11, s.f.).


102 One important qualification must have been availability: a budgetary allowance from the end of December 1371 prescribes a monthly salary of 25 florins for the doctores legum and 16 florins for the layment, although Lamberto Giuntori merited only ten florins due to his frequent absences, and meals at public expense were to be provided for them: ASLu, CG 3, p. 184 (31/12/1371 | Az).
previous two elections is the increasing number of doctores legum chosen to work with the legislators.\textsuperscript{103} The statutarii accomplished their task quickly, which perhaps suggests that the previous two committees had already done some of the necessary editing, and new statutes were promulgated in July 1372.\textsuperscript{104} This publication consisted of two separate texts: the general statutes of the commune and the statute of the gabella maggiore.\textsuperscript{105} The former document dealt with the rights and obligations of citizens and subjects, the disposition of the urban courts, and the territorial organization of the vicariates, parishes, and Sei Miglia. In format and content, the general statutes drew heavily on the communal statutes of 1342, published with Pisan approval in the first days of the occupation, and also reflected the organizational scheme of the statutes of 1308 and 1333.\textsuperscript{106}

The statute of the gabella maggiore was an important part of this new constitution insofar as it was designed to streamline and rationalize the new fiscal program developed since 1369.\textsuperscript{107} On the other hand, this document was comparatively limited in scope, as it addressed only the tax-farms (proventus) and gabelles, including the eponymous customs duty. The sole extant copy contains two separate sets of statutes: the first set, subdivided into seventy-three chapters, describes the urban gabelles and tax farms; the second set, containing twenty-nine chapters, concerns the application of the gabella maggiore in the vicariates.\textsuperscript{108} My transcription of the first of these two sets of statutes may be found in the

\textsuperscript{103} The June 1371 group had included three notaries and two jurists, whereas the November 1370 statutarii included only a single notary and two jurists.

\textsuperscript{104} The statute of the gabella maggiore lists the signing date as 6 July (ASLu, GM 1, f. 4r), and on 30 July the Anziani opened the chancery to public visits “lest someone be able to seek acquittal on the grounds of ignorance of any law”: CG 3, p. 336 (30/7/1372 | Az): ... ne ratione alicuius ignorantiae quis poterit excusari. Bongi lists the official promulgation as 31 July: Bongi, Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca, vol. 1: 35.

\textsuperscript{105} ASLu, Statuti 6 (general statute); GM 1 (statute of the gabella maggiore).

\textsuperscript{106} Bongi, Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca, vol. 1: 57-8. From the perspective of continuation in the Lucchese legal tradition, it is noteworthy that ser Simone di messer Bommes, who had been included in the first two groups of statutarii of 1370/1, was the son of one of the statutarii from 1331 (messer Bommes da Barga), while ser Marchese Gigli, one of the March 1369 reformers, had been statutarius in 1342 alongside messer Guglielmo Mercati, messer Lodovigo’s father. This was not only a local legislative tradition, but also a tradition safeguarded over decades by patrolines.

\textsuperscript{107} To boot, getting the system in order also prepared the state to profit from the “blossoming liberty” safeguarded by the new statutes; Lombardo has suggested that the statutes of the Roman gabelles were revised for a similar reason in 1398, when millennial fervor stood to profit the apostolic treasury: Lombardo, “Le gabelle della città di Roma,” 210–11.

\textsuperscript{108} ASLu, GM 1, pp. 1-93, pp. 95-128, respectively. The first section is embellished with red and blue block capitals and penstroke decoration around the rubrics and within the paragraphs (crossbars on capital ‘e’s, ‘p’s, ‘t’s, and ‘i’s, etc.), whereas the second part has rubricated titles but no further decoration – and empty spaces left open for absent block capitals.
appendices. The rates of the urban *gabella maggiore* are provided in the first twenty-three chapters of this section; by and large, the vicariate gabelle directly copies these chapters, although the authors modified a few rates where appropriate and appended several explanatory chapters. Chapters twenty-four through fifty-one of the first section deal with one particular *proventus* or gabelle each. The final twenty-two chapters are a miscellany containing, among other things, the rules for auctioning off tax farms, penalties for smuggling, and exceptions to other ordinances, such as the grant of free passage for comestibles at harvest time and the ban on exporting myrtle leaves.\(^{109}\)

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Table 2.2: Structure of the 1372 Statute of the *Gabella Maggiore* (ASLu, GM 1)

The tax rates in the first section, 493 tariffs for distinct items divided into twenty-three categories, stand out as the most striking part of this document, both for our purposes and in general. We have seen the governing councils issue decrees on specific tax rates in the years leading up to the publication of this document. While clearly motivated to shore up the fisc and secure the return on their own shares of the *massa creditorum*, members of the Anzianate and its advisory committees were nonetheless keen to keep local markets attractive to foreigners and citizens alike; they employed caution when changing the rules or tariffs of the *gabella maggiore*, and most of their decrees either lowered rates or offered new options to taxpayers. The statute of 1372 contains what amounts to several hundred such decisions – nearly five hundred statements on the optimal price point for as many kinds of goods. What was the process by which the *statutarii* came to these conclusions?

\(^{109}\) Chapters 55, 68, 62, and 73, respectively.
Just as they did for the general statutes, they first looked to earlier statutes of the *gabella maggiore*. We know that some list of tax rates was in use during the Pisan occupation, and it seems likely that the *statutarii* used this as a base in the same way that they used the general communal statutes of 1342.\(^{110}\) These lost statutes, in turn, presumably also drew on earlier fiscal legislation. Due to the loss of this text, it is impossible to determine precisely where the *statutarii* copied and where they innovated. Given the changes in tax policy developed between 1369 and 1371, one might expect that they made the changes that seemed necessary to ensure the profitable administration of the *gabella maggiore* and the other indirect taxes under its aegis. But I believe that these changes, where they occurred, were general rather than specific, and a strong case can be made that the complexity of the statute of 1372 reflects a process of accretion rather than a thorough legislative review. The *statutarii* copied more than they created.

The peculiar ordering of the first section, the twenty-three *capitula* containing the tariff rates, is clear evidence of this kind of wholesale borrowing. These chapters of rates follow the same progression as the *pedaggio* ordinance of 1314, at least with regards to the categories found in both documents.\(^{111}\) As Table 2.3 shows, the common order breaks after the ninth, which deals with cheese and salted fish in both documents. Even here, we can explain the disjunction by noting that the men who wrote the *pedaggio* ordinance had no reason to include worked stone and plaster, local agricultural products, and livestock, since the Lucchese college at Genoa did not import these goods from overseas for exportation to their home city. Beyond structure, the documents even contain the same goods: for example, the extensive lists of spices in both documents, eighty-two rates in 1314 versus ninety in 1372, feature the same products.\(^{112}\)

Using a comparative survey inspired by the Hidetoshi Hoshino’s use of 89 different tariff systems from thirteenth- to fifteenth-century Italy – although mine is far

\(^{110}\) A decree from 1373, for example, references the tariffs on *albagio* cloth in the “old statutes of the gabelle”, which should supersede that written in the “new statutes” of 1372, indicating that copies of that text were still circulating at the time. CG 3, p. 495 (20/1/1373 | Sp): *Item que de pannis arbagis qui fiunt in comitatu lucano solvatur gabella pro factura et pro introitu in civitate sicuti solvebatur per statuta gabelle antiqua et nova statuta gabelle que ad hoc locum non habent*.

\(^{111}\) ASLu, GB Orsucci 44, ff. 210r-218v.

\(^{112}\) This is perhaps not noteworthy by itself, but it is telling that the Florentine statute, with a total of 183 rates, has only 48 items for spices, while the 1314 *pedagium* ordinance contains 82 such rates – 70% more – despite being only 25% longer (232 total rates).
less ambitious – I have also determined that the Lucchese documents follow an
idiosyncratic order that does not resemble the tariff lists used in contemporary Bologna,
Florence, or even Pisa.\textsuperscript{113} Roberto Greci has published the Bolognese \textit{tariffa daziaria} of
1351, which specifically covered exports, but its three hundred-odd rates are arranged in
alphabetical order rather than by commercial or industrial categories.\textsuperscript{114} As for Florence,
although the statutes for its \textit{gabella} in the late fourteenth century are not extant, an
extensive excerpt covering 183 different rates can be found in the Datini archive, dated
by context to the last quarter of the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{115} The term \textit{copia} in the heading
indicates that this extract, presumably made by a factor of the Datini company, follows
the order in the official statute or chart.\textsuperscript{116} This list begins with the textile industries, like
the Lucchese statute, but raw wool and woollens precede linen and silk. The Florentine
groupings respect guild divisions rather explicitly.\textsuperscript{117} Linens belong to a category entitled
‘linen merchants’ (\textit{linaiuoli}) while silks are naturally under the heading, ‘guild/trade of
Por Santa Maria’ (\textit{l’arte di porta sancte marie}).\textsuperscript{118} And where the statute of 1372 has a
single category for leather goods and luxury furs (Section Seven: \textit{de pellaria pellibus
coriame coriis et opera facta}), the Florentine writers divided skins between ‘vair and
pelt merchants’ (\textit{vaiai o pillicciai}) and ‘tanners’ (\textit{coiai}), hence the separation in Table
2.3.\textsuperscript{119}

The Florentine system of ordering tariffs would evidently persist into the fifteenth
century. Giovanni da Uzzano’s 1442 \textit{Pratica della mercatura}, an updated version of
Francesco Pegolotti’s mid-14\textsuperscript{th} century mercantile almanac, begins with a copy of the

\textsuperscript{113} Hoshino, \textit{L’arte della lana in Firenze nel basso medioevo}, 50–63.
\textsuperscript{114} Greci, \textit{Mercanti, politica e cultura nella società bolognese del basso Medioevo}, 77-107. Unlike the
Lucchese \textit{gabella maggiore}, it seems that the \textit{gabella delle porte} was a tax farm in the 1350s under the
Visconti government: see Lorenzoni, \textit{Conquistare e governare la città: Forme di potere e istituzioni nel
primo anno della signoria viscontea a Bologna (ottobre 1350 - novembre 1351)}, 315, no. 265.
\textsuperscript{115} ASPr, Datini 1174.10, ff. 1r-4v, entitled by a contemporary “Copia delo stratto delagabela delcomune di
firenze alentrare”
\textsuperscript{116} It is not clear from which document this extract is drawn; in his seminal article on the Florentine indirect
tax system, De la Roncière does not mention this statute: “De La Roncière, Charles M. “Indirect Taxes or
‘Gabelles’ at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs.”
\textsuperscript{117} The groupings in ASPr Datini 1174.10 are nearly identical to those in use in the fifteenth century, so it
seems fair to suggest that they were copied faithfully. See below.
\textsuperscript{118} ASPr, Datini 1174.10, ff. 1v-2r.
\textsuperscript{119} GM 1, f. 2r; ASPr, Datini 1174.10, ff. 2r, 3r.
Florentine gabelle rates.\(^{120}\) This list of rates was first published by the Florentine government in 1402 and revised thereafter by a Florentine magistracy called the Six on Provisioning (sei della massarizia).\(^ {121}\) This is much more extensive than the extract in the Datini archive, which may indicate that the shorter document selected only those sections which were relevant to his employer’s business.\(^{122}\) But it is also possible that the Pratica della mercatura statute reflected a more methodical approach than the previous statute quoted by the Datini copyist, one motivated by the ever-increasing demands of the Florentine monte and its pursuant fiscal policy. Such an interpretation would accord well with De la Roncière’s description of Florence’s indirect taxes, which he claims grew harsher as the fourteenth century progressed.\(^{123}\) Indeed, the rates from Uzzano’s version are, on paper at least, much higher than what the Datini extract describes.\(^{124}\) Some rates rose only slightly between the two documents: in 1442, a load (four hundred fifty libbre) of cow hides cost eighteen soldi on entry, up from fifteen soldi in the fourteenth-century extract.\(^{125}\) Other changes were more dramatic: according to the Datini document, an importer could bring a hundred prepared vair skins into Florence for eighteen soldi, but by 1442 they would cost over twice that (forty soldi).\(^{126}\) Regardless, both documents

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\(^{120}\) First published in the eighteenth century by Giovanfrancesco Pagnini della Ventura as part of his history of Florentine fiscal policy; the relevant section: Della decima e di varie altre gravezze imposte dal comune di Firenze della moneta e della mercatura de Fiorentini fino al Secolo XVI, vol. 4, pp. 1–41.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., vol. 4, p. 1: Uzzano begins, “Here will be written all the merchandise and other things that have to pay the gabelle on entry to the city of Florence and its contado, and what they will pay on exit and transit... The aforementioned gabelles were posted, ordained, and corrected by six men, commonly referred to as the Six on Provisioning, elected for three-year terms beginning on September 1st 1402” (Qui appresso saranno scritte tutte le mercatantie & altre cose le quali anno a pagare di Gabella alla entrata di la Città di Firenze, e del Contado, e quello pagheranno per uscita, e passo... E le dette Gabelle furono poste, e ordinate, e corrette per li sei Homini eletti, che volgarmente si chiamano i sei della Masserizia, per anni tre, incominciando in Calendi Settembre MCCCCII). Presumably this was the most updated version available when the author was writing, 1442 according to Pagnini della Ventura.

\(^{122}\) This would explain, for example, why the sections on lumber, pottery, and building materials from Da Uzzano’s version are absent from the Datini extract.

\(^{123}\) “De La Roncière, Charles M. “Indirect Taxes or ‘Gabelles’ at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs.”

\(^{124}\) ‘On paper’ because the silver-to-gold (i.e. lira-to-florin) ratio may have changed between the two years; without knowing when the Datini extract was copied, it is impossible to be precise about the difference. See the beginning of chapter three for a brief description of Lucchese currency in this period.

\(^{125}\) Pagnini, Della decima e di varie altre gravezze imposte dal comune di Firenze della moneta e della mercatura de Fiorentini fino al Secolo XVI, vol. 4, p. 2; ASPr, Datini 1174.10, f. 1r.

\(^{126}\) Pagnini, Della decima e di varie altre gravezze imposte dal comune di Firenze della moneta e della mercatura de Fiorentini fino al Secolo XVI, vol. 4, p. 4; ASPr, Datini 1174.10, f. 2r.
employ the same system of ordering for the goods in the statute, indicating an inherited Florentine style distinct from that in use in other cities.\textsuperscript{127}

What is most interesting, given their proximity and the influence Pisans had in the fisc during the occupation, is that the documents in use in Lucca seem fundamentally different from the tariff lists of their southern neighbor. Writing what would become known as his Pratica della mercatura in the 1330s, the Florentine Francesco Pegolotti reproduced a list of rates that Pisan brokers (sensali) could charge for handling and arranging sales for around one hundred and twenty separate items; this was not Pegolotti’s paraphrase but an adaptation of a Pisan statute from 1323 to the Florentine dialect, and the author follows the order of the original.\textsuperscript{128} The list is not broken down into categories, and one finds certain items at the opposite end of the list from the other goods that accompany them in the Lucchese and Florentine lists – whole cow hides, unworked linen, and paper, for example. But, by and large, the internal groupings are self-contained, and I have included these in Table 2.3. Although gold and cloth once again appear near the top of the list, the Pisan list does not follow the Lucchese or Florentine system. It is certainly true that this brokers’ tariff was an institution entirely distinct from the Pisan gabelle, but it clearly presents a fourth, yet again distinct, method of categorizing goods that might be found in the local marketplace.

As for the Pisan gabella portarum itself, it seems to have followed a completely different system from the Lucchese gabella maggiore.\textsuperscript{129} Given the thirty-year period during which Pisans were concerned with the fiscal policies of their subject city, this seems a strong argument for the existence of a Lucchese tradition insulated from the direct influence of the dominante. A ‘brief’ of the Pisan rates survive in a document from 1362, which, according to the diplomatic edition by Bruno Casini, contains a summary of

\textsuperscript{127} As far as a ‘Bolognese’ style is concerned, the 1351 tarifa published by Greci seems representative of another distinct statutory tradition. The 1317 Bolognese tarifa daziaria published by Lodovico Frati is also arranged in alphabetical order, and the main innovation of the 1351 document – the description of a separate tax per 10-pound, 100-pound, and 500-pound measurements – was in fact copied by the tax list promulgated in 1383: see Frati, “Tariffa daziaria fra il comune di Bologna e quello di Firenze (1317).”, esp. pp. 362-4.

\textsuperscript{128} Pegolotti, La Pratica Della Mercatura, 204–9, esp. 204 n. 1, where the editor, Allan Evans, directs the reader to the original in Bonaini’s Statuti Pisani.

\textsuperscript{129} Casini, “Il ‘breve’ delle gabelle della porta della Degazia del Mare di Pisa del 1362.”
the tariff procedures for the Porta della Degazia – the sea gate. Unlike the 1314 pedaggiun or the 1372 statute of the Lucchese gabella maggiore, which present a set of established tariff rates by volume, value, and tally, grouped into distinct categories, the Pisan breve contains the official estimated value of over five hundred commercial goods. As in the Bolognese tariffa, the rates found in the breve are listed alphabetically. At the end of this list are three mandates: for each item on the list, the transporter should pay eight denari per lira of value; for each item not on the list, but in the “special chapters” of the breve (the later sections referring to meat, for example), follow the instructions in those sections; finally, for all goods with no tariff listed, the tariff of eight denari per lira of value will be applied following the “estimate that happens to be made by the guards at the gate”.

In terms of format and mode of application, the Pisan breve seems to derive from yet another legislative tradition. One sign of this divergence is the various categorization schemes for goods in the documents used at the different customs houses. The Bolognese and Pisan tariff lists follow alphabetical order, whereas the Florentine gabelles and the Pisan brokerage list from 1323 observe an order distinct from the Lucchese rationale in both 1314 and 1372.

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130 Casini’s article came to my notice late in the preparation of this dissertation; it deserves more attention and a deeper analysis, particularly since it contains a contemporary estimation of the value of trade goods found in the Lucchese gabella maggiore. My comments here pertain only to the format of the document as such, but I hope at a later date to integrate this document into my conclusions concerning the real rates occluded by the by-tally and by-volume tariffs in the statutes of the gabella maggiore. It would be interesting to see, on the same basis as the histograms below comparing the grouping of tariff ratios, whether the Pisan gabella portarum and the Lucchese gabella maggiore reflect a similar reckoning of the value of goods and their fair taxation.

131 Ibid., 397–414, corresponding to ASPi, Commune di Pisa, div. A, n. 240, ff. 1v-16r.

Table 2.3: Categorization of Tariffs in Lucca, Florence, and Pisa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Lucchese pedaggio ordinance of 1314</th>
<th>1372 Statute of the gabella maggiore</th>
<th>Florentine gabelle, late 14th c.</th>
<th>Florentine gabelle, early 15th c.</th>
<th>Pisan brokerage rate list, 1323</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silk Cloth, Raw Silk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precious Metals, Gemstones</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool Cloth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linen Cloth, Thread, Raw Linen</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Wool, Feathers, Stuffing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skins and Leatherwork</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5, 8</td>
<td>5, 8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Iron Products</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Metals (Copper, etc.)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and Woodwork</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese, Fish, Etc.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pottery, Glass, Stone</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6, 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain, Wine, Oil, etc.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry and Fresh Fruit</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens and Vegetables</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beasts, Fowl, and Eggs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyestuff</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spices</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Merchandise (Veils, Rope, Hats, etc.)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hay and Fodder</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Exports</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wine Exports</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transhumant Herds</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Categorization of Tariffs in Lucca, Florence, and Pisa

While statutes from the three cities have a few similar features – textiles tend to lead each list, while metals and consumables come later – their arrangement suggests differing rationales. The existence of a distinct Lucchese style should not surprise us. The statutarii of 1372, like those of 1342, 1333, and 1308, were not foreign officials or
itinerant notaries. Although the silk merchants, many of whom had lived for years at a time outside Lucca, certainly had first-hand experience with paying tariffs at foreign customs houses, they may not have been familiar with the physical documents used by the collectors. Consequently, we can conclude that the Lucchesi based their statute of the *gabella maggiore* on previous versions produced in Lucca rather than external models, such that the categorization of tariffs remained unchanged from 1314 – or, rather, from whenever the statute underlying the *pedaggium* was written – to 1372.

One might argue that this tradition persisted because it accurately described the Lucchese economy, whose essential features did not change between 1314 and 1372, such that the order of the document continued to accurately reflect contemporary practice. Moreover, while the Lucchese order of categories clearly reflects the continuing importance of the textile and tanning industries, the list of items included within each category mirrors the contents of shipments found in the *gabella maggiore* registers themselves. Merchants dealing in salted fish and salted meat, for example, often imported cheese and tallow as well, all of which are contained under same heading (*de caseo carnibus tonnina piscibus* etc).

If we assume that these divisions reflect some persistent logic of the Lucchese marketplace, however, some items occupy inconvenient places in both documents. For example, cotton thread (*bambax filata*), listed under the heading for linen goods in both 1314 and 1372, is typically found in shipments containing spices and would have been sold in spicers’ shops. Indeed, the Florentine statute places cotton thread (*cotone filato*) in the category for *speziali*. A 1376 statute specifically required chandlers to use fine cotton thread as the filament for wax candles, which were more valuable than tallow candles; the *statutarii*, who used such items on a daily basis, would have been aware of this use. The category for miscellaneous merchandise, besides the expected

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133 Although the Datini extract serves as a counter-example to this, it seems likely that the political situation between Prato and Florence made accessing the physical statutes much simpler; to skirt an argument *ex nihilo*, this appears to be the only ‘stratto’ of this kind found in the archive. While it is fair to assume that Lucchese merchants knew the gabelle rates in foreign cities, there is no evidence that many had copies of foreign statutes.

134 ASPr, Datini 1174.10, f. 3v.

135 ASLu, Corte de’ Mercanti 3, ff. 85v–86r: “[Those making wax candles] with a filament of any type or material other than new cotton, and made of anything but new and pure wax – and not mixed with tallow –
complement of ropes, bags, and boxes, contains objects that could have been described elsewhere in the document: leather helms or hats (elmis de corio) surely belong with the other leatherwork, while marzacotto (marzacoctus in 1314), a substance used in the preparation of glass, might fit better under the heading for vessels. Regardless, not a single item found in the pedaggium ordinance was moved to a different category in 1372.

This indicates that the organizational principle behind the statute did not always follow contemporary commercial or industrial practice. At the more granular, item-by-item level, the 1372 statute simply duplicates the organization of the 1314 pedaggium ordinance — or, more precisely, copies the order used by the lost series of Lucchese tariff statutes of which the pedaggium is the sole surviving witness. As we turn to the tax rates assigned to these goods in 1372, we should keep in mind the weight of this inheritance. Of course, even if previous statutes influenced the statutarii as they decided on the order of categories and of goods within those categories, one would expect them to consider each tariff in terms of its impact on the contemporary marketplace. Such, after all, would seem to be the promise of the “new laws” described in the speech from December 1371, which launched the legislative effort behind the new gabella maggiore statute.\footnote{136}{ASLu, CG 3, p. 137.}

Towards the end of this chapter, I argue that these price-points were also influenced by the weight of tradition, but it is nonetheless true that the statutarii produced a more nuanced tariff than that witnessed in the 1314 pedaggium.

Each item named in the statute of 1372 is paired with a tax rate, a set amount to be paid per unit of measurement.\footnote{137}{A fuller exploration of these rates would reveal much about the relative value ascribed to certain types of spices, dyestuffs, and cloth; Hoshino, for example, used the statutes of the Lucchese gabella maggiore among eighty-nine different tariff systems to establish a hierarchy of cloth types by origin and finishing: Hoshino, L’arte della lana in Firenze nel basso medievo, 44–45.} The most common such unit was the Lucchese libbra, a mass equivalent to approximately one third of a kilogram; for example, the document states that silk cloth entailed a toll of six soldi per libbra on exit from the city.\footnote{138}{Bongi, Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca, vol. 2: 71.} Other merchandise owed tax according to its estimated worth rather than its weight; to import a quantity of precious metal would cost eight denari for every lira of its assessed value. Finally, a few large but standard items, such as millstones or cart-wheels, [must pay] twenty lire in penalty" (Li quali abiano stappino daltra cosa o materia che di bambace nuoa et di nuoa et leale cera et non mescolata con sevo... l. xx).
were taxed by unit. Within the same category, different goods received different treatment; the statute describes weight-based rates for most iron products, but it levies a value-based tax on knives, cuirasses, and other arms both defensive and offensive (ten denari per lira of value), and it also prescribes a per-unit tariff of ten denari on each sword entering or exiting the city. Certain goods had two rates, one to be paid on entry to the city and the other upon exit; for example, each hundredweight of leather cost one lira four soldi to bring into the city but two lire one soldo to export, just over seventy percent more.

Despite the many rates found in the statute of 1372, the document does not encompass the variety of goods available at market in Lucca. Accounting for every conceivable piece of merchandise would have been inefficient both in terms of ink and parchment and in terms of practical use at the court of the gabella maggiore. A number of unusual items crossed the view of the court’s assessors, but most of those that fell outside the statute of 1372, like beehives, legal and liturgical books, and lutes, appear in the registers only once or twice. Nevertheless, a few items of these unlisted items appear more than once in the records themselves; in fact, some very common items like mattresses and shoes do not appear in the statute either, so much so that seven percent of the shipments recorded in my sample contained undefined goods.139 Most of these are finished cloth and leather goods, such as tunics, dresses, cloaks, shoes, and boots, all of which are absent from the 1372 statute. The categories that contain linens, woolens, and leatherwork contrast with those describing ironwork and soft metalwork in this respect; the former describe mainly unfinished commodities like uncut wool cloth, while the latter contain an array of finished products like cauldrons, sickles, and nails alongside unworked – but smelted – iron and copper.140 For all such unlisted goods, the assessors employed a catch-all rate provided at the end of the category for “notions and things pertaining to the merchant’s trade”: eight denari per lira of estimated value, or 3.3 percent.141

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139 3,410 out of 47,705 total entries contained unlisted items; only 921 shipments consisted entirely of unlisted items.
140 This exemption for finished cloth and leather goods is common to both the statute of 1372 and the pedaggium ordinance of 1314.
141 ASLu, GM 1.13r: De aliis mercibus quibuscumque supra non specificatis solvatur gabella ad rationem
The customs registers frequently bear witness to the ability of the court assessors and custodes to estimate the price of merchandise by sight and then assign the flat tariff of eight denari per lira of value. In the end, then, the legislative tradition of itemized rates must be understood as an alternative to this kind of flat assessment. The existence of separate categories for importation and exportation and the use of weight-, value-, and tally-based rates indicate that the final goal was some nuanced distribution of the gabella maggiore. Since both the statute of 1372 and the pedaggium ordinance of 1314 retain no trace of the deliberation behind these modulated rates, we can only speculate on the logic at work. Even if my argument is that, in fact, the statutarii simply adopted the rationale of their forebears, it is worth determining the types of information that would have been necessary to develop such a system in the first place.

There are several reasons for which the statutarii would have prescribed separate entry and exit rates for an individual trade good. In the case of a higher rate for importation, the item may have been in high demand in the city, such that a higher tax would glean more for the fisc but would do no harm to trade; alternatively, a higher tax could be intended to discourage importation so as to buttress the local industry producing the same material. Or, perhaps the higher rate is the ‘base’ rate, while the lower charge on exit indicates a desire to foster the exportation of Lucchese products. Finally, it also seems possible that a local product was simply worth less than an imported alternative, and the tax rates reflect this hidden valuation. The same explanations apply, mutatis mutandis, for an item that cost more to export than import.

The use of value-based rates for certain goods indicates a different set of concerns. On the face of it, value-based rates differ from both tally- and weight-based rates in that they peg the tax associated with a given good to a potentially fluctuating market value. Like all items left out of the statute and thus subject to the catch-all 3 1/3% rate, goods taxed by value had to be assessed by officials on a case-by-case basis without recourse to the cargo scale or tally stick; in other words, assessment was certainly more efficient but potentially less accurate. It allowed merchants to pay a tax that reflected the assessed worth of goods of variable quality, such as gold or armaments. For these, a stable tax by weight would not encompass diverse levels of workmanship or might

*per libram valoris scilicet extimationis ipsarum mercium: denarii otto.*
unfairly prejudice merchants trafficking in objects whose value changed by the day. On the other hand, the use of weight-based taxes shielded other items of variable price, such as linen cloth, from the process of estimation. It is telling that silk cloth, a single term encompassing a bewildering array of thicknesses, grades, and embellishments, was taxed by weight; given the abundance of local expertise, one assumes that the assessment of silk cloth could easily provoke a lengthy argument.

What is difficult to determine in this and all other cases is where the weight-based rate for an individual good sat in relation to a hypothetical value-based tax. The statute itself indicates an answer in one case: each sword, for example, cost 10 *denari* to import or export, while the tax for all other bladed implements was 10 *denari per lira* of estimated value. Since a fine sword was obviously worth more than a fifth of a florin, the tariff was lower than the market value would entail; thus, this rate seems to be a concession to the swordsmiths of Villabasilica in the eastern Lucchesia, who exported thousands of swords through Lucca each year. In most other cases, however, solving this puzzle requires information that lies elsewhere.

I would argue that the addition of modes of assessment beyond weight and the creation of distinct entry and exit rates for certain goods were the most major procedural innovations within the Lucchese tariff system between the issue of the 1314 *pedaggium* ordinance, which only contains rates based on weight, and the 1372 statute of the *gabella maggiore*. Each new type of rate provided new options for legislators seeking to discourage or encourage particular economic behaviors, and clearly the framers of the latter document felt that a nuanced system of rates was strictly superior to one based entirely on weight. But it is impossible to determine who proposed these methods, when they were introduced, and whether they answered a specific demand or instead sprang from the process of review involved in reissuing the statutes in question.142

An analysis of the assessment modes and alternating rates used in 1372 ultimately draws one’s attention back to how little had changed since 1314, insofar as the same categories and the same items appear in both documents. Above, I presented some evidence for the existence of a distinct Lucchese format for tariff lists based on these

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142 It is also possible that the *pedaggium* ordinance of 1314 was a simplified version of the document in use at Lucca, which may have possessed rates by tally and value as well as weight.
features, but format alone is a trivial feature of a piece of policy. In an interconnected regional economy, transaction costs across borders like the customs tariff should have normalized, even if, following Epstein, they could not disappear before jurisdictional integration.  

One would expect that the rates in Lucca, Florence, and Bologna would have been based on similar systems of valuation, if not a truly common ‘fair price’. In other words, given a ratio between the value of pepper and the value of cumin in Alexandria, the weight-based tariff rates of all three cities should reflect that same ratio. And if, for example, the Lucchesi wanted to glean more money from their tariff than the Florentines and therefore applied a higher overall tax rate, their rates for pepper and cumin should have remained proportional insofar as both were based on the value of the same commodity. The tariff systems employed in Lucca, Bologna, and Florence should therefore be related to each other in some measurable way.

Setting aside the higher or lower rates intended to satisfy diverse local economies – such as the low per-piece tax on Villabasilican swords – there are three consistent problems with comparing the tariff lists of different city-states. First, such taxes were administered in different currencies that related differently to the ‘gold standard’ of the florin; some of these currencies may have been monies of account with a value distinct from that of a city’s minted money, as in Lucca, which further complicates correlation between one system of rates and another. Second, each city-state would have wanted a different sum, i.e. some different proportion of commercial profits, to be diverted to the fisc, leading to higher or lower rates respective to other cities. Third, different assessment modes cannot easily be applied in the absence of reliable information about the weight and value of the items assessed, such that the weight-based tariff for wool cloth in Bologna cannot be compared to the per-piece tariffs in Florence and Lucca. But we can dampen much of this noise if we look at the ratios between these cities’ tariff rates rather than the differences between the rates themselves.


\[144\] Of course, many memoranda and texts in the same genre as Pegolotti’s *Pratica* address currency and weight exchange rates; the same fonds in the Datini archive that holds the Florentine *stratto*, for example, contains a *Manuale mercantile* by Niccolò di Bono Rinucci, which contains contemporary conversion rates between the Lucchese and Florentine *libbra* (1.02 – 1), the *braccia* (‘armlength’) of cloth (27 to 25), and the *lira* (1 *lira* 12 *denari* per *lira*) (ASPr 1174, fasc. XI, f. 13v); for the purpose of this brief comparison, however, I have eschewed such conversions and stuck to comparing ratios.
In other words, if prices in the regional marketplace determined tariff rates, the ratio of two cities’ rates should be more or less static despite their currencies, respective mill rates, and systems of measurement. On this basis, I have tested for the existence of a regional system of ‘fair prices’ for commercial goods by comparing the Florentine *stratto* from the Datini archive, the Bolognese *tarifa daziaria* of 1351, and the Lucchese *gabella maggiore* statute of 1372. My findings indicate that tax codes from different cities represent distinct rationales with regards to their rates and, beneath those, the underlying valuation of goods. Within the Lucchese tradition, however, a single system of assessment seems to have lasted the course of the fourteenth century despite changes to the political and economic constitution of the city.

My analysis takes into account all rates that can be compared without transforming between systems of measurement, which necessarily restricts the following findings to the items that were assessed by weight.\(^{145}\) The set is further restricted because the method of assessment used for a given commercial good, such as linen cloth, varied between the lists; in the case of linen, for example, the Florentine *stratto* assigned a per-piece rate while the Lucchese and Bolognese lists have a by-weight rate. Ultimately, the Lucchese-Florentine set contains 55 items, while the Lucchese-Bolognese comparison group contains 77 items; each of these items corresponds to a single pair of rates, simplified here as a ratio between the Lucchese and the foreign rate. Assuming that consumer goods had a relatively stable value within the region, one would expect to find that these rates clustered around a single point, representing the conversion between the two systems that accounts for differences in weights, currencies, and the revenue desired by each city. There should also be outliers, of course, to represent those items for which the cities in question had a fundamentally different valuation due to differences between their local economies – e.g., wool in Florence or silk in Lucca.

The resulting statistics do not suggest a strong correlation between the tariff rates employed by Lucca and its neighbors, and they strongly discourage the assumption that

\(^{145}\) I multiplied all the rates used below to the price per hundredweight (100 *libbre*), which is one of the three base rates supplied for most items on the Bolognese tariff list and the most common denomination in the Florentine and Lucchese lists.
direct collaboration occurred between them in order to arrive at a fair system of regional rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Avg</th>
<th>Mode (%)</th>
<th>Unique Ratios</th>
<th>% in Ratio Groups with 1 member</th>
<th>% in Ratio Groups with ≥5 members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lucca-Bologna</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9.69:1</td>
<td>4.96:1 (5)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45% (35)</td>
<td>23% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucca-Florence</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.12:1</td>
<td>1.2:1 (7)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45% (25)</td>
<td>9% (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: Correlation Between Tariff Rates, Lucca vs. Bologna and Florence

In both groups, the mode ratio represents only a small percentage of the total sample of ratios, and nearly half of the ratios are isolates with only a single witness. The fact that the other 55% of ratios are found in groups with multiple witnesses seems entirely coincidental and, more specifically, the result of a shared duodecimal currency system.

Nor would this data support my less ambitious hypothesis, namely that some common system of valuation and assessment prevailed regionally and influenced the tariffs employed in multiple city-states. The frequency distribution of ratios between the rates used in Lucca and Bologna and Lucca and Florence remains flatter than one would expect to find in the presence of such a standard.

![Figure 2.1: Frequency Distribution of Tariff Ratios, Lucca and Bologna, grouped by tenths of the average (9.69:1)](image-url)
Without a doubt, both distributions show that ratios cluster around the mode, but not to such an extent as to posit a ‘core’ range of ratios that represents a real relationship between the Lucchese and Bolognese or Florentine systems. The distribution representing the former is, for the most part, flat, and the latter chart is ambiguous on whether the Lucchese rates should be understood as half those used in Florence or exactly the same.

These statistics should not be taken as an argument about the extent of commercial integration among these three close trading partners, but I do contend that they show that the tariff rates of individual cities could exist in isolation despite any such integration. The reason for this isolation comes into focus when one turns to the relationship between the rates of the 1372 statute of the *gabella maggiore* and the tariff rates employed in the 1314 *pedaggium* ordinance, particularly when these latter statistics appear side-by-side with those from the analysis above.
The rates found in the statute clearly derive from a tradition to which the *pedaggium* ordinance belongs; over ten percent of the comparable rates found in the former are strictly four times the corresponding rate in the latter. Over half of the rate-pairs appear bunched in larger groups representing, one imagines, specific conversions made by legislators throughout the history of the two documents. The resulting frequency distribution further underscores this strong relationship.

**Figure 2.3: Frequency Distribution of Tariff Ratios, 1372 vs. 1314, grouped by tenths of the average (5.6:1)**

**Table 2.5: Correlation Between Tariff Rates, Including the *Pedaggium* Ordinance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Avg</th>
<th>Mode (#)</th>
<th>Unique Ratios</th>
<th>% in Single-Ratio Groups</th>
<th>% in &gt;=5 Ratio Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lucca-Bologna</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9.69:1</td>
<td>4.96:1 (5)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45.5% (35)</td>
<td>23% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucca-Florence</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.12:1</td>
<td>1.2:1 (7)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45.5% (25)</td>
<td>9% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucca 1372-Lucca 1314</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>5.6:1</td>
<td>4:1 (19)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td><strong>16.6% (28)</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.4% (93)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nonetheless, the precise mechanism that transformed the *pedaggium* rates into those we see in 1372 remains opaque. For example, the 4:1 category contains raw tallow, several spices, a type of wool, and the dyestuff orchil; were these taxes quadrupled once, doubled twice, or was the *pedaggium* ordinance pegged at one quarter the rate of the contemporary *gabella*, such that these rates never changed between 1314 and 1372?\(^{146}\)

This evidence strongly suggests that not only the format of the statute of 1372 but also the rates had been passed down along a line that also runs through the 1314 *pedaggium*. The input of the *statutarii* may not have altered this received wisdom to a great extent. Their work clearly did not encompass a complete overhaul of the system of rates, since such a total reconstruction would have erased most of the common ratios found between the two documents. The authors had evidently not elected to reexamine the city’s tariff rates one-by-one, although it is likely that they lowered or raised the rates by some percentage. Perhaps the challenge of this task overawed them, or perhaps they did not see the need to alter the customary rates. However, even though it was the culmination of several years of vigorous fiscal policy-making, the 1372 statute of the *gabella maggiore* set the stage for the years to come. The initial burst of energy and innovation that characterized fiscal policy from the years between 1369 and 1372 quickly gave way to sluggish ambivalence. After the publication of the new statute, petitioners and attentive officials played a more active role in shaping gabelle rates.

\(^{146}\) Barring, of course, the extravagancies of the Pisans. Really, if one considers that the legislators were specifically tasked with wiping out the Pisan influence in the statutes, it does not seem impossible that the *statutarii* of 1372 returned to an even earlier set of tariff rates.
2.3 Conclusion

In December 1390, the Standardbearer of Justice – chairman of the Anzianate – delivered a speech lauding the city’s successful management of numerous external threats:

Not only do Lucca’s citizens enjoy the wondrous utility of living well, but they also have a far and away better lifestyle than any other city in this part of the world. This has earned us fame, and not without cause, because whereas other domains are powerful – more so than us, to reckon rightly – they have not become so without the trouble and harassment brought by mercenary companies, nor without the burden of imposts, uncontrolled shortages, and mortal wars. On the other hand, God has conceded to us the grace of defending ourselves from the snares of our neighbors and the attacks of mercenary companies without snatching money by force from the purses of individuals.\(^{147}\)

Quoting this in her survey of Lucca’s fiscal system, Meek notes the possibility that, in general, “Lucchese subjects bore a lighter burden of taxation” than their neighbors, but I believe the speech is being more specific and less egalitarian than that.\(^{148}\) The term “impost” (imposta) here surely refers to direct taxes on property, the seca and its ancillary estimo census, and perhaps also forced loans on the same basis. According to the Standardbearer, the councilors deserved credit precisely for avoiding taxes that predominantly affected their wealthy peers. But they also did this without introducing “shortages” or “famines” (carestia), which in the context seems to indicate the fluctuating availability of certain goods in the local marketplace, including but not limited to foodstuffs. To belabor the point, the councilors’ accomplishment required two things: first, they had managed threats to Lucchese liberty without major expenditures of

\(^{147}\) ASLu, CG 11, p. 371 [16/12/1390 | CG]: ...non pure a citadini di Luca e stata gloriosa utilita di ben vivere ma etiando et da lungi et da presso di meglio vivere che alcuna altra cita di questo paese. A prese fama et non senza cagione, perché dove l’altre terre con viva ragione via più di noi potenti non senza graveze e molestie di compagne, non senza graveze d’imposte e di smesurate carestie e mortali guerre sono state, dove idio a noi a conceduto gratia di ripararsi da le insidii de vicine da le graveze de le compagne senza cavare di borsa sforsatamente denaio a persona. The translation is mine, but the text is quoted in full at Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400: 74.

\(^{148}\) Ibid., 371.
cash, which practically meant avoiding war at all costs; second, they had ensured that indirect taxes could cover unavoidable or unforeseen expenses without becoming themselves an obstruction to the provisioning and alimentation of the urban populace.¹⁴⁹

To be sure, Lucca had indeed been fairly successful at avoiding foreign wars between 1369 and 1390. The city’s ambassadors maintained good relations with Gregory IX during the War of Eight Saints and developed progressively better ties with the Visconti despite Bernabò’s advances on Tuscany in the early 1370s; naturally enough, in both cases Lucca also joined military leagues against them to stabilize its position vis-à-vis its Tuscan neighbors.¹⁵⁰ And, as noted above, the consolidated public debt in the massa creditorum had not risen drastically over the course of those two decades. But what had the leaders of this freedom-loving commune done to maintain the stability of the local economy? Had they managed to ensure that the gabella maggiore was a secure source of revenue, an essential part of a system that aimed to shift as much of the tax burden as possible onto outsiders and non-elites? And, in the course of squeezing what they could out of the gabelles, had they avoided doing harm to the economy?

At this point, I have established the physical and statutory framework within which Lucchese legislators operated regarding the gabella maggiore. After 1372, the merchants who sat on the governing councils knew more or less what the major official and his staff could do, and most were very well acquainted with the process by which customs duties were paid. They also had a newly revised statute for the gabella maggiore representing the received wisdom of several generations of Lucchese legislators. While much of this document had been inherited from past statutes, the commune’s councils had already made substantial additions to the original text, including a new mode of taxation that would prove very profitable in the years to come. But the gabella maggiore itself was a sluggish ship in waters quick to shift; each of its hundreds of rates incentivized or disincentivized specific actions, yet the circumstances in which the statutarii of 1372 and earlier years made these judgments were far from static. The next

¹⁴⁹ As Meek notes, the Lucchesi maintained an expensive force of several hundred mercenaries even in peacetime – the term is admittedly somewhat stretched when referring to Tuscany in the last quarter of the fourteenth century: Ibid., 124–26.
¹⁵⁰ Even in these leagues, Lucca managed to avoid the taglia, the ‘slice’ of the total military effort representing a fixed contribution of manpower, through the 1370s. See Ibid., 128–36, 146–52.
two chapters present contemporary commercial and industrial activity as revealed through the records kept by their administrators in the Pinelli house. Changes in Lucca’s local and regional markets would provoke petitions, which questioned the wisdom of certain rates and challenged the councilors to reexamine their predecessors’ decisions. We have seen how eagerly Lucca’s merchant-elite tackled the issue of the *gabella maggiore* immediately after the city regained its independence. But this enthusiasm for fiscal policy, this pursuit of an ideal epitomized by the major investment in the state in 1369 and the tax policy that emerged up to 1372, would encounter stiff resistance in the form of contemporary economic reality.
Chapter Three: The Shape of Trade

This chapter presents the statistical features of the Lucchese economy between 1373 and 1410 as revealed through my thirteen-semester sample from the records of the *gabella maggiore*. But, since this work also concerns itself with the ability of the urban councils to put into effect their plans with regards to that economy, I will begin with a vignette that highlights the byzantine pathways along which their legislative efforts could wander. The following story describes an abortive monetary reform in the early 1370s, which started as a real response to a coinage crisis and ended as a stealth increase to the rates of the *gabella maggiore*.¹ This ordeal showcases the level of competence displayed by the governing councils, which appear to swing between self-sabotage and tentative farsightedness throughout the period of this study. It seems relevant to note the seeming absence of economic common sense on the part of these councilors, especially since they were the same men who oversaw the system that produced the records of the *gabella maggiore*. It is equally important to observe how quickly they responded to their own failures, inventing a solution that shored up fiscal revenue and preserved public order.

In March 1369, on the eve of emancipation, the worthies of Lucca elected eighteen men to reduce the indirect taxes that had become “unfair and excessive” under the Pisans; as explained in the previous chapter, castigating and then erasing the Pisan administration was of paramount political importance for the soon-to-be independent councilors.² For the city’s customs tariff, this process of reevaluation culminated in the publication of a new statute of the *gabella maggiore* in 1372. But, in the end, the tariffs may have been as much as 40 percent higher than they were three years earlier. That an intended tariff reduction had been transformed into an increase should come as no surprise given the fiscal anxieties of the newly emancipated commune, as described in the

¹ Since the 1340s, when it was more or less at par with the Florentine denaro, the value of the Lucchese silver currency had dropped progressively over the course of the Pisan occupation; see Meek, *The Commune of Lucca under Pisan Rule, 1342-1369*, 65–66. For a succinct overview of the silver-gold exchange and medieval monetary policy, see Munro, *Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340-1478*, 11–42.
previous chapter. But the communal government was also attempting to portray itself as an improvement upon the foreign occupation, so the councils did their best to conceal the tax hike within an overhaul of the currency system.

The rates applied under the Pisans were denominated and exacted in the “tarnished/petty money” (nigra or parva moneta – later referred to as the Pisana moneta, but not until the 1380s), the little silver-alloy denari used in Lucca during that period. In this currency, whether it had actually been coined in Pisa or, more likely, in Lucca itself, one gold florin was worth between five lire and five lire three soldi, and individuals paid customs in a mixture of gold and silver.\footnote{See, for example, ASLu, CG 2, p. 40 (14/8/1370 | Sp), for the five lire three soldi rate; when this same currency was reissued in 1371, after the intervening failure of a three lire ten soldi minting (see below), it was set at five lire to the florin: CG 3, pp. 15-16 (6/8/1371 | Eighteen).}

The statute of 1372, however, states that the tariffs were denominated and paid in a new form of money, a silver penny pegged at three lire ten soldi to the florin.\footnote{Complicating matters is that the gabella maggiore was evidently paid in the bona moneta of fifty-eight soldi per florin before 1371: see n. 4 below. This factors into our discussion only insofar as, both before and after the currency changes described here, the gabelles were always paid in a money of account that differed from the physical currency.}

This short-lived currency, which I will refer to as the ‘new penny’, was commissioned in January 1371, and the proponents of this minting claimed that the ‘new penny’ would be the means to bring Lucchese currency up to parity with the silver coins used in Florence – rather than the less valuable Pisan coins.\footnote{ASLu, CG 2, p. 200 (30/1/1371 | Eighteen): this commission also describes the desired purity of the coins (lige) and their insignia. The decree also describes the weight for a new high-silver-content trade coin, the grosso, worth 2 soldi. At around that time, the Lucchese valued Florentine currency at 3 lire 10 soldi to the florin. Both the parva moneta and this 3.5 lire-to-florin money were distinct from the so-called bona moneta or moneta mercadantilis, a money of account valued at 58 soldi to the florin, which was used in Lucchese business transactions: ASLu, CG 2, p. 271 (25/4/1371 | Eighteen). See also Meek, “Clothing Distrained for Debt in the Court of Merchants in Lucca in the Late Fourteenth Century,” 127.}

But mere months after its appearance, the ‘new penny’ experienced a collapse that was rapid, catastrophic, and complete.

The proximity of a debased Pisan money supply, on its own, might not have been enough to sink the finer ‘new penny’, but the Lucchese government made a very unwise move at the end of April. As the mintmasters bought up as much silver as they could get their hands on, the local penny supply collapsed. Panicking, the Eighteen decreed that the Pisan denaro, which hovered around five lire to the florin, would be received by the fiscal authorities at the same rate as the ‘new penny’ containing almost 50 percent more...
silver. In other words, under this decree one could ‘buy’ a florin’s worth of tariffs for 840 pennies, regardless of their silver content. This baffling attempt to violate Gresham’s Law failed very quickly. While Lucchese *parva moneta*, which must have dated to the Pisan occupation, disappeared into the mint, a tidal wave of recently debased Pisan *denari* broke into the Lucchese money supply. If any were ever issued amidst this debacle, the new, finer pennies disappeared into mattresses; in any case, they have left no imprint on the numismatic record. By the end of May, the Council of Thirty-Six attempted to staunch the bleeding by creating a punishing tariff on the importation of Pisan pennies, but this was too little, too late. The ‘new penny’ had clearly failed to launch.

The communal government admitted defeat in July by restoring the original exchange rate between the Pisan *denaro* and the florin. It is not clear what happened to the January *denari*, nor, again, if any of the proposed coins had ever been minted; the process to propose a new minting started once more in August, and the new target product was a penny pegged at five *lire* to the florin. To guarantee the quality and

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6. ASLu, CG 2, p. 271 (25/4/1371 | Eighteen): this is the same decree that declared the parity of the Florentine and Lucchese *denaro*, a somewhat less ludicrous claim. To contextualize this strange decision, the Lucchese and Pisan *denari* were again assigned a one-to-one exchange rate in a similar decree from in October 1371, but this referred to the new Lucchese *denaro* worth 5 *lire* per florin (ASLu, AaTdL 132, p. 109 [30/10/1371 | Az]). In other words, the April decree overvalued the Pisan penny by over 40 percent compared to the October ordinance.

7. “Bad money drives out good,” a principle named in the nineteenth century but expounded upon in the fourteenth century in the Aristotelian work of Nicolaus Oresme, a French scholastic and mintmaster. In chapter twenty of his *De moneta* (~1360), entitled *De aliis inconvenientibus totam communitatem tangentibus*, Oresme noted, among many other points quite relevant to the Lucchese situation in 1371, that “Men try to carry their money to those places where they believe it is worth the most” (*Homines enim libencius conantur suam monetam portare ad loca, ubi eam credunt magis valere*). Oresme was addressing his warnings to princes attempting to devalue their national currency, but the failure of the Lucchese ‘new penny’ was certainly predicted by his theories. See *The De Moneta of Nicholas Oresme and English Mint Documents*, fol. 32r. As Johnson’s introduction notes (ibid., p. xiii), some scholars think this section of the *De moneta* was added by mint officials towards the end of the fourteenth century who had witnessed Charles V of France’s attempts to debase the money supply.

8. During this period, one enterprising Pistolese smuggler was caught importing 105 *lire* worth of Pisan pennies, over 25,000 coins; he was pardoned at Pistoia’s request in July: ASLu, CG 2, p. 349 (21/7/1371 | Thirty-Six).

9. ASLu CG 2, p. 284 (21/5/1371 | Thirty-Six): the councilors, agreeing that “the Pisan money that is flowing into Lucca ought to be banned since it is so debased” (*…moneta pisana que currir in civitatem lucanam debeat exbanniri ex eo quod est adeo prava…*), assigned a 1 *lira* per florin of introduced coins. This would be equivalent to over a quarter of the coins’ value, since penalties were assigned at the 3.5 *lire*-to-florin rate.


quantity of this new minting, the Eighteen specifically decreed that, foregoing the customary seigniorage and brassage, “the Lucchese commune would profit nothing from the process.”\(^\text{12}\) This *denaro* actually did break into the market, its production no doubt buoyed by unusually favorable terms for the mint’s suppliers and customers.

Despite its momentary life as a going concern, during which it had not become enshrined within commercial contracts, the 3.5-\(\text{lire}\)-to-florin money did survive as a money of account, but solely for the payment of taxes within the remit of the court of the *gabella maggiore*.\(^\text{13}\) The decree that reduced the Pisan *denaro* to its original value (five \(\text{lire}\) three \(\text{soldi}\) per florin) included the caveat that “this does not include the ordinances of the gabelles and the increases made to the same, which ought to be exacted as previously decreed until repayment has been made to the commune of Florence and the Lord Marquis.”\(^\text{14}\) Since this ‘reversion’ refers to some new form of exaction for the gabelles, and since no explicit changes to the tariffs appear in the *Riformagioni* or minutes of the Anziani relating to the creation of the ‘new penny’, it is very likely that the pre-1369 tariff rates, which pertained to the *parva moneta*, had been carried over, not converted, into the ‘new penny’. In other words, the gabelles had come to be paid at the same rate as before, but in the ‘new penny’, a money of account worth half as much more than the Pisan *denaro*. So, although the communal government had started out seeking some form of reduction for the “excessive” gabelles charged under the Pisans, in reality the tariffs had been increased by means of a currency conversion in 1371.\(^\text{15}\) A hypothetical three

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\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., p. 15: *...ut fiat bona sufficiens moneta, lucanum commune nil inde lucretur*. Oddly enough, in their desperation to ensure an ample supply of buyers at the mint, the Eighteen had stumbled upon an element of the Standard Model vital to modern coinage – the assumption of all minting costs by the state. Cf. Sargent and Velde, *The Big Problem of Small Change*.

\(^\text{13}\) This currency is not found in the statute of 1372, but it was in use in years to come. In 1388, during a period of intense mercenary activity in and around the Lucchesia, the money of account was altered to 3 \(\text{lire 15 soldi}\) per florin (CG 10, p. 486 [19/6/1388 | CG]); this temporary reduction in the real value of the gabelles was solved by the promulgation of a new statute of the *gabella maggiore* ten years later – with a few exceptions, the statute of 1399/1400 repeats the rates from the statute of 1372 but adjusts them up by around 7 percent.

\(^\text{14}\) ASLu, CG 2, p. 341: [all official uses of the 3.5-\(\text{lire}\) currency] ad valorem et monetam consuetam, salvis tamen ordinamentorum gabellarum et augmentorum earum que exigantur prout statutum est donec fuerit comuni florentie et domino marchioni integre satisfactum.

\(^\text{15}\) The conversion between these two currencies at the court of the *gabella maggiore*, i.e. the *parva-Pisana moneta* and the ‘new’ 70-\(\text{soldi}\)-to-florin coin, caused some initial trouble, and one petition complained that, “Due to the variety of money which was reduced to five \(\text{lire}\) per florin, the revenue of the *gabella maggiore* has been harmed in this way: it was elsewhere decreed that the gabelle which was exacted at a rate of fifty-eight \(\text{soldi}\) per florin should be exacted at the rate of three \(\text{lire}\) ten \(\text{soldi}\) per florin, but now it has been
soldi six denari charge at the gabella maggiore meant handing over 42 Pisan pennies before January 1371 and 60 of the same coins after July 1371 – no wonder that, in the intervening period, the Pisan pennies had been in such demand!

The planned conversion of the Lucchese denaro into a higher quality coin thus allowed the state to hike tariffs by around 50 percent, although this must not have been the only motivation for the new minting. As a currency so distinct, in its silver content alone, from the Pisan denaro, the ‘new penny’ would have been attractive simply for rejecting the norms of Lucca’s former dominante, the kind of renunciation that was in political vogue in the early 1370s. Also, the immediate inflow of foreign currency also suggests that the Lucchese money supply had begun to shrink after emancipation cut it off from the Pisan mint. But the absence of any legislation to convert earlier gabelle rates into the new money, followed by the explicit injunction in July against returning those rates to the cheaper currency, suggests that the councils consciously took advantage of the situation to stealthily increase tax revenue. Although we cannot compare the 1372 statute with the one in use under the Pisans, it is highly unlikely that the statutarii...
lowered rates to account for the disparity between the ‘new penny’ and the actual Lucchese *denaro* current from late 1371. After all, if they had intended such a reduction, the ‘coin’ found in the records of the *gabella maggiore* would surely have disappeared from the historical record; the *statutarii*, more than anyone, had the power to change the terms of gabelle administration.

Beyond highlighting the legislative ineffectiveness of the communal government, the twisted history of this money of account lays bare the constitutional issues involved in altering fiscal legislation in the restored Lucchese republic. Rather than waiting for the General Council to authorize higher tax rates to contend with the commune’s increasing indebtedness, members of the smaller ‘senatorial’ councils (the temporary Eighteen and the Thirty-Six) undertook a new minting, which lay firmly within their remit.\(^\text{17}\) Then, they simply directed the fisc to collect taxes in this new currency without altering the statutory rates, which would have entailed the cooperation of the General Council. When the General Council did step in to resolve the brief currency crisis in July, the assembly essentially had to decide whether, in the middle of a fiscal emergency, it was wise to *lower* tax rates by reverting them to the five-*lire* currency – a far more straightforward issue than the question of raising them in the first place. In the end, the real rates were raised without recourse to a laborious process of statutory reform; the inner elite had sidestepped the more representative General Council without overtly subverting its authority.

Whether this course of events proceeded through guile or opportunism, such political craftiness must be kept in mind as my study proceeds to the central analytical task of evaluating fiscal policy decisions within the context of the Lucchese economy. On the basis of the records of the *gabella maggiore* and contemporary legal debates, I do conclude that the councils of the restored republic were not able to arrest the decline of the tannery and the urban silk industry. But readers should not forget that the leading players of the restored republic possessed enough political wisdom to tackle issues from an oblique angle and enough flexibility to respond creatively to their own legislative

\(^\text{17}\) The Eighteen Honest Men (*probi homines*) was the name of a council assembled several times during 1369, 1370, and 1371, and their original mandate described them as an executive (i.e. *balìa*) committee on revenues; their composition was functionally identical to that described in Chapter Two: initial election at ASLu, CG 1, p. 49 (21/8/1369); subsequent elections at CG 2, p. 223 (5/3/1371), *ibid.*, p. 320 (19/6/1371).
failures. Theirs was not a primitive mode of governance, and the dire tensions of the early 1370s had a transformative effect on the role of the politician in Lucchese society.\textsuperscript{18} As we have seen, the years leading up to the launch of the new statutes saw a burst of activity from the inner oligarchy, which demonstrated a capacity for experimentation. The failure of the ‘new penny’ nonetheless indicates that these legislative bodies, wanting both the benefit of hindsight and a firm grasp on economic principles discovered over the early modern period, had difficulty gauging the consequences of some policy decisions.

3.1 Descriptive Limits of the \textit{Gabella Maggiore} Records

Before I present an analysis of my database of tax records, the image of the economy which will serve as the context for the discussion of fiscal policy and Lucchese industry in chapter four, it will be valuable to describe precisely what material this database contains. Whereas the first and second chapters of this thesis concerned the material and statutory framework that produced the records of the \textit{gabella maggiore}, here I will discuss the extent to which these records managed to encompass that portion of the Lucchese economy that fell under the remit of that court. Major gaps in this coverage restrict what we can conclude concerning the urban marketplace, but the registers’ insufficiency in certain respects falls far short of rendering them useless for our purposes. Even after we note the absence of certain commercial activities and actors engaging in low-value transactions, the material remains unique in both breadth and depth as a tool for analyzing a premodern urban economy.

The roughly 48,000 tax entries considered by this study derive from a sample of eight years: 1373, 1378, 1385, 1387, 1392, 1397, 1401, and 1410.\textsuperscript{19} For one of these years, 1385, only the first semester survives, whereas the registers from the other years

\textsuperscript{18} As our survey also covers the first decade of Paolo Guinigi’s rule, we will see that the effective components of republic’s fiscal policy continued to function during the despotism; in this and other ways, the Guinigi ascendance was not an imposition but instead represented an evolution of the late-\textit{Trecento} Lucchese political system.

\textsuperscript{19} As mentioned in the introduction, records of the \textit{gabella maggiore} survive from before 1370 and after 1410, but they are fragmentary in both cases.
preserve the records from an entire year.\(^{20}\) Although 1385 is the only incomplete year in the survey, some reconstruction was necessary for two other years. First, the two volumes of records from 1373 are missing the quires containing July and August 1373; these sections reappeared in one of the miscellanies of tax records composed, presumably during the same archival reorganization, from the stray quires remaining after the main registers were rebound under the direction of Salvatore Bongi.\(^{21}\) Second, the records from 1410 have been divided into three sections, which separately list imported and exported shipments, shipments paying only the passage-fee, and shipments that arrived from Pisa, for which merchants owed a surtax of three percent on their goods’ assessed value.\(^{22}\) There is complete overlap between the first and third categories, since most of the items declared for the extra tariff are also listed under the same payer in the main body of records, and I had to compensate for this duplication in tabulating the statistics for that year.\(^{23}\)

As these inconsistencies indicate, the recordkeeping practices of the court of the *gabella maggiore* varied slightly between each year of my survey. These differences mainly affect material other than the entries regarding the payment of the tariff, whose format does not change between 1373 and 1410. For example, the records after 1390 include around forty entries recording the tax on butchered meat, the *Macello*, which was

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\(^{20}\) Some of these, however, are split between two or more registers; 1373 fills GM 13-14, 1378 is contained in GM 17-18. Several registers contain more than the records from a single year, as well: GM 35, for example, contains both 1397 and 1398. The registers are, of course, modern bindings, and it seems that their creation led to the loss of most of the original parchment wrappers found in most other fonds in the ASLu, if these ever existed. The haphazard combination of records found in the four miscellanies at the end of the main record series (GM 47-50) suggest that the gabelle material was not securely bound or ordered by the time it was reorganized in the late nineteenth century: Bongi, *Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca*, vol. II, p. 39.

\(^{21}\) The relevant sections were found in ASLu, GM 49, pp. 815-874.

\(^{22}\) GM 45, f. 246r (*Titulus introytus extimationis trium pro cento [sic] rerum conductarum de Pisis Lucam*), f. 286r (*Titulus introytus passagiorum*); the 462 entries in this final section repeat verbatim, albeit with the addition of an assessed value in florins, the matching shipments from Pisa found in the main records. The entries have not been removed from our statistics for entry count and tax revenue below, but their contents are not included in the volumes of specific trade goods described in chapter four. I did include the figures from the final section for raw, unworked wool, which was a tax-exempt commodity and only listed in 1401 and 1410 for its value under the Pisan surtax, as I describe in chapter four.

\(^{23}\) I have not found the decree enacting this three percent tax on Pisan imports, but context indicates that it was issued between 1397 and 1401; unlike entries from the former year, the latter’s registers record payments “for the Pisan assessment” (*pro extimatione Pisarum*), i.e. the surtax. By 1410, these payments were moved into dedicated handbooks that were bound after the main records; this binding must have occurred at the end of the year, since the separate sections and their foliation are described in a contemporary table of contents at the beginning of the register.
a separate gabelle administered by its own agency. The registers composed after 1380 contain seven hundred entries recording fees paid upon the sale of livestock, another transaction tax that was not under the purview of the *gabella maggiore*; over eighty percent of these misplaced sales entries are found in the records from 1392.\(^{24}\) Nothing in the registers explains the rationale behind the inclusion, from year to year, of some payments properly belonging to the registers of other gabelles. Presumably, some of these irregular entries resulted from the taxpayer’s choice, such as when an individual owing payment on the sale of a horse also happened to be in the *gabella maggiore* to cover the cost of a shipment. It seems likely that the officials at the Pinelli house had some leeway to collect monies on behalf of other tax agencies, a flexibility that would not, in any case, prejudice the receipts of the central treasury.\(^{25}\)

On the other hand, the many receipts for livestock sales present in the records from 1392 presumably represent the entirety of that tax for the period covered by the registers. It therefore seems to be the case that the court of the *gabella maggiore*, which formally presided over all other tariffs and tax farms, could sometimes assume the record-keeping duties of one of these subordinate offices. It is perhaps notable that the position of court treasurer had been extended to a semester-long office by 1392; one assumes that such *ad hoc* agglomeration of revenue streams would have been harder to organize when the presiding treasurers rotated on a weekly basis.\(^{26}\) Needless to say, no mention of the inclusion of livestock sales in 1392, nor indeed any other explanation for the administrative irregularities found in the *gabella maggiore* series, appears in the contemporary *Riformagioni* or unpublished minutes of the Anziani. For any major changes to either the format of the registers or the categorization of receipts therein, the *maior officialis* presumably had the final say. The occasional addition of a tax receipt for

\(^{24}\) The registers from 1392 record 567 out of the total 688 livestock sales found in my sample from the registers of the *gabella maggiore*.

\(^{25}\) On a few, nonetheless intriguing, occasions, these payments were being made on behalf of taxpayers in the vicariates by merchants that had passed through there; this kind of substitution occurs in three out of the thirty-eight entries for butchered meat in the *gabella maggiore* and nine out of the 688 livestock sales. Most of the time, one assumes, it was far easier to pay the officers of the *macello* and rural gabelles, who were temporarily resident in the vicariates as well.

\(^{26}\) The position changed in April 1391 (ASLu, CG 11, p. 454 [22/4/1391 | Thirty-Six]).
the sale of a horse or a butchered pig most likely did not require any special authorization from above.

The occasional appearance of other tax records in these registers underscores how the court in the Pinelli house functioned as the hub of the Lucchese marketplace; it occupied this role both in terms of its physical situation in the city and with regards to its structural centrality as a regulator of commerce. Indeed, the very value of the *gabella maggiore* records derives from the fact that the toll was exacted at the court in the Pinelli house on all cargo over a certain value, regardless of the merchant in question. No blanket exemptions existed for certain people and privileged classes, and such exemptions would in any case have been counterproductive for an institution already designed to alleviate the tax burden of the wealthy. The well-heeled members of the Guinigi, Rapondi, and Moriconi families paid for licenses alongside the factors in their silk firms and far humbler traffickers in salted fish and nails.

Of course, the precise relationship of each taxpayer to the shipment under his name remains hazy, and a few rare entries do describe payers as receiving “for” (*pro*) another individual.\(^27\) Beyond such explicit examples, many who paid the tax were surely carriers in the employ of others; such transporters, acting on behalf of others, often paid the gabelle with special allotments separate from their salaries, but the records of the *gabella maggiore* would not preserve the employer’s name in these cases.\(^28\) For example, in the margin beside one entry from November 1397, which otherwise describes a shipment of untanned skins by one Polo da Genoa, the notary wrote that “the license should say the name of Bonaccorso Bocci,” who, unlike Polo, was a well-established Lucchese merchant.\(^29\) And, even if locals turned up to pay for their commissioned

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\(^27\) There are 162 examples of explicit payer substitution in my sample, e.g. GM 13, f. 3r: *a Jannino Faytinelli solvente pro Leonello saulli pro libris cxxvii laborerii sete in uno fardello conducendis de luca apud motronem hodie habuit pro libris xxxvii sz dili.*

\(^28\) As context, see, for example, a petition addressed by the Council of Thirty-Six in 1372 (ASLu, CG 3, p. 331 [16/6/1372 | Thirty-Six]): a certain transporter (*vectigalis*), Francesco Tenci da Firenze, was caught smuggling a shipment of silk veils (*velorium et sindonum*), which he was transporting towards Pisa on behalf of one Piero da Mantoiano of Bologna; the latter petitioned for the return of his veils, claiming that he had given Francesco some money for the express purpose of paying the tariff in Lucca, which the villainous carrier had attempted to pocket by avoiding the city while traversing Lucchese territory.

\(^29\) GM 35, p. 260: *a Polo de Janua pro balla una coriaminis sicii non concii ponderis librarum 260 missis in civitate... licet apodixa dicat nominis Bonachursi Bocci; Bonaccorso Bocci paid for 56 shipments of*
shipments in person, many more carriers may have been in the service of foreign companies. Barsotto Bocchini, an otherwise obscure citizen, appeared in the employ of the Datini company as a carter (*charadore*) at the end of the fourteenth century. He also shows up in the *gabella maggiore* records as the payer for over one hundred and fifty shipments of oranges, treated wood, and many other things between 1373 and 1410, but we only find his name there, without an appended ‘*pro* Francesco di Marco Datini’ or any of his factors’ names.\(^{30}\)

Whether in person or through intermediaries, even visiting dignitaries and friendly heads of state paid the tariff on imported and exported goods. Six cardinals, possibly in person, paid for the importation of cloth and foodstuffs while Urban VI was resident in the city in 1387.\(^{31}\) Beyond these, Pietro Gambacorta, the doge of Pisa from 1370 to 1392, petitioned regularly to import carts of wine from the Lucchesia for two florins apiece, while Coluccio Salutati, chancellor of Lucca for a short stint in the early 1370s – over which period he evidently developed a taste for Lucchese wine – submitted a similar petition in 1385.\(^{32}\) Even in the case of these dignitaries, the General Council offered only the right to export, not an exemption from taxation.

Between 1370 and 1400, in fact, I could find only a single grant of a personal exemption from the *gabella maggiore*, and this took a decidedly unusual form. In May 1392, Andrea Stornelli and Giovanni Landi received permission to bring a total of fifty casks (*vegetes*) of *malvasia* wine into the city starting in July, for each of which they would be paid an addition florin by the treasury, “so that the city will be full of foreign, cloth, skins, and other merchandise between 1387 and 1401, and he served on the Council of Thirty-Six in 1397: CG 13, p. 23 (14/3/1397).

\(^{30}\) ASPpr 1156, fasc. 11 (s.f.), which contains “cover-charges/advances forwarded to carriers and others” (*coperte prestite sono a charadori e alii*), lists Barsotto di Luche and a *Bochino di Barsoto* immediately thereafter, which presumably refer to Barsotto Bocchini and his son; the ‘cover-charges’ described in this document, moreover, presumably included the cost of tolls like the *gabella maggiore*. As regards his relative obscurity, Barsotto Bocchini never achieved the Anzianate or sat on the Thirty-Six, nor did he hold any other communal office between 1369 and 1410. Many of the shipments for which he appears as payer may indeed have been shipments for the Datini branch at Pisa, but it is certainly possible that Bocchini served several other employers over the course of his career.

\(^{31}\) These were the cardinal bishops of Nocera (Inferiore), Pisa, Florence, Lodi, Monopoli (Bari), and Bologna (GM 23, ff. 8r, 36v, 37v, 47r, 52v, 89v); many other dignitaries, presumably, imported goods via intermediaries.

\(^{32}\) Salutati appears as *ser Coluccius Petri de Stignano* (CG 9.332 [19/4/1385 | CG]); there are numerous other petitions for Pietro Gambacorta and other members of his court, including his successor Giovanni d’Appiano, e.g. CG 9.230 (25/11/1384 | CG).
and especially medicinal and useful wine.” This is less a license and more a privilege – or even a gift. Indeed, Stornelli had performed a key service for the now-dominant Guinigi faction in the role of gang-leader and assassin during the streetfight on the 5th of May and the weeks of chaos that followed. This exemption from the gabelle on wine was but one of several monetary rewards for his work provided by the emergency committee assembled by the Guinigi after the death of the Forteguerra brothers, all of which were masked under a veneer of commission or election. In early June, for example, the emergency committee assembled by the Guinigi after the death of the Forteguerra brothers also granted Stornelli the tax-farm on public gambling (proventus barrattarie) for three years. The committee first revoked the proventus from its original buyer, one Cecco di Simone from Pistoia who had bought it for 1,530 florins per year (4,590 total), and then resold it for 2400 florins to Stornelli – after this initial payment, it was a gift worth, effectively, at least 2,200 florins. Given the tendentious nature of Stornelli’s unusual privileges, it seems fair to say that the gabelle exemption for Stornelli’s wine imports is an exception that proves the rule.

33 ASLu, CG 12, p. 104 (19/5/1392 | Twenty-Four): ...ut civitas vino forensi et potissime medicinali et utilis sit abundans.
34 To be sure, it was a gift analogous to the more regular practice of reducing the tariff for wine merchants commissioned by the commune to import large quantities of foreign wine. See, for example, the petition of Giannino di Bernabo from Corniglia on the Genoese littoral, who complained to the Council of Thirty-Six that he was forced to overpay for wine at the court of the gabella maggiore despite a previous arrangement with the commune (ASLu, CG 6, p. 167 [12/1/1377 | Thirty-Six]); Giannino paid 14 lire 10 soldi per cart – the going rate for vernaccia wine in the statute of 1372. Boccaccio makes a passing reference to a wine called vernaccia di Corniglia (Decameron X.2), and this was probably what Giannino was importing – rather than the agreed-upon 3 lire 12 soldi, the price for wine from Corsica and Elba. This was an extremely large reduction, if not an exemption, for a merchant who engaged in vigorous trade with Lucchese wine merchants at the time, importing six different shipments of vernaccia and other high-end vintages in 1378 alone.
35 Stornelli himself, aided by a Florentine associate known as ‘Maestro Andrea di Gregorio, the Singer’, executed Bartolomeo Forteguerra and a couple of notaries who were taken prisoner on 5 May: Sercambi, Croniche, vol. 19, vol. I, 281-2.
36 This Guinigi-led executive (balìa) committee had been summoned on 9 May after the dust had begun to settle: ASLu, CG 12, p. 96.
37 ASLu, CG 12, p. 123 (3/6/1392 | Twenty-Four).
38 Yields from the gambling tax could be much higher than this, although recovering this investment did require some organizational skill. The proventus barrattarie was exacted on gambling tables on the steps of S. Michele in Foro, i.e. the central market square, which was the only location in the city where regular gambling was permitted. Private gambling was explicitly banned, although certain exemptions were granted for night watchmen during periods of military activity in the Lucchesia (e.g., ASLu, CG 4, pp. 322-23 [9/2/1374 | Sp]; CG 7, p. 245 [19/4/1380 | Sp]) and, after 1383, between Christmas and Epiphany (CG 8, p. 450-51 [17/2/1383 | CG]).
Just as people of every social and political status had to pay the *gabella maggiore*, the communal government never issued exemptions from the tariff to subject communes or foreign cities. This held true even in what one might consider exceptional circumstances, such as when a village performed a special service or experienced extreme strife.\(^39\) In all such cases, fiscal privileges or inducements not to emigrate were limited and did not extend to the customs tariff or other indirect taxes, as indicated by the boilerplate tag “excepting the gabelles” (*salvis gabellis*) that appears on each such offer.\(^40\) The closest I found to a remission of indirect taxes for a particular subject commune is part of an accord struck with the people of San Donnino, a small commune in the northernmost reaches of the Serchio River valley that had been briefly conquered by the forces of Bernabo Visconti in 1370.\(^41\) The exemptions offered to this embattled village exclude, naturally, any reduction of the gabelles, but the Lucchese government did order that they not be liable for the indirect taxes incurred *during* their period of subjugation.\(^42\) This seems a generous dispensation given the hard line the Lucchesi struck elsewhere concerning indirect taxes.\(^43\)

I also found no discount offered to merchants from any specific foreign nation between 1369 and 1400. This is indicative of a shift away from the mutual exemptions

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\(^39\) Leverotti’s research has demonstrated that the mid-late Trecento was a period of intense demographic instability for the Lucchesia due to plague and war, an instability exacerbated by the mobility of the rural population. See Leverotti, “La crisi demografica nella Toscana del Trecento: l’esempio delle Sei Miglia lucchesi.”, and Leverotti, *Popolazione, famiglie, insediamento*.

\(^40\) This is especially evident in the early years of the emancipated commune, when numerous exemptions were issued to subject communities. See, for example, Trassilico’s privileges in exchange for guarding the pass from the Serchio to the littoral (ASLu, CG 1, p. 53 [19/8/1369]); Terpignano was freed from all taxes due to poverty, but not the gabelles (CG 1, p. 31 [7/8/1369]); the *borghi e sobborghi* were released from a variety of imposts besides the gabelles (CG 1, p. 228 [16/2/1370]); Cerasomma, burnt and destroyed by mercenaries in Visconti employ, could defer many of its fiscal obligations but not payment of the gabelles (CG 1, p. 263 [5/3/1370]). Meek casts such fiscal exemptions in the context of the long and miserable history of the Lucchese contado in the fourteenth century, but notes a similar reluctance to offer immunities from the customs duty: Meek, *Lucca, 1369-1400*, 77–97.

\(^41\) Christine Meek contextualizes San Donnino’s plight among the many petitions submitted in mid-1370, when Visconti forces ravaged the northern Lucchesia: see Ibid., 82ff.

\(^42\) ASLu, CG 1, pp. 368–9 (22/5/1370): “...concerning the gabelles, however, they ought to make compensation just as other communes of the aforementioned vicariates do and according to the provisions that will be made when they return to obedience towards the Lucchese commune; in the meanwhile, however, they should not at all be held to pay those gabelles.”

\(^43\) It should be noted that this reluctance to offer exemptions from the general tariff was not a strictly local phenomenon; in 1339, Florence offered a number of tax exemptions to the war-torn polities of the Valdinievole (Pescia, Buggiano, Uzzano) it had recently absorbed, excepting only the gate gabelle: Brown, *In the Shadow of Florence: Provincial Society in Renaissance Pescia*, 144.
and special rates that characterized the tariffs preceding the *gabella maggiore* in Lucca.\textsuperscript{44} Even beyond the Lucchesia, the institution of the customs tariff in the fourteenth century was heavily influenced by reciprocal agreements made in the previous century between political or economic partners, which necessarily entailed special treatment for favored allies. In some systems, like the Bolognese *tarifa daziaria*, these exemptions continued to be renewed into the fourteenth century and became part of the commercial *status quo* between the cities involved. But, presumably because of Lucca’s tortured experience of the fourteenth century, the statute of the *gabella maggiore* preserved no trace of former political-economic partnerships. The short-term Lucchese empire under Castruccio Castracani followed by decades of foreign rule had altered the city’s trade relationships too frequently and too violently, and the constitution of the *gabella maggiore* appears to have retained local features but not political traditions like privileged trading status.

In fact, the only special tax arrangement made with a foreign state between 1370 and 1400 was profoundly negative. In 1397, the Council of Thirty-Six issued a decree that individuals from Pistoia – including Pistolesi, their *contadini*, and anyone transporting goods for Pistolesi – would have to pay double the normal rate for shipments declared at the *gabella maggiore*.\textsuperscript{45} Darkly mirroring the trade agreements from which exemptions elsewhere sprang, this was a kind of negative reciprocity; according to the brief presented before the council, Pistoia had several years earlier drafted a law forcing Lucca’s citizens and subjects to pay a double tariff on goods passing through their territory.\textsuperscript{46} This was a punitive and evidently unique surcharge applied only to Lucchesi

\textsuperscript{44} Such as the *collecta* which was not exacted on Pratese merchants; see chapter two, note 10.

\textsuperscript{45} ASLu, CG 13, p. 126 (2/5/1397 | Thirty-Six): “All the officials of the gabelles for the Lucchese comune... are held and ought, chained by oath, to exact in tariff... from each and every citizen, subject, *contadino*, inhabitant, and denizen of that city of Pistoia, or on and for all their goods, animals, and other things... or on those things which are transported in their name by anyone else... double the normal price... that they would demand from foreigners of other cities and lands in every case” (...) *Providerunt et hac reformatione sanxerunt et ordinaverunt quod omnes et singuli officiales gabellarum... teneantur et debeant vinculo iuramenti exigere cum effectu pro gabella. ab omnibus et singulis civibus districtualibus comitatis incolis et habitatoris civitatis pistorii et seu de et pro quibuscumque mercimonii animalibus... et seu que eorum nomine per alios quoscumque... Duplum ciuislibet quantitatis que a ceteris forensibis aliarum civitatum et nationum in quocumque casu exigi deberet et consuevit.* Note that this was far from the beginning of conflict over commercial access between the two cities: Barlucchi, “Mutamenti nella viabilità del territorio pisoiese in età tardomedievale,” 197ff.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.: *Cum in civitate pistorii iam pluribus elaptis annis conita et firmata fuerit lex ut furtur et etiam per executionem manifeste cognoscitur qua lucani cives et committatini qui per pistoriensem territotium merciantias deferent seu res coguntur ad solutionem dupli eius quod ab aliis exigitur quantumcumque*
traversing the Valdinievole, and I assume that the unstated cause for this penalty was some disagreement or incident concerning the mountainous borderlands dividing the cities from each other.\(^{47}\) It is worth noting that this was a particularly delicate time for this commercial route, since the Florentines had come to rely on passage through the Valdinievole and Lucchesia to the port at Motrone in lieu of Porto Pisano.\(^{48}\) As the Anziani had failed “fraternally and sweetly” to convince their colleagues – characterized by “obstinate minds” – to throw out this “odious law”, it became a matter of public honour to redress the insult. A reciprocal double tax for Pistolei in the Lucchesia ensured that “equality would be preserved”, and, one assumes, this decision was designed to spur Pistoia’s government to action.\(^{49}\)

Within three months, this measure had the desired effect of driving the government of Pistoia to rescind the double tariff, and the Lucchesi acknowledged this by removing the temporary increase for Pistolese merchants.\(^{50}\) It is perhaps notable that, in opposing Pistoia’s punitive tariff, the Lucchesi specifically appealed to a principle of equity (equalitas), an expectation of fair treatment under which merchants from a given state would not be taxed more heavily than those from other states under the same conditions. In particular, the Lucchese complaint describes a Pistolese tariff system in which, as in Lucca, all foreign merchants were originally paying the same base rate. Nor do contemporary statutes describing the Florentine tariff, as far as they have come down to us through the fragment and later editions described in chapter two, mention any specific exemptions for foreign states. In some places, certainly, exceptions were carried

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\(^{47}\) Disputes between Lucchese and Pistolese subjects in the montes pistorienses appear frequently throughout the Riformagioni, and the region saw open conflict between the two cities in the mid-1380s: for disputes, see, for example, ASLu, CG 8, pp. 280-1 (1/10/1382 | Az); a temporary truce at CG 8, pp. 450-1 (17/2/1383); a more lasting peace treaty at CG 10, p. 84 (28/6/1386). Meek discusses these conflicts in the wider context of Lucca’s unstable relationship with Florence, which, like Pistoia, proved a safe harbour for the city’s rebels, such as members of the Obizi family who were exiled after the decision for ‘a popolo’ rule in 1370: Meek, Lucca, 1369-1400, 153–62.

\(^{48}\) Melis provided a succinct summary of this situation as well as the consequences of the Lucca-Bologna-Pistoia network for Pistolese industry: Melis, Industria e commercio nella toscana medievale, 169–73.

\(^{49}\) ASLu, CG 13, p. 126: ...volentes quod saltem pistorienses non aliter in territorio lucano tractentur quam ipsi in suo territorio lucanos tractent ut sic equalitas observetur...

\(^{50}\) ASLu, CG 13, p. 166 (23/8/1397 | Thirty-Six).
over from the old pact-based tariffs, but this episode indicates that a single rate for all foreign merchants was considered the norm.

Nonetheless, Pistoia’s – and, in return, Lucca’s – deviation from this norm in 1397 demonstrates that no merchants had an ironclad guarantee of fair and equal treatment vis-à-vis the customs tariff in foreign cities. Beyond the terms of trade agreements, the application of transaction fees like the *gabella maggiore* was entirely within the control of a given state’s executive body. Although the statutes of the *gabella maggiore* limited the actions that the Anziani and Council of Thirty-Six could take without the cooperation of the General Council, they neither explicitly restricted punitive taxation nor enshrined equal treatment for all taxpayers. The *balìa* committee elected on 15 May 1392 employed such measures to derive the special privileges granted to Andrea Stornelli for his knife-work during the street fights a few days earlier. By raiding the fiscal system for Stornelli’s spoils of victory, the victorious Guinigi faction certainly poked a hole through the façade of impartiality at the Pinelli house, but what they did was completely legal for a committee vested with power by the General Council.\(^{51}\)

But, while any deliberate favoritism in the Lucchese tax regime would seem like corruption to a modern mind, it would be unfair to say that the statutes of the *gabella maggiore* set out to guarantee such rights. The kind of apolitical economic “equality” that served as a rhetorical flourish during the commune’s dispute with Pistoia had no legislative foundation in the customs house. As contemporaries knew, the Council of Thirty-Six and the Anziani were perfectly within their rights to issue exemptions and privileges at any time, and the General Council could and did alter the statutes themselves if necessary. Their peers in Pistoia, Pisa, and elsewhere were similarly empowered. And yet, in Lucca at least, these bodies rarely used fiscal policy and privileges to curry favor with specific individuals, and their negotiations with subject communes and neighbors did not involve the creation of special tax categories. That the city’s government did not issue exemptions from the tariff on a regular basis reflects the personal interest of the city’s councilors more than adherence to a political principle.

\(^{51}\) To be sure, I do not mean to gloss over the physical elimination of members of the opposition who were extra-judicially murdered, sentenced to death, or exiled, but the *balìa* did act within the powers granted it by the subdued General Council on 15 May; see Meek, *Lucca, 1369-1400*, 271–72.
More precisely, because its investments in the fisc produced returns reliant on the revenues of the *gabella maggiore* and other indirect taxes, the merchant elite would have had little inclination towards lowering that revenue.52

This reading is further supported by the fact that Paolo Guinigi’s government issued few exemptions from payment of the *gabella maggiore*. In the first decade of his principate, Guinigi’s publicized decrees contain only five grants that can be considered privileges of this sort. Four of these are individual or community-based exemptions that proclaim, in a manner reminiscent of the republican period, general prosperity and the indirect fiscal benefit of the exemption in question. For example, one exemption was issued in April 1401 to Prospero di ser Conforto Conforti, a paper-maker who had set up shop near the juncture of the Serchio and Lima rivers north of Lucca; this permit was limited to the linen scraps (*stracci*) used in the industry, which Prospero could export from Lucca and import from outside the Lucchesia without paying the gabelle.53 To be sure, Prospero di ser Conforto held several offices both before and after the accession of Paolo Guinigi, including postings as an assessor of silk cloth and in the prince’s own council; it is therefore conceivable that this grant was simply a reward for some service.54 But an identical grant was issued in 1409 to Antonio di Giovanni, another aspiring paper-maker who does not appear on elections lists during the first decade of Guinigi’s government, and here the language is even more explicitly about fiscality: the grant is issued “so that the art of paper-making... will return to the Lucchesia, which cannot

52 The triumph of the Guinigi hegemony in 1392 quashed the kind of dissension that made personal or origin-based tariff exemptions politically difficult, but the fundamental economic logic remained. In this context, the special wine-shipping rights granted to Pietro Gambacorta, Salutati, and others make much more sense; as specific – and therefore low-value – privileges, they would have been politically uncontroversial and served as relatively cheap good-will gifts.

53 ASLu, GPG 1, p. 67 (22/4/1401 | Guinigi): *Magnificus et potent dominus ... considerans que ars conficiendi cartas de papiro multum fructus et utilitatis civitati et comitatui lucano conferre poterit, cum Prosper ser Confortis lucanus civis dictam artem adduxerit in comitatum iuxta pontem Lime ut idem Prosper causam habeat dictam artem conservandi et illam semper augendi decrevit et voluit quod de stracciis que conduceretur de extra territorium et extra civitatem lucanum ad dictum hedeficium pro dictis cartis conficiendis nulla solvatur gabella in civitate vel comitatui lucano set illi stracci possint ad dictum edeficium libere et sine ulla gabelle solutione portari...

54 Prospero di ser Conforto first appears in the Riformagioni as a *provisor sete* elected for 1381 (ASLu, CG 7, p. 374 [23/12/1380]); he achieved his first Anzianate in 1395 at the latest (AaTdL 766, p. 462 [22/6/1395], reconstructed from the minutes of the Anziani due to the gap in the Riformagioni); under Guinigi, he served as a *consiliarius Domini* in 1404 and held several posts between 1408 and 1410 (GPG 1, p. 249 [29/6/1404]).
happen without advantage or profit for the lord’s revenues.”\(^{55}\) Similarly, the recipient’s status does not appear to be the motivating factors behind the 1403 grant to the plaster-diggers of Pomezzano and Stazzemo west of Lucca, who were permitted to pay half the tariff on plaster imports to Lucca, or the 1408 grant to Domenico di Piero, a cauldron-maker (*calderaio*), which allowed him to pay a third less for the gabelle on unworked copper.\(^{56}\)

The fifth, and the most unusual, tariff exemption I found during the first decade of Guinigi’s rule was bestowed on the city of Pistoia. In November 1405, the prince’s register records a license to the Pistolese government to disembark a total of twenty thousand *staia* of salt at the port of Motrone and transport it through Lucchese territory without paying the gabelle.\(^{57}\) The only fee owed for this grant was to the *magazzenum* in Motrone, the port’s warehouse, where the Pistolese had to pay two *bolognini* (four *soldi*) per *staio* for storage.\(^{58}\) Given that a *staio* was worth a few florins or more, this storage fee hardly approached the price of the customs tariff; no such tariff exists in the statutes for the *gabella maggiore* because the transport and sale of salt was restricted, but the catch-all tax of eight *denari* per *lira* of value (3 percent) serves as a baseline.\(^{59}\) The salt presumably went to supply Pistoia’s government salt monopoly, and twenty thousand

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\(^{55}\) GM 3, p. 6 (20/11/1409 | Paolo Guinigi): *Ut ars et exercitium conficiendi cartas de papiro que longe temporibus retroactis in civitate vel comitatu lucano non viguit in ipso comitatu et districtu lucano resurgat et maneat et in dictis crescat quod esse non poterit sine comodo et utile intraeptum ipsius domini...*

\(^{56}\) GPG 1, p. 168 (29/3/1403 | PG); GPG 1, p. 513ff (28/11/1408 | PG). In the first case, mercy (*misericordia*) is said to be the motivating factor behind the grant, whereas in the latter the recipient’s poverty appears to have been the reason his petition was successful; Domenico’s vision of a lower tax “to render the citizens of Lucca more abundant in items of bronze and copper... and to entice masters of the trade from other parts” would not have been satisfied by a personal exemption: *quia mitteretur in civitate plus raminis quam nunc mittatur in duplum et ars hic cresceret et esset honor civitati et etiam starent cives magis copiosi de laborerio raminis et esset dare materiam quod plus raminis in civitate mitteretur et venderetur et alliceretur magistri istius artis ad veniendum Lucam [514] ad faciendam artem.*

\(^{57}\) GPG 1, p. 364 (17/11/1405). The twenty-thousand *staia* referred to are Pistolese *staia*, for which I have not found a conversion to the Lucchese unit. The Lucchese *staio* of salt, a unit of volume mentioned in the same passage, held 54 *libbre*, or about 18 kilograms, of salt – about fifteen or sixteen litres in volume – such that twenty thousand Lucchese *staia* would equal about 360 metric tonnes of salt. For more on Lucchese measures, see Bongi, *Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca*, vol. 2: 67-77.

\(^{58}\) To confound matters, the *staio* used by the *magazzenum* was the Lucchese measure, such that, when the Pistolesi imported twenty-thousand of their own *staia*, they then paid an as-yet unknown multiple of the four- *soldi* tax.

\(^{59}\) In 1379, for example, the overstocked Dovana was authorized to sell salt to foreigners for the coming two months: between fourteen and thirteen *lire* per *staio* for *sal provincialis*, or between thirteen and twelve *lire* per *staio* for *sal valligianus* (ASLu, CG 7, p. 7 [9/1/1379 | Sp]); within Lucca, i.e. for the purposes of the salt monopoly, the price of salt was set variously at six *lire* five *soldi* (CG 11, p. 349 [25/11/1390], referring to a norm) and five *lire* five *soldi* (CG 12, p. 48 [20/2/1392]).
staia would have been sufficient to stock its warehouses for an extended period of time.\footnote{Twenty-thousand Lucchese staia was considered sufficient for stocking the Dovana’s magazzena when the office’s statutes were revised in 1382 (CG 8, p. 94 [18/4/1382 | Az]).}

The justification for this munificence is unclear; it may be relevant that, four days earlier, one ser Niccolò Pandragoni from Pistoia was elected to the post of major official at the court of the *gabella maggiore*, although it seems more likely that both incidents reflect the more pacific relationship between Lucca and Pistoia under the Guinigi principate.\footnote{GPG 1, p. 364 (13/11/1405). Also, Pandragoni had served as an officer in the Guinigi government for several years already: he was the official of the *fondaco* and the court responsible for roads for the whole of 1403 and 1404, for example (e.g. GPG 1, p. 154 [16/12/1402]).} The records do not describe what the Pistolesi offered in return for this grant, but one should assume that the license was part of some reciprocal arrangement.

Overall, these few exemptions do not suggest that Paolo Guinigi considered the *gabella maggiore* a ready source for personal gifts or a means to cement his influence over Lucca’s subject territories and sovereign neighbours. The Guinigi family itself headed a few of the city’s larger silk firms during his principate, yet they and their factors continued to pay the *gabella maggiore*.\footnote{The Guinigi family firm registered in 1371 had branches in Pisa, Naples, and Bruges (ASLu, Corte de’ Mercanti 82, f. 10v); in 1372, the same partners registered branches in Venice, Naples, and Bruges (Corte de’ Mercanti 83, p. 13); and in 1381, Pisa, Rome, and Bruges (Corte de’ Mercanti 84, f. 9v); by 1407, there were three separate Guinigi-led firms dealing in silk cloth, and, of course, the large Forteguerra and Rapondi concerns had by this point been driven out of Lucca (Corte de’ Mercanti 85, ff. 6r-v).} In fact, the Guinigi visited the court at the Pinelli house even more often during Paolo’s rule; the lord’s relatives disbursed 234 florins in 1401 and 1410 at the court in the Pinelli house, versus just under 329 florins in the remainder of my survey.\footnote{I.e. 234 florins in 121 payments (out of 11,775 total entries for 1401 and 1410), versus 329 florins over 195 payments before the Guinigi accession (out of 35,939 total entries before 1400) – Guinigi family members appeared roughly twice as often with Paolo Guinigi as dominus. These figures also exclude the many payments presumably made by Guinigi factors, couriers, and carters.} It may be that the Guinigi firms, particularly that of Paolo’s cousin Baldassare, performed especially well with their kinsman in charge, but it is also true that the family evidently did not exploit their advantage to seek exemption from the *gabella maggiore*.\footnote{Baldassare di Niccolò was Paolo’s first cousin; his father Francesco was Niccolò di Lazzare’s brother. Baldassare headed two firms in 1407 (Corte de’ Mercanti 85, f. 6v, 22r) and accounted for 113 out of 234 payments (out of 121 payments) at the Pinelli house.} Paolo Guinigi himself shows up in the customs records from 1410, in fact, paying for three staia of grain to be exported to Segromigno – a token appearance, to be sure, but one that symbolizes the reality that the urban elite were
perfectly willing to pay the *gabella maggiore*, which impacted them far less than direct taxation would.\(^65\)

With the few exceptions noted up to this point, everyone transporting goods within the Lucchesia between 1369 and 1410 had to pay the *gabella maggiore*. Nationality, station, and profession did not affect the application of the tax, and special personal exemptions were rare to the point of being virtually nonexistent. Nonetheless, not all of these payments came into the registers used by this study. As noted in chapter one, all tax receipts valued at more than thirty *soldi* had to be paid at the court in the Pinelli house, but travellers paying less than thirty *soldi* had the right to pay at the gates themselves. Many merchants falling into this category nonetheless travelled to the court to make their payments, but this seems unlikely to have been the norm for all taxpayers owing small amounts of money.\(^66\)

Although the city government strictly controlled the market for certain taxable consumables, like fish, individuals presumably imported small quantities of other items for their own consumption.\(^67\) For example, many basic foodstuffs that were assigned rates in the statute of 1372, such as onions, pears and apples, and chestnuts, make only rare appearances in the records.\(^68\) Each of the four city gates had a small customs post, complete with a collections chest, and I have surveyed all of the official gate-books surviving from this period, but I have found no records witnessing payments below thirty *soldi* within any of these registers.\(^69\) Quite probably, no written receipts of these were ever issued, as the staff of a gate gabelle did not include a notary authorized to draft official receipts, which were only produced at the central court at the Pinelli house. This

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\(^{65}\) ASLu, GM 45, f. 35r: *A domino Paulo pro stariis 3 grani conductis de Luca Subgromineum habuit [camerarius superscriptus] ... s 8 d 8*

\(^{66}\) As described in chapter one, a full third of the entries in my database record payments that *could* have been made at the gate gabelles (chapter one, note 46); the right to pay at the gates was paired with the right to be escorted to the *gabella maggiore* to pay there (chapter one, note 43).

\(^{67}\) The market for fish was strictly controlled, as will be discussed further in chapter five; in sum, a set of statutes from 1372 forbade the private sale of fish from any part of the Lucchesia outside the delimited zone of the urban fish market, which was located not far from the Pinelli house: ASLu, CG 3, pp. 214-5 (23/1/1372 | Thirty-Six), ratified and promulgated at ibid., pp. 216-7 (27/1/1372 | CG).

\(^{68}\) Onions appear in nine records, apples and pears in a total of sixty-one, and chestnuts, a staple in the Garfagnana region to this day, show up in only forty-three records.

\(^{69}\) The *Libri dei Portonai* exclusively contain records of shipments escorted to the court of the *gabella maggiore*. The case of Domenico Orbicciani, who was condemned for stealing from the gabelle chest at the Porta di Borgo, illustrates the layout and furnishings of these posts: see chapter one, nn. 47-8.
is precisely why the statute of 1372 forbade the gate gabelles to accept payments above thirty soldi, since neither the state nor the taxpayer would have received any written record of these transactions.\textsuperscript{70} This also explains why the right to travel to the court, regardless of the value of one’s tax, was enshrined in the statutes of the *gabella maggiore* by an amendment made in the late 1380s.\textsuperscript{71}

Setting a precise value for this invisible commerce lies outside the scope of this project, although it certainly amounted to a considerable proportion of total tax transactions. In chapter one, I presented evidence indicating that less than two-fifths of all payments made in the name of the *gabella maggiore* – and possibly much less than two fifths – were registered in the official volume produced in 1378.\textsuperscript{72} This fact is imperative for understanding the *gabella maggiore* as a political institution, or else the petty transactions at the gate gabelles therefore run the risk of being erased twice: once by the original system; a second time by this study. Throughout the remainder of this work, I will be invoking statistics related to the silk industry, the leather industry, wool and wine, but my database only contains, on the whole, the names of professional conveyers and merchants. While I can cover in detail how fiscal legislation reflected or failed to reflect these individuals’ experience at the court of the *gabella maggiore*, my discussion of how these measures affected artisans and poor Lucchesi necessarily remains conjectural. We can only address the latter through the voices of the governing class, whose members,

\textsuperscript{70} Cases of complaints against the gabelle for overcharging are not common, but the case of Giannino di Bernabo mentioned above (n. 28) suggests that some merchants did check their tax receipts thoroughly. Another wine merchant made a similar complaint in 1380: one Giovanni Bernardini called Chiappone claimed to have overpaid by a full seventeen florins for shipments of strong medicinal wine (*razese* and *vermiglio*) imported over the course of five months (CG 7, p. 259 [11/5/1380 | Thirty-Six]). The complaint does not indicate that Chiappone had a special arrangement with the Anziani as an importer, as did Giannino di Bernabo, but the Council of Thirty-Six granted him the requested restitution nonetheless. When the books were checked, however, the major official – ser Giovanni Linelli da Castiglione – noted that Chiappone had actually overestimated his refund by 3 lire, 8 soldi, and 4 denari. This case demonstrates that at least some merchants considered their receipts useful for the purpose of recordkeeping, another reason for which individuals owing less than thirty soldi may have preferred to pay at the court rather than the gates. Ser Giovanni’s response also demonstrates that officials accused of abuse could review the court’s registers in turn.

\textsuperscript{71} CG 11, p. 168: Et tales teneantur dictam gabellam solvere sive interrogentur sive non de et pro his de quibus gabella solvi deberet, nisi iam vellet duci ad maiorem gabellam, quo casu illuc ducatur et ibi solvat.

\textsuperscript{72} The general treasurer’s register from the second half of 1378 (ASLu, Camarlingo Generale 82, c.f. [7\textsuperscript{th} binding, f. 1r]) records the receipt of over 10,000 lire (of the *parva moneta*) from the gate gabelles. This is equivalent of at least 6,700 payments of thirty soldi, and presumably a great many more. Over the same period, the records of the *gabella maggiore* recorded only 4,366 payments.
even if they repeated or feigned the complaints of the poor, remained insulated from the full force of indirect taxation.

Nonetheless, as the preceding points indicate, the many small shipments cleared by the gate gabelles did not represent the bulk of merchandise entering and leaving the urban marketplace, and certainly not a significant portion of the monetary value of that trade. In the absence of exemptions or temporary cancellations, therefore, my survey should contain the vast majority of Lucca’s industrial imports and exports during the years in question: raw silk and silk cloth; unfinished skins and leather; unworked iron and the many tonnes of nails exported thence to Pisa. And, while locally-sourced consumables will appear in unusually low volumes, the records should also cover the majority of certain unusual types of consumables, particularly those imported over long distances. This includes cheese from Sicily, Corsica, and Lombardy, medicinal wine from the Cinqueterrano and the Versiglian littoral, and, of course, spices.

One additional group of shipments that should have been present in the records of the urban *gabella maggiore* remains by nature outside the purview of this study: those transported illicitly by means of smuggling. For our purposes, smuggling refers to any transmission of goods accomplished without paying the requisite tariff, whether intentional or accidental. The precise quantities of goods transported into or out of the city without payment of the tariff remain, like most aspects of the shadow economy, completely unknown to us, and it would be imprudent to estimate quantities with regards to this kind of activity. But, just as I described the kinds of items and actors whose payments fell under the thirty-*soldi* limit, I can suggest a few general features characterizing the activity of Lucca’s late-medieval smugglers. To this end, the modern archive once again preserves a useful guide in the form of the *gabella maggiore*’s legal records, which describe condemnations, absolutions, and trial procedures deriving from the actual legal court controlled by the major official. The smuggling cases from a

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73 Those 4,366 payments at the court of the *gabella maggiore* in the second half of 1378 totalled around 30,900 lire (*parva moneta*), thrice as much as was paid at the gates over the same period.

74 ASLu, GM 78-80 preserve the condemnations from 1376-1378, but their section has been badly eroded by the same damp rot that has affected other parts of the GM series. Only GM 80 has been preserved fully intact, and contains material from the second semester of 1377 and the entirety of 1378 – summaries of the charges only, without the attendant legal briefs containing the actual course of legal actions and procedures, some of which are preserved in a fragmentary state in GM 79.
single volume of these, GM 80, provide several details to illuminate this otherwise obscure corner of the Lucchese economy.

GM 80 contains the condemnations and absolutions issued by the court of the *gabella maggiore* between the beginning of July 1377 and the end of December 1378, during which period the court sat for eighteen sessions.\(^75\) Over these three semesters, the court delivered 131 judgments, 97 of which concern smuggling.\(^76\) As summarized in Figure 3.1, most of the alleged criminal activity brought before the court occurred outside the urban context in the *pievi* of the Sei Miglia and further afield in the vicariates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Item Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling</td>
<td>97, including:</td>
<td>Urban, <em>gabella maggiore</em></td>
<td>jewelry</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14, including:</td>
<td>precious metals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cloth and apparel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unworked silk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Urban, other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Condemnations by Crime, Context, and Item Type

The court only tried twenty-four cases of smuggling within the context of Lucca and the suburbs immediately outside the Porta di Borgo. Of these, ten instances

\(^75\) Over these three semesters, ser Giovanni Linelli da Castiglione was serving as a major official alongside (*una simul maiores officiales curie*; GM 80, p. 7) two different qualified judges: *dominus* Guglielmo di ser Bernardo da Castiglione Aretino for most of 1377 (ibid.); *dominus* Francesco Pietrucci da Camerino from December 1377 until the end of 1378 (ibid., p. 95). The court employed a single notary, either Niccolò de’ Berretani, Niccolò dello Strego, or Ubaldo Perfettucci, and required the presence of two witnesses. Each condemned individual, i.e. each decision, was “presented and publicized” (*positus et gridatus*) by a public crier (*preco*) at the end of each day’s hearing.

\(^76\) The remaining 34 concern usury, animal sales, and a single case brought against the administrators of one of the purchased ‘tax farms’, namely that for gambling, who were accused of erecting a tent to serve as their public office without the requisite number of entrances: GM 80, pp. 70-1 (delivered 21/10/1377).
concerned grain, wine, or animals being brought to the slaughterhouse, leaving only fourteen cases falling under the *gabella maggiore* proper.\textsuperscript{77} Although all such instances are described, formulaically, as acts undertaken “fraudulently and intentionally” (*dolose et scienter*), most of the briefs describe items that were quite small, either in size or in value, and these are mainly goods for personal use and consumption: small amounts of jewelry, cloth, and even a crossbow that presumably served as the accused’s stock-in-trade.\textsuperscript{78} It is therefore quite difficult to determine how many of these condemnations resulted from a deliberate intention to defraud the fisc or whether the reported “intention and spirit of smuggling” was in fact not present in each case.\textsuperscript{79}

In any case, in only three of these fifteen cases were the smuggled goods carefully hidden from view or otherwise transported “secretly and covertly” (*clam et obculte*). These three secreted parcels include one large packet of paper, five armlengths (*braccia*) of linen cloth carried beneath the defendant’s lap as he left the city, and twenty-two pounds of unworked silk.\textsuperscript{80} At least three other cases concern major criminal enterprises, actions that cannot be ascribed to either personal error or imagined as crimes of convenience. The first two such cases describe a joint operation undertaken by two men to import quantities of gilt and golden rings totaling 100 *lire* in value without paying the attendant tariff.\textsuperscript{81} In the third case, the condemned had to pay a stiff penalty of over five

\textsuperscript{77} These ten include two shipments of wheat flour, five of wine, and two of animals sent to the butcher; the final delict was a complicated breach of the tax on transhumant herds that occurred when a large flock of young sheep and lambs was led from Gallicano and Coreglia in the Garfagnana to Lucca without first obtaining the requisite permit from the *gabelliere* in Gallicano (GM 80, pp. 170-1). It is unclear whether this constitutes a crime against the *gabella maggiore* proper; methods for measuring and taxing transhumant herds are found in the statute of 1372 and large herds travelling between winter and summer pastures were often assessed in Lucca and not in the vicariates.

\textsuperscript{78} In the ‘crossbow case’, the accused – Giovanni Mazini da Bolano (near La Spezia) – is not specifically described as a *stipendiarius*, but his two guarantors are: Antonio di Iacopo da Barga and Domenico Torre da Montegaldella in the Vicentino are both described as *stipendiarii Lucani comuni* in the squad (*banneria*) of Silvestro da Coreglia. It seems likely that Mazini was either a member of the squad or was otherwise transporting the new crossbow from Pisa for their use, although he nonetheless had to pay the penalty.

\textsuperscript{79} Naturally, voluntary confession was also a regular part of this procedure – eleven out of fourteen condemnations describe a penalty mitigated by confession, and two of the remaining three briefs describe defendants who were contumacious and therefore could not have appeared to fulfill this standard part of the legal process.

\textsuperscript{80} ASLu, GM 80, pp. 50-1 (28/9/1377); ibid. p. 147 (4/9/1378); ibid. pp. 177-8 (16/12/1378).

\textsuperscript{81} The two condemnations for shipping rings were connected, since the condemned in the first case, Bartolomeo di Puccio da Pistoia, was found guilty both of importing a single shipment of rings valued at 58 *lire* into Lucca and also of bringing a second shipment of rings, worth 21 *lire*, into the city suburbs; the
lire for smuggling a kilogram of some form of gold bullion out of the city towards Pisa.\footnote{The “four libbre, three ounces of gold”, it is impossible to determine the value of the gold that the defendant, Stefano di Gherardo da Bologna, had tried to export to Pisa without knowing its exact fineness (GM 80, pp. 24-5); his penalty, set at five lire ten soldi after the mitigating confession, was about four times as much as that in the crossbow case (one lira ten soldi), in which the crossbow was valued at four lire ten soldi in Pisan money (ibid., p. 28).}

Note also that, in any condemnation concerning fraudulent exportation, the smuggled items and any animals used to transport them would be forfeited to the state and then sold at auction; the fine was often much less severe than the cost of this confiscation.\footnote{The penalties applied under the urban gabella maggiore are described in detail in the statute of the gabella maggiore in 1372 (GM 1, f. 45r). The fine for goods smuggled into the city, suburbs, or Sei Miglia was twelve times the normal tariff for those goods, i.e. one soldo for each denaro of gabelle, but anyone sending goods out of Lucchese territory or through its territory without declaring them at the city would lose both the items and, if their value exceeded three lire, the beast upon which they were transported. This is what happened in the case of Andrea di Giuntino da Buggiano, who lost both his pancerone and the ass upon which he was transporting it (GM 80, p. 78; see also Table 3.2 below). Beyond these penalties, the major official could assign a further penalty of up to twenty-five lire, which, as Table 3.2 shows, was only employed in our fourteen cases when the defendant did not appear to answer the charges or was otherwise contumacious. In the vicariates, which, as described in chapter two, were covered under a separate section of the statute of 1372, the penalties were modulated depending on the distance travelled by a transporter without a license (apodixa) before he was caught, i.e. within a ‘mile’ (miliare) of the starting point or further than a mile (GM 1, ff. 61r-v). The vicariates’ statutes otherwise employ the same penalties and bounties that were used in the city; as noted above, all rural offenses were tried by the court of the gabella maggiore in Lucca itself.}

Regardless of the spirit behind these acts of smuggling, none of them concerned enormous tariff payments. The most valuable item on the list is certainly the twenty-two pounds of unworked silk smuggled into the city by Piero Rossiglioni \textit{de Valentia Raone} (i.e., Aragonese Valencia), which would have entailed a payment of about a florin had it been properly registered at the court of the \textit{gabella maggiore}.\footnote{According to the statute of 1372, each libbra of raw silk cost three soldi, six denari on entry (GM 1, f. 4r), meaning that the tax would have been three lire, seventeen soldi total in the court’s money of account, measured at three lire, ten soldi to the florin.} The only other item to come close would have been the two shipments of silver and gold coins fraudulently imported by Bartolomeo di Puccio da Pistoia, altogether estimated at 79 lire in value and owing around one lira at the court of the \textit{gabella maggiore}.\footnote{GM 80, p. 87 (24/12/1377).} The remaining 12 shipments would have cost between ten denari and fourteen soldi to legally admit to the city.
Table 3.2: Smuggled Items, Penalties, and the Ratio between Tariffs and Fines, 1377-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Tariff (soldi)</th>
<th>Fine (soldi)</th>
<th>Ratio T:Fine</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pp. 24-25</td>
<td>1 centonaio of gold weighing 4.25 libbre</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>N/A87</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>crossbow worth 4 lire s10</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1:8.5</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-45</td>
<td>comb pro tessendo</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>(1.5)88</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1:40</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>silver belt, rosaries of amber worth 10 florins</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1:64</td>
<td>Contum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-51</td>
<td>paper worth 4 florins</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1:17</td>
<td>Contum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>5 pounds of domestic linen cloth</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1:5.6</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 panzerone and an ass</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>(&gt;6.5)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>(1:&lt;26)90</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>6 armlengths Pisan cloth</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>rings worth 79 lire in 2 shipments</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>1:20.6</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>rings worth 21 lire</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>152.5</td>
<td>1:30.5</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>linen cloth worth £3 5 armlengths</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1:8.8</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>4 armlengths bigio cloth and 1 small interula</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1:2</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177-78</td>
<td>22 pounds of raw silk</td>
<td>import</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1:7.9</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>1 purse, silver-seqinned hat, frigia, two linen veils</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>N/A91</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Mitig.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86 I.e., whether the fine was mitigated by a confession (mitigate – mitig.) or the condemned was described as not attending court to address the charges – contumacious (contumax – contum.).

87 As stated above, the value of this gold is impossible to determine without some sense of its fineness. When it did not mean ‘one hundred libbre’, as it certainly does not here, the centonaio was a unit of measurement typically used for gold and silver thread. See Bongi, Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca, vol. 2: 69.

88 The statute of 1372 charged a tax of six denari per lire of value for industrial combs (pettines: GM 1, f. 12v), but prices for such combs are difficult to determine; the registers of the gabelle maggiore provide examples of combs worth 95 soldi (GM 35, p. 191 [25/7/1397]), 20 soldi (GM 17, f. 77v [21/3/1378]), 70 soldi (GM 18, f. 67v [16/8/1378]), or even 300 soldi (GM 45, f. 154v [22/10/1410]). If one assumes some median price of three lire, which seems high, the unpaid tariff would have been 1.5 soldi for the comb in question.

89 According to a tax receipt from December 1410, when the city was charging an extra tax of three percent by value on all goods imported from Pisa, 350 libbre of paper was worth 24 florins; estimated by that price, this smuggled load consisted of around 50-60 libbre of paper, entailing a tax of ca. seven soldi at the gabelle.

90 It isn’t clear what the gabelle owed for the ass was, which was presumably a factor in this unusually large fine. The tax rate for beasts of burden exported from the Lucchesia was eight denari per lira of value. If we take the total reported value of the panzerone and ass at auction – eight lire five soldi – and note that the buyer was willing to “offer more” (plus offerenti) in the case of both items, we arrive at the conclusion that the requisite gabelle of 6.5 soldi (eight denari per lira of value, resulting in a tariff to fine ratio of 1:26) is almost certainly a low estimate; the condemned man, Andrea di Giuntino, had presumably owed a larger tariff, hence the size of his fine despite its being mitigata.

91 The value of these luxury goods, which is not laid out in the brief, is more or less impossible to determine.
The penalties assigned in these cases depended partially on the table of fines established by the statute of 1372 and partially on the major official’s interpretation of the “quality and status” of the condemned man. The condemnations often describe a fine “mitigated” (mitigata) by a spontaneous confession, which seems to have affected the severity of the ultimate penalty more than the extent of the initial crime. In almost every case in which the defendant admitted to defrauding the gabelle, the penalty never exceeded 1,000 percent of the unpaid tariff. The two exceptions to this trend occur in the cases describing the ‘golden ring’ smugglers, who may have merited a greater penalty precisely because of their collusion and concerted effort to violate the law. Similarly, each condemnation that calls out the defendant’s contumacious behavior also prescribes a proportionally exorbitant fine.

While the extent of smuggling in Lucca around the turn of the fifteenth century remains unclear, the sample condemnations from 1377-8 indicate that most delinquent shipments consisted of small quantities of goods entailing minor tariffs. In other words, smuggling during this period should not have obscured a different part of the economy than that segment already hidden by the absence of records from the gate gabelles. Because accusers were incentivized by a proportion of the total penalty exacted by the court of the gabella maggiore, one assumes that larger shipments would have been even more attractive for the customs house aides and private citizens who sought such bounties. That such large shipments do not appear does not prove that no major commercial and industrial smuggling took place, but it does seem unlikely, particularly when one considers the aforementioned willingness of the merchant elite to pay the gabella maggiore.

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92 GM 1, f. 45r; see chapter three, note 78 above.
93 Oddly enough, the silk-smuggler Piero Rossigliioni paid a proportionally low fine despite the pejorative description of his crime (clam et occulte); this may indicate that, despite wording that clearly suggests an intent to defraud the gabelle, it was accepted that Rossigliioni had made an error. As we shall see, there had been an exemption for several varieties of unworked silk at the gabella maggiore since the middle of 1373 (ASLu, CG 4, p. 59 [25/5/1373 | CG]).
94 The condemnations deriving from smuggling in the vicariates and Sei Miglia also tend towards small quantities and values; the main exception appears to be unlicensed transhumance, which did lead to the confiscation of several large herds – between thirty and over two hundred head of sheep – over the period: GM 80, pp. 53-4, 121-3, 170-1.
95 Despite the small sample size of our urban smuggling set, and despite the fact that most small transactions were never registered, it may be notable that only two individuals condemned in 1377-78
The condemnations from GM 80, particularly when the entire set of 97 smuggling charges throughout the Lucchesia are considered, argue for the existence of a shadow-market that remained intractable to the urban government despite its pretensions of control. And, ultimately, we should not be surprised to find holes in the administrative practices of the *gabella maggiore*. Below the terse confidence characteristic of the wording of Lucca’s legislative measures, we can imagine the difficulty of subjecting an indifferent populace to invasive fiscal registration: taxes on selling produce to your neighbor, taxes on butchering a lamb born in your own fold, taxes on bringing home an armful of linen cloth to make your children’s undershirts. The effort put into controlling roadways and limiting access, such as to the coastal route between Pietrasanta and Pisa – supposedly plagued with bandits but certainly a convenient spot for clandestine transport – could not have been sufficient for managing such a large and mountainous *contado*. Simply put, the city’s agents could not be everywhere. Counterbalancing this freedom from detection was the random and heavy imposition of state power directed by means of third-party denunciation. The potential for a grievous fine had to feature into the cost-benefit analysis made by someone aspiring to evade the tariff.

In sum, both smuggling and the practices of the gate gabelles led to the erasure of small-scale trade from Lucca’s otherwise comprehensive record of commercial activity. In this study, as I noted above, I do not have sufficient evidence to assign precise limits or ascribe specific features to this hidden market, but its general character is indicated by what is missing from the records of the *gabella maggiore*. It encompassed most low-value trade between the city and its immediate hinterland, particularly consumables such

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96 See, for example, the challenges faced by Pistoia in wrangling its similar, mountainous *contado*: Francesconi, *Districtus civitatis Pistorii. Strutture e trasformazioni del potere in un contado toscano (secoli XI-XIV)*, 92–101. Melis found that very few losses in the Datini records occurred due to issues with overland transport: Melis, *Industria e commercio nella toscana medievale*, 56.

97 In the end, though, grievous loss was not what the system intended. In January 1378, the General Council debated a measure presented by Benvenuto Coscini da Maggiano, condemned for smuggling oranges in October 1377, and a few other rather more legitimate merchants (CG 6, pp. 489-90 [23/1/1378]; a copy was transcribed by a contemporary hand into GM 80, f. 2v). They claimed that quite a few men, both citizens and *contadini*, had been made outlaws for “little reason” (*ex parva causa*), namely because they had violated the gabelles. The councilors are begged to allow the condemned to pay some fraction of their fine: this would not only be for the “evident good and usefulness of the city” (*pro bono evident et utile lucani communis*), but also result in a windfall for the commune, which will otherwise lose the money as the men flee. The council quickly accepted the motion.
as oil, vegetables, and small quantities of preserved meat and fish. This is one reason why most basic foods present in the tariff rate lists from 1372 appear only rarely in the registers produced by the tariff administration.

Beyond food, it is possible that modest Lucchesi purchased cloth and minor household goods in the Sei Miglia and the nearer vicariates, either casually during transit or on a trip for that express purpose. The towns of Boveglio and Villabasilica in the Valdriana produced large quantities of a coarse wool cloth generically called arbagiano or albasiano, which did not cost much to import. Out of 438 imported lots containing this fabric, 295 (67 percent) entailed a tax less than thirty soldi (parva moneta), which suggests that many more importers of arbagian cloth could have paid at the gate gabelles. Intriguingly, the gabella maggiore records contain just fewer than fifty shipments for which the importer explicitly paid “for the cost of manufacture” (pro manufactura, de manufactura, soluit manufacturam, etc.) in the place of processing, which suggests a consignment industry.

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98 Transactions for fresh meat were taxed under the Macello, while the fish market at the Augusta presumably encompassed most of the fresh fish consumed in the city. The sale of fresh fish at the littoral or the lakes at Massaciucoli and Sesto for personal consumption by Lucchese citizens would seem to be illegal according to a statute issued by the Council of Thirty-Six in 1372, which was never repealed during our period: “all fishermen of the entire Lucchese contado and district, wherever they may reside, are bound to bring or send all fish that they will have fished and will take from any bodies of water into the city of Lucca, and they should only sell them in the Piazza San Piero in Cortina and nowhere else...” (Quod omnes piscatores totius comitatus et districtus lucani undecumque sint Teneantur et debeant omnes pisces quos piscati fuerint et habebunt de aquis quibuscumque reducere seu miscere in Civitatem lucanum et ipso vendere solum in platea Sancti Petri in Cortina et non alibi sub pena in statuto lucani fundaci contenta: CG 3, pp. 214-5 [23/1/1372 | 36]).

99 The other reason is that bulk importers of fruits and vegetables paid separate fees, as evinced by a set of prescriptions from the statute of 1372 (GM 1, f. 34r-v). Evidently, a separate tax farm existed for professional fruit and vegetable sellers, the proventus pizicuolorum seu triccolorum, whose private administrators – the farm was auctioned off like many other proventi – collected two soldi per cart (currus), six denari per load (salma), or three denari per handcart or parcel (cofinum vel iustra) entering the city. Those selling specifically on the steps of San Michele in Foro owed a separate fee to the church fabric (...predicta... non referantur vel intelligantur... ad eos vendentes super gradibus ecclesie sancti michaelis in foro, cum solvant opere dicte ecclesie). Ultimately, the only group who actually would have paid the gabella maggiore for such items were “individuals arriving with produce in a casual manner” (...predicta...non referantur... ad personas venientes interpollatim cum fructibus...), i.e. for their own consumption, and, as the gap in the records demonstrates, very few of these travelled with enough produce to warrant paying at the Pinelli house.

100 The size of, and therefore taxes levied on, these ‘consignment’ shipments reflects the general trend for coarse wool cloth: 34 of the 49 entries (69 percent) containing the special “manufacture” clause owed less than thirty soldi (parva moneta) in tariff.
What we have, then, are records that do not document, category by category, the entirety of trade in the late fourteenth-century Lucchesia. The *gabella maggiore* was not designed to tax most major agricultural activities, such as viticulture and cereal production, and certain industrial exports, like most kinds of finished leather goods. Such items were either handled by another appendage of the fisc, such as the special offices for wine and grain, or completely free of extra duties, as in the case of most exported worked leather. Beyond this, a considerable portion of all taxes paid to the *gabella maggiore*, perhaps around a quarter based on the treasurer’s sums from 1373, were paid at the gates, and the contents of these shipments were not recorded; moreover, the sum from 1373 actually represents more shipments than those registered at the court in that year. The entries employed in this study may reflect significantly less than half the total customs transactions during the period in question.

The registers do, however, provide an abundant resource for studying most types of international commodities, including luxury silks, spices and dyes, and wool cloth, all of which were too expensive to be relegated to the gate gabelles. What is more, Lucchesi consumed large quantities of foodstuffs imported in bulk from overseas, such as salt fish, meat, and cheese from Sicily, Corsica, and Lombardy. On the regional level, the records can provide a new perspective on the economic relationship between Lucca, Pisa, and Florence, whose interdependence is laid bare by the back-and-forth of swords, cloth, and lumber. Also, all payments of the passage fee had to be registered with the court of the *gabella maggiore*, so our records serve as a complete image of Lucca’s position.

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101 The category for leather goods in 1372 contains “leather bags, gloves, and belts” (*bursarum, guantorum, cinturarum de corio*: GM 1, f. 6r), but shoes and boots appear nowhere in the document. Without a doubt, the city had a thriving leather industry, as attested by, for example, the twenty-three *calzolarii* registered as heads of household in each of the armsbearer censuses taken in the early 1370s (ASLu, Biblioteca Manoscritti 176, 176bis). However, throughout the entirety of my survey, only sixty-five shipments containing shoes (*calse, alute*, etc.), slippers (*planule, pianelle*), and boots (*calige*) were exported from the city, which suggests that any significant industrial activity in the leather sector was not taxed on export.

102 The data for this projection comes from the second half of 1378, for which we have both the records of the *gabella maggiore* and the official receipts of the general treasurer. In 1378, the sum received by the officers of the *gabella maggiore* at the gates, which is explicitly separate from the gabelles on wine, grain, and butchery (also collected at the gates), indicates a minimum of 6,500 shipments paying thirty *soldi* apiece, whereas the *gabella maggiore* records for that semester contain only 4,570 shipments: see nn. 71-72 above.

103 The relationship between Lucca and Sicily had been forged in the late Norman period; in exchange for Lucchese cloth, the kingdom of Sicily offered, besides cheese and fish, access to sources of gold in that early period: see Abulafia, *Two Italies*, 260–61.
within an interregional commercial network. And, while the court of the *gabella maggiore* may not have captured all trade between Lucca and its hinterland, what remains available to us does clarify the extent of commercial and industrial integration within the Lucchesia, especially with regard to the thriving leather industry. Finally, because of what they do contain, and despite what they do not, these customs registers still serve as useful context for the tariff legislation produced by the governing class in Lucca between 1370 and 1410.

### 3.2 Analysis of the Sample, 1373-1410

As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, some of the entries in the registers used for this study concern transactions other than tariff payments, but they represent a small minority. The vast majority of licenses registered at the court of the *gabella maggiore* described the movement of goods from place to place, such that each record or entry can also be described as a shipment and its contents assessed as a shipping manifest. From the perspective of the notaries and assessors who levied the tax and issued receipts, each entry had four interdependent parts: the name of the taxpayer and, rarely, whom he paid for; the contents of the shipment; its origin and destination; and the value of the tax paid. Combined, these items circumscribe the transaction as a legal event, both a record of payment and a brief of the contract between the taxpayer and the court that licensed the former to complete his or her itinerary without further harassment. The contract itself, the physical license (*apodixa*) issued to the taxpayer at the court, contained a further point of

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104 The statute of 1372 outlines that those paying *pedaggium* had to leave their goods in the *gabella*, i.e. the Pinelli courtyard rather than the gate gabelles, until such time as they left the city: GM 1, f. 46v.

105 Only 757 out of 47,705 entries concern livestock sales, the butchering of animals, and miscellaneous licenses and condemnations. Inclusion of payments related to condemnations, like those from GM 80 discussed above, resulted from the fact that those guilty of defrauding or otherwise violating the statute of the *gabella maggiore* occasionally made their payments at the Pinelli house and were issued a receipt by the notaries on hand. However, these may have been a separate category of delict than that explicitly registered in the court briefs, since none of the payments described in GM 80 are registered in the contemporary records from 1378.

106 Although I will use these three terms – shipment, record, and entry – more or less interchangeably below, it is worth noting again that the identification of an entry with a discrete commercial venture is not justified by the source. Rather, certain shipments were bundles of different merchants’ wares; other entries may only represent part of what a merchant had committed to different conveyors. But for the purposes of the *gabella maggiore*, as for ours, each entry described and circumscribed a collection of goods as a single item.
data, the date of the transaction, which was elided in the registered entries but was indicated in a header at the beginning of each new day.\footnote{For a longer discussion of the form of the \textit{apodixe}/\textit{apodisse} as opposed to the entries used in this study, see chapter one.}

Only a very small number of entries in the registers are missing the vital details: the taxpayer’s name, the shipment’s contents, and the tax paid at the court.\footnote{A few defective entries do exist: see, for example, GM 17, f. 101v (no tax payment).} But many do not specify an origin or destination for the shipment in question, a statistic that, unlike the date of payment, cannot be supplied from the context of the registers. It seems highly unlikely that court officials did not collect this information, at the very least on all outgoing shipments. Since licenses issued by the court served as their safe-conduct through Lucca and its territory, taxpayers had an incentive to register their complete itineraries; the court administration, in turn, issued detailed licenses to ensure that shipments did not divert from their authorized – and purchased – course. But our registers served as the account books of the \textit{gabella maggiore}, a guarantee for the court treasurer, and therefore only had to contain information relevant to the payments themselves.\footnote{To be sure, the notaries’ individual dispositions must have been an important factor vis-à-vis omissions, but the fact that some were able to leave out such information as a matter of course, like ser Opizo Dombellinghi did with export itineraries in his sloppy entries from 1373 (e.g. GM 14, f. 1v, etc.), suggests that the information was not considered vital by the treasurer or the major official.} For most of our sample, an imported shipment arriving from outside the Lucchesia entailed the same tax regardless of origin, so it was unnecessary to include this information in the registers; as a result, nearly 75 percent of imported shipments in my sample do not list the city or region of origin.\footnote{19,239 out of 24,929 entries describing importation to Lucca.} But, presumably because the destination of outgoing merchants was of greater interest to the administration tasked with controlling their transit, very few export manifests, only 3.5 percent, are missing the final destination of the goods in question.\footnote{256 out of 6,243 shipments exported from Lucca alone (rather than from its subject territory via the city), are missing the destination. However, just as a significant number of importations are described without the location of origin, over 15 percent of exported shipments (963 out of 6,243) omit the origin, which demonstrates the notaries’ rational tendency towards eliding irrelevant or obvious information.}

In general, the officiating notary’s laziness – for lack of a better word – seems to have been an important factor in the quality of records produced from year to year. Besides origins and destinations, cursory or imprecise entries also obscure the contents of
some shipments. This is a particular problem when we look at goods passing through the Lucchesia and paying the pedaggium, since the notary had no specific reason to record any of the shipment contents besides silk, for which a separate type of pedaggium was prescribed.\textsuperscript{112}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unspecified (Percentage)</th>
<th>Specified (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>168 (32.6%)</td>
<td>347 (67.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>640 (82.3%)</td>
<td>137 (17.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>100 (21.5%)</td>
<td>364 (78.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>74 (8.5%)</td>
<td>802 (91.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>496 (57.3%)</td>
<td>369 (42.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>39 (5.1%)</td>
<td>720 (94.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>153 (18.8%)</td>
<td>659 (81.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>92 (14.4%)</td>
<td>545 (85.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Unspecified Contents for Passage Shipments, by year

In some years, of which 1378 is the most striking example, the notaries on duty did not register the contents of most shipments passing through the Lucchesia, stating only the number of loads, or sometimes generally describing them as loads “of merchandise”\textsuperscript{113}. However, in others cases, particularly in 1387, they included the information despite the fact that it did not affect the recorded tax payment in the slightest.\textsuperscript{114} In the absence of any prescribed methodology for recording these payments, it seems that individual

\textsuperscript{112} The special economic committee appointed in 1369 to deal with the immediate consequences of emancipation from Pisan control established a special passage-fee for silk cloth at the same time as they drafted the initial rules of the general pedaggium (AaTdl 45, p. 43 [24/6/1369 | Sp], changed into a graded fee by-weight rather than by-load at CG 1, p. 96 [20/9/1369 | Sp]).

\textsuperscript{113} E.g. GM 13, f. 50v (23/2/1373): “From Arrigo di Filippo from Pescia for passage of four loads of merchandise on large pack animals that were transported from Pisa...” (ab Arrigho filippi de piscia pro pedaggio salmarum quatuor mercadantie conductarum de pisis super bestias grossis...). Here, too, note that the notary did not record the destination of the shipment in question, which, of course, would not have affected the recorded tax payment.

\textsuperscript{114} E.g. GM 30, f. 11v (15/1/1392): “From Nanne Picchini for passage of four loads of large pack animals, which contain tallow, cheese, cloths, and other things, brought from Pisa and directed towards Pistoia...” (a Nanne pichini pro passagio salmarum quatuor ad bestias grossas super quibus est sepum caseum panni et cetera conductis de pisis versus pistorium...).
notaries could indulge their own idiosyncrasies. Some aimed for a level of completeness that was entirely unnecessary for the task but perfect for my purposes; other notaries, free of any such compulsion, did the bare minimum of what was required.

This free-for-all may have ended with the turn of the fifteenth century, after which incomplete entries become more rare. Although I found no decree or new statute that prescribes such a change, it seems that the court’s practices became more regular and more thoroughly descriptive after the accession of Paolo Guinigi. For example, the percentage of unknown origins for imported shipments falls through the floor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unknown (Percentage)</th>
<th>Known (Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>4006 (98.1%)</td>
<td>77 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>3808 (97.4%)</td>
<td>103 (2.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>1807 (98.1%)</td>
<td>35 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>4162 (98.9%)</td>
<td>46 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>3064 (97.8%)</td>
<td>70 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>1750 (98.1%)</td>
<td>34 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>752 (27.3%)</td>
<td>2000 (72.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>30 (0.8%)</td>
<td>3613 (99.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Origins for Imported Shipments, by Year

It is possible that this new order originated with the notaries in office; of the six different notaries men working in the court in 1401 and 1410, only one, Aldibrando Luporini, had also served in office during one of the sample years below. In any case, as noted in chapter one, the office of gabelle notary rotated through a small group of men after 1400, especially when the office became combined with that of the notary of the tax farms (proventus) after 1403. Within such a small professional group, it would have been easier to refine the record-keeping system to reduce sloppiness and increase efficiency; the handwriting, too, is markedly better in 1401 and 1410 than in previous years.

As a consequence of this unevenness, it is difficult to describe the origin of many Lucchese consumables before 1400 except by analogy to the situation after the turn of the century. We shall see, however, that Lucca’s trade relations changed year-to-year in
response to political circumstance, so we can only aim at a few general conclusions about the source of goods on the Lucchese marketplace during the last quarter of the fourteenth century. It is also impossible to determine whether the origins and destinations listed in the records of the *gabella maggiore* always describe the ultimate goal as opposed to the nearest foreign stop along each shipment’s itinerary. Pisa, for example, received just under half of all shipments exported from Lucca during my sample, but some of these items may have been destined for other places via the Porto Pisano rather than the Pisan marketplace.\(^{115}\) Within the confines erected by incomplete records, however, it nonetheless remains possible to identify Lucca’s more important trading partners and generally characterize the city’s commercial relationship with its subject communities.

An aggregate analysis of Lucca’s economic situation relies on the five data points outlined above, of which two points lend themselves to categorization: directionality and shipment contents.\(^{116}\) With regards to directionality, namely the trajectory of the shipment listed in each entry, I have divided the records in my sample between six activity types – or behaviors– of which two types, import and export, contain two subcategories:

\(^{115}\) 4,567 out of 9,899 shipments exported from Lucca and its territory were destined to Pisa. The Pisan shipyards did exert a considerable demand on Lucchese wood and iron over the period, as will be discussed below.

\(^{116}\) Beyond these, tax values are useful as an alternate mode of tallying entries besides simple count, while entry dates allow me to project the summary statistics through time. With regards to taxpayers’ names, however, it is not within the reach of this study to track the economic activity of each merchant or even each family through time. Considering the issues with representation outlined above, particularly the problem of identifying the taxpayer with the proprietary merchant, it would be tendentious to treat these records as an accurate resource for individual, rather than collective, economic behavior. Nonetheless, I will present brief dossiers based on gabelle payments for individual merchant-politicians in chapter four, but this certainly falls short of a complete *oikono*-graphy of the city’s leading politicians.
Table 3.5: Overview of the Sample, Entries Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total Entries</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import to Lucca</td>
<td>25,357</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import to Territory</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export from Lucca</td>
<td>6,465</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export from Territory</td>
<td>3,434</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject-Subject</td>
<td>4,092</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage</td>
<td>5,705</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transhumance</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47,705</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first category contains goods imported either into the city or into its territory after being registered in the city. Import to Territory could also be described as ‘Double’ Import, since the shipment entailed a double tax for entry and exit.  

The second category denotes exports divided along the same lines. In the third category, Subject-Subject, I have isolated all shipments passing from one part of Lucca’s territory to another. Passage indicates shipments that entailed the passage-toll (passagium/pedaggium/pedaggio), which therefore originated outside Lucca’s territory and ultimately headed to a destination other than the Lucchesia. Transhumance refers to entries describing payments for transhumant herds, whose shepherds often set up outside the Porta San Donato to acquire the licenses necessary to move their flocks back and forth between summer and winter pasturage. This small but important category contains flocks entering from outside Lucchese territory, leaving Lucchese territory, and...
every other permutation represented by the other categories. Nonetheless, I have grouped all such entries under this separate category because of the unique nature of the trade, which did not entail a commercial exchange.

Table 3.5 above contains the entire sample as divided between these eight categories. A majority of entries describe acts of importation, while roughly ten thousand entries concern exportation from either the city or its territory. Passage fees, subject-subject shipments, and transhumance are comparatively minor but important categories of trade. Note within exports and imports, however, that the import and export to territory categories do not include the trade between Lucca and its hinterland. Besides those entries listed under the ‘Import to Territory’ category, the contado also drew around 1,200 shipments from Lucca itself, and the city in turn imported nearly 1,600 shipments from its territory. In sum, then, the Lucchesia imported at least 2,000 or so shipments through or from Lucca, and it produced nearly over 5,000 shipments of goods for export. The relatively low rate of importation most likely reflects three interdependent factors: first, the hinterland’s relative poverty meant that its denizens consumed fewer luxuries than the center per capita; second, small shipments of food and textiles would have fallen below the thirty-soldi limit, and these taxes may have been more frequently paid at the city gates. Finally, most of the vicariates, which had their own customs posts, were geographically situated on the periphery, such that they could have imported goods from outside the territory without passing through Lucca itself; this would have been the norm for the northern reaches of the Lucchesia. The consequences of this fragmented network, particular insofar as it affected the market for wine and oil as commercial products, will be discussed briefly at the end of this chapter.

119 For example, on the same day, 8 January 1392, one Bartolomeo di Leonardo Tugli da Castelnuovo di Garfagnana paid for 42 fattened pigs travelling from ‘Lombardy’ to Pisa, and a Michele di ser Giovanni da Tereglio paid for 47 ‘small animals’ (bestie minute, i.e. sheep and goats) shepherded from Brancoli to Tereglio, both in the Lucchesia (GM 30, f. 5v). While the former describes passage from one place outside the Lucchesia to another, and the latter entry describes transport from one subject commune to another, both will be described as ‘Transhumance’ in my statistics below.

120 The final category, “Other”, contains incomplete entries and those which did not belong to the gabella maggiore proper, like the five hundred entries for livestock sales in 1392, which were mentioned above. For the sake of simplicity, these will not be included in the figures below.

121 In my sample, the city directly exported 1,052 shipments into the vicariates and 185 shipments into the Sei Miglia. Lucca also imported 699 shipments from the Sei Miglia and 929 shipments from the vicariates, although again the vast majority of entries for imports do not contain specific origins.
A somewhat different distribution results if, instead of counting entries that describe importation, exportation, etc., we observe the tax payments made in each category. Note that even if one assumes that specific rates for items – ten denari per sword, for example – represent a different valuation than the catch-all tariff of eight denari per lira (3.3 percent by value), these statistics give a general sense of the value of goods listed in the entries in my sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Tax per Category, Florins</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Tax</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Shipments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import to Lucca</td>
<td>32,772.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import to Territory</td>
<td>782.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export from Lucca</td>
<td>15,126.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export from Territory</td>
<td>5,647.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject-Subject</td>
<td>990.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage</td>
<td>3945.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transhumance</td>
<td>6,131.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>663.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66,060.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Overview of the Sample, Tax Value

A few of the features on the table above help elucidate certain aspects of the Lucchese economy as a whole. Shipments exported from both Lucca and the contado entailed a higher tax on average than those imported to Lucca. By and large, this is not because the quantities within each entry varied extensively between imports and exports. Instead, exports as a category garnered so much more for the fisc because the Lucchese silk industry produced valuable luxury silks, ‘drapery’ (drappi) composed of thickly-woven and embroidered silk, a trade which I will discuss in depth in chapter four.

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122 Based on these figures, a shipment exported from Lucca paid an average tax of 2.34 florins, whereas one imported to Lucca owed only 1.29 on average.
123 To explain further, the percentage of entries entailing less than half a florin in tax is similar between the Import (direct to Lucca and to the countryside) and Export (from Lucca and from its territory) categories: 45.6 percent (11,954 out of 26,228) of import records record such small payments, compared to 40 percent
Trade within the Lucchesia produced far less revenue for the fisc per shipment than either imports or exports, which reflects the fact that manifests in this category frequently list no more than a few libbre of oil or small quantities of local wine. Receipts from shipments passing through the territory follow a similar trend, albeit for dissimilar reasons. As I discussed in chapter two, the pedaggium was designed specifically to encourage the use of Lucca as a transit zone, a means of attracting visitors to the city’s markets. By design, then, it amounted to a relatively small revenue stream. In fact, the graded fee for silk manufactures passing through the Luchesia is main reason that the Passage category produced as much revenue as it did.\(^{124}\)

Several permutations of these tally- and value-based statistics allow us to step beyond summary and approach a more nuanced depiction of Lucchese commercial life. The date field permits a diachronic projection of importation, exportation, and other activities over the course of years, months, or even weeks and days. This is a more useful angle than the preceding tables for our ultimate purpose of determining the context for specific decisions occurring during our forty-year survey period. Second, the shipping manifests present in each entry allow us, albeit with some difficulty, to count the instances and even volumes – weight, tally, and value – of particular commercial goods and chart these over time and within the behaviors of importation, exportation, and passage. Here, I will be performing such a division on the basis of the categories present in the statutes of the gabella maggiore, such as the category for Silks (de seta), rather than presenting tallies of specific items, such as silk cloth (e.g., manufactura sete).

By segmenting the data temporally and generically, we can get as close to a complete picture of the Lucchese economy as possible. In the remainder of this chapter, I will first present the annual breakdown of shipments and gabelle revenue between our different behaviors for each year in our sample. Next, I will turn to the month-by-month

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(3,961 out of 9,899) of exported shipments. But the tariff on the largest shipments, both imports and exports, amounted to a more serious source of revenue for the state than the myriad of petty licenses drafted at the Pinelli house. If one looks at those shipments entailing a payment of more than five florins, the 1,240 import shipments (4.7 percent of the total) were taxed to the sum of 11,973.5 florins (35.7 percent of the total tax paid in that category), and the 953 (9.6 percent of total count) export shipments in that range paid a total of 12,112.6 florins, fully 58.3 percent of the total taxes paid for all exported goods in my sample.\(^{124}\) The 600 entries recording passage-fees for silk cloth, although they represent less than a tenth of all shipments in this category, entailed a total tax of 1,167 florins, i.e. nearly 30 percent of all pedaggium.
account of these figures and discuss whether recognizable commercial patterns emerge from the data. Finally, I will present the annual instances of different categories of goods as divided between behaviors. With these more comprehensive images of the Lucchese economy in mind, we can then proceed to the fine-grained analysis of specific industries and related tax legislation in the final chapter of this study.

The following figures contain the data from Tables 3.5 and 3.6 above, divided between the eight years of my sample. Although I will later refer to the specific sums and percentages found in the appendix to this chapter, these are the convenient visual means to highlight the distinctions between each year.

![Figure 3.1: Annual Total of Entries by Activity, Stacked Count](image)

Here, for example, we can clearly see that the total volume of trade in certain years lagged behind the average. In particular, the whole of 1397 features even fewer recorded transactions than our single semester of 1385. The figure also demonstrates the general fact that the kinds of activity seen at the court of the *gabella maggiore*, namely long-distance trade and the more valuable sorts of local commerce, ebbed slightly over the course of our period. From the high points in the 1370s and 80s, traffic subsided in 1392

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125 See Appendix 2, Tables 3X.1, 3X.3
and especially in 1397. The recovery under the first years of Paolo Guinigi’s regime was only partial, as the following chart shows in greater depth.

![Annual Total Tax Revenue by Activity, Stacked Florins](image)

This figure clarifies the trend indicated by the gradual decline in entries per behavioral category. Certainly, starting in 1392, and especially during the war year of 1397, the Lucchese seems to have consumed fewer imported goods than in the preceding years. But a more pressing issue in the late 1390s and early 1400s was that the taxable value of Lucchese exports decreased at an even faster rate than the number of outgoing shipments. By 1410, the value of exported commodities as a category of gabelle receipts began to approach the level of 1373, a year in which the toll on all outgoing shipments was abolished from February onwards. An absolute decline in silk cloth production, which

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126 See Appendix 2, Tables 3X.2, 3X.4
127 This decision, which we will discuss more fully in the introduction to chapter four, was described as a “lightening of the gabelles and revenue streams that had been increased for the satisfaction of debts to Florence and the Marquis of Ferrara,” and it specifically consisted of a suspension of all export tariffs besides that on unworked iron; in the interim, a balia committee of eighteen had the chance to modify the gabelles, presumably to lower them, but no widescale changes to the statutes of 1372 occurred before the decree expired at the end of 1373. CG 3, p. 480ff. (7/1/1373 | CG): Cum pro elevatione augmentorum gabellarum et introituum alias additorum pro satisfactione debitorum comunis Florentie et domini marchionis Ferrarie,... de rebus quibuscumque extrahendis de civitate lucana in exitu nulla solvatur gabella preterquam de ferro non laborato que remanecat ut nunc est. Item quod eligantur sex cives pro quolibet terzerio per dominos antianios boni et amatores boni status inter quos sive de qualibet facultate
accounted for a large portion of customs revenues on its own, may be one cause of this phenomenon. Over the same period, the value of for-export industrial products from the contado increased, which reflects the strength of the local lumber and iron concerns. Note also the value of transhumant herds as a source of tax revenue, particularly as compared with the relative cheapness of goods passing from one Lucchese subject to another.

As a category, passage/pedaggium is complicated by the fact that its entries list two discrete taxable items, namely silk cloth, which entailed a graded tariff, and loads or salme of other goods, for which the taxpayer owed a flat tax by tally regardless of the shipment contents. The value of this silk traffic, which outpaced the revenue from the other category in most years, will be discussed in chapter four, but it is interesting to note just how many individual loads were registered in each year. Of all my data, only the Passage category contains an indication of the number of pack animals travelling through the Lucchesia. The following table lists the specific number of salme, or pack-animal loads, that passed through the Lucchesia in each year of my sample. After January 1373, these salme came to be registered as either ‘large animal’ loads (salma bestie grosse), presumably those carried by horses, and ‘small animal’ or ‘mule-drawn’ (salma bestie minute / somerii) loads, although in typical fashion the notaries often failed to note this distinction, hence the third category below.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ CG 3, p. 492ff. (20/1/1373 | Sp): Although this set of decrees addressed other defects of the recently-published statute of 1372, one purpose of this meeting was to lower the passage fee by 50 percent, from twelve soldi in the statute (GM 1, f. 46v) to ten soldi for ‘large’ loads and six soldi for ‘small’ loads. At the same time, the pedaggium for silk cloth and raw silk was set at ¾ of a florin per hundred libbre.
Since we will not be returning to generic shipments in the Passage category in the next chapter, let us briefly note the pattern evident on this table. The number of shipments passing through the Lucchesia rose after 1373, perhaps as the system of pedaggium developed over the period 1369-1372 became better known to foreign merchants. In general, though, the traffic year-to-year seems to have been one of the more elastic features of the Lucchese commercial zone. For example, the volume of traffic declined in 1392 but bounced back in the war year of 1397, when Lucca’s Motrone served as an exit port for an embattled Florence.

In 1397, as in the rest of my sample, the records of the gabella maggiore help elucidate the position occupied by Lucca and its hinterland within an interregional network of trade. As noted above, the directionality of our records is less precise or consistent than in, for example, the contemporary Datini ‘bale’ books. Our customs material nonetheless preserves itineraries for almost all exported goods, most pedaggium

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129 The decree in the previous note marked an end-point for the development of the pedaggium system, but experimentation had begun in 1369 and continued over the next few years. The rules of payment and storage accreted from these specific decrees: AAL 45, p. 27 (30/5/1369); AAL 45, p. 43 (24/6/1369); CG 1, p. 7 (19/7/1369); CG 1, p. 96 (20/9/1369); CG 1, p. 151 (10/12/1369); CG 2, p. 229 (13/3/1371); CG 2, p. 336 (3/7/1371). The statute of 1372 clarified this system (GM 1, ff. 46v-47r) and two decrees from 1373 altered the rates slightly and established penalties for contravention: CG 3, p. 493 (20/1/1373); CG 4, p. 43 (15/2/1373).

130 E.g. ASPr Datini 378, a quaderno di ricevute e di balle from Pisa (1386-1390), and its partner register Datini 395 (continues to 1392), which list the payments made by carriers at various customs houses and ports between their shipment’s origin and Pisa, or vice versa.
payments, and about a quarter of all imported shipments. Since the origin data for incoming shipments are only comprehensive for 1410, I will here present the data for exports and passage.

Figure 3.3: Destination of Exports from Lucca, Count of Entries per Year

Lucca’s main trading partner in every year besides 1397, when they were engaged in open hostilities, was Pisa. The Porto Pisano served the Lucchese silk industry as its primary access to markets outside Central and Northern Italy. However, Pisa’s importance seems to have waned in the early fifteenth century relative to the sample years before 1397, presumably as a result of worsening relations after the death of Pietro Gambacorta in 1392, tensions that culminated in war. Florence became an increasingly important market for Lucchese goods over this period, but Lucca also turned to direct shipping to Genoa, either along the littoral or via the small port at Motrone, in order to bypass Pisa entirely. A sizeable chunk of urban exports travelled no further than the Lucchesia itself.

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131 Data from Appendix 2, Table 3X.5
132 ‘Genoa’ data here and below includes the sixty or so shipments which listed Motrone as a destination. It therefore represents all those shipments explicitly avoiding the Porto Pisano on the way to Genoa.
For products from the Lucchesia, which rivaled urban goods in volume if not value, other destinations could never assume the importance of Pisa. Unlike urban industrial products like luxury goods, which were destined for more foreign ports, the contado’s chief exports, iron – unworked or as swords from Villabasilica – lumber, and agricultural products like wine and oranges, aimed at local markets.\(^\text{133}\)

![Figure 3.4: Destination of Exports from Lucchesia, Count of Entries per Year\(^\text{134}\)](image)

To be sure, Florence consumed some of these products, and the Lucchesia did send large quantities of oranges and pine nuts east. But most of the market for iron and lumber lay in the Pisan shipyards. This meant that, amidst the fighting in 1397, when they could not access their traditional markets in Pisa, the forges and lumberyards seem to have simply shut down rather than send their products elsewhere.\(^\text{135}\) Florence, which was always a good market for Villabasilican blades, began to attract more crude iron in the first decade of the fifteenth century, but this occurred without a corresponding collapse in exports to Pisa. Note also that, while very little industry in the Lucchesia appears from this data to

\(^{133}\) The data for the figure below is found in Appendix 2, Table 3X.6

\(^{134}\) Note that, due to the notaries’ less scrupulous recordkeeping in 1392, we are missing final destinations for 103 shipments leaving the Lucchesia via Lucca; it is easy to imagine that most of them went to Pisa and Lucca as per usual.

\(^{135}\) As noted below, the vicariates may have sent more iron and lumber to northern markets in these years, which commerce would not have been recorded by scribes in Lucca.
have been oriented towards the north, it seems probable that many shipments heading to ‘Lombardy’ or Genoa would have paid the gabelle in the northern vicariates. For the most part, only those shipments from the Lucchesia travelling along the east-west axis between Lucca and Florence or south to Pisa would have registered at the city itself.

We can also track commercial activity within each year rather than between years in order to gain a better sense of the annual rhythm of trade. In chapter four, I will present a more detailed analysis of specific commodities over the eight years of my sample. But this kind of detailed breakdown will not be effective for observing the economy as a whole. Besides producing an impenetrable set of statistics, such a projection allows the features of specific industries to define the economy as a whole. To find the seasonal flow of trade, its constants and variables through the years in our sample, a monthly distribution produces a more comprehensible result. For the following statistics, I have excluded the semester of records from 1385, since I cannot draw any firm conclusions about the flow of trade in the last six months of that year.\textsuperscript{136}

It seems best to begin again with an overview of the entire sample as divided between the months of the year. The first figure that follows presents the volume of entries within each of four general categories of commercial activity: Import and Export, including both ‘to/from Lucca’ and ‘to/from the Lucchesia’; Passage; and Subject-Subject.

\textsuperscript{136} As the wild deviations in the annual charts below make clear, such projections would be premature.
The figure would indicate that February, and the period January-March more generally, saw a major uptick in importation, whereas summer and December were the low point in the annual cycle of trade. For exportation, on the other hand, the most active month was August and the summer more generally. Goods passed through the Lucchesia on a more or less constant basis, besides a slight depression in February, while the communes and vicariates subject to Lucca engaged in vigorous trade during the summer months.

But this chart, which is based on the average flow of trade over a seven-year sample, is completely misleading. I include it here to underscore a point that the following figures will make more fully: each year possessed its own very unique trade flow. Although the result is somewhat more complex than projecting the mean, it is far more useful to either consult each year individually or comparatively. Here, for example, is a figure that presents the monthly percentage of total imported shipments in seven years side by side.

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137 Based on a summary of Appendix 2, Tables 3X.7-10
March certainly appears to be the most active month in several years, which accounts for the high average seen above, but this is a trend with many exceptions: July 1397, February 1410, and the fall and early winter of 1378. The peaks and troughs in 1373 are the most extreme of the sample, and one can see how the dearth of activity in the summer of that year has exaggerated the more modest decline in activity evinced in other parts of the sample. In two years, such as 1378 and 1397, the summer was actually the most bustling period for the importation of foreign goods.
As this figure demonstrates, no normative annual cycle for exportation emerges from my sample. The summertime surge, witnessed in Figure 3.5, here appears to be a quirk found in only three years: 1392, 1401, and, to a lesser extent, 1378. All three of these featured a higher than average total volume of exports, such that the common feature of elevated commercial activity in August distorts into a general trend when viewed from the perspective of the entire sample. It is true that the August maximum, as evinced in those three years, has the highest frequency of monthly maxima. And there is certainly strong evidence to suggest an annual recurrence of two peaks activity periods, one in the late spring and the other in the late summer or early fall. But evidence for a cycle is weak, and the flow of traffic must have been very responsive to microeconomic stimuli like weather and local military activity, as well as macroeconomic trends in

Note, again, that the General Council suspended the export tariff on all goods besides unworked iron in January 1373 (see note 126 above), such that its export count is seriously depressed and the peak in May represents an uptick in iron exports only.
regional markets and political conditions abroad. In addition, each commercial sector had its own rhythms, as we shall see.\textsuperscript{139}

A complete analysis of the features of each year, contextualized by these external pressures, lies outside the bounds of this study into local political culture, but certainly within the potential of the rich material of the \textit{gabella maggiore}. The year 1387, for example, during which Urban VI held his court in the city, seems an invitation to follow in the footsteps of Arnold Esch and determine “if and to what degree one can recognize the weight of the papacy and the importance of its spiritual dimension in the economic life of the city.”\textsuperscript{140} But if the figures above fail to reveal a rigid cycle represented in each year of my sample, this does not mean that certain general patterns are not evident within every year of the survey. On a week-by-week basis, the commercial activity witnessed in these documents does observe certain cycles related to the static quantities of local industrial output and the city’s alimentary needs. Some of these systems, like the Lenten fish trade and transhumance patterns, deserve dedicated treatment on their own and will be the subject of future work on the \textit{gabella maggiore}. For the sake of clarifying what I mean by these cycles, however, we can take a closer look at the figures from 1378 to get a sense of what these commercial rhythms could look like.\textsuperscript{141}

The figure below presents a week-by-week count of shipments entering Lucca via the court of the \textit{gabella maggiore} in 1378. The peaks indicate weeks with higher-than-average activity, whereas the troughs were moments of relative calm at the Pinelli house.

\textsuperscript{139} Studying the market in skins and leather arriving in Livorno, for example, Tognetti found no evidence of a seasonal rhythm: Tognetti, “Aspetti del commercio internazionale del cuoio nel XV secolo,” 23.
\textsuperscript{140} Esch, “Roma come centro di importazione nella seconda metà del Quattrocento ed il peso economico del papato,” 108 (translation mine). With regards to the records of the \textit{gabella maggiore}, among other things, the heightened consumption of fish in the city that year seems attributable to Urban’s numerous indulgences and masses at San Martino.
\textsuperscript{141} Similar charts for the other years in my study can be found in the appendix to this chapter. Week-by-week projections for specific industries and trade goods will be presented in chapters four.
Figure 3.8: Imports per Week in 1378, Count of Entries

Note that import activity typically remained extremely active or extremely depressed for a single week, the two exceptions here being the peaks during weeks 14-16 (29 March – 18 April) and weeks 50-52. The least active week, 17 (19-25 April), occurred two weeks after the most active week, 15 (6-12 April); for context, Easter fell on 18 April in that year. Other than during the early summer, a surge of activity occurred every few weeks; this is why June and July, more or less slightly below average here, appear to be a period of depression in our monthly chart above.

The picture becomes even clearer if we look at tariff revenue by week, which is a more accurate indicator of the quantity and quality of goods entering the city than the simple count in Figure 3.8.
We can here see that periods of extreme activity were often correlated with high tariff revenue; see, for example, weeks 11 (7-13 March) or 29 (12-18 July). But, compared to periods of frequent importation, peak revenue weeks are fewer and further between; furthermore, the latter are more extreme than the former in terms of their variation from the norm. The three most active weeks in 1378 saw around three times the average number of shipments; the three most lucrative weeks for the fisc, however, garnered over twenty times the average weekly revenue. Two of these weeks – 4 and 25 – were the result of large imported shipments of unworked silk, as Figure 3.10 demonstrates.

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142 The most active weeks, 11, 16, and 22, contain 39, 41, and 40 shipments respectively, while the average number of imported lots per week was 13.5. The highest revenue weeks, 11, 13, and 45, brought in 36.3, 23.5, and 25.2 florins respectively, compared to an average weekly take of 1.1 florins.
Silk was not necessarily brought into the city on a weekly basis, but its arrival had a preponderant importance for the revenues of the *gabella maggiore*.

The trend is similar but much more pronounced with exported goods.
Figure 3.11: Exports per Week in 1378, Count of Entries

Note, again, that periods of depressed activity tend to be interspersed among more active weeks, which is one reason that the monthly chart of exports in 1378 appears flatter than that for other years. This image nonetheless masks the extreme variation in revenue from exported goods, visible in Figure 3.12 below.
This figure shows that the bulk of gabelle revenue came in staccato bursts, brief periods during which high-value commodities were exported in large volumes. The chief factor here is the silk industry, whose valuable manufactures went to Pisa or Genoa bundled *en masse* in caravans of pack animals. These caravans occurred at several points throughout the year, interspersed with periods of relative inactivity, as Figure 3.13 shows:
The ‘peaks’ here represent the crescendo of a local industrial rhythm, an uptick that lasted a week rather than a month, and they correlate perfectly with the peaks on Figure 3.12. The frequency and intensity of these periods varied greatly from year to year depending on market conditions, and they provide one means by which to measure the vitality of the urban economy. In an analogous way, the volume of importation indicates both the availability of a given product and Lucchese consumption patterns. We can see on both the monthly and weekly charts that the seasons held less prescriptive power in this system than this internal economic rationale. My results indicate that it is more appropriate to speak of discrete cycles for different commodities rather than a single annual cycle for the market as a whole.

The patterns evinced by specific industries over the whole of my survey serve as the core material of the next chapter, but I will here introduce the manner of categorization that informs that approach. Up to this point, the main criterion employed to distinguish classes of entries has been directionality, which defines the ultimate goal or intent of each commercial act and therefore its behavioral category. Turning from
directionality to the contents of the shipping manifests themselves, a more nuanced picture of the Lucchese economy emerges, one in which the vitality or sluggishness depicted above is distributed among groups of commodities. In order to categorize these entries according to contemporary logic, my database employs eighteen of the categories of rates found in the tariff statutes of 1372, supplementing these with one heading for unlisted items (Not Listed) and another for unidentifiable or insufficiently described contents – the ‘Unspecified’ category described above. This analysis necessarily differs from that by directionality because individual entries only rarely describe multiple types of commercial acts, whereas most shipments contain more than one kind of good. As a result, I will here refer to instances of a particular category of goods rather than shipments, with the result that the totals in the tables below will not be equivalent to the total shipments in a given year. Moreover, as it would be prohibitively complicated to divide a single tax payment between the various items in a given shipment, I will only discuss the fiscal value of individual commercial goods in chapter four, where I present trafficked volumes for specific items like silk cloth, leather, and wool.

In a fairly summary way, the four figures below describe the importance of individual sectors within each of the four main categories of Lucchese commercial activity: importation; exportation; non-terminal commercial activity, or passage; and rural commerce (Subject-Subject). Each figure presents a simple count of instances for each category of good. Among imports, for example, we can see that the predominant sectors were alimentary and low-value textiles – Linen Etc., Cheese Etc., Spices, Grain –, with a somewhat less significant importation of raw materials for industrial activity.
Of note here is the preponderance of cheese importation; most important here were cheeses from Sicily (*messinensis*), Sardinia (*gallurensis*), and Corsica (*corsescha*), which arrived in shipments of “files” (*file*) consisting of a dozen or more wheels (*forme*). This imported cheese was brought to Lucca in bulk by professional cheesemongers at various junctures throughout each year, corresponding to the arrival of carriers from Motrone, Genoa, and Pisa.

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143 Appendix 2, Table 3X.11
This could represent a considerable burst of revenue for the *gabella maggiore*. In week 15 of 1378, for example, when a trivial amount of raw silk arrived at the Pinelli house (see Figure 3.13), the importation of nearly three hundred *file* of cheese from Messina helped bring the cashier’s box up to the average (see Figure 3.12).

Perhaps more surprising is the distribution of exports over the course of the sample, as seen below. Alongside silk textiles, perhaps Lucca’s most famous export, and ironwork, we find that a great number of entries contained items from the Fruits and Grain Etc. categories, which included wine and oranges.
The fruit trade from Lucca may not be the best-known aspect of its economy, but the Lucchesia actually sent large shipments of oranges east to the Valdinievole and up to Bologna. While I have elected to include this item in the Fruits category in my categorization of the *gabella maggiore*, the statute of 1372 actually contains a separate heading for “transport of oranges” (*de pedalibus aranciorum*).\(^{145}\)

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\(^{144}\) Appendix 2, Table 3X.12
\(^{145}\) GM 1, f. 13v. The rates for oranges are delineated in a unique manner, as *pedali grosso*, *pedali minus grosso seu mediocr*, and *pedali tenui seu exili*. These are not terms found elsewhere in the statute, and this fact strongly suggests a direct inheritance from another ordinance or customary system preceding the emancipation of 1369. It may also indicate that the orange trade was established and important enough that the *statutarii* decided not to bring its idiosyncrasies into line with the rest of the *gabella maggiore*. As I argued in chapter two, however, the *statutarii* were not necessarily proactive in this regard.
Figure 3.17: Instances of Orange Shipments by Destination, Whole Sample

Florence presented the biggest market for these oranges, which were cultivated in places like Bozzano, Quiesa, and Massarosa in the western hills and lowlands of the Lucchesia. The shipments of wine, which account for 89 percent of the exports in the GrainEtc category, were mostly destined for Pisa.\textsuperscript{146} I mentioned above the licenses granted to Pisan officials and Pietro Gambacorta, but the appetite for Lucchese wine was clearly prevalent outside that inner circle.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{146} 1,588 out of 1,767 shipments contained wine.
\textsuperscript{147} See note 31 above.
It also seems to have been a growing market, taking into account the open hostilities between the two states in 1397, when exports almost dried up – although two shipments did make it through in March, one in the hands of a very dedicated Pisan.\textsuperscript{148} This figure also excludes all the wine shipped out of the Lucchesia via Pietrasanta and Montecarlo, where the rural customs houses were authorized to write licenses for wine among other things.

Some amount of that exported wine may have been destined for the Pisan \textit{contado} as part of a local wine exchange also witnessed within the Lucchesia. As Figure 3.19 shows quite clearly, over three quarters of all shipments between Lucca’s subjects contained instances of items from the Grain\textit{Etc} category, such as wine, oil, and grain; wine specifically was present in 83 percent of these instances.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{148} GM 35, p. 48 (12/3/1397): one Luca di Francesco da Pisa paid two florins to ship a cart of wine from Brancoli to Pisa.

\textsuperscript{149} 2,825 out of 3,409 instances
Once again, these are only those shipments that passed through Lucca, surely only a part of the total exchange occurring via the rural gabelles. Although it is noteworthy that so many of these men and women came to the Pinelli house for their *apodixe*, indicative perhaps of the difficulty of navigating from one section of the *contado* to another, even within the flatlands and low hills of the Sei Miglia, without reaching Lucca. A thorough exploration of Subject-Subject traffic in the Lucchesia would hopefully reveal something more about traffic and access control in the regions subject to Lucca. But the traces here do suggest a local network that integrated consumption and production, allowing for specialization in terms of crops, olives, and vines. If we factor the Pisan *contado* into this

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150 Appendix 2, Table 3X.14
equation, would we be able to see the contours of a regional agricultural zone, arbitrarily split by the *gabella maggiore* and the territorial border running through the lowlands west of the Alpi Pisani? I hope to answer this question in future work on the *gabella maggiore*.

### 3.3 Conclusion

Before we proceed to an analysis of specific sectors of the Lucchese economy and the fiscal policy affecting them, I want to make a few notes about the relationship between the Lucchese economy as represented by the records of the *gabella maggiore* and the policy decisions made by the governing councils of the city. Economic policy, to some extent, affected the economic behaviour of individuals living within or travelling through the Lucchesia, and the men who shaped that policy were, in turn, responding to perceived disfunction within that regional economy. Therefore, the statistics presented above, which will be explicated more fully below, do not represent some natural state of the regional economy, since the very administration from which we have this data was an imposition on commercial activity. Even before the many changes to rates and procedures made between 1369 and 1410, the existence of the *gabella maggiore* affected profits and was therefore part of the cost-benefit analysis behind contemporary economic behavior. Every discrete choice to raise or lower the tariff took place within a fluctuating economic and political landscape, not a *tabula rasa*, and each change affected the context of ensuing legislation in turn. The environment was in constant flux, and our snapshots are not the film in motion. In this respect, tables of statistics can obscure how difficult it must have been for those trying to tame the urban market and render it productive for the state. More than anything, as I will explore more in chapter four, it must have been very difficult to gather accurate information on that market.

Late medieval Lucchese councilors did try to take account of the complicated correspondence between their choices and the economy they hoped to shape. But, while they were certainly motivated to carve stable revenues out of a fluctuating tax base, their personal expertise remained necessarily limited by trade and tradition. Whenever the decision in question concerned something outside the luxury cloth business, the governing councils had to depend on advice derived from outside the inner oligarchy,
which was primary composed of silk merchants as described above. But the ability of
those outside the elite to actively influence policy remained quite constrained.

In 1381, for example, the General Council sat to consider several petitions
concerning an evident decline in Lucchese commercial activity after the Peace of Turin
reopened the Venetian markets to northern European trade.\textsuperscript{151} The first and last petitions
concerned long-distance trade, specifically whether it would be viable to kick-start a local
wool cloth industry to complement the flagging silk industry and which privileges would
serve as sufficient inducement to attract German merchants to the city.\textsuperscript{152} The wool
petition was an internal document written by the \textit{cives super introitibus} and ser Giovanni
Linelli, then the major official of the \textit{gabella maggiore}. The petition concerning the
Germans contained the signatures of fifteen named men and “many other citizens, who
were content to be written in the petition but whom it would be tedious to read now” –
needless to say, all of the named petitioners were silk merchants, besides a single
moneychanger.\textsuperscript{153}

These men had a bird’s eye view of the local economy, and their minds were
oriented towards the macroeconomic ramifications of the fallout from the War of
Chioggia, the “adversities of the wider world”.\textsuperscript{154} They envisioned a decline of local
exports due to Venice’s better marketplace (\textit{pro meliori foro}), such that some other
reason for foreigners to come to Lucca had to be found (\textit{morandi et causa detur et
materia forensibus veniendi}). They would have to have a wool industry, then, and source
their wool from England, Scotland, and France while welcoming woolworkers from
foreign parts with wide-reaching privileges. The second group of petitioners, who wrote
less didactically to the Anziani – the first petition technically came from an internal \textit{balìa}
committee, after all – also had wide-reaching predictions to make concerning the fallout

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{151} CG 7, pp. 628ff (2/12/1381 | CG).
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., pp. 628-9; 630-1.
\textsuperscript{153} The men were Fredo Martini, Arrigo Sandei, Matheo Captani, Piero Brilla, Martino Martini, Lando
Moriconi, Nello Faytinelli, Lando Sartoy, Galvano Trenta, Francescho Guidicciioni, Martino Arnolfini,
Piero Vannelli Panichi, Johanne Bernardini, and Guido Rodolfini. All but Bernardini are listed as \textit{sendadari}
or \textit{mercatores sete} in either the Libri dei Mercanti or the Estimi from 1371-2 (ASLu, Biblioteca Manoscritti
176 [1371], 176bis [1372]); Bernardini’s occupation is found in an election as councilor in the \textit{curia
mercatorum} in 1389 (ASLu, Corte de’ Mercanti 16, f. 27v).
\textsuperscript{154} CG 7, p. 628: ...\textit{Ars sete...propter adversitates mundi occurrentes tam in presenti quam in preteritu
diminuit...}
of Turin. Despite a recent uptick in foreign buyers, they warned that “due to the peace recently made in Venice, it is dubious whether Germans will come here to make their purchases,” but a dedicated hostelry and certain gabelle exemptions would induce these foreigners to make Lucca a standard port-of-call.\textsuperscript{155}

This is not the mode in which less privileged groups approached the economy and economic policy. Between the two petitions by members of the inner oligarchy is an essentially anonymous complaint from the generality of tanners in the city.\textsuperscript{156} On the whole, they tell the same story as the silk merchants: foreigners who would otherwise buy leather in Lucca are instead making their purchases elsewhere, and the craft has thereby fallen into decline, leading to a wholesale abandonment of the Lucchesia.\textsuperscript{157} They continue,

“A twofold problem has ensued for our single commune: first with regards to the tariff on leather itself, since little is exported and little is received from the gabelle, whereas if the gabelle were small more would be exported and more would thence be received from the gabelle, since, although it would be lenient, so much more would be exported that it would make up the difference; second with regards to all the ordinary taxes, since the trade would grow and be augmented and thus it would be necessary for many working men to stay here and many foreigners to come and go, from all of whom, coming, going, and living, the

\textsuperscript{155} CG 7, p. 630: Per buono istato della citta di Luca e della mercadantia sarebbe buono inducere li mercadanti tedeschi a venire a comprare a lucha delle nostre merce. Et e piu mercadanti qui sono venuti da due mesi in qua i quali molta mercantia ci anno comprata et trovano quie avere mercanticie che in loro paeze da farne utile. Che la pace facta ora di Vinegia si dubita quelli andi lae a comprare diche avendo qui alcuno piacere delle gabelle si di quello ci metesseno et di quello ne traesseno di Luca e dando loro una casa lavve quelli potesseno tornare pagando bene loro schocto, Crediamo quel li sanzerenno qui venire a comprare.

\textsuperscript{156} In fact, the petition itself was likely not anonymous but was not being read aloud, unlike the vernacular petition by the city’s wealthier plaintiffs: “Next, a complaint and petition on the part of the tanners of Lucca has been presented to your magnificence, containing in effect that...” (Item cum querela et petitio sit porrecta magnificie vestre pro parte coiariorum lucitae civitatis in effectu continentes quod...: CG 7, pp. 629-30).

\textsuperscript{157} CG 7, pp. 629-30: “Foreigners wanting this leather do not come to buy it in your city but rather go to Pisa, despite the fact that tanning is done better here than elsewhere in these parts. Therefore the art is abandoned and decline greatly here and grows strong in Pisa... since workers and even master artisans who were accustomed to work here are unable to survive... (forenses indigentes tali coriamine non veniunt ad emendum de illo in vestra civitate sed vadant pisas non obstante quod hic fiat melior concia quam alicubi in ists partibus. Et pro tanto deseritur et declinat nimis ipsa fieri hic et augmentatur in civitate pisana... illis laborantibus et etiam magistri de artis qui hic laborare soliti erant ipsis valentibus suam vitam substentare).
normal taxes would be taken and would grow more lucrative. The gabelles shall be a strong resource, when the city is full and well-populated by its people.”

The proposed solution, however, is small and concrete. According to them, the root of the problem is the high gabelle on exported leather, which commands forty-one soldi per hundred libbre on departure from the city. Their suggestion, filtered through the cives super introitibus, is that the tax be halved for at least two years. This is noteworthy since the gabelle rates of 1372 specifically assigned a higher tax – forty-one soldi – to exported leather than imported leather, which paid only twenty-four soldi per hundredweight; in other words, the framers of the original document had imagined a domestic leatherworking industry which required more protection than the domestic tanners. The consequence of this misstep, as alluded to by the group of leather manufacturers in the petition, was not only the diminution of the industry in Lucca, but also, perversely, a reduction in the potential revenues of the gabella maggiore. The tanners, then, are directly challenging the reasoning behind the legislation in place and offering an alternative that would profit both artisans and state interests.

The difference between the artisans’ and the silk merchants’ petitions is that the former came to nothing. Work began soon afterwards on determining budgetary allocations and separate statutes to foster a local wool cloth industry, which included

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158 Ibid.: ...uni comuni duplex consequitur dampnum unum in ipsa propria gabella coriaminis quia parum exportatur et parum in dicta gabella habetur, ubi si gabella parva esset multum exportaretur et multum inde de gabella haberetur licet parva esset quia tanto plus exportaretur quod restauraret, aliud in omnibus aliis gabellis ordinariis quia ars cresceret et augmentaretur et sic opporiteret multis homines laborantes stare hic et multos qui non sunt venire et redire quibus sic venientibus et redeuntibus et stantibus gabella ordinaria conservantur et augmentantur, tunc bene valeant quando civitas bene in habitatoribus est habitata et plena.
159 Ibid., p. 629: ...pro eo quod coriamini concio in exitu nimie est magna gabella imposita videlicet s xli pisanorum pro quolibet centenario ad pondus; note that, as described at the beginning of this chapter, the ‘Pisan’ or ‘small’ money worth five lire to the florin, which was nominally the currency used in the statute of 1372, from which this rate derives, was not the currency in which the gabelle was actually exacted. The actual taxes were exacted in a currency equaling three lire ten soldi per florin, such that these forty-one soldi cost the payer over half a florin rather than around two fifths of a florin.
160 CG 7, p. 629: Et ipsi vestri vices deputati super yntroytibus et officialis gabelle prefatus deligenter [sic] habuerint super hiis informatis et deliberatis. Referunt magnificientie vestre quod eis videretur quod dicta gabella exitus dicti coriaminis conci minueretur et reducenda esset ad dimidium eius quod nunc solvitur, providendo hec ad presens solum pro duobus annis ut materia detur dictis coriaris faciendi bonam conciam et bonum forum et sequatur quid exposuerit et causa detur magnificentie vestra finitis duobus annis hanc diminutionem prorogare vel aliter providere prout celsitudini vestra placuerit.
special exemptions for foreign workers as requested by the *cives super introitibus*.\(^{161}\) Of the three main desires raised by members of the inner oligarchy, only the college for German merchants remained, it seems, unfulfilled, although it was referred to a dedicated *balìa* committee.\(^{162}\) But nothing was done for the tanners, and their petition reappeared mainly verbatim – with the same threats and inducements – nearly a year later, in October 1382, although one assumes they had been pushing their case for some time.\(^{163}\) After significant prodding, another *balìa* committee finally drafted this long-desired tariff reduction into law in January 1383.\(^{164}\) Despite the initial two-year limit on this discount, the concession to the Lucchese tanning community continued to be renewed and was ultimately enshrined as a privilege for Lucchese tanners in the statute of the *gabella maggiore* produced in 1399.\(^{165}\)

I began and have now ended this chapter with two legislative vignettes that serve the same purpose: both tales frame my customs data within the political culture that ordered its collection. The logic that treats the records of the *gabella maggiore* as context for the decisions of Lucchese legislators is inherently circular; cause and effect are impossible for us to separate, particularly given the imperfections in the records described in the first half of this chapter. But, more to the point, to assume that legislators would have heeded sage warnings concerning the economy would ignore what we have seen concerning the priorities of the city’s governing class and the constitutional strictures within which they operated. The context provided by my data is not the

\(^{161}\) The first set of statutes for the new wool industry appeared in February 1382, and will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4: CG 8, pp. 60ff (26/2/1382 | Twelve).

\(^{162}\) CG 7.631: the committee consisted of the *cives super introitibus* and four additional citizen per *terziere*, Michele Guinigi issued a caveat that the tax on silk merchandise exported from Lucca could not be lowered, even for *tedeschi*. Regardless, over the next century, German companies continued to develop ties with Lucca, which became one of the chief sites of investment in Tuscany next to Florence: see Kellenbenz, “Mercanti tedeschi in Toscana nel Cinquecento.”

\(^{163}\) CG 8, pp. 284ff (6/10/1382 | Twelve): it would be unfair to describe this as a completely unoriginal petition, and I will discuss this unusual attempt to influence fiscal policy in chapter four. It is worth noting that the *balìa* committee assigned to look into the possibility of developing a wool industry was also assigned to look at the leather gabelle, but produced no policy on that front.

\(^{164}\) CG 8, p. 431 (17/1/1383 | Sp).

\(^{165}\) In fact, the terms for exportation were even better in the statute of 1399, fourteen *soldi* per hundredweight versus the twenty *soldi* decreed in 1383 (GM 2, p. 16: *Coiame concio... del centonaio a peso nello entrare lira una soldi sei e nello uscire lire due soldi cinque. Vogliamo non di meno che de cordovani conci... e di ciaschuno altro coiame concio in ditta citta si paghi solamente nello uscire per gabelle del centinaio a peso soldi quatuordici.*)
economic knowledge base of contemporary Lucchesi but rather the map within which we can situate their efforts to shape the economy. We should not expect that they had the same information or, when they did, the same priorities as the perfect economic actor of neoclassical economics, as the following chapter will demonstrate.

The first chapter of this study approached the *gabella maggiore* as a physical customs house, and my aim was to situate and clarify the context within which the physical records were made. Next, we looked at the weight of the legislative tradition that culminated in the statute of 1372 as further evidence of the ambivalent relationship between Lucca’s leading men and the fiscal system. I have now presented the heart of my study, statistics summarizing my sample of the *gabella maggiore* records from the turn of the fourteenth century, and I have qualified the precise limits of their descriptive reach. In the final chapter, I will finally try to weave these strands together, digging deep into the data presented above while discussing Lucchese industry as the subject of fiscal legislation produced between 1369 and 1410.
Chapter Four: Legislating for Lucchese Industry

The merchant oligarchs of late medieval Lucca saw the state as a potential source of redress for their economic, as well as their political, concerns. These men could appreciate – at least in theory – the superior organizational potential of economic legislation over the individual efforts of entrepreneurs and artisans.¹ Their positive impression of the mediated economy inspired rhetorical flourishes like the following, which appeared on a petition for new statutes for the mercanzia (Corte de’ Mercatanti) in 1376:

Industrial activity in silk and the other trades of the mercanzia, from which almost all citizens draw their vital force... should be regulated and guided to its improvement with providential love and care at all times, and this cannot happen without the regulation and statutes that provide equally and equitably for these trades – since nothing in nature is more holy than to live under laws.²

And who could be better suited to managing an economic regulatory system than the governing councils stocked with wealthy merchant-bankers, a class defined by its market savvy and economic foresight? For their part, urban elites were ideologically primed to appreciate the benefits of well-tuned legislative machinery – a demonstration of the state as bonum commune, a shared patrimony offering status and material rewards in exchange for managerial effort.

This participation in the development of economic policy was one of the things sacrificed upon the accession of Paolo Guinigi in 1400. Due to the rise of the new lord of Lucca, the republican Anzianate, General Council, and Thirty-Six were disbanded, and this left only a few advisory councils to represent an oligarchy once validated by much

¹ As Gene Brucker has noted in the case of Florence, political culture in the late medieval republic was remarkably tolerant towards invasive legislation and generally positive about the effect of ‘big’ government; the main difference in this regard between Florence and Lucca is that elites in the latter did not have to contend with a politically-powerful popolo: see Brucker, “Civic Traditions in Premodern Italy.”
² A selection from CG 5, p. 264 (17/3/1376 | CG): “cum artificio sete et aliarum artium mercantiae ad bonum statum et tranquilliam civitatis predictae conservandum fuerit et proprio esse speretur membrum ceteris principalibus ex quo cives dicte civitatis quasi omnes vitae sumunt fomeneum et cum omni previsa diligentia et cura regendum ad augmentum veniat et gubernandum, quod sine ordine et statutis artibus predictis ex bono et equo convenientibus fieri congrue non possit cum nichil nature sanctius quam legibus vivere...
wider participation. After decades of being fully responsible for the state, they had, to use
the words of Lorenzo Tanzini, chosen “una soluzione signorile” in the person of the
prince. Unlike the events of 1392, this was a more or less bloodless transition,
accomplished without the application of mercenary force or exile en masse – i.e., without
significant resistance from the dispossessed.

The relationship of this event to the fortunes of the economy is far from
straightforward, and the records of the gabella maggiore do not present us with the
smoking gun responsible for Paolo Guinigi’s triumph. Here I merely want to emphasize
the point that responsibility for economic legislation was one of the burdens that the inner
oligarchy transferred to the signory in 1400. With that in mind, we now turn to the
development of customs legislation before and after the suspension of the republic. Over
forty years, the records of the gabella maggiore indicate a slowdown in certain sectors of
the Lucchese economy, specifically the export trade in leather and silk cloth, while new
opportunities opened in the production of locally-produced woolens. Over the same
period, we can track the success and, more often, the failure of the city’s governing
councils to direct the economic energies of Lucca through fiscal policy and industrial
privileges. While far from the whole story, the episodes of failed legislation help clarify
the political circumstances in which the oligarchs allowed their state, bought alongside
independence at a steep price, to be eclipsed by an autocratic government headed by one
of their former peers.

In the most general sense, a quick overview of the legislative output of these
councils gives a sense of some participatory decline after the early 1370s. More than two
hundred ordinances that affected the gabella maggiore survive for the period bracketed
by the recovery of Lucchese independence in 1369 and the end of the extant customs
record series in 1410. But as Figure 4.1 shows, the annual volume of gabelle legislation

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3 “Emergenza, eccezione, deroga: tecniche e retoriche del potere nei comuni toscani del XIV secolo,” 169.
4 My sample consists of 220 separate acts found in the published decrees of the communal government (the
Riformagioni, i.e. ASLu, AAL 45, CG 1-13), the few surviving volumes of unpublished minutes and
deliberations found in the Anziani al Tempo della Libertà series (esp. AaTdL 1-5 and 130-4), and the first
ten years of decrees from the Guinigi principate (GPG 1-2). The paucity of evidence from the Guinigi
period, combined with the plethora of licenses, suspensions, and administrative changes found in the
surviving fraction of minutes from the republican period, all but guarantee that many more such ordinances
were issued and have been lost.
was highest before the promulgation of the statutes of 1372 and gradually decreased over the course of our period.\footnote{Note that the series of Riformagioni breaks off in August 1394 (i.e. the end of ASLu, CG 12) and resumes in January 1397 (CG 13). The only well-attested years in my sample without any gabelle decrees, then, were 1397 and 1402.}

Figure 4.1: Pieces of Legislation Related to the *Gabella Maggiore*, by Year

In the early 1380s, for a few years after the Peace of Turin, the government produced significant legislation aimed at developing the new woolen industry and shoring up certain export trades in crisis. Again in 1392, the Guinigi-backed Twenty-Four *balia* cut through numerous pieces of red tape and pushed through a variety of ordinances affecting the gabelles. On average, however, progressively fewer laws affecting the *gabella maggiore* were produced after the 1370s. With the fall of the republic and the rise of Paolo Guinigi, alterations to the rates and application of the *gabella maggiore* became a rare occurrence.
While striking, this figure may be slightly misleading, and it is certainly possible that other gabelle ordinances besides these were published between 1369 and 1410. During the thirty years of the restored republic, many minor decrees and licenses were issued directly by the Anziani, and only some of these migrated from the fragmentary series of unpublished minutes to the *Riformagioni*. Under Paolo Guinigi, it is difficult to determine how much of his government’s legislative output was captured by the published minutes in the Governo di Paolo Guinigi series, which mimic the *Riformagioni* in format but clearly do not contain all decrees and licenses issued under his hand. As an example of omissions spanning both periods, we can look to the men of Pomezzano and Stazzema, who were mentioned in chapter three as recipients of a special gabelle discount for plaster in 1403; they complained that a license issued twelve years earlier – i.e. in 1391 or 1392 – granted them complete exemption from the tariff on plaster sent to Lucca, but that now the *gabellieri* in Pietrasanta and Camaiore were claiming the right to tax them on such goods. I was able to find neither the license from the republican period nor any grant from Guinigi to reinstate the tax.

Most of the surviving pieces of *gabella maggiore* legislation target consumables like cheese, oil, and fish, whereas only a very few address the rates applied to the products of Lucchese industry. The following table indicates how many ordinances affected each sector of the urban market taxed under the *gabella maggiore*, once again using the rate categories from the statute of 1372. Bear in mind that most ordinances

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6 The process of transformation from the minutes from this period (ASLu, AaTdL 1-4, 130-136) to the published *Riformagioni* (CG 1-13) has been thoroughly explicated by Giorgio Tori in an article on Coluccio Salutati’s tenure as chancellor of the commune; Tori, “Coluccio Salutati cancelliere della repubblica di Lucca.”

7 ASLu, GPG 1 (1400-1410), 2 (1410-1429), 3 (1408-1410). The last of these contain items issued by the prince himself during his sojourn in Pietrasanta, separate from the ordinances of the government which remained resident in Lucca and which are contained in GPG 1.

8 GPG 1, p. 168 (29/3/1403 | Guinigi): ...exponunt et dicunt quod iam sunt [sic.] circa annos duodecim quod de plastris que in dictis comunitibus ﬁdebantur et exinde portabantur et conducebantur per comitatum lucanum nulla prorsus gabella inde solvebat dictante statuto lucani comunis. Et nunc vestri gabellari Petresance et camaioriss pro plastris que de dictis comunitibus conducuntur et portuntur per dictum comitatum lucanum gellalam exigent et in futurum exigere velle videntur. There is of course the possibility that the *gabellieri* simply spontaneously decided to start taxing this plaster, perhaps in the absence of an enforceable license – a caution against assuming that the surviving decrees guaranteed compliance from materially interested officials in the countryside.
concerned more than one sector, so I have also provided the percentage of my sample that addressed the trade in question.\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Instances</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silk</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precious Metals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool Cloth</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linen Etc</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Wool Etc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skins Etc</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Metals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber Etc</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese Etc</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels Etc</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Etc</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beasts Etc</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyestuff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spices</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merch Etc</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified (^7)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Categories Represented among Gabelle Adjustments, 1369-1410, Count and Percentage of All Ordinances

\(^9\) For example, one decree from September 1381 authorized Dino Guinigi, then vicar of Pietrasanta, to issue licenses to merchants who wanted to travel along the otherwise-forbidden via marina to Pisa, provided that they were departing with iron, linen, and marble or returning with wine, ore (vena), notions (mercia), and salted cheese (caseum salsum tantum) (AaTdL 133, p. 323 [12/9/1381 | Az]).

\(^7\) Twenty-four edicts pertain to the administration of the gabella maggiore or blanket exemptions rather than specific sectors of the economy.
As indicated in bold, about half these amendments regarded wine, oil, and grain, while the next most frequent subjects were cheese and fish (CheeseEtc), and domesticated animals (BeastsEtc); there, the adjustments chiefly concerned taxes on pigs and sheep imported for slaughter. Industrial products, like silk cloth or leather, received some attention, but substantively less. The textile industries profiled in this chapter – the manufacture of woolens, tanning and leatherworking, and silk cloth production – were each addressed no more than a dozen times in this forty-year sample of surviving legislation.

The wealthy merchants who ran Lucca clearly cared about the products of its export-oriented trades, but such concerns, much of the time, could wait. In terms of maintaining public order, industrial dynamism was rarely an immediate concern, whereas the same could not be said about alimentation after inclement weather or war. On a fairly regular basis, the tariffs on grain and fish had to be shifted or lifted to guarantee sufficient supply in the public granary and the local market. As a corollary to this, the tariffs that affected the city’s chief industries must not have been so severe as to require this kind of constant adjustment. The ever-shifting exchange of silver and gold or the fluctuating supply of raw materials, which would have reduced profit margins from time to time, never required immediate and severe reductions for the tariffs on silk, swords, or other vital exportables.

This is not to suggest that Lucca’s productive capacities were stable; from the tally of bulk exports captured by the records of the gabella maggiore, it seems that many of the city’s trades wilted over the last quarter of the fourteenth century. Silk entrepreneurs, tanners, and cloth merchants bewailed, separately and in tandem, the collapse of the urban economy, and the declining volumes found in my database certainly corroborate their complaints. But the influence of the gabella maggiore on this decline does not appear to have taken the form of sudden, dramatic shocks. For example, the tanners’ petition against the tariff rate on exported leather, described at the end of the previous chapter and more thoroughly below, hung in limbo for about a year and a half.\(^{11}\)

I found nothing to suggest that the tanning industry had precipitously declined or been

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\(^{11}\) Initial petition at CG 7, pp. 629-30 (2/12/1381 | CG); similar petition at CG 8, pp. 284ff (6/10/1382 | Twelve); finally resolved at CG 8, p. 431 (17/1/1383 | Sp).
abandoned in the interim; moreover, by the time they submitted their first petition in 1381, the tanners had been laboring under this adverse tax for at least nine years, since the promulgation of the statute of 1372. The records of the *gabella maggiore*, within which we can see an uptick of leather exports in 1385 compared to 1378, indicate that the tariff was indeed deleterious to the tanners’ commercial ventures – but the industry was evidently strong enough after a long depression to take advantage of the tariff reduction of January 1383.

In contrast, the tariffs on bread, fish, and wine could quickly contribute to suffering and political unrest in times of dearth or plenty, and the legislative response in such periods had to match that intensity. Instead of changing rates, Lucchese councilors typically elected to suspend such taxes altogether. Given a market for consumables that was simultaneously stressed by external factors and internally taxed to the point of intolerability, suspensions of the gabelles could cause rapid changes in economic behavior. In the summer of 1372, one ill-designed decree resulted in a portion of the city’s bread production immediately moving to the *contado*, and drawing the bakers – or rather the engrossers and forestallers – back into the city necessitated a series of changes to the tax code.\(^{12}\) I shall return to the topic of tariffs on consumables in a later work, wherein I can better address the fundamental contrast between the tone of legislation meant to affect the alimentary gabelles and that meant to address tariffs on locally-produced trade goods.

Regarding both consumers and producers, however, permanent changes to the rates comprise only a small portion of our sample legislation. Most laws in my sample are temporary suspensions, decrees addressing specific routes or commercial practices, and licenses.\(^{13}\) Less than two-dozen ordinances made permanent changes to the rates by

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\(^{12}\) The initial decree by the Council of Thirty-Six was published in June 1372; by July, the General Council issued a new ordinance to tax bread made in the *contado*: CG 3, p. 334.

\(^{13}\) This was a unilateral power that the Anziani made use of more than the Council of Thirty-Six, the senatorial committee with which they consulted. It seems likely that a number of their executive suspensions for alimentary goods did not make there way into the *Riformagioni*: for example, the unpublished minutes of the Anziani from July 1376 describe an immediate suspension of the *media oncia* bread gabelle (AaTdL 133, p. 45 [4/7/1376]). As an instrument of maintaining public order, their power extended to bans on commercial activity as well: less than a month earlier, as will be discussed below, they forbade ser Giovanni Linelli from issuing *apodoxe* for silk cloth, gold thread, and other fine merchandise for a month due to concerns about reprisals abroad (AaTdL 133, p. 39 [20/6/1376]). Like the daily licenses
which officials assessed specific items or sectors. But because they were infrequent, ordinances that changed tariffs on industrial products occasioned the presentation of petitions, lengthy back-and-forth debate, and lengthy deferment to sluggish balìa committees. Although the period boasts only a few illuminating episodes of this kind, they make up in quality what they lack in quantity.

The main reason why these few changes are so well documented was procedural rather than political. The following table describes the division of our sample legislation among the ratifying councils, excluding any decrees published before the statute of 1372.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anziani</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve Conservatores</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consiglio Generale</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balìa Committees</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo Guinigi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.2: Gabella Maggiore Ordinances, 1372-1410, by Officiating Body

Issued in September 1376 to open and close the city gates for repairs (e.g. AaTdL 133, p. 54), these ad hoc decrees never found their way into the Riformagioni.

14 Only ten percent of the sample (22 items) concern specific, i.e. denari-per-libbra, gabelle rates, and even this includes two decrees that merely authorized the Anziani to change a rate (CG 7, p. 409 [24/1/1381 | Twelve]; CG 8, p. 572 [28/7/1383 | Az]) and one debate in the General Council that did not result in the desired change (AaTdL 4, p. 121 [5/2/1389 | CG]).

15 I refer specifically here to the length of the petitions and debate involved. Petitions to suspend the tariff on consumables like oil or wine are comparatively short; the exception here are the ordinances concerning butchered meat, since, unlike fishing or viticulture, the processing of animals occurred in the city itself and the butchers therefore had better representation; note also that the ordinances concerning meat were typically punitive and related to sanitation, such that the butchers’ position tended to be analogous to that of the tanners described in this chapter.

16 The Anziani category includes thirty-six decrees authorized by the twelve conservatores libertatis, the nine de bona custodia, the nine de balìa, and the twenty-four citizens appointed after the factional crisis of 1392, all of which held wide-ranging powers to alter the statutes; these groups were similar to normal balìa committees insofar as they could issue permanent changes, different insofar as they had general, emergency powers whereas normal balìe concerned specific items of business.
As Figure 4.2 demonstrates, the smaller legislative councils like the *Conservatores* or the Thirty-Six were not responsible for drafting the bulk of legislation that affected the *gabella maggiore*. In chapter two, I noted that such senatorial groups, like the original Eighteen, were responsible for developing the kinds of tariffs and administrative practices that were collected and codified by the statute of 1372. But after the publication of that document, these groups ceased to be the source of permanent new legislation, such as that which instituted the *pedaggium* system in 1369-70. Instead, the Thirty-Six, and later the Twelve, administered temporary changes, special licensing schemes, and localized administrative issues, rather than drafting permanent changes to the tariff rates. Even the Anziani, who acted with executive power, mainly issued temporary adjustments like these, rather than permanent changes. Some of these ordinances never found their way into the published *Riformagioni* at all and can only be found in the fragmentary series of minutes from the late fourteenth century.

The Anziani, Thirty-Six, and Twelve Conservators typically delivered temporary fixes because all constitutional changes made after the promulgation of the statute of 1372 had to be carried out in the General Council or by delegates endowed by that council with its authority, i.e. the *balìa* committees. Since the statute of the *gabella maggiore* was part of that document, all permanent alterations made to the tariff rates necessitated a full hearing before the general assembly, and so the General Council became the main clearinghouse for most major decisions concerning the *gabella maggiore*. If gabelle officials or members of the innermost oligarchy wanted to suggest such a change, their plans had to be laid before the assembly. And when tradesmen and merchants demanded lower rates for their wares, their petitions had to be palatable to the larger community represented by an assembly of one hundred and eighty men, along with their invited consultants.

As a result, petitions in the General Council concerning otherwise mundane subjects, like tanning or the tax on iron nails, tend to the dramatic, speaking of the general prosperity of the city and its ultimate survival rather than just the material interests of the community of artisans or merchants directly affected. The chancellor of the commune (*cancellarius comunis*), who compiled the *Riformagioni* out of the unpublished council minutes, seems to have found a certain appeal in this kind of
rhetorical noodling – and, I imagine, he enjoyed the challenge of rendering such vernacular petitions into fashionable Latin. Beneath the use of idiom and posturing, petition excerpts in the published and unpublished minutes often contain discursive descriptions of existing or desired laws, and we can examine such petitions’ self-justifications to better understand contemporary perspectives on Lucca’s economic health.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will return to the records of the *gabella maggiore* to highlight the salient features of three Lucchese industries: the production of luxury silk cloth, Lucca’s most famous export; tanning and leatherworking, which were important and well-established trades in Lucca just as they were in most other Italian communes; and, first of all, the nascent woolen cloth industry.\(^{17}\) Each of these industries was the subject about the *gabella maggiore* received this kind of public acknowledgement over the course of our survey period. These three trades also represent three different tiers of political influence. The inner oligarchy consisted of silk merchants, alongside those imbued with a certain *noblesse du robe*, such as notaries and doctors of law, and other prestigious long-distance traders like spicers and cloth importers. Needless to say, the silk industry maintained healthy representation whenever tariffs were the topic of discussion. Tanners were a sizeable and, as we shall see, sometimes effective activist group, but their members rarely sat on the Thirty-Six or were elected to the Anzianate. And the woolworkers were newcomers and had no political footprint to speak of, such that most discussion in the halls of power focused on policies surrounding the expedition of their products by entrepreneurs and their international brokers.

Over the course of my survey, all three of these groups developed grievances against the administration of the *gabella maggiore*. Some of these required redress in the form of serious statutory changes, while other complaints could be solved by temporary suspensions or licenses. Their collective strategies for effecting change reflected both the political power possessed by each group and the value of their trade to the local economy,

\(^{17}\) My use of the terms “trade” and “industry” rather than “guild” is intentional. Lucca was not a corporatist guild republic like Florence, nor do descriptive “briefs” of rights and regulations survive from this period for the wool, leather, and silk trades. The closest these industries had to corporate representation was the Corte de’ Mercanti, which also regulated the wool and silk industry, and the Fondaco, which contained regulations on tanning.
in terms of both the market and the fisc. To fully appreciate each legislative event as part of a continuum that reveals something about the nature of Lucchese political life, we need to determine the relationship of participants to the industry in question and the position held by that event within the history of the industry affected by it. In the course of my attempts to address these two aspects of industrial-political agency, I will rely on the registers of the *gabella maggiore* for perspective on the contemporary material framework.

4.1 The Production of Woollens in Lucca and the Lucchesia

As a demonstration of this methodology, let us first look at the production of woolen cloth in the city of Lucca. At the outset of our survey period, Lucca itself did not produce much woolen cloth, and its citizens’ needs were met by importation. From outside the Lucchesia, citizens imported both high-end materials, like Florentine scarlet and cloth slashed in silk, and cheaper stuffs, such as *grosso lano* from the Romagna. In brief, the bulk of this trade passed through the hands of Lucchese cloth dealers, *pannai*. Local production provided the remainder of Lucca’s needs, and most of this appears to have been based in the *contado*. According to the records of the *gabella maggiore*, the hinterland produced a steady supply of low-quality cloth called *arbagio* (*arbagium*) or *arbagiano*.

Interestingly, much of the low-quality cloth produced in the Lucchesia appears to have been produced under commission by urban residents. In 1373, a decree reestablished the “ancient statutes,” under which those importing this kind of cloth from rural weavers had to pay one tariff for the cloth and a second tariff for improvement based on the value of the weaving; this indicates both the antiquity of this type of transaction and the involvement of the importer in the manufacturing process. To be sure, *arbagiano* was not a local term nor a distinctly Lucchese concept, and it seems likely that some low quality woollens imported under the name of *arbagiano* were not produced in the Lucchesia. See, for example, the shipment made by Angelo Neri below, which included both *arbagiano* and cloth from north of the Alps. In any case, all *arbagiano* was low-quality woolen cloth.

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19 To be sure, *arbagiano* was not a local term nor a distinctly Lucchese concept, and it seems likely that some low quality woollens imported under the name of *arbagiano* were not produced in the Lucchesia. See, for example, the shipment made by Angelo Neri below, which included both *arbagiano* and cloth from north of the Alps. In any case, all *arbagiano* was low-quality woolen cloth.

20 ASLu, CG 3, pp. 495 (20/1/1373 | Sp): *Item que de pannis arbagiis qui fiunt in comitatu lucano solvatur gabella pro factura et pro introitu in civitate sicii solvebatur per statuta gabelle antiqua et nova statuta gabelle quo ad hec locum non habent*. The ‘new statutes’ of 1372 had a flat tax of 24 soldi per hundred
also some evidence of entrepreneurship here, since both the exportation of unworked wool to the countryside and the importation of *arbagiano* cloth over the course of my sample concentrated in the hands of relatively few individuals, as the table below indicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arbagiano Importers</th>
<th>Volume (libbre)</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>Raw Wool Exporters (to Vicariates only)</th>
<th>Volume (libbre)</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicolao Narducci</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>12.61%</td>
<td>Cristofano Moriconi</td>
<td>2485</td>
<td>17.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolao Nerini</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
<td>Giovanni Micheli</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>9.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolao Lupori</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>8.19%</td>
<td>Biagio Bartoli</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td>8.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michele Giuntini</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
<td>Piero Giovanni</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>7.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelo Neri</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>5.52%</td>
<td>Armannino da Piacenza</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessio Giovanni Paganucci</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>5.06%</td>
<td>Iacopo Stefani</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casino Vanni</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>Bargetta Vanni da Villabasilica</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>6.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Pauli</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
<td>Parasacchino Nino da Borgo Buggiano</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>6.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvatico Salesi</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>3.87%</td>
<td>Paulo Lippi</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>5.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forteguerra</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>3.76%</td>
<td>Antonio Morrucci</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 other merchants</td>
<td>5044</td>
<td>35.47%</td>
<td>64 other merchants</td>
<td>17862.5</td>
<td>61.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Importers of *Arbagiano* and Exporters of Wool to Vicariates, Total Sample²¹

None of the major importers of *arbagiano* cloth were personally responsible for exporting the raw material to the weavers from whom they sourced their wares. In fact, two of the chief exporters of wool to the vicariates were themselves identified with rural toponyms, Parasacchino Nino hailing from Borgo Buggiano and Bargetta Vanni from Villabasilica. Without arguing a negative, which is doubly impossible given the

²¹ Note that many of these merchants were not active in every year of the sample, a fact which will be made more explicit in our dossiers on other industries below.
ambiguous relationship between the listed taxpayer and the owner of the goods in question, there is no evidence that individual importers managed the manufacturing process *in toto.* Regardless, the very existence of a separate, “ancient” category of tariff suggests that the rural production of *arbagiano* was thoroughly integrated into the urban market for woolens.

In December 1381, as we discussed at the end of the last chapter, the General Council debated on the best path to address the decline of silk industry. The initial petition came from the *cives super introitibus*, a three-man council that was repeatedly elected for a period between three months and a year, and the major official of the *gabella maggiore*, ser Giovanni di ser Bartolomeo Linelli da Castiglione super Serchio. As their petition admitted, it was impossible to reverse the Peace of Turin, which had had the indirect effect of reopening northern markets to the Venetian silk industry and consequently enervated the Lucchese market – which, moreover, depended on the port at Genoa. To cushion the expected demographic consequences of the overall economic decline occasioned by this event, namely the emigration of silkworkers and others from the Lucchesia, they could invest in a domestic wool industry to provide work for Lucca’s inhabitants and draw immigrant workers to the city. In this way, they inadvertently

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22 Seven of the ten top importers of *arbagiano* were described, either in their tax entries, in the census of 1371-3 (Biblioteca Manoscritta 176, 176b), or in elections lists, as *pannai* or cloth dealers, whereas none of the major exporters of raw wool possessed this descriptor.

23 Silk and wool tended to be linked in this way in the legislative record. In the 1430s, similar fears about the silk industry led to new protectionist laws for the wool trade: see Bratchel, *Lucca, 1430-1494*, 155ff.

24 The election lists for the *cives super introitibus* are lacking between 1378 and 1382, but they were typically selected from a group of men who had held the Anzianate and were established merchants; the group elected in 1382, for example, consisted of ser Andrea Bellomi, Bartolomeo Buzolini, and Din Guinigi (CG 8, p. 36 [21/1/1382]).

25 CG 7, pp. 628ff [2/12/1381]. After describing the decline in Lucchese industry in the light of these events, the petition continues: “And it is not possible to offer a solution for this situation unless divine wisdom arranges the regions of the world for business and in a good state so that our silk manufactures can have a strong export market, which does not seem likely to happen in the near future” (*Et in hoc non est dare remedium nisi divina providentia partes mundi disponetur in actu et bono statu ita quod laborerii haberent bonam expeditionem quae non videtur extitutur de proximo*).

26 Ibid.: “As your lordships know, among the other chief things to be considered concerning the good of the state and the republic is to provide the means whereby the city might be full of inhabitants and strong, and also to take care that the inhabitants do not have grounds to leave; as a result, it seems to them [the petitioners] that it would be for the good of your city that this plan be put into effect immediately: that those living in the city should have a reason to stay and that foreigners should be offered a reason and a purpose for coming to our city to live, and henceforth they should be invited to come for this reason” (*...quod prout vestra dominatio novit inter ceterea principalia ad quo providendum sir circa bonum civitatis et rei publice est providere quam civitas habitatoribus repleatur et augmentetur et reparare*)
copied a model of their former occupiers, the Pisans, who invested heavily in wool industry infrastructure following the Battle of Meloria. After the erection of fulling mills and warehouses at the public expense, Pisa had, in Berti’s words, “meno vele al vento, più rumore di telai.” This was also, in some ways, identical to the means by which Lucca’s famous silk industry had been coopted abroad; as Molà has shown, emigrant Lucchese weavers in the early fourteenth century exported their trade to Venice, Bologna, and other cities with the assistance of local merchants and bankers, typically with the same kinds of inducements – tax privileges, open contracts, and facilities.

Of course, planning a renewed wool industry would not address problems in the silk industry directly, but the council took to the proposal with enthusiasm and elected a council of citizens to deal with the petitioners’ suggestions. These specific recommendations consisted of the suspension of the tariff on all foreign wool worth more than eight florins per hundred libbre, a free license for sending wool into the Lucchesia for spinning, and five years’ indemnity (franchisia) for immigrants arriving within three years – a temporary exemption in Lucchese courts from overdue debts and other complaints brought against the workers by foreigners. “And so,” the petition claims, “although the art of silk, which offered nourishment to the whole city and its people, is

quantum non habeant habitantes discedendi et pro tanto videtur eis quod ad bonum vestre civitatis expediat provideri per modum quod existentes et habitantes in civitate tamen habeant morandi et causa detur et materia forensibus veniendi ad habitandum et exinde ad sic veniendi invitentur).

27 Berti, Lana, panni e strumenti contabili nella Toscana bassomedievale e della prima età moderna, 17ff.


29 Ibid., 628-9: ...quod de lana Sancti Macthei, Borgogne, Anglie, et Scotie, et cuiusque alterius lane gentilis similiter predictis ut meliore [sic.] conducende de pelago et partibus Francie, itaque quod centenaria valeant octo florenos vel ultra mictenda in civitat nulla solvatur gabella... volentes illam posse mictere extra civitates per comitatus ad filandum et laborandum et remictere in civitate lucana sine ulla gabella liber e illa tamen scripta in curia lucana gabella vel ad portas pro remictendo... prout in pluribus aliis civitatebus Tuscie et [629] Italie quod quilibet forensis veniens ad habitandum in dicta vestra civitate et habitationem contrahendi haberet franchiam quod ad petitionem alicuius forensis in civitate lucana vel eius territorio non possit conveniri in persona vel civeri principaliter vel secundario seu accessorio infra quinque annos a die sui adventus ad habitandum incipiendi per aliquibus debitis per eum contractis extra civitatem lukanam et eius territorium ab inde retro cum aliquo cuiuscumque conditionis existat preter quam cum cive et similiter non possit conveniri pro iuribus cessis per forensem contra talem forensem habitantem alicui civi ad petitionem dicti talis civis cui cessa essent iura hanc tamen partem ad presens formando duraturam hinc ad tres annos proximos venturos et valituram solum pro venientibus infra dictos tres annos et hoc ut videri possit interim si bonum consequitur fructum et finem quo causa poterit prorogari.
declining and weakening, at least there will be a wool industry.”³⁰ The assumption, of course, was that merchants involved in importing raw silk and exporting silk cloth would be able to diversify their investments via this new industry, and this was by no means a matter of speculation. As Hoshino demonstrated, the Guinigi family, among others, had been engaged in the importation of English wool to Tuscany via Bruges up to the early 1370s, and other families like the Forteguerra and Rapondi had similarly penetrated these vital northern markets.³¹ Their enthusiasm for ser Giovanni’s plan, therefore, was in line with their commercial activity up to this point.

The balìa committee elected to deal with the matter met in February with the Anziani and the Twelve on the Conservation of Liberty – the Conservators, a smaller senatorial council that supplemented the role of the Thirty-Six in function but also held full balìa authority for their decisions.³² Together they published a list of eight statutes to foster the wool industry:

1. Five years’ indemnity (*franchigia*) for immigrant woolworkers, who need to be registered as such, within a month of their arrival, at the chancery of the Anziani
2. Immunity from the *gabella maggiore* for all personal possessions on entry
3. Five years’ immunity from the *g.m.* for all tools related to the wool trade
4. The tariff on wool, spun or raw, is permanently lifted
5. Wool can be sent into the *contado* for spinning without paying the *g.m.*
6. Yarn, weft and warp, can be sent into the *contado* for weaving without *g.m.*
7. No wool can be exported from the district, on penalty of loss of the merchandise and a penalty of one florin per *libbra* of material
8. Woolens made in Lucca can be exported without paying the *g.m.* provided that at least ten canne are being exported.³³

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³⁰ Ibid., 628: *Itaque deficiente et declinante arte sete que nutrimentum exibet tota civitati eiusque populo saltim sit ars lane, que valde conferret ad populum et civitatem nutriendum et sic habitantes causam haberet standa qua lucrarentur, et forensibus esset invitatio ut venirent ad habitandum in civitate.*
³² The *conservatores*, who were assembled for the first time in 1374, were an even more restricted group than the Anzianate, since its members sat for years at a time; as an idea, this emergency council exemplified the tendency of the inner oligarchy to agglomerate executive power in the face of external threats like those faced in the mid-late 1370s. See Meek, *Lucca, 1369-1400*, 237–48.
³³ CG 8, pp. 60-1 (26/2/1382 | Sp): see Appendix 4, Text 1.
After the criers got their hands on these ratified capituli, the immigration scheme apparently took off quite quickly. Woolworkers were an exceptionally mobile group in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and this program pulled out all the stops to court a strong labor force. By the end of March, the Twelve Conservators were already issuing grants of citizenship to immigrant woolworkers, including one to Michele di Lando, a wool carder famous for his leadership during the revolt of the Ciompi in Florence. Beyond the privileges listed above, such immigrants could expect substantial perks in the form of working space and housing, for which the committee had allotted a considerable sum. A building contractor named Giovanni della Fratta accepted a commission in mid April to make fulling mills (gualcheria), a drying house (tiratoio), a workshop (lavoratoio), and a laundry (purgo) of some sort for a salary of four florins per month. As Goldthwaite has noted, the capital-intensive part of wool manufacture was not in the structures or equipment but in the raw materials and labor, but this presupposes the existence of the requisite facilities; by investing in infrastructure, the commune performed the necessary first step to inviting private investment.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the major official of the gabella maggiore and the cives super introitibus – of which group only ser Giovanni Linelli was a stable member – continued to follow up with this scheme to set the wool industry on its feet. In 1384, they adjudged that the commune’s expenditures on the woolworkers’ behalf had actually gone

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34 Franceschi, Oltre il “tumulto”. I lavoratori fiorentini dell’Arte della Lana fra Tre e Quattrocento, 120–21. As Franceschi shows, the circulation of workers around Tuscany was not linear; at the same time as these privileges were published, woolworkers from the Lucchesia were immigrating to Florence. 
35 CG 8, p. 83 (28/3/1382 | Twelve).
36 The total to be spent was something more than three hundred florins, since the confusingly-worded ordinance states that the three hundred had to be spent within three months, but these florins were only part of a sum conceded for these matters. By whom this sum was authorized, precisely, does not appear in the statutes for this purpose. CG 8, p. 61: *E per meglio e più salutevilmence provedere a questi fatti non si possa infra tre mesi spendere piu che infine in somma di fiorini trecento doro de la somma concedi per artificis necessarii a la dicta arte.*
37 CG 8, p. 91 (16/4/1382 | A2); Giovanni was supposed to be working alongside a notary from the office of the exactor maior, an official who handled court fines and certain other revenues, but the book containing his accounts has been lost. Two foremans’ registers from 1384 do survive (ASLu, Beni e Fabbriche Pubbliche 12, 19), outlining public works project to reforge the commune’s official bell, repair the gates, and other similar commissions. Both detail the transmission of public funds, voted on by the Thirty Six, to individual masons, carpenters, and unskilled laborers. It seems likely that Giovanni della Fratta’s project had a similar organizational scheme. Cf. the Pisan 1305 Breve dell’Arte di Lana: Berti, *Lana, panni e strumenti contabili nella Toscana bassomedievale e della prima età moderna*, 26–27.
too far, and they recommended that the wool industry itself, in whatever form it existed, be responsible for maintaining the facilities that had been built for them. Among other things, their proposal clarifies that the building plan undertaken by the communal government in 1382 had indeed been carried out: the state was providing houses for dyeing, cleaning, and drying as well as tools and furniture (massaritie), and it was also paying twenty four florins a year to a master dyer. In 1384, the wool industry was not yet large enough to fully employ, and thus fully rent out, these facilities, but by 1390 the Thirty Six was once again considering building new facilities for washing, stretching, and dyeing.

Glaringly absent from the original eight provisions for the wool industry is anything approaching protectionism for local wool products. While woolens manufactured in the city was exempted from the export gabelle, those manufactured elsewhere could be imported without prejudice. In 1387, therefore, a proposal before the General Council took the logical step of restricting the importation of all Italian-made woolen cloth worth less than two and a half florins per canna. This effectively removed

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39 This was accomplished, cunningly enough, by assigning the buildings to “all engaged in the wool trade” (tutti quelli del arte de la lana) through a five year lease, which stipulated that the commune owed nothing for maintenance and the woolworkers owed nothing for rent: CG 9, p. 63 (4/3/1384 | Twelve): “Pare aloro che quelli edificii et massaritie siano da logare a tutti quelli del arte de la lana che in luca fanno l’arte per fine in cinque anni senza averne il comune denai o d’entrata, ne simile denai o spesa ne per li edificii ne per le massaritie ma ellino a tutte loro spese mantengnino et governnino. This particular idea, which was only part of a long list of suggestions to strengthen the fisc, was ratified by a separate balìa council a few weeks later; unfortunately, this ordinance also fails to list the names of the magistri artis lane who were taking up the locatio and going to be responsible for the buildings and their inventories: CG 9, p. 74 (14/3/1384 | Sp). 40 CG 9, p. 63 (4/3/1384 | Twelve): “First, it should be considered that, beyond the costs laid out by the commune in making the buildings and houses for the dyeworks and the laundries and driers for wool, as well as for the furnishings bought by that trade – which is not small – the master of the dyeworks also cost the commune twenty-four florins last year, and it will cost still more in every coming year until the wool trade has been multiplied to the point that the furnishings are rented out more often” (Prima che considerato che oltra le spese facte per lo comune in fare li edificii e case dela tintoria e purghi e tiratoi delalana et dele Massaritie comprate a quella arte che non è poga e gosto lanno passato anco al comune fiorini xxiii lo maestro delatintoria e assai piu gosterebbe per lo avenire ogni anno fine che l’arte de la lana non fusse meglio multiplicata oltra che anco le Massaritia si logorarebbero molto.) 41 CG 11, p. 236 (23/2/1390 | Thirty-Six): while a balìa commission was elected, there is no evidence that this proposal was subsequently put into effect; no contract appears in the Riformagioni. 42 CG 10, p. 285 (7/6/1387 | CG): Egregius legum doctor dominus guillelmus de flamnis alius consiliarius surgens ut scriptum dixit et consuluit quod autoritate presentis consili ut lucana civitas artificibus et arte lana repleatur et fecundetur et ut radices suas altius figat, Panni foresnes interi vel incisi quorum canna sit precii florenorum duorum cum dimidio vel minoris non possint decetero temporibus successivis innicti in civitatem lucanam nec in eius committaturn fortiam vel distriuctum sub pena perditionis pannorum et bestiarum super quibus inmitteretur vel portarentur salvis et exceptis pannis francigenis anglicis et ultramontanis non intelligendo ultramontanos anglicos vel francigenas pannos provinzales et catelanas qui
all non-luxury foreign cloth from the Lucchese marketplace, a drastic step taken so that
the industry, as the counsel from domino Guglielmo de’ Fiammi put it, “would plant its
roots more deeply” in the city by yoking local consumption. This ordinance did not affect
the locally-produced albagiano, but it did exclude all Tuscan or Romagnol cloths of
middling to poor quality.

With this act, the fostering of the Lucchese wool trade had finally run directly
against the interests of an established class of merchant: the pannai or clothier who dealt
in woolens imported from abroad. While black Ultramontane cloths or Florentine greens
and scarlets must have been their most impressive wares, many pannai dealt in humbler
material as well; on 24 April 1378, for example, the clothier Angelo Neri imported over a
hundred libbre of albagiano alongside one and a half canne of fine northern cloth.43 As a
result, wealthy and well-connected pannai began trying to get the ban on low-quality
imports lifted in February 1389, about eight months after it came into effect; this first
petition was not approved by the General Council and survives only in the unpublished
minutes.44 The pannai returned again in March, then in April, a year later in March 1390,
and finally in 1391, but to no avail.45 The inconclusive debates, which survive in an
abbreviated form due to the terse style of the unpublished minutes, reveal a fractious
political elite arguing against itself. In April 1389, for example, this was the tenor of the
dispute:

*anglici ultramontani et francigene more solito possunt inmitti et ut civitas fulciri possit pannis necessariis
per artifices civitatis ut omnis cesset necessitas, hoc decretem seu lex et sanctio incipiat locum habere et
vires sumere in kalendis julii anni nostri domini mcccclxxxviii proximi securi.*

43 GM 17, f. 108v (24/4/1378).
44 The ban was voted on in June 1387 but did not become law until July 1388; AaTdL 4, p. 121 (5/2/1389 | 
CG): “Niccolò Folchini has consulted that, ignoring the decree to the contrary, cloth of every kind should
be able to be imported into the city of Lucca with the required tariff. Lord Lodovico Mercati has consulted
that the lords [Anziani] together with the cives super introitibus and two citizens per terziere should be able
to make provisions... Lord Tomaso [da Ghivizzano] [agrees]... Lazzare di Niccolò Guinigi [agrees]...” and
the passage ends, inconclusive (Nicolaus Folchini consuluit quod non obstante decreto in contrarium
disponente panni cuiuscumque maneriei sani et incisi possint inmitti in citatem lucanam cum solutione
debite gabelle. Dominus Lodovicus mercati consuluit quod domini una cum civibus super introitus et
duobus civibus per terzerium de quibus eis videbitur possint presentis autoritate consilii providere...
dominus Tomas consuluit idem... Lax N guinigii consuluit idem...).
45 AaTdL 4, p. 185 (26/3/1389); AaTdL 4, pp. 190-1 (8/4/1389); AaTdL 4, pp. 396-7 (28/3/1390 | CG);
AaTdL 4, pp. 651-2 (6/10/1391 | CG).
Niccolò ser Pagani: “Both for the common good and that of individual people, up to five hundred [low quality] cloths should be able to be imported into the city over the next six months.”

Opizo Onesti: “Two hundred pieces.”

Giovanni Sbarra: “Cloth of every kind and price should be able to be imported freely.”

Dino Moriconi: “Nothing should be done.”

Domenico Cosciorini: “Niccolò is right, except Provençal and Catalan cloths should not be excepted from the ban.”

Giovanni Turchi: “For the next six months, cloth of every price should be able to be imported into the city of Lucca.”

Piero Rapondi: “As Dino said, nothing should be done.”

Francesco Dati: “The Anziani ought to meet with the cives super introitibus and two citizens from each terziere to decide how many cloths ought to be imported.”

Andrea da Portico: “The forbidden cloths should be able to be imported for the next six months, except for Catelan and Provençal cloth – and by Catelan and Provençal I don’t mean cloth of Cadiz or Perpignan – but not after those six months.”

After Andrea’s suggestion, the recorded minutes cease with no indication that a vote was called.

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46 Paraphrased from AaTdL 4, pp. 190-1 (8/4/1389): Nicolaus ser Pagani... consuluit... tam pro comuni utilitute quam singularium personarum inmitti possit in civitatem lucanam hinc ad sex proximos futuros menses usque in quingentos pannos de quibus in petitone petitur non obstante reformatione in congrarium... opisum honesti consuluit de ducentis petiis... Johannes sbarra consuluit quod libere possit inmitti panni cuiuscumque maneriei vel precii... dinus moriconis consuluit quod fiat nullam... domenicus cosciorini consuluit ut nicolaus dommodo non exceptentur panni provinciales et catalani... Johannes turchii consuluit quod hinc ad sex menses proximos possint inmitti in civitatem lucanam panni cuiuscumque pretii... pierus rapondi consuluit ut dinus... franciscus dati quod domini una cum civibus super introitubs et duobus per terz' possit provid'... quot panni inmitti possit [191] et Andreas de porticu consuluit... panni vetiti hinc ad sex menses proximis exceptis catalanis et provincaltibus non intendendo catalanos vel provincales cades vel perpignanas ab dictis vero sex mensibus ultra nullo modo inmitti possint...
Even without untangling the networks of patronage and family alliances lurking behind this dispute, one can imagine the annoyance felt by those pannai trying to reverse the ban. But a permanent ordinance ratified by the General Council had the force of statute, and the kind of quick fix one might expect from a smaller balìa committee was therefore difficult to attain. Fittingly enough, the ban was finally lifted in June 1392 at a meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Four, who were elected with emergency balìa power in the wake of the May crisis, rather than at the General Council. In their successful petition, the pannai alleged a dire shortage of low-quality cloth necessary for making clothing for children, but one assumes that the Guinigi-led Twenty-Four were already sympathetic to the idea; Lazzare di Niccolò Guinigi, for example, had been in favor of lifting the ban back in 1389, and several of the Twenty-Four, such as Andrea da Portico or domino Tommaso da Ghivizzano, had registered opinions to that end in the inconclusive debates described above. In any case, the committee agreed that cheap cloth made from Sardinian wool and Savonese taccolino and bianchetta ought to be permitted for importation; less than a year later, in February, the General Council overturned the ban in its entirety, permitting the entry of Romagnol and Tuscan cloth worth less than one florin.

One could frame opposition to the ban on cheap cloth importation as originating within the Guinigi faction, particularly given that it was the Guinigi ascendancy that immediately preceded its dissolution. We can see over the course of this dispute that families identified with the Guinigi, such as the Onesti or the Sbarra, consistently favored the side of the pannai. It is certainly evocative of a factional dispute that members of these families argued against Piero Rapondi and Dino Moriconi, a future exile and a future exile’s brother, in 1389. But the initial ban was popular in the General Council,

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47 CG 12, p. 141 (14/6/1392 | Twenty-Four); the Twenty-Four were elected on 15 May 1392 after an emergency meeting of the General Council, which devolved, among other things, the power to alter all statutes, reforms, and decrees including those which required the intervention of the General Council by the terms of the statute of 1372: ASLu, CG 12, pp. 98-102.

48 Ibid.:

49 CG 12, p. 271 (27/2/1393 | CG).
and it seems unlikely that the thirty votes against it represented a Guinigi party position.\(^{50}\)

Dino Guinigi himself had been on the council of Anziani who forwarded this petition to the General Council in 1387.\(^{51}\)

In fact, if we set aside these kinds of tangential political pressures, the long-term survival of the ban on cheap cloth is even more remarkable. The deadlock demonstrates the difficulty of rescinding major changes to the *gabella maggiore*, even when members of the inner oligarchy threw their support behind the act. After all, of the eight *pannai* who identified themselves in the 1392 petition before the Twenty-Four, only two had never achieved the Anzianate, while the remaining six had been elected for a total of sixty-one terms; many of them had also sat on the influential *cives super introitibus* committee.\(^{52}\) Despite this influence, it took a full three years for them to overturn the ban.

Whatever harm the ban on low-value cloth had on the business of the *pannai*, it seems that protective legislation did have the intended effect of boosting local woolen cloth production, which was firmly established by the turn of the fifteenth century. We can trace this growth through the language used in legislation. In 1384, the petition to lease out the woolworkers’ lodgings complained that the industry was not yet large enough to fully utilize that space.\(^{53}\) By 1387, one proposal, specifically the one that culminated in domino Guglielmo de’ Fiammi’s recommendation for a low-value import ban, spoke of a wool industry that “had begun, starting a short time ago, to build up strength in the city.”\(^{54}\) Another petition, which succeeded in renewing immunities for woolworkers, noted that “at this point, the craft has really grown and has profited citizens and *contadini* as well as the commune”.\(^{55}\) By 1390, as noted, the Thirty-Six had to

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\(^{50}\) The ban was passed by a wide margin of 124 ayes to 30 nays: CG 10, p. 285 (7/6/1387 | CG).\(^{51}\) Extracted at CG 10, p. 256 (22/4/1387) for the term of 1 May to 30 June 1387.\(^{52}\) ASLu, CG 12, p. 141: Nuccio Giovanni, 12 terms as Anziano; Francesco Berindelli, 11 terms; Casino Vanni, 11 terms; Niccolò Neri, 10 terms; Agostino Puccinelli, 9 terms; Giovanni Parducci, 8 terms; only Michele Gualardi and Tomaso Nicolai are unattested in the *tasche* of Anziani between 1369 and 1400.\(^{53}\) CG 9, p. 63, see note 38 above: *et assai piu gosterebbe per lo avenire ogni anno fine che l arte de la lana non fusse meglio multiplicata* – suggesting that it had not yet reached that position.\(^{54}\) CG 10, p. 285, see note 40 above; the proposal begins: *Cum ars lane a pauco tempore citra in civitate lucana incepit vires assumere...*\(^{55}\) CG 10, p. 225 (24/2/1387 | CG): *...hucusque ars illa valde profuit et contulit tam civibus et comitatinis quam comuni quia vere civitas magis habitatur et repletur;* the proposal also narrowed the gabelle exemption on imported wool to solely that wool “which is imported for making into cloth” (*Cum hac declaratone quod solum illa lana sit a gabella introitus exempta que pro operando in panno faciendo duttaxat inmitteretur et non alia...*).
consider the necessity of building, at public expense, new facilities for processing finished cloth.\textsuperscript{56} And when the General Council finally lifted the ban on importing low-quality woolens in 1393, the proposal spoke of a wool industry that simply did not produce such low-quality cloth, not necessarily that they could not produce \textit{enough} of that cloth: “It is apparent that cloths of which one \textit{canna} would be worth a single florin or less cannot be produced by our woolworkers or wool craftsmen, and a severe problem results from this situation, as much for the revenues of the commune as for poor people.”\textsuperscript{57}

We can also observe the strength of this industry over the last quarter of the fourteenth century through the records of the \textit{gabella maggiore}. To begin with a brief recapitulation, in 1381-2, on the advice of ser Giovanni Linelli and the \textit{cives super introitibus}, the communal government began to issue legislation and develop physical infrastructure to foster an urban wool industry. They were responding to the end of the War of Chioggia and an expected decline of silk cloth exports, but their project was explicitly designed to stem the demographic consequences of this decline – the wool industry was intended to elicit immigration and curb emigration more than produce an export commodity. By 1387, in fact, the General Council established a ban on importing low-value woolen cloth, suggesting that the counselors envisioned some form of import substitution.

Because of these features, there are three key metrics that would gauge how well this legislative scheme worked: the import volume of low-value cloth; the import volume of raw or spun wool; and the export volume for Lucchese woolens. Unfortunately, since the ordinances of 1382 indefinitely suspended the tariff on exported Lucchese woolens, provided that at least ten \textit{canne} were being exported at once, it is impossible to determine how much the urban industry produced for exportation. Similarly, the ordinances suspended the tariff on unworked wool imported to the city or sent to the \textit{contado} for spinning, and there exist no records from 1385, 1387, 1392, or 1397 for the wool used in
urban wool production. We do, however, have the figures for unworked wool sent to the *contado* for use by the extraurban weavers who produced *arbagiano* cloth. And in 1401 and 1410, because of the surtax on goods entering the city from Pisa, the records preserve the annual volumes for all unworked wool arriving from Pisa alone, even though the taxpayer in each case only paid the surtax and not the base tax. We can also determine how much *arbagiano*, *taccolino*, *sardesco*, and *romagnolo* cloth entered the city in these years – bearing in mind that the latter three categories were banned for half of 1387 and half of 1392.\(^58\)

The following table summarizes the annual volume of these items in turn: unworked wool imported into Lucca; unworked wool exported directly from Lucca into the *contado*; *arbagiano* cloth imported into Lucca; and the total imported volume of *taccolino*, *sardesco*, and *romagnolo* (R/T/S), the three varieties of cloth explicitly identified as low-value cloth. The fifth category contains an index for the year in question, representing the deviation of that year’s *gabella maggiore* revenue from the average annual revenue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Wool Imported</th>
<th>Wool to Contado</th>
<th>Arbagiano Imported</th>
<th>R/T/S</th>
<th>Total Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>23562</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>3205</td>
<td>4209</td>
<td>-9.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>7238</td>
<td>2506</td>
<td>5945</td>
<td>7541</td>
<td>26.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>2932</td>
<td>1289</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>~2500?</td>
<td>(~3800?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>3380</td>
<td>1686</td>
<td>4576</td>
<td>27.12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>6067</td>
<td>8.05%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>5092</td>
<td>-40.96%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>16025</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2362</td>
<td>5.95%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>30245</td>
<td>2068</td>
<td>2810</td>
<td>-24.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Volumes Relevant to Urban Wool Industry, in *Libbre*  

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\(^58\) One should also note that small quantities of low-value woolen cloth may have been cleared at the gate gabelles and thus never registered at the Pinelli house. Our totals for these items, then, must represent a low bar.
The first year of my survey recorded an extremely high volume of unworked wool imports, but it is not clear how much of that was intended for weaving within the city. Unlike in other years, it is difficult to determine how much wool was actually exported for weaving in the contado in 1373, given that the General Council issued a year-long suspension on the export tariff in January of that year. Between 1373 and 1378, the importation of raw wool declined precipitously, but we can see that around a third of all wool imported to Lucca in 1378 went to the contado for weaving or spinning. It seems possible that a similarly large portion of those 24,000 libbre in 1373 was consigned to rural industry. The city continued to funnel wool towards the contado through the 1380s, even after the urban industry had begun to satisfy the demand for non-luxury cloth. Presumably, this was a side effect of the suspension in 1382 of the import gabelle on unworked wool. The preexisting rural weaving industry was well-positioned to take advantage of this exemption, which might be why the 1387 decree that extended the woolworkers’ franchigia for another five years also stipulated that the 1382 ordinance only be applied to wool imported to the city for weaving. By the 1390s, the re-exportation of wool to the vicariates had begun to slacken, and it remained low through the fifteenth century.

By that point, in any case, the finished goods produced by weavers in the hinterland must have been oriented towards markets other than Lucca. The importation of arbagiano, which had reached a peak in 1378, was lower in the sample years of the 1380s and 1390s, culminating in an apparent slump in the first decade of the fifteenth century. Unlike arbagiano, however, the volume of romagnolo, sardesco, and taccollino imported into Lucca did not decline significantly until the fifteenth century, despite the half-year bans in 1387 and 1392. These were, in fact, among the only goods not to suffer significantly from the commercial depression during the war year of 1397. It may be the case that the Lucchese industry had led to a decline in weaving in the vicariates and Sei Miglia. Alternatively, the figures might suggest that cheap foreign woolens were an alternative to arbagiano; as the Lucchese enterprise competed for raw materials with the rural arbagiano industry, it necessarily created a demand for cheap cloth that could no longer be met by the contado. Either interpretation indicates that the case of the pannai was indeed valid: these three low-value products, whether like or unlike locally-produced
arbagiano, do not seem to have competed in the same markets as the cloth produced in Lucca. But the low volume of romagnolo, sardesco, and taccolino imports in the first decade of the fifteenth century may indicate that Lucchese weavers had begun to diversify to meet this demand as well.

It is difficult to gauge how the Lucchese industry itself developed over this period due to the suspension of the tariffs on raw wool and Lucchese woolens. But in 1401 and 1410, when we have some sense of the volumes involved due to the surtax on Pisan imports, we can see that the wool industry was importing significant quantities of unworked wool, very little of which was destined for re-exportation. In 1401, in fact, when the industry would have been recovering after a plague year, the city brought from Pisa alone over twice what it did from all sources in 1378. Since the figures from the early fifteenth century represent only that wool imported from Pisa, the volumes of imported unworked wool in 1401 and 1410 suggest an urban wool industry that was much stronger than it had been in the 1370s. Its products had evidently driven rural-woven arbagiano out of the market, and it seems likely that some weavers were producing material to compete with lower-quality sardesco, taccolino, and romagnolo.

There are a few scattered indications that this new industrial concern had attracted merchants from abroad, which would indeed validate the proposals from 1381. In the summer of 1388, for example, an unnamed Catalan merchant approached Niccolò Cecchorini da Poggio, the Lucchese advocate (orator) in Genoa, hoping to unload some wool at Motrone. The Thirty-Six authorized a committee of twelve to arrange plans to attract the Catalans over the longer term, including the disbursement of four hundred florins to repair and outfit the port; they also directed this balia committee to permit one ship’s load of wool to disembark without payment of the gabella maggiore. This may

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59 Melis, for example, found little to no evidence of Lucchese woolen cloth on the Pisan market in the second half of the fourteenth century: Industria e commercio nella toscana medievale, 108–52.
60 ASLu, CG 10, p. 504 (16/7/1388 | Thirty-Six). The Catalans were familiar with the Versilian coast further south, having established a college in Pisa nearly a century earlier: Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study in Urban Growth, 171.
61 AaTdL 4, p. 56 (16/7/1388 | Thirty-Six): ...possint expendere pro reparazione at aptatione portus Motronis usque in florenos IIII auris de pecunia lucani comunis cognoscente quod utile et fructuosum sit et quod una navis lane cuiusdam catellani possit appellere in dictum portum et exonerare dictam lanam sine solutione gabelle...; in December, a further two hundred florins were disbursed for this project (AaTdL 4, p. 113 [23/12/1388]).
have been the start of a stronger relationship between Lucca and Aragon: in 1390 the Thirty-Six assigned a further two thousand florins to projects at Motrone, and in 1403 the government of Paolo Guinigi issued a safeconduct to Catalans and other Aragonese, noting that their voyages to Lucca had become both *utile* and *necessarium*.\(^{62}\) Certainly direct access to raw materials from the Kingdom of Aragon via Motrone, rather than indirect access through Pisa and Genoa, would have proven beneficial for the growing wool industry – not to mention the tannery, which relied on imported skins, as we shall see. Melis estimated that, at its height in the late Trecento, Motrone could have played host to large vessels, bringing in hundreds of tonnes of material from Languedoc or Aragon.\(^{63}\)

Nevertheless, in the absence of complete data on woolen cloth exports or raw wool imports, it is impossible to say for certain whether the efforts of ser Giovanni Linelli and those ambitious panels of *cives super introitibus* in the early 1380s accomplished the goal of offsetting the damage done by the Peace of Turin. What information we do have from the records of the *gabella maggiore*, supplemented by ordinances and statutory adjustments in the *Riformagioni* and council minutes, suggests that the Lucchese wool industry did indeed develop in response to their efforts. The cautiousness evinced by the *General Council* towards changes to protective measures, like the ban on importing cheap woolen cloth, indicates a strong desire on the part of the broader oligarchy to support a successful venture. By the second half of the fifteenth century, as Bratchel has shown, the Lucchese woollen industry had succeeded in attracting a number of economic immigrants and seemed able to satisfy local demand for mid-range cloth.\(^{64}\) It had achieved the goal of attracting new, tax-paying residents to the city.

However the new trade ended up a century later, its launch was plagued with procedural infelicities. The government’s inability to rescind the ban on *sardesco*, *romagnolo*, and *taccolino* cloth, which, as we have seen, did not compete with Lucchese manufactures in the 1380s and 1390s, again underscores the inflexibility and sluggishness

\(^{62}\) AaTdL 4, p. 413 (22/6/1390); GPG 1, p. 208 (13/12/1403).
\(^{63}\) Melis, *Industria e commercio nella toscana medievale*, 67. To be sure, as Melis notes, Motrone had certain disadvantages, such as its exposure to storms and the absence of a reliable waterway inland.
of the General Council. When faced with competing accounts of an economic phenomenon – the necessity of the ban in the original decree and the scarcity described by the *pannai* – the large assembly entered a deadlock only broken by the spilling of blood in May 1392, when they delegated their power to alter statutes to the Twenty-Four.

In light of this later standstill in the General Council, it is worth noting that the original set of privileges and exemptions from 1382 did compete with another account of economic necessity, that which would consider the strength of the commune’s revenues to be their only lifeline in the face of war. Many things done to strengthen the nascent wool industry, after all, reduced the revenues of the *gabella maggiore*, and woolens could not buy or beg off the services of a mercenary captain like John Hawkwood, particularly not the middling-quality wool envisioned by the *cives super introitibus* in 1381.\(^{65}\) In this case, however, a farsighted plan to improve the economy overcame the conservative instincts of the General Council. I suspect that a significant factor in this ambitious legislative effort was the support of ser Giovanni Linelli, the frequent major official of the *gabella maggiore*, who lent his voice to both the initial petition in December 1381 and the ordinances of 1382.

As demonstrated by his military adventures in the late 1390s, ser Giovanni had personal ambitions beyond enriching the Lucchese treasury. But before his exile in the mid-1390s, and before the escapades that occasioned his disgrace, he seems to have been considered the foremost authority on the city’s economy. In May 1392, as part of the emergency measures designed to shore up the bloodstained republic, the Twenty-Four reappointed ser Giovanni to the office of the Abondanza, which governed the city’s grain stores among other things, and added the duties of the major official of the *gabella maggiore* and the *proventus* to this as well; this super-office lasted for a year.\(^{66}\) They created this position despite the various mandatory vacations and statutes which forbade such an agglomeration, due to “how much trouble the Abondanza received after the removal of ser Giovanni da Castiglione from the office” and “the most evident public

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65 Caferro, “Warfare and Economy in Renaissance Italy, 1350-1450,” 190ff. See also Caferro, “Travel, Economy, and Identity in Fourteenth-Century Italy: An Alternate Interpretation of the ‘Mercenary System’.”

66 CG 12, p. 127 (29/5/1392 | Twenty-Four).
utility” of restoring him.\textsuperscript{67} The term “evident utility” is a phrase that signals the usage of \textit{balìa} or otherwise super-statutory power, found frequently in emergency decisions of the Anziani concerning the gates in times of siege or providing gabelle exemptions in times of famine.\textsuperscript{68} This appointment was surely the culmination of his career as a bureaucrat-vizier, an enduring presence whose advice the Anziani and governing councils rarely disregarded.

In 1381, ser Giovanni’s seal of approval alleviated the burden of responsibility felt by councilors and committee-members as they debated new policies with unforeseeable outcomes. It certainly helps that, here as elsewhere, the major official’s advice had a positive result. To be sure, ser Giovanni, perhaps more than any other fiscal official, would have had an acute awareness of the health of the Lucchese economy in terms of both consumption and production. Although he presumably relied more on his perception and position than the records produced in the court of the \textit{gabella maggiore}, ser Giovanni must have known when the local market was affected by scarcity or open to new modes of exploitation, both by the fisc and by entrepreneurs. That this knowledge led to such political power, to the extent that a notary from the Garfagnana was elevated beyond his title and even despite the prescription of the statutes, suggests that this kind of expertise was especially valuable to the members of the governing councils. Ser Giovanni may have been better informed on these subjects than the members of the inner oligarchy, or in any case he must have appeared to have such specialist knowledge.

The story of Lucca’s late medieval wool industry was marked by uncertainty, constitutional infelicities, and the importance placed on expert advice, which describe the shortcomings of economic legislation during the republican period. I will now proceed to an analysis of two industries for which we have more complete commercial data: the urban tanneries and the silk cloth industry. As I hope to demonstrate, fiscal legislation

\textsuperscript{67} CG 12, p. 127 (29/5/1392 | Twenty-Four): \textit{considerantes... quantum damni ipsa abundantia receperit post amotionem ser Johannis de Castilione ab officio supradicto pro evidentissima utilitate publica elegerunt et nominaverunt... [etc.]; much more could be said about ser Giovanni, a fascinating figure whose economic advice and political career deserve separate treatment insofar as he tracks alongside the political ascendance of the Guinigi family.

\textsuperscript{68} Massimo Vallerani has noted the prominence of this same phrase, \textit{evidens utilitas}, in the independent acts of the Bolognese Anzianiate after the new statute of 1376; \textit{utilitas} helped the Anziani “per superare i limiti, per altro non chiari, imposti dal tradizionale sistema comunale delle coesistenze istituzionali”: Vallerani, “L’arbitrio negli statuti cittadini del Trecento,” 134–36.
failed to address the complaints arising from both of these trades; despite – or perhaps because of – the city’s long association with leather and silk, the governing councils had more success fostering the production of woolens. For the leather industry in particular, new ordinances respecting otherwise ‘expert’ advice had unexpected and disastrous consequences.

4.2 Economic and Political Movements within the Urban Tannery

We know relatively little about the location of the woolworking facilities developed in accordance with the ordinances of 1382. I did find that one gualcheria, or fulling-mill, was located next to a flourmill at the cataratta di piscilla, a culvert north of the Porta di San Gervasio feeding into the canal (fratta) that separated the old city walls from the suburbs (borghi). According to another proposal in the General Council, the housing units (casalini) for new residents were to be built in the precinct of the old Augusta, in the southwest corner of the city. What is clear, however, is that these buildings and the activities associated with them would have contributed new noises and odors to the urban streetscape. But, perhaps because it was centrally planned, the development of this new industry did not occasion any public order complaints, at least none that found their way into the official and unofficial minutes of the Anziani and their governing councils. Without a doubt, the establishment of Lucchese woolworking as a

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69 The association of the fulling mill and the ‘fish pond’ beyond the culvert appears in several items from the Riformagioni: the initial sale of rights over a new flour mill and gualcheria to Turellino Bonucci in 1383 at CG 8, p. 466 (2/3/1383 | Az) – Bonucci was, perhaps unsurprisingly, on the committee charged with constructing the buildings (CG 8, p. 273 [26/9/1382 | Az]); an ordinance authorizing the release of Turellino Bonucci from these rights due to repairs being conducted on the canal that rendered the waterwheels useless (CG 11, p. 428 [20/2/1391 | Thirty-Six]); and, most explicitly, a complaint from one messer Galvano Bovi, who purchased the fishing rights of the piscilla and the whole canal for ten years, states that he had witnessed the canal being emptied of water and fish due to the need to “repair the fulling-mill at the pond” (conciare la gualghiera che è a piscilla: CG 10, p. 259 [10/5/1387 | CG]).

70 ASLu, CG 8, p. 250 (8/9/1382 | CG): the location was proposed by ser Andrea Bellomi, in response to a petition complaining of the “dearth and scarcity which exists in the city of Lucca in terms of houses and habitations, considering that, as the aforementioned wool trade expands – as by the grace of God [we] hope will happen – many new people will come here to live” (considerando la necessita et stretteza che in la cita di luca e di case et abitazioni et che moltiplicando la dicta arte dela lana in luca come per la gratia di dio sperano che fara molta gente dinuovo ci verra ad habitare). To be sure, I found no explanation of what became of these houses or whether they were even constructed, and the handbooks of the public overseer (massaio) do not survive from the period 1382-3.
major industrial concern must have affected the city and its inhabitants, but the placement of homes and work facilities did not cause sustained public outcry.

In contrast, we know exactly where tanning and leatherworking occurred in Lucca precisely because these activities created long-lasting aesthetic and sanitary problems that the government could not overlook.\footnote{Lucca was not alone in this: for Siena, see Szabó, “Lo spazio pubblico nel Costituto volgarizzato: genesi dei principi di ordini, decoro e igiene nell’urbanistica di Siena.”; for a general overview of the zoning legislation with regards to the tanning industry, see Bocchi, “Ecologia urbana nelle città medievali italiane.”} In the late fourteenth century, Lucchese tanners imported both fresh and processed skins, some of which were already depilated and cleansed of the subcutaneous fatty layer, and many more completely unprocessed skins would have come from urban and suburban butchers.\footnote{An ordinance for butchers in 1389, for example, banned them from “killing, butchering, and skinning” animals in a public street described as the \textit{taverna maior}, evidently producing material for the tanning industry as a byproduct; supplying further context to the location of the fulling mill described above, the same decree ordered them to transport their offal to the \textit{piscilla}, where the intestines could be cleaned for other uses, such as for the core of gold thread: CG 11, pp. 67ff (31/3/1389 | Sp): Quod nulis carnifex seu \textit{macellator}... debeat vel presumat occidere mactare excoriare... in via publica in qua solitum est macellum fieri... Item quod omnia intestina seu ventres porcorum boium vaccarum vitularum et quaruncumque... evacuari et lavari debeant extra civitatem lucanam et extra burgos muratos et foveos in aqua piscille vel alia aqua... See also Costantini, “Tra lavoro e rivolta: i carnaoli senesi nello specchio del Costituto del 1309-1310.”} The process of turning these hides or membranes into leather involved animal brains, feces, and urine, among other things, and the effluvia included rotten fat and polluted water. Between their unpleasant start and malodorous finish, the skins had to be submerged in open vats of urine or treated water for a week or more, hung up in the open to stretch and dry, and plied with tannins like alum and gall. Like the butcher’s art, which involved the emptying of intestines and the disposal of offal, tanning had an unmistakable impact on its environs; more than merely effect, it determined the character of a neighborhood.

As a result, the city did its best to physically restrict these noxious activities within certain physical and temporal bounds. In the statute of 1308, an ordinance concerning the elimination of “putrescence” (\textit{putretudo}) from public streets commanded that no skins be stretched out in the street and that the plaza around the church of San Pietro Somaldi should be kept clear of skins during Lent, on festivals, and on Sundays.\footnote{Bongi, \textit{Statuto del comune di Lucca dell’anno MCCCXVIII}, 221. CXL. De non tenendo coria in viis publicis nec in platea S. Petri Somaldi. Ut putredo cesset in viis et stratis lucane Civitatis, statuimus, quod nulla coria possint tendi vel poni in aliqua via publica lucane Civitatis... Item, quod in platea sancti Petri...}
It is notable that this decree mentions only those holidays, which means it was licit for such materials to sit within that precinct during the rest of the year. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, then, the tanners maintained their base near the Piazza S. Pietro Somaldi in the northeastern corner of the town, just within the circuit of the then-new walls – not far, in fact, from the Fratta, the canal associated with the mills described above. The proximity of the canal may have made it easier for the tanners to dispose of befouled water.

But by the late Trecento, industrial activity seems to have migrated to the west to align with the modern streets whose names witness the medieval industry: the Via Pelleria (Tannery Road), the Via delle Conce (Leather Street), and the Via S. Tommaso, named for the parish church of S. Tommaso in Pelleria, known in the medieval period as S. Tomeo. We can only guess at the changes in the urban fabric that made such a shift possible, given that the statute of 1308 explicitly localized the tannery to the opposite side of town. But by then, the government of the restored republic had published its own sanitary ordinances, beginning with the 1372 statute of the officialis viarum (street official). Among other things, the statute banned uncovered latrines, ordered the use and cleaning of both dry (i.e. for sewage) and normal wells, and generally forbade dirting the streets. Although the tanners escaped explicit mention in the statute of 1372, the odor, polluted water, and foul appearance of skins during the tanning process eventually required that this new headquarters in the Contrada San Tomeo be delimited by a strict zoning law.
That legislation finally arrived in 1382 as a result of a dispute, which, together with its aftermath, seems to characterize the political position of the leather industry with regards to the urban government. In brief, the tanners provoked a very strong pushback from their neighbors in the early 1380s due to the expansion of workshops and facilities beyond the traditional boundaries of the Contrada San Tomeo. Two such aggrieved individuals, Chiarino Pagani and Francesco Dati, presented the following complaint, claiming to act on behalf of the Contradas of San Giorgio and San Pelegrino as well as the “good and utility of the commune of Lucca”:

As is known to you lords, the city is small, has few citizens, and is more afflicted by plague than other nearby cities, such that it is that much more necessary to keep an eye on sanitation... and also that much more necessary to conserve the beauty of the land and purge pollution. We notify you that, just a while ago, the tanners moved from their accustomed areas with their workshops, which used to stand in in the Contrada di San Tomeo, and they have come to set up with their shops outside in the main street. They are tanning fresh, putrid skins and setting unwashed hides and sheepskins out to dry along the street in stinking urine. As a result, one can hardly survive in the neighborhood due to the stench, and, besides the stench, the sight of our eyes cannot stand to see such things.

This petition demonstrates that the visual and olfactory offenses of tanning were considered exceptional even within the unpleasant streetscape of the premodern city.

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76 CG 8, pp. 222-223 (12/8/1382 | Twelve): Esponsi reverentemente per parte di Chiarino Pagani e Francesco Dati e degli altri vicini dela contrada di San Giorgio e di San Pelegrino per bene e utilita della comita di Luca e de dicti vicini... With regards to the status of these two individuals, only Dati seems to have been well-connected; he was a silk merchant, although one drawn as Anziano only once, in 1377 (CG 6, p. 139). Beyond that, however, he was a fairly constant presence in the Thirty-Six (six elections between 1372 and 1381) and in balìa councils. Dati was one of the twelve who drafted the butchers’ ordinance described above (n. 70), and he was also one of the men who petitioned for, and then drafted, new sumptuary legislation in 1380 (CG 7, p. 280 [26/6/1380 | CG]; ibid.; p. 285 [28/6/1380]). Meek notes that he was one of the original conservatores: Meek, *Lucca, 1369-1400*, 243, n. 48. While Chiarino Pagani does not appear in elections lists during my survey, he had been a factor in Francesco Buzolini’s silk firms in the early 1370s (Corte de’ Mercanti 82, f. 6r [1371]; ibid. 83, p. 15 [1372]).

77 Ibid., p. 222: Esponsi reverentemente per parte di Chiarino Pagani e Francesco Dati e degli altri vicini dela contrada di San Giorgio e di San Pelegrino per bene e utilita della comita di luca e de dicti vicini, chome a voi signori manifesto la cita e picola e con poghi cittadini e piu offesa dala morte che altri nostri vicini siche per tanto si conviene oservare la sanita e la vita piu che si puo, etiamdio conservare labeleza delatera e cessare le cose putride notificando a voi signori che da pogo tempo in qua li coiari sono partiti de loro usati luoghi con le loro botteghe li quali sono usati di stare nellacontrada di San Tomeo e venuti a stare fuori nella strada mastra cole loro boteghe pellando cuoia fresche putride e tenendo per la dicta strada pelli nere ascugare e lana in calcinata putente per tal modo che nele dicte contrade non si puo quasi vivere per la puza et oltra la puza la vista deli ochi mal sostiene a vedere tal cose.
complaint also fills in a gap about the situation of tanning in contemporary Lucca. For one, the tanners’ move out of their early-Trecento haunts, namely the zone around San Pietro Somaldi in the Contrada Sant’Andrea, must have occurred well before this petition, since the Contrada San Tomeo is described as the “usual environs” (usati luoghi) of the tannery.78

After describing the aesthetic offense, the petitioners recommended that the tanners “be sent with their trade around the corners away from the main street (ruga mastra)... just as had been recently ordained at Pisa – [the tanners] were made to stay inside their alleys in order to beautify and purify their city.”79 On the reverse, Nicolao da San Gemignano, the officialis viarum who investigated the claim before bringing it to the Anziani, endorsed the petition, lending credence to its claims. He detailed the exact course of events that led to the complaint: “a certain man, not a citizen, recently took up the aforementioned business in a certain shop, in which no one before him had performed the trade, and this was a short time ago; moreover, a certain other man, a citizen, wanted to build another shop for tanning across from the first.”80 Everyone in the neighborhood, he concludes, was very annoyed by these developments.

In pitting themselves against an established and evidently growing industry, the petitioners made use of a few compelling rhetorical tropes. It is not difficult to interpret the subtext of the comment about the sanitary legislation recently ratified by the Pisan government, a transparent goad to solicit a quick response from the Twelve Conservadori. Even more direct is the description of their fragile, plague-ridden city-state and its unfavorable demography compared to its neighbors. While the plaintiffs make no explicit reference to infectious mala aria, they draw a direct line between disease and polluting industrial activity. The threat of depopulation recurs throughout the

78 During the same period, other hygienically troubling trades were shuffled around the city, such as the brickmakers; cf. Borelli, “Abitare e produrre nella Lucca medievale,” 342–43.
79 Ibid.: Per lo qual cosa vi piaccia con consiglio di balia provedere che li dicti coiari si debbano riducere cola loro arte fare dentro da cantoni fuori dela ruga mastra cioè nella contrada di San Tomeo come usati erano di stare infra uno mese proximo. E così in questi poghi di passati e proveduto a Pisa e facti riducere dentro da chiassi come erano usati per ornare e tenere sana la loro cita.
80 CG 8, pp. 222-3: Refero quod... hoc certe apparat cum quidam nec civis de novo elevavit dictam artem in quadam apotheca in qua nisi per eum dicta ars facta fuit et hoc a parvo tempore cira. Et quidam alter civis aliam vult edificare ad dictum exercitium opponendum. Qua de re quasi omnes convicini contrate nominati in petitione condolendose esse graviatos a dictis coiariis de turpitudine quam conspiciunt et putredine strata exercent.
Riformagioni in discussions of industry, commerce, and public order. But in 1382, with a third great plague spreading through southern France and Italy, Lucchesi were likely even more nervous about poor sanitation. In October 1382, for example, they made arrangements to hire three purgatori, a profession eventually associated with cesspits specifically but at this point hired to clean the streets of the city. Those streets, according to the contract in the Riformagioni, were full of “mud, lime, and other very foul things,” such that a “contagious corruption of the air might easily creep in amongst the citizenry.” These fears would become reality when the plague once again struck Lucca in the summer of 1383.

Given this ominous atmosphere, it is unsurprising that the petition pushed the Twelve Conservadori to do even more than was asked of them. Pagani and Dati simply wanted the tanners out of sight, but responses from three conservadori (ser Andrea Bellomi, Francesco Guinigi, and Puccinello Galganetti) led the group to elect a balia committee of six citizens to address not only the tanners but also “all other trades of the city of Lucca that produce putridity.” In light of the serious disruption in the northeastern quarter of the city, they evidently wanted a full review of industrial activity as it affected public health.

The balia committee met less than a month later to deliver a set of ordinances meant to avert the looming threat of miasma, and their response further clarified the contours of the tanners’ industrial zone “around the corners” of the ruga mastra. The official solution consisted of a set of ordinances in the vernacular, which began with a Latin preamble that underscored the threat of plague: “Some artisans of Lucca have taken their crafts, which, although necessary, are nevertheless horrible in appearance and foul to behold, and are practicing them in streets and public roads, with all customary boundaries ignored. As a result, the city’s land is befouled and contagious disease could

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81 E.g. CG 7, p. 280 (26/6/1380 | CG)
82 Cohn Jr, Cultures of Plague, p. 22.
83 CG 8, p. 294 (23/10/1382 | 36).
84 Naturally, there were no tanners among the subscribers of the pledge, invited counselors, or the six citizens elected to look into the matter.
85 The committee (Corrado da Poggio, Puccinelli Galganetti, Martino Arnolfini, Iacopo Ronghi, Nicolozo Bartolomei, and Ugolino Scortica) did not contain any citizens from the contradas of S. Pelegrino, S. Giorgio, or S. Tomaso, as per the stated intention of the Twelve: duobus civibus per terzerium... dummodo tales cives non sint de contratis in quibus dicte artes exercentur (CG 8, p. 223).
easily rise up, which must be avoided at all costs."\textsuperscript{86} After this reiteration and, indeed, intensification of the rhetoric of the original petition, the document delivered seven new statutes:

1. Tanning cannot be practiced outside the Contrada San Tomeo, nor can any shops for that trade be located anywhere besides a specific nearby street; and in those ‘external’ shops on that street it is illegal to practice tanning.

2. No skins can be set out in mordents or other treatments outside of the Contrada San Tomeo, except along the walls of Lucca between the Porta San Donato and the Porta di Borgo.

3. All butchers must deposit offal and void intestines in specified covered containers (tombe) and can only transport such things outside their shops between the night bell and the dawn bell.

4. No one can slaughter pigs in the city save on a specific street.

5. Shield and sign makers should obey the statute of 1352.

6. No one can process fat into tallow, not even indoors, except along the walls between the Porta San Donato and the Porta di Borgo or between the tanners’ well and the walls.

7. No one can make varnish or potash except in those locations.\textsuperscript{87}

These new ordinances served as a warning towards a number of industrial practices that had, like the tannery, violated customary boundaries and rendered the city more vulnerable to plague – or at least less sanitary.

The zone assigned to the tanners ran from the “corner of the garden of Francesco Folchini up towards San Tomeo,” and had to be within the Contrada S. Tomeo; these were the “places where the trade was accustomed to be practiced of old” – “of old” evidently meaning after the tanners had migrated from the zone around S. Pietro

\textsuperscript{86} CG 8, p. 233 (25/8/1382 | Sp): ...advertentes non nullos artifices lucane civitatis artes suas licet necessarias tamen aspectu orrendas et visi turpes, transgressis usitatis limitibus in stratis et viis publicis operari et facere, ex quo et civitatis situs fedatur et morbus posset contagiosus faciliter exoriri quid omnino vitandum est.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., pp. 233-234; see Appendix 4, text 2.
We can get a little more specific about the limits of the tannery thanks to two censuses dating to the early 1370s. At that time Francesco Folchini lived, like Francesco Dati, in the Contrada S. Pellegrino, such that his property must have straddled the boundary line between the two neighborhoods; as a result, we can probably associate his corner with the spot where the modern Via Pelleria or Via S. Tommaso meet the modern Via Galli Tassi. The street for leather shops, i.e. where tanners could sell but not produce leather, is identified as “the road which runs from San Giorgio to Santa Giustina” – that same stretch, one assumes, of the Via Galli Tassi between the Via Pelleria and the modern Via S. Giustina, just south of the Via S. Tommaso.

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88 Ibid., p. 233: *Ne fare fare l’arte de la coiaria in la cita di Luca se non in la contrada di sancto Tomeo in li luoghi dove anticamente e usata di farsi cioe dal cantone de l’orto di Francesco Folchini in suso verso sancto Tomeo.*

89 ASLu, Biblioteca Manoscritta 176 and 176bis; although entitled *Estimi*, these two incomplete collections of neighborhood censuses only contain the names of the heads of households, without any economic information.

90 Dati and Folchini appear in the 1372 Estimo for S. Pellegrino: ASLu, Biblioteca Manoscritta 176, p. 23.

91 The ordinance distinguishes that stretch of the Via Galli Tassi as the easternmost limit of shops which produce as well as sell leather, but specifies that no tanning facilities can sit along the street itself: “No one can have a shop dedicated to tanning outside of the aforementioned limits [here referring to the ‘luoghi dove anticamente...’ mentioned above], namely from the street that runs from San Giorgio to Santa Giustina up to San Tomeo. And in that street one cannot and should not have a shop where the aforementioned trade is performed or happens in any way.” (*Ne possa tenere alcuna botega a la dicta arte diputata di qua da dicti termini cioe da la ruga che vae da San Giorgio a Sancta Giustina in suso verso Sancto Tomeo superscripto. Etiamdio in ne la dicta ruga non possa ne debia tenere alcuna botega ove la dicta arte sia d’operi ne faccia in alcuno modo.*)
Any shops violating these conditions had to be closed by the first of January 1383, about four months away, under a penalty of twenty-five *lire* per offence, the fine common to all violations addressed by these ordinances. The careful circumscription of industrial activity, specified for each problematic trade, left the tanners with a specific area within which to carry out their trade. For indoor facilities, they had to crowd together in the northwestern corner of the city between the modern Via Galli Tassi and the walls. Outdoors, the tanners could set up vats and hang skins along the wall between the Porta S. Donato and the Porta di Borgo, a stretch around a kilometer long.

The new ordinances certainly addressed the concerns of the tanners’ neighbors, but it seems that the heart of their complaint consisted of something more than ire at the proximity of tanning vats. A few weeks later, on 10 September, a group of tanners appealed the decision of the August *balia* committee concerning the shops along the ‘main street’, and their description of the problem clarifies the distinction between processing and sale indicated in the ordinances above. But also, quite dramatically, the tanners’ appeal depicts the initial Pagani-Dati petition as an act of deceit perpetrated by bad neighbors; the eleven subscribed tanners wrote:
It is now not possible to have a shop, work, sell, or tan skins in the Via San Giorgio, which runs from the houses of the Pagani sons towards the house of San Giorgio. [We] are prepared to follow this ordinance and anything else ordained by your lordships, and follow it to the death, despite the fact that it causes extreme damage and loss because the shops run by some of the subscribed [tanners] in the aforementioned street are rented at great price and under long-term leases. Moreover, [we] understand that the ordinance was made because of a fictitious report made before your lordships and those six citizens [the August balia committee] by some tanners speaking on their own behalf and that of the entire trade and by a certain citizen living nearby – not for the good of the citizenry but due to their own envy. They said that all the tanners were contented with the ordinance, and that the foul art of tanning was being performed in the street… But, saving your reverence, all the tanners never came to speak nor came to an agreement on the said ordinance, nor did we come to talk to the elected citizens or you lords. Neither tanning nor foul leather manufacture is ever performed in the street, but only, clearly, now as in ancient times and for the longest time, the [tanners] sell and cut leather that is already tanned, which renders no odor but that which the shoemakers make throughout the city – but they do perform the putrid practice of tanning behind their houses near the wall of the city.92

This brief presents a completely different account of the zoning issue than the initial petition from Pagani and Dati. The tanners admitted that they had, at some point, begun to establish shops along the Via S. Giorgio, where the northern properties backed onto the city walls. It was a perfect location, insofar as the tanners could operate shops in the front and perform their unpleasant work along the wall where it was out of the public eye. But, naturally, that which did not affect the street directly could easily be a nuisance to someone whose property also backed onto the wall. Their aggrieved neighbors were concerned not about what happened on the ruga mastra, but rather what happened in the alleys behind their own homes.

Although the tanners may indeed have been too audacious, moving well outside their “usual environs” by 1382, since they had spread far enough along the Via S. Giorgio to draw the ire of Chiarino Pagani. The petition describes the Via S. Giorgio as the street running between a “Casa di San Giorgio” and the houses of the Pagani family. The Casa di San Giorgio refers to the structure at the western end of the modern Via S. Giorgio occupied, in turn, by a Dominican convent, a Napoleonic prison, and a modern correctional facility. The Pagani brothers therefore must have lived at the eastern end of

92 ASLu, CG 8, p. 261 (10/9/1382 | Twelve); see Appendix 4, text 3.
the Via S. Giorgio, where it meets the Via Fillungo, almost four hundred meters from where Francesco Folchini’s property sat. If Chiarino Pagani had been annoyed enough by the tanners’ activities to headline the petition against them, it is possible that their shops, or at least their malodorous influence, had reached the east end of the Contrada S. Pellegrino. Like a pervasive miasma, their trade had spilled out of one contrada and spread along the length of a second!

Unlike the angry elites named in the August petition, the ‘jealous tanners’ who supported the shop closures along the Via S. Giorgio are much harder to identify. The coiari maestri who subscribed to the tanners’ appeal against the new ordinances include most of the prominent leather- and skin-traders found in the records of the *gabella maggiore*.93 Moreover, it is unclear who in the neighborhoods mentioned in the initial petition would have fit into this category. The early 1370s *Estimi* for the neighborhoods of S. Giorgio and S. Pellegrino included only a single man identified as a tanner, and he never appeared at the court of the *gabella maggiore*.94 Although he isn’t mentioned by name in the petition, Francesco Folchini of Contrada S. Pellegrino may have been one of those informing against his colleagues; he appears in the census without a professional title, but he does show up five times in the customs records between 1373 and 1385 as the payer for shipments of unworked skins, over four thousand *libbre* of material in total.95

Beyond these two individuals, most of the heads of household in the aggrieved neighborhoods identified as different professions, mainly cloth dealers, silk merchants, and carpenters. So, whoever these tanners moved “by their own envy” happened to be, they were probably not residents of the two neighborhoods represented by Francesco Dati and Chiarino Pagani in August 1382. There is a story of competition behind this dispute that remains, for the moment, elusive.96 Regardless, certain tanners had become

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93 These are the eleven men listed in the appeal: Pasciutino Talucci, Biagio Lieti, Matteo di Giunta, Vannello di Giovanni, Giunta di Matteo, Bianco Pelegrucci, Piero Mazini, Iacopo di Matteo, Domenico Tottini, Giovanni di ser Andrea, and Francesco di Bartolo.
94 Parente Lemmetti *coiato* lived in the Contrada San Giorgio: Biblioteca Manoscritta 176, p. 17.
95 GM 14, f. 3r, 21v; GM 21, f. 57r, 139v; GM 49, p. 816.
96 It is interesting to consider this issue from a trade-internal perspective: the putative ‘angry tanners’ here would have been falling behind the individuals successful enough to set up shop outside San Tommaso, such that they were invoking public health legislation to actually reestablish a norm. Compare this with the anti-monopolistic laws promulgated by the major guilds against the minor trades in contemporary Florence: Becker, *Florentine Essays*, 11–29.
successful enough to rent shops in an elite neighborhood; this is the kind of mobility that might inspire pushback or sabotage from other tanners, like those who supposedly contributed their ‘expert’ advice to the aid of Dati and Pagani’s petition.

The master tanners’ appeal against the new zoning laws had no clear effect. The *officialis viarum* did not endorse the tanners’ petition or carry out any investigation into their accusations of conspiracy. This is perhaps understandable considering that he himself had validated the disputed claim that skins were being hung out to dry in the main street. Caught between the complaints of their peers and the indignation of the tanners, and with no official direction from the *curia viarum*, the August *balìa* committee took the most politic course of action and did absolutely nothing. The ban extended to shops in the Via S. Giorgio was presumably left in place, and, although its authority was renewed three more times for a total duration of nine months, the committee met to revise the ordinances only once in that period.\(^9^7\) At that single meeting, the delegates focused on a few items affecting butchers without once mentioning the tannery.\(^9^8\) From the extant evidence, then, it seems that some tanners were forced to shutter their shops in the Via S. Giorgio, and the government of Lucca offered no financial support when they exited or transferred the “long-term leases” under which the shops were held. With regards to zoning law, tanners, butchers, and others practicing the “trades introducing putridity and squalor” did not have a strong bargaining position, particularly in the face of the extreme mortality associated with stench and pollutants in the contemporary imagination.\(^9^9\)

The master tanners’ failure to roll back the new zoning laws may indicate their weakness as a political action group in opposing their more politically entrenched neighbors. But, while certain tanners’ bid to spread into neighboring *contrade* had backfired, the trade as a whole scored a major victory at around the same time: the long-desired reduction to the tariff on exported leather finally went into effect in January 1383. This reduced the tax rate from 2.05 *lire* to one *lira* per hundred *libbre*, which meant that


\(^9^8\) CG 8, p. 459 (27/2/1383 | Sp): the committee meets to modify the ordinances governing the butchers’ offal pits (*tombe*).

\(^9^9\) The *Riformagioni* employed the phrase *artes lucane civitatis putredinem et fetorem inducentes* to describe the focus of the August *balìa* committee (CG 8, p. 233 [25/8/1382]).
exporting leather was slightly cheaper than importing it, which cost 1.2 lire per hundredweight. This reduction is significant insofar as a group of low-status but expert petitioners were able to convince high-status but inexpert legislators that the tariff rates for their industry were fundamentally flawed in terms of their economic logic. The tanners’ representatives successfully argued that the laws ought to treat the Lucchese tannery as an export-oriented industry rather than a subsidiary of the local leatherworking trades. There may have been a double layer of misinformation with regards to this industry, however: the tariff reduction may actually have resulted in the decline of the tannery around the turn of the fifteenth century, as we shall see when we turn to the volumes of skins and leather registered at the gabella maggiore.

Before moving on to the consequences of the tariff reduction, we can review the brief history of the petitions that led to it, intertwined as they are with the zoning dispute described above. As we saw at the end of chapter three, the tanners had originally presented their complaints about the high export tariff in December 1381 during the session of the General Council aimed at addressing the fallout of the War of Chioggia.100 That meeting inspired a series of tariff reductions and suspensions meant to foster a centrally planned cloth industry, whose immigrant workers would fill the gap created by Lucca’s economic downturn. At the same meeting, the tanners submitted a petition for their own tariff reduction, namely the reduction of the protectionist tariff on leather – which taxed it severely upon exit from the city – to something more conducive to exportation. The cives super introitibus and ser Giovanni Linelli indicated, by subscription to the petition, that it seemed appropriate to them for the tariff on exported leather to be halved for two years to create a stronger market for their goods.101 But despite the fact that tanning was an established industry with a large workforce, the balia

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100 The Peace of Turin harmed Lucca insofar as it was expected to normalize Venetian trade.
101 CG 7, p. 628: “Those same citizens assigned to revenues and the official of the gabelle have investigated and deliberated suitably on these issues [i.e. on the tanners’ preceding petition]. They refer to your magnificence that it would seem appropriate to them that the aforementioned export tariff on tanned skins be reduced and diminished to half that which is paid at present, by providing these things for two years at present so as to give the tanners material for making good tanning and so that a good market might result.” (Et ipsi vestri cives deputati super yntroytibus et officialis gabelle prefatus delicenter habuerint super hiis informati et deliberati. Referunt magnificentie vestre quod eis videretur quod dicta gabella exitus dicti coriaminis conci minueretur et reducenda esset ad dimidium eius quod non solvitur, providendo hec ad presens solum pro duobus annis ut materia detur dictis coriariis faciendo bonam conciam et bonum forum et sequatur).
committee elected to address the issues raised in that session never delivered any legislation concerning the leather industry. At the time, the *cause célèbre* was wool, whereas the tanners evidently lacked sufficient backing to keep their petition in focus.

The petition surfaced again almost a year later in October 1382, when six tanners brought it before a meeting of the Twelve *Conservadori*, and the timing of this appeal strongly indicates a connection to the zoning dispute described above. The leather industry repeated their request for a reduced tariff on exported leather almost a full year after their first remonstrance in December 1381 but only a month after the failed appeal against the new zoning ordinances in September 1382. It is easy to imagine that the tanners’ representatives hoped the recent adverse circumstances would in fact favor their petition. The tariff reduction could have served the city government as a sop to mollify aggravated tanners, some of whom must have been insulted or even materially harmed by the closure of shops along the Via S. Giorgio at the hands of an official *balìa* committee. The six advocates for the tannery avoided the General Council which had proven so negligent of their trade in the past; they took their complaint directly to the Twelve Conservators, whose power to effect statutory change without lengthy consultation had also served to bolster the fledgling wool industry.

In the event, however, and despite the fact that they had the power to simply draft the tanners’ request into law, the *Conservadori* resolved to pass the responsibility for this renewed petition back to that original *balìa* committee elected after the Peace of Turin session. I believe that this indicates confusion about jurisdiction more than the Conservators’ inability or unwillingness to act regarding tariff legislation, and the committee from the previous winter had certainly been delegated to produce a decision concerning the same piece of legislation, namely the export gabelle on leather. One could argue that the reinvestment of *balìa* power after its expiry was procedurally awkward, but nonetheless the Twelve issued a two-month extension of power to the twelve men that had been elected back in December 1381.102 Once again, that committee failed to do

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102 CG 8, p. 284 (6/10/1382 | Twelve): “...the aforementioned [Twelve *Conservadori*] ordain... that, by the authority of the present council, the below-named honorable Lucchese citizens, namely the four per terziere who had been elected on 4 December 1381... should have authority and *balìa*, the same that they had held at that time, for the next two months...” (*Qua petitone audita et plenius intellecta prefati domini et cives providerunt ordinaverunt et sanxerunt quod autoritate presentis consili consilii infrascripti honorables lucani in terziere*)
anything about the tariff before the expiration of their renewed *balìa*, such that the
tanners again submitted their petition at a meeting of the Twelve Conservators on 8
January 1383. Once again, the *Conservadori* voted to renew the December 1381 *balìa*
committee till the first of March, and, although the *Riformagioni* betray no sense of
chastisement, the *balìa* committee seems to have finally gotten the message. They met for
the last time on 17 January and approved the reduction from forty-one *soldi* per hundred
*libbre* of exported leather to twenty *soldi*.\(^{103}\)

Since, as we are about to see, this reduction had a profound impact on the
practices of the Lucchese tannery, it is worthwhile to consider whether its proponents
represented themselves or the community of tanners as a whole. The second half of 1382
saw a remarkably dense series of interactions between the communal government and
Lucchesi tanners: first, an anonymous group of jealous tanners advised the *balìa*
committee to restrict activity along the Via S. Giorgio; then, a different group of tanners
appealed the zoning ordinances; finally, a third group petitioned for a reduction to the
export tariff. This series of negotiations demonstrates that the tanners engaged in
collective action even in the absence of official representation in the government.
However, the internal structure of the tannery remains completely opaque throughout this
discussion. In the absence of any statutes from the period, even that professional
distinction of mastery within the petitions and appeals – the title of *maestro* – does little
to explain the internal features of the Lucchese *arte di coiai* or how its members related
to the urban government. Complicating matters further, the zoning dispute introduces an
internal division between the aggrieved tanners of the September 1382 appeal and the
tanners “speaking on their own behalf... due to envy” who evidently advised the August
*balìa* council to ban tanners’ shops along the Via S. Giorgio.

Can we speak of a professional division among the tanners based on this *invidia*?
To be sure, not all the tanners seem to have been equally affected by the zoning dispute,
whereas all gained a clear advantage from the reduction in the export gabelle. Of the

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\(^{103}\) CG 8, p. 431 (17/1/1381 | Sp): *Providerunt ordinaverunt et sanxerunt quod In exitu lucane civitatis de
coriamine concio et laborato hinc ad duos annos proximos secutos non salvatur nec solui debeat pro
gabella nisi ad rationem soldorum viginti bone monete pro quolibet centenario ad pondus.*
eleven *maestri coiari* who subscribed their names to the September appeal, only two, Biagio Lieti and Pasciutino Talucci, were among the six tanners who then petitioned for the tariff reduction in October. But I found nothing to suggest that those other four tanners, Pelegrino Lelli, Stefano di Piero, Giovanni Guidelli, and Giovanni Perotti, represented a rival faction within the industry, or at least not a faction that persisted over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>September 1382 (Appeal)</th>
<th>October 1382 (Reduction)</th>
<th>February 1385 (Extension)</th>
<th>June 1404 (Red. Repeal)</th>
<th>February 1405 (Hallmarks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biagio Lieti</td>
<td>Biagio Lieti</td>
<td>Biagio Lieti</td>
<td>Biagio Lieti</td>
<td>Biagio Lieti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bianco Pelegrucci</td>
<td>Stefano di Piero</td>
<td>Stefano di Piero</td>
<td>Stefano di Piero</td>
<td>Stefano di Piero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matteo di Giunta</td>
<td>Pelegrino Lelli</td>
<td>Pelegrino Lelli</td>
<td>Pelegrino Lelli</td>
<td>Michele di Coluccio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vannello di Giovanni</td>
<td>Giovanni Guidelli</td>
<td>Giovanni Guidelli</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stefano Bertugli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giunta di Matteo</td>
<td>Giovanni Perotti</td>
<td>Giovanni Perotti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasciutino Talucci</td>
<td>Pasciutino Talucci</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero Masini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iacopo di Matteo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico Tottini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni ser Andree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco di Bartolo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To the contrary, Lieti, Lelli, Guidelli, Guidotti, and Stefano di Piero appear to have maintained a strong bond as joint representatives of their trade well into the early fifteenth century.  

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104 I have not been able to isolate their exact role in that organization; not even Biagio Lieti ever appears with a title like *capitaneus* or *consul*. In 1404, Stefano di Piero, Lieti, and Lelli subscribe simply as “tanner-citizens of Lucca, [subscribing] for themselves and for the other tanners who wish for and love the honor of their trade/guild (*arte*)” (GPG 1, p. 233 [6/6/1404]: *coiari citadini di luca et per loro et per li altri coiari li*...
blood, the table above shows that the October 1382 petitioners represented a stable bloc for several decades. They presided over the renewal of the export tariff reduction in 1385, the surviving members petitioned for a new set of tariff changes in 1404, and in 1405 Biagio Lieti and Stefano di Piero, colleagues for twenty-five years, helped bring into existence official assessors with leather hallmarks to guarantee the quality of exports.\footnote{CG 9, p. 293 (5/2/1385); GPG 1, p. 233 (6/6/1404); GPG 1, p. 320 (20/2/1405).}

One assumes that these same men were the authors of the largely identical petition in 1381, although the published minutes do not include any subscriptions, perhaps due to the extreme length of the Peace of Turin session.\footnote{CG 7, p. 629 (2/12/1381): the transcript speaks only of a petition \textit{pro parte coiariorum} without any specific names.}

Besides these petitions, we can also look at the political profile of the industry’s major importers and exporters, those men who appear as payers in the records of the gabella maggiore for the largest quantities of skins and leather between 1370 and 1410. As discussed in Chapter Three, this is an imperfect gauge of an individual’s actual role within the tanning community, but it provides a group of actors outside the five major petitions described in Table 4.4. First, let us profile the ten individuals who imported the largest quantities of unworked skins over the years of my sample.

\textit{quali vogliano et amano l’ onore del arte predicta}). In 1405, the four subscribing tanners describe themselves as “tanner-citizens of Lucca in the name of the ‘university’ (\textit{universita}) of the trade/guild of tanners in Lucca” (GPG 1, p. 320 [20/2/1405]: \textit{coiari citadini di luca in nome de la universita del arte de coiari de la cita di luca}), but I found nothing to elucidate nature of this ‘university’, whether it refers to a discrete organization or simply ‘the totality’. Not is there any indication of whether the \textit{arte} in these petitions refers to an organization or just the tanning industry as a whole.
Table 4.5: Top Ten Importers of Unworked Skins 1373-1410, Ranked by Percentage of Total Imported Volumes, with Tenures Among the cives super introitibus, Anziani, and Council of Thirty-Six

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Importer</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Imported Skins</th>
<th>cives super introitibus</th>
<th>Anziani</th>
<th>Thirty-Six</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pelegrino Lelli</td>
<td>10.12%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Biagio Lieti</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Giovanni Perotti Fazi</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Andrea dal Portico</td>
<td>7.07%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Giovanni Maggiolini</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Stefano Pieri</td>
<td>4.19%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Matteo Giunta</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gherardo Pacini Martini</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Leonardo Rodolfi</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bartolomeo Balbani</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two of the individuals in this group, such as Leonardo di Rodolfo or Gherardino di Pacino Martini, were only active in one or two years of the sample; but Pelegrino Lelli, Biagio Lieti, and Giovanni di Perotto Fazi, the three most active importers of unworked skins, paid for imports in at least seven out of the eight years of my survey. Regardless, few of these professional tanners held the Anzianate or sat on the senatorial Council of Thirty-Six, and none served on the influential cives super introitibus committee. Stefano di Piero and Matteo di Giunta, two men who also subscribed to the petitions describes above, also sat in office only infrequently. The only importers who had personal influence in the government were Andrea dal Portico and Bartolomeo Balbani, both of whom were primarily associated with other trades – Andrea registered as a goldsmith and banker, while Bartolomeo was one of the city’s most prolific silk merchants.\(^\text{107}\)

Turning to those individuals who appear to have dominated the market in leather exports, we can see an even lower level of political representation.

\(^\text{107}\) Andrea registered at the Corte de’ Mercanti as a campsor et orifex in 1371 (CM 82, f. 17v), and that is how he is described in a 1381 election list for the same body (CM 15, f. 12v [21/11/1381]); Balbani registered two different silk companies in 1371 (CM 82, f. 3v), two again in 1372 (CM 83, p. 11), and one in 1381 (CM 84, f. 11r).
Much as with wool imports and cloth exports, we see little overlap between the major importers of unworked skins and the most prolific leather exporters; only two men, Pelegrino Lelli and Giovanni Fazi, appear on both lists. It is worth noting that five of these ten exporters are identified in the records of the gabella maggiore by toponyms suggesting residency in or recent immigration from the contado. The presence on the list of these names underscores the importance of the rural leatherworking industry as a client for the urban tannery. As we shall see, some tanners wanted to make a transition to long-distance exportation during this period, but the local market remained more important for the industry as a whole.

After reviewing the list of major traders who registered with the gabella maggiore and the names of pro-tannery petitioners between 1382 and 1405, it would seem that the locus of political action within the tanning community was both fairly stable and fairly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Imported Skins</th>
<th>cives super introitibus</th>
<th>Anziani</th>
<th>Thirty-Six</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Filippo Cecchini da Castelnuovo</td>
<td>12.23%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Giovanni Perotti Fazi</td>
<td>6.11%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pellegrino Lelli</td>
<td>2.62%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Guido Giovanni da Colognora</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Giovanni Corsini da Villabasilica</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Michele Pauli da Minucciano</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pauluccio Tolomei da Silano</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cambino Lemmi</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Iacopo di Bartolomeo Nucci</td>
<td>1.59%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bartolomeo Nicolai</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
distant from the innermost halls of power. What exactly changed between December 1381 and October 1382 that caused the Twelve Conservators to review the petition when the original balìa committee had ignored it? The situation in the autumn of 1382 certainly worked in favor of a tariff reduction, as the tanners, aggrieved by the September zoning ordinances, had a strong case for demanding some legislative recompense. But I would argue that Biagio Lieti, Pelegrino Lelli, and their companions had done quite a lot of work to tighten up their rhetoric and deliver a more compelling call to action. And, since the claims involved in each petition also reflect the perceived reality of contemporary tradesmen, a final review of the petitions that led to the tariff reduction will serve as a fitting introduction to the statistical overview of trade patterns in the Lucchese leather industry between 1370 and 1410.

As recorded in the Riformagioni, the original request delivered during the Peace of Turin session offered the following justifications for lowering the export tariff on leather:

1. foreigners are going to Pisa to purchase leather;\(^{108}\)
2. since tanners can’t make a living, they are leaving Lucca and working in Pisa and the contado;\(^{109}\)
3. a lower tariff results in increased revenues because:
   a. as a direct result of the reduction, more leather would be exported;
   b. the recovering industry would encourage immigration, which would indirectly benefit all other sources of revenue.\(^{110}\)

Predictably enough, the petition plays on the same fear of emigration that fueled the successful plea to establish a subsidized woolen cloth industry. It also contains the claim

\(^{108}\) CG 7, p. 629 (2/12/1381 | CG): forenses indigentes tali coriamine non veniunt ad emendum de illo in vestra civitate sed vadunt pisas non obstante quod hic fiat melior concia quam alicubi in istis partibus.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.: Et pro tanto deseritur et declinat nimis ipsa fieri hic et augmentantur in civitate pisana, et in vestris castris vestri comitatus civitibus et in castra et loca vestri comitatus illis laborantibus et etiam magistris de artis qui hic laborare soliti erant ipsis valentibus suam vitam substentare.

\(^{110}\) Ibid.: ...ubi si gabella parva esset multum exportaretur et multum inde de gabella habereetur licet parva esset quia tanto plus exportaretur quod restauraret aliiud in omnibus aliis gabelis ordinariis quia ars cresceret et augmentaretur et sic opporitter multos homines laborantes stare hic et multos qui non sunt venire et redire quibus sic venientibus et redentibus et stantibus gabella ordinaria conservantur et augmentantur tunc bene valeant quando civitas bene in habitatoribus est habitata et plena.
that individuals dependent on the urban tannery were turning to foreign alternatives to insulate themselves from the high tax on leather exports. This note simultaneously serves as a dig about the inadequacy of the Lucchese system in comparison to the Pisan model, a shaming tactic also employed in the Dati-Pagani complaint against the tanners in August 1382.\(^\text{111}\) As for the specter of depopulation, it is hard to verify whether tanners were actually leaving Lucca due to the tariff; of the 109 exporters of leather attested before 1381 in the records of the *gabella maggiore*, less than 20% (21) left the market during that period.\(^\text{112}\) While this is not an ironclad statistic for the tanners as a whole, I also found no mention of any mass exodus of tanners in the *Riformagioni*. In any case, the *balìa* council appointed to look into these matters did not find the tanners’ case compelling, despite the endorsement of ser Giovanni Linelli and the *cives super introitibus*.

By October 1382, the tanners’ had edited and expanded their petition to refine the above points into more effective justifications (additions in italics):

1. foreigners and *Lucchese subjects* are purchasing leather in Pisa;\(^\text{113}\)
   a. as a result, they are only paying the passage-fee on return to Lucca;\(^\text{114}\)
   b. some of this leather is illegally unloaded in the *contado*;\(^\text{115}\)

2. *unworked skins are being purchased in Genoa, imported into the *contado*, tanned in the hinterland by tanners who once lived in Lucca, and sold directly from there*;\(^\text{116}\)

3. *since tanners can’t make a living, they are leaving Lucca and working in Pisa and the *contado*;\(^\text{117}\)

\(^{111}\) Although leather may indeed have been cheaper there, owing to an industrial transition dating to the early fourteenth century; see Herlihy, *Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study in Urban Growth*, 139–40.

\(^{112}\) Of the 224 individuals who paid the gabelle on leather exports between 1373 and 1410, 109 appeared for the first time in 1373 or 1378; only 21 of these do not appear after 1378, whereas 88 appear in payments at the *gabella maggiore* in 1385 or afterwards.

\(^{113}\) CG 8, 284: *Ita quod forenenses et comitatini indigentes tali coriamine non veniendum ad emendum de illo in vestra civitate sed vadunt pisas non obstante quod hic fiat melior concia quam alicubi in istis partibus.*

\(^{114}\) Ibid.: *Et quia redeuntes de pisis et transeuntes per territorium istud solvunt gabellam solummodo pro passagio videlicet solidos xii pro qualibet salma...*

\(^{115}\) Ibid.: *...et de isto coriamine isto modo multum remanet in vestro comitatu.*

\(^{116}\) Ibid.: *Et etiam vestri de comitatu munc vadunt Januam ad emendum coriamen crudum et ipsum conducunt in vestro comitatu. Et ibi per colarios luce solitos habitare dictum coriamen actatur et venditur.*

\(^{117}\) Ibid.: *Et pro tanto ipsa ars deseritur et declinat nimirum hic fieri et augmentatur in civitate pisana et in vestris castris et comitatu multis ex magistri dictae artis qui hic laborare solebant laborantibus in dicta*
4. A lower tariff would result in increased revenues, because:
   a. As a direct result of the reduction, more leather would be exported;
   b. Therefore, more merchants would be bringing skins from abroad;
   c. The recovering industry would stimulate both immigration and the return
      of economic exiles.\textsuperscript{118}

The October petition does a better job explaining the precise fallout of the high tariff on
exported leather. Rather than simply warning that foreign merchants were heading to Pisa
to do business, this document describes a topsy-turvy world in which the \textit{contado} was
pulling ahead of the city in terms of industrial growth. Given the high demand for leather
from the Lucchesia and the narrowness of profit margins, emigrant tanners from Lucca
and tanners in the hinterland could outcompete an urban industry hamstrung by an unfair
tariff. The petition also argues that the benefits of lowering the tariff would be more than
a volume-driven increase in tax revenue from exported leather or the other gabelles paid
by immigrant or returning tanners. In addition to these bonuses, the tanners state, foreign
merchants would be lured to the city by the demand for untanned skins from far off
\textit{(longinquo)}, implying that the dynamism of the tannery could increase Lucca’s exposure
to foreign markets through a kind of cross-sector symbiosis.\textsuperscript{119}

The petition’s depiction of an expanding rural tannery would certainly make sense
in terms of the underlying tariff structure. In the statute of 1372, the tax on leather for the
vicariates was set at 4 \textit{lire} per ‘load’ (\textit{salma}), presumably 400 \textit{libbre} here as elsewhere.\textsuperscript{120}
In other words, leather produced outside the Lucchesia could be imported into the
vicariates at that rate, and leather produced within the vicariates could be exported from

\textit{civitate pisanarum et in dictis castris et locis vestri comitatus non valentibus in hac vestra civitate suam
vitam substantare.}\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{Ibid.: ...ubi si gabella parva esset multum exportaretur quod restauraret dictam magnam solitam
gabellam in duplum et in omnibus alis gabellis ordinariis quia mercatores de coriamine longiquo crudo
hic facerent portari et quia hic ars cresceret et augmentaretur. Et sic opporiteret multos homines laborantes
hic stare et multis absentes dicta de causa venire et redire, quibus sic venientibus et redeuntibus gabelle
ordinarie conservarentur et augmentarentur. Et tunc bene valent quando civitas habitatoribus est habitata
et plena.}\textsuperscript{119}

\textit{This kind of stimulus had been the topic of another inactive petition from the Peace of Turin session,
which advocated for new privileges for German merchants in order to encourage them to remain trading
partners with Lucca after the reopening of the Venetian market: CG 7, pp. 630-1 (2/12/1381 | CG)}\textsuperscript{120}
\textit{GM 1, pp. 102-3: de dorsis bovinis et equinis conciis et his similibus de salma tam in introitu quam exitu
libre quatuor | Et de una vicaria ad aliam libre due; the document continues to list other forms of leather at
the same tariff rates.}
the district at that same rate; to boot, leather could be exported from one vicariate to
another for half that rate, which served to encourage regional specialization. This tariff
stood about 17% less than what was charged for leather on entry to the city of Lucca,
where the importer paid 1 *lira 4 soldi* per hundred *libbre* – or 4 *lire 16 soldi* per ‘load’ of
400 *libbre*.

Even more important given the context of the October 1382 petition is the fact
that the import and export rates for leather in the vicariates were identical. The framers of
the statute of 1372 had no protectionist instinct towards the rural leatherworking industry
to discourage exportation of their basic material, such that shifting production to the
*contado* meant a tariff reduction of over 50% relative to the city. It is certainly
conceivable under these circumstances that entrepreneurial tanners from the Lucchesia
might set up shop outside the city to intercept unworked skins imported from Genoa,
cutting the urban *gabella maggiore* out of the loop entirely. The logistics of moving
production to the countryside represent the chief obstacle to this scheme, but it is possible
that some individuals had overcome that barrier by the 1380s. And indeed, the *balìa*
committee agreed to a reduced rate for exported leather, one *lira* per hundredweight; they
approved a figure identical to the vicariate rate that, according to this petition, had proved
so salutary for the rural industry.

Besides stating the troubling fact that a rural industry was successfully competing
with an established urban trade, the petitioners also alleged that the new commercial
configuration led to outright tax fraud. By the tanners’ word, not only were Lucchese
subjects and foreigners venturing to Pisa to acquire leather they otherwise would have
purchased in Lucca, but some of them were in fact importing this product into the
*contado* under the guise of the passage-fee system. In effect, these smugglers took
advantage of the difficulty of policing the entire district to supply rural leatherworkers,
who would otherwise have paid the much higher tax on leather from the urban tannery.
One may wonder whether this petition indicates a problem common to the whole *gabella
maggiore* system, namely that transporters could violate their ambiguous *pedaggio*

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121 Unfortunately, since the vicariate gabelle books are either lost or, where they survive, do not retain
itemized *apodixe* like the records of the *gabella maggiore*, it is not possible to determine whether the
*contado* was producing much leather for exportation in this period.
licenses by offloading part of their cargo in the poorly-patrolled contado before leaving the district. In any case, the tanners’ made their case for a reduced export tariff in triplicate: the high tariff on exported leather drove down volume and thus reduced tariff revenues; it encouraged the decline of an urban industry and migration to the contado, which reduced other indirect taxes; and the difficulty of constraining this rural industry led to tax fraud.

It remains unclear whether this revised rhetoric is what made the October 1382 petition more successful than the ignored complaint of the previous December. As noted above, despite the changed wording the renewed balìa committee required several prods from the Conservadori before they finally drafted the tariff reduction into the statutes in mid-January 1383. But the oligarchs evidently agreed with the basic reasoning of the petition, that the gabella maggiore stood in the way of the survival of the urban tannery. 1383 marked a total pivot from the government’s initial preference for protecting local leather supply over export-oriented leather production. In 1385, when the initial tariff reduction expired, the General Council passed a five-year extension; later on, in 1389, a long list of alterations to the statute of the gabella maggiore included a further one-third reduction to the tariff on leather exports, which fell from twenty soldi to fourteen soldi per hundred libbre.122 The reasoning behind this proposed, and passed, reduction argued that it would “give the tanners material for performing good tanning in Lucca,” echoing the words of ser Giovanni Linelli and the cives super introitibus in December 1381.123 After ten years of sustained petitioning, the tanners’ position had become normative even within the inner oligarchy that drafted the recommendations of December 1389.124

It is striking that neither the petitions of 1381-3 nor tariff reductions made later that decade mention the urban leatherworking industry, a trade that the framers of the

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122 CG 9, p. 293 (5/2/1385 | CG); CG 11, p. 165 (10/12/1389 | CG).
123 CG 11, p. 165 (10/12/1389 | CG): ...parebbe per dar materia di far buono quello mestieri in luca si pagasse del concio a luca tanto del centonaio a peso soldi quatuordici et simile sintenda delemonitone concie a luca. The recommendation for passing the original reduction is found at CG 7, p. 628 (...ut materia detur dictis coriariis faciendi bonam conciam).
124 CG 11, pp. 163-168. I have not been able to find the names of the duodecim oculatissi cives who, according to the Latin preamble delivered by the Standardbearer of Justice, had drafted the vernacular recommendations for revising the statutes of the gabella maggiore, but there is no reason to believe that the group contained any tanners, who were only rarely represented among the cives super introitibus and other economic advisory panels.
1372 statute had tried to protect with a double tariff on exported leather.\textsuperscript{125} It is similarly unclear whether the original \textit{balìa} committee’s consistent reluctance to render a decision on the tax reduction had anything to do with resistance from the city’s cobblers, shield-makers, and saddlers. These tradesmen and -women had a natural reason to oppose the normalization of the export tariff, insofar as such a move could drive up leather prices by increasing export viability for material produced in the city. But there are no petitions in the \textit{Riformagioni} to clarify the leatherworkers’ position, and, as we shall see, most of their goods appear to have been consumed in the city. The records of the \textit{gabella maggiore} provide no further guidance here, since gloves, bags, and belts rarely appear as export goods; beyond these items, the statute of 1372 prescribed no tariff rates for footwear, which were in any case not standardized trade goods during this period.\textsuperscript{126}

Whatever the desires of local leatherworkers, the petitions for a tariff reduction on exported leather indicate that the city’s tanners were not satisfied with meeting local demand but wanted access to foreign markets. What exactly were they hoping to export? In both December 1381 and October 1382, they claimed that merchants were buying leather from Pisa “despite the fact that better tanning is performed in this city than anywhere else in these parts.”\textsuperscript{127} But it is worth noting that the higher export tariff, a volume-based tax applied to all leather regardless of value, would have more severely discouraged the commercialization of less valuable leather. While more expensive to produce, high-value cordovan or suede cost comparatively less to export than cheap leather – a hundred \textit{libbre} of the former was far more valuable than a hundred \textit{libbre} of the latter, but both cost the same at the \textit{gabella maggiore}. Rather than hoping for a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{125} Note also that the statute of 1372 fixed the export duty on gloves, belts, and bags at 1 \textit{lira} per hundred \textit{libbre}, less than the tariff on the same volume of imported leather (1 \textit{lira} 4 \textit{soldi}) and under half the tariff on exported leather (2 \textit{lire} 1 \textit{soldo}); not only were tanners discouraged from exporting their product by means of a higher tariff for exportation, but leatherworkers were offered a preferential rate for their products in relation to the ‘base’ tax on leather.

\textsuperscript{126} Footwear was, of course, tailor-made in this period and not mass-produced with standardized patterns; however, to avoid discouraging exportation of high-quality footwear commissioned by extraurban clients, the statute of 1399 added the caveat that “no tariff should be exacted on shoes prepared and tailored in Lucca which are exported into the \textit{contado} or outside the district”: \textit{Declaramus insuper et volumus quod... de scarpis cucitis et incisis que de civitate lucana extraherentur et in comitatu vel extra districtum portarentur nulla prorsus gabella gabella [sic.] solvatur et exigatur in exitu} (ASLu, GM 3, p. 22; GM 2, p. 16 [identical, but in \textit{volgare}]).

\textsuperscript{127} CG 7, p. 629, and CG 8, p. 284 (identical): \textit{...sed vadunt Pisas non obstante quod hic fiat melior concia quam alicubi in istis partibus...} For a review of the Pisan industry contemporary with that of Lucca, see Tangheroni, “Note sull’industria conciaria a Pisa nel Medioevo.”
\end{footnotesize}
stimulus to produce a better product, as claimed by ser Giovanni Linelli in his endorsement of the December 1381 petition, some tanners may have been seeking a tariff reduction for the purpose of opening the export market to cheaper leather. Unfortunately, we can find little evidence in the records of the *gabella maggiore* concerning the kinds of leather actually exported from the city; the phrase “tanned skins” typically appears without a modifier, and I therefore found only a few references to high-quality cordovan or dyed leather.

Despite the absence of concrete proof from the records of the *gabella maggiore*, I would argue that the reductions to the export tariff in January 1383 and afterwards caused precisely this change in the urban tannery: a decline in high-quality leather production in favor of cheap exportables. According to a 1404 petition presented to Paolo Guinigi, many tanners had begun to switch to a less laborious tanning process, resulting in a lower-quality product.\(^{128}\) The aforementioned tanner-advocates (see Table 4.4) who, in the 1380s, referred to “tanning done better here than in neighboring parts” now lamented that “the trade in Lucca used to have the best name in Tuscany” but “now stands to have the opposite name and situation.”\(^{129}\) The culprits were those artisans who carried out the tanning process over the course of two months and falsified the nature of their products; proper tanning, as the petitioners reported it, required a process lasting between ten and twelve months.\(^{130}\) One imagines that this cheaper product was only commercially viable because the volume-based tariff had fallen below a certain threshold.

According to the petition, Lucca was losing its reputation with both foreign merchants, who wanted to buy fine leather for export, and locals desiring shoes crafted from higher quality materials. It is easy to imagine how the decline of high-quality

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128 In the absence of further details, one wonders whether the process had devolved from cold water tanning to hot water tanning, as it had in Pisa around a century earlier: Herlihy, *Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study in Urban Growth*, 138–49. Herlihy summarized the distinction between these two processes with reference to a Seicento manual, noting that the cold water process could take up to six months, whereas the hot process might require only two weeks, and required less myrtle and other tannins. See note 129 below.

129 GPG 1, p. 233 (6/6/1404): *Che lau la dicta arte di Luca soleva avere nome de la migliore concia di Toscana et molti forestieri di lontani paesi per la buona concia ne veniano a comprare gran quantita oggi mene ad avere lo nome e faci contrarii con grandanni e sconci de la cita.*

130 Ibid.: *...lo coiame a conciando bene e compiutamente stia per lo mene da dieci mesi in fine in uno anno, et hora ci sono molti che lo conciano da du mesi intre et falsificasi l arte e lo coiame con grande danno de citadini che comprano le scarpe e de le vestre entrate et con grande vergogna del arte de la coiaria et con loro grande disuiamento.*
leather production could have impacted the viability and diversity of finished goods on the Lucchese market. So, following the advice of the *cives super introitibus* and the *officialis maior* of the gabelles – two of the advisory groups that survived the transition from republic to signory – Paolo Guinigi acquiesced to the tanners’ requests for assistance. First, he ordained a system of regulated hallmarks to identify properly-tanned leather and a list of penalties for those deliberately creating an inferior product, all of which would be overseen by elected tanners and leatherworkers. Second, and perhaps more to the point, he increased the tariff on leather exports, which had been fourteen soldi per hundredweight since 1389, to twenty-one soldi, slightly higher than the rate set in 1383.\(^{131}\) Obviously, Guinigi’s government expected this to disincentivize the production of cheap leather for exportation, since it reversed the trend that began this shift.

Despite these steps, it does not seem likely that the tannery returned to its pristine standards. For one, the 50 percent reduction to the tariff on exported leather in 1383 must have had a dramatic impact on the industry all by itself, perhaps even more extreme than the second reduction in 1389, and Guinigi’s fix in 1404 was merely a return to an already-reduced rate. I also found a petition from 1408, four years after the tannery started using the new supervisory system, which specifically refers to a shortage of high-quality shoe leather in Lucca.\(^{132}\) The petitioner, Meo di Biagio, was a *pianellaio*, engaged in the production and marketing of expensive shoes and slippers; he was also one of the

\(^{131}\) The statute of 1399 had maintained the reduction of 1389 described above: GM 3, p. 21: *Volumus tamen quod de cordovanis in civitate lucana concis et de dossis bovinis et equinis concis in civitate lucana et de quolibet coriamine concio in civitate lucana solvi debeant pro gabella de Centenario ad pondus in exitu dumtaxat soldi quatuordecim.* Note that the tariff of 21 soldi per hundredweight was roughly equal to that assigned in 1383 (20 soldi per hundredweight) after accounting for the inflation of the customs duty money of account, whose exchange rate was changed from 70 soldi to 75 soldi per florin in 1388: CG 10, p. 486 (19/6/1388 | CG).

\(^{132}\) The petition is not found amongst the minutes of the Governo di Paolo Guinigi series, but rather among the loose folios gathered at the front of Latinate copy of the 1399/1400 statute of the *gabella maggiore* (GM 3, p. 8); the title states that it “is a copy of a certain petition found in the *filsa* of the court of the tax farms” (*hec est copia cuiusdam supplicationis existentis in filsa curie proventuum...*) and it presumably wound up attached to the 1399/1400 statute for ease of reference at the court of the *gabella maggiore*. The petition dates to 1408, but the copy was updated as late as 1410, when the attached privilege for Meo di Biagio was renewed.
leather assessors elected in 1404. Even this established merchant could not find all types of leather needed for his trade on the Lucchese market:

...For many years now your lordship ordained that none may import into Lucca from Pisa any white leather. But the aforementioned Meo needs this leather for making stamped insoles and worked arches, and Lucchese tanners will not produce that leather, and if they do produce it, they make it into uppers for shoes. All the tanners are content that the aforementioned Meo might endeavor to obtain it elsewhere if it is within your lordship’s pleasure.

The officialis maior and the cives super introitibus endorsed the petition, stating that, “in a discussion held with some tanners, they admitted that they were unable (non valent) to make leather as white and as soft as they make in Pisa for making slippers of the kind described in the petition.” It seemed fitting to them that, “for the utility of all citizens,” Meo should have a special license to import four bales of whitleather from Pisa. As a personal privilege, this license is a typical Guinigi-era response, similar to the 1408 exemption granted to Domenico di Piero, a cauldron-maker who, like Meo, was a specialty artisan who needed to import specific kinds of raw materials.

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133 The title was consilarius artis coriariorum (GPG 1, p. 321 [20/4/1404]), but the election list survives for the first year only. Meo di Biagio was described as a pianellai at his election, although he self-identified as a mercator in the petition at GM 3, p. 8. As we shall see below, the records of the gabella maggiore indicate that he was also engaged in the bulk importation of unworked skins, presumably as a supplier for the urban tannery.

134 “White” leather (coriamen concium album), known conventionally as chamois or whitleather, is specially treated beyond the initial tanning process to produce whitish, soft, but durable leather. Before the modern period, this kind of leather was produced from a variety of animals besides the chamois, such that the contemporary usage of camoscio referred to a skin’s origin rather than its manner of preparation; see, for example, the Florentine gabelle extract found in the Datini archive, which lists a rate for cuoia di camoscio (ASPr Datini 1174.10, f. 3r).

135 Ibid.: Officialis gabelle et cives super introitibus se informer et conferant... qualiter intellecta petitione et supplicatione superscripta et habito super contentis in ea colloquio cum aliquibus coiarii dicte civitatis confessi sunt quod non valent coriame facere in ipsa civitate taliter albam et morvidam sicut fit Pisis de coriame acto ad planulas faciendas eius maneriei de qua in supplicatione exponitur eis videtur pro utitate universorum civium quod dicto supplicatione ad hoc ut valeat planulas bonas et pultras in ipsa civitate facere licentia concedatur de quatuor ballis dicte coriaminis in ipsa civitate inmixtendi anno quolibet cum solutione solite gabelle prime.
Meo di Biagio’s petition achieved its desired result, but it seems that the tanners’ petitions for tariff reductions had come around to cripple their industrial capabilities. Whereas the men who framed the statutes of 1372 hoped the tannery would primarily supply Lucca’s leatherworkers, locally made leather had become qualitatively insufficient for the needs of the city’s elite artisans. An earlier decree of the Guinigi government, referenced in the 1408 petition above, had restricted the importation of whitleather from Pisa to encourage consumption of local materials, but the protected market was now empty. The same tanners who once boasted, “Better tanning is performed in this city than anywhere else in these parts,” now had to admit that they could no longer compete with Pisan products. Moreover, this inability arose from industrial rather than commercial obstacles; the Lucchesi working in the urban tannery could no longer manufacture the same kinds of goods as they had a few decades prior. But the source of this degradation was almost certainly the commercial sea change of the 1380s. The process of negotiation that began with bringing the export tariff for leather into line with that for importation, and which continued by reducing the former below the level of the latter, had fundamentally altered the profile of the urban tannery. By 1408, Lucchese leather was a cheap, export-oriented alternative to the finer leathers available elsewhere in Tuscany, a complete reversal of the system imagined by the statutarii of 1372 and touted by the tanners themselves in the early 1380s.

What remains to be seen, however, is whether we observe this progressive limitation of the leather industry within the records of the gabella maggiore. My database allows us to estimate production levels and the size of the leather export trade for certain years between 1370 and 1410, and it can offer some guidance in gauging the material reality surrounding the declarations and complaints made by the tanners between 1381 and 1408. Unfortunately, as noted in chapter three, the itemized receipts found in the customs records do not present an even level of detail over the survey period. Cordovan, a soft goat leather used in shoemaking, appears in thirty-nine entries, but only in 1373, 1378, 1397 and 1410; in other years, and in other cases in those four years, we can assume that cordovan was entered into the registers as leather with no further descriptors.

These features of the documentary record limit the sorts of conclusions we can draw; we cannot expect, for example, to find evidence of an absolute decline in the
production and exportation of whitleather between 1389 and 1405. Nor, obviously, can we make estimates about the material produced within Lucca for consumption within the city walls. But we do know precisely how much leather entered and left the city walls in bulk shipments, and we know the quantities of skins imported from Genoa, Pisa, and the contado to feed the local tannery. By extrapolating from these isolated statistics to trends, we can derive a general model of the leather industry in the late fourteenth century.

First, we can look at the total volume of leather exported from Lucca in our eight sample years.

![Figure 4.4: Total Volume of Leather Exported from Lucca, in Libbre](image)

This picture is remarkable insofar as it corroborates all of the petitions we just surveyed, which describe a sequence of structural problems resulting from the tariff on exported leather. In 1381/2, the petitioners claimed that the high tariff on exported leather had depressed the market, and the reduction signed in law in January 1383 indeed seems to have led to a significant expansion of that trade relative to 1378. Taking into account the fact that the volume from 1385 reflects only a single semester, it seems probable that the exportation of leather increased two- or three-fold as a result of the reduction. By the end

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137 Due to the temporary suspension of tariffs on exports in January 1373, there are no reported shipments of leather from that year.
of the 1390s, however, that strong flow of leather exports had slowed. In the first decade of the fifteenth century, as the petitioners complained about the declining reputation of the Lucchese tannery, exported volumes fell below the level recorded in 1378.

However anemic the industry may appear in the early fifteenth century, it would seem that the tanners did succeed in breaking into foreign markets. As the following figure shows, much of the growth in Lucchese leather exports in 1385, 1387, and 1392 was oriented towards the urban hinterland.

![Figure 4.5: Destination of Leather Exports, Total Volume in Libbre](image)

This may reflect the natural orientation of the tannery, which was pictured by the framers of the 1372 statute as a protected industry servicing the domestic leatherworking trades. The petition of October 1382 also claimed that a rural tanning industry was benefiting from the high tariff, which contadini obviated by producing leather outside the city walls – supposedly out of skins smuggled under fraudulent pedaggio licenses.\(^{138}\)

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\(^{138}\) It is impossible to verify this claim, since many items travelling to the vicariates passed directly through the rural customs houses and left no trace in the records of the gabella maggiore. Over the whole of my sample, I found only 2,932 libbre of foreign leather destined for the contado. Presumably the ballooning rates of exportation in the 1380s and early 1390s had a negative effect on the health of rural tanneries, but they may have recovered to some extent by the early fifteenth century; while most of their raw materials must have come from outside the Lucchesia or from other parts of the district (via the rural gabelles), the
Traffic in leather to the *contado* was nearly tripled in 1385 compared to the same semester in 1378, while the exportation of leather outside the Lucchesia only began to increase in 1387. By 1392, after the second tariff reduction to 14 *soldi* per hundredweight, the foreign market finally comprised roughly a third of all exports. And by the early fifteenth century, when exports as a whole were quite low, much more leather was destined for parts outside the Lucchesia than within its borders. Even if, as claimed by the petitioners of 1405, Lucchese leather had lost value in the eyes of foreign merchants because of some perceived decline in quality, markets outside the Lucchesia had in fact become the primary draw for exportation by that point. It is nonetheless true that the tannery as a whole seems to have failed to transition to export-oriented products.

As evidence for that conclusion, we can also turn to figures for leather importation. Within the urban market, the introduction of foreign competitors for leather necessarily had some impact on the availability of raw materials for the leatherworking trades. If, as I have suggested, the preferences of foreign buyers gradually changed the practices of the tannery, we would expect to see Lucchesi forced to import more leather after 1381. As the following figure demonstrates, Lucchese leatherworkers always depended to a certain extent on commerce to this end, although certainly the rate of importation spiked relative to the 1370s in the first semester of 1385 and again in 1392.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ The figure for 1387, clearly, does not follow this trend.
But those may be the only years in which the tannery was failing to meet local demand. By the early fifteenth century, importation of leather had fallen relative to 1385 and 1397, which were, as per Figure 4.4, boom years for exportation. In fact, leather importation had declined between 10-30% compared to the 1370s. The question is, had the leathercraft industry in Lucca begun consuming less leather as a whole? Or, notwithstanding Meo di Biagio’s complaint about whitleather, was the urban leather market saturated with raw materials precisely because the tannery had failed to transition to export-oriented wares?

One way of determining the answer to this question is to look at the importation of skins, the raw material of the tanning industry itself. Our picture here is unfortunately incomplete, since an unknown quantity of skins must have come from urban abattoirs; similarly, due to the absence of origin markers for almost all import records, I cannot conclude whether these skins were coming from the contado or from outside the Lucchesia. Regardless, unlike the total volumes of exported leather, the quantities of skins imported to supply the tannery remained high relative to the 1370s during the first decade of the fifteenth century.
In this figure, we can see that the importation of skins increased over the period 1373-1392; in the early fifteenth century, it remained high despite the collapse of export-oriented leather evinced in Figure 4.5 and lamented by the petitioners of 1405. Moreover, little of this material was then re-exported from Lucca, which means that most of it must have found a use as rawhide or primary materials for the tannery.
In an average year, only around 3-5% of the recorded skins imported to Lucca were then re-exported to the contado or foreign parts. Curiously, the first semester of 1385, when the exportation of unworked skins was equivalent in volume to around a quarter of imports, is an exception to the trend noted above. Given that this year marks the beginning of an increase in exported leather, it is possible that the market for unworked skins had been glutted by speculative importation after the 1382 tariff reduction. But by 1387 and 1392, the tannery was evidently ready to absorb even greater quantities of raw material.

<table>
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<th>1385</th>
<th>1387</th>
<th>1392</th>
<th>1397</th>
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<td>3.56%</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
<td>4.31%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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</table>

Table 4.7: Annual Exportation of Unworked Skins as Percentage of Imported Volumes

In the early fifteenth century, just as the exportation of leather dropped to its lowest levels, business was still brisk in the market for imported skins, and the city exported less and less of its raw materials to the contado and outside the district.

Barring a sudden and otherwise unattested expansion of crafts consuming rawhide, most of which – i.e. saddle-making – also relied on finished leather, the rising volumes for imported skins and declining volumes for imported leather signal a period of sustained prosperity for the urban tannery beginning in the late 1380s. Extrapolating from my sample of the gabella maggiore, it seems that by the early fifteenth century the tannery enjoyed a stronger demand for domestic leather within the city walls relative to the 1370s and 80s. What does seem to have collapsed by 1410, and which the petitioners of 1405 specifically bemoaned, is the temporary success of the tannery’s export-oriented lines. The bullishness triggered by the tariff reductions of 1382 and 1389 seems to have subsided during and after the chaotic period 1397-1400. But the tannery’s local customers must have made up this shortcoming. Even if we accept the tanners’ account that inferior practices had taken root by the mid-1400s, the city was still importing almost twice as much material in 1401 and 1410 compared to 1373 and 1378. This leather may not have been as attractive to foreign merchants, but it was going somewhere.
Who were the buyers in this market, then? According to Figure 4.8, most individuals buying up leather in bulk must have been urban leatherworkers, but then who were their customers? The city of Lucca itself had not expanded significantly between 1373 and 1410—indeed, several plague years had most likely diminished the urban population. I would conjecture that the evidence indicates an expanding market for finished leather goods in the contado. As mentioned above, many of the products marketed by saddlers, shoemakers, and other clothiers paid no tax on exit from the city, so these goods cannot be tracked using the records of the gabella maggiore. But a growing integration of the urban industry with rural consumers would be concordant with the features of the trade outlined above.

The Lucchese hinterland was evidently dependent enough on Lucchese leather in the 1380s that their suppliers rushed to take advantage of lower export tariffs, becoming dominant buyers even as foreign merchants entered the new market in force. But this share failed to increase after the second reduction to export tariffs in 1389. And by the late 1390s, the rural share of exports had declined even as the urban tannery was processing larger and larger quantities of unworked skins. Meanwhile, practices at the tannery became more lax—evidently in consequence of the two tariff reductions—and its product became cheaper. This trend privileged Lucchese leatherworkers, who had tariff-free access to cheaper materials, and punished rural leatherworkers, for whom the by-volume tariff would have grown more expensive relative to cheaper Lucchese leather. Competitively-priced urban goods may have flooded the rural market, displacing extraurban artisans, such that demand remained high for leather in Lucca into the fifteenth century.

This is a tortuous thread to follow, but the situation in 1410 seems to be the mirror image of the scene found in the complaints of the tanners in their 1382 petition. There, the petitioners claimed that rural tanners and leatherworkers had driven urban tanners out of the market by taking advantage of an unfair market created by the protectionist tariff on leather exports. The plaintiffs hoped to build a new future for the tannery in foreign markets, and in 1383 they got their chance to pursue this vision. But the final outcome of their petitioning was a return to the status quo. In 1405, Paolo Guinigi’s government raised the tariff on exported leather—albeit only back to the 1383 level—and the tannery
in 1410 was primarily supplying local demand. That the overall productivity of the
tannery was significantly higher may have been precisely because of the reductions of
1383 and 1389, since the increased demand for Lucchese leather led to an effective
deregulation of the industry.

I would argue that the fundamental tension expressed through these petitions is
one of identity, namely the self-identification of high-status tanners as the experts on their
industry. In the first decade of the fifteenth century, as we have seen, these men took
steps towards not codifying their practices, but rather establishing themselves as ‘experts’
to judge and denounce what they considered less acceptable products. Clearly, the tanners
chafed under the vague ordinances of the Fondaco and the Corte de’ Mercanti, in the
absence of an established system of guild monopolies controlled by the guild members
themselves. Michael Bratchel has outlined a case in the 1430s, when the tanners returned
to the post-Guinigi government to complain about shoemakers operating small tanning
operations on their own; since there was nothing in the statutes to restrict this, it took
thirty years for the shoemakers to be pushed back.\(^{140}\) By jostling with their neighbors,
each other, and the communal government in the 1380s, the leading tanners managed to
establish some control over practices and tariffs. But this achievement seems to have
been undercut by a lack of foresight concerning the influence of the *gabella maggiore* on
the day-to-day practices of the tannery. Professional expertise, in short, had its blind
spots.

In conclusion, the story of the urban tannery in this period lays bare some of the
weaknesses inherent to customs legislation in this period. Specialized tariff rates could
prove clumsy and potentially damaging, but successive governments since the early
fourteenth century had decided against relying on *ad hoc* assessments of value-based
taxes at the customs house. But whenever legislators deviated from the default value-
based tax, as they effectively did with every volume-based tariff, they were proposing an
economic model. They had to determine, for example, the sustainable tax rate on a bale
of unworked wool, in both the current market and all probable future markets. Regardless
of the motivations in doing so, any errors of judgement made in the course of deriving

\(^{140}\) Bratchel, *Lucca, 1430-1494*, 146–47.
this model could disbar the desired outcomes or unbalance the market for that item. The situation became all the more risky the further the tariff rate varied from a value-based norm; a misjudged protectionist tariff could seriously retard the growth of an important industry. Advice from professionals within the industry was not necessarily useful for framing tariff rates, since such expert advice emerged from the very system it sought to change.

To make matters worse, any corrections made to the tariff rates after 1372 faced a series of hurdles. Constitutionally, such adjustments had to pass through the General Council, where new laws concerning any trade besides the silk industry faced disinterest or even opposition. A petition also had to propose a new model that sounded convincing and would not prejudice the income of the state to an extreme extent; based on the language found in petitions of this kind, the plaintiffs’ desired outcome had to be either zero sum or even a net gain for the fisc. And all of this appears to have happened in a low-information, low-expertise environment. As the evidence shows, the tanners could not even predict the final outcome of a tariff adjustment for their own industry. Should we be surprised that this unstable environment fostered the rise of an ‘expert’ official like ser Giovanni Linelli? or, after him, the accession of a prince?

4.3 Declining Exports in the Urban Silk Industry

Despite its place in my order of treatment, Lucca’s silk industry never came second to the urban tannery in the contemporary reckoning. Luscious veils, gold-embroidered samites, and thick drapes catch the eye in a way the most adept tanner can never hope to emulate. Besides that, the stench of the cocoon-boilers’ vats could hardly provoke revulsion in contemporaries who knew the value of their final product, the cloth that was Lucca’s golden ticket into an international economy. And, in a society

141 And the complaints about the state of the industry in 1405 by well-established tanners – including some of the same men who petitioned in 1382 – would seem to disbar the possibility that they had secretly predicted the transition to cheap, low-quality leather.
142 Amusingly enough, and in contrast to the aesthetic complaints that brought down the leather shops along the Via S. Giorgio, dyers and silk-boilers operated fairly freely in the city. In 1373, in response to an ordinance restricting their disposal of effluvia in the public streets, a group of tintores et cocitores petitioned for and received an exemption to the new law (CG 4, pp. 124-5 [12/5/1373 | CG]). They were
managed by merchant-bankers who specialized in organizing silk shops and marketing silk cloth as the basis of their fortunes abroad, the industry did not lack for patrons in the legislature. Aesthetically, economically, and politically, the silk industry enjoyed unrivalled prestige within the walls of Lucca. In the words of ser Giovanni Linelli, silk was:

The trade from which all other industries in the city, the whole city itself, and also its contado gain their influence, wealth, and increase. It is silk more than any other trade that gives succor to our community, contributing both to the profit of our citizens as much as to filling the city with men and inhabitants – keeping the city flush with money and filled with people.¹⁴³

This was the gabelle official’s professional opinion on the subject in the early 1380s, but it would have played especially well with an inner oligarchy comprised of silk merchants. Ser Giovanni certainly knew his audience.

Despite this glowing appraisal, Lucchese production of silk cloth was much reduced in comparison to the glory days of the Duecento. Starting in the tumultuous 1310s, Florence, Venice, and other rivals had begun drawing down its talent through waves of emigration. Workers fleeing political unrest during and after the time of Castruccio Castracani set down new roots abroad, and Lucca’s trade secrets began to feed into foreign markets.¹⁴⁴ The industry was still staffed and, in many places, marketed by Lucchesi, but the conditions of its development abroad remained outside the reach of the urban government. The city’s emancipation in 1369 may have lured back some of its lost weavers, but it must be remembered that well-established Lucchesi in Venice drummed

allowed, as a result, “to dispose of the water which they use in their crafts and trade through the public streets with impunity” (Providerunt et decreverunt quod tintores et cocitores lucane civitatis possint impune prohicer eorum aquam quam operantur in eorum artibus et magisterio per vias publicas...: CG 4, p. 132 [14/5/1373 | Sp]). They made use of corrosive mordents and urine like tanners, but these artisans’ political clout, exercised through their patrons and partners in the silk industry, was markedly different from that of their peers in the Contrada San Tomeo.

¹⁴³ CG 7, p. 545 (20/8/1381 | CG): illa ars a qua omnes alie artes que fiunt in civitate ista et tota civilitas et comitatus recipiunt influentiam lucrum et incrementum et que magis confert civilibus comitati et comuni tam ad lucrum civium quasi ad replendum civitate hominitibus et habitatoribus ad tinendum civitatem pecuniosam et copiosam habitantium quam aliqua alia ars.
up many of the loans required for that emancipation.\textsuperscript{145} Ironically, the condition most conducive to the revival of the Lucchese silk industry, political and fiscal independence, came about precisely because of the development of permanent silkworking enclaves outside the Lucchesia. In the end, there is little evidence that those solvent émigrés ever returned in force.

In this chapter, I have twice discussed the December 1381 ‘Peace of Turin’ session of the General Council as a turning point for both the woolen cloth and leather industries, but anxiety over the silk industry was the primary motivation of the changes proposed at that session. It was neither the only session nor the only set of tariff adjustments driven by concerns over the health of silk cloth production in the city of Lucca, largely because the interested parties never lacked for representation at the highest levels of government. Unlike tanners, or really any other artisans, entrepreneurial merchants in the silk cloth business faced no opposition to their interests in the General Council, Thirty-Six, Anzianate, or any other political body. All the leading families of the Forteguerra-Rapondi and Guinigi factions made their fortunes in international banking carried out on the basis of the silk market. There were certainly distinctions between their preferences, particularly in terms of their clientele and portfolios, but they all wanted a steady influx of raw silk and a steady outflow of silk manufactures.

In contrast to the leather industry, where both city and countryside evidently competed over raw materials and market share, the locus of silk cloth production in the later fourteenth century was the city and only the city. I found no evidence for any weaving being performed outside Lucca, although the preliminary stages of manufacture (i.e., boiling the cocoons and spinning the thread) were sometimes carried out elsewhere in the district.\textsuperscript{146} Nor did the \textit{contado} play any role in supplying the industry; the Serchio

\textsuperscript{145} Francesco “Il Vecchio” da Ferrara had made ten thousand florins available to Lucchesi at Florence, and some men active in Lucchese politics after 1369, like Bartolomeo Moccindenti, had provided loans from their companies based in Venice: see CG 6, p. 411; CG 5, p. 199 (31/1/1376 | Sp).

\textsuperscript{146} Barga, for example, before it was under the control of Florence, was known for its hydraulic silk-spinning facility (\textit{filatoio}), purportedly the invention of one Barghesano di Bonaventura in 1272. Like much else related to the silk industry, this Lucchese invention had been transported to foreign parts during the period of subjection and disorder following the death of Castracani. In his annals of Garfagnanese history, Domenicho Pacchi, an eighteenth-century antiquarian, noted a 1342 grant from the city of Bologna to one Bolognino di Barghesano to construct a hydraulic \textit{filatoio}: Pacchi, \textit{Ricerche storiche sulla provincia della Garfagnana esposte in varie dissertazioni dal dott. Domenico Pacchi pubblico professore di filosofia}
valley was not conducive to the cultivation of mulberry, and, unlike the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century projects in the Florentine dominion, silk production in the Lucchesia was never very successful, and certainly not in the Trecento.\textsuperscript{147} This means that, when assessing the productivity of the city, we are not leaving out a potentially large suburban and rural industry, which is the case for leather, leathercrafts, and woolens.

And so, unlike in the case of leather and its products, the extant records of the \textit{gabella maggiore} provide a near-complete view of the Lucchese silk market. Even fairly small imported and exported shipments of these expensive materials necessarily entailed tax payments above the thirty-\textit{soldi} limit prescribed for the gate gabelles.\textsuperscript{148} My database also contains over three hundred receipts for truly miniscule shipments of a few \textit{libbre} of cloth, a reminder that professional merchants seem to have preferred to make their payments in the court of the \textit{gabella maggiore}, where they actually received written receipts, rather than at the gates.\textsuperscript{149} So, it seems that whether silk entered Lucca in an unworked state or left it in a finished state, the vast majority of this material ended up passing through the Pinelli house. In sum, the taxes paid by agents of this industry allow us to assess production volume with a high level of precision for the years in my sample. The only exceptions are 1373 for silk cloth, as the government suspended the \textit{gabella maggiore} on exports in January of that year, and 1385 and 1387 for unworked silk, which owed no duty in those years for reasons that will be discussed below.

For the sake of simplicity, I have confined my survey of silk below to two items found in the records of the \textit{gabella maggiore}: raw silk (\textit{seta cruda}) and silk manufactures (\textit{laborerium sete}, or, very rarely, \textit{drappus sete}).\textsuperscript{150} There are a few other goods worth looking at, including dyestuffs and specialty piles for velvet, which I will also review in the appropriate place. But, while reviewing the input-output volumes of the silk industry,

\textit{in Casteluno}, 144. The precise nature of Barghesano’s mill has been the subject of some debate: Bratchel, \textit{Lucca}, 1430-1494, 136. Other cloth-producing centers exported their spinning work to the periphery; Venice, for example, used Vicenza and Verona in the fifteenth century: see Demo, “La produzione serica a Verona e Vicenza tra Quattro e Cinquecento.”\textsuperscript{147} Battistini, “L’industria della seta in Garfagnana (secc. XIV-XIX),” 223–24.
\textsuperscript{148} By the rates set in 1372, five \textit{libbre} of silk cloth, at six \textit{soldi} per \textit{libbra}, hit that thirty-\textit{soldi} mark, as did nine \textit{libbre} of unworked silk (three \textit{soldi}, three \textit{denari} per \textit{libbra}) (GM 1, f. 4r).
\textsuperscript{149} Exactly three hundred and sixty entries record
\textsuperscript{150} The term \textit{drappus} appears in only twenty-three records in my survey, as opposed to 2,564 entries describing \textit{laborerium}.  

I have set aside several infrequently mentioned types of unworked silk and silk products. For the sake of clarity, I will explain these omissions before proceeding to the relevant figures.

First, although ‘raw silk’ sounds vague and certainly encompassed a variety of origins and grades, the tariff rates clearly treat it as a discrete variety of primary material. Several other types of unworked silk, described as *filugelli*, *bavelle*, and *capitones*, appear in the statute of 1372, and these are assigned lower by-volume tariffs than *seta cruda*.\(^{151}\) Considering that these three terms conventionally refer to whole (*filugellum*) or damaged (*bavella, capitones*) silkworm cocoons, it seems likely that *seta cruda* was in a semi-processed state.\(^{152}\) At the very least, the inclusion of a separate category for *filugelli in vermibus*, with a very low rate of five *denari* per *libbra*, seems to suggest that all other forms of silk were imported without the ‘dead’ weight of the silkworms themselves, which were conventionally removed via an initial boil. A *gabella maggiore* entry from 1401 records the conversion rate between *filugelli in vermibus* and *seta*; on October 12\(^{th}\), Ranerio Malizard imported 69 pounds of raw silk from Villabasilica, where he had earlier sent 420 pounds of these ‘cocoons with worms’ to be processed into silk “at a rate of sixteen *libbre* per hundredweight”.\(^{153}\) If we take this rate of conversion as standard, or at least reasonable in the eyes of the court of the *gabella maggiore*, the tariff for *seta cruda* was 34 percent higher than that for an equivalent amount of *filugelli in vermibus*; this hints, perhaps, at the perceived processing cost, although it is difficult to convert from the tariff rate back to the value of the underlying commodity.\(^{154}\) Regardless, none of the other terms describing unprocessed silk appear in significant volumes relative to *seta cruda*.

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\(^{151}\) All three were assessed at one *soldo*, four *denari* per *libbra*.

\(^{152}\) Explicitly damaged scraps of unworked silk or low-quality silk threads (*sirichella, pessi, brocchi, costa, and stracci*) were covered under yet another rate, entailing a mere five *denari* per *libbra*. Note that it also seems possible that *filugellum* did not refer to the cocoons themselves, but in fact some lower grade of silk than *seta*. The 1314 *pedaggium* document, for example, contains two different rates for ribbons made from *seta* and those made from *filugellum*: *De quolibet centenario bursarum cordellarum trecciolorum fectarum de seta et similium ad pondus - libras quinque | Et si fuerint de filugello - libras duas* (ASLu, G.Orsucci 44, f. 210v). Also, see note 153 below, which certainly casts *seta cruda* as a processed material.

\(^{153}\) He had gained about half a kilogram (1.8 *libbre*) over the expected yield; GM 38, f. 162r: *a Ranerio Malizardi pro libris 420 filugellorum in vermibus conductis de villabassilica reductis ad seta ad rationem librarum sedecim pro centenario sunt libre 69...*

\(^{154}\) By the statute of 1372, one hundred *libbre* of *filugelli in vermibus* would have cost 2 *lire*, 1 *soldo*, 8 *denari* to import, compared to 2 *lire*, 16 *soldi* for sixteen *libbre* of *seta cruda*. 
cruda, which would seem to indicate that the industry in Lucca favored the use of pre-processed and refined silk to the exclusion of any lower-grade material.\(^\text{155}\)

Even if it proves difficult to identify the nature of each term used in this category, we do know that the the notaries who used, for example, seta cruda were referring a specific category of unworked silk insofar as they had to choose between the various rates for raw materials. In contrast, it is nearly impossible to determine the grades and types of finished silk manufactures leaving Lucca under the title of “silk manufactures”.

All types of silk products, including velvet (vellutum), fringes (cordella) and ribbons (fetta), entailed a tax of six soldi per libbra on export from the city.\(^\text{156}\) Consequently, the records elide the variety of weaves, densities, and finishes that we know characterized the advanced Lucchese industry, famous in particular for its precious brocades.\(^\text{157}\) This simplification would certainly have made it easier to administer the tariff, and we might see the flat by-volume rate for all types of silk cloth as a gift from the silk-merchant aristocracy to themselves – the exporters of gold-threaded luxury cloth must have come out ahead with a tax that ignored their goods’ value.

The records of the gabella maggiore cover the vast majority, if not the entirety, of imports and exports related to the silk industry over the course of my sample, and they paint a somewhat dismal picture. For example, the following figure presents the declining annual volumes of silk cloth exports, the central anxiety of the Lucchese aristocracy during this period.

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\(^\text{155}\) Brocchi, pessi, sirichella, and silk scraps appear in a total of twenty-seven entries, while bavella, capitones, and filugellum show up in a total of thirty-two further entries, all this compared to almost nine hundred entries describing the importation of seta cruda.

\(^\text{156}\) I have omitted pedani from my statistics due to the paucity of records describing this type of good: the item appears in only seventy-three entries.

\(^\text{157}\) Interestingly enough, this presents a certain departure from the institutional history of the gabella maggiore; the 1314 pedaggium document actually prescribes two separate rates for thick silk cloth – cloth-of gold (drapporum auri), ‘fringed’ silk cloth (listacarum), ‘purple’ or grana-dyed silk (purpurarum), and samite (sciamitorum) – for which each load entailed a tax of six lire, and thinner silk and notions – purses, ribbons, threads, fringes, and sashes – which owed only five lire per load (GB Orsucci, f. 210v). The actual values are irrelevant, since the document employs a very different rationale in taxing silk products (which, in any case, would not have been shipped in bulk from Genoa to Lucca), but it suggests that more categories for silk cloth did exist on early-Trecento tariff sheets than can be found in the statute of 1372.
It seems like the stable annual output for the silk industry in the last quarter of the fourteenth century was around twenty-three to twenty-four thousand libbre of silk manufacture. With no solid data on 1373, it looks as though 1378 represents a sharp diversion, an increase of 50 percent over this average, suggesting that the War of Chioggia had indeed resulted in advantages for Lucchese manufacturers over their cousins living in Venice. The closure of certain northern markets to Venetian silks may have resulted in the best year on record, but, as we have seen, the inner oligarchy seemed convinced in December 1381 that any cessation of hostilities would abruptly terminate

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158 Data is for a single semester of 1385.
159 As we shall see later on, expedition of silk cloth mainly occurred through bulk shipments by multiple firms over the space of about a week. These ‘sweeps weeks’ were spaced fairly evenly throughout the year, so we can safely derive a rough total of around twenty-four thousand libbre for 1385 by doubling the volume exported over the first half of the year. For 1373, given that the shipments up to 23 January include one such week of heightened activity, it is difficult to arrive at a certain total. More may have been exported than can be predicted by the month of January, though, since the tariff exemption should have prompted exportation of all backlog material. Similarly, members of the inner oligarchy would not have been surprised by the exemption, so some may have held back material otherwise destined for January shipments. In any case, twenty- to twenty-five thousand libbre total seems more likely than the thirty-five thousand libbre exported in 1378, a high-water mark that almost certainly reflects the political circumstances in Venice.
this period of growth. While the Peace of Turin marked the resumption of competition with Venice, the real crisis appears to have struck in the second half of the 1390s. We might blame the evident downturn of the market in exported cloth in 1397 on the brief war with Pisa, but the market remained depressed after the turn of the century.

This evident decline seems to be mirrored in the records of primary materials imported for the industry, in particular unworked silk.

![Figure 4.10: Annual volume of Raw Silk (seta cruda) Imports, in Libbre](image)

As this figure shows, in the 1370s, Lucca imported around thirty thousand *libbre* of the stuff to serve as the primary material of its silk industry. Merchants brought in around the same volume in 1392, despite the decline in silk cloth exports relative to 1378. This may indicate that raw silk importers reacted slowly to the outbreak of war in the spring of 1381 removed the tariff on raw silk imports (CG 7, p. 544 [20/8/1381]); this exemption was repealed in 1388 (CG 10, p. 485 [19/6/1388 | CG]).

161 Note that, except for the first half of 1373, the figures on this chart are somewhat lower than the actual annual volumes of unworked silk imported into the city; in May 1373, as I will discuss below, the General Council approved a proposal to eliminate the gabelle on a variety of silks, mostly Italian, which were imported to create notions (*merciaria*) such as veils, ribbons, and the like (CG 4, pp. 140-1 [25/5/1373]). In 1388, when the tariff on raw silk was reinstated (see the previous note), it excluded this “domestic” (*terrano*) stuff. As a result, the figures presented here represent just that unworked silk imported to make the “silk manufactures” described above – and, in that sense, the volume for 1373 is slightly inflated by Italian silks destined for other products.
1378. But, while silk importers were slow to speculate on the impact of war between Venice and Genoa, silk cloth exporters rushed to take the former’s place in the international market. In fact, the evident silk cloth boom in that year may reflect a sudden offsell of stocked cloth due to the newly favourable market; to be sure, the War of Chioggia only hit full swing in the spring, and more silk cloth was exported in the second half of that year compared to the first half.

![Figure 4.11: Monthly Volume of Silk Cloth Exports in 1378, in Libbre](image)

The registers of the *gabella maggiore* record an immediate uptick in the exportation of existing cloth stores after the outbreak of war, but I would expect that the market conditions of 1378-1381 resulted in a persistent increase in cloth production and therefore raw silk imports. In 1397, however, the importation of silk declined precipitously, and the market lost the ratio evinced in the 1370s and 1392, when about thirty thousand *libbre* of raw silk went to sustain the output of around twenty- to twenty-five thousand *libbre* of finished cloth. In 1401 and especially in 1410, far less raw silk entered the city than in those years, which certainly accords with the figures for exported cloth.

We can also trace this reduction in the ancillary materials used in the silk industry, such as ‘velvet yarn’ (*accia pro velluto/vellutis*), a non-silk weft used in the
production of velvet. In 1373, around 7,250 *libbre* of this material was brought into Lucca; in 1378, in contrast to the trend for raw silk, the market expanded to over 15 thousand *libbre*. Extrapolating from the first semester of that year, however, only eight thousand *libbre* of *accia* were imported in 1385 and about three thousand in 1387. Even if we add all untyped ‘yarn’ to these figures, accounting for the gabelle notaries’ tendency towards generalization, *accia* slowly vanishes as an import commodity over the last decade of the fourteenth century.

![Figure 4.12: Annual Volume of Yarn Imported into Lucca, in Libbre](image)

It is certainly possible that the local industry had begun to rely on import substitutes, but even that would point to a decline in quality. The simpler explanation is that the city had stopped producing much velvet. Like the leather industry, had Lucchese silk production grown less varied and less prestigious over the course of these forty years?

Besides this decline in production volume and variation, the records of the *gabella maggiore* also indicate that Lucca was slowly losing its role as a clearinghouse for silk produced elsewhere. The importance of the expatriate silk-manufacturing

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communities in Venice, Florence, and Bologna has been discussed earlier in this chapter, but the same groups that helped to fund Lucca’s independence also served as her main rivals in the international market. Despite this, a considerable volume of silk cloth (laborerium sete) from these industrial communities entered the city under pedaggio licenses and then travelled on to Genoa and Pisa, and the majority of the entries regarding these shipments stated Bologna as the city of origin.163

![Figure 4.13: Count of Pedaggio Shipments of Silk Cloth, 1373, by Origin](image)

Although there were only about 150 entries of this kind in 1373, the majority of them contained considerable amounts of cloth; all told, Lucchese managers handled a total of more than 70,000 libbre of foreign-processed silk, roughly triple the output of Lucca itself. This represented an incredible outlay for Bolognese manufacturers – so much, in fact, that I think it even more likely that many of these shipments originated further afield.

163 Besides the volumes evinced in the records of the gabella maggiore, we know this through-transit traffic of silk cloth was considered important because it was the target of specific gabelle ordinances. In June and again in September 1369, separate pedaggio categories were set up for silk cloth and raw silk, which were taxed at a higher rate (and by volume) versus other types of transiting goods: ASLu, AAL 45, p. 43 (24/6/1369 | Az); CG 1, p. 96 (20/9/1369 | Az).
than Bologna itself. Some of these ‘Bolognese’ silks may in fact have been Venetian in origin, but through Bologna in turn. Their arrival in Lucca would represent a conscious decision by Lucchese expatriates to avoid the commercial circuit of the Adriatic port in favor of their home city’s traditional entrepôt of Genoa.

In any case, wherever this pedaggio cloth originated in 1373, Lucchese companies clearly had a hand in sending them on to their destinations. Forty-eight different men paid the gabella maggiore on the 144 shipments in that year, but only a few stand out as professional carriers (vettigali/vectigales) operating with no personal interest in the market. The majority, like Dino Malapresa, who paid for over ten thousand libbre of silk cloth, Opizo Onesti (over seven thousand), and Bartolomeo Balbani (almost five thousand) professionally operated as silk merchants. Lucca’s relationships with its expatriate silk-working communities have been the subject of some research in the past, particularly the community in Venice in the Trecento. But the precise nature of the relationships between the Lucchese industry and its ‘colonies’ remains somewhat unclear. The volume seen in 1373 is certainly remarkable, especially since it seems unlikely that these 70,000 libbre came from the Bolognese industry alone, even as its total annual output.

If Lucca-based merchants were in fact directing massive production operations in foreign cities in the early 1370s, the next forty years witnessed a significant reduction in their influence.

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164 Although Bologna had become, to use Melis’s phrase, “una seconda Lucca” with regards to silk production, the sheer mass of silk transiting the Lucchesia seems too high to represent Bolognese production alone: Melis, Industria e commercio nella toscana medievale, 68. As mentioned in Chapter Three, above, the ‘origin’ of a shipment listed in the records of the gabella maggiore was likely just its last major port of call.

165 For example, Vanne di Piero da San Gennaro, Benedetto di Nuto da Carmignano, and especially Parasacchino di Nino da Borgo a Buggiano were established vettigali, not silk merchants. Given the ambiguous relationship between taxpaying and ownership in the records of the gabella maggiore, it seems possible that these shipments ultimately passed through the hands of Lucchese companies.

166 Dino Malapresa, who died in the early 1380s, exported several large shipments of cloth made in Lucca in 1378 (e.g. GM 18, f. 70v [169 libbre]; ibid. f. 223r [154 libbre]); Opizo Onesti registered at the Corte de’ Mercanti as a mercator sete in 1372 (ASLu, Corte’ de Mercanti 83, p. 12); and Bartolomeo Balbani and his brother Luigi registered for two silk companies in 1371 (CM 82, f. 3v), one of which had factors in Avignon.

167 Besides Molà, The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice, see Mainoni, “I lucchesi e la seta a Venezia nel tardo Medioevo.” Mainoni argues that one of the things that set the Lucchese expatriate community apart was its maintainance of a distinct brand – they produced and sold products that were specifically Lucchese.
As this figure demonstrates, the torrent of silk manufactures passing through Lucca in 1373 completely evaporated after the 1370s. What we are seeing here, I would suggest, is the decoupling of the Venetian community from the Lucchese commercial network. Given the timeline, it seems like the War of Chioggia must have played an important part in this process, since it threw into sharp relief the conflict between Lucca’s traditional trade route, i.e. via Genoa, and the political circumstances of Lucchese manufacturing centres in foreign lands. One might point to the danger of overland shipment during these years, which witnessed the intensification of mercenary warfare throughout the peninsula – but note that 1397, which saw war with an immediate neighbor, is the only year after 1381 to crest ten thousand libbre. Shipment through Lucca may have remained practical for the land-locked Bolognese community, but the turning point of 1378 suggests that the Lucchesi in Venice, in particular, had stopped sending material through their native city.

The consequences of this transition have to be understood against the background of a general production slowdown after the 1370s, witnessed by declining tariff payments in the import/export markets. For the industry as a whole, the promise of revitalization after the emancipation of Lucca proved illusory. After a short period of growth, the silk market contracted dramatically. By the accession of Paolo Guinigi in 1400, the city
exported roughly half of what it had in the 1370s and -80s. What group did the impact of this economic collapse strike hardest? At the very least, we know that less production meant less work for weavers, dyers, and spinners. But even if the decline in gabelle revenues reflects a progressive diminution of Lucca’s *industrial* capacity, the relationship between this decline and the fortunes of Lucchese merchant-banking companies is ambiguous. Silk cloth served as the basic commodity underwriting the international financial operations of Lucchese companies, which was the real business of the city’s leading families. But, by the end of the fourteenth century, these families had already diversified their interests in the silk industry outside the local market. At the most basic level, many companies registered at the Corte de’ Mercanti had branches and factors in other cloth-producing cities.\(^{168}\) Besides that, we have seen that Lucchese merchants handled considerable quantities of silk cloth produced in foreign cities.\(^{169}\) The volume of this trade, which never fell below a fifth of the annual volume exported from the city itself in the years of my sample, indicates the extensive connections maintained in other cloth-producing cities by local companies. Beyond these obvious links, preserved by chance in Corte de’ Mercanti depositions or in the records of the *gabella maggiore*, we can safely assume that most international silk companies had branches and contacts in silk centers outside the Lucchesia.\(^{170}\)

The fact remains that the Corte de’ Mercanti registry for 1407 lists only sixty-two silk companies, compared to seventy-five in 1371, eighty-nine in 1372, and eighty-three in 1381.\(^{171}\) As the market contracted, companies were not renewed, and families left the industry. We can pinpoint the specific losers later in this chapter, when we turn to the political circumstances affecting both silk legislation and particular families prominent

\(^{168}\) The company owned by Giuffredo Cenami, Francesco Martini, and Piero Martini in 1381 (CM 84, f. 10v) listed a factor (Martino Giuntorini) in Venice, as did the 1372 Guinigi company (CM 83, p. 13). The firm registered by Baldassare Guinigi in 1407 was actually described as a “company in the reckoning/region of Bologna” (*compagnia della ragione di Bologna*), indicating that the first family of Lucca had a branch operating more or less independent of the territory.

\(^{169}\) Such as the company of Opizio Onesti, registered at the Corte de’ Mercanti in 1372 (CM 83, p. 12) and 1381 (CM 84, f. 9v); besides personally exporting over two thousand libbre of silk cloth between 1373 and 1392, Onesti also paid *pedaggio* for a further 7,771 *libbre* that entered the city to be forwarded to Genoa.

\(^{170}\) Opizio Onesti’s registrations, for example, do not declare any factors or branches in foreign parts, although his company obviously did extensive business with silk manufacturers abroad.

\(^{171}\) CM 85, ff. 2r-12v; CM 82, ff. 2r-12v; CM 83, pp. 1-17; CM 84, ff. 3r-12r
within the industry. But, in a general way, the following table isolates a few demographic features of silk commercialization across my sample of customs records.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Top Ten Exporters</th>
<th>&gt;20 Libbre</th>
<th>&lt;20 Libbre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8: Share of Silk Cloth Export Market, Grouped by Total Volume Exported

Nothing about this chart is surprising, given the features of the market described earlier in this section. Expedition of silk cloth was primarily done by dedicated professionals, and those who exported a total of less than 20 libbre in the course of a year may have been as numerous, on average, as more specialized taxpayers at the court of the gabella maggiore, their share of the total market never reached above a few percentage points.

In most years the top ten exporters controlled around two-thirds of all silk exported from Lucca, the chief exceptions being 1378 and 1397. In 1378, when the international market was unusually favorable to Lucchese products, over half of all exports were in the hands of the middle-range exporters who shipped less than the top ten but more than twenty libbre over the course of the year. Given that the records from 1373 are incomplete, I cannot say whether the high figure for 1378 reflects speculative participation in the market by relative outsiders, continuation of a trend endemic to the Lucchese silk market before the War of Chioggia, or simply the fact that, as companies did more business than usual, multiple representatives had to be sent to the Pinelli house to handle their shipments. In 1397, the war year, we could attribute the vanishing of mid-range exporters to the rising costs of doing business, both in terms of raw materials – silk,
as we have seen, was in short supply— and transportation fees. Again, these statistics on their own do not indicate that companies were leaving the market in 1397, as it would make sense for companies to have engrossed large shipments, carefully guarded them, and dispatched them at safer times. It is nonetheless the case that, after setting aside the unusual figures for 1378, the number of individuals paying for silk shipments at the court of the *gabella maggiore* was on the decline over the course of this period. Totalling over a hundred people in 1387 and 1397 and eighty-two in the first half of 1385 alone, the tally of silk cloth taxpayers in 1410 comprised only fifty-nine individuals. Over the same period, as noted, the number of registered silk companies fell by around 25-30 percent.

One way of gauging the experience of Lucchese silk merchants during this period is to look at the fortunes of the most successful among them. The most dynamic family within the industry between 1373 and 1410 seems to have been the Trenta family, whose close ties with the Guinigi led to a preferential position in the new urban order after 1392. In the 1370s and 1380s, several members of the Trenta family, originally spicers, came to be employed in silk companies owned by the Boccella and Buzolini families. Matteo di maestro Federigo worked for Luigi Boccella in the 1370s, while his cousin Galvano di Piero lived in Avignon as the factor for the Buzolini brothers; by 1381, both were partners (*socii*) in Lucca under Simone Boccella, while Lorenzo Trenta worked alongside them as a factor.\(^{172}\) In the first half of 1385, Matteo di maestro Federigo Trenta appeared at the *gabella maggiore* to pay for almost fourteen hundred *libbre* of silk cloth, the second most prolific exporter in that year; after that, the three Trenta cousins paid for 14.5 percent of all exported cloth in 1387, 15.6 percent in 1392, and 30.7 percent in 1397!\(^{173}\)

The Trenta certainly fared well in the years leading up to the accession of Paolo Guinigi, but there were no real winners in the Lucchese silk market after 1400. In 1401, Lorenzo and Matteo Trenta exported volumes similar to their contributions in 1397, again just about a third of the total of all exports.\(^{174}\) But the general slowdown in the industry

\(^{172}\) CM 82, ff. 5r, 6v; CM 83, p. 8; CM 84, f. 11r.

\(^{173}\) I.e., 3415 *libbre* in 1387 (Matteo); 3624 *libbre* in 1392 (Galvano and Matteo); 4474 *libbre* in 1397 (Lorenzo and Matteo).

\(^{174}\) Lorenzo and Matteo exported 4504.8 *libbre* in 1401, 30.8% of all silk cloth sent from the city in that year.
eventually took the wind out of the Trenta sails, and in the last year of my sample Lorenzo, Federigo, and Bertolino – the latter two presumably scions of the next generation – exported 40% less in terms of volume compared to what the family had managed in 1397-1401.\textsuperscript{175} This is not to say that the Trenta family had really fallen into hard times, which is a conclusion falling outside the range of this study.\textsuperscript{176} At the very least, however, the Lucchese branch of their operations was experiencing a significant downturn, one common to all the major exporters in the silk industry. The Trenta may have taken a permanent position at the top of the charts in the 1380s, but theirs was a plurality share in an ever-shrinking trade.

By 1410, it would have been clear that the Lucchese silk industry had not experienced that rebirth celebrated by the citizenry on the eve of liberation forty years earlier. Having established the framework of this decline from the outside, we can now turn to how the urban oligarchy responded to the decay spreading through their wealth base. One might expect that the General Council and \textit{balìa} councils held debates over the mechanics of the silk industry on a regular basis, given its importance to the economic fortunes of the leading councillors. In actuality, while the chancellor of the Anziani certainly spilled more ink over silk than leather or woolens, legislation dealing directly with silk industrial practices was somewhat rare and alterations to its tariff rates even rarer. Nonetheless, anxiety over the future of Lucchese silk permeated all of the major reformulations of economic policy between 1369 and 1400, and the records of the \textit{Riformagioni} preserve a running account of contemporary perspectives on the industry’s health. It is at once a more complete and more personal record of how the republic’s ruling class struggled with the intractability of international economic change.

More than any other facet of Lucca’s economy, the silk industry materially interested the families that comprised the inner oligarchy. This emerges from even a cursory review of the men elected to the Anzianate or the Council of Thirty-Six, the two most permanent executive councils in the restored republic between 1370 and 1410. We

\textsuperscript{175} A total of 2487 \textit{libbre}, or 21.8% of all exports.

\textsuperscript{176} In 1407, at the very least, the Trenta family registered three separate companies at the Corte de’ Mercanti, one each for Matteo, Lorenzo, and Federigo; these do not declare any foreign factors, but that does not mean that their business was limited to Lucca. Both Lorenzo and Federigo, for example, paid \textit{pedaggio} for silk cloth shipments heading from Bologna to Genoa in 1410 (Lorenzo: GM 45, f. 289r [10/2/1410]; Federigo: \textit{ibid.}, ff. 286r [4/1/1410], 299v [23/6/1410], 312r [27/11/1410]).
have the names of those individuals who registered silk companies at the Corte de’ Mercanti in 1371, 1372, 1381, and 1407, but we can arrive at a more comprehensive roster by tallying the names of all those men who paid the tariff on silk cloth exports or raw silk imports over the course of my sample. To be sure, the ambiguous nature of the payments recorded by the *gabella maggiore* means that they serve as a fairly crude measure of the relationship between an individual and the trade in question. But a dragnet through the customs registers offers a long list to compare with both specific accounts – i.e. private business ledgers, of which few survive in Lucca to rival the *ricordanze* of neighboring Florence – and even more ambiguous references – i.e. occupational names in the *Riformagioni* – as we attempt to reconstruct the artisanal-commercial-political silk network in this period.

Between 1370 and 1400, I have recorded 459 individuals who served a total of 1,943 terms as Anziani, some of whom were substitutes for individuals who died between the creation of the election lists (*tasche*) and sortition. As for the Council of Thirty-Six, only 521 served the 2,356 separate terms recorded in my database. Despite the mandatory *vacanze*, the considerable overlap between the two lists means that 625 men served in one or both of these councils during this thirty-year period, a group I will refer to in the charts below as the oligarch set (*O*). Over my eight sample years between 1373 and 1410, I found 440 individuals paying to export silk cloth at the court of the *gabella maggiore*, and there were 268 men who rendered customs on raw silk imports

177 At most, such a survey provides us with a partial demographic survey of the market, since individuals involved in the industry, even in a managerial role, did not necessarily pay the gabelle personally; Ugolino Scortica, for example, who registered a silk company in 1371 and again in 1381 (CM 82, f. 41v; CM 84, f. 11r), never paid for silk cloth at the court of the *gabella maggiore* – but he did sit on both executive councils, and was even a counselor for the *fondaco* in 1382 and 1385. By the same token, one could argue that an individual paying at the *gabella maggiore* may have only had a casual association with the industry in question – at the very least, however, he or she was materially affected by the state of the industry at at least that juncture.

178 There were 96 such substitutes. Most of this data comes from the published minutes, the *Riformagioni*, but due to the mid-90s gap in this series I had to source the election lists from August 1394 to January 1397 from the early-seventeenth century *Cronologia dei Signori* (ASLu, AaTdL 766).

179 Again, 105 of these were substitutes; the Thirty-Six were elected for semester terms – one began on 15 March and the other on 15 September.

180 This means that 166 Thirty-Six and 104 Anziani did not appear on the corresponding election lists, which, even accounting for the careers interrupted by the cutoff dates of 1370 and 1400, is a puzzling disconnect and warrants further investigation.
(seta cruda). There was, perhaps unsurprisingly, significant overlap between these two groups and the oligarch set O, as the following table demonstrates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&lt;100 Libbre Total</th>
<th>&gt;100 Libbre Total</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>‘Oligarch’ (% of O)</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk Cloth Exports</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>67 (10.7)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Silk Imports</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>16 (2.6)</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Exports</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>5 (0.8)</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Skin Imports</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>14 (2.2)</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Wool Imports</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 (0.1)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9: ‘Oligarch’ Set Taxpayers in Specified Markets, divided by total item volume

Over a quarter of all men in the set of Thirty-Six and Anziani members exported silk cloth once or more between 1373 and 1410; most of these (102 out of 169) exported significant quantities of manufactures, doling out several florins or more in tariffs. And nearly a fifth of the ‘Oligarch’ set were significant importers of unworked silk. In comparison, few enough politically powerful men appeared at the gabella maggiore for the sake of the leather industry or to bring in material for wool weavers. Nearly a tenth of the O set paid tax on imported skins for the tannery, which, given the status of the men involved, suggests something about the dependence of the tannery on the international market.

In sum, no industry had access to the legislative process in Lucca like the silk industry – a full quarter of all individuals to serve on the Thirty-Six and the Anzianate between 1370 and 1400 – 157 men – were personally involved in processing large shipments related to the silk industry.\(^{181}\) And this tally of tariff payments surely presents us with the bare minimum of interpenetration between political power and silk interests in the city. After all, my sample contains only five and a half years out of the three decades in question, and many prominent silk merchants never appeared at the Pinelli

\(^{181}\) Sixty-six ‘Oligarchs’ are found in both ‘Over 100 Libbre’ categories related to the silk industry, such that the combined set consists of 157 individuals.
house, operating instead through factors or from abroad. In late medieval Lucca, no regular council – and one imagines few, if any, balia committees – came to order without silk professionals in attendance; they had a hand in every piece of legislation that affected the *gabella maggiore*.

The rest of this section presents my reflections on the consequences of this remarkable confluence of power and expertise. I will try to determine whether or not the evidence found in the legislative record indicates a rational application of professional experience to economic policy. I base my critique on material deriving from the legislative process itself, the petitions and debates in the governing councils, irrespective of the statistics outlined above. Having reviewed the figures from 1373-1410, we already know that all such policies failed to correct the downward trajectory of the Lucchese silk industry. The question is, did the silk merchant aristocracy further its decline through poorly framed restrictions – like the ban that unnecessarily strangled trade in foreign *grossolano* – and misguided privileges – like the long-desired tariff reduction that helped erode the quality of leather produced in the urban tannery?

The simple answer to this complex question seems to be no. The *Riformagioni* and the secret council minutes contain no lengthy debates over rescinding silk tariffs; rather, petitions with specific requests tended to be approved with the kind of speed that suggests a pre-arranged agreement. Nor do we find silk merchants in the 1390s complaining about the unintended consequences of laws published years earlier. I do not necessarily mean that Lucchesi demonstrated their superior knowledge of the silk industry and the international market through superior regulation, which successfully avoided the pitfalls encountered in the case of leather or woolens. Rather, I suspect that there was less debate because almost all controversy was behind closed doors, outside the legislative assembly and the public minutes. This would explain why the records feature few enough petitions about tariffs or other complaints related to the silk industry, and

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182 Forteguerra Forteguerra put his name to just over two hundred *libbre* of cloth, and Dino and Francesco Guinigi were the only two members of their family to appear in my sample before 1400 – and they expedited less than six hundred *libbre* between them, at that. Piero Rapondi, with his combined volume of over four thousand *libbre*, was the only member of the three great feuding families to expedite a significant quantity of cloth in the records covered by my sample.
those that do appear tend to enjoy a rapid transition from proposal to law without acrimony, delay, or delegation.

This is not to say that all petitions discussing the silk industry offered actionable solutions. As we have seen, the December 1381 “Peace of Turin” session was sparked by fears about the reentry of Venice into the silk market; despite its lengthy, lacrimose preamble about the decline of Lucchese cloth, the proposal of the cives super introitus actually concerned alternative investment in wool.\textsuperscript{183} As another example, in 1375 the merchant-banker Giannino Faitinelli lamented that, “As we all know, the silk trade was exported into other parts due to evil circumstances and a lack of foresight in the past, and now one can see that the trade has started up in another place where it seems able to be performed better and more easily than it can be in Lucca.”\textsuperscript{184} The identity of this new rival remains ambiguous – presumably not a traditional competitor like Bologna or Venice – although the message seems clear enough: since the “evil circumstances” (mali stati) were a thing of the past, councillors had little excuse to repeat the regulatory errors that resulted from a “lack of foresight” (poga providentia) on the part of their forebears. But if circumstances in 1375 truly demanded a proactive response, Faitinelli was at a loss for a specific course of action; the balìa committee elected in response to his petition also failed to produce any ordinances related to the gabella maggiore or otherwise. But if the petition itself had no immediate aim, had he simply come before the General Council to vent his frustration?

In light of the nature of successful silk petitions, I think that is a definite possibility. Generalizing laments, whether about the silk industry, the health of the

\textsuperscript{183} ASLu, CG 7, pp. 628ff. (2/12/1381 | CG).
\textsuperscript{184} ASLu, CG 5, p. 149: Item consulatur in dey nomine super petitione infrascripti tenoris videlicet Dinanci a voi singnori antiani et confaloneri di justitia del populo et comune di luca Exposi com Reverentia pro parte de Jannino Faytinelli et dalli altri consoli della corte de mercantanti et delloro consilio, Considerato che le mestieri della seta per mali stati delli tempi passati et che per poga providentia e traslatato in piu terre come a tucti e manifesto, Et ora di nuovo si sente cominciarsi lo decito mestieri in alcuno luogo in dell quale mellio et piu habilemente fare visi puote che in luccha et che in altri luoghi lau al presente si fa, Et anco come a tucti e manifesto per le decte cagioni et per moltre altre, qui in luccha la decita arte e molto venuta meno, et e per intuito abandonarsi se com subito et salutifero rimedio non si ripare et pero conciosia cosa che in luccha larte della seta e una dota preciupe et uno dono singulare da die precedente dal quale tucti altre arti ne valliano molto di mellio et dal quale tucti i cittadini e contadini maschi et femine et di ongni conditione loro vita sostentano et unde procedono et sensa la quale arte luccha e per venire in piggioare stato et conditione che mai fusse riccorono alla vostra singnoria per gaudoni che per dio col consilio bisongnevole pro vedere et remediare per quelle vie et modi che a voi parra si convenga.
economy, or fiscality in general, caused the General Council to elect several *balìa* committees between 1369 and 1400. Sometimes these investigatory groups even produced legislation; for example, the 1373 “citizens on reducing expenditures” (*cives super moderando exitus*), elected with the wide mandate suggested by their name, published a series of ordinances touching on tariff rates, officials’ salaries, and the *pedaggio* system. But this is not how silk legislation tended to be passed in Lucca during this period; presumably, no legislative changes came before the General Council that had not already been hashed out in private and prepared for rapid deployment.

In fact, I have not found a single ordinance affecting the silk industry that derived from one of the surrogate *balìa* bodies. Instead of delegating its statute-altering authority as it did in most of the examples seen earlier in this chapter, the General Council itself approved all new legislation pertaining to silk manufacture between 1370 and 1400. This underscores the fact that the governing bodies of the city typically contained representatives of every major silk company. What was the point of an inquisition via *balìa* committee when the council chamber already contained the sum total of Lucchese expertise on the subject? In sum, compared to the path taken by most legislation, the process for decrees affecting the silk industry was speedy, straightforward, and provoked no substantial contestation at a later date.

Considering the control evinced by Lucca’s silk aristocracy over the legislative process, it is surprising that the government experimented so little with commercial and industrial regulation in the course of this decline. With one exception, the state made no adjustments to silk-related tariff rates between 1372 and the publication of the statutes of 1399-1400; and, while those later statutes did raise many customs rates, including that for silk cloth, these changes merely reflect the deflated money of account in which the *gabella maggiore* was denominated. That single alteration, as we shall see, demonstrates the expedience with which the government could respond to issues in the silk industry, which makes it all the more puzzling that they reacted so infrequently to its problems.

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185 CG 3, pp. 342ff. (20/1/1373 | Sp).
186 The money used at the court of the *gabella maggiore* had been adjusted from seventy *soldi* to the florin to seventy-five *soldi* to the florin in June 1388: CG 10, pp. 485ff. (19/6/1388 | CG); GM
In December 1389 the Anziani and the Twelve Conservators submitted to the General Council a list of tariff alterations, one of which was the second reduction to the export tariff on leather.\footnote{ASLu, CG 11, pp. 163ff. (10/12/1389).} Another of these items lowered the import tariff on raw silk by about 70%, from three soldi six denari to one soldo per libbra.\footnote{Note that this new tariff was denominated in the new currency of account (seventy-five soldi to the florin), versus the old currency (seventy soldi to the florin) in use since 1372 (GM 1, f. 4r).} This is the only act I found that changed a tariff rate related to the silk industry, but it was actually the last in a series of four modifications since 1373 that affected raw silk. Unlike the final order, the other three proposals did not introduce alternative rates but rather concerned exemptions from the tariff. But, since these four ordinances represent the only sustained discussion of silk-related legislation during our period, it is worth investigating the process that led to the significant reduction of December 1389. I would point out that, compared to the debates behind the similar reductions to the export tariff on leather, each of these developments came to the vote without debate and took effect without complaint, but not without revealing something of the conflict within the silk merchant class between self-interest and the projection of selflessness.

The first of these four acts was approved in May 1373, and it created an exemption from the *gabella maggiore* for unworked silk used by weavers to make ribbons and other “notions” (*merciaria*).\footnote{ASLU, CG 4, pp. 140-1 (25/5/1373 | CG).} Although this industry is not covered by my study, it is worth noting that this import tariff privilege for raw silk was followed a year later by an export tariff exemption for these notions, all of which was meant to foster an industry “that requires less money and less time” than traditional Lucchese silk cloth.\footnote{ASLu, CG 4, p. 398 (26/5/1374 | CG): Bartolomeo Micheli warned the General Council that the *gabella maggiore* itself was stifling the growth of this industry, which was instead growing in Venice due to the absence of a gabelle. See Appendix 4, Text 2.} These tax-exempt silks, primarily of Italian origin, were identified in the petition by toponymic descriptors like *sermonesis*, *campagnina*, and *calabresis*, but the councilors evidently recognized that amateurs would have trouble distinguishing between these types.\footnote{See Appendix 4, Text 3.} As a result, the General Council also ordered the election of two special assessors (*provisores sete*) to correctly identify grades of silk upon registration at the
court of the *gabella maggiore*; these assessors were, after 1375, added to the regular roster of gabelle officials found on the bi-annual election lists.\(^{192}\)

For almost eight years, these special silk assessors sat in the courtyard of the Pinelli house and assessed each shipment of imported silk; given their role in applying or withholding a costly tariff, they unsurprisingly made a few mistakes and a few enemies. By August 1381, the situation had obviously become contentious enough that ser Giovanni Linelli announced to the General Council that “disagreement often arises because some assessors sometimes expedite a certain type of silk as ‘for notions’, and so it goes on tax-free, and some sometimes do *not* send on the same type of silk, saying that there ought to be a payment for the gabelle.”\(^{193}\) At the same meeting, ser Giovanni noted that the city would benefit from some new reorganization of the gabelle on raw silk and a new set of privileges for foreigners coming to work in the silk industry, including “silk-boilers, dyers, weavers, and lace-makers.”\(^{194}\) This petition, which brought up the familiar spectres of depopulation and Pisan competition, was successful on all its points, and the exemption for the tariff on raw silk was extended to all raw silk imports regardless of industrial use. Between August 1381 and June 1388, the silk merchants in Lucca enjoyed a complete exemption from the tariff on the primary material of their industry. This may help explain the evident health of the Lucchese industry in the late 1380s despite the dreaded return of the Venetians into the market after the Peace of Turin in late 1381. It is

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\(^{192}\) The General Council elected the first two assessors, Michele Lomori and Iacopo di Gregorio, on 30 May 1373 (CG 4, p. 148); by 1375, the court evidently had three such assessors, and this number was preserved through 1381 (CG 5, p. 6 [10/1/1375]).

\(^{193}\) CG 7, p. 544 (20-8-1381 | CG): ...

\(^{194}\) Ibid.: Item cum utile videatur civibus lucani communis super introytibus deputatis et dicto Johanni quam seta quod multimode de partibus mundi conducuntur in tusciam pro illis vendendis conducuntur lucam et ibi conducentur si illas vendere possunt, et si non liceat eis infra certum terminem per vos declarandum vel eis a vestro officiális assignandum reportare illas sine ulla gabella quam illas dimicte in civitate pisana et illuc habeant ire cives volentes de illis emere videtur quod sit providendo quod cuique setam crudam in civitate inmictendi pro illa vendendo et illam in curia gabelle scribi faciendo licet illum ad suum fundacum vel quo voluerint in civitate deferendo et si non vendiderit extrahere possit infra terminem declarandum vel assignandum ut supra dictum est sine ulla gabella. Item ad hoc ut civitas civibus et eorum famulis repleatur et maxime mercatoribus et artificibus dictam artem exerceret...
worth noting that ser Giovanni Linelli introduced this petition on his own initiative, as the *fidelis servitor* of the commune. With silk merchants as his audience, this notary from the *contado* laid out a plan that appears to have preserved the industry in a time of crisis.

In June 1388, in a time of dire fiscal straits, the General Council was assembled by the *podestà*, Santo Triconi da Firmo, to make some changes such that “the city might maintain itself in liberty”.195 The recommendations delivered at that meeting took the form of the vernacular review described in the introduction, at the beginning of which the authors proposed the direct antagonism of civic unity and direct taxation.196 But the reimposition of the gabelle on unworked silk actually derived from the response of Michele Guinigi to that list of recommendations, who directed the General Council to reimpose the tariff on silk “from the great sea” – i.e., not the silk for notions which mainly came from Italy.197 It is important to note that this was not prompted by the official list of recommendations, but rather came *ad libitum* from one of the *invitati*: it was, in other words, a spontaneous offer on the part of the Guinigi and other silk merchants to do their part to help maintain the public weal.

The troubling summer of 1388 passed without the dreaded crisis of Lucchese liberty, and by the end of the following year the reimposition of the full tariff on raw silk evidently started to seem unnecessary to the silk community. At a meeting of the General Council in December 1389, Bartolomeo Forteguerra, acting as the Standardbearer of Justice, delivered a list of recommendations coming directly from the Anziani:

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195 CG 10, pp. 485-6 (19/6/1388 | CG): *Cum lucana civitas iam multis exactis annis turpi redemptioni castrensis armatorum fuerit sepius quando eius suppetant facultates supposita et exausta in tantum pecuniis ut introitus exitus excendant et ob hoc per collegium dominorum commissum fuerit in quibusdam civibus ut diligenter animadverterent et considerarent quibus modis providendum esset ut introitus ab expensis non excendantur et ut emergentibus casibus lucana civitas se possit in sua libertate tenere; due in part to extraordinary payments to mercenary companies, solvency was such an issue in the summer of 1388 that interest payments from the massa creditorum were redirected to the Abondanza to finance the harvest, and the state could only promise grain in October to repay these injured creditors (CG 10, p. 491 [26/6/1388 | CG]).

196 See the introduction.

197 CG 10, p. 486: *Michael de Guinigiis unus ex invitatis ad dictum consilium surgens in ipso consilio ad arenegheriam publicam et consulentibus deputatam dixit et consultuit quod […] Gabella Serici quod de maiore mari lucam conducitur et portatur decetero reimponatur et exigatur sicut hactenus consuevit antequam abmota et sublata fuisset.*
“...who have long meditated in their serious conversations how they might procure abundance for both the commune and the city as a whole, and now they have achieved this, for the most part, since the cost of living is far more expensive in other cities and neighboring parts. They therefore want to unburden their citizens of communal costs insofar as is possible, so long as this does not confer loss or danger to the republic.”

As noted above, the first item on the list was a reduction of the tariff on silk imported “del mare magiore”, i.e. from across the Mediterranean via Genoa, which was reduced from the original three-and-a-half soldi per libbra to a single soldo per libbra. This 70% discount clearly offered a compromise between the original rate and the complete exemption enjoyed by the industry for seven years. Even in the absence of figures for 1385 and 1387, I would point to the reduction in December 1389 to explain the 1392 ratio of raw silk imports to silk cloth exports, which is inflated in comparison with 1378.

Beyond this, did the significant reduction of the gabella maggiore tariff on raw silk in 1389 cause any changes in the industry itself, like the reduction for leather that was passed at the same meeting? For that matter, had the exemption active between 1381 and 1388 changed the dynamics of production in any significant way? These are not questions that can be answered definitively by recourse to the records of the gabella maggiore, nor do the Riformagioni betray the inner workings of any of the silk companies or weaving shops. It is possible that further research into the records of the

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198 CG 11, p. 163 (10/12/1389 | CG): ...maturis consiliis diu excogitaverint quo modo et lucano comuni copiam et toti civitati possent abundantiam procurare; et iam id magna ex parte fecerint cum in aliis civitatibus et locis circumstantibus longe carior victus sit, volentes etiam quoad fieri potest cives a comunibus oneribus disgravare si id tacturam seu periculum rei publice non afferat.

199 Ibid.: Prima la seta del mare magiore et ogni altra seta crude di che condizione si sia si dichiari dover pagare per l avenire per continuo ne l entrata a ragione di soldo uno per libra a peso, a ragione di libre tre et soldi xv per fioreno.

200 In November 1389, curiously enough, the Council of Thirty-Six debated a set of ordinances to protect the silk industry, a conversation which began with several general complaints about the decline of Lucchese silk, as it often did, and one specific complaint about the exportation of looms, wefts, frames, and other vital materiel: CG 11, pp. 154ff (9/11/1389 | 36). Naturally, the Thirty-Six could not debate the statutes in the absence of the balia held by the General Council, so they concerned themselves with banning Venetian products and setting up a join commission with the Corte de’ Mercanti for applying fines. One wonders whether the reduction that came a month later was discussed at the same meeting of the Thirty-Six, at which that same college of Anziani was, of course, present.
Corte de’ Mercanti might reveal something new, but the registered ordinances of the court from this period have not shed any light.\textsuperscript{201}

As it happens, the tariff reduction in December 1389 is the last time in our period that the taxes affecting the silk industry were discussed in the General Council; in fact, it seems to be the last time before the accession of Paolo Guinigi that any aspect of the silk industry was discussed in the city’s published minutes. Yet, to look at the statistics described at the beginning of this section, this was hardly a period of growth. Rather, from 1392 onwards, the silk industry suffered a slow and steady contraction. That no one brought up the tariff during this period would be more understandable if we knew that the \textit{gabella maggiore} had no significant impact on the health of the silk trade. To the contrary, that the reimposition of the tariff survived for only the year-and-a-half between June 1388 and December 1389 indicates that it \textit{had} caused problems within the industry. Once the fears of 1388 had passed, silk merchants sought relief from taxation. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the oligarchs of Lucca did recognize that legislating the economy could provide remedies to their immediate concerns. In just such a way, they had embraced ser Giovanni Linelli’s suggestions in 1381 amidst growing anxiety about the reentry of Venice into certain markets after the War of Chioggia. Why did they stop after 1392, as the city’s productive capacities evidently continued to worsen?

This question prompts us to look more closely at the composition of the silk entrepreneurial elite as described by the records of the \textit{gabella maggiore}, because 1392 was a turning point for several reasons. After the blood was swept from the streets in May of that year, the ranks of silk merchants were somewhat thinner than they had been in April. Forteguerra Forteguerra was dead, while Giovanni Maulini, Gherardo Burlamacchi, and others had been assigned to confines outside the Lucchesia or banned

\textsuperscript{201}The surviving contemporary Libri della Corte de’ Mercanti (ASLu, Corte de’ Mercanti 13-16) cover the period 1369-1389. Within these registers, I found two items in CM 16 seem relevant the discussion of tariff reductions: in February 1389, on Nicolao ser Pagani’s advice, the court published new regulations for the weight and size of silk cloths (CM 16, ff. 4v-5r [12/2/1389]); in October of the same year, the court heard a complaint about the emigration of Lucchese weavers, a complaint which, as we have seen, was forwarded to the Council of Thirty-Six in November (CM 16, f. 20v [12/10/1389]). There are indeed more items of note within this founds, which has been a fruitful object of inquiry: see Meek, “Clothing Distraint for Debt in the Court of Merchants in Lucca in the Late Fourteenth Century.”
from high offices like the Anzianate and the General Council. A good number of these men, like the three just named, Lando Moriconi, and Piero Rapondi, were major players in the expedition of silk cloth from Lucca. As Meek has rightly noted, the personal differences separating the Guinigi and Forteguerra-Rapondi faction did not culminate in legislative duels over economic or even foreign policy. Regardless, in the end, members of the losing faction were physically or effectively removed from the city.

Most of the punished men were on the list of Guinigi family enemies that has been described by Christine Meek, a dossier purportedly drawn up by Dino Guinigi in 1391 that survives in an eighteenth-century copy. If we combine these names with the men who received sentences at the hands of the emergency balia committee and the General Council in May 1392, we arrive at a core roster of twenty-five men eliminated or isolated by the triumph of the Guinigi faction. Checking these names against the records of the gabella maggiore provides a partial answer to the question above. Before 1392, the losing faction’s contributions to the economic life of the city were far from inconsiderable, and the health of the Lucchese economy was not a zero sum game.

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202 Following Meek’s description, Giovanni Maurini, Niccolò Genovardi, Gherard Burlamacchi, Giovanni Rapondi, ser Antonio da Camaiore, and Matteo Nutini were confined by order of the General Council; the emergency balia committee excluded Orlandino and Duccio Volpelli, Piero Rapondi, Betto Schiatta, Iacopo Ronghi, and Lando Moriconi from high offices; it also removed Carlo Ronghi and Niccolò Maurini from positions as vicars, a fairly major punishment. See Meek, *Lucca, 1369-1400*, 272.
203 Ibid., 229.
204 For example, after Lando Moriconi was rendered ineligible for office, he, along with Carlo Ronghi, spent part of the later 1390s as a rebel in the Garfagnana: see Galoppini, “La Garfagnana nelle Croniche di Giovanni Sercambi,” 94–96. Dino Moriconi, Lando’s cousin and a silk merchant, was a member of the Guinigi party and maintained the family’s presence in Lucca.
206 Ibid., 367.
This table represents the absolute minimum volumes of silk cloth exports handled by the companies owned and operated by members of this supposed Anti-Guinigi faction. As described in chapter three, the records of the *gabella maggiore* do not permit us to reassemble the output of corporate entities. First, the Libri di Mercatanti series, which recorded company rosters on an annual basis, does not survive for every year of my sample; second, even if they did, some merchandise was presumably paid for by professional porters who would not have appeared in the Libri di Mercatanti anyway. And yet, even just that core group of twenty-five men evidently controlled between a fifth and a quarter of the trade in the 1380s, and their joint output in the first half of 1392 was equal to a full quarter of all silk cloth expedited that year.\(^\text{207}\)

After increasing the silk cloth export volumes for 1397, 1401, and 1410 by a third, the decline after 1392 is far more gradual. What seemed to be a sudden economic collapse is actually revealed as a sudden political sea change. Some families, like the Trenta, took advantage of this power vacuum to continue expanding their network, but a significant chunk of the industry administered by the anti-Guinigi faction seems to have evaporated overnight. The fact that the Guinigi ascendancy necessitated this slowdown

\[^{207}\text{With the exception of 333 libbre in 1397, all the silk cloth handled by ‘Anti-Guinigi’ individuals after 1392 was in the hands of Giuffredo Cenami. Cenami, who had married a member of the Rapondi family and worked with Betto Schiatta, was on Dino Guinigi’s list and was threatened by Guinigi partisans in May 1392, but he quickly worked his way back into favor and continued to hold office in the city into the reign of Paolo Guinigi: Ibid., 287. Ironically, the Guinigi may have been better off exiling him, since his son Piero was one of the leaders of the coup that removed Paolo from power in 1430.}\]
would hardly have comforted the weavers, spinsters, and dyers who had worked with the Forteguerra, Rapondi, and Moriconi companies. Nor is it entirely clear what mechanisms facilitated the removal of anti-Guinigi capital or prevented pro-Guinigi companies from simply stepping into the breach. This event, which seems a distant mirror of the much-lamented Castruccian diaspora of silk-weavers, deserves further inquiry, and the political-legal crisis over Forteguerra Forteguerra’s estate would be an excellent starting point.

The records of the *gabella maggiore* do explain why silk disappears as a topic of discussion in the *Riformagioni* after 1392. Before, the General Council and Council of Thirty-Six were necessary intermediaries between rival factions in the same industry. Michele Guinigi and Piero Rapondi needed a space within which to hash out new policies or just jointly lament the state of the silk trade – and, if the events of May 1392 are any indication, they couldn’t share a sitting room. After the death of the anti-Guinigi faction, two things happened. First, the high demand for silk-working labour in Lucca declined, hence the end of complaints about the ‘disappearance’ of weavers and their craft. Second, the demand for primary materials in Lucca decreased as local competition for resources declined. The latter does not necessarily mean that the cost of goods went down, but perhaps that the supply of these goods became an in-party concern. Rather than altering the rates of the *gabella maggiore* to have an effect across factional boundaries, as they had in 1381 and 1389, the silk community after 1392 may have been more united and better able to coordinate their deals with suppliers in Genoa and further abroad. Whether or not they were more cooperative with each other, Table 4.8 certainly indicates that there were progressively fewer members of the inner oligarchy as the Guinigi hegemony continued into the first decade of the fifteenth century.

### 4.4 Conclusion

Looking to Lucchese society after the fall of Paolo Guinigi, Michael Bratchel noted that the stagnation of the silk industry in the fifteenth century might have stemmed from the resilience of its political and economic norms. The traditional silk merchant-oligarchs occupied, in a more or less stable manner, the positions that elsewhere began to
be held by upper-middle class entrepreneurs.208 One feature of the former class, as Bratchel rightly notes, was their loyalty to the ordinances – and thus technologies – of yesteryear.209 They were reluctant to modernize, reluctant to change their techniques of production and commercialization. In the later fourteenth century, we can see the roots of this moribund culture of silk production described by Bratchel. For example, the sharp division between Italian silk and silk “from the great sea” proposed by the exemptions in 1381 indicates an unwillingness to adapt to local products under the guise of maintaining quality.210 Following on the work of Del Punta, it seems that Lucchese silk production had eschewed the use of Italian silks in the late Duecento, when they were becoming more readily available; a century later, this continued resistance set Lucca apart from its competitors.211 While Lucchese silk fell behind the curve in terms of its product lines, Lucchese dyeing was also slow to catch up with new fashions. In October 1388, the General Council had to create a special tariff rate for silk cloth sent from Lucca to Pisa – of all places! – to be dyed in kermes rather than grana.212 It took three years for Lucca to secure a dyer proficient in the new material, despite the fact that kermes had become such a necessary ‘add-on’ for luxury cloth production.

I would argue that the absence of new legislation after the triumph of the Guinigi faction in 1392 demonstrates the reluctance of silk interests to mobilize their influence as a political action group. Even after the ouster of the Forteguerra, Rapondi, and Moriconi companies and the concomitant expansion of the pro-Guinigi Trenta company, the Guinigi did not introduce new legislation related to the silk industry. The flight or murder of Guinigi opponents, as we have seen, does not seem to have opened much space for growth for the survivors; the commercial-familial bonds established by Forteguerra in the Low Countries and the Rapondi in Paris and Avignon could not be confiscated like their material possessions in Lucca.

209 Ibid., 135.
212 CG 10, p. 490 (26/6/1388 | CG). The distinction between carmesic acid and cremesic acid, both of which derive from a beetle that arrived in Lucca from the Black Sea and both of which produce a deep red dye, was of dire importance for a brief period at the end of the fourteenth century: see Munro, “The Medieval Scarlet and the Economics of Sartorial Splendor,” 16–17.
This conservative instinct towards legislation was completely rational in the low-information environment within which the silk aristocracy of late medieval Lucca had to operate. Throughout this chapter, I have highlighted incidents within the wool, leather, and silk industries that resulted in unforeseen consequences and procedural stalemates. The legislative record of the restored republic is full of unfulfilled promises and empty threats, a fact that would have been even more apparent to contemporaries than it is to a modern reader. It should come as no surprise that the members of the inner oligarchy were least inclined to edit the statutes that could most affect their own profits, those of the *gabella maggiore*. Besides this calculation of risk and drive towards self-preservation, this class also betrayed a marked conservatism towards novelty in legislation. As I described in chapter two, the framework of the *gabella maggiore* seems to have been an inheritance from the early fourteenth century. The design of its tariff lists, and even some specific rates, passed through the hands of several generations of reform without any major changes. To offer a correction to this inherited wisdom might be seen as an overreach by political opponents, and, ultimately, there was no guarantee that the new policy would result in a positive outcome. The taxes on raw silk and silk cloth were static, for the most part, because the process of constantly altering the rates to correspond to the current value of the good in question would have been politically infeasible.213

There may be yet another, simpler answer. The men in charge of the commune were well acquainted with the challenges of long-distance trade, relied on a growing library of handbooks, like the famous Pegolotti manual, that described the costs of transport down to the level of local tariffs. These merchant-bankers were, to some extent, accustomed to a fixed system of taxes that were the most predictable features of an unpredictable international market. Perhaps this is why they exhibited such disinterest in the tariffs governing their sector, while the tanners persistently beat on the council door to have the gabelle on leather reduced. They did, to be sure, reduce their tax load in 1381, and endured only eighteen months after the reimposition of the tariff on raw silk before reducing it by a significant percentage. But 1389 marked the end of meddling in the silk

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213 Note, too, that the Pisan breve for the *gabella della Degazia* presents a fixed estimation for each of the items in its list; even a by-value tax could be framed in such a way as to be resistant to market fluctuations: Casini, “Il ‘breve’ delle gabelle della porta della Degazia del Mare di Pisa del 1362.”
industry for the inner oligarchy. Maybe, seeing the disfunction of the tannery in the late 1390s and early 1400s, the silk merchants who had gradually disengaged from the political life of their city felt validated in their decision to leave the silk tariffs alone after 1389.
Conclusion

After the dust settled in May 1392, and the Forteguerra-Rapondi faction was well and truly dead, the Guinigi-run *balìa* committee – the Twenty-Four – set about publishing a series of extraordinary decrees. A few of these contained rewards for the family’s supporters. Andrea Stornelli had murdered Bartolomeo Forteguerra and sers Iacopo and Francesco di ser Angelo da Camaiore, decapitating them in the street “without any confession or reading of scripture” according to Sercambi. As I described in chapter three, he received an unusual pair of gifts: first, in May, a license to import fifty casks of expensive wine without paying the *gabella maggiore*; second, in June, the tax-farm on gambling, worth more than two thousand florins. This was a nice pay-off; in comparison, the commune offered John Hawkwood and his ‘English Company’ only seven thousand florins to avoid Lucchese territory in 1375.

Another immediate beneficiary of Guinigi munificence was ser Giovanni di ser Bartolomeo Linelli da Castiglione di Garfagnana, a central figure in this institutional history up to the mid-1390s. At the end of May 1392, he was granted the post of *maior officialis* of the *Abondanza*, the magistracy in charge of the urban grain supply and, indirectly, the repayment of Lucca’s creditors; paired with this was a new office, the “general solicitor of revenues” (*sollicitatorem omnium introituum*) for the commune, and the two positions drew a yearly salary of 240 florins for himself and two aides (*famuli*). In comparison, the new office of “captain of the people” (*capitaneus populi*), which Paolo Guinigi would occupy on his short trip to the principate, garnered 1,450 florins yearly, but the captain’s household included 25 aides, a second-in-command (*miles socius*), two attendants (*domicelli*), and a foreign notary – thirty men to ser Giovanni’s three, and yet only six times the pay for this prestigious office. Moreover, the former customs czar’s tenure was set to last for a year “and beyond, until he should have a

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2 See chapter three, 107-108.
3 ASLu, CG 5, p. 90 (9/7/1375 | CG).
4 CG 12, p. 127 (29/5/1392).
5 CG 12, p. 113-4 (26/5/1392).
legitimately-elected successor”; slightly more subtle than “until he displeases the Guinigi family”, but not by much.\(^6\)

The Twenty-Four also wanted to clear up any confusion surrounding ser Giovanni Linelli’s frequent, and technically illegal, reeelections to offices with mandatory vacation periods.\(^7\) To ensure that an exception existed for ser Giovanni, they decreed that:

> With regards to the office of the gabelles and tax farms and, again, the office of the Abondanza, to which ser Giovanni has been elected and in which he remained for many, many years – with regards to these, ser Giovanni was able to have been elected and to have remained in them and therefore able to have received his salary, irrespective of mandatory vacancies (\textit{vacationibus}) or any other legal contradictions or statutes indicating otherwise. For any such contradictions, and in each of them, this shall serve as and be recognized to serve as an exception, expressly and with deliberate intent, even if a special mention is made in the future about these matters that is considered to be intentional.\(^8\)

The most striking aspect of this exception is not that it overrode existing statutes, which was true of many of the decrees issued by the Twenty-Four; rather, it is surprising that this exemption was explicitly meant to exist in perpetuity and without any risk of its being overturned by future governments – it was made \textit{ex certa scientia} and \textit{expresse} to override future contradictions, even if those were considered to be made “expressly” to renege on ser Giovanni’s exception.\(^9\) After this act, published at the end of May 1392, ser Giovanni’s standing as a career bureaucrat would have been unassailable so long as the Guinigi considered him an asset to the commune.

Ironically, the next week after this exception was issued found ser Giovanni treating in the countryside with ser Iacopo d’Appiano, Pietro Gambacorta’s former

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\(^6\) CG 12, p. 127 (29/5/1392).
\(^7\) See chapter one, pp. 37-8.
\(^8\) CG 12, p. 127: \textit{...decernentes quod ad officium gabbellarum et proventuum et ad ipsum officium abundantie ad que ipse ser Johannes electus fuit et in quibus pluribus et pluribus annis stetit ipse ser Johannes potuerit fuisse electus et in illis stetisse et propterea salarium percepisse non obstantibus vacationibus vel aliis quibuscumque contrarietatibus legis vel statutis in contrarium disponentibus quibus et cuique eorum intelligatur et sit expresse et ex certa scientia derogatum etiam si de eis facienda est mentio singularis que pro expresa habeatur.}
\(^9\) For a review of \textit{ex certa scientia} and similar phrases in legal workarounds used by the Visconti and Sforza, see Black, \textit{Absolutism in Renaissance Milan}, 205–9.
second-in-command, who was now gunning for his patron’s position as doge of Pisa.\textsuperscript{10} In Sercambi’s account, ser Giovanni had been a confidant of ser Iacopo and was helping Andrea Stornelli smuggle Florentine arms into the Lucchesia. They conspired to use the littoral vicariates, Pietrasanta and Camaiore, as a staging ground for an attempt on Pietro Gambacorta’s life; in October, after some false starts, ser Iacopo succeeded in murdering Pietro and his son and installing himself as the lord of Pisa. Sercambi is coy about Guinigi involvement in this, repeatedly mentioning only ser Giovanni, Andrea Stornelli, and “some soldiers” from Lucca. If the Guinigi were involved, this situation must have been an embarrassment, coming as it did on the bloodied heels of their triumph in May, especially because ser Iacopo d’Appiano proved a more troublesome neighbor than the Gambacorta. According to Sercambi, in 1395 don Iacopo could still rely on Andrea Stornelli and ser Giovanni Linelli as minions within the Lucchesia, where he ordered Stornelli to ambush and capture one Federigo da Gonzago for him.\textsuperscript{11} Afterwards, the Guinigi finally put an end to this situation of split loyalty by publicly decapitating Stornelli; ser Giovanni, wisely enough, left Lucca. His career as a bureaucrat was at an end, only a few years after it received its most thorough validation.\textsuperscript{12}

Besides Andrea Stornelli and ser Giovanni Linelli, several other Guinigi allies were rewarded with posts or public acknowledgements between the end of May and the first weeks of June 1392. Among these partisans, we find one unusual recipient of an extraordinary public office: Labruccio Cerlotti, the goldsmith, appointed as the “manager

\textsuperscript{10} The account is found in Sercambi, \textit{Le chroniche di Giovanni Sercambi, Lucchese}, vols. 2, 285–93.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., vols. 2, 308–11.
\textsuperscript{12} This was not the end of ser Giovanni Linelli, but the actual end was hardly happier. He remained friendly with the Guinigi in his exile, even after the Lucchese government issued its expected order of capital banishment and property confiscation. After Paolo took power, it is unclear whether the Linelli holdings in Lucca and Castiglione di Garfagnana were returned. He returned to Tuscany upon the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti, whom ser Giovanni had served as a kind of executioner or collector; Sercambi states that “he had carried thousands of sentences in his service” (\textit{avea per lo dicto duga facie migliaia di justitie: Croniche}, vol. 3, p. 62), which led to his being beaten and robbed after Giangaleazzo’s death. By 1405, he was residing in the castle at Ripafratta in some unknown capacity (vol. 3, p. 96); Ripafratta, which sat on the Serchio near the traditional border of Pisa and Lucca, was one of the few castles in that area remaining loyal to Pisa throughout the gradual Florentine takeover. After Pisa itself fell that year, the castellan of Ripafratta sold his post to the Florentines. Curiously enough, upon entering the fortress, the Florentines recognized ser Giovanni Linelli; Sercambi continues: “Ser Giovanni was decapitated at the hands of some Pistolese sent to help guard the fort, and his body was thrown down from the castle; and so, he died shamefully, [his killer] saying something like, ‘Now a great Ghibelline and enemy of Florence is dead.’” (vol. 3, p. 100).
of the clock” for fifteen years at a fairly standard salary of three florins per month.\textsuperscript{13} Cerlotti had been contracted in June 1391 to build a clock for the commune – In February 1390, a meeting of the Thirty-Six debated the merits of building a clocktower for the commune, a prestige landmark, they noted with a usual dose of envy, found in most of Lucca’s neighbours.\textsuperscript{14} After, naturally, a sixteen-month delay, they signed a contract with Labruccio di Giglio Cerlotti, a well-established goldsmith who also served the city as a coiner \textit{(talleator)} and assessor of scales and weights \textit{(sigillator ponderum et mensurarum)} and frequently sat as a consul at the Corte de’ Mercanti.\textsuperscript{15} He was also a skilled tinker or clockmaker of some kind, and his contract contains a lengthy explanation of the work he intended to do on the clock. He expected to be finished by February 1392, and he evidently completed his task on time.\textsuperscript{16} A curious ordinance appears in the minutes of the Anziani from late February 1392, ordering that Labruccio be permitted to install his clock in the modern Torre delle Ore as soon as the public contractor \textit{(massarius)} completed his repairs.\textsuperscript{17} Unlike the commune, which had yet to prepare the housing for the clock, Labruccio had kept up his end of the bargain.

Some time between late February and June, Labruccio completed the installation of the clock at the Torre delle Ore, which was intended to take over the duties of the belltower atop the Palazzo della Signoria. There is no description of what the new clocktower was used for during the streetfighting in May, presumably nothing. Unlike Stella’s famous \textit{guerre du cloches} during the Ciompi revolt, there is no indication that the communal or ecclesiastical belltowers played any major role in rallying or organizing

\textsuperscript{13} CG 12, p. 134 (3/6/1392 | Twenty-Four).
\textsuperscript{14} CG 11, p. 233 (11/2/1390 | Thirty-Six). This is the initial decision to get a public clock, which they wanted to “define the hours” and summon councils and courts to session, as Guglielmo de’ Fiammi’s response to the petition states explicitly. It comes at the end of a very long and somewhat pathetic story about the belltower on top of the Lucchese Palazzo della Signoria, which was constantly out of order and for which the major councils seemed incapable of finding a clear solution. Complaints about that broken bell arose in 1370 (CG 2, p. 335 [4/5/1370]), 1374 (CG 4, p. 350 [11/3/1374]), 1376 (CG 5, p. 230 [21/2/1376]), 1381 (CG 7, p. 472 [1/4/1381]): one Boccaccio, the bellringer of San Michele in Foro, requested a raise to his salary because his bell was doing double-duty for the Palazzo della Signoria), 1382 (CG 8, p. 367 [31/12/1382]), 1384 (CG 9, p. 96 [22/4/1384]), and finally in 1388 (CG 10, p. 479 [4/6/1388]). In between these complaints, the bell was repaired, shored up, or otherwise ‘fixed’ however temporarily.
\textsuperscript{15} E.g. \textit{talleator}: CG 4, p. 338 (28/2/1374); \textit{sigillator} (replaced): CG 12, p. 40 (1/1/1392); \textit{consul curie mercatorum}: CM 14, f. 5r (20/11/1370).
\textsuperscript{16} CG 11, p. 476ff (15/6/1391 | Sp).
\textsuperscript{17} AaTdL 133, p. 540 (26/2/1392 | Az).
partisans.\textsuperscript{18} The only mention of bells during the fight in Sercambi’s account concerns the death of Forteguerra Forteguerra. During the Standardbearer of Justice’s last panicked moments, he tried to ring the bell in the Palazzo della Signoria, “but his colleagues didn’t let him.”\textsuperscript{19} Outside of this account, which is clearly intended to exonerate Forteguerra’s fellow Anziani, it is possible that the bell was simply broken or the tower inaccessible at the time; after all, the public clocktower was intended partly to replace the \textit{campana maggiore} of the Signoria.\textsuperscript{20} In that sense, the appointment of Labruccio by the Twenty-Four rather than a regular council is in keeping with the \textit{balia} council’s ‘clean-up’ job. The clocktower was a new symbol of local pride, and the Guinigi put their mark on it by ensuring its maintenance for years to come. In 1408, Paolo Guinigi renewed Labruccio’s unusual fifteen-year appointment for a further eight years, but the renewal was backdated to 2 June 1407, i.e. the day that his original contract had expired.\textsuperscript{21}

Stornelli, Linelli, and Cerlotti provided expert services to the communal government and were rewarded for this. Stornelli, to be sure, only provided a ‘service’ in the \textit{ex post facto} justifications of the Twenty-Four, and both Stornelli and Linelli would go on to bite the hands that fed them in a rather remarkable fashion. The motivations of these two men, in the end, did not directly align with those of the communal government. Stornelli clearly worked for foreign interests as well as those of the Guinigi family, and ser Giovanni’s failed attempt to become some sort of \textit{condottiere} led to his entering the judicial system of the Visconti. Perhaps Cerlotti was closer to the ideal, but just because he engaged in less open violence or fewer blatantly illegal actions does not mean that he was a perfect servant of the state, whether the republic or the Guinigi principate thereafter. He simply provided a steady and reliable service, and his reward was an office nowhere mentioned in the Lucchese statutes and a term-based salary that was effectively indefinite – almost the exact same reward that ser Giovanni received in May 1392. In a way, ser Giovanni was perceived to be the clockmaker of the fiscal system, and we have

\textsuperscript{18} Stella, \textit{La révolte des Ciompi}, 73.
\textsuperscript{19} Sercambi, \textit{Le chroniche di Giovanni Sercambi, Lucchese}, vol. 1, p. 278: Forteguerra, che era gonfalonieri di giustizia, et altri ciptadini suoi amici, li quali erano tracti a palagio armati a difesa della loro secta... voleano fare suonare la campana del popolo a stormo ma i compagni del dicto gonfalonieri non lassònnno quella sonare, ma fu dato e porto il gonfalone al dicto Lazzari e aperto le porti del palagio.
\textsuperscript{20} See note 14 above.
\textsuperscript{21} GPG 1, p. 481 (1/5/1408).
seen how readily his advice regarding the wool cloth and silk industries was translated into reality.

The Guinigi family resembles this trio in more ways than one. They cemented their grasp on the Lucchese councils in mid-1392 by violently eliminating the Forteguerra and Rapondi factions, but they rapidly transformed the struggles in the streets into a counterinsurgency. In Sercambi’s account, the Rapondi and their partisans begin the fighting, and the Guinigi simply finish it; the ultimate culprit is the winged devil that appears in several of Sercambi’s own illustrations, breathing moral poison onto the city.22 The rest of the city’s inner oligarchy was content to accept this story as truth, as the Twenty-Four sent agents to France and Flanders to help confiscate and seize property from the Forteguerra brothers’ estates; in August, the Twenty-Four overrode “learned arguments” (contentione in opinione doctorum) against this kind of wholesale confiscation by “supplying their fullness of power” (supplentes de plenitudine potestatis).23 Within a few months, the Guinigi managed the complete annihilation of several families that had been their equal in the city government, depriving them of their prestige, patrimonies, and any future in the city of Lucca.

There are no records of any complaints against these measures in the Riformagioni or the unpublished minutes, just as there is no reference to Andrea Stornelli’s brutality or ser Giovanni Linelli’s split interests. After the Guinigi achieved their position, they faced little opposition. The assassination of Lazzare di Francesco Guinigi was not a counterrevolution, nor was the conspiracy of bishop Niccolò Guinigi in late 1400 representative of a widespread reaction to Paolo Guinigi’s election as Captain. Instead, like Labruccio was for the clock and ser Giovanni had been for the regional economy, the Guinigi achieved a sort of ‘life-long’ position as governors of the city of Lucca after 1392. Paolo’s title changed the form, but not the substance, of the Guinigi hegemony. And, like ser Giovanni, he was given supraconstitutional powers to govern until he made one too many political mistakes and was deposed in 1430. The republic, as Bratchel has shown, picked up from where it left off in 1400, displaying a certain naïve assumption that the substance of the statutes had not been irrevocably altered by the

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23 CG 12, p. 145 (29/6/1392 | Twenty-Four); *ibid.*, p. 171ff (16/8/1392 | Twenty-Four).
accession of a prince. Until the French Revolution, the city’s inner oligarchy maintained the image of a pristine Lucchese Libertas. Nonetheless, the Guinigi family accumulated their power over the 1390s with the tacit permission of their peers.

It would be a strange insult to imply that the second-tier families involved in Lucca’s highest offices were ignorant of the risks involved in this kind of devolution of authority or responsibility. Their entire political system rested upon checks and balances, with mandatory vacations from office and gated access to constitutional authority controlled, in the outset, by the largest and most unwieldy of the assemblies, the General Council. This system was designed to maintain peace and stability, but the General Council allowed these defenses to be eroded after 1372 by the addition of special plenipotentiary committees, such as the Twelve Conservators. Factionalism, in the general sense of opposing networks of marriage ties and clientelism, sped up this process of decay, primarily by motivating the Guinigi to secure an even tighter control over Lucca than they already had. It is unclear whether the Forteguerra and Rapondi families represented a credible threat to the Guinigi family, which was heavily invested in terms of property and manpower within both the urban and rural contexts, but the presence in the city of these rivals evidently became unbearable in the early 1390s. In any case, the Forteguerra-Rapondi faction was a small enough threat that the Twenty-Four could confine its purge of the government to a relatively tiny group of individuals.

Yielding to the Guinigi meant that the republican councils could offload some of their responsibilities for maintaining the security and prosperity of the state, which seems to have meant spending less time overall in the council chamber. The Riformagioni from 1369 to the end of 1391 fill eleven quarto volumes comprising around five hundred folios each, roughly one every two years. In the absence of the volume covering the period between August 1394 and December 1396, the Riformagioni from 1392-1394 and from 1397-1400 fill only two such volumes, and the latter time itself represents four years of government output. Legislation concerning the gabella maggiore, of which there was a steady stream in the 1370s, more or less disappeared from the public record. As I noted at the end of chapter four, this may have been because the inner oligarchy was no longer

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24 Bratchel, Lucca, 1430-1494, 17ff.
divided into factions. Without the Forteguerra-Rapondi-Guinigi rivalry, certain issues or plans regarding the silk tariff or cloth-making facilities could have been resolved in private without recourse to the force of regulatory measures. In the end, of course, the Anzianate and the General Council were simply abolished, replaced by Paolo Guinigi and his small council of nine. The published minutes of his thirty-year reign fill only two volumes.\textsuperscript{25}

Paolo Guinigi did not rule by an iron fist because he did not need to employ any extreme measures to maintain control of the city. This is despite the fact that, as Christine Meek has described it, he had completely abolished the republican institutions that were held so dear in the 1370s:

\begin{quote}
He spoke of ‘my city’, ‘my territory’, ‘my subjects’, ‘my camera’, even ‘my Podestà’. Since there was no other source of authority than himself, since the financial resources of the city were his to do with what he liked, and since he himself chose the podestà and all other officials, even the most minor, this language did no more than reflect the realities of the situation.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

He also began his rule by rebuilding part of the hated Augusta and spent significant sums of money on a new urban palace for his family. Meek, trying to find an explanation for why Paolo faced such little opposition over three decades, notes that the city was at peace and the signore’s government was “benevolent and well-intentioned.”\textsuperscript{27} Without disagreeing, I would note that, from the perspective of the leading families in March 1369, the installation of a despot over the republic would not have seemed benevolent in the slightest. In the interim, the political culture of the city had clearly changed.

In the introduction, I stated that one of my intentions in the course of this and future work on late medieval Lucca was to grapple with this question of shirking responsibility in the political culture of the republic, the evident abandonment on the part of the ruling class of Libertas in favor of a smaller share in the state. The key to understanding this, I believe, is recognizing the heavy responsibility held by the General Council, Thirty-Six, and Anziani in exchange for their members’ share of the prestige of

\textsuperscript{25} Bongi, \textit{Inventario Archivio di Stato in Lucca}, vol. 1, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{26} Meek, ‘‘Whatever’s Best Administered Is Best’: Paolo Guinigi Signore of Lucca, 1400-1430,” 132.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 142–43.
self-governance. In 1369, the net positive of autonomy was considered to be worth entailing a combined debt of one hundred thousand florins. Thirty years later, maintaining the state had become a burden that only the Guinigi family was sufficiently invested to bear. The honor and lifestyle of the sons of Niccolò and Francesco Guinigi had become so intertwined with the city of Lucca that they could not abandon their stake in it. For them, the business of governing had become an essential part of their identity, whereas its importance shrunk for the city’s other silk merchants and bankers to such an extent that they accepted the formal abolition of the republic.

Over the past four chapters, I have described a small part of the responsibilities born by the city’s merchant-oligarchs as part of their duties towards the republic. The customs tariff was a vital component of the state’s fiscal program, a lifeline that assured the repayment of the city’s debts to foreign and domestic creditors. Poorly-framed tariff legislation, however, could harm the trades upon which the city’s inhabitants depended, or even stifle the importation of essential foodstuffs. Ser Giovanni Linelli, by Guinigi patronage or other means, stood out to members of the governing councils as a man whose advice on the economy was informed and useful. More importantly, they could have recourse to his authority on issues upon which they themselves possessed no expert knowledge. For twenty years, ser Giovanni offered advice on woollen manufacture, tariffs on leather and wine, iron extraction in the Valdisotto, the price of salt fish and grain, and the routes taken by transhumants in the northern Garfagnana. He himself put forward fifteen items related to the gabella maggiore, in comparison with six that derived from the committee members of the cives super introitibus.

In many cases this advice was sound, and I found no instance in which he was singled out as a source of misinformation; although one might note that ser Giovanni subscribed to the tanners’ petition for lower export tariffs, which ultimately seems to have led to the decline of their craft. Besides the quality of his recommendations, however, perhaps his most valued trait was the frequency of his recommendations. He offered the inner oligarchy a way to interact with the economic fortunes of the city without requiring any of their number to generate plans and thus take blame for unforeseen outcomes. Importantly, though, he was only able to alleviate the burden of responsibility of the republican government by occupying a position that was not entirely
 constrained by his official, i.e. statutory, responsibilities. Ensuring that ser Giovanni could occupy the office of *maior officialis gabellarum* required that the General Council waive the statutory requirement for the doctorate in law and the mandatory vacation period, but in return the state had a stable source of expert advice on a delicate topic. It did not matter whether ser Giovanni was entirely loyal to the commune – or indeed the Guinigi – until his relationship with ser Iacopo d’Appiano became too blatant to ignore.

I believe that the Guinigi occupied a position very similar to that held by ser Giovanni Linelli before his fall. Like ser Giovanni, the Guinigi pursued their own family agenda while consolidating their hold over the republican councils. Given the endpoint of his accumulation of power, it seems unlikely that Lazzare di Francesco Guinigi was a devoted republican. And whatever his sense of patriotism, as Meek notes, Paolo Guinigi saw the state as his possession. But the expansion of Guinigi responsibility and authority permitted the city’s other families to divest themselves of their own responsibilities towards the republic. Especially after the rise of Paolo Guinigi, members of the inner oligarchy could turn from the affairs of state, which were not only time-consuming but also profitless, to spend more time on their private business. This all occurred during a period of economic contraction and amidst serious threats to the integrity of the Lucchesia from foreign agents – mercenary companies, the Florentines, ser Iacopo d’Appiano.

Future work might focus on why these pressures seem to have driven the Lucchesi away from the state, whereas the even more intense pressures of war with the Visconti seem to have strengthened the republican rhetoric, if not necessarily values, of neighboring Florence. One key difference between the two cities lies in the structure of the consolidated debt, as described in chapter two. Lucchesi could not trade credits in the *massa creditorum*, nor were there partial-payment buyout schemes like those that permitted the accumulation of vast discount credits in Florence. The consolidated debt did not increase much over the period between Lucca’s emancipation and the accession of Paolo Guinigi, such that the city’s domestic creditors were not as thoroughly invested in the ability of the state to meet its obligations by securing revenues.

Throughout this text, I have tried to follow Molho’s suggestion to set aside Chabod, Weber, and Tilly and investigate the development of fiscal policy and
bureaucracy as a result of *ad hoc* decision-making rather than long-term tendencies of specific regime types. In this regard, late medieval and early Renaissance Lucca makes for a fascinating case study in the short-term evolution of political values in an Italian republic. In 1369, a group of Lucchese merchants and their contacts abroad arranged for the termination of transfer payments to Pisa, in return for which the Pisan government had managed military affairs and much of the fiscal administration of the Lucchese state. Thus emancipated, that same group of men, and the generation immediately following them, devoted themselves to maintaining the fiscal health of the state in a period of economic decay, a challenge they approached with a certain ideological fervor represented by the public worship of Lucchese independence. As the task proved difficult, they began to rely on notaries and other professionals from outside the inner oligarchy to provide legislative advice. Gradually, this reliance caused them to stretch rules and, eventually, abandon some of the safeguards that kept the bureaucrats in check. This process was repeated within the ranks of the inner oligarchy itself, and eventually a single family achieved hegemony precisely because its members were ready and willing to assume the burdens of the state. Self-selecting or otherwise, the Guinigi were an option that proved amenable to the short-term goals of the inner oligarchy. In 1430, members of these same families – the Cenami, the Boccella, the Cattani – chose again to restore the republic. As for what was lost in the interim, self-governance or quasi-sacred *Libertas*, the case of Lucca demonstrates that its value was situational.
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Appendix 1: 1372 Statute of the Urban *Gabella Maggiore*

ASLu, GM 1, ff. 2r-47r

[f2r] i de forma exactionis gabelle fiende in civitate lucana
ii de mercantiis sete
iii de auro et argento et similibus .
iiii de pannis lane novis et veteribus
v de pannis lini lino et similibus
vi de lana stamine borra et similibus
vii de pellaria pellibus coriamine coriis et opera facta
viii de ferro laborato et sodo acciario armis arrotatis et de mallia vena et scallia
viii de stagno plumbo ottone et bulsone et similibus
x de lignamine laborato et non laborato, cofinis et similibus
xi de caseo carnibus tonnina piscibus sepo assungia et budellis
xii de vasis vitreatis terreis groma gesso marmoribus tegulis et calcina
xiii de blana vino oleo et aliis similibus.
xiiii de fructibus siccis et viridibus
xv de oleribus et similibus
xvi de bestiis et avibus domesticis et silvestribus et ovis et aliis
xvii de tintoria et aliis spectantibus ad tintoriam
xviii de speciebus et aliis spectantibus ad speciaria
xix de mercibus et rebus spectantibus ad merciariam
xx de feno paleis et erba
xxi de pedilibus aranciorum
xxii de vino deferendo extra territorium lucanum
xxiii de gabella soluenda de infrascriptis bestiis conducendis extra territorium lucanum
Capitula proventuum et modum exactionis et venditionis eo
xxiv de proventu vini venalis quod venditur ad minutum in civitate[2v] lucana burgis et suburgis
xxv de proventu vini venalis quod venditur ad minutum in sex miliariis
xxvi de proventu farine
xxvii de proventu macelli
xxviii de proventu pensionum et livellorum
xxix de proventu venditionum alienationum dotium et testamentorum
xxx de proventu medie uncie panis civitatis lucane burgorum et sub burgorum
xxxi de proventu medie uncie panis sex miliarorum et quasi et oley
xxxii de proventu burgorum et sub burgorum
xxxiii de proventu dacie insolutorum et preda rum curie potestatis et residui curiarum
xxxiv de proventu dacie denario rum sedecim per librum solvende de salariis officialium
qui non percipiunt eorum salari a cammera lucani communis
xxxv de proventu ponderis fen i palearum et lini
xxxvi de proventusigilli mensurarum et ponderum
xxxvii de proventu civium silvestrium
xxxviii de proventu bestiarum que comodantur ad vecturam
xxxviii de proventu gabelle gualcheriarum et follium fabricarum serrarum et rotarum ad aquam
xl de proventu barcharum
xli de proventu molendinorum
xlili de proventu ortorum
xlilii de proventu piziccuolorum seu tricolorum
xliliiii de usurariis tenentibus banchum vel pannellum in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis et gabella per eos solvenda
xlv de usurariis mutuantibus in comitatu districtu vel fortia lucana
xlvi de usurariis non tenentibus banchum vel pannellum mutuandi ad usuras
xlvi de gabella solvenda per bancherios et cambsores
xlvi de proventu hospitatorum
xlvi de proventu meretricium et modo et forma vendendi dictum proventum
l de proventu baractarie
li de proventu herbe prati lucani communis
lii forma venditionis dictorum proventuum
liii de proventu carcerum lucani communis
liiiii forma venditionis proventuum vicariarum
lv de modo et forma incantandi et vendendi proventus
lvi de termino exactionis imponendo in proventibus
lvii de terris non subjectis iurisdictioni lucani communis non intelligendis in venditionibus proventuum
lviii de pignoribus non vendendis nisi certa forma
lviii de gabella denario duodecim per libram solvenda per illos qui reciipiunt pecuniam a cammera lucani communis
lx de declaracione salme quanti ponderis intelligatur
lxi de eo quod permutantes se de uno communi ad aliud possint eorum massaritias et res portare
lxii de eo quod tempore recoltus, blava et legumina et vinum et oleum possint portare de uno loco ad alium sine solucione gabelle
lxiii de mittendo bladum in civitate lucana sine solucione gabelle
lxiii de officio portonariorum et officialium deputatorum ad portas super exactione gabellarum
lxv de mercantius et rebus non distaricandis nisi in apotheca gabelle
lxvi de eligendo officiais super denoto
lxvii de eo quod facientes contra statuto gabelle possint accusari et de parte danda accusatoribus
lxviii de pena fraudentium gabellam
lxviii de mercantiiis et rebus que portantur et reducuntur in sex miliaris
lxx de rebus que portantur per comitatum predictum
lxxi de rebus que portantur de comitatu sex miliariorum et subburbanorum ad vicarias.
lxxii de non extrahendo de civitate lucana aliquod laborarium sete non completum
lxxii de eo quod mortella non possit extra territorium lucanum deferri
[Statute Proper]

[Statute Proper]

IN nomine domini amen. Hoc est statutum lucane gabelle factum editum compositum et firmatum per infrascriptos statutariorum anno nativitatis domini millesimo trecentesimo septuagesimo secundo, indicione decime die sexta mensis julii in hunc modum, videlicet,

Nos Bartholomeus forteguerre, Simon de bargha, Ludovicus mercati legum doctores, Bettus busolini, Franciscus betti, Andreas bellorii notarius, Guido honesti notarius, Alluisus balbani et Lambertus coluccini Statuarii lucani communis electi et assumpti auctoritate maiorus et generalis Consilii populi et comunis lucani Ex auctoritate potestate et bailia nobis ad hec et alia concessa a dicto mairo et generali consilio ut in reformatione ipsius consilii anno a d mcccclxxi, indictione x, die vii mensis decembris, latius et evidenter appareat, et omni auctoritate via iure et modo quibus magis melius et efficacius possumus, statutum lucane gabelle reformamus et de novo componimus, ordinamus et firmamus, christi nomine invocato in hunc modum videlicet

\[de forma exactionis gabelle fiende in civitate lucana\]

STatuimus et ordinamus quod de mercantiis et rebus que mittuntur in civitatem lucanam et deferuntur de ipsa civitate solvantur et solvi debeant pro gabella ut infra particulariter declaratur, videlicet

\[de mercantiis sete\]

Sete crude de qualibet libra ad pondus in introitu = soldos tres denarios sex.
Sete laborate vel texute, Drapporum sete et sendadorum, Vellutorum, Bursarum sete, Cordellarum et fettarum sete: de qualibet libra ad pondus tam in introitu quam exitu = soldos sex
Filugelli, Capitonis, Ba?elle: crudorum vel tintorum de qualibet libra ad pondus tam in introitu quam exitu = soldus unus denarii quatuor
Sirichellarum, Pessorum, Brocchorum, Coste, Stracciorum: de q. lib. ad pon. tam in in. q. ex. = s. 0 d. 5

[Statute Proper]

Filugellorum in vermibus de q. lib. ad p. in in. = s. 0 d. 5
Pedanorum de q. lib. precii seu estimationis tam in in. quam ex. = s. 0 d. 8
Et ultra predicta solvatur de qualibet balla s. 2 d. 6
Et quolibet fardello = s. 1 d. 3

\[de auro et argento et similibus\]

Auri, Argenti: factorum luce de q. lib. precii seu valoris = s. 0 d. 8
Orpellorum, Arginpellorum: de q. lib. ad p. = s. 0 d. 10
Auri vel argenti extranei filati et non filati, perlarum, lapidum preciosorum, Anulorum et aliorum gioiellorum de qualibet extimationis tam in in. q. ex. = s. 0 d. 3

\[de pannis lane novis et veteribus\]

Scherlacti ultramontani de qualibet pecia = £ 7 s. 5
Scherlactorum florentinorum vel lombardorum Travisatorum in seta ubicumque factorum de q. p. = £ 6
Pannorum ultramontanorum de q. p. = £ 3 s. 12
Et intelligatur pecia superscriptorum omnium pannorum decem cannarum exceptis
pannis artis de anglia quorum pecia intelligatur viginti cannarum
Florentinorum, pisanorum et aliorum de tuscia Exceptis vulterraniis, lombardorum
provincialium et catalanencium de q. p. que intelligatur ad plus cannarum duodecim = £ 2
s. 8
Albagianorum et agnellanorum pannorum de centenario ad pondus tam in in. quam ex. =
£ 1 s. 4
Taccolinorum, Sardescorum, Legatorum et laggiourum de Centenario ad pondus = £ 0 s.
18
Aliorum quorumcumque pannorum non scriptorum et comprehensorum in presenti statuto
[f5r] de q. l. valoris seu estimationis eorum = £ 0 s. 0 d. 8
Banchalium cuiuscumque maneriei existencium de q. lib. stimationis seu valoris eorum =
£ 0 s. 0 d. 8
Sargiarum irlandi de q. p. alba = s. 14
Ed de q. p. tinta = £ 1 s. 4
Et si dicti panni qui declarati sunt ad mensuram canne non essent pecia completa vel
essent scanpori solvant pro gabella pro mensura eorum secundum distribucionem
predictam.
Et ultra predictam solvant de q. balla pannorum = s. 1 d. 6
Et de quolibet torciello = s. 2 d. 6
Pannorum veterum de lana de q. l. val. seu ext. = s. 1
Celorum cuiuscumque maneriei existencium de q. lib. val. seu ext. = d. 8

¶ de pannis lini lino et aliis similibus
Pannorum lini et Canapis tincti et non tincti de Centenario ad pondus = £ 2 s. 14
Borracciorum et Cancuacciiorum de Cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 7
Boccaraminis de Cen. ad p. = £ 5 s. 8
Baracanorum de Cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Accie pro baccitoribus auri vel vellutis de Cen. ad p. = £ 3 s. 12
Lini allennxandrini de Cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 12
Lini nostrati, Canapis ebonice? [likely concie] : de Cen. ad p. = s. 16
Stuppe de Cen. ad p. = s. 3 d. ?
Canapis non concie de cen. ad p. = s. 8
Accie grosse, Fili albi comuralis: de Cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 12
Bambacis nove de Cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 14
Bambacis veteris de cen. ad p. = s. 16 [probably]
[f5v] Fili uncti?, Bambacis uncte?: De cen. ad p. = £ 2
Treccioles de filo vel aeria alborum vel tintorum = £ 2
Bambacis filate albe de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 16
Fectarum de filo de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8

¶ de lana stamine, borra, telis et pannis
Lane Buldronum galbi lanate, Lane gentilis, Staminis de garbe filati, Telarum
Cavezarum: de Cen. ad p. = s. 16
Lane Garbi Buldronum sucede, Lane Sardesche mannie lanate seu filate, Lane legati
filati, Staminis filati provinsalis, Lane nostrate et Mannie: de cen. ad p. = s. 12
Lane legati de Cen. ad p. = s. 5
Barre pili de Cen. ad p. = s. 4
Pennarum novarum de Cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 4
Pennarum veterum de Cen. ad p. = s. 16
Lane sardesc he, Pellarie sucide: de Cen. ad p. = s. 8
Lane nostrate pellarie de Cen. ad p. = s. 10

¶ de pellaria, pellibus, coriamine, coriis et opera facta
Variorum crudorum et chonciorum, Serriolorum crud. et chon., Coniglorum crud. et chon., Vulpinarum et ghatarum et similium, Agnellinarum Crud. et chon.: de q. lib. val. seu ext. = d. 8
Coriorum bobum et vaccharum ? et succorum non conciorum de cen. ad p. = s. 12
????Gruarum et C. ?? pardigi non chonciorum alba. ?? de Cen. ad p. = s. 12
[f6r] Cordovani chonci, Dossorum bovinorum et equorum chonciorum, Coriaminis chonci: de Cen. ad p. in in. = £ 1 s. 4
Et in exitu = £ 2 s. 1
Cartarum montoninorum de cen. ad p. = s. 8
Bucciarum de cen. ad p. = s. 4
Bursarum, Guantorium, Cinturarum: de corio de cen. ad p. = £ 1
Montoninorum chonciorum de cen. ad p. in in. = s. 16
Et in Ex. = £ 1 s. 8
Coriorum montoninorum et ircorum pilosorum et siccorum de Cen. ad p. = s. 6
Coriorum predictorum recentium de cen. ad p. = s. 4
Coriorum ? vaccharum et equorum recentium de quolibet = s. 4
Sommerii de quolibet corio recenti = s. 1 d. 8
Sommerii de quilibet corio sicco = s. 2 d. 6

¶ de ferro laborato et sodi, acciario, armis arrotatis, et de mallia vena et scallia
Acciarii, pomorum, Vangarum, elsarum, Marronum, clavorum, Sapparum, Agutorum, Vomorerum, pastrarum, Ferrorum ab equis et alii animalibus, sprangarum, bullectarum et simulium: de q. Cen. ad p. in in. = s. 15; Et in ex. = s. 10
Ancudinis pro q. lib. ext. tam in in. q. ex. = d. 8
Ferri sodi, Cantorum ferri crudi et mezanulium: de cen. ad p. tam in in. q. ex. = s. 4
Spadarum de quilibet pecio tam in in. q. ex. = d. 10
[f6v] Cappellorum ferri, Coscialium, Cerucciorum, Cereullearum, Cameriarum, Pennatorum ad razzum, Dossalium, Laniarum et Similium armorum et De Mallia, Spiedarum, Strechorum, Cultellorum: De q. lib. ext. seu val. tam in in. q. ex. = d. 10
Ferri veteris de cen. ad p. in in. = s. 5; Et in ex. = s. 10
Quadrellorum, Moschettarum, Verrectorum: De cen. ad p. in in. = s. 6, d. 6; Et in ex. = s. 13
Ferrati et nigri de cen. ad p. tum in in. q. ex. = d. 5
Vene ferri que reducitur ad civitate vel comitatum Lucanum de cen. ad p. in in. = s. 1 d. 3
Et de quilibet currui in in. = £ 1 s. 10; In exitu non solvatur gabella in quadruplum
Scallie, Limature seu ferruginis, Minussaminis: de q. cen. ad p. = s. 1
Et quod de et pro quolibet miliare ferri rudis extrahendi de vicariis lucani comuni et defferendi ad extraneas partes extra territorium lucanum vel in districtu lucano ubicunque extra civitatem lucanam burgos et subburgos solvatur et solvi debeat pro gabella gabellario illius vicarie de qua dictum ferrum extraheretur et non alibi = florenus unus auri

Et de quolibet miliare ferri rudis extrahendi de sex miliaris et deferendis ad vicarias vel extraneae partes solvatur lucane gabelle = fl. 1 auri

¶ de scagno plumbo ottone et bulsone et similibus
Scagni non laborati de Cen. ad p. = s. 18
Scagni laborati de quelibet lib. ext. = d. 8
Plumbi de Cen. ad p. = s. 6
Bacinorum? misciarebarum? de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 16
Raminis, Bronsii: non laborati de Cen. ad p. = s. 15
Bottonorum de Oricalcho, Ottonis, Acuum, Fili ottonis, Spillarum, Sonalliororum, Dencilliororum: Et Similium de q. lib. val. seu ext. = d. 10
Cortonensium, Bulsonis: de Cen. ad p. = £ 3 s. 4
monete non extranea que reduceretur ad civitatem vel inde extraheretur

¶ de lignamine laborato et non laborato cofinis et similibus
Dovarum abietis, Barilium, Bigongiarum, Barlectarum, Stilium, Ascarum: Et Similibus de Cen. ad p. in in. = s. 2 d. 6; Et in ex. = s. 4
Scudellarum, Incisorum seu Tallenorum, Cacinorum et Similium: De q. lib. Ext. seu val. in. = d. 6; Et in ex. = s. 1
Mailarum, Albuolorum, Dovarum castanei, Decciorum: Et Similium de cen. ad p. in in. = s. 2 d. 6; Et in ex. = s. 5
Ricorrentorum, Subbiellorum, Tempiarum, Dovarum de castanee non conciarum de q. salma in. = s. 2 d. 2
[f7r] Et de quelibet curru = s. 8
Tabularum de Abiete de q. salma = s. 3
Cofinorum, Canistrorum, Canistrarum: Magnorum de q. = d. 4; Et de parvis = d. 2
Capsarorum, Soppidaneorum, Archipredolarum, Tinerorum, Vegetum: Et Similium novarum et veterum in in. de q. lib. ext. seu val. = d. 8; Nulla tamen licentia concedi possit ea deferendi extra comitatum et territorium lucanum
Circulorum seu cerchiorum de salva somerii in in. = s. 1 d. 8; Et in Ex. = s. 3 d. 2
Et de salma muli vel equi in in. = s. 2; Et in ex. = s. 4
Et de q. carico hominis in in. = s. 0 d. 8; Et in ex. = d. 10
Lignaminis de ypo? ad faciendum balistas et arcus de cen. ad p. in in. = s. 3 d. 3; Et in Ex. = s. 6 d. 6
Lignaminis de abiete exceptis tabulis de q. Carra in in. = s. 12; Et de Salma in in. = s. 2; Et in Ex. infra lucanum districtum de q. carra = £ 3 s. 10; Et in ex. de salma = s. 12
Lignorum comburendorum de salmo in in. = d. 6; Et de Carra = s. 3 d. 3
Stiparum de salma = d. 6; Et de Carra = s. 3
Lignorum cum cortice preter comburenda de carra tam in in. q. ex. = s. 4
Carborum de salma in in. = s. 2 d. 6
Cineris de q. stario in in. = d. 4
[f8r]Lignorum actorum ad cippellos de salma in in. = s. 6 d. 6; Et in exitu de civitate in comitatum et non aliter = s. 10
Arcionum, Bancarum: ad faciendum bastos tam in in. civitatis q. ex. = s. 6 d. 6
Et in ex. extra districtum lucanum de salma = s. 12
De lignamine non laborato vel non laborato quod deferunt de luca infra sex miliaria et comitatum lucanum et burgos et subburgos et de uno comuni ad alium infra ipsum comitatum per reflectione domorum et capannorum nulla gabella exigatur habendo de his apodixam ab officialibus gabelle.

¶ de caseo carnibus tonnina piscibus sepo assungia et budellis
Casei messanensis de filo formarum decem in In. = s. 10; Et in Ex. = s. 3
Casei gallurensis et corscheschi de filo formarum decem septem in in. = s. 7; Et in ex. = s. 2 d. 6
Casei salsi de filo formarum decem in in. = s. 5; Et in ex. = s. 1 d. 6
Casei Cavalli de Cen. ad p. in in. = s. 12; Et in Ex. = s. 5
Alterius Casei de Cen. ad p. in in. = £ 1; Et in ex. = s. 8
Tonnine, Ossorum, Sardellarum: de q. barile magno in in. = s. 10; Et de q. parvo = s. 7; Et in ex de magno = s. 6 d. 6; Et de parvo = s. 5
Piscium salitorum de cen. ad p. in in. = £ 1 s. 4
[f8v]Piscium recensium de q. lib. ad p. tam in in. q. ex. = d. 3
Sepi cotti de Cen. ad p. in in. = s. 8; Et in Ex. = s. 16
Candelarum de sepo de Cen. ad p. in in. et in Ex. = s. 10
Sepi crudi, Assungie: de Cen. ad p. in in. = s. 5; Et in Ex. = s. 12
Budellarum siccarum de cen. ad p. tam in in. q. ex. = s. 12
Carnium salitarum de cen. ad p. in in. = £ 1; Et in ex. = s. 10
Casei recentis de cen. ad numerum de minutis tam in in. q. ex. = s. 3
Et de magnis ad similitudine predictorum
Casei bufalini recentis de cen. ad numerum = s. 12

¶ de vasis vitreatis terreis plastris groma gesso marmoribus, tegulis et calcina
Vasorum vetentorum seu de vitreo, Ciatorum: de cen. ad p. tam in in. q. ex. = s. 3 d. 6
Et de salma = s. 13
Urceorum et aliorum vasorum pictorum, Ollarum de ylba: de cen. ad p. = s. 2
Vasorum non pittorum, Ollarum: de cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 6
Cupporum ab oleo de q. lib. ext. seu val. = d. 8
Plastrarum de salma tam in in. q. ex. = s. 1 d. 6; Et de curru = s. 7
Marmorarum spessatorum non laboratorum qui fodiuntur in lucana fortia et portantur extra lucanam fortiam de q. curru tam in in. q. ex. = s. 2; [f9r]Et de salma = d. 8
De laboratis vero solvatur de quolibet collonello = s. 2
Et de quolibet capitello = s. 1
Et de q. brachio quadro ad rationem brachii = s. 3
Gessi de q. stario lucano = d. 6
Grome de quolibet stario tam in ex. q. in in. = s. 2
Vitri fratti de cen. ad p. tam in in. q. ex. = s. 2
¶ de blava vino oleo et aliis fructibus
Blave, Liguminum: de q. stario tam in in. q. in ex. = d. 10
Milii, Segalis: de q. stario in in. nisi portaretur ad macinandum = s. 1
Grani de q. stario in ex. nisi portaretur ad macinandum = s. 1 d. 8
Panichi de q. stario in ex. nisi portaretur ad macinandum = d. 10
Seminis lini de q. stario tam in in. q. in ex. = s. 1
Castanearum viridum tam in in. q. ex. = d. 5
Semnole de q. stario tam in in. q. ex. = d. 2
Olei de q. lib. tam in in. q. ex. = s. 2
Vini vernaccie de q. curru tam in in. q. ex. et intelligatur vinum vernaccie quodlibet
vinum de riperia = £ 14 s. 10
Vini grechi de q. curru tam in in. q. ex. = £ 9 s. 4
Vini corsi et ylbe de q. curru tam in in. q. ex. = £ 3 s. 4
Et de predictis vinis non nostratis intelligantur barilia viginti duo unus currus.
Vino nostrati et cuilibet alteri maneriei de q. curru tam in in. q. ex. = £ 3 s. 12

¶ de fructibus siccis et viridibus
[9v] Aranciorum de salma somerii tam in in. q. in ex. civitatis = s. 4
Et de salma bestie grosse = d. 6
Et in ex extra territorium lucanum de Salma somerii = £ 1
Et de salma bestie grosse = £ 1 s. 10
Nucum, Nocellarum, Castanearum siccarum: Siccorum de q. stario tam in in. q. ex. = d. 10
Ficuum siccorum non nostratorum de q. cen. ad pondus tam in in. q. ex. = s. 3
Ficuum nostratorum videlicet de com. lucano = s. 1
Uvarum siccarum de q. cen. ad p. tam in in. q. in ex. = s. 3
Castanearum viridum de q. stario tam in in. q. ex. = d. 5
Ceragiorum, Pirorum, Pomorum: de q. salma tam in in. q. ex. = s. 3 d. 6
Aleorum, Ceparum: de q. salma tam in in. q. ex. = s. 3; Et de quolibet curru = £ 1
Nucuum, Uvarum, Nocellarum, Suzirarum, Persicorum, Prugnarum, Ficuum, Aliorum
similium: recentium de q. salma at rationem salme = s. 2

¶ de oleribus et similibus
Caulium, Porrorum, Aliarum Erbarum ad coquinam: de q. salma = s. 1 d. 6; et de q.
canistra = d. 6

¶ de bestiis et avibus domesticis et silvestribus et ovis et aliis
Bestiarum minutarum que venient tam de extra lucanum districtum quam de lucano
districtu et transient per lucanam fortiam et districtum pro eundo in maritimam pro
quolibet Capite = s. 1 d. 2
Et tantumdem in redditu.
[f10r] Nullam vero aliam gabella solvere deneantur in alia parte territorii lucani.
Bestiarum grossarum que ducentur de extra lucanam fortiam et venirent per lucanam
fortiam causa ducendi eam extra lucanam fortiam Sive intrarent civitatem sive non pro
quilibet = £ 5
Et tantumdem solvatur de illis bestiis grossis que ducentur de lucano comitatu extra
lucanam fortiam et districtum.
Bobum, Vaccharum: Extractorum de civitate et sex miliariis et missorum in vicariis de
qualibet = £ 1
Bestiarum minutarium que ducerentur de una vicaria ad aliam de qualibet = d. 6
Ovorum de quolibet Cen. ad numerum = s. 1
Turdorum et merularum de quibuslibet duobus = d. 1
Stornorum de quibuslibet quatuor = d. 1
Anserum, Gruum, Paparorum, Similium: de qualibet = d. 6
Gallinarum, Capponum, Anatrum fagianorum: de q. = d. 3
Pollastrorum, Pipionum, Starnarum: de q. = d. 2
Turturum, Columborum, Qualliarum: de q. = d. 2

¶
de tinctoria et rebus spectantibus ad tintoriam
Aluminis de castillione, Aluminis de roccia: De cen. ad p. = s. 16
Aluminis de feccia de Cen ad p. = s. 5
Berzi de Cen. ad p. = £ 4 s. 10
Bucciarum Ontarii de cen. ad p. = d. 5
Grane de Cen. ad p. = £ 7 s. 4
Item ultra gabellam pro q. balia = s. 2 d. 6
Guadi et gualde de cen. ad p. = s. 6
[f10v] Indici undecumque de cen. ad p. = £ 6
Lacche de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Mondigliu seu bostallief berzi de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Mortararum in frondibus de salma somerii = s. 1; Et de salma bestie grosse = s. 1 d. 4
Mortore piste de cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 3; Vel de salma somerii = s. 3 d. 6; Et de salma bestie
grosse = s. 5
Oricelli fatti de cen. ad p. = s. 12
Pulveris Oricelli de cen. ad p. = s. 14
Pipporum siccorum mortelle de stario = s. 1 d. 8
Pipporum viridum mortelle de stario = d. 7
Quiricis de cen. ad p. = d. 10
Robbie siccie de cen. ad p. = s. 16
Robbie viridis de cen. ad p. = s. 8
Vergoli de cen. ad p. = d. 10
Zaffloris de cen. ad p. = £ 1
Item ultra gabellam de balla seu sacco = d. 8
Gallarum de cen. ad p. = s. 6
Gallonum de cen. ad p. = s. 2 d. 6
Scotani de cen. ad p. = s. 8
De Mortora non in frondibus seu pista nullo modo possit extrahí de territorio lucano ad
penam perditionic ipsius mortore et bestie super qua foret.

¶
de speciebus et rebus spectantibus ad speciariam
Argenti vivi de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 16
Argenti sublimati de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 16
Agmidolarum cum gusciis de cen. ad p. = s. 4
Agmidolarum sine gusciis, Arzicchie: de cen. ad p. = s. 6
Anisorum de cen. ad p. = s. 8
Aureipigmenti de cen. ad p. = s. 18
[f11r] Aloe de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Agarici de cen. ad p. = s. 12
Aghette de cen. ad p. = s. 3
Biache, Bucuri, Colle: de cen. ad p. = s. 6
Cere de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 16
Confectorum de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 10
Cenami, Cardamomi, Cannelle: de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Celliciorum de dozzina dupla = s. 10
Castorii de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 4
Cartarum ad stracciandum de cen. ad p. = s. 2 d. 6
Cartarum bombiciarum de cen. ad p. = s. 12
Cartarum montoninarum de cen. ad p. = £ 1
Comini de cen. ad p. = s. 10
Cassie fistule, Cinabilis: de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 4
Canfore de cen. ad p. = £ 6
Cornocchiorum sancti marci de cen. ad p. = s. 4
Dragantis, Dentis Elefantis seu eboris: de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 10
Dattilorum de cen. ad p. = s. 12
Erbe provinsalis de cen. ad p. = s. 3
Feniculorum de cen. ad p. = s. 10
Gallarum de cen. ad p. = s. 6
[f11v] Fustorum garioflorum de cen. ad p. = £ 5
Gariofolorum de cen. ad p. = £ 10
Gumme arabice de cen. ad p. = s. 9
Muschati de cen. ad p. = £ 6
Miribolani de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 4
Melus de cen. ad p. = s. 5
Masticis de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Nucuum muschatarum de cen. ad p. = £ 4 s. 16
Nucuum de india, Melaghetarum: de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 10
Olei de orbache de q. lib. ad p. = d. 2
Ocrie, Prugnarum siccarum, Pinorum in granis, Similium: de q. cen. ad p. = s.3
Passularum de q. cen. ad p. = s. 6
Piperis de cen. ad p. = £ 3 s. 12 d. 6
Pulveris succhari de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Pedis columbini de cen. ad p. = s. 5 d. 6
Picis, Pegule, Pistaci: de cen. ad p. = s. 6
Risi de cen. ad p. = s. 6
Resalgalli de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 10
Riquillitio de cen. ad p. = s. 3 d. 6
Reubbarbarum de cen. ad p. = £ 6
[f12r] Ruche, Sinapis: de Cen. ad p. = s. 4
Sal gemme de Cen. ad p. = s. 3
Sene de Cen. ad p. = s. 9
Sinopite de Cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 6
Scamonee de Cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 16
Sandalorum de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 4
Spettorum de q. lib. ext. seu val. = d. 8
Saponis, Sibbibiarum, Sulfor, Trufoli, Spingarum, Terre camelli: de cen. ad p. = s. 6
Turis de cen. ad p. = £ 2 s. 8
Tramentine de cen. ad p. = s. 12
Tamarindi de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 4
Turbittorum, Vitrioli romaneschi: de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 10
Vitreoli terricci, Verrucis in granis: de cen. ad p. = s. 6
Violarum de cen. ad p. = s. 4
Verderaminis, Zenza?rate, Similium confectorum: de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 4
Zinziberis de cen. ad p. = £ 4 s. 16
Zuccheri de cen. ad p. = £ 3 s. 12
Zaffarani de cen. ad p. = £ 12
Zectuarie de cen. ad p. = £ 1
Specierum supra non specificatarum de q. lib. ext. eorum = d. 8

[f12v] ¶ de mercibus et rebis spectantibus
Sendarum, Velorum: de cen. ad p. = £ 10
Berrectarum de ultramontibus pro qualibet = s. 1 d. 6
Staccolorum de cen. ad p. = £ 1 s. 18
Berrectarum feltri et Berrectarum lane: de cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 3
Branchacciorum de Cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 3
Cinghiarum et Caggialium: de cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 3
Criborum et Cardorum, Cornuorum bobum, Montoninorum, Yrcorum, et aliorum: de cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 3
Cofèorum parvorum de qualibet = s. 1 d. 6
Et de qualibet ferrato et non ferrato et picto = s. 5
Cappellarum de lana de cen. ad p. = s. 18
Copertorium de q. lib. val. = d. 8
Elmorum de Corio pro qualibet = s. 1
Funium de cen. ad p. = s. 5 d. 6
Funium erbe et pili de cen. ad p. = s. 2 d. 6
Feltrorum de cen. ad p. = s. 18
Fustorum de sellis equorum de cen. ad p. = s. 3
Cappellorum de bicuora de cen. ad p. = £ 2
Frustorum de sellis somerorum de cen. ad p. = s. 2
Macinarum magnarum de qualibet = s. 5
Macinarum parvarum de qualibet = s. 2 d. 6
Mercium florentinarum et aliarum de q. lib. ext. = d. 8
Marsachotti ad faciendum vitrum de Cen. ad p. = s. 3 d. 6
Pettinum et Pasimasarum et similium de q. lib. ext. = d. 6
[f13r] Pavensium et Paternostrorum: de Cen ad p. = s. 10
Rotarum magnarum de q. = s. 5
Rotarum parvarum de q. = s. 2 d. 6
Spagi subtilis, Scutorum, Speculorum, Sonaglorum: de cen. ad p. = s. 9
Spinacciiorum de Cen. ad p. = s. 12
Stacciorum de Cen. ad p. = s. 2
Sacchorum de Cen. ad numerum = s. 5
Suverum, Stracciorum ad faciendum cartas et seuaccios: de cen. ad p. = s. 1 d. 3
Sextiorum ultramontanorum pilosorum et non pilosorum de q. grosso = s. 12
Et de quolibet parvo = s. 6
Taulacciorum, Targiarum, Similium: de cen. ad p. = s. 10
Velosellorum de cen. ad p. = s. 10
De aliis mercibus quibuscumque supra non specificatis solvatur gabelle ad rationem per libram val. se. ext. ipsarum mercium = d. 8

¶ de feno paleis et erba
Feni de q. curru = s. 6 d. 6
Et de q. salma best. gros. = s. 1 d. 8
Et de q. salma somerii = s. 1
Palearum et panicalis de q. curru = s. 3
Et de salma bestie gros. = s. 1
Et de salma somerii = d. 6
Et de q. fasce feni = d. 5
Et de q. fasce palearum = d. 4
Et de q. fasce = d. 4
Sextiorum de q. magno = d. 4
Et de parvo = d. 2

¶ de pedulibus aranciorum
De q. pedali grosso aranciorum qui deferretur extra territorium lucanum = Flor. 6 auri
Et de q. pedali minus grosso seu mediocri = Flor. 4 auri
Et de q. tenui seu exili = Flor. 2 auri

¶ de vino deferendo extra territorium lucanum
Vini nostrati quod deferretur extra territorium lucanum de q. curru = flor. 2 auri

¶ de gabelle solvenda de infrascriptis bestiis conducendis extra territorium lucanum
Equo, Equa, Ronsino, Ronsino, Mulo, Mula, Asino, Asina: De quolibet et qualibet qui et que extra territorium lucanum ducerentur causa vendendi seu qui vel que vendite vel empte forent solvatur et solvi debeat et exigi pro gabelle ad rationem dictorum otto per libram ext. talis bestie que dic duceretur. Et hoc capitulum denuntiatur per baptismum?

Et de omnibus aliis rebus super non specificatis et que suprascriptis adsimulari non possent solvatur pro gabelle de et pro qualibet libra valoris seu extimationis ipsarum rerum tam in in. q. ex. = d. 8

Item si aliquae res vel mercies deferrentur vel reducementur in civitatem lucanum vel extra
ipsam civitatem de quibus supra non fieret mentio et suprascriptis assimulari possent de eis exigatur gabella ad similitudinem predictorum silicet illarum rerum quibus magis assimulari vel actari possint.

Statuimus quod quelibet persona que reducetur in civitatem lucanam pannos laneos et lineos acciam filum vel alios quoscumque [f14r] res excepta sete et operibus et laborerii sete pro tingendo seu faciendo eas in civitate lucana illas tintas extrahere possit de ipsa civitate solendo gabella pro introitu tantum prout solui debet secundum statuiti gabelle Et reportare ad locum unde eas reduxit absque solvendo gabelle pro exitu dummodo eas extrahant et reportent infra mensem a die missionis facta in civitatem lucanam possit tamen maiora officiis lucane gabelle ipsum terminum prolongare, si sibi videbitur considerata qualitate persone et temporis servando in predictis cautelam, quod fraud in predictis committi non possit.

ITem quod quelibet persona civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum comitatus districtus et fortie que miserit in civitatem lucanam vegetes. Tina Scululis lectis et massaritas et quascunque alias res metu inimicorum vel mandato lucani comitatis occasione guerra vel adventus seu transitus gentium armatarum, Et ipsas res scribi fecerit ad portam civitatis per quam eas innimeret illa et illas reportare possit ad suum locum unde ea elevavit absque aliqua solucione gabelle fiendi pro introitu vel exitu. Et si ea cessata novitate infra mensem non extrixeret teneatur de rebus non extractis solvere pro introitu gabelle ordinatam.

ITem quod quelibet persona civitatis lucane et burgorum possit cum licentia officialis gabelle vel eius curie portare et portari facere ad villas suas in comitatu lucanu supellectilia vetera seu uizicata et arnensia et lectos pro eis remittendis in civitatem libere sine aliqua solucione gabelle pro introitu vel exitu. Et de predictos scriptura fieri debeat in actis dictae curie.

ITem quod panni lini et accia qui et que portantur ad lavandum vel curandum extra civitate lucanam possint deferri extra dictam civitatem in comitatu lucano et remitti in civitatem absque aliqua solucione gabelle Et sine aliqua licentia licentia vel bulletta de illis qui portantur ad lavandum, de illis non qui portantur ad curandum debeat haberi licencia officialis gabelle vel eius curie.

ITem quod omnis lucani cives morantes in civitate lucana qui se permutarent et irent ad standum in burgis vel subburgis [f14v] possint libere extrahere et portare et portari facere de civitate lucana in dictis burgis vel subburgis apud domum in qua habitarent intendent sine aliqua solucione gabelle omnis eorum lectos pannos ad usum eius et familie seu vegetes suppidanea et alia arnensia et massaritas quas habebat in domo sue habitacionis in civitate lucana. Et similiter omnis de burgis et subburgis venientes ad standum in dicta civitate lucana et habitandum habeant simile beneficium de dictis rebus. Et idem beneficium habeant omnis comitati lucani venientes cum eorum familiis ad standum et habitandum in civitate lucana causa se efficiendi cives lucanos.

ITem quod omnis et singuli de burgis et subburgis in comitatu lucano possint et eis liceat
mittere in civitatem lucanam causa suppignorandi pannos lectos et arnensia uzicata et ea reportare ad eorum domos et loca sine aliqua solucione gabelle. Ita tamen quod predicti fiant cum licentia maioris officialis gabelle. Et in curia gabelle scribantur adhibendo cautelam quod in eis fraus aliqua committi non possit.

I Tem quod quecunque red predate in burgis vel subburgis vel comitatu lucano misse in civitate lucana possint portari ad loca ubi predate fuerunt sine aliqua solucione gabelle in introitu vel exitu.

I Tem quod Accia possit reduci et mitti in civitatem lucanam pro texendo et faciendo pannum vel aliud texutum et reportari pannum et texutum factum sine aliqua solucione gabelle in introitu vel exitu. Et etiam de una terra ad aliam per comitatum lucanum. Et econverso Accia possit portari extra civitatem dictam occasione et pannus et texutum factum ex illa et reduci in civitatem sine aliqua solucione gabelle. Ut dictum est?

I Tem quod de qualibet balla vel fardello mercium lucanarum et de pondere ipsius balle vel fardelli pro cassis inovillos funibus et cottle et alis que super imponuntur in eis pro salvitate ipsarum detrahantur de chara cuilibet balle vel fardelli si fuerit ponderis librarum ducentarum quinquaginta vel ab inde supra libre septuaginta due. Et si fuerit minoris ponderis librarum ducentarum quinquaginta [f15r] detrahantur tres libre ad pondus pro quibuslibet decem libris pro chara predicta.

(capitula proventuum et modi exactionis et venditionis eorum

STatuimus ordinamus quod de quolibet vino quod vendetur ad minutum in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis sive sit mustum sive clarum solvatur lucane gabelle ut infra continet. Videlicet de quolibet vino forense videlicet vernaccia rassese greco et corso, tercia pars pretii quo ipsum vinum vendetur. De vino autem nostrato cuiuscunque maneriei solvatur dimidia precii eius quo dictum vinum venderetur.

ET quelibet persona que vendere volet vinum ad minutum in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis sive sit vinacterius sive hospes sive alia persona ante quam ipsum vinum vendere incipiat faciat sigillari vegetem dicti vini per officiales dicti proventus ad id deputatos, declarando pretium quo ipsum vinum vendere vult, quod pretium scribatur in cedula clavata ad vegetem ita quod appareat sigillando sigillo dictorun officium ipsum cedulam que non possit mutari vel elevari. Et ultra summam declaratam in dicta cedula vendi non possit. ¶ Et teneatur etiam ante quam ipsum vinum vendere incipiat dare officiial gabelle bonam et ydoneam caucionem de solvendo gabelam dicti vini. ¶ Et intelligatur ipsum vinum venditum quantum ad dictam gabelam solvendam ex quo vege dicti vini fuerit sigillata. Et gabelam solvere teneatur ac si dictum vinum venditum foret. Et de quantitate dicti vini et precio quo ipsum vendere voluerat credatur et stetur relatione scripture officialium dicti preventus as predicta deputatorum. Et cuilibet contrafacienti in quolibet dictorum casuum sit pena librarum decem usque in centum arbitrio officialis gabelle. Cuius pene quarta paras sit denuntiatoris sive accusatoris.

Item quod vinacteriis et aliis vinum vendentibus ad minutum quibus inventa fuerint
eorum cellaria aperta post tertium sonum campane nocturne sit pena medietatis eius que
imponitur aliiis personis per formam statuti. Et sic dominus potestas et alii officiales
servare tenerint.

Item quod ludentes in cellariis contra formam statuti puniatur in duplum eius quo
puniarentur si luderent in aliiis locis. Et vinacterius puniatur eadem pena.

Item quod siquis inventus fuerit in cellariis ubi vinum venditur ad minutum post tercium
sonum predictum solvat in duplum penam ordinatam.

Item quod fructus possint vendi in locis ubi vinum vendetur ad minutum impune.

Item ad hoc ut fraudibus obvietur Statuimus quod officiales gabelle et proventus predicti
possint perquirere ab omnibus et singulis undecunque sint vinum vendentibus vel vendere
facientibus ad minutum in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis de quantitate et qualitate
vini quod habent in cellariis vel locis vel pertinentiis ubi vinum venditur ad minutum. Qui
officiales tale vinum et quantitate et colorem eius scribere debeant et ipsum sigillare et
bullare et sugomare ita quod fraud committi non possit. Et quilibet de predictis ad
irquisitionem dictorum officialium vel alicuius eorum teneatur ipsi officiali de quolibet
vino quod habet in dictis locis dicere veritatem declarando quantitatem in colorem vini.
Et qui aliquod vinum succelaret officiali predicto vel ipsum vinum rimari sigillare vel
scribi debere non permitteret condemnaretur per maiorem officiales gabelle in libris
decem usque in libris vigintiquinque qualibet vice arbitrio dicti officialis considerata
qualitate persone et rei. Et de predictis dominus teneatur pro famulo de quibus excessibus
creatur relaciioni officialis dicti preventus ad id deputati cum iuramento de novo
prestando nisi per accusatum vel denunciatum contrarium probaretur.

Item quod nullus de predictis vinacteriis tale vinum sic sigillatum sugumatet et
descriptum possit vel debeat sine expressa licencia officialis gabelle mutare augere vel
minuere vel desigillare aliqua racione vel causa sub pena librarum decem usque in
vigintiquinque pro qualibet vegete et qualibet vice arbitrio dicti officialis gabelle
considerata qualitate persone et rei credendo de predictis relaciioni officialis dicti
proventus ut in precedenti capitulo continetur.

Item quod quando continget vinacterios habere licentiam a dictis [f16r] officialibus dicti
proventus vendendi vinum alicuius vegetis quod in ipsa vegeta vel aliqua parte ipsius non
permittatur aliquid seffum vel foramen quod ipsum non patefaciant et sigillari faciant per
officiales dicti proventus. Et quod desigillare vel penetrare ipsam vegetem in aliqua parte
sui non facient sine expressa licentia officialis gabelle sub pena librarum decem usque in
vigintiquinque arbitrio dicti officialis gabelle considerata qualitate negocii et persone pro
qualibet cive et qualibet vegete et qualibet defectu et dominus teneatur pro famulo, et de
excessu credatur relaciioni dicti officialis ut supra dictum est.

Item quod nullus vinacterius vel vinum vendens vel vendere faciens ad minutum per se
vel alium possit vel debeat aliquo tempore imbuttare vel imbuttari facere aliquod vinum
cuiuscunque qualitatis existat in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis in eorum cellariis ubi
vinum venditur ad minutum vel eorum pertinentiis sine expressa licentia officialis gabelle 
ad penam soldorum decem pro quolibet stario vini. Salvo quod tempore vindemiariarum 
usque ad festum omnium sanctorum possint imbittare vel imbittari facere impune.

item quod non possit per se vel alium adducere vel tenere in suo cellario vel eius 
pertinentiis in fraude gabelle aliquid vinum cuiuscumque qualitatis existat in aliquo vase 
nisi in vegetibus rimatis et sigillardis et scriptis per officiales dicti proventus ad penam 
soldorum viginti usque in centum arbitrio dicti officialis gabelle considerata qualitate 
perste et rei. Et credatur ut suprascribitur.

item quod nullus portator vel alius cuiuscumque conditionis existat ad petitionem alicuius 
vinacterii vel alterius persone pro eo audeat vel presumat portare vel tramutare vinum 
alicuius vinacterii de loco ad locum sub pena soldorum quadraginta qualibet vice sine 
expressa licentia dicti officialis gabelle.

item quod officiales dicti proventus possint plumbare vinum quod esset in vegetibus 
sigillardis vel inceptis vendi prout eis placuerit et sigillum ponere usque ubi est vinum 
quotiens voluerunt. Et nulla persona possit tale sigillum vel bullam elevare vel mutare 
[16v] sine licencia dictorum officium vel alicuius eorum aut aliquam fraudem 
committere ad penam librarum vigintiquinque pro qualibet vice.

item quod officiales dicti proventus possint facere marcaris vegetes vinacterii quando 
eis placuerit sine aliquo onere expensarum vinacterii. Et ipsi vinacterii permittantur 
et teneantur ita marcaris et prout marcatum fuerit habeatur pro veritate, Salvo quod siquis 
diceret se deceptum in marchio possit facere mensurari vegetem et prout apparebit veritas 
marchium reformetur.

item quod nullus vinacterius vel alia persona qui vinum vendat vel vendi faciat ad 
minutum possint tenere aliquid ultricinum vel instrumentum vel rem per quod vel quam 
possint maliciose vel in fraudem gabelle reperi vegetes. Et quod non possint habere vel 
tenere aliquam vegetem foratum in aliqua parte sui nisi in tempano et bullis anterioribus 
ubi sunt saffi et supra in manfaro. Et intelligatur instrumentum et res malicosa que 
manifeste maliciosa apparat vel que officiali gabelle malitiosa videbitur. Et cullibet 
contrafactent si peni librarum decem usque in vigintiquinque qualibet cive arbitrio dicti 
officiales considerata qua conditione et qualitate delicti et ad penam combustionis dicte 
rei et instrumenti.

item quod nulla persona in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis audeat vel presumat 
reponere vel imbittare in eius domo propria vel conducta vel alibi in dicta civitate burgis 
vel subburgis aliquam quantitate vini alicuius vinacterii vel pro aliquo vinacterio vendente 
vendere consueto vinum ad minutum dictis locis sine expressa licentia dicti officialis 
sub pena librarum decem usque in centum pro qualibet persona et qualibet vice qua fuerit 
contrafactum arbitrio dicti officialis auferenda.

item quod nullus vinacterius per se vel suam familiam vel aliam personam possit vel 
debeat reponere vel imbittare in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis aliquam quantitatem
vini nisi dumtaxat in cellariis ubi vendunt vel vendi faciunt vinum ad minutum sine licentia dicti officialis sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod nullus hospitator vel hospitatrix seu venditor vel venditrix commestiorum cottarum vel vinacterius possit vel debeat per se vel eius familia vel aliam personam imbuttare in suo cellario vel albero vel in aliqua alia parte seu tenere ad eius instantiam aliquam quantitatem vini quod primo non denuntuaverit et scribi fecerit officiali et per officialem dicti proventus sub pena predicta.

I Tem quod nullus conestabilis equester vel pedester vel quid alius stipendiarius seu provisionatus lucani comunis possit vel debeat vendere seu vendi facere alci eius socio vel alii persone vinum ad mintum vel alio modo nisi sit prius sigillatum et scriptum per officiales dicti proventus sub eadem pena.

I Tem quod nullus conestabilis equester vel pedester vel quid alius stipendiarius seu provisionatus lucani comunis possit vel debeat vendere seu vendi facere alci eius socio vel alii persone vinum ad mintum vel alio modo nisi sit prius sigillatum et scriptum per officiales dicti proventus sub eadem pena.

I Tem quod nullus conestabilis equester vel pedester vel quid alius stipendiarius seu provisionatus lucani comunis possit vel debeat vendere seu vendi facere alci eius socio vel alii persone vinum ad mintum vel alio modo nisi sit prius sigillatum et scriptum per officiales dicti proventus sub eadem pena.

I Tem quod nullus conestabilis equester vel pedester vel quid alius stipendiarius seu provisionatus lucani comunis possit vel debeat vendere seu vendi facere alci eius socio vel alii persone vinum ad mintum vel alio modo nisi sit prius sigillatum et scriptum per officiales dicti proventus sub eadem pena.

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I Tem quod nullus conestabilis equester vel pedester vel quid alius stipendiarius seu provisionatus lucani comunis possit vel debeat vendere seu vendi facere alci eius socio vel alii persone vinum ad mintum vel alio modo nisi sit prius sigillatum et scriptum per officiales dicti proventus sub eadem pena.

I Tem quod nullus conestabilis equester vel pedester vel quid alius stipendiarius seu provisionatus lucani comunis possit vel debeat vendere seu vendi facere alci eius socio vel alii persone vinum ad mintum vel alio modo nisi sit prius sigillatum et scriptum per officiales dicti proventus sub eadem pena.

I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

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I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod nullus albergator vel albergatrix civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum possit vel debeat ullo modo recipere vel receptare in suo hospitio aliquod vinum quod mittetur vel donaretur alci suo hospiti vel alie persone in suo hospitio existenti sine licentia officialium dicti proventus sub dicta pena.

Et quelibet persona possit contrafacientis et delinquentes in aliquo casuum predictorum denuntiare et accusare et habeat quartam partem condempnationis.

Et si aliquis accusaretur vel denuntiaretur vel inquireretur in eo quod dicaretur vindidisse vendidisse vinum ad minutum contra dictam formam vel deliquisse contra capitula suprascripta, in eo casu credatur duobus officialibus dicti proventus cum iuramento de novo perstando. Et etiam credatur quelibet alie persone bone fame cum iuramento et cum uno teste bone fame qui reddant bonam causam scientie sue dicti sui.
Et in quolibet predictorum casuum que fuerit contra factum dominus teneatur et puniri possit pro famulo et quolibet de familia sua.

Et si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam capitulorum cum pactis et conditionibus infrascriptis.

¶Quod liceat emptori et quibus partem dederit constituere ad predictam exequendam officiales oportunos ut consuetum est qui sint liberi et exempti ab exercitibus et cavalcatis

ITem quod si contingueret infra terminum venditionis fieri exercitum generalem quo casu intelligatur exercitus generalis quando equitaret vel iret unum terserium civitatis vel ab intra supra, restauretur eidem emptori dampnum quod incurreret ad extimationem unius civis lucani eligendi per collegium dominorum antianorum et unius alterius eligendi per dictum emptorem qui duo si non essent in concordia eligatur tertius per collegium supradictum. Et id de quo duo ipsorum essent in concordia observetur, Et dictum restaurum declaretur tali tempori quod possit computari in prima paga post exercitum. Et teneatur dictus emptor denunciare officiales gabelle die itineris exercitus vel sequenti quod ponat unum officialem qui videat et scribat vinum quod sigillabitur durante exercitu ad hoc ut nulla fraus committi possit per emptorem in dampnum comunis. Et si sic denunciare omiserit non possit dictum restaurum petere vel habere.

ITem si contingueret inimicos lucani comunis equitare in planum lucanum vel in sex miliaria propter quod dictus proventus dampnum incurreret quod emptor predictus restauraret de ipso dampno ad extimationem duorum bonorum virorum civium lucanorum eligendorum per collegium ancianorum et emptorum et supra dictum est et illud [f18r] quod declaraverint computetur et compensetur in pagis dicti proventus tunc proxime fiendis.

Et si contingent dictos inimicos venire exercitualiter ad civitatem lucanam et poneret campum vel campos contra ipsam civitatem quod tunc ipso casu teneatur comune lucanum ad se reducere dictum proventum ad requisitione et protestatione dicti emptatoris et pro eo tempore quo staret dictus exercitus emptor liberetur a solutione pagarum dicti proventus pro rata temporis.

ITem si contingat aliquam questionem vel dubium esse vel verti intra ipsum emptorem et socios et eorum officiales et vinacterios seu vendentes vinum ad minutum declaretur et terminetur per maiorem officialem gabelle, et eius declarationi stetur, Et de predictis questionibus maior sindicus vel alius officialis se intronuctere? non possit nisi de iniuriis vel preceptis contra vel ultra formam huius venditionis.

ITem quod dictus emptor vel socii non possint vel debeat gravari vel cogi ad aliquam solicionem vel subventionem pecunie pro dicto proventu nisi per terminos ordinatos.

ITem quod in hac venditione non veniat vinum quod venditur ad minutum in contrata sancti quirici æd in monticello et in vallebuia cum solvatur pro eo in proventu vini sex
miliariorum.

I. Tem quod vinum quod reperiretur die venditionis sigillatum et non venditum debeat sugumari per unum eligendum pro parte lucani comunis seu habentis causam ab eo et unum alium eligendum pro parte emptoris et pro ea parte vini que tempore dicti sugumationis reperiretur in vegetibus non venditi solvaev emptori et in quantum solutum esset comuni lucano vel habenti causam ab eo de dicto vino vel eius causa comine lucanum vel habens causam ab eo restituere teneatur eidem emptore dictum proventum perceptum de dicto vino non vendito, et simili modo fieri debeat per emptore omni successori suo in fine termini dicte venditionis de vino quod reperiretur sigillatum et non venditum.

¶de proventu vini venalis quod venditur ad minutum in sex miliariis

S. Tatuimus et ordinamus quod de vino quod venditur ad minutum [f18v] in comunibus sex miliarorum vel quasi et subburbanorum et sancti aurici in monticello et callia lime exceptis comunibus iure pleberii sexti noviani solvatur et solvi debeat gabella ut infra continetur videlicet:

De quolibet vino forense, videlicet vernaccia rassese greco et corsi tercia pars pretii quo vendetur.
De vino autem nostrato cuiuscumque maneriei solvatur dimidia precii quo vendetur.
Et ultra predicta pro quolibet currro pro quocumque pretio vinum vendatur in dictis locis solvantur soldi quadraginta.

Et quod de quantitate vini stetur et creditur relationi et scripture officialium seu officialis dicti proventus qui fuerit deputatus ad sigillandum vegetes dicti vini, Et intelligatur vinum venditum quantum ad dictam gabellam solvendum statim cum veges fuerit sigillata. Et in sigillando servetur modus et forma qui et que servari debet in civitate lucana de vegetis vini quod venditur ad minutum in civitate lucana.

Item quod dicti officiales in eundo et veniendo pro dicto officio exercendo possint ferre arma offensibilia et defensibilia impune.

Item quod committentes fraudes in dicta gabella et proventu possint et debeant puniri et condemnari per maiorem officialem lucane gabelle secundum formam et modum et prout puniri possint vinacterii et committentes fraudem in gabella et proventu vini venalis civitatis lucane.

Et idem modus servetur et fides adhibeatur ut fit et fieri debet in dicto proventu vini civitatis lucane.

Item quod vendentes vinum ad minutum in dictis locis possint tenere in locis ubi vinum venditur de pane venali facto in sex miliaris gabellare et ipsum ibi vendere impune dummodo sit iusti ponderis.
Et si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam capitulorum cum pactis infrascriptis.

Quod vinum quod reperiretur in vegetibus die qua compera incipit sigillatum non venditum debeat sugumari per unum eligendum per parte emptoris et alium pro parte lucani comunis seu habentis causam ab eo et solvi debeat dicto emptori de ipso vino reperto sigillato [f19r] non vendito. Et si comuni lucano esset de dicto vino seu parte ipsius solvatum ipsum comune seu habens causam ab eo restituere et solvere teneatur dicto emptore statim aliud pretium ad solutum foret eidem de dicto vino sigillato non vendito. Et in fine dicte compere similiter vinum sigallatum et non venditum debeat sugumari et de eo solui comuni lucane vel habenti causam ab eo. Et dictus emptor similiter sibi pretium solutum de vino sigillato et non vendito solvere et reddere teneatur.

ITem quod si infra temporis vendicionis contingere aliquam gentem de sex miliariis duci vel mitti in exercitum cum armis propter quod emptor damnum incurrerit ipsum damnum per unum civem lucanum eligendum per dominos antianos et unum alium eligendum per emptorem extimentur qui duo si non essent in concordia de ipsa extimatione addatur eis tertius per dictos dominos antianos et id quod duo ex eis iudicabunt sit firmum et restauretur emptori, si non ducerentur vel mitterentur guastatores vel explanatores usque in quingentos et starent minus decem diebus restaurum detur, set si starent ultra decem dies servetur et fiat ut in casu predicto continetur de extimationis fienda.

ITEM quod officiales dictorum comunium vel ipsa comunia nulla habeant potestatem petendi fideiussories a vendentibus venum ad minutum de delictibus et excessibus que committeretur in eorum cellariis nec possint prohibere volentibus vendere vinum ad minutum de non vendendo. Et si prohiberetur non valeat talis prohibitio nec prohibentes propterea damnum incurrant.

Item quod quilibet possit impune ludere ad taxillos in cellariis ubi vinum venditur ad minutum et in eorum circumstantiis et rapellare ad vinum tantum et non alio modo.

†de proventu farine.

STatuisimus et ordinamus quod de quolibet stario farine que mittitur in civitate lucana solvatur ad portas soldi tres [f19v] denarii novem parvorum lucanorum.

ITEM quod qucumque persona que mittit in civitate lucana panem factum sive venalem sive non solvat dicto proventui ultra gabellam adiudicatam provenui medie uncie panis de pane venali gabella predictam videlicet soldi tres denarii novem parvorum pro quolibet stario panis Et intelligatur esse starium panis de libris triginta sex ad pondus. Cum hoc intellectu quod de dicto pane venali que mitteretur in civitate lucana et venderetur publice sup platea in civitate lucani comunis dicta gabella pro dicto proventu farine non exigatur donec per dominos antianos lucani comunis provism et deliberatum fuerit ipsam gabbellam solvi debere.
Et quod nulla persona possit vel debeat reducere vel deferre in civitatem lucanam aliquam farinam vel panem in aliqua quantitate quam non faciat ponderare ad portam ordinatam per quem intrabit per officiales dicti proventus et de qua vel quo non solvat dicto proventui gabellam predictam ad penam perditionis farine et panis reducti vel delati contra dictam forma et ultra usque in libris decem ad arbitrium maioris officialis gabelle inspecta qualitate persone et rei.

Et quecumque persona seu molendinarius mittet vel mittere volet in civitate lucana aliquam farinam cuiuscumque conditionis existat ipsum farinam mittat et mittere teneatur et debeat solum per portam sancti petri Et omnis extrahentes seu extrahere volentes aliquum bladum de civitate lucana pro eo portandum ad macinandum teneatur et debeat dictum bladum extrahere per dictam portam et illud ibi facere ponderare et se et dictum bladum et quantitatem seu numerum dicti bladi scribi per officiales dicti proventus Et tot libras farine ad pondus in civitatem lucanam remittere teneatur quot libre fuit ad pondus dictum bladum liceat tam persone remittenti dictam farinam minus remittere libras tres farine ad pondus pro quolibet stario bladi extracti ut est usus pro premio molendinarii Et si dictum bladum exportaretur vel mitteretur per alias portas quam predictam portam sit pena molendinario [f20r] vel alii persone que dictum bladum extraheret vel farinam mutent predicti perditionis bladi et farine. Et nichileminus condemnetur contrafactiens a soldis quadraginta usque in libris quinque arbitrio officialis gabelle considerata conditione et qualitate persone et defectus.

Et officiales deputati super dicto proventu teneantur et debeant facere postam cuiuslibet molendinarii de blado quod extrahat de civitate lucana et de farina quam mittet et ipsum civitate et facere rationem cuiuslibet molendinarii singulis octo diebus. Et si invenerint aliquem molendinarii extrassisse de civitate lucana plura staria bladi quam fuerit farina missa per eum in civitate tunc dicti officiales conpellant et conpellere teneantur dictum molendinarium teneantur in civitate lucanam farinam quam per dictum eorum rationem invenerint ipsum molendinarium remittere debere infra tres dies a die rationis facte et sibi notificare. Et si elapso dicto termino molendinarius dictam farinam non remiserit in civitate ut dictum est condemnetur per maiorem officiale gabelle in soldis viginti parvorum pro quolibet stario farine obmisse remitti et nichilominus ipsum farinam remittere teneatur.

Et si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum farinam dictorum capitulorum et cum pacto infrascripto videlicet quod si contingiter infra tempus venditionis fieri exercitum generalem pro lucano communis eo casu durante ipso exercitu introitus dicti proventus sit lucani comunis et pro ipso tempore quo duraret exercitus emptor nil solvere teneatur.

\[de proventu macelli\]

\[S\]Tatuimus et ordinamus quod de infrascriptis bestiis macellandis solvat dicto proventui, ut inferius continent videlicet:

- De quolibet bove vel vaccha unius anni vel ab inde supra = £ 12
- De quolibet vitulo seu vitula ab anno et infra = £ 6
De quolibet castrone = £ 1 s. 10
De quolibet agno grosso = £ 1
De quolibet agno mediocre = £ 0 s. 10
[f20v] De q. agno parvo seu cordesco = s. 6
De q. pecude = £ 1 s. 10
De q. capra et yrco = s. 15
De q. edo = s. 6
De q. cen. porci domestici libra una ad pondus = s. 30 d. 14
De q. cen. porci silvestris ad p. = s. 12
De q. capriolo = s. 12
De q. vulpe lepore et taxo = s. 3

Et si aliqua dictarum bestiarum pro quibus solui debet dicta gabella ad pondus conduceretur viva in civitate lucana Tunc officiales dicti proventus extiment pondus ipsius. Et factum eorum extimationem dicta gabella solvatur.

Et quod omnis bestie predicte non possint vel debeant intromitti per alias portas civitatis lucane quam per porta sancti donati sub pena librarum decem pro qualibet vice et qualibet bestia auferenda cuiuslibet officiali et portonario seu custodi qui permiserit intrare aliquam de predictis bestiis per aliquam aliarum portarum lucane civitatis et librarum quinque cuiuslibet persone aliquam dictarum bestiarum per aliam per portam immictenti.

Et quod nulla persona cuiuscumque conditionis sit audax vel presumat interficere seu interfecti facere aliquam bestiam in sex miliariis pro faciendo tabernam aut carnas recentes vendere ad penam librarum decem pro qualibet contrafaciente et qualibet vice nisi fuerint silvestres vel porcine et tune cum licentia et apodixa officialis dicti proventus dum tamen primo solvat gabella que solvi debet pro dictis carnibus vel nisi licenciam haberet a dominis anciaribus lucani comunis de faciendo tabernam cum solutione debite gabelle Et idem intelligatur, servetur in burgis et subburgis civitatis lucane.

Et si contingat vendi dictum proventum vendatur secundum formam dictorum capitularum et cum infrascripto pacto quod emptor et sotii [f21r] non teneantur nec cogi possint solvere comuni lucane aliud pretium pro tempore quo fuerit aut duraverit exercitus lucane civitatis in quo esset unum terserium lucane civitatis vel ab inde supra quo casu dictus proventus remaneat lucano comuni durante exercitu sine aliqua solutione fienda pro ipso tempore per emptorem vel sotios. pro quadragesimo vero nil detrahatur vel minuatur.

[on pensions and salaries]

¶ de proventu pensionum et livellorum

STatuimus et ordinamus quod quelibet persona lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum vel aliunde qui recolligit seu recolliget aliquam pensionem vel livellum ubicunque recolligat. Solvat et solvere teneatur et debeat annuatim et ad rationem anni gabelle lucane pro gabella ad rationem soldorum duorum per libram pensionis seu livelli quam
vel quod recolligit. Et quod quicumque facit alicui exercitium artis in sua apotheca
terrestri vel stufis solvat ad eandem rationem extimando et extimari faciendo dictam
apothecam et stufas ad modum aliarum apothecarum circumstanciam quantum valet et
valere potest ad pensionem. Et stufe que non locantur extimentur per bonos viros
eligendos per iudicem gabelle. Et predictum pretium solvatur ad eandem monetam ad
quam recolliguntur dicte pinsiones et livella. Et quod dicta gabella solui debeat in duabis
pagis in anno videlicet in primis sex mensis dimidiam et aliam dimidiam in alii
subsequentibus.

I Tem quod quecumque persona locaverit seu concesserit alicuam domum vel apothecam
in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis ad pensionem seu mercedem reddendam in alio
quam in pecunia eandem gellenam solvere teneatur quam qui colligit gellenam in pecunia
numerata?

I Tem quod simili modo solvatur et solui debeat gabella de domibus gratis concessis
excepto quod de concessis gratis mulieribus viduis et miserabilius et alii hominibus
inablibus de persona propter senectutem vel aliam infirmitatem de quibus sit verisimile
contemplacione [f21v] dei et non utilitatis causa in ipsis domibus receptari exigendo
nichilominus iuramentum a domino talis tamus et etiam habitante quod nil inde solvatur
sed amore dei concessio facta sit.

I Tem quod sigua domus cum orta vel terreno locaretur simul ad granum vel alicuius
altius rei solutionem solvatur gabella pro parte contingente domum ac si locatio facta
foret ad pecuniam. Et hoc locum habeat tam de localione facta de domo sola quod etiam
derreno dum tamen gellenam solvat solum pro parte contingente domum ut supra
dictum est. ¶Et quod in quolibet casum predictorum contentorum in dictis tribus
proximis capitulis fiat extimatio de eo quod fuerit congrua pensio predictorum de quibus
dicta gellenam solui debeat per duos bonos viros eligendos unum pro parte lucani comunis
per dominus antianos et alium per solvere debentem qui duo si non essent in concordia de
dicta extimatione fienda eligatur tertius per dominus antianos et id quod duo ex eis
declarabunt observetur.

I Tem quod officiales gellenae teneatur et debeat dictas pensiones et livella perquirere et
investigare et personas recolligentes et solventes dictas pensiones et livella per consules
contratarum et brachiorum et communem comitatus districtus et forte et alias personas
prout sibi melius et convenientius videbitur et etiam cogere dictas personas ad veritatem
dicendam de pensionibus et livellis non obstante quod inde apparat instrumentum.

[sales, dowries, testaments]

¶de proventu venditionis alienationum dotium et testamentorum

STatuimus et ordinamus quod de bonis immobileibus que vendentur permutabuntur vel in
insolutum debuntur vel alio titulo alienabuntur in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis
comitatu districtu et forti lucana solvantur et solui debeant pro gellenam lucana [f22r]
gellen denarii octo per libram videlicet quatuor per emptorem et quatuor per venditorem
sue per quemlibet contraherentem. Et si aliquis ex contrahentibus esset de non subiectis iurisdictioni lucani comunis teneat contrahaens subiectus ad solvendum integre dictam gabellam quod solui debet per utrunque contraherentem ac si quilibet eorum eorum subiectus esset iurisdictioni lucani comunis Et quod omnis et singuli contractus et instrumenta que fient in civitate lucana comitatu districtu et forcia fieri debeant per notarium subiectum iurisdictioni lucani comunis. Et si per alium fieren eis fides non adhibeat. Et nichilominus persona que per notarium non subiectum iurisdictioni lucani comunis instrumentum de predictis fieri fecerit teneat solvere duplum dicte gabelle. Salvo semper et in suo vigore manente statuto lucani comunis loquente de instrumentis non fiendis per notarium non subiectum iurisdictioni lucani comunis in eo quod predictis non contradicent. Et notarius quod dictum contractum vel instrumentum fecerit et dicti contrahentes teneantur ipsi contractum vel instrumentum denuntiare vel denuntiare facere officiali gabelle ad hec deputato infra unum mumen a die celebrati contractis.

Et contrahentes infra dictum tempus dictum gabellam solvere teneantur. Et notarius qui sic denuntiare omiserit teneat et cogi possit solvere duplum eius quod solvere teneretur unus ex contrahentibus contraherentes autem qui sic non denunciaverint etolluerint tenanter solvere duplum eius quod solvere deberent et de et pro ipsa qua contractum est, et ipsis contrahentibus ius non fiat nisi prius soluerint cum effectu. Sufficiat tamen per quemcumque predictorum vel aliam personam dicta denunciatio fiat dum tamen fiat infra dictum terminum vel quod infra dictum tempus ad notitiam dicti officialis pervenerit quantum ad excusationem pene cum hac conditione quod emptor teneat solui totam gabellam et partem contingente venditori retineat de pretio rei empte. Et eodem modo qui alienaverit per ditionem insoluti sua auctoritate res immobiles solvat totam gabellam retinendo sibi partem ab illo cui tales res auctoritate propria dederit insolutum.

[f22v] I Tem statuimus et ordinamus quod quelibet persona que dotem vel augmentum dotis recipit solvat et solvere teneat et debeat pro gabella lucane gabelle ad rationem denariorum sex per qualibet libra. Et idem fiat in his qui concessi essent recepisse dotem vel augmentum dotis. Et omnis et singuli consules et officiales contrariorum et brachiorum lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum et comunum lucani comitatus districtus et fortie teneantur et debeat denuntiare dicto officialis omnes et singulos ducentes uxores in eorum contrata et brachio vel comuni videlicet in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis infra decem dies et in comitatu fortia et districtu infra unum mensem. Et quod omnes notarii qui contractus inde fecerint teneantur denunciare ut supra dictum est de alii instrumentis alienationum. Et quo dotem vel augmentum dotis recept vel concessus fuerit similiter denunciare teneat infera dictum tempus. Et solvere gabellam predictam. Et si predicta non fecerint teneat solvere duplum eius quod solvere deberent si denunciassent, sufficiat tamen per quemcumque predictorum vel aliam personam dicta denunciatio fiat infra dictam tempora vel quod ad notitiam dicti officialis pervenerit quantum ad excusationem pene.

I Tem Statuimus et ordinamus quod quilibet intelligatur habuisse et recepisse dotem a die qua uxorem duxerit seu penes se habuerit et dictam gabellam solvere teneat. Et notarii teneantur declarare quantitates dotium de quibus fecerint instrumentum, Et si per
instrumentum non constarent exquirant ab arbitris et sensalibus et eorum iuramentorum stetur et credatur. Et si predicto modo stari non posset inquirant a vicinis et stetur et credatur iuramento quatuor vicinorum de quantitate dotis quam scire iuraverint per publicam famam vicinorum.

ITem statuimus et ordinamus quod de iudiciis et legatis et hereditatibus extraneorum solveantur et solui debeant pro gabella lucane gabelle soldi duo per libram. Extranei vero intelligatur omnes preter ascendentes et descendentes et preter omnes alias personas que venirent ad successionem illius de cuius hereditate vel ultima voluntate tractatur si testamentum non fecisset. Salvo quod descendentes ex filia vel descendentes ex nepte ex filio solvere teneant denarios duodecim [f23r] per libram; germani vero et germane et nepotes et neptes ex fratre masculo de talibus iudiciis legatis et hereditatibus solvere debeant solum denarios duodecim per libram in eo casu in quo non venirent ad successionem ab intestato si testamentum non fecisset. Si vero aliqua donatio fiat per quacunque personam de aliqua re immobili per quam donacionem possessio vel quasi et dominium vel quasi rei donate transferatur in illum cui donatio facta est post mortem donantis quod tunc predicta donatione solui debeat gabella ac si res donata foret iudicata vel relicta. Et quod officialis gabelle teneatur et debeat executionem facere eorum qui supra continentur contra heredes defuncti et etiam contra legatarios et fidei commissarios et executores et possessores honorum et quemlibet eorum in et super bonis defuncti tantum et contra ipsa bona cui gabelle omnes et singuli predicti quantis ad bona defuncti et ipsa bona intelligatur obnexi et suppositi honeri predicto tanquam tributarii quantum ad dictum honus et ad quemcunque transierint ipsa bona honeri predicto intelligantur adstricta.

ET possit et debeat dictus officialis predicta executioni mandare et dictas gabellas solui facere integre cum effectu et in eis et circa ea habeat plenam bayliam et auctoritatem et maxime quod dicta gabella non fraudetur. Et omnes notarii teneantur et debeant denunciare dicto officiali omnia et singula iudicia et legata et hereditates et ultimas voluntates de quibus instrumentum fecerint unde solui debetet gabella infra quindecim dies a die mortis testatoris vel relinquentis ad penam penam dupli gabelle que pro eo quod omissum esse denunciare solvere esset. Et nichilominus debens dictam gabellam solvere teneatur Et consules contratarum et brachiorum lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum et commun lucani comitatus districtus et fortie denunciare teneantur dicto officiali omnes singulas personas sue contra brachii vel comunis que decesserent declarando nomen et prenomem defuncte persone et diem mortis eiusdem sub pena arbitrio dicti officialis delinquentibus auferenda.

Et predicta que supra dicta sunt etiam locum habeant et se extendant tam ad iudicia et legata et hereditates et in iudiciis et legatis et hereditatibus factis et iudicatis per quoscumque lucanos cives quibuscumque [f23v] personarum et per districtuales et comitatinos et de fortia lucana quam ad illa et de illis qui fieren per quoscunque alios lucanis civibus et de comitatu et districtu et fortia lucana et ad dictam gabellam solvendam teneantur forenses habitantes nunc et in futurum in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis comitatu districtu vel fortia lucana de bonis existentibus in dictis locis que eis iudicarent vel in quibus sucederent seu aliijs iudicarent Cum hac conditione quod
quelibet persona cui aliquid fuerit iudicatum vel relictum a die scientie infra unum mensem teneatur tale iudicium seu relictum acceptare vel renunciare alioquin dictam gabellam pro tali iudicio solvere teneatur.

ITem si contingat testatorem relinquare suis fideicommissariis vel aliis denarios dispensandos prout eis videbitur teneantur fideicommissarii et ali quibus relinquatur pecunia distribuenda ad petitionem dicti officialis infra annum post mortem testatoris declarare cui vel quibus dictam pecuniam relictam dederint vel si non dederint cui dare intendunt adeo quod legatam seu relictum clarum appareat quod si non declaraverint dictam gabellam soluere teneantur. Et quod dictus officialis tenatur fideicommissarios et alios quibus pecunia relinquitur dispensanda monere quod dictam declarationem faciant infra dictum tempus quam si non fecerint teneantur solvere gabellam prout de iudiciis declaratis per testatorem solui deberet ad quam solvendam heredes et bona defuncti et ali obligati sint prout supra dictum est de aliis. Set si contingat testatorem relinquare vel iudicare denarios pauperibus et miserabilibus personis vel piis locis prout eius fideicommissariis videreetur vel per tunicis et camicis emendis in eo casu declaratio predicta fieri non debeat. Et nulla gabella solui debeat de tali iudicio vel legato.

ITem si contigerit legatum fieri alicui miserabili persone cuius nomen fideicommissarii declarare nolint teneantur ipsi fideicommissarii solvere gabellam de tali legato.

ITem quod de hereditatibus et iudiciis et legatis que fierent vel relinquerentur alicui persone que ab intestatio ad successionem illius de cuius hereditate vel testamento seu ultima voluntate tractatus tempore mortis illius de cuius hereditate vel iudiciis tractatur si testamentum factum non foret gabella predicta solui non debeat non obstantibus supradictis.

ITem quod nullus officialis vel alia persona sit exempta a gabella et spectantibus ad gabellam sed ipsa gabella indifferenter ab omnibus exigatur silicet a subiectis iurisdictioni temporali et a forensibus ut supra dictum est.

ITem quod qucumque persona cuiuscumque conditionis existat que fecerit seu fieri fecerit aliquod rogitum cuiuscumque conditionis existat de vel pro quo aliquid solui debeat pro gabella ipsum rogitum denuntiare seu denuntiare facere teneatur si ipsum rogitum factum fuerit in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis vel comitatu districtu et fortia lucana infra tempora supradicta. Si vero ipsum rogitum factum fuerit extra comitatum lucanum et fortiam videlicet in tuscia vel lombardia aut venetiis vel ianue denuntiari debeat infra tres menses si vero ipsum rogitum factum fuerit in alios mundi partibus denuntiari debeat infra sex menses. Et in quantum ipsa rogita sint nulla et eis fides non adhibeat nisi primo debita gabella solvatur in duplum et ipsa solutione dupli facta valeant et teneant et valuisse intelligantur. Et predicta omnia et singula locum habeant et exigi possint etiam si contraherentur et fierent extra civitatem comitatum districtum et fortiam lucanam Et ita ex eis exactio fieri possit sicut si in civitate lucana contraherentur et fierent.

ITem quod omnes teneantur soluere gabellam ad illam monetam ad quam fuerit
contractus vel iudicium.

ET ad tollendum fraudes que per testatores committi possent in testamentis in preiudicium gabelle confitendo se debitores eorum quibus legata facuerit, Statuimus et ordinamus quod officiales gabelle cum consensu collegii dominorum antianorum habeant auctoritatem providendi declarandi et pronuntiandi an talis confessio facta fuerit in fraudem gabelle vel non. Et secundum eius declarationem cum dicto consensu fiendam observent et non intelligatur confessio in fraude [f24v] facta in quantum que debite appareat per iuramentum testatoris vel alio legislimo modo.

ET si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam dictorum capitulorum et cum pactis et conditionibus infrascriptis videlicet quod predicta omnia dictus emptor possit exigere infra tempus sue compere et etiam per duos annos postea de his que tempore sue compere deberentur et non ultra.

ITem quod Officiales gabelle teneantur ad requisitionem emptoris vel sociorum percipere vicariss vicariarum eorum notariis tam per litteras quam per nunptios ut voluerint quod sub pena que dicto officiali videbitur convocari faciat coram se omnes notarios eorum vicariarum. Et consules seu sindicos comunum earundem et ipsis notariis et consulibus seu sindicos percipere quod omnes venditiones insoluti permutations dotes et testamenta facta et facienda infra tempus venditionis de his que spectant ad dictum emptorem. secundum formam sue compere denuntient ipsi imptore et suis officialibus et pretium et annum et diem infra quindecim dies a die celebrati contractus et persone defuncte et in forma publica et nomina et prenomina defunctorum et bona eorum que hабебant in suo comuni.

ITem quod in predicta venditione non veniat aliqua terra que modo non est ad obedientiam lucani comunis nec aliqua terra de provincia vallis nebule.

[Bread tax?]

\[ \text{de proventu medie uncie panis civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum} \]

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod omnis fornarii et pistores et quilibet alius qui facit seu faciet in civitate lucana panem ad pondus pro eo vendendo ad minutum vel quod alio modo faciant pro vendendo solvant de quolibet stario panis grani soldos decem parve lucane monete.

Et de quolibet stario milii vel alterius blave \( = \text{s. 2 dicte monete} \)

Et omnes fornarii et pistores et alii qui faciunt seu faciunt panem dicto modo in burgis vel subburgis solvant de quolibet [f25r] stario panis \( = \text{s. 10 dicte monete} \)

Et de quolibet stario panis milii vel alterius blave soldos duos dicte monete. Et ultra dictam gabellam illi de burgis et subburgis facientes panem ut dictum est extra fortilitiam burgorum in quibus exiguntur gabelle sicut in civitate lucana solvant et solvere teneantur pro quolibet stario sicut solvitur gabella in proventu farine ad portam civitatis. Et
intelligatur omnis panis factus pro vendendo ad minutum qui factus fuerit in domibus propriis vel conductis predictorum vel aliquiuis eorum vel alio modo eis concessis vel d eos vel aliquem eorum pertinentibus vel alibus pro eis. Et de quantitate panis facti stetur et credatur relationi et scripture duorum officialium proventus ad hec deputatorum.

ITem quod omnis fornarii et pistores teneant et debeant ad petitionem cuiuscunque officialium dicti proventus aperiri et aperiri facere domos et furnos pro eorum officio et occasione eorum officii de die et de nocte quotiens voluerint et eos promittere rimari et scriptari qui officiales pro eorum officio exercendo possint ire de die de nocte impune in quantum sint fideles et non suspecte persone lucano comuni. Possit tamen quilibet predictorum facere panem sine solutione gabelle pro conviviis nuptiarum cum licentia officialis dicti proventus.

ITem quod omnes fornarii et pistores et eorum familia teneant et debeant ad petitionem cuiuscunque officialis dicti proventus ostendere et denuntiare eidem quantitatem panis faci sive impastati et aliquam quantitatem panis sive paste non succelare ad penam librarum trium pro quolibet et qualibet vice et de predictis et infrascriptis omnibus et singulis credatur et plena fides adhibeatur dicto et relationi duorum officialium dicti proventus fide dignorum cum iuramento de novo prestando. Et de condempnationibus fiendis contra delinquentes quarta pars sit denuntiatoris.

[f25v] ITem quod nullus fornarius vel pistor possit habere in domo propria vel conducta nisi unum caldanum sub dicta pena.

ITem quod nulla persona que panem fecerit pro vendendo ad minutum vel alio modo possit vel debeat panem non cottum vel pastum pro vendendo ad minutum factam vel factum tenere nisi in suo caldano vel iuxta ipsum caldane.

ITem quod quando rimatores dicti proventus vadunt rimatum pro pane facto ipsum a parte et clare videre possint ad penam librarum decem pro quolibet contrafaciente qualibet vice cuius pene quarta pars sit accusatoris seu denunciatoris.

ITem quod nulla persona que fecerit panem pro vendendo ad minutum possit ipsum impastare vel facere nisi in caldanis consuetis ad penam librarum decem pro quolibet et qualibet vice.

ITem quod nulla persona in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis possit vel debeat vendere vel vendi facere aliquem panem ad minutum vel alio modo nisi primo scriptus fuerit per officiales dicti proventus sub dicta pena. Et hoc locum non habeat in pane qui mittitur de comitatatu in civitate de quo in introitu soluta fuerit debita gabella.

ITem quod omnes fornarii civitatis lucane burgorum et subburorum et eorum familie teneantur et debeant eorum furnos permettere sigillari per officiales dicti proventus quotient voluerint et eos non disigillare sine licentia dictorum officialium sub dicta pena. Et hoc capitulum locum non habeat in quantum dicti fornarii denegarent dictis officialibus quod panem facere nolint.
TEM quod quilibet volens facere panem pro vendendo teneatur dare fideiussum de
solendo dictam gabellam debitam et omnem condempnationem que de eo fiet si
reperiretur contra gabellam in aliquo diliquisse.

TEM ad tollendas fraudes quas hospites civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum et
pistores et alii qui commestiones cottas vendunt publice vel private consueverunt et
possunt [f26r] facere in dando ad comedendum in eorum domibus panem non sigillatum
et non gabellatum in fraude gabelle quod nullus hospitator vel alia persona vendens
commestiones chottas publice vel private in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis audeat
vel presumat facere vel fieri facere aliquam quantitatem pannis sigillati vel non sigillati in
aliqua eorum domo propria vel conducta vel alibi nisi primo talem panem et quantitatem
ipsius denuntiaverit officialibus ipsius proventus ante quam coquat ad penam librarum
trium pro quolibet et qualibet vice. Et hoc capitulum non habeat locum in pane de milio
et honesto quem possint pro eorum familiis facere et tenere, ut supra in alio capitulo
dictum est.

Et si contingent in domibus predictorum vel aliiius eorum inveniri de dicto pane quod
sit et remaneat in discrecione maioris officialis lucane gabelle videre et considerare utrum
dictus panis sive unus sive plures fuerit ibi dolo vel frauda dictorum hospitatorum et
vendentium et facientium commestiones chottas. Et ipsa consideratione habita sit in eius
arbitrio condempnare vel absolvere talem cui dictus panis inventus fuerit.

TEM quod dicti hospitatores et vendentes commestiones et eorum familie teneantur et
debeant tenere aperta hostia eorum habitationum de die et qualibet hora diei sub pena
soldorum quadraginta pro quolibet et qualibet vice et teneantur etiam de nocte et qualibet
hora noctis aperire dicta hostia ad petitionem dicti proventus officialium dicti proventus
quamadmodum tenentur fornarii sub pena librarum trium pro quilibet et qualibet vice.

TEM quod nullus Conestabilis Equester vel Pedester vel quis alius stipendiarius vel
provisionatus lucani comunis possit vel debeat vendere vel vendi facere in civitate lucana
burgis vel subburgis aliius suo sotio vel alii persone panem nisi talis panis fuerit sigillatus
vel gabellatus et scriptus per officiales dicti proventus ut scriptum de pane venali dictum
est sub pena librarum decem [f26v] usque in quinquaginta arbitrio officialis gabelle
considerata qualitate et conditione persone et facti.

TEM quod predicte pene possint mitigari ad arbitrium maioris officialis gabelle inspecta
qualitate delicti.

ET si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam dictorum
capitulorum cum pactis et conditionibus infrascriptis quod officiales lucane civitatis vel
aliquis ipsorum non prohibebunt nec prohiberi facient nec promittent quin fornarii et
pistores panem coquant et vendant secundum pondus eis datum nec ipsi officiales
prohibere possint. et in quantum prohiberetur non valeat. Et si procederetur propterea
contra aliquem per dictos officiales vel aliquem eorum ad aliquam contempnationem vel
gravamina ipsam et ipsa officiales predicti et notarii colere cassare et cassari facere
teneantur et ipso iure sint casse et nullius valoris et non possint propterea molestari. Et in quantum prohiberetur cum effectu pistoribus et fornariis quin panem coquant et vendant secundum dictum modum vel ipsi emptori quin dictam gabellam exigere et percipiatur emptori pro se et quibus partem dederit prorogetur dicta venditio et eidem detur et concedatur et datus et concessus intelligatur et sit dictus proventus et introitus in tantum tempus quanto duraret impedimentum predictum. Et ex nunc liceat emptori et quibus partem dederit dictum proventum et introitum tenere et exigere ultra tempus venditionis quantum ipsum impedimentum duraverit.

I Tem quod officiales predicti proventus possint ire de nocte impune pro eorum officio exercendo in quantum sint fidelis et non suspecte persone lucano comuni.

I Tem addimus et adiudicamus dicto proventui medie uncie gabellam panis que exigitur et exigi consuevit ad portas quin mittitur in civitatem ultra gabella que exigitur pro proventu farine salvo quam de pane signato qui mittitur in civitatem per fornarios et pistores burgorum et subburgorum cum de ipso solvatur in dicto proventu medie uncie panis Et salvo quod de pane venali que mitteretur in civitate lucana et venderetur publice super platea lucani comunis dicta gabella pro dicto proventu medie uncie panis [t27r] non exigatur donec per dominos antianos lucani comunis provisum et declaratum fuerit ipsum gabellam solui debere.

I Tem statuimus quod nullum restaurum de dicto pane peti vel haberi possit per aliquem emptorem occasione alicuius exercitus.

I Tem quod nulla persona audeat vel presumat deferre vel reducere vel reduci facere in civitatem lucanam panem non signatum et qui non sit ponderis ordinati quem non faciat ponderari ad portam ordinatam per quam intrabit per officiales ordinatos et de quo non soluat debitam gabellam ad penam perditionis panis et ultra usque in soldis quadraginta arbitrio officialis gabelle inspecta qualitate persone et negotii Salvo eo quod dictum est supra de pane vendendo in platea lucani comunis.

[half ounce bread tax, six miles]

¶ de proventu medie uncie panis sex miliariorum et quasi et olei

S Tatuimus et ordinamus quod omnes fornarii et pistores et alii qui faciunt panem pro vendendo ad minutum vel alio modo pro vendendo in sex miliariorum et quasi solvant et solvere teneantur et debeant pro gabella talis panis lucane gabelle prout soluunt et soluere debent fornarii pistores et alii facientes panem pro vendendo in civitate lucana et intelligatur omnis panis factus pro vendendo qui factus fuerit vel fiet in domibus propriis vel conductis predictorum vel aliiuis eorum vel alio modo eis concessis aut ad eos vel aliquem eorum pertinentibus vel alibi pro eis. Et quod pro dicto pane solui debeat dicta gabella qualibet ebdomada excepto quam pro pane illo qui reduceretur ad vendendum in civitate lucana de quo facere teneantur fiden infra quinque dies officiali dicti proventus per apodixam summendam ad portas civitatis. Et excepto pane quem ipsi fornarii et pistores facerent ad suum et eorum familie usum. Et eadem gabella solvatur de et pro
quam facerint vel fieri fecerint ipsi fornarii et pistores et eorum familie et ali quotiens ab eis peteretur per officiales dicti proventus iurare teneantur de veritate dicenda et cogi possint et debant per officiales gabelle ad requisitionem dictorum officialium ad dictum iuramentum prestandum. Et quod ipsi officialium tenentur et debant singulis quatuor diebus referre et in scriptis dare officiali gabelle ad predicta deputato nomen et prenomen et contratam facientis dictum panem et quantitatem stariorum panis quem fecerit sub dicta pena.

ITem quod quicunque persona vendet in dictis sex miliariis vel quasi oleum ad minutum solvat et solvere teneatur et debant lucane gabelle tantum quantum solueretur pro gabella si mitteretur in civitate lucana pro qualibet libra. Et quod vendere volentes dictum oleum teneantur ante quam ipsum oleum vendere incipient solvere dictam gabellam ad penam dupli ipsius gabelle.

ITem quod omnis panis venalis fiendus in sex miliariis fit et esse debeat eiusdem ponderis et forme prout est et esse debeat panis venalis qui fit in civitate lucana. Et sic officiali vinculi iuramenti facere teneatur.

ITem quod nulla persona que panem fecerit pro vendendo possit vel debeat panem non coctum sive pastam pro vendendo factum vel factam tenere nisi in suo caldano vel iuxta ipsum caldanum ita quod quin rimatores dicti proventus vadunt rimatum pro pane ipsum aperte et clare videre possint ad penam librarum decem pro qualibet contrafaciente et qualibet vice cuius pene quarta pars sit accusatoris vel denunciatoris Et de predictis stetur et credatur relationi duorum officialium dicti proventus fide dignorum cum iuramento.

ITem quod nulla persona que fecerit panem pro vendendo possit ipsum impastare et facere nisi in caldanis consuetis ad penam librarum decem pro qualibet et qualibet vice.

ITem quod quilibet volens facere panem pro vendendo teneatur dare officiali gabelle vel dicti proventus fideiussores de solvendo gabella debita et omnem condemnationem que de eo fieret si reiperetur contra dictum proventum in aliquo deliquisse.

ITem quod omnis fornarii dictorum sex miliariorum et eorum familie teneantur et debant eorum furnos promittere sigillari per officiales dicti proventus quotiens voluerint et eos non desigillare sine licentis dictorum officialium ad penam librarum decem. Et hoc capitulunm [non?] locum habeat in quantum ipsi fornarii denegaretur velle facere panem.

ET si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam dictorum capitulorum cum infrascriptis pactis videlicet quod aliqui officiales lucane civitatis non
prohibebunt vel aliquis eorum non prohibebunt hec prohiberi facient quin fornarii et pistores panem coquant et vendant secundum dictum modum. Et in quantum precederetur propter ad aliquam condemnationem vel gravamina sint nulla et nullius valoris et notarii camere lucani communis illa et illa cassare teneantur. Et non possint propter molestari. Et in quantum prohiberetur dicto emptori quin ipsum gabellam exigat et percipi pro dictum esse prorogetum et prorogata esse intelligatur dicta venditio dicto emptori in tantum tempus quanto duraret ipsa prohibitio seu contra predictam fieret et tanto tempore liceat dicto emptore ultra tempus venditionis ipsum proventum exigere et tenere. Salvo quod si lucanum comune vellet restaurare dictum emptorem pro tempore prohibitionis et restauretur cum effectu dictus emptor non possit dictum proventum tenere ultra tempus sue copere.

ITem quod dictus emptor possit ad predicta constituere officiales oportunos qui sint immunes et exempti ab exercitibus cavalcatis et tractis qui fienter pro lucano comuni solvendo convenientem [f28v] talliam lucane camere ut videbitur dominis antianis.

ITem si contingat fieri exercitum pro lucano comuni durante tempore dicte venditionis et dictus emptor propter danno incurredetur in dicto proventu detur et assignetur idem pro dicto danno de tempore sequenti post terminum venditionis tantum tempus quo restauretur de dicto danno secundum provisionem dominorum antianorum.

ITem quod dictus emptor et sui officiales possint deferri arma offensibilia et defensibilia dum irent pro dicto officio exercendo per loca dictorum sex miliarorum.

[tax on burgs and subburbs]

¶ de proventu burgorum et subburorum

STatuimus et ordinamus quod de omnibus et singulis victualis et rebus et mercantibus que reponuntur et recolliguntur seu discaricantur in burgis et subburgis civitatis lucane de quibus gabellae deberetur si mitterentur in civitatem lucanam solvantur et solvi debeant gabellae ac si mitterentur in dicta civitate lucana exceptis burgis que sunt intra foveos cum in eis exigat gabella sicut ad portas civitatis.

ITem quod pro omnibus et singulis personis dictorum burgorum et subburgorum Etatis annorum quinque vel ab inde supra solvantur et solvi debeat pro gabella panis quem comedunt et rationem stario rum sedecim blave per annum pro qualibet persona libras tres parvorum faciendo rationem singulis sex mensibus ante.

ITem quod quicumque discaricaret seu reponetur in dictis burgis vel subburgis alios mercantias cuiuscumque conditionis existat de quibus non intelligatur victualie teneatur et debeat ipsas mercantias denuntiare et notificare officialis maioris gabelle lucane et eius curie et illas et nomen et prnomen illius in cuius domo eas discaricaverit scribi facere in curia dicte gabelle ipsa die qua discaricaverit vel sequenti sub pena perditionis ipsarum mercantiarum.
I Tem quod talis persona in cuius domo dicte mercantie discaricate et posite fuerint non possit eas permettere exportari nisi de ipsis fuerit primo debita gabelle soluta sub pena solvendi gabelleam pro eis debitam in duplum.

I Tem quod in quantum persona discaricans seu reponens dictas mercantias in dictis burgis et subburgis vel in civitatem lucanam mittere vel ad alias partes transferre seu portare et miserit vel portaverit infra tres dies proximos a die discaricatarum mercantiarum tunc et eo casu de his dicto proventui nullam gabelleam solvere teneatur sed gabelleam debitam pro eis in curia maioris gabelle solvere teneatur.

I Tem quod fornarii dictorum burgorum et subburgorum solvant et solvere teneantur de qualibet boccha fornacis qualibet vice qua cosserit libras duodecim et soldos decem parvorum et a gabella lignorum compurendorum pro tali fornace sint liberi et exempti.

I Tem quod omnes et singule persone facientes ortos paponum in dictis burgis et subburgis vel in comunibus suburbaban teneantur et debeant solvere pro gabella dicto proventui ad rationem soldorum decem et denariorum sex parvorum pro qualibet salma dictorum poponum secundum extimationem fiendum per extimatores ad predicta deputatos.

I Tem quod officiales dicti proventus possint intrare domos et capannas et habitaria dictorum burgorum et subburgorum et rimari et omnibus spectantibus ad gabellam et quod homines et persone dictorum burgorum et subburgorum eorum familie possint cogi ad iurandum de veritate dicenda dictis officialibus de predictis quotiens petierint ab eisdem.

[court tax]

¶ de proventu datie insolutorum et predarum curie potestatis et residui curiarum

S’Tatuimus et ordinamus quod de quolibet insoluto quaruncumque rerum mobilium vel immobiliunm seu nominum quod dabitur seu investietur in curie potestatis lucani vel ex officio vel auctoritate aliquorum consiliorum decretorum vel reformationum stan[f29v]tientorurn seu aliquorum habentium auctoritatem predictam insoluta dandi vel investiendi sive insolutum de iure valeat sive non solui debeant pro qualibet libra insoluti ante quam detur denarii sex per illum ad cuius petitionem datum insolutum salvo quam de insolutis que darentur in curis ordinariis cum ibi solvatur dacia secundum formam statutorum ipsarum curiarum.

I Tem quod de qualibet libra prede que dabitur in dicta curia potestatis solvantur denarii tres illius monete ad quam elevatur preda.

I Tem quod totum residuum curiarum sancti christofori querimoniarum treuguanorum nove iusticie et executorum deveniat ad lucanum comune et intelligatur residuum facta solutione feudorum et salariorum officialium dictarum curiarum et expensarum legiptimarum.
I. Tem quod omnis pene tam legales quam iudiciales et mixte et bampna que imponerentur et fieren vel exigerentur per aliquem officialem dictarum curiarum vel alicuius earum contra contumaces vel delinquentes perveniatur et exigantur ad utilitatem dicti proventus soluti primo predictis salariis et expensis.

II. Tem quod omnes officiales dictarum curiarum teneantur et debeant reddere rationem de introitibus et exitibus dictarum curiarum ad voluntatem et requisitionem maioris sindici lucani comunis vel emptoris dicti proventus.

II. Tem quod notarii dictarum curiarum et curie potestatis teneantur scribere infra quindecim dies omnia acta et in libro ordinato ponere et ratio de predictis videri possit ad ad penam librarum decem pro quolibet et qualibet vice.

II. Tem quod ratio de predictis omnibus videatur et fiat per ratiocinatores lucani comunis finito officio dictorum officialium si vero dictus proventus venderetur possit emptor constituere ratiocinatores ad dictas rationes videndas finito officio officialium ut supra dictum est.

II. Tem quod officiales dictarum curiarum et cui libet earum deposito eorum officio dictum residuum teneantur dare et assignare in camera lucani comunis vel emptori dicti proventus deductis his que deduci debet secundum formam dictorum capitulorum.

[16 shillings for officials' pay]

[f30r] de proventu datie denariorum sedecim per libram soluende de salariis officialium qui non percipiunt eorum salaria a camera lucani comunis

SIatuimus et ordinamus quod quilibet qui habet vel in futurum habebit aliquod officium a comuni lucano vel ab alicuius comitatibus districtus comitatus vel fortie lucane vel ab alicuius gerentibus vel habentibus auctoritatem a lucano comunis vel ab aliqua congregacione hominum vel qualitercumque habuerit officium in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis comitatu districtu et fortia de vel pro quo officio recipiat aliquod salarium sive donum solvat et solvere teneatur et debeat lucane gabelle pro gabella ad rationem denarium sedecem pro qualibet libra dicti salarii sive doni. Et ubi non esset declaratum salarium sive donum quod habere deberet talis officialis iudex et officialis gabelle teneatur et debeat dictum salarium sive donum declarare seu declarari facere inspecta qualitate officii et persone officialis et cuius est officialis. Et omni modo quo melius poterit intra quos officiales intelligatur superstites carcerum et eorum custodes. Et predicta se non extendant vel referantur ad officiales qui recipuerit eorum salarii minus perciuperit pro gabella debita a dicta camera et camerariis nec ad consules vel sindicos contratarum vel brachiorum lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum et comunium lucani comitatus districtus et fortie nec ad aliquem ex comitatuus lucanis habentem aliquid officium a vel in suo comuni proprio unde est vel in quo moratur continue.
I Tem quod omnis et singuli qui dictam solutionem dictorum salariorum facuerit dictis officialibus teneantur et debeant dictam gabellam denariorum sedecim per libram retinere officialibus supradictis et eam solvere lucano comuni ad penam solvendi de suo proprio ipsam gabellam Et salarium sive donum intelligatur perceptum et habitum ex quo fuerit ipsis officialibus statutum declaratum vel provisum per illos ad quod talium officialium electo spectat.

[f30v] ET quelibet comunitas que officialem seu officiales elegerit vel tenuerit debeat ipsos officiales et eorum salaria sive dona denunciare lucane gabelle a die qua officium inceperit ad quindecim dies. Et nullus officialis possit vel debeat se intromittere in aliquo officio nisi prius nominatum eius salarium seu donum per se vel alium denuntiaverit lucane gabelle. Et hoc locum habebant tam in salario et dono debito vel promisso in principio sui officii quam inqualibet augmentatone vel additione salariorum vel doni que fieret durante tali officio.

I Tem quod quelibet comunitas que contra predictam vel aliquod predictorum facerit vel ea non observaret possit et debeat contemptari per maiorem officialem lucane gabelle et contra eam procedi nulla iuris solemnitate servata.

I Tem quod maior officialis gabelle ad cessionum fraudes que committi possent in predictis teneatur et debeat siqua declaratio salariori seu doni non appareret vel in fraudem factam esset ipsam fraudem tollere et salarium sive donum invenire et declarare per libros et scripturas et verisimilitudines prout sibi melius videbitur considerata qualitate officii et persone et consuetudine talis officii Et prout predictum officialem provisum et declaratum fuerit observetur et nichilominus qui fraudem in hoc commiserit vel allegaverit in non dicendo et denunciando integre salarium sive donum condempnetur in quadruplum eius quod solui deberet pro tali salario sive dono.

ET si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam dictorum capitulorum cum pactis et tenoribus infrascriptis quod in hac venditione non veniant nec intelligantur alique terre vel loca que modo non sunt ad obedientiam lucani comunis nec aliqua terra de provinciis vallis nebule.

¶ de proventu ponderis feni palearum et lini

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod de quilbet fasce palearum vel feni qui ponderabitur vel extimabitur solvat venditor dicto [f31r] proventui denarios duos parvorum Et de qualibet salma palearum vel feni denarios quatuor. Et de lino denarium unum parvorum. Et de quibuslibet duabus libris duabus libris stuppe\(^1\) denarium unum parvorum. Et quod deputatur super platea lucani comunis et ecclesie sancti Sentii unus officialis super ponderando et extimando predictam et exigendo dictum proventum qui iuret et teneatur suum officium bene bene et legaliter exercere.

\(^1\) tow, like as not
¶de proventu sigilli mensurarum et ponderum

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus pro qualibet sigillatura vasis de ramine terra vel ligno solvatur et exigatur soldus unus et denarii tres parvorum. Et pro sigillatura cuiuscumque barilis stariorum duorum soldos duos et denarios sex parvorum. Et de sigillatura cuiuslibet vegetis que portatur in curru pro vindemiis = £1 s. 10 parvorum. Et de cannis bilanciis starior solvatur pro sigillo = £ 1 d. 3 parvorum. Et de quolibet marco et pondere = d. 8 parvorum. Et exactiones predictorum fiant et fieri possint in civitati lucana et sex miliaris.

Et si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam dictorum capitulorum et cum pactis inscriptis videlicet quod nulla persona possit sigillare et sigillum apponere vel mutare vel contrafacere nisi dictus emptor et socii vel eius officiales sub pena librarum vigintiquinque pro quolibet sigillo et mensura.

ITem quod omnis et singuli vecturales et ali quicunque deferentes vinum ad vecturam teneantur et debeant facere sigillari eorum barilia in quibus vinum portant infra terminum assignandum per bampnum si ipsa sigillari non fecerint condempnentur per maiorem officialem sindaci in soldis decem parvorum pro quolibet barile.

ITem quod omnia pondera et mensura que invenirentur per officiales [f31v] dicti proventus deputatos ad rimandum pro mensuris non sigillatis non sigillata seu non sigillate sint et esse debeant cambere lucane et dicti emptoris et illorum qui dictas mensuras et pondera non sigillata invenerint per territorium dum modo hec locum habeant nec intelligantur in mensuris et marchis mercatorum nisi secundum consuetudinem de his hactenus observatam.

ITem quod dicte mensure et pondera sigillari possint et debeant semel tantum in anno.

ITem quod dictus emptor et sotii et officiales dicti proventus teneantur et debeant sigillare solummodo iustas mensuras et iusta pondera ad penam librarum decem pro qualibet mensura et quolibet pondere a contrafaciente auferendam cuius condempnationis dimidia sit accusatoris vel denunciatoris.

ITem quod nulla persona possit aliquam vegetem longam pro vectoregiando ponere super curru vel cum ea vectoregiare nisi primo fuerit sigillata sub pena soldorum quadraginta qualibet vice.

ITem quod maior officialis fundaci faciat et facere teneatur et debeat condempnationes de quibuscumque facientibus contra predicta prout in statuto lucani fundaci et in his capitulis continetur.

¶de proventu civium silvestrium
S.Tatuimus et ordinamus quod omnis lucani cives qui morantur in villis in comitatu districtu et forti lucana extra civitatem lucanam burgos et subburgos solvant pro quolibet anno lucane gabelle pro pane vino et oleo pro ipsorum victu quia non solvunt ad portas civitatis ut alii cives lucani habitantes in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis ultra alias gabellas quas solvunt pro qualibet buccha sue familie annorum quinque et ab inde supra libras Tres et soldos duodecim et denarios sex parvorum Et dicta gabella solvat in duabus pagis videlicet singulis sex mensibus Et si aliquis predictorum civium steterit et habitaverit ut dictum est uno mense vel minus nichil solvere teneatur. Et si ultra mensem habitaverit teneatur solvere unam pagam posit tamen iudex et [f32r] maior officialis gabelle providere super pauperibus et miserabilibus personis Et dictam gabbellam minuere eis vel eos in totum absolvere si ei videbitur ad quam gabbellam solvendam cogantur omnis lucani cives habitantes ut dictum est non obstante quod dominus domus luce habitet dumtamen pro uno famulo et una famula quem vel quam teneret ad custodiendum vel laborandum terras vel podere nichil solui debeat. Et predicta locum non habeant vel se referant ad illos lucanos cives qui vadunt in comitatu tempore vindemiarum et ibi morantur per duos menses in anno vel quasi?

ET consules seu sindici comitatum in quibus morantur dicti cives teneant et debeant denuntiare officiali dicti proventus omnis cives habitantes seu morantes in ipsis comitatibus buchas eorum familie infra terminum assignandum per dictum officialem sub pena librarum quinque pro qualibet bucha denunciari omissa. Et ille intelligatur civis lucanus qui solitus est solvere gabellam predictam vel qui reperiretur extimatus vel secatus tanquam civis et soluisse secam vel extimationem comuni lucane.

ET si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendatur secundum formam dictorum capitulorum Cum hac additione quod in venditione non veniat nec intelligatur aliqua terra vel locus que vel qui modo non est ad obedientiam lucani communis.

¶de proventu bestiarum que comodantur ad vecturam

S.Tatuimus et ordinamus quod quolibet persona cuiuscumque conditionis existat que tenet vel tenuerit aliquem equum ronsinum vel ronsinam vel equam vel mulum vel mulam pro mutuando locando dando vel concedendo ad vecturam solvat et solvere teneatur pro gabella quolibet mensis de et pro qualibet dictarum bestiarum soldos sex parvorum. Et teneatur et debat quolibet persona tenens aliquam dictarum bestiarum pro comodando ut dictum est illam denuntiare cum suis pilis et signis officiali dicti proventus ante quam eam locare vel concedere incepit ad penam librarum quinque pro qualibet besta sic non denunciata [f32v] Et consules et sindici contractarum et brachiorum civitatis lucane burgorum et subburgorum et comunium comitatus lucani teneantur denuntiare dicto officiali infra quindecim dies a die qua persona tenere incepit pro locando et concedendo dictas bestias omnes et singulas personas tenentes aliquam dictarum bestiarum pro concedendo ut dictum est ad penam predictam.

ET officialis dicti proventus teneatur et debeat dictas bestias et qualibet earum estimari facere per estimatores equorum stipendiariorum lucani comunis qui estimatores teneantur vinculo iuramenti dictas estimationes facere bene et legaliter secundum valentiam
congruam omni dolo cessante. Et dictus officialis teneatur scribere in actis dicti proventus bestias predictas et earum signa et extimationes. Et in quantum questio oriretur vel esset de vel pro aliqua bestia locata vel concessa ad vecturam inter personam locantem et personam conduceantem cognoscatur et terminetur summarie per maiorem officialem lucane gabelle adhibendo de extimatione talis bestie fidem extimationi facere prout supra dictum est.

¶ de proventu gabelle qualcheriarum et follium fabricarum et serrarum et rotarum ad aquam

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod de qualibet qualcheria seu folle ad conciandum pannos que est vel fuerit in territorio lucano Solvantur et solui debeant pro gabella qualibet anno soldi decem octo parvorum Et de qualibet serra ad aquam ad qualibet anno libras sex parvorum Et de qualibet fabrica ad aquam sive fumo pro ferro conciando libras quinque et soldos octo parvorum quolibet anno Et de qualibet rota ad aquam libre due et soldi quatuordecim parvorum.

ET consules et sindici comunium territorii lucani teneantur et debeant denuntiari officiali dicti proventus omnes et singulos folles qualcherias fabricas furnos serras et rotas predictas [f33r]que sunt vel essent in eorum comitibus et nomina et prenomina domnorum eorum ea tenentium sub pena librarum quinque pro qualibet re de predictia non denuntiata.

¶ de proventu barcharum

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod de qualibet barcha que fuerit in comitatu districtu vel fortia lucana Acta ad portandum plastras et mercationes at transeundem gentes solvatur et solui debeat annuatim lucane gabelle una et soldi sedecim parvorum Et de qualibet barcha dupla solvantur et solui debeant soldi decemotto parvorum Et de qualibet barchetta et nocoro solvatur et solui debeat soldi novem parvorum Et quod officiales gabelle et dictu proventus teneatur et debeat inquirere et investigare tam per consules et sindicos et alios officiales comunium districtus comitatus et fortie lucane in quorum territorio tenentur et solite sunt teneri vel haberi barche et nocore quam alia quacumque via et modo Et cogere dicta comunia et eorum sindicos et officiales ad denunciandum dicip barchas et nocoras et illas habentes vel tenentes et in qua aqua Et dicti consules et officiales sic denuntiare teneantur sub pena dupli eius quod solui deberet pro qualibet barcha seu nocora denuntiari omissa. Et nulla persona possit vel debeat tenere vel teneri facere in aliqua aqua in toto territorio lucano aliquam barcham vel nocoram nisi eam primo denuntiaverit officiali dicti proventus sub dicta pena. Et ad declaratione predictorum illa intelligatur barcha pro qua solui debeant libra una et soldi sedecim que habuit a vigintiquatuor mateis supra quotcumque sint. Et illa intelligatur barcha pro qua solui debeant soldi decemotto que habuerit a duodecim mateis usque in vigintiquatuor. Et illa intelligatur barchetta sive nocora pro qua solui debeant soldi novem que habuerit duodecim mateos et ab inde infra. Et in predicto proventu non veneat vel intelligatur aliqua barcha deputata seu que deputaretur per comune lucanum seu auctoritate lucani comunis in flumine Serchum [f33v] ad transitum seu passagium.
Apud proventu molendinorum

STatuimus et ordinamus quod de quolibet pario macinarum molendinorum que sunt vel essent in flumine Serchii a ponte sancti quirici in sursum solvantur et solui debeant pro gabella quolibet mense libre una et soldi sedecim parvorum.

Et de quolibet pario macinarum molendinorum que sunt seu essent in flumine a dicto ponte infra solvantur et solui debeant pro gabella quolibet mense libre tres et soldi duodecim.

Et de quolibet pario macinarum molendinorum que sunt que sunt vel essent in districtu sex miliariorum vel qui solvantur et solui debeant pro gabella quolibet anno soldi trigintasex.

Et de quolibet pario macinarum molendinorum que sunt que sunt vel essent in territorio lucano extra districtum sex miliariorum solvantur et solui debeant quolibet mense anno pro gabella soldi decemotto.

Et dictas gabellas solvere teneantur molendinarii.

Et consules et officiales et sindici comunium suburbanorum sex miliariorum vel quasi et totius comitatus districtus et fortie lucane Teneantur et debeant denuntiare et in scriptis dare officiali dicti proventus infra terminum per dictum officiale statuendum omnia et singula molendina que essent in confinibus et territorio eorum communium et paria macinarum ipsorum molendinorum et nomina molendinariorum seu tenitorum ipsorum molendinorum sub pena librarum decem pro quolibet contrafacientem qualibet vice. Et pro predictis possint contrafacientes denuntiare et accusare et accusantes et denuntiantes habeant quartam partem denuntiationis conempnationum, et eis credentia teneatur. Et nullus molendinarius vel alia persona possit dicta molendina facere macinari vel in eis pro macinando bladum recipere nisi primo denuntiara fuerint ut supra dictum est ad dictum penam e

Et si contingat vendi dictum proventum vendatur secundum formam dictorum capitulorum cum hoc pacto quod in venditione non veniat in aliqua terra vel locus qui modo non est ad obedientiam lucani comunis.

Apud proventu ortorum

STatuimus et ordinamus quod ortarii et laboratores ortorum infra unum miliare a civitate lucana solvant et solvere teneantur pro gabella singulo anno pro qualibet cultra orti proprii libras duas et soldos quatuordecim parvorum Et pro qualibet cultra orti conducti soldos vigintiseptem. Et dicta soluto fiat in duabus pagis videlicet singulis sex mensibus ante pro dimidia. Et quilibet ortorarius et laborator ortorum dictorum locorum Teneatur et debeat quolibet mense Ianuarii cuiusque anni denuntiare officiali dicti proventus et scribi facere se et mensuram orti quem tenet et laborat et si est proprius vel conductus. Et quicumque sic ut dictum est non denuntiaverit puniatur in soldis centum et in duplo eius
quod solvendum esset pro gabella. Et possit dictus officialis invenire et perquirere veritatem de predictis per consules contratarum et alias bonas personas prout sibi videbitur ita quod dicta gabella non fraudetur.

¶ de proventu pizicuolorum seu triccolorum

S*Tatuimus et ordinamus quod quilbiet piziccuolos seu pizicculoa pollaiolus et pollaiola Triccolus et Triccola qui et que tenet vel tenebit aliquam apothecam vel locum proprium vel stationem vel cabiam super platea lucani comunis ad vendendum vel alibi in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis solvat et solvere teneatur et debeat pro qualibet apotheca statione vel loco continuo vel bancho super quo tenentur fructus vel pro cabbias usque in duas qualibet mense soldos decemotto parvorum. Et non tenentes apothecam vel locum continuum aut stationem solvat pro qualibet curru soldos duos parvorum. Et omnis et singule persone reducentes in civitate lucana et vendentes ad minutum fructus vel olera solvant pro qualibet curru soldos duos parvorum. Et pro qualibet salma denarios sex. et pro quolibet cofino vel iustra denarios tres parvorum. Et predicta que dicta sunt de solvendo pro fructibus non referantur vel intelligantur ad personas venientes interpollatim cum fructibus et eos vendentes super gradibus ecclesie sancti michaelis in foro cum solvant opere dicte ecclesie.

I*Tem de quolibet barile tonnine que vendetur ad minutum ubicumque extra stationem propriam vel conductam solvatur vendens soldos novem parvorum. Et de quolibet centenario ad pondus piscium salitorum solvat soldos novem parvorum.

¶ de usurariis tenentibus banchum vel pannellum in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis et gabella per eos solvenda

S*Tatuimus et ordinamus quod omnes qui mutuant vel mutabunt ad usaram in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis et tenent vel tenebunt banchum ad pannellum solvant et solvere teneantur et debeat pro gabella quolibet anno ad rationem anni videlicet lucanus civis a septuaginta florenis supra pro qualibet cascina et quilibet forensis a centum florenis supra pro qualibet cascina prout videbitur collegio dominorum antianorum lucani comunis habita conducta consideratione exercitii et lucri.

ET quilibet dictorum usurariorum qui mutuabit vel mutuare volet dicto modo in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis teneatur et debeat semel in anno in principio temporis quo volet mutuare dare bonam et ydoneam fideiussionem de salvando pignora sibi pignorata bona fide sine fraude et ea restituendo facta sibi solutione eius quod habere deberet et de solvendo gabellam predictam.

I*Tem quod nullus ex dictis usurariis possit petere vel exigere pro usuris ab aliqua persona ultra denarios otto per libram pro quolibet mense integro et intelligatur mensis dierum triginta.

I*Tem quod solutio dicte gabelle fieri debeat quolibet anno [f35r] in duabus pagis videlicet singulis sex mensis ante pro dimidia.
I. *De usurariis mutuantibus in comitatu districtu vel fortia lucana*

STatuimus et ordinamus quod quilibet personae undecumque sit et cuiuscumque conditionis qui mutuat et mutabit ad nominatas usuras in comitatu districtu vel fortia lucana super pignorisves vel alio modo solvat et solvere teneatur et debeat pro gabella annuatim lucane gabelle a libris vigintiquinque parvorum supra prout et sicut videbitur collegio dominorum lucani communis habita consideratione exercitii et lucri.

ET teneatur quilibet usurarius predictus dare quolibet anno in principio temporis quo mutuare incepit bonam et ydoneam fideiussionem in curia maioris gabelle lucane de salvando et restituendo pignora et solvenda dictam gabellam.

I. *De usurariis mutuantibus in comitatu districtu vel fortia lucana*

[135v] STatuimus et ordinamus quod quilibet persona undecumque sit et cuiuscumque conditionis existat que mutuat vel muhabant ad usuras in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis eiusque comitatu forti et districtu et non tenet bancum vel pannelum solvat et solvere teneatur pro gabella lucane gabelle quolibet anno prout solvit et sovlerete debet quilibet qui mutuat ad banchum vel pannelum.

ET quold maior officialis lucane gabelle vel dictorum proventuum teneatur et debeat inquirere investigare et invenire omnes et singulos usurarios et mutuantes ad usuras de quibus infrascriptis capitulis ut dictum est tam per consules et sindicos contratarum et brachiorum lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum et comunium comitatus districtus et foritie lucane quam per alias personas prout sibi expendies videbitur. Et illi quantum ad hoc intelligentur muautare dicto modo et de dicto numero usurariorum esse quos dictus officialis gabelle vel dictorum proventuum declaraverit.

¶*De gabella solvenda per bancherios et campsores*
S. Tatuimus et ordinamus quod omnes bancherii et cambsores lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum solvant et solvere teneantur et debent annuatim inter omnes libras pro gabella auri et argenti et lapidum pretiosorum et lapidem aliorum que emunt et vendunt que libre distribuantur et distribui debeant inter omnes prout et sic videbitur collegio dominorum antianorum lucani comunis vel cui seu quibus commiserint quam gabellam solvere debeant et cogantur in duabus pagis videlicet in principio singulorum sex mensium pro dimidia.

¶ de proventu hospitatorum

S. Tatuimus et ordinamus quod omnes et singuli hospitatores lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum solvant et solvere [f36r] teneantur et debent quolibet mense lucane gabelle pro gabelle soldos duos parvorum pro quolibet lecto quem tenuerit in domo propria vel conducta pro hospitando exceptis necessariis lectis pro se et familiis suis.

I. Tem quod nulli personne hospitatrici liceat hospitari nisi primo se et numerum lectorum tenuerit quos tenuerit ad usum hospitandi scribi fecerit per officialem dicti proventus sub pena librarum decem pro quolibet contrafaciente.

I. Tem quod officiales gabelle vel dicti proventus teneantur et debent inquirere et invenire de hospitatoribus predictis per consules contratarum et brachiorum lucane civitatis burgorum et subburgorum et per omnem viam et modum de quibus sibi melius videbitur.

¶ de proventu meretricium et modo et forma vendendi dictum proventum

S. Tatuimus et ordinamus quod emptori dicti proventus et quibus ius et partem in et de dicto proventu dederit liceat habere et tenere habitationem et retentionem meretricium et scortum publicum in civitate lucana in loco qui dicitur choiaria ubi hactenus est solitum teneri et ibi per se et quos ponere voluerit ad exactionem dicti proventus ipsum proventum exigere et consequi et habere.

I. Tem quod preter dictum locum non possint in civitate lucana burgis vel subburgis aliquam seu alias meretrices mulieres meretrices tenere vel teneri facere nec ab aliqua muliere extra dictum locum nomine dicti proventus aliquam pecuniam extorquere.

I. Tem quod non possint molestare vel compellere quoquomodo aliquam mulierem vel mulieres cuiuscumque conditionis contra voluntatem ipsius mulieris vel mulierum venire ad standum vel meretricium faciendum in dicto loco nisi de mera ipsius mulieris vel mulierum voluntate procedat.

I. Tem quod nulla meretrix possit ire per civitatem lucanam nisi in diebus sabbati prout continetur in statutis lucani comunis.

[f36v] ¶ de proventu baractarie

S. Tatuimus et ordinamus quod nulla persona possit ludere in civitate lucana burgis vel
subburgis nisi super platea que dicitur sancti michaelis in foro exceptis gradibus ecclesie sancti michaelis predicti ad penam cuilibet ludenti et ludum tenenti in statuto lucani comunis contentam, liceat tamen ad cuilibet posse ludere ad vinum tantum et rappellare in cellariis ubi vinum venditur ad minutum libere et impune absque aliqua malitia videlicet ludendo ad vinum tantum et non paciscendo ad denarios sub dicta pena.

I Tem quod quilibet qui luderet cum malis taxillis possit per emptorem dicti proventus et socios capi et coram domino potestate presentari qui potestas teneatur ipsum in carceribus mitti facere et detineri uno mense et restitui facere illi cui vicisset cum dictis taxillis totum illud quod vicisset eidem.

I Tem quod nullus possit vel debeat per vim seu violentiam tenere aliquem ad ludendum vel aliqui lusori ad ludum aliquos denarios tenere nec devastare tabuleriu nec iniuriam aliquam facere dicto proventui vel dicto emptore vel sotii sub pena librarum decem pro quolibet et qualibet vice cuius pene dimidia sit lucani comunis et alia sit denuntiatoris vel accusatoris.

I Tem quod quilibet lusor teneatur solvere dicto emporte vel sotii baractariam ut consuetum est et quicumque cessaret seu nollet solvere puniatur et condempnetur per dominum potestatem ac si luderet in loco prohibito.

I Tem quod si infra terminum venditionis dicti proventus fieret exercitus generalis quod dictus proventus durante exercitu remaneat lucano comun et reverso exercitu liceat emptori ipsum proventu tenere tanto tempore pro restauro quantum duraverit exercitus. Et intelligatur exercitus generalis quando iret in exercitu unus terserius civitatis lucane vel ab inde supra.

[f37r] I Tem quod dictus emport et sotii non possint vel debeant in dicto loco habere vel tenere aut haberi vel teneri facere aliquam logiam vel claudendam.

I Tem quod dictus emptor et siud officiales et deputati ad exactionem dicti proventus teneantur et debeant domino potestati et eius iudici denuntiare omnis et singulos blasfemantes deum vel beatam virginem mariam vel aliquem sanctum aut sanctam dei in presentia alicuius predictorum infra secundam diem postquam audierit alem blasfemationem sub pena librarum vigintiquinque pro qualibet vice auferenda ei in cuius presentia blasfemation facta foret.

¶de proventu herbe prati lucani comunis

STatuimus et ordinamus quod si vendi contingeret dictum proventum et herbam dicti prati quod coheret a tribus partibus viis publicis et ab alia terre ecclesie sancti pontiani et herbam dicti prati et fenum quod precipi et haberi poterit in seu de ipso prato vendatur usque ad kalendas ottubris tunc proxime futuri cum pactis et tenoribus et modis infrascriptis videlicet quod dictus emport non possit vel debeat per se vel alium cavare vel cavari facere dictum pratum in aliqua parte vel aliquo modo ipsum devastare vel deformare.
I Tem quod dictus emptor per se vel alium sive cui ius et partem dederit non possit tenere vel teneri facere aliquam bestiam ad pascendum in dicto prato sub pena soldorum viginti per qualibet bestia et qualibet vice.

I Tem quod dictus emptor vel habens causam ab eo non possit prohibere vel interdicere aliqui persone infra dictum tempus quin vadat per ipsum pratum et in ipsum seu in ipso prato seu in eo non non mortetur eques vel pedes sed cuilibet persone sit licitum eques et pedes et cum bestia et sine ire et redire in ipsum [f37v] et per ipsum pratum et in eo stare et morari prout et quando et quotiens tali persone placuerit et in eo sedere tripudiare ludere et currere et omne solatium facere pro suo libito voluntatis nulli tamen liceat aliquam bestiam ibi tenere ad pascendum vel herbam dicti prati secare vel secari facere sine licentia emptoris vel lucani comunis in quantum dictus proventus non esset venditus ad penam soldorum decem pro qualibet bestia et qualibet vice et emendatione damni in duplum dati in secatura dicte herbe.

¶ forma venditionis dictorum proventuum

T'Alis syndicus et procurator comunis lucani ad facienda legiitme constitutus de cuius mandato constat publico inrumento manu . . . notarii lucani comunis cancellarii sub anno et cetera. Sindicatus et procuratorio nomine pro dicto comuni lucano cum et de consensus et voluntate dominorum Antianorum lucani comunis numero . . . stantium simul ad collegium in palatio residentie ipsorum dominorum et antianorum vendidit et titulo venditionis dedit et concessit tali . . . presenti ementi et recipiendi pro se et illis quibus partem dare et assignare et concedere voluerit omnem introitum et proventum gabelam commodum et utilitatem camere lucane et comunis lucani qui et que exigi et haberi potest vel debet de tali proventu secundum formam et tenorem infrascriptorum capitulorum et ordinamentorum videlicet: ponantur capitula et pacta et ordinamenta cuiuslibet proventus que vendetur cum infrascriptis capitulis, videlicet ad habendum tenendum exigendum et percipiendum pro tempore unius anni incipiendi die tali Ita quod dictus emptor et quibus partem dederit et sui officiales possit et eis liceat predictum introitum et proventum et commodum et utilitatem exigere et percipere, et sibi habere libere et expedite sicut lucana camera et lucanum comune melius [f38r] posset tam infra dictum tempus quam post per unum annum tans et non ultra de his que dicto temporedeberentur promittens dictus sindicus dicto nomine dicto emptori stipulationi ut dictum est quod nullus officialis lucane civitatis dabat vel prestabit de iure vel de facto dicto emptori vel suis officialibus aliquid obstaculum vel impedimentum quin dictus introitus et proventus libere et expedite possit exigi et haberi per dictum emptorem et suos officiales secundum formam huius venditionis, immo quod omnis et singuli officialis lucane civitatis et maxime iudex et officialis lucane gabelle per se et eorum officiales et nunptios dabunt et prestabunt et dare et prestare teneantur et debeant dicto emptori et suis officialibus auxilium et favorem et fortiam ad predictum introitum et proventum exigendum et habendum integre et cum effectu et cogent summarie et de facto realiter et personaliter omnes et singulos solvere debentes ad solvendum eidem emptori et suis officialibus dictum introitum et proventum.

I Tem quod dictus iudex et maior officialis gabelle teneatur et debeat punire et
condempnare omnes et singulos delinquentes et fraude committentes in predictis et penas et bampna exigere et iuramenta fieri facere quarum penarum quarta pars sit dicti emptoris et alia quarta pars sit denunciatoris seu accusatoris et alie due partes camere lucane.

I Tem quod dictus emptor et quibus partem dederit possint et eis liceat eligere ad predictam exigendam officiales videlicet unum camerarium et unum notarium et duos nunptios qui habeant plenam bailiam et auctoritatem quam et prout habet maior officialis lucane gabelle in exigendo dictum introitum et proventum, qui officiales sint liberi et exempti ab exercitibus andatis chavalcatis et tractis que fierent pro lucano comuni solvendo convenientem talliam [f38v] prout videbitur dominis antianis lucani comunis qui emptor et sui officiales possint in curiis cuiusque officialis comparare pro suo iure dicendo et narrando.

I Tem quod libris et scripturis et actis notarii et officialis dicti proventus pro dicto emporte adhibeatur fides quemadmodum adhiberetur libris et scripturis et actis notarii et officialis dicti proventus pro comuni lucano.

I Tem quod dicto introitu et proventui nulla additio vel diminutio possit fieri vel aliquid addi minui vel mutari sine expressa licentia dicti emptoris et quibus partem dederit et quod dictus emptor et quibus partem dederit non possint vel debant gravari vel coagi ad solvendum vel mutuandum aliquid predicto proventu nisi in terminis contentis in hac venditione et tunc illud solum quod solvere debeat secundum pacta et promissiones huius venditionis.

I Tem quod siqua contrastio oriretur vel essent inter predictum emptorem et quibus partem dederit et aliam aliam personam cognosceatur deffiniatur et terminetur per maiorem officialem gabelle summarie sine strepitu et figura iudicii prout sibi iustum videbitur secundum formam huius venditionis.

Quam quidem venditionem et omnia et singula superscripta et infrascripta dictus sindicus dicto nomine promisit et convenit dicto emptori stipulationi ut dictum est firma et rata habere et tenere contra non facere vel venire potius ea de iure et de facto auctorisize et defendere ab omni persona loco comuni collegio et universitate constituen eum in et de predictis procuratorem et dominum ut in rem suam. Et quam venditionem et alia suprascripta dictus sindicus dicto nomine fecit pro pretio et nomine pretii librarum . . . quod pretium dictus emptor promisit et convenit dicto sindico stipulationi pro comuni lucano solvere camere lucane seu camerario [f39r] dicte camere in duodecim pagis, videlicet singulo mense infra ipsum mensem unam pagam silicet duodecimam partem pretii suprascripti. Et pro predictis omnibus et singulis observandis et dampnis et expensis propertes contingentibus emendandis et restituendis dictus sindicus dicto nomine ex parte et dictus emptor ex alia obligaverunt se se ad invicem, videlicet dictus sindicus dicto emptori se dicto nomine et comune lucanum et dictus emptor dicto sindico se et eius heredes et bona presentia et futura iure pignoris et ypothece ad penam dupli pretii suprascripti qua soluta vel non rata maneat omnia et singula suprascripta, renuntiantes omni legum et iuris et statutorum auxilio et cuilibet alii eis vel alieui eorum contra predicta modo quelibet competenti.
de proventu carcerum lucani comunis

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod exactio dicti proventus fiat secundum modum et ordinem infrascriptum videlicet a quolibet carcerato pro homicidio furto vulnere et alii maleficiis pro introitu et exitu et toto tempore quo ibi steterit de soldis viginti parvorum videlicet dimidia in introitu et alia dimidia in exitu a quolibet carcerato pro testimonio vel officio custodie vel ali et officialis vel correctione vel ludo vel armis vel alio levi excessu de soldis septem parvorum, videlicet dimidia in introitu et alia dimidia in exitu.

Et a quolibet carcerato pro debito de soldis tredecim parvorum videlicet dimidia in introitu et alia dimidia in exitu. Et pro quolibet intesto ab illo cuius petitionem fieret intesimentum de soldis sex parvorum. Et a quolibet carcerato pro levi negotio preter quam de maleficiis et alii de quibus dictum est supra de soldis sex parvorum videlicet dimidia in introitu et alia dimidia in exitu. Et a qualibet femina carcerata fiat similis exactio prout dictum est supra de alii in suo casu et liceat superstite percipere et recipere a quolibet carcerato cui ipse faceret comoditatem extra carceres in loco quo dicitur agio id de quo fuerint in concordia dumtamen soldos duos parvorum pro die qualibet non excedit. Et ultra summas et quantitates predictas nullo modo possit auferri ad penam quintupli pro quolibet et qualibet vice et ad restitutionem eius quod ultra ablatum fuerit. Et maior sindicus teneatur et debeat contra superstites et custodes delinquentes procedere et eos punire et condemnare.

I'Tem statuimus et ordinamus quod dicti carceres debeant esse et teneri divisi in tria loca separata in quorum uno teneantur et ponantur capti et detenti pro enormibus excessibus pro quibus pena corporalis deberet imponi et pro enormibus maleficiis et in alio capti et detenti pro debitis et levibus excessibus et in alio mulieres.

I'Tem quod superstites et custodes non possint vel debeant aliquem detentum in carceribus pro debito vel levi excessu ponere in compedibus ferreis vel ligneis vel inferriare nisi in casu quo talis detentus esset furiosus vel rixas faciens vel verberans aliquem incarceratatem.

I'Tem quod superstites et custodes predicti et aliquis eorum per se vel alium non possint vel debeant aliquem accepere vel auferre de pecunia pane vino victualiiis aut aliiis rebus ad victum et vestitum necessarii que darentur vel mitterentur carceratis vel allicui eorum amore dei et alia causa nec prohibere quin predicta dari et portari possint ut dictum est sub pena librarum decem pro quolibet et qualibet vice.

I'Tem quod superstites et custodes carcerum non possint vel debeant aliquam meretricem voluntarie intrare permettere dictos carceres nisi talis meretric mitteretur ad carceres ex officio allicius officialis sub pena pro qualibet et qualibet [f40r] librarum vigintiquinquque in quibus per lucanum sindicum debeat condempnari.

item quod non permittant in dictis carceribus aliquem seu aliquos ludere ad aliquem ludum prohibition per statuta lucani comunis sub dicta pena.
item quod teneantur et debeant denuntiare et accusare domino potestati vel eius iudici omnes et singulos blasphemantes deum vel sanctos aut sanctas in dictis carceribus infra secundam diem postquam ad ipsorum notitiam et auditum pervenerit sub eadem pena.

item quod dictus sindicus lucani comunis teneatur et debeat bis singulo mense mettere notarium suum ad dictos carceres ad examinandum et inquirendum si contra predicta vel aliquid predictorum fuerit attentari et quos invenerit delinquentes punire et condemnpnare secundum formam dictorum capitulorum ad penam librarum quinquaginta qualibet vice in quibus debeat sindicari.

Et si contingat dictum proventum vendi vendat secundum formam dictorum capitulorum cum modis et tenoribus infrascriptis videlicet quod nullus officialis lucane civitatis possit vel debeat aliquam personam detineri facere vel in cippis vel in domo dicti officialis ultra duos dies.

item quod omnes expense necessarie pro fortificatione et tutela carcerum et carceratorum fiant et fieri debeant expensis lucane cammere.

item quod emptor dicti proventus teneatur et debeat dare bonam et ydoneam cautionem arbitrio dominorum antianorum de et pro custodia dictorum carcerum et carceratorum.

forma venditionis proventuum vicariarum

Talis sindicus et procurator lucani comunis ad hec facienda legitime constitutus de cius mandato constat publico infrascripto manu talis notarii, anno etcetera, sindicus et procuratorio nomine pro communi lucano cum et de consensu et voluntate dominorum antianorum lucani comunis numero . . . stantium simul ad collegium in tali loco vendidit et titulo venditionis dedit et concessit tali presenti ementi et recipients pro se et illis quibus partem dare et concedere et assignare voluerit omnem introitus et proventum gabella ius et utilitatem cammere lucane et comunis lucani qui et que exigi et haber potest vel debet per commune lucanum in tali vicaria de et pro omnibus et singulis de quibus sive de iure sive de facto solui debet gabella comuni lucano sive gabelle comunis lucani secundum formam statutorum et ordinamentorum comunis et gabelle lucane de gabella solvenda in vicariis facientium mensionem et prout in ipsis statutis et ordinamentis continetur, salvoque in hac venditione non veniant nec venire intelligantur gabella alicius sete laborate vel non laborate nec gabella et proventus venditionum et alienationum bonorum immobillum dotium et testamentorum et hereditatum et similibus nec proventus pensionum et livellorum et molendinorum currum et carrectarum, fornicium et fornellorum et corborum qualcheriarum et usurariorum et civium silvestrium cum predicti proventus vendantur luce cum similibus proventibus qui exiguuntur in civitate lucana, Et salvo etiam quod in dicto proventu non veniat vel venire intelligatur gabella ferri laborati quod nullo modo sgbellari possit in aliqua vicaria vel deferri de aliqua vicaria ad extraneas partes, et idem intelligatur et servantur de lignamine laborato et non laborato.
item quod aliqua pecora seu bestiamen sgabellari non possit in aliqua vicaria pro
dererendo vel conducendo ad extraneas partes sine licentia dominorum antianorum lucani
comunis et tunc cum solutione gabelle fienda comuni lucano. ad exigendum
precipiendum et habendum pro tempore unius anni incipiendi die tali, itaque dictus
emptor et quibus partem dederit possint et eis liceat predictam exigere recipere et habere
infra dictum tempus et etiam postea per unum annum tantum de his que dicto tempore
[f41r] debita fuerint, et alia omnia facere sicut lucanum comune et eius officiales melius
possent cum infrascriptis pactis tenoribus et conditionibus quod quelibet persona
undecumque sit que per formam dictorum ordinamentorum solvere tenetur gabbellam ad
ipsam solvendam cogi possit et debeat realiter et personaliter omni exceptione remota.

item quod dictus emptor possit constituere ad predicta exigenda officiales, videlicet unum
notarium unum camerarium et duo numptios et duos famulos et custodes qui sint liberi
et exempti ab exercitibus andatis tractis et cavalcatis qui fient pro comuni lucano
solvendo convenientem talliam eis ordinandam ad voluntatem collegii dominorum
antianorum

item quod quilibet vicarius et officialis deputatus in dicta vicaria teneatur et debeant dare
auxilium et favorem ad deveta custodienda et capeidna cum fuerit requisitus.

item quod committentes fraudem in gabelle predicta et deueta deferentes puniantur et
punir possint et debeant per officiales lucane gabelle secundum formam ordinamentorum
gabelle et fiant condempnations summarie per ipsum officiale gabelle secundum
formam dictorum ordinamentorum verumptamen possit emptor predictus vel eius officialis
ad ipsum proventum exigendum deputatus processus facere contra personas delinquentes
et testes examinare et procedere usque ad sententiam condempnations vel absolutionis
que sententie et condempnations fiende reservetur officiali lucane gabelle predicto et
per ipsum fiant secundum formam dictorum ordinamentorum quarum condempnations
dimidia sit lucane camere et alia dimidia dicti emptoris

item quod siqua questia oriretur vel esset inter dictum emptorem et quibus partem dederit
et aliquam aliam personam cognoscatur [f41v] et terminetur summari per dictum
officiale gabelle prout sibi iustum et equum videbitur.

item quod contra predicta vel aliquid predictorum non possit aliquid cassari mutari vel
irritari addi vel dimiri vel aliquid novitatis fieri in preiudicium dicti emptoris et illorum
quibus partem dederit hoc tamen intellecto salvo et reservato et expresse apposito in hac
venditione quod liceat lucano communi et dominis antianis lucani comunis pro ipso
comuni facere devotum de omnibus victualibet et parte ipsorum et que liceat unicuique
undecunque sit venire ad civitatem lucanam cum quibuscumque mercantiis et rebus sine
alia solutione gabelle fienda in comitatu lucano vel in aliqua vicaria vel in aliqua parte
extra civitatem lucanam unde eis solui debeat gabella in civitate lucana

item quod quicumque extrassert aliquas mercantias vel res de civitate lucana unde fuerit
soluta gabella in civitate lucana possit ipsas mercantias et res portare per totum
comitatum et territorium lucanum sine aliqua solutione gabelle fienda in comitatu et
territorio predicto.

Promittens dictus sindicus dicto nomine dicto emptori stipulat ut dictum est quod comune lucanum et omnis et singuli officiales lucani comunis dabunt et prestabunt eidem emptori et quibus partem dederit et suis officialibus auxilium favorem et fornam ad predictum introitum et proventum exigendum percipiendum et habendum secundum formam ordinamentorum gabelle Et dictam venditionem et omnia et singula superscripta et infrascripta forma et rata habere et tenere et non contrafacere vel venire sed potius inde esset adiutor et defensor ab omni persona comuni collegio et universitate Constituens inde dictum emptorem procuratorem et dominum ut in rem suam itaque in omnibus super dictis succedat in locum ius et privilegium lucani comunis pro tempore superscripto quam venditionem fecit pro pretio et nomine pretii librarum . . . quod pretium dictus emptor promisit et convenit dicto sindico stipulationi pro lucano comuni solvere camere lucane vel camerario dicte camere pro comuni lucano recipienti in duodecim pagis videlicet [f42r] singulo mense infra ipsum mensem unam pagam silicet duodecimam partem pretii suprascripti que omnia singula dicte partes ad invicem et vicissim solemni stipulazione hic inde iuraementa? promiserunt et convenerunt firma et rata habere et tenere et observare et non contrafacere vel veniere per se vel alios sub pena dupli pretii suprascripti qua comissa et soluta vel non predicta omnia in sua maneant firmate Item reficere et restituiere sibi ad invicem omnia dampa et expenses ac interesse litis et extra pro quibus omnibus observandis obligaverunt sibi ad invicem dicte partes sese dicto nomine et eorum bona presentia et futura, renuntiantes omni exceptioni et defensioni eis contra predicta modo quolibet competenti

¶de modo et forma incantandi et vendendi proventus.

STatuimus et ordinamus quod proventus vendendi incantentur et incantari debeant in consilio propterea convocando et detinendo in palatio dominorum antianorum lucani comunis in presentia aliquorum dominorum antianorum et subastatione dentur plus offerentis Et si fuerat proventus iam venditi debeat de eis fieri vendition per unum mensem ante finem ipsius proventus ut cesser error inter veteres emptores et novos et ut ipsi novi emptores possint se preparare pecunia et aliis oportunis nec vitietur propterea venditio facta post mensem et quicumque incantaverit seu obtulerit tempore incantus super aliquo proventu cui ultimo incantus remanserit intelligatur et sit obnexus et abstrictus ad ipsum proventum recipiendum et emendum pro pretio quo incantaverint uno mense proximo a die incantus contando in quantum placuerit predictis dominis antianis que sibi de tali proventu venditio fiat.

Et quicumque emerit aliquem proventum teneatur et debeat prestare bonam et ydoneam cautionem de solvendo pretium dicti proventus secundum formam venditionis ipsius proventus approbatam per approbatores fideiussorum ut moris est.

¶de termino exactionis imponendo in proventibus

STatuimus quod in Exigendo proventus per emptores eorum terminus apponatur prout in formis venditionum dictorum proventuum superius est expressum Et ubi
terminus declaratus non esset intelligatur et sit unius anni a die finiti termini proventus venditi et ab inde in antea non fiat empori vel habenti causam ab eo inde ius sed silientium intelligatur et sit sibi impositum excepto proventu venditionum alienationum dotium et testamentorum cuius exactionis terminus sit duorum annorum finito tempore venditionis ipsius proventus et omne commodum et introitum quod de talibus proventibus a dicto termino in antea consequi et haberi potuit perveniat ad lucanam cameram et comune.

¶ de terris non subiectis iursidictioni lucani comunis non intelligendis in venditionibus proventuum

STatuimus quod in venditione alicuius proventus que tangent comitatum lucanum non intelligatur venire vel comprehensur aliqua terra vel locus que tempore venditionis non esset ad obedientiam lucani comunis

¶ de pignoribus non vendendis nisi certa forma

STatuimus quod nulla pignus possit suppignorari vel vendi ante mensem a die prede facte, Et si contingat vendi vendantur publice ad incantum facta subastatione lucani comunis Et dentur plus offerenti dummodo ante suppignorationem vel venditionem teneatur proventualis elapso mense a die prede notificate persone cuius est pignus quod illud recolligatur infra octo dies. Et elapso dicto termino possint suppignorari et vendi et si plus venderetur substitutur dicte persone cuius est pignus. Et si suppignorarentur non possint suppignorari pro maiori quantitate quam solvere teneretur. Et facta suppignoratione vel venditio notificetur per numptium proventum cui venditum et suppignoratum est et pro quanto predio et qua die infra tertiam diem a die venditionis [f43r] vel suppignorationis persone cuius est pignus ut possit recolligere soluto pretio et expensis legitimitis infra decem dies infra quos possit illud recolligere et empori ipsius teneatur illud restituere facta sibi solutione predicta. Et sub dicta conditione dicta pignora vendantur. Et nullus proventualis vel habens partem in proventu vel eorum officialis vel numptius possit de predictis pignoribus aliqua incantare vel emere ad dictum incantum sub pena librarium decem et restitutionis rei sic empte.

¶ de gabella denario duodecim per libram solvendam per illos qui recipiunt pecuniam a camera lucanum

Statuimus et ordinamus quod quelibet persona que aliquam solutionem recipit a lucano comunis seu eius camera vel aliquo cammerario pro lucano comunis solvat vel minus percipiat ad rationem denarios duodecim pro qualibet libra eius quod recipit seu recipere debet nisi in provisione seu mandatoria solutionis fieri debite aliter caveretur et cammerarius dicte camere et quilbet alias qui solutionem facit pro comunis lucano teneatur et debeat dictam gabelam retinere et minus solvere de summa pecunie quam solvent ad penam solvendi dictam gabelam de suo proprio. Et cancellarii et notarii dominorum antianorum et lucani comunis teneantur et debeant specificare et declarare in electione et litteris electionis cuiusque officialis lucani comunis quod dictam gabelam solvere teneatur seu debeat retineri ad penam solvendi dictam gabelam de suo proprio in
duplum, Et ratiocinatores lucani comunis teneantur et debeant non admictere ad exitum alicuius camerarii vel altius qui solvisset aliquam pecunie quantitatem solutam contra dictam formam sub dicta pena.

¶ de declaratione salme quanti ponderis intelligatur

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod ubi in aliqua parte presentium statutorum sit mentio de salma pannorum vel aliarum rerum intelligatur salma librarum quadringentarum ad pondus et si [f43v] maioris vel minoris ponderis fuerit solvatur gabella ad eandem rationem.

¶ de eo quod permutantes se de uno comuni ad aliud possint eorum massaritias et res portare

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod si aliqua persone de habitantibus in sex miliariis et suburbanis vel quasi se cum sua familia transmutaverit eundo ad habitandum de uno comuni ad aliud de dictis locis possit lectos massaritias et arnenses et pannos veteres et bladum et legumina et vinum et ligna sua permutare de loco unde discesserit ad locum ad quem iverit ad habitandum sine aliqua solutio gabelle tamen cum apodixa maioris officialis gabelle quam dictus officiali concedere possit habendo cautelam ne fraus committi possit.

¶ de eo quod tempore recoltus blava et legumina et vinum et oleum possint portare de uno loco ad alium sine solutione gabelle

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod tempore recoltus blava legumina castanee vinum oleum et olive possint libere de terris et locis ubi recolliguntur per unumquemque cuius sunt et eius familiares redditores famulos et colones et eius vectigales a se conductos portari ad eius domum et locum proprium vel conductum sine aliqua solutione gabelle Et tempus recoltus sic intelligatur videlicet ordei grani fabarum et legumin de mensibus iunii iulii et augusti, milii panichi saggine fagilororum de mensibus augusti septembris et octubris, vini de mensibus septembris et ottubris, castanearum viridum de mensibus septembris et ottubris, olei de mensibus decembris ianuarii et februarii

¶ de mittendo bladum in civitate lucana sine solutione gabelle

S'Tatuimus quod cuique persone sit licitum mittere et mitti facere in civitatem lucanam et burgis granum milium panicum et segale sine aliqua solutione gabelle cum de ipso blado solvatur [f44r] gabella quando portatur ad macinandum.

¶ de officio portonariorum et officialium deputatorum ad porta super exactione gabellarum

S'Tatuimus et ordinamus quod portonarii et officiales deputati ad portas civitatis lucane super exactione gabellarum teneantur et debeant solui facere gabellam ad portas ubi deputati fuerint de omnibus et singulis mercationibus et rebus que mitterentur per ipsas
portas in civitatem lucanam si tales fuerint que ad portas deberent expediri alias illas mittere ad curiam maioris gabelle lucane cum uno ex famulis deputatis ad custodiam gabelle ad portas, et de talibus mercantiis et rebus que mitterentur ad dictam curiam notam et scripturam facere ad portam per quam mitterentur in libro propterea ordinato, Et non pati vel permettere quod dicte mercantie et res aliter mittantur, Et quod nulla persona extrahat de civitate lucana aliquas mercationes vel res de quibus solui debet gabella absque solutione gabelle facta in dicta curia gabelle camerario dicte gabelle de qua solutione constet eisdem per apodixam dicte gabelle vel sine solutione dicte gabelle fienda dictis portonarisis ubi ad eos spectat receptio ipsius gabelle, Et teneantur omnes apodixas predicta concessas pro aliquibus mercationibus et rebus deferendis extra portas delacelare usque ad dimidiam per transversum ut appareat quod res in ea contente extracte fuerint extra portam.

Et omnes denarios quos pro gabella ceperint in cassam gabelle propterea deputatam mittere et ponere statim cum eos ceperint.

Et ex illis nullum expendere aliquo modo nec pati quod expendum.

Et nullum pignus pro gabelle recipere vel pati quod recipiat.

Et non permettere aliquam personam ingredi vel sedere ad bancum ubi exigitur gabella ad penam soldorum centum qualibet vice pro quolibet in quolibet predictorum casuum, quo fuerit contrafactum. Et teneantur etiam non permettere quod aliquia besta pro macellando vel faciendo tabernam vel aliqua quantitas farine mittatur in civitate lucanam nisi per portas ordinatas nec quod aliquid bladum exportetur de civitate lucana ad macinandum nisi per portam ordinatam sub dicta pena cuique delinquenti vice qualibet auferenda, Et non possint vel debeant predicti portonarii et officiales aliquas res sgbellare ad portas pro quibus gabella deberetur a soldis triginta parvorum supra sub dicta pena, Et hoc non extendatur ad vinum nostratum quod mittitur in civitatem lucanam.

¶ de mercantiis et rebus non discaricandis nisi in apotheca gabelle

STatimus quod omnes et singule mercantie et res que mitterentur in civitate lucana que presentari deberent ante curia maioris lucane gabelle discaricari vel deponi non possint nisi in apotheca dicte curie nec duci per aliam viam quam per directam ad dictam curiam ad penam duplic gabelle debite pro talibus mercantiis et rebus et nichilominus discaricans et ducens contra dictam formam puniantur qualibet vice a libris quinque usque in vigintiquinque pro quolibet arbitrio maioris officialis gabelle considerata qualitate et conditione personarum et rei.

¶ de eligendo officiales super deveto

STatuimus quod maior officialis lucane gabelle possit et debeat eligere et constituere in civitate lucana burgis et subburgis et toto territorio lucano officiales et custodes super deveto ne aliquid fiat vel portetur in fraude gabelle prout dominis antianis lucani comunis
videbitur
¶de eo quod facientes contra statuta gabelle possint accusari et de parte danda accusatoribus

[f45r]STatuimus quod quelibet persona que fraudem commiserit in gabelle predicta seu contra statuta gabelle delinquerit possit accusari et accusatoribus credentia teneatur et habeant ipsi accusatories quartam partem pene imposite in dictis statutis nisi in aliqeo capitulo ipsorum statutorum maior pars concederetur.

¶de pena fraudentium gabellam

ET si aliqua persona fraudaverit gabellam vel fraudem gabelle fecerit in mittendo vel mitti faciendo in civitatem lucanam burgos vel subburgos vel in aliquam terram sex miliariorum vel suburbanorum aliquid unde sit solvenda gabella de quod gabellam debitam non solverit puniatur de facto pro quolibet denario que solvere deberet pro tali gabella in soldum unum et ultra usque in libris decem arbitrio maioris officialis gabelle inspecta qualitate et conditione persone et delicti cuius pene tertia pars silicet soldi unius sit captoris et accusatoris.

SI autem dictam gabellam fraudaverit vel fraudem fecerit deferendo vel deferri faciendo extra civitatem lucanam vel eius territorium seu per ipsum territorium non veniendo versus lucam aliquas merclationes vel res de quibus sit solvenda gabella sine solutione debite gabelle vel sine apodixa officialis gabelle ipse mercantie et res et bestie super quibus portarentur res predicte publicentur gabelle lucane et ipso iure publice et confiscare esse intelligantur et sint ubicunque invente fuerint sic portari vel conduci, Salvo quod si res que super bestiiis portarentur essent valoris seu estimationis librarum trium vel ab inde infra bestie non perdentur.

Et ultra penam predictam dicte publicationis portator seu conductor dictarum rerum puniatur per maiorem officiale gabelle usque in libris vigintiquinque ad eius arbitrium inspecta qual[f45v]itante et conditione personarum et delicti quorum rerum et bestiarum seu earum pretiorum si inceptione pervenerint libre triginta vel ab inde infra accusator seu captor habet dimidiam et a libris triginta usque in sexaginta tertiam partem et a libris sexaginta usque in centum quarum partem, Et a libris centum super sextam partem quas summas camerarius dicte gabelle in continenti solvat et assignet accusatoribus vel captoribus sine aliqua provisione fienda.

¶de mercantiis et rebus que portantur et reducuntur infra sex miliariiis.

STatuimus et ordinamus quod de mercantiis rebus que portantur et reducuntur de extra territorium lucanum in comitatu sex miliariorum vel quasi et suburbanorum que non intrabunt in civitatem lucanam burgos vel subburgos solvatur et solui debeat gabella ac si mitterentur in civitate lucana item quod de dictis sex miliariiis et suburbanis mille mercantiis vel res deferri possint ad extraneas partes extra territorium lucanum sine licentia maioris officialis gabelle lucane,
et tunc cum solutione debite gabelle de illis rebus tantum que prohibite non essent extrahi et portari per formam alicuius capituli statutorum.

¶ de rebus que portantur per comitatum predictum

S'Tatuimus que de rebus que portantur et reducuntur per comitatum predictum sex miliariorum et suburbanorum de una terra ad aliam solvatur et solui debeat pro gabelle dimidia eius quod solueretur si mitterentur in civitatem lucanam et tunc cum licentia maioris officialis gabelle et cum solutione dicte gabelle fienda in curia maioris gabelle lucane.

¶ de rebus que portantur de comitatu sex miliariorum et suburbanorum ad vicarias

S'Tatuimus quod de rebus que portantur de comitatu sex milia[m]riorum et suburbanorum ad vicarias sive comunia vicariarum solvatur et solui debeat pro gabelle dimidia eius quod solueretur si extraherentur de civitate lucana et tunc cum licentia maioris officialis gabelle et cum solutione dicte gabelle fienda in curia maioris gabelle lucane et intelligatur de illis rebus tantum que prohibite non essent portari ex forma alicuius statuti vel ordinamenti lucani comunis.

¶ de non extrahendo de civitate lucano aliquid laborerium sete non completum

S'Tatuimus quod nulla persona audeat vel presumat de lucana civitate vel eius districtu seu territorio extrahere vel extrahi facere aliquas sindones albas non concias et celendratas orsorium alicuius sete testorium crudum setam crudam sorianam vel de fregio vel aliud opus sete non factum nec completum nec aliqua supellectilia acta ad texendum aliquid opus sete vel spectantia ad tintoria vel ad celendra seu ad battendum aurum vel argentum seu orpellum vel aliquid aliud actum ad opus sete vel auri vel argentii laborandi ad penam perditionis rerum et bestiarum super quibus portarentur et ultra a libris decem usque in quinquaginta arbitrio maioris officialis gabelle inspecta qualitate delicti et culpe Et conductor ipsarum rerum puniatur de facto eadem pena Et predicta bammiantur singulis sex mensibus ex parte officialis gabele Et quilibet possit contrafacientes accusare et denuntiare et si credentia teneatur.

¶ de eo quod mortella non possit extra territorium lucanum deferri

Et non possit deferri seu extra territorium lucanum portare aliqua quantitas mortelle piste vel in frondibus ad penam perditionis ipsius mortelle et bestie super qua deferretur. Et de hoc officialis gabelle teneatur investigare et inquirere per se et suam familiam et contrafacientes punire ultra predictum in libris quindecim quarum medietas detur accusatori seu denunciatoris et alia dimidia sit lucani comunis.

Post predicta eisdem anno et indicitione die trigesima mensis iulii supra nominati domini

Bartholomaeus forteguerre
Simon de bargha legum doctores
Ludovicus mercati
ser Andreas bellomi
ser Guido honesti
Bectus busolini
Francischus betti et
aluizus balbani

Statutarii supraddicti absente lamberto coluccini eorum collega, ex auctoritate et baylia quam habent a maioris et generali consilio populi et comunis lucani et vigore reservato sibi facere ex bene cognita et provisa utilitate lucani comunis et omni via et modo quibus melius potuerunt pro se ipsis et vice et nomine scripti lamberti eorum college addentes statuto lucane gabelle de novo statuerunt et ordinaverunt

Quod de qualibet salma cuiuscumque mercantie et grasse exceptis de seta et laborerio de sete auro et argentot filato et non filato cuiuscumque maneriei et perulis et lapidibus pretiosis et omni localio et sale et salma cave mercantia conducetur extra territorium lucanum per territorium lucanum per civitatem lucanam et transiret extra dictum territorium per viam de petra sancta vel motrono solvat pro passagio gabelle lucane de qualibet salma = s. 12
Et simili intelligatur de mercantiis et grassa que conducuerentur de extra territorium lucanum per dictas vias eundo ad partes extraneas transeundo per civitatem lucanam.

Et quilibet qui conducet de dictis rebus concessis possit [f47r] ipsas de ipsis exonerare in gabella civitatis lucani ibique dimittere ad eius voluntate et ostendere causa vendendi in dicta gabella, Et illas mittere extra civitatem et territorium lucanum solvendo dictum passagium, Salvo quod si dictas res vel aliquam eamur venderet solvat de illis quas venderet debitam gabellam secundum formam statutorum gabelle

ET nullas de dictis rebus de quibus esset solutum passagium possibilit dimitti in civitate lucana seu eius territorio sub pena perdendi tales res et animalia super quibus deferrretur vel essent, Et ultra etiam ad penam librarum centum infligendum tam ei qui permitteret quam ei qui recipieret, Et quilibet possit denuntiare et accusare contrafacientes Et habeat dimietatem rerum reptarum et condempnationis.

Et predicta vires habere incipient die quintadecima augusti proxima presentis anni nativitatis domini millesimo trecentesimo septuagesimo secundo

Acta et firma fuerunt predicta omnia per superscriptos statutarios luce in palatio dominorum antianorum presentibus ser nicolao ser opizi dombellinghi notario cancellario et francico dati mercatori civibus lucanis testibus ad hec vocatis.
Appendix 2: Tables Relating to Chapter Three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Import to Lucca</th>
<th>Export from Lucca</th>
<th>Import to Lucchesia</th>
<th>Export from Lucchesia</th>
<th>Passage</th>
<th>Transhum.</th>
<th>Subject-Subject</th>
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<td>790</td>
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<td>816</td>
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<td>865</td>
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<td>492</td>
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<td>1397</td>
<td>3348</td>
<td>1784</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>1401</td>
<td>5549</td>
<td>2752</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>812</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>637</td>
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<td>435</td>
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<td>Average</td>
<td>6244</td>
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<td>862</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>546</td>
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Table 3X.1: Annual Entry Count by Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Import to Lucca</th>
<th>Export from Lucca</th>
<th>Import to Lucchesia</th>
<th>Export from Lucchesia</th>
<th>Passage</th>
<th>Transhum.</th>
<th>Subject-Subject</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
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<td>5547.5</td>
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<td>1378</td>
<td>11004.2</td>
<td>5487.5</td>
<td>3421</td>
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<td>454.5</td>
<td>556.7</td>
<td>216.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>4976.4</td>
<td>2018.9</td>
<td>1616.1</td>
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<td>328.6</td>
<td>222.8</td>
<td>624.4</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11084.1</td>
<td>5562.5</td>
<td>2534.7</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>775.3</td>
<td>494.9</td>
<td>1361</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>9421.6</td>
<td>4048.5</td>
<td>2624</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>991.1</td>
<td>395.5</td>
<td>1079.7</td>
<td>187.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2485.8</td>
<td>1612.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>142.6</td>
<td>569.9</td>
<td>307.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9238.6</td>
<td>4205.2</td>
<td>1615.9</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>1508.6</td>
<td>642.1</td>
<td>1132.5</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>6618.8</td>
<td>3416.5</td>
<td>1327.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>766.2</td>
<td>433.7</td>
<td>457.9</td>
<td>171.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8719.5</td>
<td>4369.6</td>
<td>2016.9</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>526.1</td>
<td>817.5</td>
<td>132</td>
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Table 3X.2: Annual Tax Revenue by Activity, in Flori

*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import to Lucca</th>
<th>Export from Lucca</th>
<th>Import to Lucchesia</th>
<th>Export from Lucchesia</th>
<th>Passage</th>
<th>Transhum.</th>
<th>Subject-Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>71.71%</td>
<td>6.43%</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>3.67%</td>
<td>9.04%</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>6.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>47.45%</td>
<td>15.45%</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
<td>5.63%</td>
<td>9.43%</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>17.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>48.18%</td>
<td>20.66%</td>
<td>2.48%</td>
<td>5.23%</td>
<td>12.14%</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
<td>8.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>54.10%</td>
<td>14.09%</td>
<td>2.55%</td>
<td>4.96%</td>
<td>11.26%</td>
<td>2.55%</td>
<td>10.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>49.53%</td>
<td>15.98%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>8.96%</td>
<td>13.67%</td>
<td>2.48%</td>
<td>7.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>53.29%</td>
<td>18.07%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>22.67%</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>49.59%</td>
<td>11.28%</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>16.78%</td>
<td>14.63%</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>59.04%</td>
<td>11.31%</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
<td>9.34%</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
<td>1.72%</td>
<td>7.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>54.03%</td>
<td>13.78%</td>
<td>1.86%</td>
<td>7.32%</td>
<td>12.16%</td>
<td>2.15%</td>
<td>8.72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3X.3: Percentage of Entries by Activity, Annual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import to Lucca</th>
<th>Export from Lucca</th>
<th>Import to Lucchesia</th>
<th>Export from Lucchesia</th>
<th>Passage</th>
<th>Transhum.</th>
<th>Subject-Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>70.18%</td>
<td>4.74%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>6.22%</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
<td>7.74%</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>49.87%</td>
<td>31.09%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>5.85%</td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>5.06%</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>40.57%</td>
<td>32.48%</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>4.48%</td>
<td>12.55%</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>50.18%</td>
<td>22.87%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>6.99%</td>
<td>4.47%</td>
<td>12.28%</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>42.97%</td>
<td>27.85%</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
<td>10.52%</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>11.46%</td>
<td>1.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>48.29%</td>
<td>31.32%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>2.77%</td>
<td>11.07%</td>
<td>5.98%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>45.52%</td>
<td>17.49%</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>16.33%</td>
<td>6.95%</td>
<td>12.26%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>51.62%</td>
<td>20.06%</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>11.58%</td>
<td>6.55%</td>
<td>6.92%</td>
<td>2.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>50.11%</td>
<td>23.13%</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>8.64%</td>
<td>6.03%</td>
<td>9.38%</td>
<td>1.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3X.4: Percentage of Revenue by Activity, Annual

Pisa Valdinievole\(^1\) Florence Genoa\(^2\) Bologna Lombardy Lucchesia Other

---

\(^1\) This category includes Pistoia, Pescia, and the Valdinievole itself.  

\(^2\) 'Genoa' includes Motrone, the Tyrrhenian port.
Table 3X.5: Destinations of Exports from Lucca, Count of Entries with Percentage of Annual Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pisa</th>
<th>Valdinievole</th>
<th>Florence</th>
<th>Genoa</th>
<th>Bologna</th>
<th>Lombardy</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1373</td>
<td>115 (55%)</td>
<td>31 (15%)</td>
<td>36 (17%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>352 (76%)</td>
<td>30 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>54 (12%)</td>
<td>3 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1385</td>
<td>111 (56%)</td>
<td>20 (10%)</td>
<td>51 (26%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>293 (76%)</td>
<td>16 (4%)</td>
<td>53 (14%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>376 (66%)</td>
<td>28 (5%)</td>
<td>45 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>113 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>12 (11%)</td>
<td>18 (18%)</td>
<td>68 (67%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>798 (86%)</td>
<td>4 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>109 (12%)</td>
<td>1 (&gt;1%)</td>
<td>11 (1%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>310 (54%)</td>
<td>11 (2%)</td>
<td>183 (32%)</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>32 (6%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2200</td>
<td>412 (6%)</td>
<td>617 (10%)</td>
<td>353 (5%)</td>
<td>283 (5%)</td>
<td>491 (8%)</td>
<td>1057 (16%)</td>
<td>1052 (16%)</td>
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</table>

Table 3X.6: Destination of Exports from Lucchesia, Count of Entries

<table>
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<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>8.1%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1378</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1387</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1392</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
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</table>

Average
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1373</th>
<th>1378</th>
<th>1387</th>
<th>1392</th>
<th>1397</th>
<th>1401</th>
<th>1410</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
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Table 3X.7: Percentage of Annual Import Records per Month

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Table 3X.9: Percentage of Annual Passage Records per Month

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Table 3X.11: Instances of Categories within Import, Annual Division
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Table 3X.14: Instances of Categories within Subject-Subject, Annual Division
Appendix 3: Texts Related to Chapter Four

Text 1: Wool Statutes, 1382
[CG 8.60-1] [26/2/1382] [Sp]

Magnifici et potentes domini domini Antiani et vexillifer Justitie populi et comunis lucani
In sufficienti numero numero congregati Stantes simul ad collegium luce in palatio
ipsorum solite residentie una cum Andrea de porticu, Johanne beraldi, Bartholomeo
busolini, Jacobo rapondi, Johanne puccini, Nicolao ser pagani, Dino guinigii et
Bonagiunta Simi ex numero duodecim honorabilium civium lucanorum super
conservatione libertatis ac balia lucane civitatis electis et deputatis Item cum Turellino
bonuccii forteguerra forteguerre et lazari guinigii dovaneriis Item una cum Jacobo Ursi
francisco dati piero brilla Jannino Arnolfini Arrige Sandei Bartholomeo bocella ser
Andrea bellomi Nicoloso Bartholomei et Bartholomeo balbani civibus electis et deputatis
ad providendum super artificio lanarum ad dictum consilium invitatis Et ipsi idem cives
vice et nomine suorum collegarum absentium sibi invicem consentientes et autorantes
considerantes ex huiusmodi lanarum artificio non parvum commodum lucane civitati et
civibus resultare si in civitate hac tale exercicium inducatur cum non solum divitibus et
mercatoribus profectum maximum affere videatur sed etiam ipsis egentibus et inopia
pressis ex huiusmodi artificii presidio poterit subveniri. Volentes ergo uti potestate
arbitrio et balia eis per formam consiliorum concessa dato et misso inter eos partito ad
pissides et palloctas ut moris est per me Guidonom de petrasancta notarium infrascriptum
et obtento secreto scrutinio secundum formam statutorum lucane civitatis omni via jure
modo et forma quibus magis et melius potuerunt Infrascripta capitula et omnia et singula
in eis contenta sanxerunt firmaverunt et efficacer roboraverunt et in omnibus et per
omnia prout in eis latius continetur et hodie incipient habere roboris firmitatem.

Primo che ciascuna persona forestieri che venisse ad habitare nelacita di luca et
habitatione facesse neladitta cita per cagione di fare arte di panni di lana e quello che di
quella arte dipendesse o a quella arte apertenesse, e quella arte nelacita di luca facesse gia
libere et abia franchiglia et segurta che a petitione dalcuno forestieri nella ditta cita di luca
o suo territorio non possa essere convenuto ne molestato in persona ne in avere
principalmente ne accessoriamente infra cinque anni prossimi che verranno, epr alcuno
debito contracto fuori de la cita di luca e suo terreno dainde in dirieto con alcuna persona
di qualunque condizione fusse fuori che con citadino o contadino di luca. E similmente
non possa essere convenuto ne molestato per alcune ragioni cedute per forestieri contra
tale forestieri venuto ad habitare come ditto e a petitione dalcuno citadino o contadino di
luca o forestiere habitante in luca a cui le dicte ragioni fussero cedute. Et accio che
chiaramente siano cognosciuti quelli che verranno ad habitare al dicto modo sia tenuto et
debia ciascuno di loro farsi scrivere in dela cancellaria de signori antiani infra uno mese
dal die del suo advenimento, infral quale advenimento e die che si fara scrivere
similmente non possa essere molestato e chi non si facesse scrivere al dicto modo non
sintenda ne possa conseguire el ditto beneficio delaquale scriptura debia rigare lo maestro
che si fara scrivere grossetti tre e lolavorante uno.

Item che li predicti forestieri che venisseno ad habitare nelacita di luca come ditto e
possano e sia loro lícito mettere et far mettere nelacita di luca ogni loro massaritie et
arnesi usati per loro e per loloro famiglie senza alcuno pagamento di gabella durante lo
suscritto termine.

Item che ciascuna persona di qualunque condizione sia possa et a lui sia lícito di qui a
cinque anni prossimi mettere et far mettere ne lacita di luca liberamente senza alcuno
pagamento di gabella ogni massaritia la quale pertenesse a la ditta arte.

[61]
Item che ogni lana di qual condizione sia filata o non filata si possa mettere nelacita di
luca liberamente senza alcuno pagamento di gabelle.

Item che ogni lana si possa mandare fuori delacita di luca inelcontado o per lo contato di
luca e fuori del distrecto di luca per fare filare e rimettere in luca senza alcuno pagamento
di gabella.
Item che ogni lana filata ordita e non ordita si possa cavare fuori di luca e portare nel contado per fare texere panni senza pagare gabella e quella lana o panni fatti di quella rimettere in luca senza pagare gabella si veramente che non faciano fede a portare et aregare per polisa avuta da la gabella.

Item che neuna lana filata si possa mandare ne portare fuori del distretto o territorio di luca a pena di perdere la dicta lana et di fiorino uno per ciascuna libra.

Item che ogni panni di lana lavorato e facto in luca marchiato del marchio a cio deputato si possa e sia lico portare liberamente senza alcuno pagamento di gabella fuori de la cita de luca e del suo territorio con la polisa o licentia delagabella siveramente chel panno sia per mensura canne diece o piu.

E per meglio e piu salutevelmente provedere a questi fatti non si possa infra tre mesi spendere piu che infine in somma di fiorini trecento doro de la somma concedi per artificis necessarii a la dicta arte.

Item che li predicti capitali si debiano fare bandare per la cita di luca una o piu volte come piacera al collegio de signori.

Text 2: Ordinances against Tanners, Butchers, and other trades, 1382
[233] [25/8/1382] [Az]

Magnifici et potentes domini domini [etc.] una cum Corado de podio, Puccinello galganetti, Martino Arnolfini, Nicoloso Bartholomei, et Ugolino scortica civibus electis et deputatis in providendo et ordinando circa artes lucane civitatis putredinem et fetorem inducentes iuxta consilium tentum et celebratum die xii mensis instantis, absente Jacobo Romnghi eorum collega citato amen et requisito ac plurimum expectato. Et ipsi iidem cives una cum prefatis dominis sibi invicem consentientes et autorantes advertentes non nullos artifices lucane civitatis artes suas licet necessarias tamen aspectu orrendas et visu turpes, transgressis usitatis limitibus in stratis et viis publicis operari et facere, ex quo et
civitatis situs fedatur et morbus posset contagiosus faciliter exoriri quid omnino vitandum est volentes sequi arbitrium et baliam dictis dominis et civibus ut premittitur attributum facto dato et missio inter prefatos dominos et cives partito ad pixides et palloctas ut moris est per me guidonem de petrasancta notarium infrascriptum et obtento secreto scrutinio secundum formam statutorum et omni modo via iure et forma quibus magis et melius potuerunt ordinaverunt firmaverunt et sanxerunt infrascriptos ordines et capitula perpetuo duratura videlicet primo:

Che alcuna persona di qualunqua conditione sia non possa ne debia fare, ne fare fare larte de lacoiaaria in lacita di luca se non in lacontrada di sancto Tomoe in li luoghi dove anticamente e usata di farsi cioe dal cantone de lorto di francesco folchini in suso verso sancto Tomoe, Ne possa tenere alcuna botega a la dicta arte diputata di qua da dicti termini cioe da la ruga che vae da San Giorgio a Sancta Giustina in suso verso Sancto Tomoe superscripto. Siandio in ne la dicta ruga non possa ne debia tenere alcuna botega ove la dicta arte sadoperi ne faccia in alcuno modo E quelli che le botteghe anno deladicta arte anno fuori de la dicta ruga oltra lososcritto ordine siano tenuti et debiano quelle de luoghi prohibiti rimuovere et levare di qui a kalende gennaio proximo che mene, sotto la pena infrascripta.

Item che alcuna persona di qualunqua conditione sia non possa ne debia fare alcuno molticio di alcune pelli dalcuna ragione ne istarnare alcuna pellicia in delacita di luca se non in li luoghi conceduti a coiari a potere conciare le pelli loro over lungo lemura di luca come siconprende da porta san donati a porta di borgo solamente alapena infrascritta.

Item che alcuno macellatore non possa ne debia isventrare ne fare isventrare ne voitare alcuno ventre dalcuna bestia se non in letombe accio deputate lequale tombe debiano tenere coperte e debiano ledicte tombe avere lebocche duno braccio per ciascuno quadro e non piu. Et non debiano ne possino li dicti macellatori voitare alcuno strinaccio ne fare voitare ne portare fuori di casa ne di botega alcuna cosa putrida se non sonata la campana del fuoco la sera in fine che suona la campana del die lamaitina, Ne possino gittare alcuna cosa putrida in la strada a la infrascripta pena.
Item che alcuna persona di qualunqua grado sia non possa ne debia ucidere ne fare ucidere ne conciare alcuno porco o porca inlacita di luca in alcuna ruga o strada maestra se non solamente in la ruga di taverna cioe dal ponte a foro a sancta maria in palazo. Et in case casalini et altri luoghi secreti excepto strade mastre et chiassi habitati et usati.

[234] Item che de Taulacciari et scudari se servi lo statuto facto delanno di mille trecento cinquanta due

Item che alcuna persona di qualunqua condizione sia non possa ne debia strugere ne fare strugere alcuna matassa di sene per fare sevo ne tenere in casa overo in botega alcuna stretoia da sevo inlacita di luca se non lungo le mura come comprende da porta san donati a porta di borgo overo dal pozo di coiaria verso san tomeo e verso le mura delacita alapena infrascripta.

Item che neuna persona possa ne debia fare ne far fare alcuna vernice ne alume di feccia indelacita di luca se non in li suscritti luoghi conceduti a strugere lo sevo a la pena infrascripta.

E le suscritte cose e ciaschuno di quelle siano tenuti li dicti coiari macellatori pelliciari taulacciari et altre persone tritte observare come dicto e a pena e sotto pena di liure xxv di buona moneta a chi contrafacesse e per ogni volta e capitolo alquelle contrafaesseno delequali cose lo magiore officiale del fondaco delacita di luca possa e debia fare qua danagione Et a qualunque acusasse sia dato lo quarto de la condannagione et siali tenuto credentia. Et accio che piu diligente mente lodicto officiale stia intento sopra le predicte cose, sia per lo magiore sindico del comune di luca infino del suo officio sindicato se questi capitoli sopradicti ae con diligentia facti servare.

Text 3: Tanners’ Response, 1382

[261] [10/9/1382] [12]
Simili modo et forma super petitionibus infra scripti tenoris videlicet: Dinanti da voi magnifici et potenti signori signori antiani et confalonieri di giustitia del popolo et comune di luca expensi con debita reverentia per parte deli infrascripti coiari maestri di botega citadini di luca dela vostra signoria fidelì servitori che aloro notitia di nuovo e pervenuto come per la vestra signoria et sei citadini sopra dicio eputati e stato ordinato e formato che per la ruga di sangiorgio come tiene dal case de figliuoli pagani diricto verso la casa di san giorgio da calende gennaio che viene inanti non si possa tenere botega ne fare arte di vendere o di conciare coiame in alcino modo il quale ordine et ogni altro che per la vostra signoria sordinasse sono aparechati a obidire et sequitare infine alamorte a vegna che aloro torni grandissimo danno e sconcio per le boteche per alqiaunti del infrascripti inladicta ruga conducte per grandi pigioni et a lunghi termini si come e manifesto, il quale ordine secondo anno sentito e stato facto per relatione fictamente facta a la vostra signoria et a predicti sei citadini sopra cio electi per alquanti coiari per parte di loro e di tutta larte et per alcuno citadino quin vicino mossi non per bene di citadinanza ma solo per propria invidia dicendo che tutti li coiari erano contenti del dicto ordine E che larte putrida delacoaria si facea in la dicta ruga ri che la cita ne venia in grande defecto Et salva laloro riverentia li coiari tutti non fanno mai a parlare ne etiamdio in concordia del dicto ordine ne etiamdio di parlare a predicti citadini ne avoi signori, Ne etiamdio in la dicta ruga mai non si fece concia ne arte putrida di coiame, Ma solamente quine si tenea et tiene et ab antico gia e grandissimo tempo come evidentemente appare se tenuto coiame concio a vendere et increspare, che nessuna puza rende se non quanto fanno li calsolai per la cita et etiamdio meno pero che larte putrida de la concia del coiame si fa dirieto ale loro case presso a lemura dela cita Per le quali cose li dicti infrascritti coiari ricorrono alavostra signoria pregandoni humilimente indegneate nelie predicte cose provere di remedio oportuno che tanto danno non si sostegna per linfrascripti coiari per le pigioni alequali sono obligati e per quelli di chi sono le case considerato che quine non si fa ne fara arte laquale non si potesse fare in piazza et in ogni aloro buono luogo delacita overo altramente provere indegneate come a noi parra sia visto, Pasciutino taluccii, Biagio lieti, Matheo Junte, Vanelli Johanni, Junta Mathei,
Bianco Pelegruccii, Piero Masini, Jacopo Mathei, Domenico tottini, Johanni ser Andree, et Francesco bartoli.

Text 4: Tanners’ Petition, December 1381 (CG 7, p. 629 [2/12/1381])

Item cum querela et petitio sit porrecta magnicentia vestre pro parte coiariorum lucane civitatis in effectu continentem quod pro eo quod coriamini concio in exitu nimie est magna gabella imposta videlicet sxli pisanorum pro quolibet centenario ad pondus forenses indigentes tali coriamine non veniunt ad emendum de illo in vestra civitate sed vadunt pisas non obstante quod hic fiat melior concia quam alicubi in istis partibus. Et pro tanto deseritur et declinat nimis ipsa fieri hic et augmentantur in civitate pisana, et in vestris castris vestri comitatus civitibus et in castra et loca vestri comitatus illis laborantibus et etiam magistris de artis qui hic laborare soliti erant ipsis valentibus suam vitam substantere uni comuni duplex consequitur dampnum unum in ipsa propria gabella coriaminis quia parum exportatur et parum in dicta gabella habetur, ubi si gabella parva esset multum exportaretur et multum inde de gabella haberetur licet parva esset quia tanto plus exportaretur quod restauraret, aliud in omnibus aliis gabellis ordinariis quia ars cresceret et augmentaretur et sic opporpteret multos homines laborantes stare hic et multos qui non sunt venire et redire quibus sic venientibus et redeuntibus et stantibus gabella ordinaria conservantur et augmentantur tunc bene valeant quando civitas bene in habitatoribus est habitata et plena. Et ipsi vestri vices deputati super yntroytibus et officialis gabelle prefatus delicenter habuerint super hiis informatis et deliberatis. Referunt magnificentie vestre quod eis videretur quod dicta gabella exitus dicti coriaminis conci minueretur et reducenda esset ad dimidium eius quod non solvitur, providendo hec ad presens solum pro duobus annis ut materia detur dictis coriariis faciendi bonam conciam et bonum forum et sequatur quid exposuerit et causa detur magnificentie vestra finitis duobus annis hanc diminutionem prorogare vel aliter providere prout celsitudini vestra placuerit.

Text 5: Tanners’ Petition, October 1382 (CG 8, p. 284 [6/10/1382 | 12])
Simili modo et forma super pettieione infrascripti tenoris videlicet. Coram vobis magnificis et potentibus 
dominis dominis antianis et vexillifero justitie populi et comunis lucani reverenter expostur pro parte 
infrascritorum coiariorum vestrorum civium lucanorum pro sese et aliis omnibus coiaris lucane civitatis 
quod coriamini concio in exitu civitatis lucane nimiis est magna gabella imposita videlicet solidos xli unius 
denariusiorum pisanorum pro quolibet centenario ad pondus. Ita quod forenses et comitatini indigentes 
tali coriamine non veniendum ad emendum de illo in vestra civitate sed vadunt pisas non obstante quod hic 
fiat melior concia quam aliqui in ists partibus. Et quia redeuntes de pisis et transeuntes per territorium 
istiud solvunt gabbellam solummodo pro passaggio videlicet solidos xii pro quilibet salma et de isto coriamine 
isto modo multum remanet in vestro comitatu Et etiam vestri de comitatu nunc vadunt Januam ad emendum 
coriamen crudum et ipsum conducunt in vestro comitatu. Et ibi per coiarios luce solitos habitate dictum 
coriamen actatur et venditur. Et pro tanto ipsa ars deseritur et declinat nimiis hic fieri et augmentatur in 
civitate pisana et in vestris castris et comitatini multis ex magistris dictae artis qui hic laborare solebant 
laborantibus in dicta civitate pisanorum et in dictis castris et locis vestri comitatus non valentibus in hac 
vestra civitate suam vitam substantare. unde couni lucano duplex consequitur damnum videlicet unum in 
ipsa propria gabella coriaminis quia parum ex eo exportatur et parum inde de gabella habetur, ubi si gabella 
parva esset multum exportaretur quod restauraret dictam magnam solitam gabbellam in duplum et in 
omnibus aliis gabellis ordinariis quia mercatores de coriamine longiquo crudo hic facerent portari et quia 
hic ars cresceret et augmentaretur. Et sic opporiteret multos homines laborantes hic stare et multos absentes 
dicta de causa venire et redire, quibus sic venientibus et redeuntibus gabelle ordinarie conservarentur et 
augmentarentur. Et tunc bene valent quando civitas habitatoribus est habitata et plena. Quare pro parte 
predictorum infrascritorum coiariorum humiliter supplicatur vestre dominationi quatenus in predictis 
providere dignemini de opportuno remedio ipsas gabellas diminuendo ut vestre dominationi videbitur, Ita 
quod dicta ars que esse solebat in ista civitate membro valde bonum et utile in totum non deseratur. Et 
quod pauci coiarii hic modo laborantes hinc non discedenet vel aliter in predictis providere dignemini ut 
vestre dominationi videbitur fore, infrascritum Pasciutinus Talucci, Johanne Perotti, Johannes Guidelli, 
Blaxius Lieti, Stephanus Pieri, Pelegrinus Lelli coiarii cives lucani. Qua petitione audita et plenius intellecta 
 prefati domini et cives providerunt vestre dominationi quatenus in predictis 

Nomina vero civium predictorum sunt hec videlicet:

Jacobus Ursi, Franciscus Dati, Turellinus Bonucci, Pierus Brilla SP
Janninus Arnolfini Juffredus Cenami, Arrigus Sandei, Bartholomeus Boccella SS
Lazarius Guinigi, Nicolosus Bartholomei, Bonaiunta Simi, Bartholomeus Balbani SM