ASIAN CONSERVATIVES IN CANADA’S PARLIAMENT: A STUDY IN RACE AND GOVERNMENTALITY

by

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This dissertation argues that the political integration of the figure of the Asian Conservative MP has become part of racial governmentality, a part, that is, of how racial minorities are governed. In Canada, official multiculturalism emerged and evolved as the dominant discourse to regulate political heterogeneity. My research finds that the neoliberalization of multicultural discourse as led by the Reform Party of Canada has configured the Asian Conservative member of parliament (MP) as the upwardly-mobile, bootstrap-immigrant, difference-that-integrates into the modern polity. Insofar as multiculturalism as incorporation is a project of assisting racial others into modernity, it requires the utter exclusion of those that have been cast as antithetical to the modern: Indigenous, Black, and working class or poor life. Using a Foucauldian approach to the study of governmentality, the study traces how multiculturalism discourse has given rise to the ideal multicultural subject as necessarily a narrowly imagined Asian Conservative subject. That is, the thesis explores how the Asian Conservative MPs take up the narrowly imagined space of legitimacy that has been carved out for racial others – in which they remain regarded as duplicitous - as conduits to a settler colonial, anti-Black politics.
To suggest that the figure of the Asian Conservative parliamentarian is a paradox presupposes the incommensurability of racial identity and conservative politics. By analyzing their text and talk, particularly their contributions to parliamentary debate on national identity, multiculturalism, and immigration policies, this thesis challenges this supposed incommensurability and investigates how Asian Conservative MPs, particularly since 1997, have contributed to the reproduction of racism in the Canadian context. Paradoxically raced in the name of racelessness, my research finds that the figure of the Asian Conservative MP has become vital to the state’s narrative of progress and tolerance. At the same time, speaking in the name of race, these politicians promote a discourse of integration and lend legitimacy to the project of managing racial populations. The study finds how politicians of colour also have the capacity to uphold the racial order, leave inequities uncontested, and often augment them with renewed vigour.
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Chapter 1

“Asians make no demands on the state”: The Politics of Incorporation on the Racial Landscape

_The multicultural voters who have now been attracted to the Conservative Party... make no demands on government other than those that Conservatives generally make. They may have some racial or linguistic differences, but their location in policy space is very close to other Conservative voters._

- Thomas Flanagan

_Call it assimilation, call it integration, call it adaptation, call it whatever you want: it has to happen._

- Thomas Flanagan

In their campaign leading up to the 2011 Canadian federal election, one particular narrative was heavily circulated by the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). This narrative argued that Canadians described as “multicultural,” despite their racial or linguistic differences, were newly but inherently Conservative. The Conservative brain trust specifically identified this racial population as immigrant “middle-class Asian families in the suburbs” of large Canadian municipalities such as Vancouver and Toronto. Asians were repeatedly praised for their cultural values and as individuals that “make few demands” upon the state (Flanagan 2009b, 315). News and photographs of CPC leaders shaking hands and posing with various Asian business, religious, and community groups contributed to the narrative. Strikingly, the CPC leaders at these so-called “ethnic events” also included Asian Conservative senators and members of parliament (MPs). These Conservative Asian MPs appeared at various events alongside the prime minister and cabinet ministers, sometimes as cabinet ministers themselves. Despite some partisan tensions within Asian Canadian groups, the arrival of Conservative Asian politicians was largely welcome and even celebrated. Indeed, how could the arrival of visible minority parliamentarians not be beneficial to racial populations?

My entry into ethnicity-based organizing happened to coincide with the 2003 merger of the Canadian Alliance and federal Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (PC), which led to the emergence of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) under the leadership of Stephen Harper. The significance of this timing is given new meaning as I write the preface to this thesis

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on political inclusion and racial governmentality. As a member of the Korean Students Association of Canada (KSAC), it was clear that the myth of Canadian multiculturalism and its attendant fictions governed how community leaders imagined belonging in the nation. More often than not, critical engagement with race was replaced with discussion about ethnicity and the problem of identity in another time and in another place. It seemed all too clear: there were those in a category that enacted injustice and in another category, those who suffered injustice. Most of all, it was presumed that being racialized – even if one identified politically as Conservative - meant one espoused a progressive, or social justice-oriented politics. That subjectivity and racial rule operated in much more nuanced ways on the Canadian racial landscape became more clear in 2005 when I became the president of KSAC. As I engaged with other community organization leaders and politicians at various levels of government, several lessons reshaped my understanding of race, representation, governance and resistance and led to nascent questions that shaped this thesis. Chief among these lessons was that being a racialized minority does not guarantee a progressive, social justice-oriented politics.

During my presidency, select community leaders were apparently consulted by the government and thus “we” Korean-Canadians were represented. As more Asian parliamentarians were elected, increasingly they were Conservative. At every turn, there was insistence that so-called radical politics were obsolete because “we” are post-race. While the Conservative government’s narrative about Asians’ supposedly inherent conservative values regarding women, “traditional” families, and equitable state policies was troubling, that Asian Canadian leaders echoed these narratives proved further exasperating. Meanwhile, the new Conservative government began introducing amendments to citizenship and immigration legislation that explicitly profiled racial groups. Indeed, the simple presence of Conservative visible minority parliamentarians did not seem to necessarily serve the interests of visible minority groups nor did it appear that “we” were post-race. As I left the life of ethnic politics, I was faced with questions that have energized this thesis: why have Asian Canadians been identified by the state as desirable “multicultural” political subjects? How have Asian Canadians been included by Canadian right-wing parties? In what ways have Asian Canadian Conservative political figures contributed to Canadian political discourse and to the preservation of the socio-economic order?

In this thesis, I address the question of how to account for visible minority Conservative members of parliament (MP), especially given that Canada’s political parties to the right have
included the Reform Party of Canada, which has been known for attracting racist MPs and policies. The chapters in this thesis address the following questions: How have Asians in Canada moved from being politically excluded to then becoming a politically included subgroup of visible minorities? Who else is on this racial landscape and how has the state regulated these populations as Asian Canadians have been courted by the state? Specifically, how have Canada’s political parties negotiated federal efforts to politically include certain ethnic and visible minority Canadians? How have the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) and their antecedents, the Reform Party of Canada and the Canadian Alliance negotiated these efforts to politically include racialized minorities? How do Asian conservative politicians speak about race, multiculturalism, Canadian identity, and immigration in their parliamentary statements? Specifically, how have their parliamentary statements and contributions influenced political discourse and state policies related to national identity, citizenship and immigration? Given the legacy of race-based political exclusion in Canada – in particular, anti-Asian racism, how have Conservative Asian Canadian politicians participated in the passing of bills that align with these historic exclusionary laws? In other words, how can the paradox of Asian conservatives be made comprehensible? And in what ways has a discourse of inclusion become the new means of racial governance? I explore how it is because of rather than despite their racialized difference that Asians as immigrant others - not Indigenous or Black Canadians - have become desirable multicultural subjects to be politically included under the Harper Conservatives.

The study of Racial Conservatives and the Limited Politics of Incorporation

African-American scholars not limited to Cathy Cohen (2010), Manning Marable (1990), Adolph Reed Jr. (1999), Angela Dillard (2001), Molefi Asante and Ronald Hall (2010), and Cornel West (1988) have examined the rise of Black Conservative officials and the impact of Black political elites in the United States.³ In their studies on accommodation in African American politics, Marable and Reed Jr. have separately traced the figure of the Black conservative elite to the era of Jim Crow and to Booker T. Washington, “the first prominent advocate of black capitalism” as well as Frederick Douglass and former congressman John R. Lynch (Marable 1990, 22; Reed 1999, 26). Marable has described the accommodationists as that

³ This is not to say there has been a singularly critical study of Black conservatives. While some scholars have dismissed Black Republicans as sell-outs (Asante and Hall 2010) others have centred their critique more broadly on the limits of racial authenticity and elite-brokerage politics (Reed 1999).
upwardly mobile class of black petit bourgeoisie that “seeks reforms by cooperation with the white corporate establishment, collaboration with the more conservative elements of the major parties, and an advocacy of private self-help and the development of a minority entrepreneurial strata” (Marable 1990, 22). For Marable and Reed, the “new accommodationists” of the 1980s and 1990s build on this legacy by promoting a notion of “post black politics” wherein political elites employ the discourse of empowerment and the civil rights movement in order to “articulate the interests of sections of the white middle class and corporate interests, rather than the black community” (Marable 1990, 1998; Reed Jr. 1999, 119). That is, even as Black conservatives such as Thomas Sowell and Clarence Pendleton have claimed to represent “a new and unprecedented political tendency which has the potential for becoming dominant within black civil society” they have not taken steps towards substantive social and economic change for the Black working class and poor (Marable 1982a, 35; Reed 1997, 18). According to Joy James, these “post-racial black politicians and the mainstream white voter” stake claim to a pragmatic politics - one that alleges to move “beyond old antagonisms” (James 2010, 27). By delegitimizing radical black politics as divisive, the “black elites redefine racial authenticity: the good black expresses no racial solidarity” (ibid, 27).

Adolph Reed Jr. has explored how this neoliberal politics does nothing to challenge class oppression and the systemic deterioration of Black life in America. Indeed for Reed, the politics of racial advancement has always relied on elite-brokerage and was “organized as a class politics from the beginning” (1999, 49). Reed’s research has investigated the relationship between black electoral success and “the clearly observable intensification of oppression over the 1980s – seen in a worsening of material conditions, a narrowing of life options, increasingly institutionalized marginalization, and an expanding regime of social repression and police terror” (Ibid, 117). Reed has identified three main sources of demobilization on the contemporary political landscape: “(1) political incorporation and its limits, (2) the hegemony of underclass discourse as a frame for discussing racial inequality and poverty, and (3) the left’s failure to think carefully and critically about black politics and how it connects with the role of race in the American

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stratification system” (Reed 1999 118).\(^5\) Most significant for my thesis has been Reed’s observation of the narrowing of “the operative conception of political engagement” to its most passive possibilities as the Black political elite has increasingly attained administrative power in “institutions of global governance, the public apparatus of social management” (ibid 119-121). By narrowing the Black public political forum, state incorporation undercuts “mechanisms of democratic accountability” and the possibility for substantive political discourse on race (ibid 25).

In *Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner Now*, Angela Dillard’s examination of what she calls “multicultural conservatives” has noted how Black conservatives have simply been characterized as a misguided, psychologically dominated, oxymoronic lot rather than “highly complex and nuanced subject positions” (2001, 4). Dillard argues that since the 1970s, “multicultural” conservatives have been adding a distinctive voice to the chorus against affirmative action, bilingual education, immigration, feminism, and an expansive vision of homosexual rights” in an attempt to cleanse the public sphere of “identity politics” and to transform the “status quo” (2001, xvi). Like their white colleagues, these conservatives lament the 1960s as the “destructive generation” and yearn for the golden age of supposed consensus around assimilationist sensibilities “as individuals, as citizens, as Americans” (Ibid, 14). Despite “multicultural conservatives”’ ability to influence American political culture and public policy, Dillard has found that their recognition on the Right “tends to take a highly ghettoized form, bounded by what are regarded as exclusively minority and women’s issues” (Ibid, 3). As in the case of D’Souza, racial conservatives wish to speak, not as ethnic minorities but as individuals. However, “they are constantly forced to concede that the power of their critiques relies heavily on their socially constructed identities… they speak not only as conservatives but, more important, as conservative African Americans, Latinos, women, and homosexuals” (Ibid, 14). As they speak from positions of political authority, these conservatives assert that they are more representative of ethnic communities than their liberal counterparts. What this “position of authority” does is allow white conservatives to “preface potentially racist and sexist remarks with the phrase “as Thomas Sowell says” or “as Linda Chavez says” (Ibid, 20-21). That is, the text

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\(^5\) For a critical exploration of the effects of racial political incorporation and a review of the state of Black American politics in the mid-1990s see Reed Jr. 1999. *Stirrings in the Jug*: specifically, “Chapter 4: Sources of Demobilization in the New Black Political Regime: Incorporation, Ideological Capitulation, and Radical Failure in the Post-Segregation Era“.
and talk of Conservatives of colour easily form a rich archive in the study of political participation, discourse and governmentality.

More importantly, Reed’s research finds how “the troublesome reality of demobilization” has been characterized as mobilization (ibid 118). That is, Black officeholders’ claims “to the positions they occupy in the state apparatus derive ultimately, to varying degrees of course, from the premise that their presence embodies racial interests” (Reed Jr. 1999, 119). By insisting that they are most racially authentic and representative of their fellow Black constituents, the inclusion of “Black officialdom” has constricted the field of political discourse and has resulted in what Reed has called “the long, slow surrender of American liberals” (Reed 2014). For example, neoliberal rationalities have governed discourse about inner city poverty and the enduring American racial hierarchy by focusing on the character or behavior of black people rather than the economic order that thrives on disparities. For Reed, both conservative and liberal versions of underclass rhetoric have moved public debates about poverty and racial stratification “to the private realm of individual values and behavioral” (Reed Jr. 1999, 123). As a result, policymaking privileges bootstrap initiatives and “the moral rehabilitation of the defective underclass” (Reed 1997, 19; 1999, 124). Champions of such self-help rhetoric and anti-statist, colourblind proposals have been “the black conservative crusader” such as Shelby Steele, Clarence Thomas, and Ward Connerly that offer a narrative of “overcoming poverty” against race-based policies such as civil rights, affirmative action, and social assistance (Reed 1997, 18; Reed Jr. 1999, 126). The overcoming narrative that positions Black elites as role models for “poor people in inner cities is a deeply reactionary alternative to demands for redistributive social policy and adequate employment opportunity” (Reed 2009, 14). Reed observes how taking on this position brings notoriety, recognition, and financial rewards. Similarly, Joy James has argued, “no matter how humble his origins, the new black candidate reflects new social stratifications in which class privilege and racial etiquette, in the form of an uncompromised civility towards the mainstream, trump demands for ‘speaking truth to power’” (James 2010, 27).

As such, scholars have argued that modern Black officials including those that identify with the ostensible left such as Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton, William Julius Wilson, Cornel West, Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Louis Farrakhan are more tokens than signs of progress (Reed, Jr. 2012 A35). Insofar as they presume the role of an authentic racial voice without being accountable to any Black constituency, Reed suggests that these figures reprise Booker T.
Washington’s “role as collective racial proxy designated by white elites” (Reed Jr. 1999, 155). Still, Reed specifies that it is a mistake to simply dismiss these figures as “Uncle Toms” or sell-outs: “Their expectations regarding alliance with upper-status whites stemmed most significantly not so much from self-hatred or moral deficiency as from a class-based, race-conscious conviction of their class’s mission for racial stewardship and uplift” (Reed Jr. 1999, 20-21). As such, the arrival of racial politicians has been in many ways more symbolic than a substantive change in policy directions and thus the myth of “fallen barriers are increasingly meaningless” (Reed, Jr. 2012 A35). In spite of this, dominant discourses have tended to sanctify the arrival of racialized political elites, especially the 2008 U.S. presidential election of Barack Obama, as the end of race or the end of Black politics.⁶

Reed and others have observed how liberals and leftists rehearsed the significance of electing a Black American president with “the kind of country we are” on the world stage (Reed 2009, 12-13; Cohen 2012, 23). In that sense, Obama’s election is part of the ideal of postwar racial liberalism wherein the state has advanced a conception of equality without racial reference, that is, a liberal paradox where race is everywhere yet nowhere (Goldberg 1993). Declaring the election of President Obama as the ushering in of a post-racial society “has meant the promotion of a variation of neoliberalism that emphasizes a multi-cultural colorblindness” (Cohen 2012, 23). For those who insist, “Everything has changed,” Reed asks “What exactly and for whom?” (2009, 13). Having followed Obama’s career since his senate campaign in Illinois, Reed does not mince words when he refers to the 44th U.S. president as a neoliberal and a “vacuous opportunist” (2008).⁷ Referring to Obama’s Philadelphia compromise speech, Reed has observed how “Obama gets credit for ‘opening a conversation’ on race, for ‘taking the matter on squarely’. But he doesn't really speak to what we ought to be doing to address the injustices, past and present, that he mentions” (Reed 2008, 15). Cohen has also observed how Obama had strategically spoken about challenges faced by black communities during his election campaign however once in office, “the Obama policy agenda has become decidedly silent on the issues confronting black people” (Cohen 2012, 20). Scholars suggest that Barack Obama was able to sell himself as a centrist, reasonable and progressive voice of black political legitimacy that

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⁷ Also see Adolph Reed Jr.’s: The Perils of Obamamania (2010); Without Justice for All: The New Liberalism and Our Retreat from Racial Equality (2001); Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene (2000)
transcends the left and right by presenting himself as credible and responsible enough to talk about poor Black irresponsibility. That is, in staking a claim to “racial insider” status, Obama has performed a respectable neoliberal Black politics to re-legitimate victim-blaming underclass ideologies. As such, it seems clear that as inequities intensify under neoliberalism, “Obama’s presidency will not mark the end of black politics, but it may mark the end of any space for discussing inequality as a form of injustice” (Reed 2009, 15).

Based on focus groups she conducted with young Black Americans three months after Obama’s election and weeks after his inauguration, Cathy Cohen found that for Black youth and, at times, Latin youth: “race still figures prominently in their lives, shaping where they can live, if and where they work, and how state authorities, such as the police, treat them… their access to full citizenship, in particular the psychological aspects of believing that one belongs to us and is valued in the larger political community” (Cohen 2011, 204). Indeed, Cohen and others have effectively challenged the myth of the post-racial society by showing how “Obama’s election has unleashed an unbridled racism that has not been witnessed in such regularity for some time” (Cohen 2011, 204; Browne and Carrington 2012, 116). Similarly, in her contribution to the 2012 special issue of Qualitative Sociology on Obama and the notion of “post-Black politics,” Michelle Wright has addressed the paradox whereby the election of an African American president has radically declined rather than improved the lives of most African Americans (2012, 238). Like Reed, Wright has asked: “How is it that poor blacks are suffering more than ever under our first black President? (2012, 238). As a critical race Marxist, Reed has critiqued identity politics as a politics of neoliberalism insofar as inclusionary reformist liberal politics are concerned with descriptive representation – or who is in the room - rather than substantive redistribution. Dominant discourses about “blacks’ capacities” as well as simply reducing racial inequities to mere prejudicial attitudes and intolerant tendencies detract from an urgent historical materialist analysis of enduring inequities (Reed 2009, 13). Like Cathy Cohen, Reed has commented on a false dichotomization of class politics and antiracist politics which systemically ignores the most vulnerable in the racial order, that is, poor and working class Black populations (Reed Jr., 2013). Reed emphasizes that his point is not to say that Obama and the black political elite are racially inauthentic but rather that the notion of racial authenticity and representation have precisely worked to consolidate “neoliberalism’s substitution of diversity for equality” (Reed 2009, 15). As such, in the contemporary political realm, “Blackness remains fixed as
negation (of civil society, of prosperity, of law and order, and of patriotism),’’ and thus, ‘‘is to be avoided or disciplined, or in the case of the candidate’s persona, transcended” (James 2010, 27). That is, liberal gestures of incorporation do nothing to challenge the racial violence borne from structures of modernity that imagined Black life as “outside of history” and with “no narrative of progress” (Wright 2012, 241). Similarly, for the Canadian context Rinaldo Walcott has described “the failed initiatives of racial inclusion in a post-civil rights world’ and ‘the inability of institutions to effectively incorporate the experience, histories and thus individual and collective identities of those mostly young Black men and their families into the fabric of the society’, as well as the internalization of socio-institutional and commercial violence” (Walcott cited in Austin 2010, 28).

Bringing a critique of racial capitalism to her study of Korean entrepreneurship in the United States, Tamara Nopper (2011) has challenged the myth of imported immigrant success, which she argues does nothing to dismantle the inequitable social order. Nopper has examined how the sociology of ethnicity as a study of successful immigrant integration has employed notions of “ethnic enclave economy,” “network hiring,” “social capital,” and the “disadvantage thesis” to explain why certain immigrants have higher employment rates and have achieved success as entrepreneurs than others (Nopper 2006, 2010, 2011). She shows how relying on notions of immigrant virtues and values not only detracts from a substantial critique of racial capitalism that has always disproportionately affected Black Americans but that it also amounts to what she calls “new” color-blind racism and what Jared Sexton has called “people-of-color-blind racism” (Sexton 2010). By this, Sexton is referring to “a common refusal to admit to significant differences of structural position born of discrepant histories between blacks and their political allies, actual or potential […] it misunderstands the specificity of antiblackness and presumes or insists upon the monolithic character of victimization under white supremacy” (Sexton 2010, 47-48). Specifically, Sexton (2010) and Nopper (2013) conceptualize non-Black demand for multiracial coalition building as a possible disciplinary gesture against African American and Black radicalism. Nopper (2013) has observed how even critical Asian American scholars have tended to pose uncritical desires for coalition that end up reproducing the modern
eviction of Black life. For instance, Nopper agrees with Prashad’s theorization of the model minority myth, which positions Asian Americans as:

the perpetual solution to what is seen as the crisis of black America… a weapon in the war against black America […] what many perceive to be “natural” model minority characteristics predisposing Asian Americans to social mobility are actually the result of “state selection, whereby the United States, through the special skills provision in the 1965 Immigration Act, fundamentally configured the demography of Indian America…Those who hold power in the United States use the anomalous demographic of professional desis to show that we succeed while other minorities fail (Prashad in Nopper 2013).

Reed has also commented on how mass immigration implicates immigrants in America’s race problem as immigrants to the United States “not only take possession of American dreams and ideals, but they also acquire some heavy baggage: moral and political responsibility for the vestiges of slavery” (2006, 59-61). In this way, scholars emphasize the importance of recognizing how even seemingly progressive desires possibly reproduce power structures that they claim to undo.

Of the Canadian context, scholars such as Barrington Walker, Dionne Brand, Patricia Monture, Leanne Simpson, David Austin, Glen Coulthard and Taiaiake Alfred have leveled critiques against the politics of recognition. In his examination of the historical mythologies in contemporary Quebec and Canada, Austin observes how “despite their longstanding presence in the country, Canadian Blacks, who are scattered across the country but with large populations in Toronto, Montreal and Halifax, are consistently relegated to the category of immigrant newcomers” (Austin 2010, 21). With reference to historian Afua Cooper’s research, Austin emphasizes how the history of slavery in Canada has been a “well-kept secret” owing to dominant narratives of Canadian innocence and benevolence namely, of the Underground Railroad, “which projects Canada as a haven for Black slaves fleeing US bondage” (Austin 2010, 27). Canadian historian Barrington Walker argues that, “far too much Black Canadian historiography deals with elites while ignoring those who lived at the bottom or on the margins of the social order” (Walker 2010, 7). In his examination of Black defendants in Ontario’s criminal courts from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, Walker has found that even while slavery in Canada was abolished in 1833 and by the 1920s “was virtually dead as

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an institution,” anti-Black discrimination remained. Walker finds that even while Black Canadians were positioned as outsiders, they were also “imagined in ways that made them central to ideals of British Canadian nationhood. When commentators spoke of Black infantilism and thus the necessity of showing mercy towards a member of a ‘childlike race,’ or when mob justice and lynching were deemed ‘unBritish,’ blackness was clearly helping to shape a White Canadian identity through the use of racialized discourse” (Walker 2010, 21). Of Black life in the Canadian racial liberal order, Walker proposes:

> From the early nineteenth century until the post-Second World War era, blacks in Canada lived in a state of paradox, caught between formal legality and deeply entrenched societal and economic inequality. Their experiences were shaped by the expression of ‘race’ in a racial liberal order which granted them full legal equality and the rights of citizenship but nonetheless legally supported racial discriminatory behaviour against them (Walker 2010, 3).

With reference to David Sealy’s research, Walker describes how through slavery “blackness was quite literally a product of the law, the dark side of modernity” (Walker 2010, 6). And even though the 1960s and 1970s brought “the era of civil rights, changes in immigration policy, and official multiculturalism,” true equality is “still very much an unfinished revolution” (Walker 2010, 6).

Each chapter in this thesis further highlights how this era of rights, open immigration policy and official multiculturalism has unevenly affected racial populations in Canada. Indeed, as Walker has observed, “racial formations often lurk within ostensibly ‘progressive’ political agendas as well” (Walker 2010, 10). For instance, as it will be addressed in chapter 3, while Canada elected its first Asian Member of Parliament and passed the Canadian bill of rights, the city of Halifax evicted the Black residents of Africville. Jennifer Nelson has argued that the dislocation of Africville residents is part of an ongoing process of “eviction, suppression, and denial” and “the means by which Black residents of the province came to form the community of Africville must be regarded in the context of a history of the displacement and enslavement of Black people by whites in North America … a worldview that demanded their containment and denial” (Nelson 2002, 212-214). That is, as the political integration of Asians was beginning to become imaginable in Canada, what remained was “the inconceivability to a racist society of an

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enduring communal Black presence” (Nelson 2002, 213). In this way, the thesis explores how the Asian conservative figure makes the case for the eviction of Black and Indigenous life. That is, every time there is an Asian claim for inclusion something else on the racial landscape is being given context. For example, in her study of Africville, Jennifer Nelson (2008) has observed who never gets incorporated and is never attended to (Chapter 3). Also, the Lewis Report (1992) highlighted systemic anti-Black racism in Ontario as a stark contradiction to neoliberal rationalities, which insisted that racial inequities had been neutralized (Chapter 4).

Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) has insisted that difference in the nation demands a “politics of recognition”. In this liberal multicultural formulation, citizenship becomes the proposed state-centred program of community to regulate difference in the nation and which diverts attention from decolonization. Against the limits of Taylor’s formulation and of the Australian context, Elizabeth Povinelli has examined how “state, public and capital multicultural discourses” have appropriated resistance against the modern liberal state and have repackaged these struggles as “moments in which the future of the nation and its core institutions and values are ensured rather than shaken” (2002, 29). Drawing on Hegel’s account of the cunning and brutality of reason in The Philosophy of History, Povinelli is interested in how “late liberalism ideology works through the passions of recognition, tries to develop its worth without subjecting itself to the throes of contestation and opposition” (2002, 17). In The Cunning of Recognition: Australian Multiculturalism and the crisis of Indigenous citizenship (2002), Povinelli “ask[s] how national pageants of shameful repentance and celebrations of new recognition of subaltern worth remain inflected by the conditional (as long as they are not repugnant; that is, as long as they are not, at heart, not-us and as long as real economic resources are not at stake” (ibid 17). That is, Povinelli discusses a key limit of recognition as a haunting “invisible asterisk, a proviso” that “interprets specific instance of cultural practices and indexes where public reason no longer applies”; that is, the condition that [they] are not so repugnant - a state recognition that requires that the native/ the other preserves the skeletal structure of state law (ibid 12). As such, Povinelli suggests that “before we can develop a “critical theory of recognition,” or a politics of distribution and capabilities, we need to understand better the cunning of recognition; its intercalation of the politics of culture with the culture of capital. We need to puzzle over a simple question: What is the nation recognizing, capital commodifying, and the court trying to save from the breach of history when difference is recognized?” (ibid 16-17 emphasis added).
Of the Australian context, Elizabeth Povinelli has observed how beginning in the 1970s, “Australian business leaders discovered that [...] The Asia-Pacific was not simply a new site of capital accumulation but an innovator in new forms of social and capital organization” (ibid 20). Referring to former prime Minister Paul Keating’s assertion of Australia as a multicultural nation in Asia and his famous declaration: “I am Asian”, Povinelli asks the important question: “Although Australia may have needed the strong economies of Asia, did the identification with Asia, or as Asians, cross the discursively thin line preserving European culture and its political and social institutions at the nation’s core?” (ibid 21). To borrow from Povinelli’s examination of indigenous life in Australia, even as “Asian” and other racial identifications in the Canadian context were “unhinged from their previous social referent[s], [they were] also resituated within a complex field of national and international civil and human rights standards of acceptable and unacceptable social and cultural difference” (ibid 24).

Political scientist Glen Coulthard has also remarked on the contradictions of this post-war era of racial liberalism. Coulthard traces the emergence of a new regime of racial order to 1969 as “the modus operandi of colonial power relations in Canada shift[ed] from a more or less unconcealed structure of domination to a form of colonial governance that works through the medium of state recognition and accommodation” (Coulthard 2014, 25). Notably, these changes remain “structurally oriented around achieving the same power effect it sought in the pre-1969 period: the dispossession of Indigenous peoples” (ibid 25). Indeed, Indigenous scholars have also addressed the limits of negotiating with the state for inclusion and have proposed the rejection of the “colonial politics of recognition” which serve the interests of settler-colonial rule. ¹⁰ For instance, Leanne Simpson’s *Lighting the Eighth Fire: The Liberation, Resurgence and Protection of Indigenous Nations* (2008) is “a direct challenge to the hegemony of the politics of recognition” (Simpson 2008, 16). Elsewhere, Patricia Monture has insisted that reforming the Indian Act would do little to secure any substantive change for Indigenous people. She observed: “The current governance proposal relies on a divide and conquer mentality that pits men against women and pits elected Aboriginal leaders against the people. I see this as more of the same colonial manoeuvering that First Nations people have endured since the passage of the first

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legislation that attempted to assimilate Indian people over a century ago” (Monture 2002, 21). Similarly, in *Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto* (2009), political scientist Taiaiake Alfred lodges a critique against “Native Political Elites” (Alfred 2009, 51) including former Assembly of First Nations head Ovide Mercredi and his successor Phil Fontaine for “further standing with Canadian police agencies and government officials to publicly denounce community-based activists” (Alfred 2009, 55). Alfred has observed how “Most of those who possess authority delegated by the Canadian or United States government are less leaders (with apologies to the rare exceptions) than tools of the state. This does not necessarily mean they are total sellouts. Some are simply blind to the reality of their co-optation; others, however, are complicit in the political subjugation of legitimate leaders” (Alfred 2009, 51). Such critiques of “the corporate model that forms the basis of so-called leadership” (Alfred 2009, 113) seek to problematize “the increasingly commonplace assumption that the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state can be reconciled via a liberal politics of recognition” and “settler-state sovereignty via the accommodation of Indigenous identity-related claims through the negotiation of settlements over issues such as land, economic development, and self-government” (Coulthard 2014, 151). Similarly, Povinelli has observed how multicultural domination inspires “subaltern and minority subjects to identify with the impossible object of an authentic self-identity [...] As the nation stretches out its hands to ancient Aboriginal laws (as long as they are not “repugnant”), indigenous subjects are called on to perform an authentic difference in exchange for the good feelings of the nation and the reparative legislation of the state” (2002, 6).

I bring necessary attention to the intellectual labour of Black and Indigenous scholars that have long-since examined the limits of inclusionary politics and reform not because I consider the experiences of Black life, Indigenous life, and Asian life comparable but because these intellectual archives have provided the scrupulous examination of the politics of recognition as part of modernity’s enduring configuration of settler colonial, anti-Black racial violence. That is, these scholars offer frameworks that move away from preoccupation with isolated group experiences toward one that considers how global configurations of racial capitalism have shaped all of our lives on the racial landscape “with radically incommensurate effects” (Sexton 2015, 166). It is through modernity’s configurations, what Saidya Hartman (2007) has called “a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago” (6) - at various
points also called liberalism, neoliberalism, or multiculturalism – that racial bodies have been coordinated into their various places on the social hierarchy. In other words, as this thesis specifically aims to challenge the political turns where Conservative Asian-Canadian political presence has been equated with the idea of racial progress, its greater aim is to draw attention to how this figure emerges as part of an enduring global stratified political landscape.

Examining the political inclusion of Asian-Canadian Conservatives as part of racial governmentality means paying critical attention to who else is on this racial landscape. African-American scholars not limited to Cohen, Marable, Dillard, and Reed, Jr. have argued that Black political elites have become emblems of racial success on the backs of working class and poor Blacks. Indigenous scholars have also addressed the limits of negotiating with the state for inclusion and have proposed the rejection of the “colonial politics of recognition” which serve the interests of settler-colonial rule (Simpson 2008; Alfred 2009; Coulthard 2014; Povinelli 2002). These scholars have also considered how racialized people are implicated in the reproduction of racial hierarchies. For instance, neither Patrick Brazeau nor Don Meredith – as Harper’s notable senate appointments – have sought to substantively represent Indigenous or Black constituents but notably, their place in the Harper Conservative administration was never secure. My thesis is situated within this research that confronts the politics of inclusion as part of the structures of modernity that has been constituted through the casting out of Black and Indigenous populations. It is in great part from these intellectual archives that I draw a critical race framework for examining Conservative Asian parliamentarians.

In this chapter’s epigraph, top Conservative strategist, Thomas Flanagan’s statements effectively capture the ethos of the new regime of racial management in Canadian politics. The political incorporation of Asian-Canadian Conservatives as figures representing cultural difference, immigrant bootstrap individualism, upward mobility, and neoliberal subjectivity allows the state to avoid substantively or critically engaging with race or class; this incorporation does not rupture any political categories. Indeed, such a configuration re-energizes Flanagan’s conviction that Indigenous populations are uncivilized, wasteful and unassimilable. That is, the inclusion of Asians as difference-that-integrates precludes the state from any meaningful discourse about racial and class inequities and forestalls any substantial political engagement

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11 See chapter 4 of this thesis for a closer analysis of Flanagan’s role in the racial realignment of the Canadian party politics
with ongoing white settler-colonialism and “the afterlife of slavery” (Hartman 2007, 6). For example, Austin has observed how in 2009, Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper was able to declare “that Canada has no history of colonialism” (Austin 2010, 21). In Canada, official multiculturalism emerged and evolved as the dominant discourse to regulate political heterogeneity. For example, the argument that Asians make few demands is only possible because Indigenous and Black Canadians have been imagined as populations that make far too many demands on the state. Not only does multiculturalism discourse gives rise to the good and bad multicultural subject (Mamdani 2004; Razack 1999), insofar as multiculturalism as incorporation is a project of assisting racial others into modernity, it requires the utter exclusion of those that have been cast as antithetical to the modern: Indigenous, Black, and working class or poor life. In this sense, the thesis explores how multiculturalism discourse has been critical to furthering the white settler state’s ongoing regulation of heterogeneity as it continuously dispossesses and categorically excludes Indigenous and Black populations. Thus, this thesis traces how multiculturalism discourse has given rise to the ideal multicultural subject as necessarily a narrowly imagined Asian Conservative subject. Specifically, power arrangements under the Harper Conservatives’ left very little space for the advocate of colour. For Reed, the privileging of elite-brokerage politics has limited the “range of claims on the policy agenda” as well as “the boundaries of the politically reasonable” and thus preserves the existing regime of power and hierarchy (Reed Jr. 1999, 121). As theorized by Reed, political incorporation has been a source of demobilization as it facilitates the narrowing of the place where racialized political officials can stand on the contemporary political terrain; that is, the narrow range of admissible political performances does not easily include the performance of advocacy.

Scripted in the dominant narrative as both ideal neoliberal difference and as perpetual foreigners, Asian Canadians have been well positioned to be the sell-outs however, not all have been. Among those that have been excluded - as Asian Conservatives have been included - are working-class and poor Asians, as well as those categorized as “foreign criminals” and organizations committed to a critique of capitalist incorporation that leave the social order unchallenged. These are groups and strata of Asians that have not been consulted by the Harper Conservatives and that do not appear in Conservative campaign materials. Yet, the Asian Conservative MPs have claimed to speak on behalf of all Asians as the supposedly authentic and representative voice for the majority. Asian Conservative elites give the impression that Asians
are a singular and homogenous class where all Asians are upwardly mobile, bootstrap-immigrant sell-outs eager to exploit the racial hierarchy. Here, I want to emphasize that it is a particular kind of Asian – as the upwardly mobile, bootstrap-immigrant elite Conservative - that has been necessary to the new regime of racial management.

The parliamentary text and talk that I have closely examined for the following chapters show how Asian elites have been incorporated and have participated in Canadian political discourse. In showing how Asian conservatives play their role, we are able to see the inner workings of the racial structure of governance. As a class-skewed program, neoliberal multiculturalism has relied on the personal narratives of Asian Conservative elites to legitimize and execute its race-based, government-supported disinvestment in racial populations. However, playing the role of racially authentic representative and role model for the underclass does not guarantee the Asian Conservative official security within the regime. That is, the thesis illustrates how even as Asian political elites are invited into public office and prove their loyalties to the state, they continue to be regarded as duplicitous. Indeed, in several cases these MPs have been all too easily discarded once they served their purpose. That is, the thesis explores how the Asian Conservative MPs take up the narrowly imagined and confined space of legitimacy that has been carved out for racial others – in which they remain regarded as duplicitous - as conduits to a settler colonial, anti-Black politics. Such a space is necessarily one full of contradiction and as I explore in the following pages, we can never be sure that the Asian conservative is always and only simply a conduit to a settler colonial, anti-Black politics. For instance, examined in chapter 3, as the first Asian Conservative MP, Douglas Jung entered into parliament as a symbol for the end of a period of de jure exclusion. And unlike those that come after him, Jung negotiated a political terrain unrestricted by an official multiculturalism discourse. In this position and on this landscape, Jung was able to perform the role of advocate for a racial population that had endured state violence and also participated in establishing the Canadian bill of rights. Jung’s example shows how Asians who get race on the political agenda are not simply sell-outs. As chapter 3 shows, Jung’s arrival as a body of colour does disrupt the otherwise all white landscape. As a contemporary example, Calgary mayor Naheed Nenshi has also disrupted the landscape in ways
that the Asian MPs in this study necessary do not.\textsuperscript{12} This is to say that even while incorporation narrows the range of admissible political performances, which does not \textit{easily} include the performance of advocacy, this does not mean that this space is without negotiation.

The study of Asian Canadian political figures

The role and influence of Asian Canadian parliamentarians and in particular Asian Canadian Conservative MPs on Canadian political discourse and federal legislation has been under-examined. The study of Asian political figures is virtually absent in the relatively nascent field of Asian Canadian studies.\textsuperscript{13} The question of racial inclusion and representation in Canadian parliament is a relatively recent area of study in political science (Stasiulis and Abu Laban 1991; Black 2013; Bird 2011; Andrew, Biles, Siemiatycki, and Tolley, 2008; Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2002). As part of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, also known as the Lortie Commission, twenty-three volumes of research were published including a volume dedicated to Ethnocultural Groups and Visible Minorities in Canadian Politics: the Question of Access (1991). Edited by Kathy Meyger, this volume consists of three original studies by Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, Pelletier, and Simard, which investigated the state of ethnic and racial representation in Canadian politics. More recently, in an edited volume examining political “representative democracy” in various cities across Canada and at various levels of government, Andrew et al. (2008) have argued that the study of the representation of immigrants, visible minorities, and women is highly relevant to Canadian political identity and legitimacy and yet has been relatively unstudied. More recently, scholars of political science have recognized the study of minorities in political spaces as a key subfield of the discipline. In


sociology, the question of ethnic and visible minority political participation has been found within studies examining the broader question of minority educational, cultural, social and economic inclusion and integration in Canada (Reitz 2001; Reitz and Sklar 1997; Li 1988; Satzwich 1992).

Canadian historian, Henry Yu has argued, “the delayed entry of Asian Canadians into formal electoral politics in Canada might have profound consequences for their political engagement” (Yu 2009, 1022). He also says that Asian Canadians’ “impact on municipal politics has been much greater than at the provincial and federal levels, and yet even at the municipal level the number of elected officials who are Asian Canadian has remained limited” (Ibid 1023). Like Yu, political scientists have tended to argue that “municipal and provincial politics might appeal more to minority groups because these levels of governments deal more directly with issues affecting their lives” (Trimble and Arscott 2003 in Bloemraad 2008, 59). Irene Bloemraad’s research however, works against this presumption as she finds that “the greatest gender, visible minority, and immigrant representation among members of federal Parliament” (2008, 59). Also, Asian leaders have played key governmental roles in Canada at the federal level since the late 1950s and many of them have been Conservative. To name a few, Douglas Jung, a Progressive Conservative in British Columbia, became the first Asian Canadian Member of Parliament serving from 1957-1962 and in 1988 David Lam became Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia on the advice of Prime Minister Mulroney. In 2009, Prime Minister Harper appointed Yonah Martin-Kim a senator.

Of course, despite these better-known cases, the numbers of Asian Canadian elected officials remain disproportional to their population and thus there remains a lack in statistical and substantive representation (Pitkin 1967). In her widely cited The Concept of Representation, American political theorist Hannah Pitkin has differentiated descriptive (also proportional or statistical) representation from substantive representation where descriptive representation occurs when the number of minority representatives in parliament is proportional to their population and where substantive representation refers to political representation of “minority-related” policy issues including immigration and employment equity. In one study, Matheson (2005) has found that South Asian politicians in the Toronto suburbs of Mississauga and Brampton – in particular, Sikh Canadians have electorally fared better than Aboriginal, Black, and Chinese Canadians by attaining one of the highest levels of visible minority political representation in the House of
Commons. Punjabi has even been declared the fourth language of the House (Rana 2004). Matheson attributes South Asian Canadians’ political success to “favourable suburban political opportunity structure, including dense residential concentrations, strong socio-economic status and acculturation variables, and lower incumbency rates” (Matheson 2005, 1). Referencing Tossutti, Matheson (2005) also deduces:

Canada’s Sikh community is one of the most affluent visible-minority communities in Canada, which makes it more likely that candidates will be able to afford higher campaign costs. In addition, *knowledge of the English language* and *familiarity with democratic processes* also tend to be higher among Sikh immigrants from India, than among immigrants from other countries without *British colonial pasts*, such as mainland China, making transitions into the Canadian political system easier. This familiarity helps explain why foreign-born South Asians, including Sikhs, are more likely to vote than their Chinese counterparts/ and why, although they constitute Canada’s largest visible-minority group, the Chinese community has half as many representatives in Parliament as Canada’s South Asian community (28 emphases added).

Indeed, socioeconomic barriers, language barriers, and political ignorance due to country of origin have been identified elsewhere as significant challenges to ethnocultural and visible minority political integration in Canada (Lortie Commission, as discussed in Chapter one). Still, despite having received the franchise in 1947, the first South Asian MPs were only elected to parliament in 1993, an election year that was significant because of the 1991 tabling of the final report of the Lortie Commission. This election year witnessed the highest number of ethnic and visible minority candidates in Canada recorded at the time. However, since the 1993 federal election, Jerome Black has found that while ethnic Canadians have seen improvements in parliamentary representation, visible minorities remain underrepresented in the House of Commons (Black 2013, 21) where their election numbers in 2011 were found comparable with 1993 figures. Commenting on the “representation deficit” Black has said “even though the 2011 election did establish a record for racial diversity in Parliament, population-based representation has not improved and is at the same level that it was almost twenty years ago. What is really happening is that visible minority MPs have been elected in numbers that are enough to keep the representation deficit from getting larger, but not enough to reduce it” (Black 2013, 26). Thus, while Canadian scholars have increasingly championed the proportional and substantive representation of visible minority politicians, their numbers since the early-1990s have not since improved at the federal level.
As immigration levels shifted in the 1960s and 1970s from Europe to Africa, Asia, and their diasporas, researchers became interested in the impact of such immigration on Canada’s identity, which very much included the political terrain. Few studies appeared in the 1970s and 1980s aiming to discern the political attitudes, political behaviours, psychology and voting patterns of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Canada (Flanagan 1971, Quo 1971, McAllister 1971, Layton-Henry 1978, Wood 1981). Scholars including Patricia Roy (1995) wrote about the emergence and electoral significance of “the fifth force” as a result of the post-1967 “removal of racial barriers from immigration laws” which “increased the immigration of blacks from the Caribbean and parts of Africa”… as well as “Asians from China, India and their diasporas” (Roy 1995, 200). Referencing Elizabeth Wangenheim’s 1966 work on the Ukrainians as a political “third force” or non-French and non-British Europeans, the first two forces were identified as the French and English and the First Nations as the fourth force. Such chrono-logics that neatly correlate political outlook and partisan expression with categories of immigration waves continue to distinguish “Old and New World ideological currents” on cultural, linguistic and racial terms (Wiseman 2007, 5). In this formulation, Western European settlers are re-established as those who set the political terrain where none existed prior to their arrival and who thus, accommodate subsequent waves of immigrants namely, ethnocultural and visible minority groups. The political contribution of the ethno-cultural and visible minority groups amounts to the fact of its diversity, which impelled multicultural policy and ostensibly “transformed English Canada’s older perception of itself as a British nation” (Ibid., 6). Simultaneously, the dual-white settler state persists, whether through classifying Indigenous populations as yet another different political wave or excluding them entirely from analysis. That is, research centred on the study of “difference” displaces the question of power and evades the study of racial governmentality.

The underlying determinism of such studies presumes that the political attitudes and behaviours of ethnic and visible minority others can and should be scientifically measured and thus their political activities predicted. The findings have been unsurprisingly varied and at times contradictory. For instance, in their review of the literature, Weinfeld and Wilkinson observed that while Jeffrey Reitz found “Canadians with close ties to their ethnic groups are less active in the political process,” Jerome Black “found that any gaps between immigrants and the native born in political participation decreased the longer immigrants reside in Canada, and that generally immigrants participated in Canadian politics” (Reitz 1980 and Black 1991 in Weinfeld
and Wilkinson 1999, 73). Similarly, referencing Warren Kalbach (2000, 70), O’Neill and Wesley have pointed out: "that the more different one's culture is perceived to be from that of either of Canada's founding charter groups, and the stronger one's ethnic identity and "ethnic connectedness" to one's ethnic community in Canada, the longer it may take to become sufficiently integrated and assimilated to become a fully participating member of Canadian society on a basis of equality" (2008, 224).

Political scientist, Cathy Cohen has observed how as recent social science research has increasingly relied on “the use of large N datasets to map out the political attitudes and behaviors of ordinary people, so too did scholars in the field of Black politics demonstrate increasing expertise in the use of statistical analysis in conjunction with newly developed datasets such as the National Black Election Study and the National Black Politics Study to explore the declared politics of Black respondents” (Cohen 2004, 32). Reed has specified how methods that centre on political behaviour and psychology or a:

reductivist postulation of the corporate racial subject reinscribes essentialist presumptions regarding the black American population. Such constructions such as “the Negro (or the black community) believes/wants…” originate in nineteenth-century race theory’s notions of racial temperament and ideals and other formulations asserting in effect that blacks think with one mind […] The subfield’s main discourse revolves around the dual objectives of defending a coherent and homogenized racial image and articulating putatively collective mentalities and aspirations” (Reed Jr. 1999, 47).

In other words, research objectives that seek to ascertain the political attitudes, behaviours and psychologies of racialized groups also tend to conceive of racial equality as achievable through “a model of descriptive representation that treated shared racial status unproblematically as a vehicle for expressing authentic group interests. Because officials’ actions were authenticated by their race, the insurgent language of transition facilitated tendencies among the emergent elite to define the substance of legitimate black interests tautologically, as whatever official black representatives did or said” (Reed Jr. 1999, 4). As such both Reed and Cohen have taken scholars to task for adhering to methods that are uncritically preoccupied with “ideological and behavioral dimensions of African American politics in the late twentieth century” (Cohen 2004, 32).14 Instead, Reed has insisted:

The more important issues for making sense of black politics are how concrete group interests are determined, who determines them, and how those determinations, including the strategies and objectives they warrant, affect different elements of the black American population. Reducing black politics to the black vote hinders addressing these questions because its presumption of cohesiveness as a natural state overlooks the processes of interest formation to take their outcomes as given. This mindset also bypasses questions pertaining to the distribution of costs and benefits resulting from those outcomes, as well as consideration of possible alternative processes, strategies, and objectives (Reed Jr. 1999, 39).

Similarly, Yasmeen Abu-Laban has commented on the under-development of critical theories of race and colonialism in Canadian political science. Abu-Laban (2007) has observed that in methods used by Canadian political scientists, questions pertaining to race, racialization, anti-racism, language, religion and colonialism have been inadequately studied through the rubric of “culture” and cultural difference. Abu-Laban references American political scientist Rupert Taylor who waged similar critiques of “typical election studies that categorize in a very un-nuanced way “ethnic” or “racial” groups (e.g., the “Hispanic vote,” the “ethnic vote,” the “African American vote”)” (Abu-Laban 2007, 405). Indeed, while more recent studies in political science have included work that centre historical contexts and power relations rather than cultural differences, un-nuanced questions concerned with “ethnic votes” and measures related to cultural difference continue to dominate the field of study. Political scientists such as Taylor and Abu-Laban may not necessarily be calling for an end to studies examining how minorities and women vote but rather they caution against uncritical emphases on cultural differences which evade questions of power.

Some recent studies have also explored the ongoing systemic barriers facing women in politics (Brodie 1985; Trimble, Sawyer, Tremblay 2006; Young 2000), the role of ethnic media and politics (Black and Leithner 1988), political parties and ethnic participation (Dhillon 2005), substantive representation and electoral performance of ethnic and visible minority MPs (Bird 2011; Black 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011), and the underrepresentation of Indigenous people in Canadian politics (Garcea 2008; Murray and Caverhill 2008; O’Neill and Wesley 2008). These works have identified ongoing challenges of access to sites of political power and in general,
have argued that increased incorporation of women and minorities has been minimal and do not yet reflect substantive representation of Canada’s changing demographic. Women, for example still only form 25 per cent of the House of Commons (Canada parl.gc.ca 2012). Studies employing a critical theory lens have identified the politics of limited inclusion (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1990) and have made the case that increased representation of women in parliament has not resulted in the increased representation of feminist politics (Tremblay and Pelletier 2000; Young 2002, 181). A 2005 special issue of Canadian Issues included several contributions that argued that existing assumptions about the voting behaviour of minorities may need to be revisited (Henderson 2005; Tossuti 2005) since immigrant and minority groups are “heterogeneous and their participation, preferences and issues are similarly heterogeneous” (Biles and Tolley 2005, 4). In their introduction to the special issue, entitled “Getting Seats at the Table(s)” John Biles and Erin Tolley (2005) reiterate Abu-Laban’s concern with political science’s reliance on “cultural factors” rather than “institutional or systemic ones” (Ibid, 4). Thus, the special issue as a whole reiterated some of the critiques made by ethnocultural organizations during the Lortie Commission public hearings including political parties’ manipulation of “instant party members” and branding immigrants as “uncritical, immature and easily-led” “voting blocs” for electoral gain (Biles and Tolley 2005, 3; Go 2005; Hyder 2005).

There have also been recent studies examining Aboriginal representation deficits in various levels of government. In the context of Regina and Saskatoon, Joseph Garcea (2008) has argued that "Despite the fact that they constitute approximately 10 percent of the combined population in these two cities, the proportion of Aborignals elected as municipal, provincial, and federal representatives is only about 2 percent" (170). In the context of Halifax, Murray and Caverhill (2008) have discussed the under-representation of Black and Mi'kmaq populations, noting however that "since the early 1990s, the provincial government embarked upon a number of initiatives to promote a larger presence in the political arena for Black and Mi'kmaq people" (190). In the context of Winnipeg, Brenda O'Neill and Jared J. Wesley (2008) have pointed to “a new quality of political elite in Winnipeg - one dominated by multi-ethnic politicians whose identities and positions in various legislatures blur the line between minority and majority communities in the city” (223). However, they also end with the observation that “certain minority groups remain excluded from this new multi-ethnic elite”. That is, while Eastern European leaders have been elected to city hall, the provincial legislature, and Parliament, other
groups such as the First Nations and Métis have not (Ibid. 223). As already mentioned, research centred on the study of “difference” has tended to conceive of Indigenous populations as just another cultural group, which does not account for ongoing settler colonialism. Indeed, race and politics have been understudied as a matter of racial governance and ongoing dual-white settler colonialism. My study shows that it is less a question of why some groups remain excluded while others are included, rather than a question of how it is through a discourse of inclusion that exclusion is now fashioned.

In her contribution to *Critical Policy Studies*, Abu-Laban reiterates that rather than treat race as a research variable, there needs to be focus on processes of racialization and racial governance, that is, historically and culturally specific ways in which some groups become seen as separate and are treated as inferior” (Abu-Laban 2007, 144-145). To expand this critique, processes of relational racialization must be considered as well, that is, how some groups become seen as separate and treated as inferior *in relation* to other groups. For instance, researchers have found that “The electoral system appears to privilege the election of more *moderate*, rather than *militant*, voices within visible minority communities” (Andrew et al. 2008 emphasis added). More than this, a critical policy lens probes how and why certain Canadians have been cast as moderate or militant. Contestable categorizations such as “moderate” and “militant” minority groups evade broader questions of power inequalities *within* and *between* racial populations. Instead, more attention is paid to descriptive representations of visible minorities with the assumption that increased descriptive representation will guarantee increased substantive representation. It is assumed that visible minority representatives will advance “minority policy interests” and that “it is possible to identify a set of political issues that likely hold heightened significance for most visible minorities” (Bird 2011, 215; Leslie 1969).

Similarly, scholars have suggested that a so-called minority agenda “includes numerous aspects of immigration and refugee policy, social acceptance and race relations policy considerations, diversity and cultural recognition, economic opportunities (including employment equity), and political representation itself” (Black 2011b, 1180). Scholars of colour have also tended to believe that visible minority political participation “and the persistence of the concept that “we are all immigrants” are signs of “good sense and tolerance” (Roy 1995, 208-209). Thus, much of the extant literature conclude with the sentiment that "change appears to be occurring, and we are optimistic that Ottawa's elected officials will become more diverse over time" (Biles and Tolley...
2008, 132). These conclusions reflect the persistent assumption that increased descriptive representation will bring increased substantive representation or that visible minority politicians are guaranteed to promote “minority interests”. Very few studies have remarked on the ambiguous and unpredictable relationship between statistical and substantive representations. In one case, Siemiatycki has found that in Toronto “identity markers such as race and ethnicity cannot predict the outlook of politicians” nor can they ensure “diversity friendly policies” (2008, 43). Indeed, there remains a significant gap in research that examines the complicated and irregular relationship between descriptive and substantive political representation.

As I will argue in this study, Asian conservatives have wielded some political power in Canada. Despite this influence, they have been virtually unexamined. There has, however, been an assumption that the racial conservative is a paradoxical figure. Some studies even assure that despite the prominence of some South Asian Republicans such as Governor Bobby Jindal and pundit Dinesh D’Souza, such conservatives of colour are anomalies (Chen and Yoo 2010, 59-60). In a broader context, there remains an assumed positive correlation between racialized identity and progressive politics; a supposed incommensurability of racial identity and conservative politics. Despite the assumption that people of colour are always politically progressive and that political conservatism is the ideology of old white men, racial conservatives are increasingly demonstrating their electoral sway and symbolic efforts to recruit conservatives of color have become increasingly effective. In the vein of Canadian Conservative race appeals evident in this chapter’s epigraph, the February 13, 2013 issue of Time Magazine explicitly answers the question as to why a conservative political institution would need to recruit race. Featuring an image of Republican presidential candidate Marco Rubio on the cover, the accompanying caption states that Rubio, “The Republican Savior,” (Grunwald 2013)\(^\text{15}\) will “make racism palatable to Latinos” (Wessler 2013).\(^\text{16}\) Indeed, Rubio’s existence - like the existence of Asian Conservative MPs - is to insist that certain racial populations that they represent are also naturally Conservative. And to insist that Asians in Canada or Latino’s in the United States are naturally aligned with Conservative or Republican politics is to also insist that the state policies upheld by these political parties could not possibly be racist. As this study


shows, expanding the membership of political institutions has been less about meaningful diversification of the polity but rather political inclusion has become a part of racial governmentality.

In Canada, it has been presumed that immigrants would always vote for the Liberal Party because of former prime minister Trudeau’s multiculturalism policy legacy. In 1984, the relationship between racial others and Canadian political parties began to shift when Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives won a landslide majority government ending twenty-two years of Liberal rule. As it will be discussed in this thesis, rather than reverse Trudeau’s legacy, prime minister Mulroney ushered in the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) and officially legislated multiculturalism (1988). Like his American counterpart Ronald Reagan, Mulroney also appointed several visible minorities to prominent positions throughout his tenure and he formally apologized for the wartime internment of Japanese Canadians. Indeed, scholars have observed how his approach to race distinguishes Mulroney from Margaret Thatcher’s explicit disdain for immigrants and minorities (Stasiulis 1991). However, it has been argued that the number of elected Conservative Asian Canadian MPs are so few that any serious research on these sixteen figures would be trivial. Still, it was not particularly dominating numbers of racialized conservative politicians that led to the examination of their political significance and contributions in the UK (Hall 1994, Gilroy 2000) and in the United States (Dillard 2001; Reed Jr 1999; Cohen 2011; James 2010). These studies explored the broader political contexts and discourses that provide social, political and cultural meaning to the study of racialized Conservative political figures. While descriptive representation certainly has not been achieved, the role and influence of Asian Canadian parliamentarians and in particular Asian Canadian Conservative MPs on Canadian political discourse and federal legislation pertaining to race and nation cannot be underestimated. Furthermore, a critique of racial conservatives should not simply reduce these figures to sell-outs who “betray minority interests”, which forecloses debate around why such figures have become important to the state, how they have been included, and what their political contributions have been.

**Research Design**

Between confederation and the 2011 federal election, there have been sixteen conservative Asian members of parliament (MPs). These MPs have variously identified by their race and
ethnicity and at other times by their religion (for instance, as Sikh or Muslim). Often in their statements, the MPs identify as visible minorities, as immigrants or as children of immigrants from Asia and their diasporas. My study’s focus on MPs is decisive. *Parliamentarians* are symbolic elites or “the ideological leaders of society” who have special access to and control over public discourse (van Dijk 2002, 148; Wodak and Reisigl 2001, 32). While Canadian senators are appointed by the governor general on the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada, the currently 308 members of the House are elected by eligible Canadian voters approximately every four years, where each MP represents an electoral district also called a constituency or riding. As discussed in Chapter two, Japanese, East Indian, and Chinese Canadian disenfranchisement meant Asians were legally barred by federal immigration and citizenship laws from all forms of political participation until the mid 20th century. Indeed, participation in this political site has thus been a relatively recent political right for Asian Canadians. A number of the subjects in this study have also been appointed to Cabinet, a position from which women and minorities have been underrepresented. However, due to organized challenges, “in recent decades, there has been an attempt to… include more cabinet positions for women and ethno-cultural and religious minorities” (Bottomley 2008, 145).

Parliament consists of the legislative branch represented in the House of Commons and the executive branch is reflected in the Cabinet. While the Canadian Parliament is bicameral, “the House of Commons is the centre of legislative activity. The House is where the government (the prime minister and cabinet) is held to account for its policies, actions, and inactions by the opposition” (Ibid 145-146). Canadian laws begin as bills in the House of Commons and members of federal parliament spend most of their time in the Lower Chambers, also called the Commons Chamber, debating and voting on bills (Canada 2011). All laws including those pertaining to immigration, citizenship, and federal multiculturalism are debated and legislated in this political domain thereby making it the dominant branch of parliament. Thus, a seat in the House of Commons is one of the highest levels of formal Canadian politics where one has the power to influence federal legislation and national, even international, public political discourse.

By participating in parliamentary sessions, MPs are engaged in debating and amending

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17 *The number of seats in the Commons will be increased to 338 in the 2015 election*
18 The Parliament of Canada is the federal legislative branch of Canada, located in Parliament Hill in the national capital, Ottawa, Ontario.
legislation, governing the country, representing their constituents, defending or opposing the government, and making policy (van Dijk 2004, 356). Members of Parliament in Canada have wide-ranging responsibilities, which include work in the lower chamber, committees, caucus, and their constituencies and for their political party. They act as legislators by either initiating bills of their own or proposing amendments to government and other Members’ bills. They develop specialized knowledge in one or more of the policy areas dealt with by Parliament and propose recommendations to the government. They represent the Parliament of Canada at home and abroad by participating in international conferences and host official visits from leaders from abroad. In Canada, a standing committee is a permanent committee established by Standing Orders of the House of Commons. It may study matters referred to it by special order or, within its area of responsibility in the Standing Orders, may undertake studies on its own initiative. Committee work is both a critical part of a Member’s job as well as the law making process. In committee, Members can look at bills in greater depth than is possible in the Chamber where there is a large group of people and a full agenda. Committee meetings include “the examination of witnesses and the detailed consideration of legislation… In addition, because committees interact directly with the public, they provide an immediate and visible conduit between elected representatives and Canadians” (Marleau and Montpetit 2000).

The study focuses on parliamentary debates as arguably, “few forms of oral discourse are as well known, routinely quoted, or distributed as widely through the mass media as that of top politicians” (van Dijk 2008, 53). Given the significance of political discourse and parliamentary debates on discourses of race and racism, my study focuses on Canadian parliamentary debates officially recorded in Hansard. Hansard is the traditional name of the verbatim transcripts of Parliamentary Debates in Britain and Commonwealth countries. Unlike the British House of Commons, members are referred to in the House only by the parliamentary ridings they represent, for example “The member for Vancouver Centre”, or by their cabinet post. Hansard covers routine proceedings, members’ statements, question period, private members’ business and committee meetings. Routine proceedings can cover many different subjects: Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, and committees table committee reports and petitions as well as responses to these documents requested by other members; and Ministers make short

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19 Given the bilingual nature of the Canadian federal government, two equivalent Canadian Hansards are maintained, one in French and one in English (Ward 1980; Trewin 1952).
announcements or talk about government policy, and the opposition parties reply. Despite the reliability of Hansard, parliamentary statements are underutilized as a resource for research. In particular, no systematic effort appears to have been made to examine the content of the initial parliamentary statements of newly elected MPs (Horn, Leniston and Lewis 1983, 229).

Described as a rite of passage or momentous beginning, a maiden speech is the first speech given by a newly elected member of a legislature or parliament. In her analysis of female-identified MPs in Australian parliament, Horn states, “maiden speeches represent a source of data offering information about MPs’ aspirations, goals, motivations, issue concerns and philosophical orientations at the outset of their parliamentary careers” (Ibid, 232).

The Parl.gc.ca publication search function enabled my search of all statements recorded in Hansard by discussed topic, by parliamentary session, by committee and by parliamentarian for all meetings. The parl.gc.ca website also includes complete files on MPs including contact information, federal experience, federal public office, provincial/territorial experience, selected publications and biographical data such as date of birth and place of birth, profession, and links to their department website, party website, and personal website if available. This search yielded all statements and speeches made by the sixteen MPs predominantly in the fifteen-year period between 1997 and 2012 as well as Jung, elected in 1957. Members’ statements occur during a 15-minute period that is set aside each day for any Member who is not a Cabinet Minister to make a statement on a subject of national, regional or local importance. Each statement lasts a maximum of one minute. Question period, as an exercise in accountability, is a closely watched 45-minute portion of a House meeting. It is a chance for opposition Members, and sometimes government Members, to ask questions of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers about their area of responsibility, without giving advance notice. For one hour each day, Members who are not Cabinet Ministers can have their bills and motions debated by the House during private members’ business.

Context or background information (Taylor 2001, 26) was collected as a way to intertextually situate the primary data set – the text and talk of Asian Conservative members of parliament (MPs) – and as a way to facilitate the reading of the data. In order to historically contextualize the parliamentary debates, I reference supplementary data including news media sources, newsletters from the MPs riding if possible, photographic images in which they appear at various constituency, community, and federal events, as well as historical parliamentary debate on immigration.
Transcription was limited to digital video data since parliamentary debate and committee meetings are archived in Hansard and made accessible through parliamentary websites or through Libraries of Parliament online where Hansard dating back to the first parliament have been archived. Video recordings of parliamentary debate and committee meetings were consulted where speeches and meetings highlighted during the coding process called for analysis of extra linguistic social variables such as body language, intonation of speech, and interaction. These were accessed through parlVU, a webcasting service that includes live and archived streams of video and audio from House of Commons proceedings and committee meetings. I also include debate interaction and statements made by parliamentarians that work closely with the Asian Conservative MPs such as ministers of Citizenship and Immigration, the prime minister, and opposition Immigration critics.

Preliminary analysis involved coding this collection of statements as well as the Asian Conservative parliamentary roles, specifically, the special appointments of the MPs. I also coded statements for whether they were spoken when an MP was speaking as a member of the opposition versus when an MP was speaking as a member of the governing party. I coded for a larger number of government policy issues for any themes that would emerge around the sites from which the MPs speak and the issues to which they speak. This early stage of coding revealed that the most illustrative debates involving the racial conservative MPs revolve around foreign affairs, the war on terror, the Middle East, immigration and citizenship, trade with India and China, crime, the military, national security, immigration and citizenship, drugs and gangs, multiculturalism and related topics (Asian Heritage Month, Ramadan, Lunar New Year, etc), terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, CIDA, humanitarian intervention, and Canada’s economic action plan. Based on frequently occurring codes, topics, and themes, the coding process led me to focus on MPs maiden speeches as well as parliamentary statements on topics related to race, racism, national identity and specifically, on legislative debates related to Immigration, Citizenship, and Multiculturalism. These early stages of coding revealed that all MPs in my study are serving or have served on the standing committee on Citizenship and Immigration. I thus also examine related reports from the standing committee on immigration and citizenship as well as backgrounders from the Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism that illustrate the Conservative Party of Canada’s race appeal strategies. Specifically, the coding process led me to focus on the Asian Conservative MPs’ participation in the parliamentary
debates around three bills affecting immigration during Harper’s administration: Bill C-43 Faster removal of foreign criminals act; Bill C-31 Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (formerly Bill C-4 Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada's Immigration System Act; and Bill C-10 an Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism.

I analyze Asian Conservative MPs’ contribution to parliamentary debate on national identity, multiculturalism, and immigration not only because they saturate the archive. Policy debates are assumed to be “a liberal zone of freedom in which power is absent” (Orsini and Smith 2007, 8). However, Abu-Laban has argued that immigration, in particular, is a policy site in which “we have glimmers of a modern version of the paradox of liberalism wherein states committed formally to equal treatment act in a discriminatory manner” (Abu-Laban 2002, 473). Specifically, immigration and integration policies and “state materials for new immigrants are especially revelatory of state discourses because they define who can belong to the nation, what it means to belong, and what is expected of new members” (Wilton 2010, 93). Within these documents and narratives is the ‘story’ of the nation and “lessons that define what it means to be a good citizen of the political community” (Wilton 2010, 94-95). That is, this political discourse archive contains examinable aspects of racial governmentality.

**Analyzing parliamentary text and talk**

This thesis investigates how racialized MPs contribute to the reproduction of racism in the Canadian parliamentary context by analyzing the text and talk of Asian Conservative MPs. The thesis employs a mixed methodological approach with reference to both Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Foucauldian approaches to the study of governmentality, discourse and power. While parts of CDA provide a useful methodology for examining political discourse, the analytic models mobilized by semioticians cannot account for racial subjectivity. That is, existing CDA frameworks cannot account for racialized minorities as parliamentary elites or participants in dominant racial discourses. As my thesis will show, the study of political inclusion as part of racial governmentality means examining how those that have been included take up the charge of how racial minorities are governed.

Due to their formal structure and public nature as well controlled content and style, parliamentary debates, particularly in prepared, written speeches on minorities and immigration will seldom appear overtly racist. As an official, for the record discourse, political debates
require that members refrain from lexical choices that are obviously discriminatory. Indeed, as scholars have observed notions of tolerance and diversity may be extensively topicalized though often as ways “to introduce more negative topics” (van Dijk 2002, 157). Race discourse theorists such as Li (2001) and Bonilla-Silva (2010) have examined how abstract liberalism and colorblind racism subtly perpetuate racist ideologies. Li defines racial subtext as “the hiding of racial signification in a benign discourse and conveying it in coded language, representing a sophisticated way of articulating “race” in a democratic society that makes such articulation socially acceptable” (Li 2001, 78). Marked by subtlety and enhanced through its dissemination in visual imagery and racially coded language, such racial discourses have become the dominant mode for constructing and deploying race-based appeals. Because of such discursive strategies, political discourses require deconstruction or decoding of racial subtexts and critical analysis of how texts are encoded with racial meaning (implicit or shared knowledge). For instance, rather than explicitly naming racially profiled groups, parliamentarians can express their ideology by choosing lexical items such as “terrorist,” “bogus refugee,” and “illegitimate refugee”. Such descriptions are racially encoded with meaning so that it need not be explicitly named. That is, word choice is one of the ways people encode their underlying opinions, social attitudes, values and ideologies. Rhetorical devices may also be used to describe immigration metaphorically and hyperbolically as an invasion, a flood, or a plague. Such persuasive semantic-rhetorical figures are often used in debates on immigration to simplify complex social situations, create boundaries and binaries, and narrate a supposed clash of civilizations.

Latent racial prejudices, fears, and resentments, are circulated in discursively encoded political discourse to manage public opinion and legitimate decision-making on policy issues. In political discourse we can thus trace discursive modes and strategies that justify, rationalize, legitimize, explain, essentialize, and normalize racism. Racism is reproduced and circulated in political discourse through its disavowal, denial, erasure, and trivialization (Jiwani 2006). It is through discourse that political ideologies are formulated, “acquired, expressed, learned, propagated, and contested” (van Dijk 2006, 732). Such strategies encode text with new meaning without having to abandon ideological commitments to the existing social hierarchy. Rather, new techniques of meaning making, of positions, management, subject formation, and regimes are built up as a way to sustain existing relations of power and inequality. Thus, decoding discourses of racial violence “contributes to a mapping of the values, norms, and practices around which
these discourses are organized” (Jiwani 2006, 60). That is, critical analysis of discourse makes ideologies observable.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the umbrella approach to the analysis of textual, verbal, and sign language and the activity of language use in the social sciences. By paying critical attention to subtexts, contexts, and implicit knowledge in the communication of ideologies, discourse studies is concerned with power inequities (Wilton 2010; van Dijk 2003; Taylor 2001). Prolific CDA proponent, Teun van Dijk has examined the discursive reproduction of racism in Western European parliamentary discourse (van Dijk 2008; 2006; 2002; 2000; 1997). Critical political discourse analysts have argued that parliamentary debates should be studied “as complex structures of social and political action and interaction” as they “exercise power and ethnic dominance” through defining and rationalizing the system of racial inequality (van Dijk 2000, 103). As a powerful ideological agent of legitimization, “political discourse is involved in the enactment, confirmation or challenge of attitudes and ideologies about ethnic groups, ethnic relations, or issues such as immigration and integration” (van Dijk 2000, 86-87). Thus, critical political discourse analysis is the study of how political power, ideologies, representations, and public political knowledge are reproduced and legitimized “by the text and talk of dominant groups” (van Dijk 2008, 65; van Dijk 1997 emphasis added). Van Dijk insists that elites or powerful members of the “ingroup” control “the most crucial dimensions and decisions of the everyday lives of immigrants and minorities” also known as the “outgroup” (van Dijk 2002, 145; van Dijk 2006).

The ingroup/outgroup dichotomy in the analysis of racism in parliamentary debate must be problematized. In the existing research, ingroups and outgroups are presumed mutually exclusive categories of analysis whereby ingroup elites such as parliamentarians are presumed to be white and racist whereas immigrant and minority members of the outgroup are simply the victims of racism. In this formulation, immigrant or racial minority speech acts are not articulated from the dominant seat of power including a seat in parliament. Instead, “outgroup” voices may only appear in parliament as secondary text and talk because “most dominant group members have few direct experiences with the Others” (van Dijk 2000, 94). The ingroup/outgroup dichotomy is justified by the argument that ”virtually no minority group members are members of national governments, and only very few are members of the legislature” (van Dijk 2008, 73-74). van Dijk continues:
Since most “ethnic” policies, however, are national or federal, minorities are more or less effectively excluded from more influential text and talk about their own position. On the other hand, minorities are frequently topics of political talk and text, but this form of passive access is hardly controlled by them: they have virtually no influence on this “representation” in political discourse (2008, 73-74).

In this formulation, indeed, minorities seem to feature only in political talk and text as topics of discussion or in references made by white parliamentarians to add validity to their statements. While van Dijk raises critical questions about racism in political discourse, these frameworks cannot account for racial subjectivity. Within such a framework racialized Conservative MPs are paradoxical indeed. While many CDA studies examine right wing racism and extremism (Wodak 2007; Richardson and Wodak 2009; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Potter and Wetherell 2001; Fairclough 2001), far fewer have considered how racialized people themselves are implicated in the reproduction of racial hierarchies. The assumption that minority candidates could not possibly articulate much less advocate for racist and sexist policy ideals has limited the analysis of conservative of colour discourses. Where racial minority political speech acts are examined, researchers have tended to conclude that racial minority political figures do not make race-appeals that negatively represent or impact racial populations. For instance, this is the case with McIlwain and Caliendo’s (2011) examination of political race-based appeals and racially coded language and images in American political campaigns. It is presumed that political candidates of colour are more likely to mobilize racial appeals that portray racialized groups in positive representations while racist appeals are mobilized by traditional white politicians. Their research conclusions do not consider that all race appeals have the potential to be problematic or double edged; as both racist and racial appeals continue to essentialize target groups. Reed has observed how “the white left has always had much greater difficulty than it should in figuring out when black public figures move from world views and agendas that are genuinely consistent with left political vision and when they don't” (Reed Jr. 1995, 22).

In another example, Bird’s (2011) content analysis of parliamentary debate involving visible minority MPs in the Canadian House of Commons not only found that visible minority conservatives talk more frequently about race related topics than their white conservative counterparts and even more than Liberal or NDP visible minority politicians but also insisted that this text and talk was never antagonistic to minorities. Bird assures that “it became clear that it was not necessary to code whether a speech was in favour or opposed to
ethnic minority interests as there were, in fact, no interventions that could be clearly categorized as antagonistic to ethnic minorities” (217). In this study, Conservative MP Nina Grewal is even characterized as a feminist and anti-racist based on the frequency of her statements pertaining to women and visible minorities. It seems that Adolph Reed’s (1995) observations apply here. To suggest that the existence of minority parliamentarians guarantees race-conscious and feminist representation not only misapprehends the meaning and history of feminist and race-conscious politics but also simplifies the contributions of minority politicians to a dangerous determinism. Bird’s conclusion conflicts with existing studies that argue “the presence of visible minorities in political bodies does not necessarily lead to diversity-friendly policy measures” (Siemiatycki and Saloojee 2002 in Matheson 2005, 25). More importantly, as this thesis demonstrates, visible minority MPs in Canada have in fact made interventions that are antagonistic to women and ethnic minorities. This is to say, existing research does not account for how politicians of colour also have the capacity to uphold the nation, leave inequalities unchallenged, and often augment them with renewed vigour.

Cultural studies theorist, Stuart Hall conceptualized identity formation as interplay between “being positioned” by powerful discourses and repositioning through discourses. Identities are not essences but rather unstable positionings in discourse. In other words, race is a sliding signifier (Hall 1997). In fact, identity formation involves “complicated processes of negotiation” (Hall 1995, 7). In this way, “questions of identity are always questions about representation... and they almost always involve the silencing of something in order to allow something else to speak” (Hall 1995, 5 emphasis added). That is, through representations, meanings are ascribed to the things depicted and this process of meaning making is constant. Similarly, according to Paul Gilroy, “the ‘self’ is a representational economy: a reification continually defeated by mutable entanglements with other subjects’ histories, experiences, self-representations; with their texts, conduct, gestures, objectifications” (Gilroy 2002, 109-110). As such, subject formation and knowledge production are material social processes where racial identity is not only “conceived, authored, promoted, and legitimated” (Goldberg 2002, 161) by state action and speech but is also constantly in flux and in the process of becoming. While state racial subjection and subjectification shape the parameters of possible identification, relation, and resistance, these powers are by no means complete.
Hall has problematized the notion of a politics with guarantees; that is, a commitment to conceptualizations of race as a fixed and stable signifier, which guarantees certain “cultural, intellectual, emotional and expressive qualities” (Hall 1997). For instance, a politics with guarantees, which presumes that minority politicians always espouse a politics that defends the race against discrimination cannot account for racial minorities that espouse “a range of different political positions: conservative, reactionary, progressive, and so on” (Hall 1997). Indeed, Conservatives have long relied on a politics with guarantees to sustain racist ideologies through wedge issues such as immigration, welfare, affirmative action, education, and crime. For instance, by acknowledging class and political diversity within Asian America, the American Right has been able to further divide populations towards their advantage (Omi & Takagi 1996, 157). As such, Hall urged us to practice a “politics without guarantee” or to move beyond taken for granted assumptions associated with race and instead, commit to a social justice-oriented analysis of “the constitutive and political nature of representation itself” (Hall 1997). Indeed, the presumption that for any given racial or ethnic identity category, a group-based politics will emerge discounts the fact that identifications vary over time and are inconsistent (Lee, T., 2008, 471). This is to say that racial subjectivity is far more complex than narrowly-defined frameworks allow.

Little attention has been devoted to the Asian racial conservative because it has generally been assumed that racialized politicians stand in opposition to the racial state (Goldberg 2002). Using a Foucauldian approach to the study of discourse, subjectivity, and governmentality, the thesis goes beyond analyses of texts in isolation but rather examines what subject positions are made possible by discourse; that is, how discourse gives rise to subjects (Foucault 1977). Specifically, the study traces how multiculturalism discourse has given rise to the racial conservative subject. In critiquing the shortcomings of discourse analysis, Derek Hook has insisted that Foucault offers “a broader definition of discourse and a broader analytic scope than one limited basically to the analysis of texts” (2001, 532). That is, Foucault’s approach emphasizes “how enmeshed power is within discourse” (Hook 2001, 532). Centring discourse within the field of political action, Foucault conceptualizes discourse as that which works to both constrain and limit while also generate and enable “empowered/disempowered subject-positions” (528). As a system of representations, the often discontinuous, contradictory, fragmentary, ‘un-unified’ qualities of discourse precisely give discourse its resilience (Ibid, 535). As such, simply
including what is seemingly outside of discourse or “the attempt to utter those meanings excluded, marginalized or ‘repressed’ by discourse” does not change existing relations of force (Ibid, 535). With this, a Foucauldian approach facilitates the examination of the paradoxes of abstract liberal democracy as well as the emergence of new subjects and narratives as racial regimes shift by highlighting the productivity of these new categories. It is crucial to pay attention to the workings of power in moments of “liberation” and “inclusion” when citizen-subjects find themselves “empowered,” as subjects are always operating within the limits of discourse and the historically specific regime of truth (Foucault 1982, 208). Foucault’s conception of power as decentralized and permissive rather than simply authoritarian and repressive is thus essential to the study of racial governance.

This means that the relationship between race as a signifier and political orientation as a signified is neither inevitable nor fixed; rather the meanings associated between race and politics are produced within history and shift accordingly. Because power is diffuse and decentralized, “we are all, to some degree caught up in its circulation” (Foucault 1980, 119). Categories of oppressor and oppressed are thus complicated. Racial hierarchies cannot be sustained without figures such as Asian Conservative MPs who are essential to racial governance or how minorities are governed. Constituted as expert on race does not guarantee that the figure speaks only to improve the lives of racial populations; it means they also have the capacity to reproduce dominant speech that sustains the racial order.

Parliament and its members must reference various sources such as stocks of commonsense knowledge, statistics, stories from their constituents, the media, the courts and research to add credibility to their arguments and justify or legitimate political decisions (Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997; van Dijk 2000, 93; van Dijk 2003, 110-111). For instance, in debates related to minorities and immigration, MPs would have to refer to experts or reliable spokespersons to add objectivity, reliability and credibility to their discriminatory statements and sentiments (van Dijk 2006, 739). The state can no longer legitimize its political power without including racial populations. Racialized minority parliamentarians can and do participate in defining, circulating, and reproducing dominant representations of racial others. As ostensible experts or authorities on race, Asian Conservative MPs serve as agents of legitimization by using the chronicles of their own lives as immigrants and visible minorities to convey reliability and validity in their anti-immigrant and anti-refugee parliamentary statements. Indeed, they appeal to race as a way to
disavow and trivialize the effects of racism. Moreover, as racialized subjects or members of the “outgroup” their testimonies do not have to be as subtle, insidious, or implicit; it is assumed that they can articulate blatantly racist party positions without being called racist. Thus, racial conservative MPs expand what can and cannot be said about race in parliamentary debates. Furthermore, white MPs can reference racial conservative statements as expert knowledge sources, to support their racist arguments as well.

My study thus challenges long-held assumptions that racial identity and conservative politics are incommensurate. The thesis challenges the notion that racist discourse is only used by white elites and that visible minorities always necessarily champion “minority” interests. To be sure, this critical analysis is not meant to obscure the persistence of the white settler racial state but rather to say that this state has found that it must now stake its legitimacy through inclusion. This is to say that structures of inequality have not dramatically shifted as visible minorities have been folded into the political domain rather existing social hierarchy and dominant ideologies are upheld. The thesis examines the political discourse contributions of Asian conservative MPs: what they say and do in their official capacities as parliamentarians. I excavate the contexts from which racial conservatism has become possible, how racial conservatives have been produced as a result of the ongoing organization, management, and regulation of difference, and the resultant preservation of racial hierarchies. This thesis demonstrates how conservatives of colour have expanded the boundaries of the sayable and sanctionable as supposedly authoritative voices on matters of race-related policies. First, the racial conservative has been emplaced in positions of legislative and executive authority to justify the sociopolitical strategies of the political Right. Secondly, their emplacement in these positions of authority functions as supposed evidence that race is no longer a barrier to mobility. Paradoxically raced in the name of racelessness, the conservative of colour has become vital to the state’s insistence that race no longer matters. Rather than dismiss racial conservatives, I trace the figure as integral to shifting regimes of (in)equality; that is, the states of race and racial statements that they reproduce and which reproduce them.

This thesis explores how conservative strategists in Canada have sought to rebrand their party through redefinitions of equality, hard work, and democracy that appealed to an increasingly neoliberalizing governmentality. To be discussed in chapter five, the figure of the Asian conservative became a newly privileged racial subject under neoliberal racial rule. The
Harper Conservatives’ official discourse insists that Asians are law-abiding, entrepreneurial, play by the rules - that is, the racial rules of the state - and do not make demands. By the inclusion of a few Asian MPs, the Harper Conservatives have found an alibi for the invisibility of Indigenous and Black MPs (or invisibilization of the state’s commitment to racial violence against Indigenous, Black, and Asian Canadians). Instead Indigenous and Black conservative political figures have been found in Senate ranks (Patrick Brazeau and Don Meredith as Harper’s notable senate appointments) a relatively symbolic space where figures are appointed rather than elected.

On the Canadian racial landscape, the suitable racial subject to be included necessarily became the figure of the politically conservative, neoliberal Asian. The presumption that Asians comprise a racial population that does not make demands upon the state is not only taken as true but it is also as much a statement about which racial populations are assumed to make too many demands upon the state. I emphasize this figure as an imagined political subject – just as other figures are imagined on this racial landscape. Imagining some political subjects as cooperative with the state makes it possible to imagine others as those whose demands divide an otherwise coherent national identity. On this racial landscape, imagined political racial subjects are at once valued, included, and consulted while also made valueless, excluded, and eliminated. The racial signifiers are as ambiguous and flexible as they are resilient to suit shifting political concerns of statecraft. It becomes necessary to imagine racial others in such varied ways in order to legitimate ongoing racial violence in the dual white settler state (Haque 2012). Not only was the CPC narrative’s use of the term multicultural(ism) an explicit proxy for racial difference, it is striking that desirable Asians are framed as immigrants valued for their Conservative-alignable culture; a discursive move untenable with other racial populations on the landscape but which also re-fixes Asian Canadians as perpetually foreign. To insist that Canada is a nation of immigrants is to also insist that it is not a nation of Indigenous peoples. In other words, the traffic of narratives about Conservative Asian political figures are not actually conversations about the state of race in the nation at all. Rather, race is made increasingly unspeakable as a reference other than to disavow it.

Taking for granted a depoliticized notion of inclusion, it becomes all too easy to accept that the existence of conservatives of colour is a meaningful diversification of the polity. Reaction to the arrival of conservatives of color have tended to focus on conservative political parties as newly race conscious and accommodating or the focus leads to blanket statements
about any given racial population as inherently Conservative (or Liberal, for that matter). That is, it is assumed that the arrival of conservatives of colour is merely about the parties or the racial populations rather than about the racial state and racial governmentality. It is more productive to trouble the notion of racial authenticity and to understand the question of power that politicizes the language of inclusion.

Critical race frameworks necessarily push research to go beyond enumeration in the study of political inclusion and instead, pay attention to the insidious discursive reproduction of race in the media, politics, and the law at the moment of inclusion. A critical race approach demands that research dispute the identity-to politics link (Lee, T. 2008), identify the problem of essentialism (Abu-Laban 2002), and advance a theory and practice of politics without guarantees (Hall 1994). In particular, critical race analysis pushes research on the inclusion of visible minority politicians to examine the work that race does in moments when race is declared irrelevant. Critical race as theoretical framework and methodology engenders the necessary erudite analysis that questions of political inclusion deserves. Thus, rather than focus on histories of political and legislative exclusion, this thesis examines how the inclusion of Asian political conservatives, limited though it has been, has increasingly foreclosed the possibility for substantial political diversity. In particular, in studying Asian conservatives, the thesis explores the link between race and politics and more importantly examines how political inclusion becomes a part of racial governmentality, a part, that is, of how racial minorities are governed.

**Chapter Outline**

In this introductory chapter, I have identified my subject of analysis, presented my research questions and reviewed the scholarly contexts that frame my research design thus identifying the parameters within which questions about racial political incorporation in Canada have been situated. I have reviewed the disciplinary parameters that preclude critical examination of the figure I call the racial conservative, specifically Asian Canadian Conservative MPs and their political influence. While Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) offers some techniques for reading political text and talk, the approach cannot account for subjectivity. I have outlined Foucauldian approaches to the study of discourse and subjectivity as well as Hall’s approach to the study of racial identity and a politics without guarantees. By troubling the notion of racial authenticity and representation, this chapter introduces the thesis’ case that political inclusion has become part of
the regulation of difference. I have also reviewed key scholarship on the limited politics of incorporation as they have offered significant critical frameworks for analyzing racialized political elites. These intellectual archives have provided the examination of the politics of recognition as part of modernity’s enduring configuration of settler colonial, anti-Black racial violence. Examining the political inclusion of Asian-Canadian Conservatives as part of racial governmentality means paying critical attention to who else is on this racial landscape. I have thus begun to indicate how the extended and celebrated era of civil rights, open immigration policy and official multiculturalism has unevenly affected racial populations in Canada.

The first section of Chapter 2 addresses key analytics and concepts including governmentality, racial states, racial rule, and racial projects that frame my study. The second section of this chapter narrows the analysis onto how Canada has become known as a raceless state. This section traces how Asians in Canada have moved from excluded to politically included visible minorities. In tracing this trajectory, this chapter examines who else is on this landscape and through what logics did Asians necessarily become desirable multicultural subjects on this landscape? That is, this chapter examines the manufacture of Canada as a so-called raceless state. The chapter explores how Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework as recommended by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Haque 2012) has determined the parameters of visible minority political inclusion as part of racial governmentality. Specifically, this chapter explores how the dual-white settler colonial mythology and its accompanying logics about ethnic Canadians and Indigenous populations borne out of the B and B Commission have shaped the terms of why and how the state focuses on the political inclusion of ethnic and visible minority Canadians in the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. With reference to Dionne Brand (2008), Barrington Walker (2008), and Glen Coulthard (2014), this chapter also discusses how even while Canada introduced an ostensibly colour-blind immigration policy in the 1960s, policy reforms in the 1960s and 1970s did not improve the lives of Black and Indigenous populations.

Chapter 3 delves into the text and talk of Asian conservative MPs beginning with an examination of Canada’s first elected Asian member of parliament. Specifically, this chapter closely examines Progressive Conservative MP Douglas Jung’s 1957 maiden speech, his contribution to parliamentary debate on Chinese immigration and citizenship, and his statements on Bill C-79 the Canadian Bill of Rights. By advocating for the Chinese in Canada, MP Jung’s
political participation led to amnesty for Chinese immigrants. By declaring his support for a Canadian bill of rights, Jung also contributed to a national discourse on race that would lead to multiculturalism policy and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms after he left office. That only one of the Asian Conservatives in this study was elected as a member of the Progressive Conservatives means that racial conservatives have achieved political power in parties that are on the far right as Reform and CPC MPs. It is thus not surprising that Douglas Jung’s election win in 1957 and his parliamentary contributions in this post-war political, pre-multiculturalism policy era stand in striking contrast with Asian Conservative statements made in the 1990s. That is, in Canada, Asian conservative MPs that first demonstrated electoral sway (1997) all emerged in an era of anti-multiculturalism as Reform Party MPs. With reference to Adolph Reed Jr. (2009, 2012), this chapter also problematizes tendencies to lionize the famous “firsts” in lieu of substantive changes to social policies affecting the working class and poor. The chapter also shows how in the period that Canada elected its first racialized MP, so too did it evict the Black residents of Africville. The simultaneity of these historic racial moments in Canada reveal how Black Canadians experienced a social order that contradicted the celebrated discourse of post-war racial liberalism.

Chapter 4 addresses the election of Asian Conservative MPs beginning in the 1990s as multiculturalism discourse had become neoliberalized. Of the American context, Adolph Reed Jr. has examined how since the 1970s there has been a systemic shift away from combating economic inequities through state political economy and redistribution in favour of a politics of recognition and incorporation. Similarly of the Australian context and with specific reference to Australia’s political appeals to the Asia-Pacific from the 1970s to the 1990s, Elizabeth Povinelli has observed “how a state and public leans on a multicultural imaginary to defer the problems that capital, (post)colonialism, and human diasporas pose to national identity in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (2002, 29). Thus, in this chapter I examine how the Reform Party of Canada and the conservative leadership began to include Asian officials through a neoliberal rationalized multiculturalism, which re-legitimized and intensified settler-colonial, anti-Black racism. Scholars have noted the Reform Party’s role in overturning Canada’s third party system in the 1980s and 1990s where the racial liberal consensus shared by all major political parties (Carty, Cross, Young 2002) was traded in for an anti-multiculturalism ethos that would permeate mainstream policy discourse throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Abu-Laban 2014). Political
scientists have observed how Reform/Alliance was forced to realign its platform, eventually merging with the Progressive Conservative party in 2003, to form the new Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). None, however, have studied this period of realignment as a racial realignment. Instead, conservative writers have commented on the 1990s as being a “lost decade” for the Conservatives, noting the reign of Chretien’s and Martin’s Liberal governments. Conversely, I find that this period, marks a time of significant racial realignment for Canada’s Conservative parties; that is, Canada’s parties to the far right negotiated a neoliberalizing multiculturalism discourse to stake their legitimacy. While scholars have challenged the explicit and coded racism of Reform/Alliance and while more recently, scholars have paid attention to the CPC’s relatively successful appeals to minority voters, none have traced these appeals back to Reform/Alliances’ race-based appeals to racial populations. Findings in this chapter confirm that Reform members and policies govern the new Conservative party “by stealth” (Abu-Laban 2014). With reference to the Lewis Report (1992) and more recently, the work of Grace-Edward Galabuzi (2008), this chapter also points to the contradictions of the myths of neoliberal multiculturalism.

Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of the significance of the special appointments of Asian Conservative MPs as expert speakers on topics related to race. The chapter explores how the Asian Conservative MPs since 1997 have contributed to parliamentary discourse in these specially appointed roles. In his examination of how Black political elites have crusaded against “race-based policies,” Reed (1997) has shown how these political officials mobilized narratives of overcoming – poverty and discrimination – as part of a disciplinary politics against the Black working class and poor. Through similar overcoming narratives that adhere to a militant colourblind ideology, Asian Conservatives have positioned themselves as a more racially authentic voice of visible minorities in Canada. Moreover, by attacking equity-centred multiculturalism and “hyphenated identity” as divisive, the Asian MPs have practiced a neoliberal politics that caters to the investor class and that aligns comfortably with the conservative orthodoxy. Moreover, the chapter finds that Asian Conservatives that have arrived in Canada by way of African countries have staked their own claim to political legitimacy by contributing to a globally anti-Black discourse. Raced in the name of racelessness, the MPs mobilize personal and familial immigrant narratives of a bootstrap individualism as a way to re-legitimize the racial order. These personal narratives about individual success, racial progress,
and political modernity become integral to neoliberal racial rule. The MPs themselves become
the Conservative race-appeal in the advancement of a post-racial narrative.

Chapter 6 explores discourses and subjects of apology in the context of the Harper
Conservative government’s official apologies for Chinese Canadian exclusion (2006) and for the
Komagata Maru incident (2009). This chapter examines how Asian Conservative MPs have
contributed to these official apology events as part of a larger discourse of post-racialism. As
such, this chapter demonstrates how legacies of racial violence become contained and neutralized
in official apologies.

Chapter 7 reviews the Harper Conservative government’s fundamental changes to
Immigration and refugee policy particularly, as reflected in Bill C-31, C-43, and C-10.
Specifically, this chapter examines how Asian Conservative MPs have spoken as “legitimate”
immigrants and children of immigrants as a way to rationalize tightening state policies on
citizenship, immigration, and national security. This chapter observes an intensifying
criminalization of immigrants and refugees under the Harper Conservatives that is made possible
through the contributions of Asian Conservative MPs.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the state of race beyond Conservative and
Liberal rule while emphasizing the urgency of political education, social justice education and
conversations about race and politics beyond election time.
Chapter 2:
Regulated Difference: Governmentality and Asians on the Racial Landscape

*What does a banal notion of diversity do politically?*\(^{20}\)
- Himani Bannerji

This chapter begins with a review of key theoretical frameworks and analytic concepts integral to the study of racial conservative subjects and a politics of inclusion as part of racial governmentality: racial states, subjects, and an analytics of governmentality. This chapter traces how Asians in Canada shifted from a legally excluded racial population to then a subcategory of visible minorities that have been politically included. If inclusion is how racial governmentality works, through what racial logics or political rationale did Asians necessarily become desirable multicultural subjects on this landscape? The chapter demonstrates how even as Asians have been included, they have been cast as perpetually foreign. That is, racial others are further consolidated as perpetually foreigners-within to be tolerated and accommodated even as they are consulted and included into positions of power. The chapter also examines the development of Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework through the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963-1970). Through the emergent dual-white settler myth, English and French settlers remain the normative political authorities that consult others as part of their governing capacities while Indigenous and ethnic minorities become subjects to be consulted, included when palatable, and discarded when necessary. I argue that this framework, which establishes the authority to define political projects along settler colonial and racial lines informed the terms of political inclusion outlined in the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (1989-1991) and remains the framework through which the state and political parties (as state apparatus) imagine the management of Indigenous and racial populations. The chapter also shows how changes to immigration policy and the emergence of multiculturalism policy in the 1960s and 1970s has unevenly shaped the lives of racialized populations in Canada.

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Analytics of Governmentality and Advanced Liberal Government

The subject, state, and governance are key analytic concepts part of a Foucauldian methodology for understanding relations of power and rule in modern society. That is, a Foucauldian approach to the study of governmentality emphasizes analytics of power, subject formation, and the state. By government, Foucault refers to “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1982, 220-221), which involves practices that direct the conduct of the self and others (Dean 2010, 18). As clarified by Lemke, “The semantic linking of governing (gouverner) and modes of thought (mentalite) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them” (2002, 50). Thus, an analytics of governmentality is concerned with attempts “to bring any form of rationality to the calculation about how to govern” (Dean 2010, 18). For instance, this approach necessarily suspects a discourse of values and thus “claims to be operating in the service of ‘values’ must be scrutinized as components of the rhetorical practice of government and as part of different forms of governmental and political reason” (Dean 2010, 45). Otherwise referred to as “mentalities of government” (Miller and Rose, 1990), this approach emphasizes the ways in which the thinking involved in practices of government or political reasoning “is embedded in language and other technical instruments but is also relatively taken for granted, i.e. it is not usually open to questioning by its practitioners” (Dean 2010, 25). It is thus key to examine the types of rationalities that animate the forms of power relations or “regime of practices” within which they are immersed (Dean 2010, 133). Such a study then must strive “to identity the emergence of that regime, examine the multiple sources of the elements that constitute it, and follow the diverse processes and relations by which these elements are assembled into relatively stable forms of organization and institutional practice” (Ibid 31).

An analytics of government is the study not only of how we govern but also of self-government, that is, how we govern ourselves or what Dean has called “regimes of practices or regimes of government” (2010, 28). An analysis of such regimes is concerned with “the interiorization of surveillance and discipline” and social power upon, through, and by subjects in their self-making without reducing such power to the often questionable assumption of institutional state imposition” (Goldberg 2002, 105). In other words, government concerns “not only practices of government but also practices of the self” (Dean 2010, 20). Thus, an analytics of government is the study of the conditions under which “such regimes emerge, continue to
operate and are transformed” (Ibid. 23-4). For Foucault, liberal modes of government are preoccupied with notions of freedom or the capacities of those governed. As such liberal modes of government “often conceive the freedom of the governed as a technical means of securing the ends of government” (Dean 2010, 23-4). Foucault’s study of government locates power as an “open, strategic and reversible set of relations between liberties, and domination as the fixing and blocking of these relations into permanent, hierarchical distributions” (Foucault 1988 in Dean 2010, 58). Otherwise referred to as an art and rationality of government, liberalism “views the operation of individual liberty as necessary to the ends of government” (Dean 2010, 64).

As a regime of government, advanced liberalism constructs a society of self-determining, free subjects or autonomous agents: “This is a subject whose freedom is a condition of subjection. The exercise of authority presupposes the existence of a free subject of need, desire, rights, interests and choice. However, its subjection is also a condition of freedom: in order to act freely, the subject must first be shaped, guided, and moulded into one capable of responsibly exercising that freedom through systems of domination. Subjection and ‘subjectification’ are laid upon one another. Each is a condition of the other” (Dean 2010, 192-193). In other words, modern subjects “are not merely ‘free to choose’, but obliged to be free, to understand and enact their lives in terms of choice” (Rose 1999, 87 emphasis original). In this way, advanced liberal practices of rule are ‘practices of liberty’ in the sense that they involve “two distinct, yet intertwined technologies: technologies of agency, which seek to enhance and improve our capacities for participation, agreement and action; technologies of performance, in which these capacities are made calculable and comparable so that they might be optimized” (Dean 2010, 202 emphasis added). That is, advanced liberal regimes of government consult, negotiate, empower, and “activate forms of agency, liberty and the choices of individuals” while they also determine “norms, standards, benchmarks, performance indicators, quality controls and best practice standards, to monitor, measure and render calculable the performance of these various agencies” (Dean 2010, 193). This means that advanced liberal forms of government newly rely on empowering the citizen and appeals to the rights and liberties of individuals. Because “it is through identifications that various self-governing agencies are formed” (Dean 2010, 252), this means an analytics of government is concerned with the formation of identities or the subject of advanced liberal government. Studies of governmentality should thus ask:

What forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek? What
statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who exercise authority and those who are to be governed? What forms of conduct are expected of them? What duties and rights do they have? How are these capacities and attributes to be fostered? […] How are certain individuals and populations made to identify with certain groups, to become virtuous and active citizens, and so on? (Ibid 43).

More than this, the advanced liberal state gives rise to subjects that link “political objectives with personal conduct”. That is, the “governmentalization of the state was also accompanied by the incorporation of experts into the machinery of political government” (Rose 1999, 149). A Foucauldian analytic of governmentality is thus concerned with the disciplinary ends of liberalism – where subjects consent to the terms of their inclusion, participate in their own regulation and reproduce the terms of rule.

Racial States

In Racial States (2002), Goldberg has observed that studies of the state in racial terms have been delimited to blatant, extreme, obvious and thus exceptional cases, such as Nazi Germany, South Africa and segregationist South in the US (3). What such narrow analysis evades is the fact that all nations are configured through difference and indeed, modern western states have always been constituted through race. Goldberg has emphasized that the modern state is not an autonomous entity as most often theorized; rather, the state is a “political force fashioning and fashioned by economic, legal, and cultural forces (forces of production, of sociolegality, and of cultural representation)” (109). Goldberg’s study of racial governmentalities involves examining the state as “inherently contradictory and internally fractured, consisting not only of agencies and bureaucracies, legislatures and courts, but also of norms and principles, individuals and institutions” (7). As the institutionalization of power, the state is “by both design and effect, the institutionalized elevation of the interests – political, economic, legal, social, cultural – of some to the exclusion or devaluation of others” (130). The racial state is concerned with managing “difference”, that is, the “threat and unmanageability of the unknown, the diverse, the heterogeneous” (34). Thus, by way of “dealing with difference” or regulating and containing heterogeneity, modernity seeks to control not least by “knowing”, defining, confining but also including difference and by creating their “truth conditions”; that is, the parameters of possibilities for being and relating in the world in racial terms. Significant to this formulation is that as the state defines the outside or those (internally) external to the nation-state, so too does
the nation and those “internal” to its community become racially defined; that is, difference and sameness are constantly dialectically constructed and racially configured. Namely, the modern state defines and is defined by racial conceptions. Racial states both “define populations into racially identified groups, and they do so more or less formally through census taking, law, and policy” (109-110) and involves itself in the ongoing governance of racial matters. As critical race theorists have established, “modern states have taken themselves to be conceived and constituted, managed and maintained through the rule of law… Their very modernity is ordered through the racial configuration of law” (139). Studies of modern states thus entail examination of racially configuring discourses and the coded reproduction of inequalities through the law or “racial distinction in law’s lexicon” (150). Indeed, as his most notable contribution, Goldberg (1993) has stated that the paradox of liberalism is where all is race but race is irrelevant (4) and where the racial state is everywhere and simultaneously seen nowhere: “It (invisibly) defines almost every relation, shapes all but every interaction, contours virtually all intercourse” (2002, 98). Indeed, racial states are racial because of their role in controlling modes of representation, setting agendas or shaping the parameters of the possible, as well as in arranging and determining the scope of meanings and value through routinization and normalization embedded in common sense.

Winant defines a racial project as “simultaneously an interpretation, representation or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to re-organize or redistribute resources along particular racial lines” (1994, 56). In Towards a Global Idea of Race (2007), da Silva elaborates: “racial projects are competing ideologies deployed in the political arena; they also provide the basis for common-sense “racial identification” and explanations for differential positionings” (xxv-xxvi). A racial project thus sustains an idea of race in order to act upon it and organize around it. Race becomes something knowable, measurable, a signifier associated with things signified socially, politically, and economically. Goldberg has differentiated two forms of racial rule: naturalist and historicist or progressivist. Studies of race and racialization have differentiated conservative and liberal ideologies of and approaches to race. Naturalism and historicism or conservative and liberal approaches to race - these forms of racial rule or projects are “dialectically definitive of each other’s respective parameters of possible articulation” – constantly competing in the political arena (Goldberg 2002, 204). For Goldberg, naturalism instituted formal exclusion based on explicit appeals to supposedly naturally occurring human
difference on racial terms justifying thus unequal social, economic, political conditions. Historicism motivated movements against naturalism promoting “civilized moral conscience in the face of insistent and persistent naturalist regimes” (202). While historicism projects “abstract universal agency in the personhood of the colonized, a potential agency not yet actualized among the differentiations of their social specificity,” like naturalism, it remains committed to “the notion of universal subjectivity” (89); that is, both are committed to essentialism and race determinism – either by nature or history – that positions some as perpetually undeveloped or under-developed in relation to those who are developed or advanced in racial and gendered terms. Either way, the racial other is confined and (self)defined in racial rule “outside the space(s) of modern time” (93). It must be stated that American conservatism, unlike British conservatism (old rightism), has its foundations in liberalism or old leftism, stemming from the 1776 declaration of independence (Berkowitz 2004, xv-xvi; Giddens 1994). In fact “this larger liberalism, with its bedrock devotion to individual liberty and equality before the law, serves as the common ground on which the contending camps within conservatism” (Berkowitz, xxii). Similarly, variations of conservatism in Canada have their roots in racial liberalism, that is, historicist or progressivist racial rule. Likewise, Goldberg has argued that “Classical liberalism (which includes in its range much of the commitments of contemporary conservatism in the form of neoliberalism) thus was a key element historically in promoting racial reasoning and its racist implications as central to modernity’s common moral, socio-political, and jurisprudential sense” (5). In this sense, while Liberal and Conservative camps are usually cast as fundamentally distinguished from one another, both have committed to conceptions of race that are essentialist and determinist. Moreover, in the North American context, conservatism emerges out of the classical liberal tradition and thus also upholds liberal categories of difference maintained in economic structures and national norms. In their own ways, both have delimited which representations of difference have appeared reasonable, possible, and desirable and have made inequality appear necessary, natural and fair” (Melamed xvi). Thus, it is this liberal framework, as a grand paradigm, that must be dismantled (Mills 2009, 1381-1382).

Canada as a white settler racial state

Critical theorists have long since been attentive to state iterations of racelessness: cultural racism (Fanon 1967), polite racism (Fujitani 2011), new racism (Winant 1994, 2004), neo-racism
Postracialism, as the most recent instalment in the “historical narrative of progress” (Eng 2009, 1480) – like its antecedents is not race-neutral. It is indeed a racial project – a “disguised form of race privileging” (Gotanda 1995-1996, 1139). Like its antecedents the raceless racism of postracial states is not based on ignorance but rather it is reproduced through methodical, bureaucratic, meditative processes where “the material effects of racism remain as virulent as its denial of itself” (Winant 2004, xix). Forms of “raceless” racial rule involve a “complex and contradictory character that conjoined racialized exclusion and universalizing inclusion” (Fujitani 2011, 25). Goldberg addresses how versions of “raced racelessness” emerged and become elaborated in Brazil as racial democracy… in Europe as ethnic pluralism, in Australia or Canada as state multiculturalism, and in South Africa as non-racialism (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000 in Goldberg 2002, 201). These commitments to racelessness reflect “historical transformations in dominant forms of racial governance” (203), which were “fuelled as they often were by a mix of guilt and moral enlightenment … served nevertheless invariably to renew white social control and to promote white power and privilege in the face of emerging challenges” (213). Goldberg discusses this shift:

The racist predispositions and presumptions of progressivism or historicism…are more nuanced and hidden, less self-assertive, more worried about appearing so. But the dominant effect of this trajectory has been not the dismissal of racist commitment and expression as such but the replacement … of one form of racist articulation by another. The perpetuation of racial commitments and racist exclusions has been veiled behind this shift, preserved anew in the vocal dismissal of the bald and extreme in the name of the polite and subtle, of the presumptively unsustainable in wake of the enlightened (88).

Instead under “raceless” historicist regimes, racism is narrated as an antiquity or fading from view– an artefact of the past and characteristic of “unmodern” places. By the mid-twentieth century, racism is isolated to the vulgar and irrational naturalist camp while citizens of the raceless state continue to benefit from “reproducing racisms and distancing themselves from any implication in them” (Goldberg 2002, 99). Indeed, the raceless state enables its citizens to purge their “guilt and self-doubt” as the “less developed, the different” could be brought into civility through education and development that would instil values “rationally defined by white
standards and norms, ways of knowing and being, thinking and doing” (206). By invisibilizing race, racelessness came to represent “state rationality regarding race” (203).

Significant to the analysis of common culture that Canadian nationalism exhorts in the present day, Goldberg has suggested that in the name of neutrality, racelessness works to regulate heterogeneity and recentre whiteness, that is, the “norms of an Anglo-European moral tradition masquerading as modernizing universalism” (2002, 224). Thus, as extensions of racial states, raceless states continued to rely on the rule of law as an abstract(ed) commitment to formal equality to regulate difference. The mobilization of such abstract liberal democratic values, embedded in common sense and institutionalized beliefs and routines have contributed to the reproduction of inequalities. Thus racially configuring discourse codes its regulative, normative principles in "tropes such as race reform, racial progress, racial integration, ending racism, bringing in excluded voices, and living in a postracial society” (Melamed 2011, 11) As such, raceless states obscure the racial violence on which its socio-economic order thrives. Most importantly, in ostensibly raceless states, “racial rule comes to assume the rule of law” (Goldberg 2002, 142). As it will be discussed in chapters four through seven, the rule of law or playing by the rules become frequent references in Canadian parliamentary debate and must be understood as the invocation of racial rule. More importantly, in “socially dominant conservative, liberal, and corporate versions of multiculturalism that have informed state practice” […] “racelessness is the war not on racism but on racial reference” (233 emphasis added). It is a blatant foreclosure of the possibility of naming race in public political spaces. Attempts to bear witness to and name racism and challenge state-based inequalities instead are charged with “reverse racism” against those whites supposedly suffering the exclusionary effects of “preferential treatment” or “positive discrimination”. In a refusal to reckon with the maintenance of inequalities reproduced in racelessnesses, “the racist group points accusingly to a manifestation of racism among the oppressed” (Fanon 1967; Balibar 1991; Fujitani 2011).

In official discourse, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 is accepted as a “major symbolic reversal for racist ideologies and a global political rebuff for movements that championed racist policies” (Rattansi 2011, 15 emphasis added). The Declaration is narrated as the inspiration for what has come to be understood as sweeping inclusionary changes to

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21 It is less widely known that despite the sudden wave of international sympathy with human rights and despite passionate endorsement from the United States, the Canadian government’s response to the document was hesitant, at best (Price 2011). For details, see Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 14, 1948, ed. H. Mackenzie (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 350-68.
Canadian policies and laws in decades that followed. Historian, Constance Backhouse (1999) has documented how Canada’s nationalist mythology - as having “exceptionally” avoided inter-racial strife that permeates other nations - has produced an “ideology of racelessness” (14). Researchers have documented how this mythology is only made possible by disavowing ongoing colonial violence that constituted the nation and the citizen-subjects within it (Razack 1999; Oikawa 2002; Thobani 2007). According to Razack (1999): “Canadians imagine their state as a white settler society, one that is a clone of Great Britain. In this historical construction, the presence and central importance of aboriginal peoples, peoples of colour and the French minority are all forgotten” (176). That is, the presumption that Canada is raceless is only made possible by evading the fact of ongoing colonialism – a national anxiety that demands constant state attention. That is to say, the state is required to manage counter-narratives that challenge its “raceless” reputation carefully. That is, in Canada, English and French groups are able to stake their claim as “founding nations” through a racialized settler nationalism (Haque 2012, 18-19).

The violent formation of white settler societies involves “varying levels of physical and cultural genocide; alienation of Indigenous land; disruption of Indigenous societies, economies, and governance; and movements of Indigenous resistance (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995, 19).

In her examination of Canada’s mythology of national belonging as it emerged out of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963-1970), Haque refers to Weitzer’s (1990) three pillars for stable settler rule. Of these conditions, Weitzer’s final pillar of settler rule – the maintenance of settlers caste solidarity and the state’s cohesion - is key to Haque’s examination of white settler hegemony. That is, according to Weitzer: ‘Although the great divide is that between settlers and the Indigenous population, settler unity is never a foregone conclusion’ as ‘internal conflicts within the state and dominant community – along class, ethnic, political, or cultural lines – can be dangerous” (Weitzer 1990, 28 in Haque 2012, 19). In other words, the management of difference or heterogeneity in the population is part of how the dual-white settler regime sustains itself. Through various discourses of integration, the state enforces an ideal of sameness or homogeneity, which involves “the relative externalization of threats and the different” (Goldberg 2002, 154). In its extreme manifestation, this normative regulation involves the elimination of internal and external threats.
Haque (2012) argues that as a white settler state, Canada has had to uphold “settler caste solidarity and social cohesion through the institution of an Anglo-Celtic hegemony” (21). As such, the B and B Commission was established at an historical juncture when “the legitimacy of established modes of articulating national unity” was being challenged. According to Haque: “It was in this project of finding a new basis for articulating social cohesion that the commission would finally have to contend with reconciling the challenges to Anglo-Celtic dominance from Others within the nation” (21). In other words, this juncture gave rise to profound shifts in modes of instituting normative and rationalizing power and new principles of regulation. As this chapter will show, it was at yet another similar historical juncture that the state established the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform (1989-1991). Challenges raised and demands made by “ethnocultural and visible minority groups” had to be re-negotiated in the white settler state’s ongoing dilemma of national unity. That is, for the state to appear legitimate and just, it craves racial subjects that can reproduce the white settler state.

Thus, utilizing an analytics of governmentality, this thesis shows how multiculturalism has been a technique of governing racial heterogeneity in advanced liberal government – specifically in white settler states. Multiculturalism discourse has facilitated the emergence and preservation of racial hierarchies and justifies these inequities through various liberal rationalities. As a regime of government, multiculturalism has given rise to subjects that consent to the terms of inclusion and participate in their own regulation. The thesis in part examines the conditions under which the dual-white settler state as a regime of practice continues to operate and is transformed by the multiple elements that constitute it and reproduce it. The thesis follows the diverse processes and relations by which these elements are assembled into relatively stable forms of organization and institutional practice. The next section examines how racial hierarchies have adapted from the era of legislative exclusion to the era of de jure inclusion while ensuring that whiteness remains supreme even as it shifts. The thesis further explores how the inclusion of racial others has been part of ongoing white settler state governance.

**Perpetually foreign: Including Chinese, East Indian and Japanese in Canada**

Asians have been the “foreigners within” since their arrival in Canada. They did not win the vote until 1947 and have at several times in their history been marked as threats to the nation. As a white settler state, it is well documented that Canada’s political representatives and
lawmakers sought to maintain “White Canada forever” (Ward 1978). Even while Asians have been present in Canada since the late 1700’s, “conventional notions about Asians in Canada centre on the idea that they were latecomers, that Canada had already been settled and that their arrival posed new questions in ethnic relations” (Price 2011, 13). Political leaders in British Columbia voted to disenfranchise, that is, politically exclude Asians from voting, running for office, service in the military and pursuing professional occupations and by 1875 Royal Assent was given to the British Columbia legislature's decision to deny Chinese and Aboriginal peoples a vote in provincial elections (Ibid, 15). Of course, that political candidates had to be male, British subjects and property owners – as stipulated by the Constitution Act of 1867 meant that Asians in Canada were disqualified from seeking election. A series of legislative amendments and regulations worked to keep Asians out and in the margins of the nation (Price 2011; Raj 1980; Roy 1980). This chapter shows how even with some measures of inclusion, Asians in Canada continue to be imagined as foreign or newly arriving and their allegiances questioned (Chang 1999, 20).

Researchers have observed the government’s efforts to not only control immigration but to ensure that Asians in Canada would be excluded from the political realm. Samuel Raj observed early resistance against “East Indian” political participation: "the possibility that they might participate in the forthcoming provincial election caused grave concern and there arose the cry that the polls were "unprotected against the Hindus". The result was the Bowser amendment to the Election Act which simply added "Hindus" to other "Asian undesirables" - Chinese and Japanese, who had already been disenfranchised" (1980, 74). Similarly, Ann Sunahara documents how "in 1920, when the issue of enfranchising Asians arose with the introduction of Borden’s Dominion Elections Act - a federal franchise act, the issue was quietly squelched at the request of politicians from British Columbia” (1980, 95). Likewise, a 1931 article in the Victoria Colonist cautioned, "When we begin to give some Orientals the vote, the next generation would demand it for all" (Victoria Colonist, 7 April 1931 in Ito 1984, 73). Indeed, such pronounced resistance came because in that same year, the British Columbia legislature granted franchise to about eighty Japanese veterans – survivors who had managed with difficulty to enlist in World

22 Parliamentary debates that led to the establishment of anti-Asian Canadian laws reveal the political reasoning that resulted in the systematic demonization, containment, and expulsion of Canadians. Chapter 7 shows that these racial logics continue to legitimize the criminalization of racial others in immigration and refugee debates.
War One and who after the war campaigned for the right to vote\(^{23}\) (Roy 1978, 343). Throughout the 1930s, a few voices did call for the extension of the franchise to all native-born Canadians including H.F. Angus, a professor of economics and political science at the University of British Columbia who pled “the cause of Asians” and faced rigid opposition (Roy 1980, 86-87; Raj 1980, 74). In parliament, the founder of the CCF Party\(^{24}\) J.S. Woodsworth argued in the Commons that the "oriental ought to be able to vote in British Columbia".\(^{25}\) Woodsworth believed there was "no excuse in a civilized country" for refusing "fair play" to the Orientals within it" (Roy 1980, 87). Such race-based appeals did not go without opposition. Liberal Party campaign slogans included one that argued: “A Vote for ANY C.C.F. Candidate is a VOTE TO GIVE the CHINAMAN and JAPANESE the same Voting Right that you have!”\(^{26}\) Such resistance emerges out of the assumption that racial others espouse political beliefs and conduct political activities incongruous with Canadian procedure. This assumes that the inclusion of Asians would profoundly alter parliament as the symbolic political space of “White Canada,” which ensured the decisive alienation of Asians in Canada. Leading up to the 1935 federal election “Liberal and Conservative candidates warned that once the Orientals got the vote, they would be elected to the Legislature and to Parliament, would repeal laws (including those relating to immigration) designed to protect the white population and would appoint Orientals to important government jobs” (Roy 1978, 87).\(^{27}\) Those who believed that Japanese veterans receiving the vote in 1931 was a step towards inevitable inclusion for all Asians were faced with the resilience of racism that was to come. Talks to relax immigration restrictions, evidence of economic cooperation, and episodes of sympathetic consideration of Asians in Canada amounted to what Patricia Roy has called “the illusion of tolerance” as the Depression era made targets out of racial populations again (Roy 1978, 87-88).

Military participation was considered by all racial minorities in Canada to be a stepping-stone towards civil rights. James St G. Walker has observed how "The Japanese believed that

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\(^{23}\) Despite provincial laws that granted the vote to Japanese Canadian veterans in 1931, the same right was not afforded to Black, Indigenous, and Sikh-Canadian veterans.

\(^{24}\) The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, a social democratic and democratic-socialist political party in Canada founded in 1932 in Calgary by socialist, agrarian, co-operative and labour groups, and the League for Social Reconstruction. In 1944, it became the first social-democratic government in North American when it was elected to form the provincial government in Saskatchewan. In 1961, it was replaced by the New Democratic Party.


\(^{26}\) House of Commons, Debates, 27 February 1936, p. 575. Nonetheless, Woodsworth’s successors, McInnes and Winch would acquiesce to parliament during WWII and supported the internment of Japanese Canadians.

\(^{27}\) Debates - House of Commons. 14\(^{th}\) parliament, 2\(^{nd}\) session: vol. 5 4646.
war participation would earn them the franchise, a hope that was shared by some Indian groups. Blacks maintained that a war for justice must have an impact on 'the progress of our race' in Canada” (Walker 1989, 6; Ruck 1987). Stevenson has also observed how “Native Canadian recruitment strategies under the NRMA proved to be an important factor in a more progressive re-orientation of government policy toward Canadian Natives in the postwar era” (Stevenson, 2001, 50).

Narratives about these military histories and veterans of colour continue to shape how the nation views itself as progressive. For instance, in June 2013, a three-day summit at Vancouver’s Aboriginal Friendship Centre entitled “Red Tails and Dragon Tales,” brought together two groups of WWII veterans that “faced discrimination”: the Tuskegee Airmen and Chinese-Canadian veterans. The event highlighted how both groups’ military contributions were instrumental to helping the Allies win the war and also to changing societal attitudes in their home countries: “Despite this segregation and prejudice, the Tuskegee Airmen went on to become one of the most highly respected fighter groups in the war”[…]. “Despite this discrimination, when the WWII broke out, Chinese men and women volunteered in the hundreds to fight for Canada” (2013, 2). Such narratives of overcoming obscure historical and contemporary racial violence faced by soldiers of colour. Moreover, such narratives obscure histories of recognition, at least in Canada, where Black veterans were not recognized alongside Japanese veterans.

Indeed, World War II became a critical political moment for Asian Canadians as well. As the allied forces moved their attention to the Pacific theatre after defeating Germany, supply and demand for Asian soldiers in North America shifted dramatically. Many Asians in Canada living without status and under precarious conditions - including Canada’s first Asian MP Douglas Jung - believed that the franchise was hinged on their participation in the war, that is, in proving their loyalty to king and country. Politicians committed to ongoing Asian exclusion were thus adamantly opposed to their inclusion into the Canadian military. According to Patricia Roy, those who “feared Oriental domination” … “military service was the ‘thin edge of the

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30 “A Historic meeting: WWII Tuskegee Airmen visit our Chinese-Canadian veterans.” The Maple Leaf and Dragon, A Newsletter of the Chinese Canadian Military Museum, September 14, 2013 Fall 2013
wedge' leading to franchise " (1978, 343). With the support of both Liberal and Conservative parties, Chinese, Japanese, and East Indians in Canada were systematically disenfranchised and barred from military service as a way to prohibit entire groups from political participation in the nation.

Parliamentary debates about Chinese and Japanese Canadian admissibility (as soldiers and citizens) continued to oscillate. The demand for bodies in combat exceeded overt racism that kept Asians excluded. Roy Ito (1984) notes several cases where Canada’s various government committees, news media, and military officials expressed sympathy towards the Japanese in Canada, often condemning “deplorable” allegations made against their assumed “illegality” (115-130). World War Two discourses debated the suitability of different Asian groups in racial terms. Abu-Laban and Gabriel have remarked on efforts during the war as foreshadowing “aspects of multiculturalism policy” (2002, 107) where as a way to unite Canadians for the war effort, “The Department of National War Services established an Advisory Committee on Cooperation in Citizenship,” which among other tasks was created to:

Encourage cultural activities which may promote mutual understanding and esteem between Canadian citizens of different origins; and to interest itself in situations that appear to be producing misunderstanding, dissatisfaction or discord among groups of Canadians of European origin, non-French and non-British, or between these groups and other Canadian citizens and, if it is thought advisable, to make representations with respect to such situations to the appropriate bodies or authorities” (2002, 107).

While there was some reluctance to volunteer as The National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) of 1940 and 1942 excluded Chinese and Japanese Canadians,31 a call from the British War Office in 1944 specifically called for “Chinese Canadians to work in Special Operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific”, which subsequently pressured the NRMA to be amended to call up Chinese Canadians (Ito 1984, 152). Despite this partial inclusion, Asians remained duplicitous indeed.

On February 1942, “the Cabinet passed an order-in-council authorizing the minister of justice to evacuate all persons of Japanese race from the coast of British Columbia” (Ito 1984,

31 There are a number of works examining Asian Canadians and Canadian military in the World Wars mostly using Liberal frameworks. Critical race analysis – one that can critically frame understanding of multicultural militarism today - still awaits.
As a way to dispel the myth of Canadian exceptionalism, after Canada had rescinded evacuation orders in January 1945, the government introduced three new orders to cleanse the nation of its Japanese population. Price elaborates, “On 17 December 1945, the government introduced three orders-in-council: PC 7356, stripping those going to Japan of their citizenship; PC 7357, creating a loyalty commission to investigate other suspicious cases; and PC 7355, authorizing deportation” of Japanese nationals, naturalized citizens and Canadian born Japanese (Price 2011, 135-136). The Marine Angel, the General Meigs, and the Marine Falcon are the names of the ships that exiled nearly four-thousand Canadians of Japanese descent in 1946. By January 1947, criticisms against the government forced the repeal of the orders but not without negative reaction. For instance, on 22 June 1947, one week after the Liberal government announced the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act, “soon-to-be prime minister, Louis St. Laurent, insist[ed] that, unless the Japanese were deported, they would create trouble” (Price 2011, 145).

As a result of organized demands, support from the CCF and civil society, franchise was extended to all Chinese Canadians on February 20, 1947 and on June 15, 1948 “Bill 195 was passed to amend the section of the Dominion election act which specified that person denied the provincial franchise were also denied the federal franchise” (Ito 1984, 282). Of the 1940s, it is not uncommon to read that “Laws barring Asians from certain professions were reversed” (Bolaria and Li 1988, 173). The franchise has often been narrated as (uni-dimensional) moments where Chinese, Japanese and South Asian Canadians were extended the vote. Racial liberal discourses assume that racial progress is inevitable. As Ito surmises: “It would have come in any case” (1984, 284). Ito continues:

After the war, the winds of change were sweeping into every corner, in Asia, in Africa, and in the Americas, and they left their mark in British Columbia. In the newly created United Nations, Canada pledged to support fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of the human person, and the equal rights of men and women. Racial prejudice and animosity were no longer popular (Ibid, 284 emphasis added).

For Ito and others, the franchise came about not as a result of organized demands or even military participation. Instead, what becomes circulated are seamless stories about the

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32 Roy has noted that “Whereas the US Congress (1943) began to take minimal measures to implement a quota system for immigration from Asia, the Canadian government refused to even consider quotas for new emigrants from Asia. Immigration was restricted to relatives only, narrowly defined” (Roy 2007 in Price 307).
inevitability of racial progress and the inherent goodness of modern western civilization. Nor is it uncommon to encounter accounts that suggest, "British Columbia did not see the Chinese as a threat to their way of life… unlike the Japanese, the Chinese had made no organized demand for the franchise" (Ito 1984, 152). Indeed, debates on the suitability of Asians as measured through moderate relationships with the state appear not new. In debating the suitability of certain racial populations, resistance (anti-colonial/anti-racist) and organized political demands for recognition and representation are cast as undesirable political conduct.

Indeed, despite the franchise, Asians were ambivalently included and remained duplicitous as evidenced by prime minister Mackenzie King’s 1947 repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act while simultaneously reiterating his commitment to keeping Canada white: “The people of Canada, he stated, do not wish “as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of [their] population. Large-scale immigration from the Orient would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population”.33 Then in 1951, as Canada entered the Korean War, Canada’s then-prime minister Louis St. Laurent delivered a speech entitled, “The Preservation of Civilization” at the University of Toronto. St. Laurent described the Soviet Union as a “menace to civilization” and exclaimed, “civilization was “advancing steadily over the face of the globe” and only “ignorance and barbarism” stood as obstacles in that path.34

It should be clear by now that the Liberal Party of Canada under King and St. Laurent are not the Liberal Party under Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau. Indeed, right-wing voices have narrowly argued that anti-Asian discrimination policies passed under Liberal governments: the MacDonald government legislated the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1885 and the Mackenzie King government instituted the Japanese Internment during the Second World War. Yet, the formal apologies and reparations to the Japanese and Chinese Canadians for these racist policies came from the Conservative Mulroney (1988) and Harper (2006) governments, respectively. Indeed, because of this history, Canadian MP Douglas Jung vowed not to join the Liberal Party in the 1950s (Lowe 2007). However, debates preoccupied with the question of which party is or is not racist evade more important questions about the Canadian racial state and racial governance that have been reproduced in various ways by all political parties. In other words, it is more important

to study how racial rule under the Canadian white-settler racial state has transformed over time in order to secure its dominance beyond Liberal and Conservative rule.

The formal removal of racial discrimination is thus part of how the racial rule transforms. The racial state was re-energized by a racial liberal discourse in postwar Canada. According to a 1947 report entitled, “The United States and the Soviet Union: A Study of the Possibility of War and Some of the Implications for Canadian Policy” by Pearson’s chief aide Escott Reid: “The Soviet Union today is posing as the principal defender of the rights of coloured and colonial people […] if the Western powers are unable to remove racial discriminations rapidly and to satisfy the demands of colonial peoples for self-government, the Western powers may have the great majority of the colonial and coloured peoples hostile or unfriendly to them in the event of war with the Soviet Union” (Price 2011, 146 emphasis added). In these statements, anti-colonial independence movements: “India in 1947, China in 1949, Ghana in 1956, Algeria in 1961” (Goldberg 2002, 211) became articulated as “communist-led insurgency under the direction of the Soviet Union” (Price 2011, 126). For Pearson and Reid, the removal of racial discrimination is about Canada’s place in a shifting paradigm of global racial government. The racial state is shaped and reshaped “in part by the resistance response of those it most directly and viscerally affected, namely, the racially characterized, marginalized, exploited and excluded” (Goldberg 2002, 4). In other words, it became necessary to manage the “racial contradictions that antiracist and anticolonial movements exposed” (Melamed 2011, 4). Thus, political officials realized that Canada could not effectively operate within the new racial order without changing its racist policies. At war’s end, proclamations of the “end of racism” were thus about ”camouflaging the shift in racial configuration and representation” (Goldberg 2002, 210). Indeed, “the state of emergency is also always a state of emergence” (Bhabha 1994: 41 in Goldberg 2002, 247). Asians would be courted in an ideological war between modern capital and communism. It was in this context that Canada elected its first Asian Member of Parliament (1957), as it will be discussed in Chapter three.

In the post-war era and into the 1960s and 1970s, as human rights discourse became vital to the formation of the modern western nation state, de jure racial exclusion had to be replaced with new technologies of racial governance without necessarily abandoning racial hierarchies. Simultaneously, the post war economy demanded a skilled labour force that could not be filled by European sources (Mackey 1999, 66). As a result of these mounting pressures, the Canadian
government needed to “de-racialize” its immigrant selection process while still maintaining control and selectivity. In 1967, the government of Canada introduced a “points system” "whereby an individual applicant was assessed according to the requirements of the labour market, his or her occupational skills, education, age, and language ability" (Indra 1980, 164; Abu-Laban & Gabriel 2002, 43). Skills discourse and a points system at the heart of contemporary organizing principle of Canadian immigration policy –has served to further mesh immigration with labour market requirements, labour cycles, and the interests of business (Abu Laban & Gabriel 2002, 44; Abu-Laban 1998, 72). Thus, contemporary immigration policy emerges out of legacy where the suitability of potential migrants could be measured on economic and racial terms. That is, post-1967 immigration policy claims to formally remove preference based on race, nationality, or ethnicity yet racial codification is sustained in them. The economic determinants of immigration policy established in 1967 paved the way for a business model of multiculturalism “rooted in economic rationality and national interest as exemplified in Mulroney’s 1986 speech on “Multiculturalism Means Business” (Fleras 2009, 75). Asian immigration levels nearly quadrupled from 7% to 25% in the decade between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s (Indra 1980, 170). Asians became not only desirable as workers but as investors with ties to lucrative Asian markets (The Economic Council of Canada 1975: 55 in Indra 1980, 176). As such immigration to Canada would flow from those Asian countries whose GNP was increasing rapidly and from those countries which were already heavily influenced by British or American contact not limited to “Hong Kong, India, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines" (Indra 1980, 177). As such, some scholars have noted how "the government brought into existence the most economically rationalized act in Canada's immigration history” (Indra 1980, 168). However, this obscures the fact that entry into the nation and the conditions of life upon arrival have always been economically rationalized.

With reference to historian Afua Cooper’s research, Austin emphasizes how the history of slavery in Canada has been a “well-kept secret” owing to dominant narratives of Canadian innocence and benevolence namely, of the Underground Railroad, “which projects Canada as a haven for Black slaves fleeing US bondage” (Austin 2010, 27). Barrington Walker has also found that even while slavery in Canada was abolished in 1833 and by the 1920s “was virtually dead as an institution,” anti-Black discrimination remained (Walker 2010, 3). Commenting on King’s 1947 speech and “new rights and new racisms” in the post-war era, Barrington Walker
has discussed how “Firstly, admission was to be seen as a privilege and a matter of the government’s discretion. Secondly, immigrants were to be viewed in terms of what they could bring to the country. Thirdly, immigration was not to change the fundamental character of the country” (Walker 2008, 238). That is, even while Canada introduced an ostensibly colour-blind immigration policy in the 1960s: “It is clear, however, that many – though certainly not all – non-white immigrant groups tend to languish at or near the bottom of Canada’s socio-economic ladder. They often face a daunting number of covert, systemic barriers to full inclusion in the mainstream of Canadian political and economic life. In addition, many non-whites in Canada, such as domestics and agricultural workers, are allowed in the country for their labour but denied the benefits of Canadian citizenship” (Walker 2008, 238).

In other words, the post-war era of racial liberalism unevenly affected the lives of racialized populations in Canada. Scholars have demonstrated how 1960s and 1970s changes to immigration and multiculturalism policies did not improve the lives of Black Canadians. To say Canada is a nation of immigrants is to say that it is not a nation of indigenous people but it is also that this desirable immigrant is specifically not Black. For example, Dionne Brand (2008) has examined how Black women claimed their rights to new kinds of paid labour in the post-war era. Despite the abolition of slavery, Brand describes how “Black women of the time had inherited not only the burdensome legacy of a labour force stratified by race and gender but also a social milieu steeped in racial hatred” (Brand 2008, 239-240). With reference to James St G. Walker’s research, Brand reminds us how “in 1941, 80% of Black adult females in Montreal were employed as domestic servants” (Walker 1981, 132 in Brand 2008, 243). Specifically, Brand notes how as white Canadian housewives faced a “domestic crisis” at the end of the war, “the solution lay in immigration” as the Canadian government recruited thousands from Europe to become domestic workers (Brand 2008, 248). However, Brand finds how “by 1949 the importation of European servants failed to make up the shortage, Black Caribbean women were imported to do the job. Nowhere do they mention race as an actor in the Canadian “servant problem” (Brand 2008, 248). These conditions of labour and differentiated citizenship continued as the Canadian government developed the Foreign Domestic Movement (FDM) policy in 1981 and in 1992 established the Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP). In their examination of how

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Caribbean and Filipina domestic workers in Canada have negotiated their status, Stasiulis and Bakan have noted the racial logics that govern these domestic worker programs and policies. Specifically they observe how “There is a notable preference among domestic placement agencies in Canada to recruit Filipinas from outside Manila […] In contrast, West Indian women in search of domestic service as a means of emigrating are not on the most favoured list in Canada, or in any other country” (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997, 126). As such the researchers find that many West Indian women were forced to enter as visitors in order to work in Canada, that is, as undocumented workers, rather than through the FDM/LCP.

In yet another study, Nelson reminds us that “the last Africville home was bulldozed in 1970” (2002, 216). That this eviction took place in the midst of Canada’s much-celebrated era of civil rights clearly reveals how Black life has been conceived of as categorically outside the idea of progress and development. That is, the dislocation of Africville residents is part of an ongoing process of “eviction, suppression, and denial” that must be considered in “the context of a history of the displacement and enslavement of Black people by whites in North America… a worldview that demanded their containment and denial” (Nelson 2002, 212-214).

Glen Coulthard remarks on the contradictions of this post-war era of racial liberalism. Coulthard traces the emergence of a new regime of racial order to 1969 as “the modus operandi of colonial power relations in Canada shift[ed] from a more or less unconcealed structure of domination to a form of colonial governance that works through the medium of state recognition and accommodation” (Coulthard 2014, 25). Notably, these changes remain “structurally oriented around achieving the same power effect it sought in the pre-1969 period: the dispossession of Indigenous peoples” (ibid 25). Thus, these histories demonstrate how even while the 1960s and 1970s brought “the era of civil rights, changes in immigration policy, and official multiculturalism,” these changes unevenly affected the lives of Indigenous, Black and Asian Canadians and true equality is “still very much an unfinished revolution” (Walker 2010, 6). Also observing the contradictions of the extended period of ostensible civil rights, Stasiulis and Bakan note, “Despite the advent in 1982 of a new and controversial Constitution, including a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and regardless of the political party in office at both the federal and provincial levels, social services, the rights of immigrants and visible minorities, working women's access to public childcare and other historic provisions of the welfare state have been in continual decline” (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997, 120).
Setting the terms of political inclusion: Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework

The opening up of immigration policy and increased immigration from Asia, Africa and their Diasporas led to demands for a more substantial representative and inclusive polity. As immigration opened up, a policy to manage the increasingly heterogeneous population became necessary. Eve Haque has shown how The Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism (1963-1970) has established “a new mythology of national belonging” (2012, 240). That is, out of the narrow definition of multiculturalism in Book IV’s recommendations emerged a national formulation of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework as a way “to install a racial order of difference and belonging through language in the ongoing project of white settler nation-building” (ibid 5). In other words, a new Canadian mythology was debated and defined in “linguistic and cultural terms while the effects were organized along racial and ethnic lines” (ibid 240). That is, a racialized hierarchy of belonging and citizenship rights was normalized through terms of language and culture that re-secured whiteness as the Canadian norm. Indeed, the range of concerns presented by indigenous groups and “other ethnic groups” during the inquiry’s preliminary and public hearings were distilled into an overall singular national crisis between English and French groups. Challenges raised by indigenous groups “which had displayed a propensity toward armed struggles for land claims” (Bannerji 2000, 9) were rationalized away “by deeming Aboriginal languages fossilized and premodern” (Haque 2012, 235). The claims for cultural retention made by “other ethnic groups” were deemed separate from issues of language preservation. Concerns raised by “other ethnic groups” for state recognition were also characterized as fragmented; thus, negating their group demands for substantive language rights. Such strategies and rationales were used to trivialize the concerns of Indigenous and ethnic groups and cast the inquiry as one concerned with a national crisis between English and French groups; effectively reproducing “other ethnic groups” as a homogeneous population that would become described as “multicultural” in national discourse. The concretization of “multicultural” as a racial category into its current mundane signification is revealed in Haque’s study.

The policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism that emerged out of the B and B continue to shape Canada’s national narrative where the idea of “two founding nations” is made

36 The Contributions of Other Ethnic Groups
possible only through the constant erasure of challenges raised by Indigenous and “other ethnic
groups”. Even while claiming racelessness, the state has preserved the dominance of two ethnic
groups – the English and French – as evidenced by their constitutional recognition as the two
official languages. Indeed, Haque has identified the paradox of multicultural nationalism and
national identity. That is, white-settler bilingual and bicultural hegemony and its accompanying
hierarchy of group-differentiated rights makes equal citizenship for all Canadians impossible.
Rather than promote equality, multiculturalism policy has led to inequity, discourses of
integration, and the conservation of racial hierarchy.

Indeed, multiculturalism was “racialized from its inception” (Rattansi 2011, 9) where the
question of cultural accommodation evades the power relations that produce essentialized
“difference” in the first place. The construction of difference to be included has been integral to
Canada’s flexible strategies of nation-building project. According to Thobani: “Multiculturalism
is ‘a way of imagining the nation itself’, which allows it to live with the difference of others,
while claiming this difference to enhance its own cultural superiority” (Thobani 2007, 145).
Thus, state based multiculturalism has been about state management of heterogeneity “to ensure
that people don’t act upon their differences to disrupt the status quo […] The disruptiveness of
diversity is dispelled by homogenizing differences around a singular commonality” (Fleras 2009,
110). Multiculturalism enters the public discourse in 1960s and 1970s as the solution to the crisis
of whiteness where “the national subject remained empowered by displacing the patterns of
discrimination and racial hatred onto the now disclaimed past or onto its own rejected,
obstreperous, and stubborn minority in the present” (Thobani 2007, 154).

In particular, multiculturalism discourse’s preoccupation with cultural difference presents
Canada as a land of immigrants “finding unity in diversity” allowing for the disavowal of
ongoing colonial violence and Indigenous dispossession (James 2013). Indeed, Canada’s official
multiculturalism policy framework constructs Indigenous people as just another cultural group
inclusion of the complex history of land and treaties, Aboriginal peoples are then slotted into the
broader liberal multicultural ethos as though they were another cultural or “ethnic” group making
demands for cultural respect and maintenance” (54). Far from “extricating Canada from its
colonialist past” (Fleras 2009, 88), scholars have critiqued seamless narratives about the
development of multicultural policies by revealing how strategies and rationalities upholding
racial hierarchies have merely been recalibrated rather than reversed. Colonialism and other legacies of racial violence are thus occluded from our “knowledge” of other cultures. Through discourses of a unifying and homogeneous national identity, difference becomes essentialized and depoliticized as culture becomes the way we define and act upon Others (Kymlicka 1998 in Dhamoon 2009). That is, racism persists under the “veneer of democracy” where the “culturalizing of race and racism” facilitates the “denial of racism” (Essed 1988, 9).

The B and B Commission reiterated a founding myth that recognized English- and French-Canada as founding partners of the nation, recognized the contributions of ethnics as “other”-than, and again effectively evaded Indigenous populations. Contemporaneously, the state produced the 1969 White Paper to abolish the Indian Act, reject land claims, and forcefully assimilate Aboriginal people into Canada just as any other ethnic group, as opposed to recognizing the effects of colonization (Day 2008, 51). Scholars have analyzed this as the recentring of whiteness and Anglo-Canadians as ordinary Canadians while others would remain outside that category (Haque 2012; Thobani 2007; Mackey 1999). In other words, postwar policy developments played a key role in providing rationalization for officially sustaining the supremacy of whiteness with a new discourse of inclusivity. The B and B Commission facilitated the emergence of an unspecified notion of multiculturalism and language as the terrain on which Indigenous and other ethnic groups could negotiate claims for inclusion. According to Haque (2012):

> the ongoing anxieties and crises about the place of the other in the nation emerge out of a contradictory set of rights and hierarchical relations, put into place through our current federal formulation of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, which delineates groupings, their rights, and their mode of national belonging. These crises indicate that our current formulation gives rise to principles for nation building which cannot accommodate who we are and have become since the BB Commission was inaugurated (251).

The politicization of minoritized groups has required that the state continuously manage various contestations and demands - that is, the “crisis” that such heterogeneity brings to the modern state’s racial project of homogenization. The state has had to constantly reassert itself as raceless in its management of the challenges waged against it by those that refuse state containment. The state has had to reassert a seamless singular narration of national unity in order to suppress multiple narrations that identify the state’s contradictions and challenge its patronizing “diversity” platitudes.
By 1989, in the ongoing management of difference, sameness, and Canadian identity, white “ethnocultural” groups were made distinct from “visible minorities” as emergent categories of regulation. That is, the descriptive categories of “ethnocultural” and “visible minority” used in the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (1989-1991) find their antecedents in the B and B Commission’s conceptualization of these groups as the “third force.” In this formulation, visible minorities, in particular are understood always as “new” Canadians, which aligns with the stereotypical trope of the “perpetual foreigner” commonly associated with Asian Canadians. Visible minorities, already established as “other” to Canadian “founding groups”, become discursively constructed as “special interest groups” whose politics relegated them to the fringe, promoting disunity as they undermine Canadian tradition and values through the courts. This national discourse perpetuates the myth that British and French are not also ethnic groups thereby recentring the privileged position that afford them special group rights under the pretext of “neutrality” and “fairness”. As part of a longer legacy of white settler solidarity, the Lortie Commission’s final report distilled the various claims and demands for substantive recognition and representation from Canadian racialized groups’ into a crisis of political party dominance against the Charter. Thus, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (1989-1991) is part of a legacy of the disciplinary ends of racial liberalism directed towards the integration of “other ethnic groups.”


The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism found that "between 1867 and 1964, only ninety-seven individuals from non-founding ethnic groups were elected to the House of Commons (Canada, 1970, 282)." Twenty years later, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing [RCERPF], also known as the Lortie Commission (1989-1991) after chairman Pierre Lortie, was established by Order in Council P.C. 2290 on November 15, 1989 by the recommendation of Prime Minister Mulroney to re-evaluate the principles of representative governance. In defining the objectives of electoral democracy, the final report refers to the fall of the Berlin Wall as part of the global political juncture at which the inquiry was established in 1989. Indeed, according to the report: “An equitable socio-economic order cannot be built on an

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inequitable political order” (Final Report 1991, 1). Elections, the report says, are more than mechanisms for choosing governors -- they represent the political culture and values of Canadian society (Ibid 7-8).

Invoking cold war logics, the occasion of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform was an occasion for the state to rearticulate itself as free through an imagined unfree East. Among other characteristics, the right to vote, to be a candidate, and to participate in free and open elections, says the final report, are what make us free and democratic and what makes other nations unfree and undemocratic. While the Commission sets out to improve the political system, it is understood as already “free and democratic”. Coincidentally unmentioned is that the notion of “equitable” socio-economic and political order were precisely being reimagined with the emergence of a neoliberal paradigm under Britain’s Thatcher Conservatives, America’s Reagan Republicans, and Manning’s Reform Party of Canada. From these shifts emerged new racial subjects and a racial calculus whereby the social and political would become reordered through market logics. That is, neoliberalizing hegemony comes to dominate through a new racial order. Of this historical juncture, it is said:

Canadians looked with new appreciation on their democratic society and its political and economic rights and its freedoms. But even as they did so, many Canadians made it clear at the Commission’s public hearings that in evaluating the processes of our electoral democracy they have found it lacking in several crucial respects (Ibid, 1).

The Lortie Commission thus reviewed the Canada Elections Act as well as issues pertaining to Section 3 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides:

3. Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.

Public hearings and written submissions from various organizations representing ethnocultural and visible minority groups identified challenges to Section 3 of the Charter including systemic barriers to political participation for women, Aboriginal, disabled, and ethnocultural groups. The Lortie Commission’s final report proposed “several means to enhance ethno-cultural, Aboriginal and female representation, including setting limits on nomination spending; providing public funding for nomination expenses, establishing party search committees to identify potential candidates from disadvantaged groups, offering financial incentives to parties that nominated members of disadvantaged groups, and electoral reform” (Black & Lakhani 1997 in Tossutti and
Najem 2002, 87). Indeed, one main objective of the Royal Commission was to encourage political parties to statistically and substantively represent Canada’s changing demographics in their membership.

The historic context in which the Lortie Commission emerged is significant for two reasons: (i) Canadians were increasingly mobilizing political change through Charter challenges and (ii) the emergence of the Reform Party of Canada. Researchers have remarked on the early 1990s as a period where “we began to see growing signs of inclusiveness at the very top of the party system partly as a result of the 1982 Charter of Rights” and Freedoms that has suggestively “produced strong support for multiculturalism and a growing expectation that Parliament should reflect Canada’s growing ethnic diversity” (Bird 2011, 209). Simultaneously, the late 1980s and early 1990s, marks a time where Canadians were reportedly apathetic, retreated from civic life, and became “increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of their political parties” (Biles and Tolley 2005, 3; Cross 2002, 3) and yet in their study for the Lortie Commission, Andre Blais and Elisabeth Gidengil found that three-quarters of Canadians believe that “without political parties, there can’t be true democracy” (Blais and Gidengil 1991, 20). The time in which the Lortie Commission was established is also marked by the 1987 emergence of the right-wing Reform Party, in reaction to the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives’ augmentation of multicultural policies established under the Trudeau Liberals. That the Conservative party would “acquiesce” to the social policy positions of the Liberals became intolerable for social conservatives and Western provinces that felt their regional concerns were being ignored by elites in Ottawa. Thus, with the rise of the Reform Party38, Canadian political scientists have characterized this time period as the end of the third party system and the emergence of a new fourth party system. According to Kenneth Carty, William Cross, and Lisa Young (2002): “Until 1993, the number of parties in the Canadian system changed little, and the two major parties [Liberals and Progressive Conservatives] remained dominant” (Carty, Cross, and Young 2002, 15). As a brief summary of the Canadian tradition, the authors define the three Canadian party systems:

…the first party system, from Confederation to 1917, as highly localist and dependent on patronage to hold the parties together… The second system, which spanned the years from 1921 to 1957, was characterized by a politics of/ regional brokerage…The third party system, from 1963 on, has been an era of pan-Canadian politics. (Ibid 15-16)

38 As well as the Bloc Quebecois in 1993
Thus, the third party system – the era of racial liberalism – between the 1960s and 1993 was marked by a pan-Canadian consensus – that is, to do with racial governance - among Canada’s major political parties including the Liberal Party, the Progressive Conservative Party, and the newly formed New Democratic Party. That is, since the 1960s, the political party system more or less “promoted inclusiveness of ethnic minorities – at least with respect to voter mobilization and recruitment into the rank and file membership” (Bird 2011, 209). Thus, the Lortie Commission emerged in a conflicted juncture in Canadian political history that marks both the height of federal efforts to represent Canada’s “diversity” and also the birth of the Reform Party – a new Conservative party that challenged feminism and multiculturalism as divisive “special interests” groups. For example, Lisa Young’s 2002 study found that the new fourth party system or what I argue is the formal political rise of neoliberal hegemony as reflected in “Reform, and its successor, the Canadian Alliance, have proved hostile to the representation of women in both their representational practices and their policies. Since the party does not recognize women as a political group, questions of gender and gender equity disappear from the political discussion” (Cross 2002).

By the late 1980s, discourses of racial liberalism came into direct tension with an emerging anti-multiculturalism national discourse that specifically targeted the political conduct of those ostensibly empowered by these policies. Researchers have documented how during the later years of the third party system and by the late 1980s “members of the urban ethnic communities aggressively began to demand inclusion in the political elite (Carty et al 2000, 91). Changes made to immigration and multiculturalism policy in the era of racial liberalism, meant that Canada’s electorate diversified racially and "as women have come to insist on a voice… political parties like other institutions - have had to come to terms with a new politics of inclusion (Carty et al 2000, 88-89). Pan-Canadian consensus on multiculturalism as part of the nation’s identity was beginning to come under attack and the increasing politicization of women and ethnic and visible minority groups were framed as the root cause of Canada’s national identity crisis. Tensions between these competing national discourses - reflective of an extended national anxiety around the management of non-British and non-French “ethnocultural and visible minority” Canadians - is evident in the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing.
Indeed, the Canadian nation state was forced to manage the contradictions of Canadian racial governance that were brought to light in the 1980s and early 1990s by feminist, Indigenous, and anti-racist activists. As the final report acknowledges, “A visibly representative body is about national identity; pronouncing and projecting itself outwardly as open, democratic, free political culture and values” (Final Report 1991, 8). Importantly, parts of the final report recognize the limits of a “colourblind” approach to electoral politics by pointing to the underrepresentation of women and visible minorities in national political party organizations and in the House of Commons under a system that does not formally require that candidates and elected representatives reflect the nation’s socio-demographic reality (Ibid 8). The final report argues that “elected representatives will not and cannot effectively represent the full range of Canada’s interests if they do not reasonably reflect its society” (Ibid 8). As such one of the challenges of electoral reform is to help reduce the systemic or structural barriers to candidacy (Ibid 8-9).

Despite evidence of some inclusion, some communities have remained “virtually excluded from the federal political process, despite a longstanding presence in Canada” (Ibid 95). In the end, the final report advises that systemic discrimination cannot be erased and equitable representation cannot be achieved simply by relying on the abstract notion of “formal equality under the law”: it may be necessary to treat some groups differently to achieve a greater measure of political equality… “the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in treatment” (Ibid 113). This critique, however, was drowned by the growing broader discourse against multiculturalism, which feared that major parties were in danger of being replaced by “interest groups or single-issue groups”39. One of several panels during the symposium on political parties held in Halifax heard the argument that since the 1960s and in leading up to the Charter, such demands have achieved greater prominence (Ibid 184). The final report thus argues:

Citizens may organize themselves for political purposes into organizations such as interest groups or pressure groups. But only political parties can reconcile and accommodate diverse and competing interests to reach agreement on public policy. The objective of democratic institutions is thus to channel these passions so that society can reach agreement while protecting the rights of minority groups.

Where formally organized political parties do not compete for political power, the result is the dominance of factions or special-interest groups (Ibid 12).

These sentiments reflect the shift from a racial liberalism rationality towards a neoliberal rationality, which characterizes Canadians that demand recognition and representation as “special interest” groups. This narrative that constructs the problem as a crisis of the primacy of political parties is indeed a racial project geared towards directing the political conduct of racial others through integration. Neoliberal emphasis on privatization, individual responsibilities and unrestricted flow of capital casts such political subjects and political conduct as threats to the social, economic and political order. Contemporaneous government reports such as the Spicer Commission (1991) and the Baudoin-Dobbie Commission (1992) further drowned out support for multiculturalism that had defined the nation for several decades (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992). Indeed, by the late 1980s, feminist and anti-racist political organizing was targeted as threats to an otherwise cohesive national identity. Conceiving of multiculturalism and the Charter as divisive and discriminatory to whites presumes that British and French populations are not also ethnic groups that have been specially privileged by the state. As chapter four examine more closely, the supposed inevitability of the turn to neoliberal hegemony gives rise to subjects and discourses that work to legitimate the advanced liberal state.

Canada’s farther right-wing groups increasingly grew frustrated at this time. The backlash against multiculturalism and efforts to increase diversity in the House of Commons with affirmative action are all reflective of the idea that Canada had “conceded too much power to ethnic minority groups” (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992, 379). Neoliberal hegemony sets out not to accommodate difference but to defend against it. Thus, in the aftermath of the Lortie Commission, the popular view was that the House was “no longer disproportionately dominated by individuals of British descent” (Black & Lakhani 1997 in Tossutti and Najem 2002, 87) and that the “crisis of representation in the later days of the third party system have been resolved” because “the current House of Commons is far more representative of the diversity of the Canadian electorate than were previous parliaments” (Carty et al. 2000, 96). As stated in chapter one, in 1993, Canada elected the highest number of ethnic and visible minority candidates and three politicians simultaneously became the first members of Parliament of South Asian descent (Matheson 2005). However, 1993 also marks a significant electoral year for the Reform Party of Canada, which proposed to abolish the Department of Multiculturalism and proposed policy to
limit immigration only to those who “possess the human capital necessary to adjust quickly and independently to the needs of Canadian society and the job market” (Roy 1995, 205-206). By 1997 Reform became the official opposition party and as the new dominant right-wing party in the House (displacing the Progressive Conservatives), they worked to reverse efforts established by previous governments including the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives, which had “at least legitimized a vision of Canada that reflects the reality of a multiracial/multicultural country” (Stasiulis 1991, 253). To be sure, despite declarations that the House had become substantially representative, by the mid-1990s, it was found that “MPs opposed Lortie's recommendation to use electoral redistricting to enhance the representation of minority groups. They feared that "ghettos" or "ethnic enclaves" would be created and that the implementation of a provision adding a reference to Canada's plural society would lead to a form of "segregation" (Courtney 2002, 12-13).40 Indeed, the Reform Party’s aggressive policies and principles crept into the mainstream of Canadian political discourse and marked the beginning of a new party system, new forms of racial governance and new racial subjects.

In their contribution to the Lortie Commission’s research program, Stasiulis and Abu-Laban found: “the House of Commons remains a “very white” institution” (1991, 15). In their examination of the 1984 and 1988 federal elections, the researchers asked: “How have the major parties attempted to recruit the support of ethnocultural minorities at the electoral level? What initiatives have been taken to facilitate integration of minority members at different levels of party organization and, in particular, as legislative candidates?” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 42). The final report suggests that since the late 1950s, “the three largest political parties have demonstrated increased sensitivity to the cultural diversity of the electorate, and to the need to include members of all ethno-cultural groups in their ranks and among their candidates” (Final Report Volume 1 1991, 102). Beginning in 1980, Elections Canada first began to direct information about the electoral process to ethnic communities. By 1988, it invested a small portion of its advertising budget on advertising in ethnic media and in “distributing a large number of multilingual booklets on voting in Canada”. Despite such efforts, studies have found

that while ethnic groups have increasingly become well represented in the House of Commons, visible minorities remain underrepresented – even as recently as the 2011 federal election (Black 2013).

All of Canada’s major political parties have appealed to minority votes and candidates by targeting specific groups. In their examination of the 1982 Liberal Party multicultural recruitment manual, Carty et al observed Liberal Party guidelines for ethnic outreach including “attendance at cultural events, and sponsoring citizenship programs for recent immigrants [...] and contacting them on a regular basis as a way to encourage active participation in their associations” (Carty et al 2000, 90). Elsewhere, researchers have found that “Liberal organizers assiduously courted the Greek, Sikh, Chinese, and Portuguese communities in recruiting support for delegate slates to their 1984 leadership convention [...] and ‘instant members’ recruited for the 1990 Liberal convention were similarly drawn from what were considered “close-knit and often intensely loyal ethnic communities” (Courtney 1995, 112 in Wiseman 2007, 24).

Moreover, in 1986, the “Federation of Ontario Liberal Satellites (FOLSAT) emerged as a result of the organizing efforts of visible minority activists, primarily in Metro Toronto who were demanding a more prominent role in the Ontario Liberal party” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 48). Researchers found that between 1965 and 2004, the Liberal Party elected the most visible minority MPs since it was the Liberal government that adopted multicultural policy and the Charter” (Pelletier 1991, 145). Similarly, in 1985, the Ontario NDP established its Ethnic Liaison Committee (ibid 51) and has been the only party to have an official affirmative action commitment to diversify its membership and nomination races. However, even while historically, it was the CCF/NDP that advocated most for Asian franchise, Stasiulis and Abu-Laban have found, “for many ethnic minorities who have left repressive Communist regimes, the fear of left-wing parties has been translated in the Canadian context to reluctance to support the party perceived to be the most socialist ” (1991, 63).

Stasiulis and Abu-Laban’s research interviews with Canadian political leaders revealed five proven party methods of outreach and appealing to ethnic voters: 1. Appeals to variations of multiculturalism policy; 2. Apology for past injustices; 3. Increasing immigration levels (as the governing party); 4. Patronage appointments (as the governing party); and 5. Attendance at ethnic events (41-43). These methods had been employed by Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives, which led to a notable shift in ethnic voters’ partisanship. Elsewhere Stasiulis
has argued that “the race relations policies of the Mulroney government reflect a commitment on the part of the Conservatives to retaining and building upon multicultural and anti-discrimination policies initiated under the Liberals” (Stasiulis 1991, 231). In 1985, the Progressive Conservative government created a House Standing Committee on Multiculturalism leading to the passage of the Canadian Multiculturalism act in July 1988 (Stasiulis 1991, 244) made it official government policy to "recognize and promote" multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity. Then in September 1988, just before the federal election, prime minister Mulroney announced official redress for wartime injustices against Japanese and Italian Canadians (ibid 245). Also, in their bid for re-election in 1988, “the Conservatives distributed third-language literature produced by the national campaign office. One standard brochure distributed in six nonofficial languages (Italian, Portuguese, Chinese, Greek, Hindi and Punjabi)” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 45). Moreover, in a research interview, the director of the Appointments Secretariat in the Prime Minister’s Office reported that “a good number” of patronage appointments have gone to ethnocultural minority individuals” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 43) including the appointment of Lincoln Alexander as Ontario’s Lieutenant Governor. In terms of policy, the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives “kept the family class category proportionately higher than the others” despite rising unemployment rates (Abu Laban and Gabriel 2002, 47) and has “increased immigration levels from those of the previous Liberal administration” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 42-43). Still, the Progressive Conservative government was criticized for changes to refugee related policies as well as for their use of multicultural platitudes and avoidance of meaningful political engagement with ethnic communities for example prime minister Mulroney’s July 1987 visit to Toronto (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 88). Perhaps for such reasons, the Conservatives' lagged behind even Reform/Alliance “in the area of minority candidate recruitment" (Tossutti and Najem 2002, 98). That the Progressive Conservative Party continued to experience electoral weakness with minority voters despite their substantial race-related policy efforts was a testimony to the image that the Liberal party had fostered over the 1960s and 1970s. As discussed in chapter four, it became the Conservative Party of Canada’s mission to overturn this tradition.

In light of finding how political parties were appealing to minority groups, Stasiulis and Abu-Laban have emphasized the political heterogeneity of ethno-cultural and visible minority groups (1991, 72). They found that there was “no such thing as monolithic minority support for
any one party” and the notion of the “ethnic vote” falsely presumes that “minority ethnic groups are preoccupied with “ethnic” issues and are unconcerned with issues of more general concern, such as the state of the Canadian economy” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 24). According to their interviews, ethnic minority MPs “reflect levels of philosophical and ideological diversity similar to those of other MPs. That is, through both belief and party discipline, the positions on economic and social policy of minority MPs (like dominant group MPs) divide along party lines” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban 1991, 72). In other words, there is no way to define a single set of interests based on race nor can we assume elected representatives are guaranteed to reflect the interests of their co-ethnic constituents. Similarly, Pelletier’s findings work against the argument that "the physical presence of Asians and West Indians on the floor of the Commons or council Chamber would ensure the representation of the ethnic minorities' specific interests” or that minority MPs “could act – or would wish to act – as ethnic spokesmen” (Crewe 1983, 276 in Pelletier 1991, 125). Groups representing ethnic communities problematized the idea of the “ethnic vote” and a singular profile of “ethnic” candidates; the politics espoused by ethnocultural minorities are unpredictable and varied.

Between March 12 and July 24 1990, several interveners representing ethno-cultural communities urged that the parties “make room for people from their communities to participate in genuine ways rather than just using them as “instant members” (Final Report Volume 4, 1991, 51). That is, these groups spoke out against the trend among political parties and leaders that recruited large numbers of “instant” members from ethnic groups to vote in nomination meetings or in the selection of leadership delegates. Interveners stressed: democracy is not served by using minorities as “pawns to be exploited and then forgotten in the game of leadership” (Ibid 52). Among the recommendations was the demand for affirmative action policies to increase the number of candidates from ethnic minorities in winnable ridings and to increase the participation of and candidates from ethnic and visible minorities in party organizations. The hearings made it clear that structural changes were necessary to increase the meaningful political participation of minority groups. While the hearings, submissions and research reports mention structural barriers such as latent or overt racism, the cost of pursuing a nomination, negative media coverage, and lack of sufficient party support as reasons that have contributed to the ongoing

41 Final Report Volume 4: What Canadians Told Us at the Public Hearings and in the Written Submissions
underrepresentation of visible minorities in electoral politics, other problematic presumptions were made. For instance, in identifying reasons for the under-participation of visible minorities in the electoral process, some argued that it was necessary to “increase the political competence of members of visible minorities” - that is, to develop a better knowledge of the Canadian political system and the electoral process. More than this, the final report suggested that “the lack of political competence” among visible minorities may be accentuated by linguistic barriers as well as religious differences and economic disparities or by the undemocratic background of the immigrant (Ibid 100). One intervener at the public hearings – who also happened to be a female member of an Asian visible minority group- argued that “those from countries with oppressive political regimes or non-democratic political culture…may not wish to voice their political concerns for fear of retaliation”. This narrative reinforces the myth that immigrants that come to Canada are fleeing one tyrannical nation for a land where there is unfettered democracy. Indeed, without the presence of other voices, orientalist binaries such as this are reproduced. At the same time, such claims presume that Canadians can equally voice politically diverse concerns without fear of retaliation while reinforcing the idea that immigrants come from places politically antithetical to Canada: undemocratic, backwards and politically turbulent while constituting Canada as democratic, progressive and politically harmonious.

The language of “political competence” and simply attributing low levels of participation to lack of education, language barriers, even religious difference underestimates the effects of ongoing political exclusion. This fails to acknowledge the many generations of grassroots political activism of ethnic and visible minority groups for franchise and other political rights. I argue that casting the problem of political exclusion as a cultural one amounts to a racialization of political illiteracy that can only be resolved through integration. The summary of the hearings and written submissions concludes that because “two-thirds of visible minority group members are first-generation Canadians…integration of Canada’s new immigrants into the social fabric requites a transition period (Ibid 103). This argument again casts visible minority Canadians as perpetual foreigners – perpetually recently arriving and perpetually in a “transition period” in relation to the mythically founding two nations. The vast political life and contributions of visible minority groups in Canada as well as decades of struggles for franchise and redress are depoliticized, delegitimized and erased from Canadian political history.
Throughout the hearings, “interveners from Aboriginal organizations emphasized the alienation of Aboriginal Canadians from the electoral system and the inadequate representation of Aboriginal people in Parliament in relation to their numbers” (Final Report Volume 4 1991, 50); a fact reinforced by the Commission’s relegation of the examination of Aboriginal political representation to a separate study thus bracketing the legacy of state-sanctioned violence against Indigenous populations apart from examinations of “mainstream” political matters. It was found that since Confederation, only twelve self-identified Aboriginal MPs had been elected to the House of Commons. Interveners including a representative of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, expressed concern “that the Commission had invited Aboriginal representatives to testify so as to legitimize a process that would once again deny Aboriginal people their proper place in the country” (Ibid 51). These sentiments were sustained by comments disparaging serious recommendations to address Aboriginal political underrepresentation. None of the recommendations including one to replicate New Zealand’s special constituency for the Maori was implemented nor taken seriously in the aftermath of the Royal Commission. Questions of settler colonialism were effectively evaded in “regular” proceedings. Recommendations regarding a third chamber in parliament for Aboriginal representatives were ignored.

Simultaneously, the report systematically referred to an imagined political group called “new Canadians”; narrated as always newly arriving, as immigrants, as perpetually foreign but also as a group to be consulted and integrated as voters and candidates. As representation is fundamental to the concept of parliamentary democracy in modern nation states (Final Report 1991, 8), it has become the role of modern states “to bring into representation even those at the limits of state extension” (Goldberg 2002, 251). However, Goldberg (2002) suggests, “access to offices of governance” is offered “within strictly delimited parameters and for more or less well-defined purposes: maintaining control, guaranteeing a steady supply of migrant labor at minimized costs, securing racial and social peace, hands-on preparation of the historically less developed for ultimate self-governance, and so on” (85). Part of managing difference has been to include a few elites; a gesture in itself, that illuminates the normative whiteness of the site of inclusion. It is thus necessary to move away from the invisibility-to-visibility model, which structures visibility as the penultimate goal. The route to “success” and “participation” have been held open for those whose docility, or whose “moderate” and tempered criticism, reinforces the system, which after all continues to need […] racially “different” administrators and
politicians who maintain some credibility at a mass level” (Winant 2004, xv). That is, the racial logics of a dual-white settler state have over-determined the possible political pathways for non-English and non-French Canadians. On such a racial landscape, some racial figures become desirable multicultural subjects while others whose politics take shape in movements like Black Lives Matter and Idle No More become delegitimized/depoliticized members of racial populations that “make too many demands” upon the state.

Defined by race and confined by their agency, this thesis shows how racial conservative figures as state agents emerge through multicultural discourses to give the dual-white settler racial state new legitimacy. Indeed, the advanced liberal state gives rise to state agents or experts that consent to the terms of inclusion and bridge political objectives with the regulation of political conduct. That is, this thesis traces how the racial state reorganizes itself through inclusion – constantly producing new subjects, rationalities, and narratives of regulation. For these reasons, a politics of inclusion is not as much a benchmark of racial progress as it is a technology of governance when existing hierarchies of race can no longer be sustained without racial inclusion. A politics that uses identity as a central organizing principle is thus not very effective (Chang 1999, 129). According to Brown and Halley (2002): “identities are double-edged: they can be crucial sites of cultural belonging and political mobilization, but they can also be important vehicles of domination through regulation” (7) as they “vanquish neither the regime nor its mechanisms of reproduction” (Brown 2001, 422). According to Goldberg (2002): “The marginalized are able to empower themselves though always subject to the limiting and homogenizing terms of state definition and design” (252). It is more important to dismantle the structures that reproduce the “difference” to be regulated. To be sure, this is not to say that racism and necessary resistance have diminished but rather that political inclusion has become a part of how minorities are governed. According to Morrison: As “promises of “individual” emancipation” have had sway, it has become necessary to redouble efforts to examine and undo the systems and ideologies that conserve racial hierarchies (1992, 242). Strategies of inclusion as solution to the problem of exclusion, implicitly accept the model of advanced liberal society as appropriate except for its exclusion of certain groups.

This thesis shows how racialized minorities folded into the state through assimilationist aspiration do indeed have the capacity to participate in racist discourse and practices thus normalizing racial violence. The pillar of stable white settler rule aimed to secure national unity
through the management of heterogeneity and hierarchy of citizenship is evidenced in this thesis by revealing who can and can not speak about race and what can and cannot be said about race. For instance, in her examination of the Manitoba legislative Assembly, Sheila Gill (2002) has observed how Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) Oscar Lathlin, Cree member of the opposition, was silenced and removed from the white provincial legislature for speaking against structural racism. It becomes impossible for MLA Lathlin to utter the word “racism” in provincial parliament without being attacked as a “racist” himself but the Asian MPs studied here have used the word “racism” in federal parliament as a way to trivialize it and ultimately disavow it. Lathlin’s interventions become outlawed speech as racial reference is made acceptable only to disavow it. According to Gill, racism is ubiquitous yet, “When racism is rendered unspeakable by parliamentary law, elite subjects will the erasure of places, communities and claims that are in fact, continually marked by racist practice and by resistance to such oppression” (2002, 168). As this thesis shows, in the dual-white settler state, certain populations remain legible only as anachronistic threats to the pioneering spirit of western civilization and their organized destruction is legitimized for the ostensible security and wealth of all humankind. As a result, being folded into the mechanisms of that civilizing project demands participation in ongoing racial violence to ensure its survival; it is the political work of a banal notion of diversity.

Conclusion

The modern state has always been racially configured; nationalism always disavows racism but it is de facto racial in structure. I have explored how white settler states such as Canada imagines itself as raceless through multiculturalism as a regime of governance. Rather than do away with inequities, racial hierarchies have been sustained through inclusion in this new regime of governance. Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework has worked to quell Quebec nationalists through the dual white settler myth that racialized and minoritized ethnic Canadians as other and further betrayed treaties by reducing Indigenous populations to mere cultural historic others. In this framework, white settlers remain the normative political authorities that consult others as part of their governing capacities while Indigenous and ethnic minorities become subjects to be consulted, included when palatable, and discarded when necessary. This framework, which establishes the authority to define political projects along settler colonial and
racial lines informed the terms of political inclusion outlined in the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (1989-1991) and remains the framework through which the Conservative party imagines the management of Indigenous and racial populations.

As this thesis will show, part of the inclusion regime has included ostensibly open policies geared toward diversity, state sanctioned holidays and state apologies that claim to bring racial others and the state into modernity. In the inclusionary regime of governance, the state indeed craves racial others that will participate in its legitimization. As Mackey observed, "the project of Canadian nation-building has not been based on the erasure of difference but on controlling and managing it" (Mackey 1999, 160). In this formulation, whiteness remains centred and the multicultural other is firmly and perpetually cast as non-Canadian even as it integrates, while the figure of the Native remains in this political imaginary as vanishing. This is the point of entry through which the “multicultural” other figure becomes formally politicized in Canada – a point that delimits the boundaries of their political speech and activities as it will be evidenced in this thesis. Within this paradigm, Asian Canadians continue to be manufactured in national discourse as perpetual foreigners. That being folded into the regime of modern state governing structures entails reproducing this white-settler bilingual and bicultural hegemony and racial hierarchy is demonstrated throughout this thesis.
Chapter 3:
“The First Member of My Race”: Jung and the Paradox of the Asian Conservative

_They have enough power now without the franchise; I do not know just what more they want, unless it might be that a little later they would put up a candidate of their own. Then we might witness one of them, either in Victoria or in Ottawa, presumably representing all his electors but – and I say this without fear of successful contradiction – really representing a great group of their fellow nationals, and perhaps being guided from abroad_42

- Liberal MP Thomas Reid

_I speak because I am aware of the tremendous responsibilities which rest upon me, not only as the first member of my race to sit in this house, but also to my constituents who have thought all times of me only as a Canadian_43

- MP Douglas Jung

On January 9, 1957 Douglas Jung declared his candidacy against the incumbent in Vancouver Centre and it was the first time any Chinese Canadian ran for federal government. Both Jung and Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives won the election on June 10, 1957, ending twenty-two years of Liberal rule and were re-elected on March 31, 1958. Jung was considered to be a pioneer especially for winning by a landslide in the same constituency where the 1907 race riots took place44. By 1957, news media declared that the same constituency and the nation at large had “made amends” with the election of Douglas Jung. This is to say that Jung was elected into a period of racial realignment that was moving away from decades of explicit state racism enacted under Liberal governments and towards a postwar era of racial liberalism. That is, the state comes into power under Conservative rule – at this time – by distancing itself away from the racial state that had been governed by the Liberal Party of Canada. As this chapter will show, parliamentary debates indicate that Jung’s election is momentous because his race matters and at the same time, a liberal political discourse emerges

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44 Also known as the “Anti-Oriental riot,” the Pacific Coast race riots involved “those calling for British Columbia and Canada to remain White rioted in Vancouver and destroyed the property and businesses of Chinese- and Japanese-origin residents. Of course, Japanese and Chinese communities organized protest and the “riots made headlines around the world”. For imperial reasons (the Anglo-Japanese Alliance) this resulted in “a prompt apology on the part of the Canadian prime minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and by his offer to create a commission to assess the damages to Japanese businesses with a view to providing compensation” (Price 2011, 19-20).
to insist that Jung should be thought of only as Canadian or that *race no longer matters*. As exemplified by an excerpt from his maiden speech above, Jung is well aware of this liberal paradox and its demands upon his conduct. This chapter examines four of Jung’s parliamentary discourse contributions, which illustrate how the MP negotiates this liberal paradox.

This chapter begins with an examination of Jung’s maiden speech by highlighting some themes that recur in interventions throughout his parliamentary tenure. Next, I examine three topics of parliamentary debate featuring Jung: comments made by Liberal Senator John Farris, debates on the Diefenbaker Conservatives’ Bill of Rights, and the Diefenbaker government’s crackdown on Chinese immigration, which was followed by the 1960 Adjustment Statement Program introduced by Immigration Minister Ellen Fairclough. Specifically, these debates show how Jung is caught in the liberal paradox articulated by Goldberg where all is race but race is irrelevant. That is, these parliamentary statements show how Jung negotiates this racial paradox and walks a political path aware that he is not beyond race but that racelessness is the feature of Canadian political discourse. In his parliamentary contributions, Jung assures the House that he knows that the state wants both race and racelessness and that he can do both. With his election, Jung insists that the nation can move towards racial healing. He also participates in what becomes a defining feature of Canadian national mythology, namely that Canada is a middle power nation less burdened by a colonial past. At the same time, Jung presents himself as an advocate for his people by introducing the notion of redress for Chinese exclusion and campaigns for immigration policy that might facilitate family reunification. That is, he makes clear that he does not intend to be raceless.

It is this racial liberal paradox that Jung negotiates throughout his time in the Commons. Henceforth, all Asians – and arguably, all racialized parliamentarians - will have to negotiate this position. Jung resolves the paradox by presenting himself as the end of an era of racial exclusion. This allows him to speak race within a narrative of progress. It allows him to be the loyal Asian who is nevertheless an advocate for his people: Canadians of Chinese descent. Jung presents his native informant credentials and how he will be able to assist Canada as an Asian. However, as exemplified by MP Thomas Reid’s 1936 statements above, Canadian parliament has long suspected the loyalties of Asians and this is part of the political terrain that Jung enters into as the first Asian Canadian candidate. That is, despite his credentials, Jung’s loyalties – like the loyalties of all Asians – comes into question.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Liberal Party of Canada under Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent are not the Liberal Party under Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau. Even while open immigration policies and official multiculturalism were installed under Liberal Pearson and Trudeau governments, the Liberal Party of Canada has not always been understood as the champion of minorities. Indeed, anti-Asian discrimination policies passed under Liberal governments: the MacDonald government legislated the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1885 and the Mackenzie King government established the 1908 Continuous Journey Order-in-Council and instituted the Japanese Internment during the Second World War. Yet, the formal apologies to the Japanese and Chinese Canadians for these racist policies came from the Conservative Mulroney (1988) and Harper (2006) governments, respectively. Indeed, this history may account for why aspiring racial politicians found their home in the Conservative party in the era defined by the third party system and why Canadian MP Douglas Jung vowed not to join the Liberal Party in the 1950s (Lowe, 2007). Indeed, beginning in the late 1950s and into the 1960s and 1970s, political parties began appealing to Canada’s changing demographics as voters and as candidates. That is, in the era of racial liberalism, a transition in the party system specifically began in the late 1950s and early 1960s which “reflected changes in the Canadian electorate that were not being/accommodated by existing partisan arrangements. Although regional, linguistic, and, to a lesser degree, religious cleavages remained salient, other political identities were also emerging. The electorate was rapidly growing more ethnically diverse. In particular, immigration from Northern and Eastern Europe to Western Canada, and from southern Europe to Ontario (particularly Metropolitan Toronto), was changing the shape of politics” (Carty et al 2000, 86-87 emphasis added). However, it was CCF MPs that most aggressively pushed for Chinese and Japanese and East Indian franchise since the 1920s. That Jung ran as a Progressive Conservative candidate rather than a CCF candidate may be that Diefenbaker himself often discussed his German heritage and his 1957 government prided itself for its ethnic diversity as well as its commitment to gender inclusion. For instance, Ellen Fairclough became the first female cabinet minister. Appointed to the immigration portfolio, Fairclough worked closely with MP Jung on the topic of Chinese immigration and the Chinese population in British Columbia. That is, the significance of this historical moment is that, emerging from a period of open exclusion, the Asian politician enters a field where his race is too hard too ignore but his usefulness to the party is in helping the state achieve the first stage of postwar nation-building,
which requires both a mythology about Canada’s racial innocence and its capacity to become a successful middle power on this basis.

**Jung’s Maiden Speech**

Jung’s maiden speech was delivered in the House of Commons on November 11, 1957 during the 1\textsuperscript{st} Session of the 23\textsuperscript{rd} Parliament. Not only had the Diefenbaker Conservatives defeated twenty-two years of Liberal rule, it was the first time that an Asian Canadian would rise to speak in the House of Commons. Jung’s maiden speech reveal how Jung is caught in the difficult and impossible position of being both raceless and raced; that is, these are parts of the speech that expose the liberal paradox. The themes invoked in Jung’s speech (i.e. regarding foreign policy suggestions, the management of Chinese immigrants, and defining Canada’s image on the world stage) echo in the maiden speeches, parliamentary statements and legislative contributions of the fifteen Asian conservatives that would follow him a half century later. That is, like Jung, all Asian Conservatives henceforth will find themselves paradoxically raced in the name of racelessness. Jung begins:

Mr. Speaker, it is with mixed feelings of pride and humility that I rise today to address this honourable house. I rise with pride because I have been privileged to participate in two historical events; one of which was the opening of this parliament by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and the other is that a Canadian of Chinese extraction now sits in this house for the first time. It is, however, with humility that I speak because I am aware of the tremendous responsibilities which rest upon me, not only as the first member of my race to sit in this house, but also to my constituents who have thought at all times of me only as a Canadian. (968)

Jung’s opening remarks reveal that he is very much aware of the paradox in which he finds himself; that he is not beyond race and that racelessness is the feature of Canadian political discourse. He reassures the Commons that he can do both, and that he knows that they want both race and racelessness. Jung understands the work that is ahead of him as both raced and raceless. The “tremendous responsibilities” he now faces as the first and only MP of his race refers to the burden of representation where he is not just a parliamentary representative, he is a representative of the race. At the same time, it is important that Jung mention that he has at all times been thought of only as a “Canadian”. Such introductory statements are echoed in the Maiden speeches of future MPs including Canada’s second Chinese MP, Liberal Art Hu and Conservative MP Leung as will be examined in Chapter five. When Jung says “only as a
Canadian” he means to say “beyond race”; that is, without his race factoring into how others have come to know him and thus elect him as a political representative of Canada. And yet simultaneously, he notes that it is his “Chinese extraction,” the very thing that supposedly has not been a factor, that makes this moment an historical event. Indeed, this moment is made historical when an Asian body arrives – in parliament – the official space where Asian civility and (un)fitness for citizenship were debated by all of the major political parties involved and where Asian exclusion was enacted on numerous occasions. Jung’s physical presence in this white space is remarked upon not only by Jung himself, but was also made notable by MPs of all three Canadian parties at the time. His presence matters not because his inclusion marks the beginning of the end of race – as it has been popularly framed - but precisely because racial hierarchies continue to shape this space. The scope of his representative responsibilities is unlike that of other MPs. He becomes the representative for not only for his riding but also for his entire race:

My constituency contains the largest group of Chinese in Canada. Out of some 44,000, British Columbia has 10,000; Vancouver alone has approximately 7,000. But lest some hon. Members think that I was elected only though the efforts of the Chinese community, may I explain that, if every one of the registered Chinese voters had voted against me, I still would have been elected with a substantial majority. I mention this point merely to emphasize the fact that no person can be elected through the efforts of any one minority group. His support must be much broader. (969)

What would become a pattern in the maiden speeches of future racial conservatives such as Rahim Jaffer (1997), Wai Young (2011), and Inky Mark (1997), Jung gestures to the racial diversity of his riding. At the same time, Jung finds it necessary to reassure Canadians, who may not know who he is, that is was not simply a mass of Chinese people that voted him into office and also to remind white Canada that they helped the nation make history. His personal story of political success thus, becomes the story of national political success:

I hope, Mr. Speaker, that hon. Members will feel some pride from my presence in this house as being one example of the kind of democracy that does exist in this country. I, personally, derive deep satisfaction from being here because hon. Members may or may not know that, less than 10 years ago, Canadians of Chinese extraction did not have the provincial franchise in British Columbia. I understand that British Columbia was the only province that had that restriction. Since that time British Columbia has made amends so admirably that to that province must now go the credit for sending a Chinese Canadian to the House of Commons. While those of us in the Conservative party will take particular pleasure in my election, which election will refute any argument that this party (p 968) has been discriminatory to certain groups in the past, I am sure that hon. Members on both
sides will rejoice that we in this country have a system of government that does not extol its virtues by fanfare, but by expressing our belief in our principles by deeds and not words. (969)

If they do not already, Jung asks his colleagues to associate his presence in the House with the kind of country Canada represents in the world. Jung’s narrative here reads like the quintessential post-racial script. The history of legal exclusion, even just ten years prior, is suggestively repaired because of his presence in the House. Jung intimates that not only Vancouver Centre, Jung’s riding, in which the anti-Asian race riots took place only fifty years prior, but Canada as a whole, has made racial amends upon his election. That is, Jung is aware of the powerful racial liberal discourse at play in parliament at this time, which begins to insist that race no longer matters. Jung frames his election as the beginning of a nation healing itself from its earlier moments of racial exclusion as taken up enthusiastically by his party. As one of Jung’s Conservative colleagues remarked,

Maloney: I think too we must not ignore the representative character of our party. We were prior to the election and are today able to make boasts such as these, boasts of which we are very proud. Ours is the only party that can boast of having the first Chinese member in the person of the hon. Member for Vancouver Centre (Mr. Jung), the first Italian member in the person of the hon. Member for Hamilton East (Mr. Martini), the first Danish member; of having appointed the first Icelander and the first native Indian to the Senate; the first cabinet minister of Ukrainian racial origin. Indeed we can boast of six hon. Members in the house of Ukrainian origin, and all sitting on the right side of the house, too…the In other words, the governing party in this country today is the party of diversity. It is a party whose inner councils are enriched by the contributions made to them by people of all walks of life, of all races, of all classes and of all creeds. It is only right that the governing party of our country should be a party of diversity because the nation itself is a nation of diversity, and it is never tedious to advert to that diversity and to comment upon it (251).45

MP Maloney’s statements illustrate how all political parties indulge in the sentiment that the nation is moving beyond race. In contrast with parliamentary debates prior to this era, it is clear how the discourse of diversity and inclusion enter into parliament at this time. The presence of racial others in parliament is no longer a question – the state is legitimated now through diversity. However, CCF MP M.W. Martin reminds the House that both the Liberals and the

Conservatives had participated in prolonging the disenfranchisement of “orientals” in Canada. Martin is careful to point out his own party’s record on fighting racial injustice:

Martin: One of the most significant factors of this election Mr. Speaker is the fact that no longer are our political parties formed on racial lines…This in my opinion, Mr. Speaker, is a very encouraging sign. It portends well for the future unity of this great country of ours that our people should vote as Canadians and not as members of certain racial origins.

I would like to deal with an interesting milestone which we saw first last June and which was repeated again on March 31st. I refer to the election of the hon. Member for Vancouver Centre (Mr. Jung). This member is, I believe, the first representative to be elected to this house who is a Canadian of oriental origin and I would certainly like to welcome him, even if rather belatedly. I was a little disappointed that he did not find it convenient or possible to pay a slight tribute to at least two men who had a great deal to do with the making possible of his election. I refer, of course, to the founder of my party, Mr. J.S. Woodsworth and to the former member for Vancouver-Kingsway, Mr. Angus MacInnis. If hon. Members would care to look up Hansard of those days they would find where these two men stood up in this house when it was the most unpopular thing to do and fought for the right to vote of Canadians of Oriental origin.

It will be recalled that in British Columbia in the general election of 1935 members of the party to which he belongs joined with the federal Liberal party and used the very words used by Mr. Woodsworth in this house against these people during the federal election of that year. I think it is to the credit of both Mr. Woodsworth and Mr. MacInnis that they took their stand not on what was popular at any particular moment and not on what was politically expedient but on what they felt to be right. I am glad that time has proved them correct.

As mentioned in Chapter two, MP Woodsworth, the founding leader of the CCF (which would become the NDP in 1961) did indeed advocate for various Asian groups’ franchise before and during the Second World War much to the chagrin of Liberals and Conservatives. As the new Progressive Conservative government revelled in a new discourse of inclusion, Martin reminds the House of how intense the racial project has been and reminds Canadians of the Conservative party’s complicity in politically excluding Asians in Canada. However, in asking Jung to pay tribute to Woodsworth, MP Martin is reminding Jung to be grateful, thus calling attention to how his place in the House is owed to benevolent white men before him. By proxy, such a demand might be read as part of a disciplinary discourse that demands all Asians to be grateful.

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Jung’s maiden speech reveals a second important feature of the racial conservative’s political terrain. He presents himself as an advocate for his people, introducing the notion of redress for the head tax and the all important issue of family reunification. He thus makes clear that he does not intend to be raceless.

I speak on this matter of immigration, Mr. Speaker, not because I advocate an influx of Chinese, but because I believe that we owe a moral obligation to the early Chinese immigrants who are now naturalized Canadian citizens. Many of our early immigrants had to pay a head tax ranging from $100 to $500 in order to enter Canada, and they were not allowed to bring their wives or families with them. They were thus, for a long time, deprived of a normal home life. Regulations were relaxed in 1947 which permitted, within limits, the entry into Canada of dependents of Chinese who were naturalized Canadian citizens. There is still, however, a number of families whose members are separated. Without going into technical details, it is my intention to urge the government to expedite the entry into Canada of these dependents, so that the members of the Chinese community who have contributed so much to the development of this country, and who have been denied a home life for so long, may be able to enjoy a measure of happiness during the last few years before they pass on. The number of persons so affected is not large. I am informed by a responsible source that even if the government were to relax the regulations today to cover this category the total number affected would be approximately 6,000. Hon. Members will appreciate the fact that this number is insignificant compared to immigration from other parts of the world. There is no danger whatsoever of a great influx. Once these people have been taken care of, then of course the immigration regulations will be applied alike to all immigrants no matter from which country they come (969-970).

Jung’s discourse here treads carefully as he knows he must be cautious with his family reunification proposition. First and foremost, he must make it clear that he is by no means suggesting that levels of Chinese immigration should increase, twice using the anti-immigrant descriptor “influx”. He must ensure Canadians that he is not talking about allowing more Chinese into Canada. The distinction has to be made clear here because despite his presence, there is an underlying awareness that more would not be welcome and any more might seem a threat to white Canada – despite the move towards racial liberalism. Jung is clear: he is only talking about family reunification for those bachelors who paid a Head Tax. He speaks of expediting the “normal” life that was deprived of these men. Again, Jung states that the number is insignificant compared to immigration from other countries. Note at this time immigration was higher still from European nations. Jung knows to tread lightly and even while supposedly being
the voice of Chinese nationals in Canada, he speaks within the limits of understanding that the
House is not a place in which he can do as he actually wishes. He must continue to ask for
permission and proceed with hyperbolic gestures of gratefulness. He must assure the House and
the Canadian public at large that it will not get out of hand. Even while he speaks of this very
recent racist legislation that excluded the Chinese in Canada he sidesteps the ongoing
discrimination against Asians in Canada.

The early Chinese immigrants referred to Canada as Gun Shan, or Gold Mountain,
because of the opportunities which this country held out to them. Material success
came only to a very few. Nevertheless, these people still held to their faith in
Canada. Today, these same people feel that their faith has been completely
vindicated because they have seen the election of a Canadian Chinese to the
House of Commons. They feel that whatever opportunities they missed, their
children will now have. (970)

As revealed here, Jung is aware of his responsibility to early Chinese immigrants who were
betrayed by the state. He is mindful of the extent to which his election is meaningful for these
people and thus, the tremendous responsibilities he has to being the first Asian member of
parliament. Simultaneously, Jung’s maiden speech reveals the pressures of racial liberal
discourse. That is, Asian countries became targeted in the post-war era as a major geopolitical
space through which the United States and its allied Western nations installed their superiority
vis a vis the Soviet Union. Mindful of this development, Jung presents himself as not merely
representative of his race in Canada but in the world. He signals his unique contributions as
linked to his race:

Finally, Mr. Speaker, while I am dealing with the question of Chinese
immigration, I think that it is appropriate that I say something about the rise of
the Asiatic countries and their influence on world politics. It is not my intention
to speak about things connected with government policy because I know that
there are other hon. Members who are more competent than I to speak on those
matters. But because of my background, Mr. Speaker, and because of my ability
to speak the language, I feel that in this particular field I can perhaps interpret to
hon. Members the thinking and the psychology of some of the Asian people. My
remarks are therefore directed more at the approach we might take towards these
peoples. (970)

In elaborating what he has to contribute in this global political stage as linked to his own racial
position, Jung crafts a position in parliament that reinforces that the racial minority politician sits
in parliament because of rather than in spite of his race. While Jung is qualified to speak to
foreign affairs in some capacity, he does not invoke his training as a lawyer when speaking to
international laws. Nor does Jung rely on his military background as his entry point of expertise; he must instead rely on his race - his “background” to secure his authority and expertise to speak on these matters.

If the racial minority politician must speak as raced in order to establish his expertise, it is not an expertise about racism but rather about Chineseness. Jung’s value thus lies in being the native informant who will provide Canada with the knowledge needed to play its role in the family of nations. As Sherene Razack (2004) has written, the family of nations that is envisioned is white and First World, and its challenge is to manage those nations less civilized. Jung outlines how Canada will play this role:

Mr. Speaker, we have today two opposing forces, namely the eastern bloc, composed of Russia and her satellites, and the western bloc consisting of the commonwealth and the United States. There is no doubt that in the commonwealth we have a strong political unit; but counteracting this commonwealth group is the new Afro-Asian group which has emerged, and it is with this group that I wish to deal. The role which I have suggested for Canada insofar as the Afro-Asian bloc is concerned may not always be an easy one, because some of these countries, imbued with a newly-forged sense of nationalism and being jealous of their status, have unfortunately gone to the other extreme in order to impress upon the world their new position. (971)

Jung’s comments here elucidate the postwar ethos, which positions commonwealth nations and the United Nations in stark opposition with Russia and the “Eastern bloc”. Within this distinctly demarcated terrain of geopolitics, Jung echoes the dominant narrative, which identifies the emergent Afro-Asian bloc or the newly decolonizing nationalizing countries of Africa and Asia as sites of opportunity for Canada. In his proposed foreign policy, Jung positions Afro-Asia as a space of underdevelopment and its inhabitants as democratically ignorant, at best and politically extremist, at worst. At once, this Afro-Asian bloc is characterized as politically cunning enough to assert themselves aggressively in the world and to align itself with the Russian superpower and simultaneously juvenile and in need of the West’s guidance. Significantly, Jung situates Canada as part of the allied family of nations but not the most powerful among these members and thus he suggests a pathway for humanitarian intervention, specifically in the Afro-Asian regions. Jung characterizes the East as a region requiring “reasoned” approach rather than condescension. In this immediate post-war period, such political strategy of the middle-power, as we have come to know, is anything but as courteous or sympathetic as this dominant narrative
asserts. Canada’s own military humanitarian legacy in Korea and Vietnam would demonstrate this fact (Price 2011).

We have today two great systems of law, the British common law system and the system of law based on the Code Napoleon. The leaders of Asia, in a great number of cases, have received their legal training from either one of these two schools and they have tried to evolve a system which would have particular application to their countries. Some of these countries, in their newly found situations of freedom and independence, are situations of freedom and independence, are now aggressively asserting their status. We all appreciate that in the assertion of their status many of them are still feeling their way and that, owing to certain period in their history, they are sensitive to the manner of the approach which certain western countries make to them. Because of this sensitivity, I suggest that our approach to these countries might be different than to those countries which have had and enjoyed a longer period of political development. (970)

Jung identifies “two great systems of law” to the exclusion of other legal systems that have existed in the region he calls “Afro-Asia,” nullifying their legitimacy and legal systems that existed prior to and during European colonization. Jung specifically states that the leaders of these nations (read: elites) have received their legal training in either of these schools and thus have the capabilities of bringing Western democracy to their respective countries. In his description of this post-war 47 moment, it would seem that these nations have never before had their own legal structures and systems of governance. The Western trained Asian elites, however, having not been pre-disposed to the Western legal climate, Jung cautions, are “aggressively” asserting their status. Nowhere does Jung mention the anti-colonial ethos of the time in which he makes his statements; evading colonial violence as he is trailblazes a path for inclusion in Canada. This dominant narrative infantalizes the Afro-Asian bloc and effectively works against Jung’s suggestion that Canada should not approach the region with condescension or an air of superiority. Within this paradigm, civilization becomes measured through the yardstick of Western liberalism:

To the oriental peoples particularly, Mr. Speaker, an approach based on reasoned argument, and presented with sympathy and courtesy rather than with an air of condescension or superiority is, I suggest, the kind of approach that will produce the desired effect of gaining their trust and co-operation. Because Canada is not, and will never be, I do not think, a major power, and because of our treatment of minority groups generally, this is the kind of approach that Canada can make without any sense of embarrassment or guilt. I suggest that Canada, by acting as

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47 He does not characterize the moment as anticolonial as that would require an acknowledgement of colonial violence.
the spokesman for the more highly developed countries, and because of our support for the United Nations and its agencies, can with facility and confidence explore new channels in order to help the west acquire the friendship and trust of this Afro-Asian bloc. This Afro-Asian bloc, which today consists of 22 countries, is in great need of economic and social development. But many of these 22 countries, some of which are part of the commonwealth, are being assiduously wooed by Russia. Russia is extending to those countries aid in every conceivable form, from economic to military. I suggest that Canada, because of our unique position in world affairs established through a record and reputation of non-exploitation, is in a position to take the lead in contacting these nations, on behalf of the western countries, for the purpose of extending a more vigorous policy of economic and social aid. (970-971)

Jung installs what would become the defining feature of Canadian national mythology, namely that Canada is a middle power nation less burdened by a colonial past (there is no acknowledgment of its ongoing colonialism) and well equipped by virtue of this innocence to take its place among the family of nations. His position is clarified in the next paragraph when he speaks of Canada’s “unique position in world affairs established through a record and reputation of non-exploitation”. Here it is again made clear that Jung’s presence in the House is intended to sanitize an ongoing history of colonialism so that the nation may be born anew as the Western world’s humanitarian ambassador; an heroic responsibility in order to guide the emerging bloc from seductive Russia. He suggests co-opting the Russian strategy of wooing the emerging Asian nations.

There can be no mistaking Asian loyalty and the role of the Asian politician to reassure his white colleagues that he will be a positive force in this new post war political landscape. As he reminded his colleagues in the house, his role is a necessary one.

Mr. Speaker, I suggest that the satellite countries in Europe are beyond our reach and influence. They are too closely under the control of Russia. And so we have the Afro-Asian bloc as the remaining alternative on which to expand our efforts. The economic and military potential of this group staggers the imagination, and we in Canada with our 16 million people might do worse than to be on friendly terms with this bloc of countries which comprise almost a billion of the world’s population. I believe that most of these countries want peace and that they need a period for economic development. (971)

His efforts to reassure parliament of his loyalty notwithstanding, Jung is nevertheless an object of suspicion. As exemplified by MP Reid’s 1936 statements above, parliamentary debates have historically expressed open fear that Asian candidates “might work some injury to the white
people of that province”. On July 10, 1958 during Senate debates, A. Neil McLean raised a question of privilege regarding an article from the Globe and Mail “Don’t Fear Comparisons, Jung’s Advice to West” featuring Jung who was then-president of the National Young Progressive Conservatives’ Association. While at a conference of political youth at NATO headquarters in Paris (funded by PC Party) Jung is quoted to have said that youth groups sent to the Soviet Union by Canada and the United States are “hand-picked, well-briefed by their governments, politically immature and naturally very biased against Russia. American and Canadian delegations returning home from Communist countries realized that if they praised the Soviet system too enthusiastically they ran the risk of being branded fellow-travellers”. Jung also said, although he regards himself as “Canadian first and Chinese second,” he could “as a lawyer” see no legal reason for the Canadian Government’s refusal to recognize Communist China. In response, Senator John Farris stated:

This is a matter for the people of Canada, and I would like to know what status this man has over there... I know that he is a Member of Parliament, and I know that he is the President of the Young Conservatives Association, but he is over in Paris as, I presume, the head of this organization that is mentioned... And just whom does he represent, and what right has this Chinaman to make these statements in Paris on behalf of the Canadian people? (305-306).

Canada’s news media and parliamentarians responded swiftly to Farris’ statement. Specifically, the next day in the House, Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson, rose to dissociate himself and the Liberal Party from Farris’ remarks when the Speaker stopped him saying it was Senate matter. When asked by a reporter what comment he had prepared, Pearson stated,

I was going to suggest that members would wish to dissociate themselves from any remark disparaging or questioning the unqualified right of a member of this House of Commons to represent the Canadian people, whatever his racial origin might be. We all serve in this House as Canadians, and our racial origin has no bearing on that service or affects in any way the equal and proud status we all

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48 Debates - House of Commons. 1923. 14th parl. 2nd session: vol. 5.Ottawa: Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty. June 29: Pg. 4650 MP Jacobs


“Mr. Jung and Senator Farris”. 1958. The Globe and Mail (July 22)
have as Canadians without distinction as to race, class, creed or calling (The Medicine Hat News July 11, 1958).⁵²

What is striking in the many news media reports as well as in the comments made by both Liberal and Progressive Conservative leaders about this episode is that none actually engaged with Jung’s relatively critical comments about Cold War dynamics. Indeed, I have included the actual comments that Jung made here not only because Jung makes critical observations about the West’s disposition toward Russia and communism but because he would not publicly make such comments again. That he was discouraged from doing so is only speculation. However, that public engagement with the episode made little to no reference to Jung’s actual comments and dealt more with shaming Farris is arguably reflective of the racial liberal ethos that pervaded postwar parliamentary discourse. In particular, that Liberal leader Pearson found it necessary to publicly and decisively dissociate himself from Farris’ comments is illustrative of the institutional changes being made by the Liberal Party at this time. As already mentioned, it was under Liberal leadership that the Canadian government had established anti-Asian legislation in the prewar era not exclusive to the Head Tax, the Continuous Journey Order in Council and the internment of Japanese Canadians; this owed to the fact that Jung vowed not to support the Liberals. Thus, Pearson’s reaction to Farris as well as their aggressive attacks against the Diefenbaker Progressive Conservatives spearheaded by Liberal immigration critic MP Pickersgill (former immigration minister) are arguably evidence of the Liberal government’s efforts to recast their image in the postwar era as racially tolerant and progressive. For instance, Pickersgill attributed the ongoing (yet menial) Chinese immigration between 1950-53, “when their troops are fighting our troops (in Korea) (w)as an example of liberality, toleration and good sense of which I think Canadians have ever right to be proud and … major credit to King, St. Laurent and Walter Harris” (4715).⁵³ Pickersgill was also particularly vocal against the Progressive Conservative government’s crackdown on “illegal” Chinese immigration. By 1963, such efforts paid off electorally for the Liberal Party of Canada, which subsequently ruled for twenty-two years.

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The Conservative Asian politician must walk a fine line between serving his constituency and sustaining his party’s own anti-immigrant agenda. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Department of Immigration discovered an abuse of immigration papers by Chinese immigrants. It turned out that because of Canada’s exclusionary laws, some Chinese migrants had been entering Canada by purchasing real or fake birth certificates of Chinese Canadian children bought and sold in Hong Kong. These children carrying false identity papers were referred to as "paper sons" and daughters (Poy 2013, 65-71). It was reported widely in Canadian news media that some “11,000 Chinese of the 23,000 that have come to Canada since 1946 have entered the country illegally” (Poy 2013, 70). Well-documented are the RCMP-led raids across Canada in 1960, which targeted “immigration agencies, travel agencies, private office, and homes of Chinese Canadians seizing documents, typewriters, bank account records, photographs, and even over twenty-year-old bills of sale” (Poy 2013, 40). Following this period of “illegal crackdown,” the Conservative government introduced an adjustment statement policy, which lasted until 1970. On June 9, 1960 immigration minister Ellen Fairclough stated, “Mr. Chairman, I think it is appropriate that at this time I should outline some of the views of the government on the matter of immigration. Canada is a nation of immigrants, and immigration policy has always been a prime concern of Canadian governments” (Fairclough 4711). The Minister went on to list reasons why immigration is necessary for Canada as economic, cultural and social stimulus and the value of immigrants as workers and for population growth. Fairclough stated the value of immigration not only in economic terms but also discussed the need for family reunification. In her speech, the immigration minister stated that spouses and children of Chinese Canadians found to have entered Canada irregularly would not be punished with deportation or criminal charges if they came forward about their entry and their actual family relationships and had not participated in systemic illegal immigration. In response, Liberal immigration critic Jack Pickersgill argued that elements of Fairclough’s speech on Chinese in Canada were identical to statements made by former Prime Minister King. In reaction, Progressive Conservative Justice minister Fulton responded that “when in opposition we never quarrelled with that point of view. We quarrelled with the administration of it” illustrating an important point in analyzing

55 Ibid 4715
Canadian inter-party dynamics; that is, that the parties do not necessarily diverge in terms of point of view, but rather with the administrative techniques of their shared position.

On the same day, Jung also contributed to Minister Fairclough’s announcements about adjusting the status of Chinese immigrants who had arrived irregularly. Jung publicly offers his office facilities to those Chinese who wish to regularize their status due to language barriers and possible fears that “would make them either unable or unwilling to communicate with the officials of the department”. Jung offers his own reputation as reassurance to the Chinese migrants: “I am prepared to make representations to the minister on their behalf, and I can only hope that my personal reputation is such that it will inspire confidence in those who wish to come forward”. However, Jung’s statements on this day began not with such sentiments but rather with remarks that seemed apologist with regards to the government’s aggressive crackdown on “illegal” immigration and also to shame members of the Chinese community:

Mr. Chairman, it is my intention to make two suggestions to the minister/regarding possible changes in the immigration regulations so far as they affect Chinese. However, in making these suggestions I, as the first representative in this house of Chinese descent, am saddened by the fact that my task has been made difficult by some members of the Chinese community who, through their activities have brought all Chinese communities under a cloud of suspicion. The government cannot be blamed for these investigations into alleged irregularities in Chinese immigration, but rather the blame must lie on those who have sought to prey on the very understandable desire of those who wish to join members of their families in Canada. (4720-4721)

Thus, Jung begins by expressing regret that his position as the first Chinese MP has been in some ways dragged through the mud by those that have helped other Chinese to enter Canada illegally such as “fraudulent notary publics” and “shady ethnic brokers”. Like the present day figure of the “human smuggler” in Canadian immigration discourse, these criminal figures are said to be the targets of the government’s immigration crackdowns yet in reality, those who suffer from these restrictions are the immigrants themselves who, because of Canada’s anti-Asian immigrant legislation, have had to seek alternative methods to reunite with families.

In his statement, Jung agreed with MP Pickersgill (immigration critic) that the news media had unnecessarily fanned public fears with their interviews with the RCMP and suggested to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and also the Minister of Justice that no further

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press interviews be granted by the RCMP until the investigations have been completed. Moreover, he states that no one wishes to see “a witch hunt in that sector of the community which has always been regarded as law abiding and I am sure the innate sense of fair play which all Canadians have will not allow the reputation of the Chinese community to suffer.” However, simultaneously Jung argues:

The members of the Chinese community as a whole would be the first and indeed are the first to agree that such offenders should be dealt with by the law if they have in fact been found guilty. But because of the figures that have been published in the press regarding the large numbers of alleged illegal entries, many Chinese feel that all the Chinese community are under a cloud of suspicion. (4721)\textsuperscript{57}

In speaking on behalf of “the Chinese community,” Jung finds it necessary to expound their faith in the Canadian legal system and in bringing criminals to justice. He also outlines tangible reasons why members of the Chinese community have grown distrustful of the government. Indeed, Jung finds himself in a difficult position having to represent the Chinese community to the government as well as the government to the Chinese community. In one of his most illustrative statements, Jung speaks of this position:

Hon. Members can realize that I have had a very heavy responsibility in so far as Chinese immigration is concerned, being the only representative of Chinese extraction in this house. It would be very easy for me to speak out loudly on the discriminatory aspects of Chinese immigration regulations but I have not done so, Mr. Chairman, because I wanted to establish myself as a parliamentarian rather than as a person whose usefulness was restricted to speaking on minority rights alone. I wanted to study the problem so that when I did speak I would be listened to as a person who had demonstrated that he could look at the problem along broad lines. While hon. Members will recall that I spoke on this subject of Chinese immigration in my maiden speech in 1957, hon. Gentlemen will also recall that I was sued for libel by Weldon Chan because of a letter I had written in reply to a woman in West Vancouver. (4721)\textsuperscript{58}

Indeed, these statements reveal how difficult and impossible it is conduct oneself as both raceless and raced. Here, Jung explains that he has chosen to restrain himself from pointing to the discriminatory aspects of Chinese immigration regulations as a way to establish himself as an “ordinary” MP rather than as an MP of minority issues. While Jung has been specifically placed in this position to speak to Chinese immigration – as the party’s go-to MP on minority issues – racial liberal discourse demands that he conduct himself as “racially neutral”. As an exemplar,

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 4721
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, 4721
Jung speaks about an instance where he proved his race neutral credentials. In a letter received by Jung on December 3, 1959, a member of the Vancouver civic unity association says she has been visiting “Mrs. Chan, wife of the man whom the immigration authorities are trying to deport from this country.” Toppin, speaking as a British subject, urges Jung to stop the deportation of Chan, who has left for Ottawa, as it would be “adverse comment on Canada throughout the entire civilized world”. Jung writes back to Toppin assuring her that he has now looked into the Chan case as he has for many similar cases. In the letter Jung contends that Chan having left his family in Vancouver reflects badly on his character and “if he is capable of treating his family in this way, what can we expect from him as a Canadian citizen? Does he treat all his duties and obligations so lightly?” He continues, “I am of Chinese ancestry, as you know, but in matters of this kind, I think as a Canadian… I deeply appreciate your interest, but in view of my own investigations, I must be satisfied that Chan is prepared to accept responsibility.”

Jung’s statement continues:

Having established that I am not afraid to speak out against one of my own race when in my opinion such words are necessary, I think I am in a better position to make an appeal on behalf of those naturalized Chinese who are still separated from their families. …I urge that Chinese dependents regardless of age be allowed to join their relatives in Canada. Bearing in mind Chinese customs and traditions in the family, the class of dependants should be sufficiently broad to cover not only nephews and nieces but also grandchildren where the/parents of the children are dead and the only relatives are in Canada. I believe we have a moral obligation to those early Chinese immigrants who sacrificed so much and received so little to become reunited with their families…Concurrent with the reunification of Chinese families there should be a quota system set up for those who have special skills and who do not have relatives in Canada. I suggest a quota system because in my view once families had been reunited the number of Chinese wanting to come to Canada would taper off. It is highly unlikely that an unskilled Chinese person without a family here would be in a position to come to this country, because without relatives to sponsor and care for him he would have neither the means nor the desire to come to a strange land. However, skilled persons such as doctors, nurses and technicians are in a different position. Even without relatives or sponsors these people would be able to look after themselves and would constitute a definite asset to the community… Finally, I again urge all Canadians not to allow the current investigation into alleged Chinese immigration irregularities to distort or prejudice the status of the Chinese communities in Canada. Much of the irregularity in Chinese immigration has sprung from the desire to rejoin loved ones. I know this government appreciates this fact, and for

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59 Ibid, 4721
60 Ibid, 4721
that reason the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has stated that the innocent will not suffer. That being so, I can only hope that those who wish to do so will take the opportunity of regularizing their entry as soon as possible” (4721-2)

Here Jung finds it is necessary to discuss the libel case brought against him as a way to demonstrate his ability to call out people of his own race. That this performance is meant to demonstrate his democratic credentials or neutrality and impartiality regarding Chinese immigrants and minority issues is significant. To speak in a particularly pejorative way to and about a minority issue still involves speaking to a minority issue, and yet, the pejorative quality of the MPs engagement is somehow meant to demonstrate their “impartiality” or “neutrality” and professionalism as a parliamentarian. That Jung finds it is necessary to first demonstrate such “impartiality” before speaking in favour of a minority group’s human rights is indeed illustrative of the position of racialized MPs find themselves in; that is, this example reveals the parameters around which race can and cannot be spoken in federal legislature. Thus, while the tail end of Jung’s speech finds the MP advocating for family reunification and the beginnings of what would become the 1967 points system, framing out the preamble that accompanies such statements erases the complexity involved in the role of racialized MPs and the parameters within which they can speak. My intention is not to say that Jung’s statements were uniquely prejudiced against Chinese immigrants but that his comments did not necessarily deviate from the dominant discourses of racial governance at the time. Nor do I make blanket arguments that all members of the federal Progressive Conservatives (or the Liberal Party or the CCF/NDP) shared uniform positions regarding Asian immigration and Asians in Canada. For instance, on this same day, MP Winch, leader of the CCF made some disparaging remarks about admitting immigrants from “enemy nations” while quotas were being placed on immigration from commonwealth nations (4719). Indeed, Jung found himself having to him to manoeuvre this political atmosphere carefully; negotiations that are evident in his collection of members statements.

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Standing for Bill C-79: the Canadian Bill of Rights

A month after Jung’s statements regarding “illegal” Chinese immigration and family reunification, Jung was among sixteen MPs appointed to the special committee on the act for recognition and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on July 7, 1960. In his statements on the Bill of Rights, Jung renarrates themes from his maiden speech:

Mr. Speaker, under any circumstances it is a very great honour to speak in this house. But in rising today to speak on Bill No. C-79, an act providing for the recognition and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, I am experiencing again some of the emotions I felt on November 11, 1957, when I rose and spoke for the first time in this honourable house. I felt in my heart then, and I think without being presumptuous that it was a feeling shared on that day by all hon. Members regardless of political affiliation, that history was being made on that occasion because for the first time a person of Asiatic origin spoke in this house as an elected representative…As I spoke that day I thought of my father and others like him who came to this country in 1900, unknown and alone./ fortified and sustained by no more than the realization that he had finally arrived in the country known to him in his native tongue as Gum Shan or Gold Mountain… Why did he come to this country, in spite of the fact that he had to pay a head tax to enter it? Why did he come to this country when only 13 years earlier, in this small but growing city of Vancouver, 300 men and boys had marched on the Chinese shacks and routed 24 Chinese out of bed and, according to the story, these 24 Chinese were also kicked and beaten? Two of them were tied together by their pigtails and thrown into a nearby creek, and all had their meagre belongings burnt… My father came because, in spite of these restrictions and in spite of these abuses, he had faith in Canada. He believed in Canada, and he gave all he had to this country. If I have done nothing else, Mr. Speaker, my election to parliament has justified the hopes and expectations of my father and mother and, indeed, those of all my countrymen… (5896-7)

Here, as an overture to speaking about Bill C-79, as he did in his Maiden Speech, Jung repeats his father’s immigrant story; that despite the violent racial backlash against Chinese in Canada, his father like so many other Chinese men, had “faith in Canada;” an insinuation that these early Chinese “knew” Canada’s true national identity as one that would one day elect one of them into parliament and also establish a Bill of Rights – despite the racist abuses they suffered. Yet, still, Jung does not attribute his electoral success to the efforts of the early Chinese or to his own merit:

My election in 1957 was not a tribute to me, but rather a tribute to the leader of our party who is now the Prime Minister of Canada; because it was he who

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ignited the spark of Canadianism in the breasts of my fellow Canadians who elected me, not as a Chinese Canadian but rather as a Canadian of Chinese extraction. I doubt whether my election would have been possible under any other leader of the Conservative party, because no one, either before or since, has been so closely identified with the protection of the rights of minorities and the underprivileged as has the present Prime Minister. Because of his reputation and because of my affiliation with the Prime Minister through the Progressive Conservative party, the voters of Vancouver Centre in 1957 made amends for that earlier incident of 1887 by electing me as their representative. (5897)

Importantly, Jung identifies the Diefenbaker government as exceptional even among Conservative governments. That is, Jung is aware that it was not just any Conservative government that elected a diverse membership but it was one that has been committed to making amendments to the law, which had previously excluded minorities; it was a Conservative government that was committed to the protection of the rights of minorities. In his statements, Jung is also supportive of a bill of rights that would structurally protect the rights of minorities. Jung’s supportive comments for the Bill appeal to the material injustices faced by minority groups based explicitly on race. Jung continues:

I cannot hope to approach the heights of speakers who have preceded me, but I do wish to interpret to some hon. Members some of the feelings of a minority group which had peculiar problems springing from the fact that those in this minority group happened to have coloured skin. Many of the difficulties of those in minority groups spring from the fact that because of the colour of their skin it is sometime difficult for them to get good accommodation and good jobs (sic)… If this proposed bill of rights did nothing else it would still be a tremendous step forward. But, Mr. Speaker, this proposed bill of rights goes further, in my opinion. For the first time we have a standard around which minorities can rally… These people who were desirous of becoming Canadian citizens had impressed upon them their duties and obligations, but nowhere were they advised of their rights and privileges… (5897 emphasis added)

While it is notable that Jung’s support for Bill-79 explicitly appeals to the material inequalities affecting minority groups’ access to housing and employment, his comments do not necessarily deviate from the positions of other members in the House. Indeed, Jung was among the numerous members from all three political parties that supported the Bill, which eventually passed. In other words, Jung’s position of support for the Bill of Rights was not necessarily a

63 Ibid
64 Ibid
maverick position in parliament at the time rather his statements align with the overall racial liberal ethos of the postwar moment. Jung continues:

> At a time when in other counties, and I think of countries within the commonwealth, measures are being taken which appear to further restrict the rights of minorities, this country is showing the way by declaring in clear language what constitute basic human fundamental rights and freedoms. This fact should be remembered by those in this country who try to give the impression that certain minority groups are being unfairly and needlessly prosecuted.\(^{65}\)

Here, Jung specifically identifies that with the Bill of Rights and by standing for human rights and freedoms, Canada stands out in the world stage. In an important discursive move, Jung’s argument that the Bill of Rights positions Canada as uniquely humanitarian is immediately used to discount critics that have spoken out against the government’s ongoing crackdown on Chinese immigrants. In other words, it is suggested that because the Bill already makes Canada exceptionally tolerant, it cannot possibly be true that the same nation is treating minority groups unfairly. This same argument is made later in the debate by Prime Minister Diefenbaker who makes his own statements regarding the Bill of Rights with reference to Jung:

> When the hon. Member for Vancouver Centre (Mr. Jung) referred to his first speech in this house and what it meant to him as the son of an immigrant to have become a member of parliament… I realized there was something in this debate more than in any other debate that has taken place in my experience in this house. There was something of that vast unity that brings us together as Canadians. (5939)\(^{66}\)

Diefenbaker’s description of the Bill of Rights as an emerging national unifier reflect the racial liberal ethos that would come to define the third party system. Indeed, the Liberal governments under Pearson and Trudeau continued to emphasise government-led efforts to ensure human rights and freedoms as what defined Canadian identity as evidenced by multicultural policy (1971) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). At the same time it becomes clear in the example of the debates surrounding the Bill of Rights that these symbolic efforts also had the effect of foreclosing the possibility to meaningfully critique ongoing racism especially in the House of Commons. Diefenbaker continues:

> I want to say this to the hon. Member for Vancouver Centre. *I want him to convey this message to those of his race. Canadians of Chinese origin are law-abiding, loyal and thrifty.* The fact that prosecutions are taking place at the moment does

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\(^{65}\) Ibid

\(^{66}\) Diefenbaker. 1960, 5939
not in any way detract from that fact. Indeed they are co-operating in every way to assure that those who endeavoured to thrive by blackmail of their brethren shall be prosecuted. I say to him, and I say to all Canadians of all racial origins that one of the major responsibilities of parliament – parliament cannot do it alone – is to provide the assurance that the heritage that is ours shall be maintained undiminished and shall be handed down to generations yet to come... When my hon. Friends say we do not need a law as long as we have the British heritage, let me point out that at the current session of the British parliament a bill was introduced... to make illegal discrimination to the detriment of any person on the ground of colour, race or religion in the United Kingdom. In other words, there, too, with all that magnificent heritage and that regard for the people and for the rights, one to the other, in 1960 a bill was introduced to prevent discrimination in this regard. This is further evidence of the fact that whatever the charters of freedom of the past have been, freedom is not static freedom is expansive; freedom has to be maintained in each generation in keeping with the changing conditions (5940 emphasis added).67

Like Jung, Diefenbaker restates his position that Chinese Canadians are “law-abiding, loyal and thrifty,” and attempts to justify the ongoing crackdown on fraudulent notary publics that facilitated false identification papers – which alternatively had the effect of profiling all Chinese Canadians as “illegal”. The Prime Minister’s reference to the British legal example reveals how much the global political climate had impacted the government’s position on the notion of freedom and equality as well as their introduction of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, statements made by Jung and Diefenbaker reflect a broader global racial liberalism discourse. Their statements reflect an appeal to federalism rather than regionalism as the path towards national unity through the passage of the bill of rights.

Still, despite their introduction of the Bill of Rights, the government’s efforts to “control” Chinese immigration continued into the 1960s to the extent that opposition members took to critiquing Jung for “smearing” his own people. On January 26, 1962 Jung rose on a question of privilege to respond to Liberal MP Regier’s statements with reference to Jung and “the investigations into illegal Chinese immigration”. Jung quotes his colleague from Hansard: “The government has dragged through the mud the good reputation of tens of thousands of loyal Canadian citizens of Chinese descent, and I very much regret that one of the members of...
parliament has been aggressive and active in helping to, smear people of the same origin as himself.” 68 In response Jung stated:

Mr. Speaker, at no time have I done anything to smear my fellow Chinese, nor have I ever entertained any such preposterous thoughts. On the contrary, Mr. speaker, the Minister of Justice (Mr. Fulton), the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mrs. Fairclough) and the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) himself have all received very extensive representations from me regarding the Chinese immigration regulations and also the investigations into the irregular entries. These representations from me have been so numerous that persons less generous and less sympathetic would long ago have lost patience with me. Also, my speeches on the subjects are contained in Hansard and I invite anyone to say that there is anything in them which can be construed as smearing the Chinese in Canada. Far from smearing them, Mr. Speaker. 69

It would be difficult to argue that Jung purposefully intended to further alienate Chinese communities in Canada, especially in his own riding. And yet, it would be just as difficult to deny that the government had indeed implemented a decisive racial profiling program to regulate Chinese immigration and those that were forced by the government’s restrictive anti-Asian policy to seek alternative methods to reunite with their families. As a member of parliament actively working with the Minister of Immigration, Minister of Justice and Prime Minister on issues related to minority groups, Jung did have a part to play in the state’s governing of minorities. MP Regier’s critique against the state’s ongoing racial profiling against Chinese in Canada and Jung’s role in that racial management, directly challenges the inconsistencies of the racial liberal state. It is thus not surprising that Jung finds it necessary to denounce his colleague’s statements against him.

Indeed, despite the government’s amnesty program for Chinese immigrants and the introduction of the Bill of Rights, Canadian news media such as a 1962 Maclean’s magazine article titled “The Criminal Society that Dominates the Chinese in Canada” continued to depict the Chinese community “as unlawful and uncooperative with the government, and suggested that the immigration brokers were controlled by Triads and Communist [sic]. The article added: “All those people, who could have been jailed, have been granted amnesty, and still the Chinese community will not co-operate … .” It went on to say that instead of letting the CBA decide whom to bring in, “we could select Chinese who can assimilate … from Hong Kong’s pool of

69 Ibid
European-educated students and businessmen with money to invest” (Poy 2013, 69-70). Similarly, this same year, an article in the Globe and Mail titled: “Help Control Immigration, Diefenbaker asks Chinese” Prime Minister Diefenbaker spoke little about a federal announcement that investigation of Chinese immigration was being abandoned and stated that “the government is confident it could henceforth control such immigration with the assistance of the Chinese Canadian community”. As quoted by the PM: “Canada’s decision to accept 100 refugee families from Hong Kong would stand comparison with the help offered by other countries…All will be welcome here so long as they have those skills which, yours have will build the sort of Canada we want” (Globe and Mail, November 19, 1962).

On one hand, Jung’s statements reveal his concern about addressing early restrictions put on Chinese immigrants and their subsequent “illegal” methods of entering Canada. It seems that with the introduction of the Amnesty program, Jung’s hope was to relax immigration regulations in order to reunite families. Like Minister Fairclough and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Jung assured Chinese communities that there would be no problems involved for those who came forward; that they would not be arrested, fined, or deported and they would receive landed immigrant status. Nonetheless, due to the severity of the immigration crackdowns, members of the Chinese community in Vancouver and elsewhere reiterated to one another “Don’t trust Doug Jung. You’ll be arrested” (Lowe, 2007). In other words, the community found it difficult to place their trust in Jung and the Conservative government following their hard-line approach to the issue of immigration and its crackdown on illegal Chinese immigration the late 1950s and early 1960s. Many have attributed these debacles with Jung’s defeat in the 1962 election” (Ng 1999, 96).

After Jung

Nonetheless, those who have written on Jung have generally argued that despite these challenges and contradictions, “Jung’s political career was an indication of Canada’s openness to its Asian minorities, and particularly to the Chinese Canadians in Vancouver” (Ng 1999, 95; Poy 2013). Particularly for the Vancouver Chinese, “Jung helped to lessen the remoteness of Canadian politics by giving them a voice in Ottawa” (Ng 1999, 95; Poy 2013, 71). In the aftermath of Jung’s election, “the two mainstream political parties became more active in recruiting supporters from Chinatown, more Canadian politicians chose to attend campaign
rallies” (Ng 1999, 95). In the late 1950s, early 1960s, and 1970s, “all three parties were trying to win support from ethnic communities “that were relatively unassertive in their relations with parties” (Carty et al 2000, 89-91). In the post-War period party officials pursued ethnic leaders “based on the belief...that these leaders’ influence was great among their ethnic supporters (Schwartz 1964 in Wiseman 2007, 23-24). Milestone political firsts of other visible-minority communities include the election of June 25, 1968 when Lincoln M. Alexander became the first Black Canadian (also Progressive Conservative) to be elected to the House of Commons and when Leonard Marchand would become the “first Status Indian” to be elected parliamentarian as the Liberal member for the British Columbia riding of Kamloops—Cariboo (Matheson 2005 26). In this same election, Canada elected its first Arab MP Pierre De Ban (Matheson 2005 26-27). In 1979, Alexander became the first Black Canadian appointed to serve in the federal cabinet. In 1985, Alexander was appointed Ontario’s Lieutenant Governor, the first member of a visible minority to serve in that role in any province in Canada on the recommendation of then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. That is, MP Jung was ostensibly the beginning of an era of racial liberalism. However, Adolph Reed Jr. has commented on how the tendency to “lionize the individuals who notch those ‘firsts’” ends up depoliticizing “the struggle for equality by folding it into a narrative of exceptional individuals who, as like as not, overcame adversity and great odds to triumph. Worse, that narrative can be used as a club against others, as the exceptional individual becomes the standard against which all are judged” (Reed 2009, 14). Elsewhere, Reed has noted how the “‘first Black’ rhetoric […] obscures the fact that modern black Republicans have been more tokens than signs of progress” and that “clichés about fallen barriers are increasingly meaningless; symbols don’t make for coherent policies” (Reed, Jr. 2012 A35).

Throughout the 1960s, further inclusionary changes were made to Canada’s political institutions, which helped define the nation as open, peaceable, and “raceless”. During the third party system, under the Pearson (1963-1968) and Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984) Liberal governments, Canada’s immigration laws relatively opened up via the 1967 immigration points system to increasingly diversify the nation’s racial composition as discussed in chapter one. Then in 1971, multiculturalism within a bilingual framework was made policy by Prime Minister Trudeau as per the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism convened under Prime Minister Pearson. Indeed, it has been argued that “Canadian society has become increasingly open to ethnic pluralism since the 1960s – with the Canadian
Bill of Rights, multiculturalism policy and, most recently, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms being the most notable expressions of that openness” (RCERPF, xxvii). That is, multiculturalism discourse has shaped the parameters through which Indigenous people and visible minorities can politically engage with the state – through making claims and demands in the search for recognition and redress.

Also, while Jung’s election has been lauded as the beginning of a new era, we must ask “new for whom?” That the first racialized Member of Parliament was Chinese Canadian and not Indigenous or Black is notable. Moreover, in 1957 while Canada elected its first Asian Member of Parliament, the Stephenson Report regarding Africville tabled. In 1961 while Canada passed its bill of rights, the Halifax Department of Development proposed the eviction of the Black residents of Africville and a year later adopted those proposals. Indeed, Nelson has discussed how “the violence inherent in the regulation of racialized space is rendered invisible when law is conceived as being a product of consensus of liberal social values” (Nelson 2002, 213). It is thus all the more critical to recognize that the dislocation of Africville residents is part of an ongoing process of “eviction, suppression, and denial” and “the means by which Black residents of the province came to form the community of Africville must be regarded in the context of a history of the displacement and enslavement of Black people by whites in North America … a worldview that demanded their containment and denial” (Nelson 2002, 212-214). That is, as the integration of Asians was beginning to become imaginable in Canada, what remained was “the inconceivability to a racist society of an enduring communal Black presence” (Nelson 2002, 213). The simultaneity of these historic racial moments in Canada reveal how Black Canadians endure a social order that contradicts the celebrated discourse of post-war racial liberalism. That is, every time there is an Asian claim for inclusion something else on the racial landscape is being given context. In this way, the thesis will continue to explore how the Asian conservative figure has made the case for the eviction of Black and Indigenous life.

By the late 1980s, the liberal paradox was becoming particular acute: political parties had to come to terms with a new politics of inclusion (Carty et al 2000, 88-89). At the same time, racial liberal discourse came into direct tension with an emerging national anti-multiculturalism discourse. Pan-Canadian consensus on multiculturalism as part of the nation’s identity was beginning to come under attack and the increasing politicization of women and ethnic and visible minority groups was framed as the root cause of Canada’s national identity crisis. The cultivation
of an inclusionary institutional image becomes important to Canadian political parties’ campaigns for electoral success. As researchers have found, "political parties, especially those most likely to form the government, must be able to reflect the ethnic pluralism in Canadian society adequately, thereby avoiding situations that could lead to ethnic or racial tension" (Pelletier 1991, 146). However, while the state at least symbolically recognized the need to set up permanent internal structures for representing ethno-cultural groups, with a mandate to increase the participation of minorities in parties and in the House of Commons, the next chapter explores how the ideological field narrows in the 1990s. That is, the state returns to a non-committed reliance on abstract liberal notions of equality while simultaneously using market logics to justify social, economic, and political inequalities along racial lines. New racial subjects and institutions would emerge to legitimate racial order.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how Jung was caught in the liberal paradox articulated by Goldberg where all is race but race is irrelevant. That is, this chapter examined how Jung negotiates this racial paradox and walks a political path aware that he is not beyond race but that racelessness is the feature of Canadian political discourse. In his parliamentary contributions, Jung assures the House that he knows that the state wants both race and racelessness and that he can do both and that. With his election, Jung insists that the nation can move towards racial healing. He also participated in what becomes a defining feature of Canadian national mythology, namely that Canada is a middle power nation less burdened by a colonial past. At the same time, Jung presents himself as an advocate for his people by introducing the notion of redress for Chinese exclusion and campaigns for immigration policy that might facilitate family reunification. That is, he makes clear that he does not intend to be raceless.

It is this impossible racial liberal paradox that Jung negotiates throughout his time in the Commons. Jung resolves the paradox by presenting himself as the end of an era of racial exclusion. This allows him to speak race within a narrative of progress. It allows him to be the loyal Asian who is nevertheless an advocate for his people: Canadians of Chinese descent. Jung presents his native informant credentials and how he will be able to assist Canada as an Asian. However, as exemplified by MP Thomas Reid’s 1936 statements above, parliament has long suspected the loyalties of Asians and this is the political terrain that Jung enters into as the first
Asian Canadian candidate. That is, despite his credentials, Jung’s loyalties – like the loyalties of all Asians – comes into question. The Conservative Asian politician must walk a fine line between serving his constituency and sustaining his party’s own anti-immigrant agenda. Henceforth, like Jung, all Asians will have to negotiate this position – a position that Jung has been better able to negotiate than those Asian Conservatives that follow him, undoubtedly because the ideological field narrows considerably in the 1990s.

Indeed, statements made by Jung and Diefenbaker reflect a broader global racial liberalism discourse. Within Canada, their statements reflect an appeal to federalism (and not regionalism) as a way towards national unity through the passage of the bill of rights. In other words, the Progressive Conservative Diefenbaker government ruled under an era of racial liberalism that would not last. The legislative amendments and political discourse in this time were legitimated by racial liberal discourses. Thus, while Jung’s political career can be read as a racial conservative paradigm insofar as his example demonstrates how racial parliamentarians must negotiate the liberal paradox of being raced and raceless, the MPs following him depart from his political path in an important way. The racial liberal state’s ethos and appreciation for rights-based equality for minorities in the Bill of Rights, despite its limited function as a federal statute, paved the way for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). In this era, the language of human rights for minorities were increasingly considered part and parcel of national unity. Jung advocated strongly for the rights of minorities, racial redress, and immigration as family reunification. As observed in the next chapter, with the rise of the Reform party of Canada in 1987, the notion of minority rights becomes narrated as the cause of national disunity. No other Asian MP would be elected as a Progressive Conservative candidate since Jung and in general, representation of Asian Canadians in the House remained dismal as the second and third Asian MPs, Art Hu and Raymond Chan were elected in 1974 and 1993 as Liberal candidates, seventeen and thirty-six years after Jung, respectively. Instead, the other fifteen MPs in this study have been elected as candidates of the farther right-wing Reform Party or the Conservative Party of Canada. These Asian Conservatives are elected into a different racial landscape - not into an era of racial liberalism but into an era of racial neoliberalism marked by strong anti-multiculturalism discourses.
Chapter 4: 
Race Matters: Reform’s Racial Realignment and the Conservative Party of Canada

In 2011, news media covering Canada’s forty-first general election featured stories, which suggested that “immigrants and natives now embrace Tories” (Chase 2011). Leaders of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) in particular, then Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney appeared regularly at “ethnic events” and argued that the values of “new Canadians” align naturally with the values of the CPC. For many Canadians, including researchers, that minorities would favour the Tories over the Grits was paradoxical indeed. While political scientists would widely debate and even contest CPC’s suggestion that minorities became conservative in 2011, it is still widely assumed that CPC efforts to appeal to select minority groups reflects a genuine commitment to inclusion and diversity rather than an unashamed electoral and political strategy (Bradford and Andrew, 2012; Farney and Rayside, 2013; Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, and White 2013). Upon closer examination, the conservative archives reveal that CPC race-based appeals of 2011 emerge out of a history of racial realignment within Canada’s conservative parties, which began in the 1990s and continued into the 2000s. As such, the frequency of conservative race appeals during the 2011 campaign is less a matter of genuine or disingenuous commitments to diversity but more importantly illustrates the fact that racial governance on the Canadian political landscape has become deeply predicated on a discourse of inclusivity and the inclusion of certain minority groups. That political inclusion has become an integral part of racial governmentality or how racialized minorities are governed is increasingly clarified here and in the chapters that follow. In particular, exploring how and why the CPC has specifically appealed to Asian Canadian groups configured as ideal neoliberal subjects that “do not make demands upon the state” (Flanagan 2009) clarifies which subjects are accordingly configured as undesirable political subjects and thus whose casting out of the modern body politic becomes re-justified.

In examining the period of racial realignment, I trace how Canada’s major rightist parties have had to negotiate formal state-based efforts to politically include visible minorities. This chapter demonstrates how even these right-wing parties, with their xenophobic foundations, ranging from explicit to race-blind, have had to make various race appeals in order to preserve
any semblance of legitimacy in the Canadian political realm as well as pave the way for electoral success. Indeed, researchers have observed that in their bid to "unite the right," Conservatives have found that recruiting minorities could spell greater electoral success (Sampert 2008; Andrew et al. 2008). That is, despite ongoing public denials that race matters to the design of their campaigns and policies, the archive of party speeches and documents reveals that the Harper Conservatives and its antecedents have mobilized race to these ends since the late 1980s. In part, these findings add to ongoing examination of the Harper Conservatives and the neoliberalization of multiculturalism as “reform-by-stealth” (Abu-Laban 2014). That is, the chapter details how while the Harper Conservatives have learned to recalibrate their race-based electoral strategies, they have not abandoned the racial policies originally outlined by the Reform Party – partly given that CPC leader Stephen Harper penned the Blue Book, Reform’s policy guidebook. Instead, racial realignment – or the resignification of multiculturalism as neoliberal governance - has been necessary in order to attain electoral success as well as to justify and legislate Reformist policies under the Harper Conservatives. Part of tracing this resignification explores the broader implications of Reform’s anti-immigrant discourse; that is, since the late-1980s, while Conservatives have shifted their racial rhetoric, the Liberals have shifted a number of policy positions thereby moving Canadian political discourse and policy debates rightward.

A Different Racial State

Adolph Reed Jr. has examined how since the 1970s there has been a systemic shift away from combating economic inequities through state political economy and redistribution in favour of a politics of recognition and incorporation. As discussed in chapter one, Reed has commented on how identity politics as a politics of neoliberalism has been appropriated by the Republicans in order to “legitimize black conservatives and their programs, often overlapping the right’s similar appropriation of a radical-sounding populist antistatism, as well as to discredit advocates of civil rights and civil liberties” (Reed Jr. 1999, 48). That is, the rise of neoliberalism has perverted the ideal of racial justice “as the removal of prejudicial restrictions on individual aspirations” (Reed 2009, 14). For Reed, such identity politics have been compatible with neoliberal redefinitions of freedom and equality, which thrive on disparities in the economic
Similarly, of the Australian context, Elizabeth Povinelli has observed how beginning in the 1970s, “Australian business leaders discovered that […] The Asia-Pacific was not simply a new site of capital accumulation but an innovator in new forms of social and capital organization” (20). Referring to former prime Minister Paul Keating’s assertion of Australia as a multicultural nation in Asia and his famous declaration: “I am Asian”, Povinelli asks the important question: “Although Australia may have needed the strong economies of Asia, did the identification with Asia, or as Asians, cross the discursively thin line preserving European culture and its political and social institutions at the nation’s core?” (2002, 21). To borrow from Povinelli’s examination of indigenous life in Australia, even as “Asian” and other racial identifications in the Canadian context were unhinged from their previous social referents, [they were] also resituated within a complex field of national and international civil and human rights standards of acceptable and unacceptable social and cultural difference” (ibid 24).

This is to say that the racial state and political terrain of 2011 is not what it was in 1957. That is, MP Jung navigated a political path in a national context of racial liberalism that differs from the path that Reform, Alliance, and CPC MPs would walk post-1990s. As immigration restrictions were lifted in the late 1960s – structural changes paved in part by MP Jung - and with the emergence of official multiculturalism in the 1970s and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Asian MPs tended to be found among Liberal ranks. Indeed, no Asian MPs have been elected since Jung as Progressive Conservative MPs. It would not be until 1997 that another Conservative Asian MP would take their seat in the House. How and why all four Asian Conservatives elected this year were Reform MPs is examined in this chapter. The formal emergence of Canadian federal Conservatism can be traced to the mid 1980s, which marks one moment in Canadian history particularly fraught with crisis around race and national identity. Chapters one through three have discussed how political parties in the third-party system had espoused multiculturalism as policy and principle to varying degrees and had made efforts to recruit minority voters and representatives. In this post-war period, legislative changes to immigration, citizenship, and employment equity as well as the emergence of official multiculturalism opened doors that were previously closed to women, First Nations, and visible

minorities. The establishment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms enabled groups and individuals to bring their human rights cases to the courts thereby shifting a degree of political power away from the parties to the courts. Even Canada’s Progressive Conservatives had augmented many of Pierre Trudeau’s multicultural policies under Brian Mulroney’s leadership. Such statist inclusionary measures were the last straw for Canada’s right, which had been burgeoning for decades. What ensued in this moment of crisis was a national, electorally oriented, reactionary social movement. In 1987, under Preston Manning’s leadership, the Reform Party emerged as the populist party for what Eva Mackey calls so-called “ordinary Canadians” fed up with Liberal “elites” and “special interest” groups that had, in their view, threatened Canadian values. In the midst of this inclusionary era, the Reform Party revived anti-woman, homophobic and in particular, anti-immigration hysteria.

The formal inclusion of minoritized “difference” signalled the increasing proximity of racial “others” in Canada’s places of authority, which aligned with increasing concerns from “ordinary Canadians” or “Canadian Canadians” about Canada’s national identity and values. In their discussion of the politicization of immigrant issues in the 1980s, Abu Laban and Gabriel (2002) show that “In 1988, national opinion polls indicated that 30 percent of Canadians felt there were too many immigrants. By April 1993 the figure had risen to over 45 per cent. And by 1994 polls reported more than half of all Canadians were of the opinion that there were too many immigrants in the country” (47). These might seem startling statistics for a country that prides itself on multicultural tolerance and on being “a country of immigrants”. Eva Mackey’s qualitative interview-based study has shown that this aggregate anti-immigrant sentiment is deeply ensconced in the nation’s racial anxieties. What became clear in Mackey’s interviews was that difference was acceptable and allowable as long as “multicultural” Canadians did not impose these differences onto “real” or “true” Canadians (Mackey 1999, 160). That is, “Canada” as a nation-building project had to come first and as soon as Canadian white identity felt threatened by so-called “special issue” groups seeking rights and meaningful political power in the nation, then difference was no longer “tolerable”. In the late 1980s and 1990s, difference became intolerable for “ordinary Canadians,” as “difference” began using the Charter to challenge human rights violations central in the Canadian nation-building project – bringing contradictions of abstract liberalism to the fore – “ordinary Canadians” argued that they were being unrepresented as a result. Such imagined white disadvantage would work as the political glue that formed the
Reform Party of Canada in 1987. Reform insisted on a race-blind approach to governance where the ideals of racelessness reproduce norms of whiteness. Under raceless racial states, such norms and values continue to define socio-political life and this dilemma, according to Goldberg, is inescapable: “Those who think they can avoid it by retreating to a neutral universalism evasive of racial reference do so only by veiling themselves in an ignorance of how racial histories continues to infuse all claims to value” (2002, 224).

The representation of “ordinary Canadian” interests at the political party level was intended to redress these crises of whiteness and representation. Reform discourse surrounding the development of multicultural programs and policies made it clear that Canada is imagined as a white space and that the so-called “ordinary Canadian” is an indisputably white figure, which accommodates and tolerates the multicultural other (Mackey 1999; Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Haque 2012). As Mackey observed, "the project of Canadian nation-building has not been based on the erasure of difference but on controlling and managing it” (Mackey 1999, 160). Indeed, “the issue at stake here is the authority to define the project” (Ibid 165-166). In this formulation, whiteness remains centred and the multicultural other is firmly and perpetually cast as non-Canadian even as it integrates, while the figure of the Native remains in this political imaginary, as vanishing. This is the point of entry through which the “multicultural” other figure becomes formally politicized in Canada – a point that delimits the boundaries of their political speech and activities as it will be evidenced in the rest of this thesis. We see in this chapter how Reform, the Canadian Alliance and the CPC distanced their racial appeals away from Reform’s initial reactionary response to the crisis of whiteness and towards a neoliberal vernacular in order to recommit to the Canadian nation building project. In effect, CPC represents not an aberration of Canada’s legacy, but rather represents a renewed commitment to the dual-white settler racial state.

Some key players in the conservative electorally-oriented political movement included Preston Manning, Stephen Harper, Jason Kenney, Ezra Levant, and David Frum with Thomas Flanagan at the helm as strategist, high-ranking advisor, University of Calgary professor, campaign boss and former chief of staff. Also known as the Calgary School (Russell 2006; Frenette 2014; McDonald 2004; Abu-Laban 2014; Philippe and Boily 2008), this network of Conservative players and pundits took power of media and policy-making with two main concerns: to define the terms of racial governance and to create neoliberal hegemony. Invoking
mafia imagery, his former student, conservative media personality, and founder of the *Western Standard*, Ezra Levant calls Flanagan “Don Tomaso… he is the master strategist, the godfather – even of Harper” (quoted in McDonald, 2004). That their relationship fell apart over Harper’s alleged outrage that Flanagan had published two monographs on the blueprint behind Conservative campaigns indicates the significance of their contents. As the Reform Party’s former Director of Policy, Strategy and Communications and as Harper’s campaign manager for the 2002 Canadian Alliance leadership race as well as leading up to the 2004 and 2006 elections, Flanagan not only possesses insider knowledge of how image management became crucial for Canada’s Conservative party and its antecedents but has been a key architect of the political realignment that led to Conservative electoral victory in 2006. As such, Flanagan’s writing on his experience and his expert counsel on conservative political success - his ten commandments - provide insight into what exactly was involved in political rebranding, how the Conservative Party of Canada has achieved electoral success and how it governs as Canada’s majority government. Flanagan has devoted much time documenting the CPC’s ability to broaden the conservative appeal without abandoning Reform’s core policies and principles.

While the 1960s and 1970s are commonly associated with antiracist, anti-war, feminist social movements, scholars observe the emergence of the conservative movement (Pierson and Skocpal 2007; Story and Laurie 2008; Andrew 1997; Berkowitz 2004; McGirr 2001; Winant 2004). Global tectonic shifts took place resulting in a broader neoliberal reorientation including Margaret Thatcher’s rule in Britain that began in 1979, and Ronald Reagan’s US Republican win in 1980. Structural changes installed under Thatcher and Reagan relied on the depiction of struggle between traditional values and liberal elites and soon similar anti-statist and anti-egalitarian messages would emerge in Canada. Patten has observed that in the “mid-1970s, Robert Stanfield led a Progressive Conservative Party defined primarily by a blend of red tory ideological commitments and market liberalism. By the early 1980s, however, partisan activists inspired by the examples of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were actively reviving classic free enterprise liberalism – neoliberalism in a bid to marginalize red toryism” (Patten 2013, 59). The blueprint for laissez faire conservative political change could be found in the economic theories of neoconservative and neoliberal intellectuals including Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Thomas Sowell, Irving Kristol, and Nathan Glazer - many of whom sat on the editorial advisory board at the Fraser Institute, a Canadian conservative think-tank.
Familiar with this literature, Harper began to build a “Blue Tory network” (Patten 2013, 65) in order to entrench a mainstream neoliberal agenda:

From deposing Joe Clark in 1983, through the founding of the Reform Party, Manning’s United Alternative initiative, various leadership races and exercises in drafting party policy and campaign platforms, to reuniting Canadian conservatives in the Conservative Party of Canada, free market-oriented activists have worked to side-line red toryism and partially contain social conservative ideological impulses. For Stephen Harper and many of the protagonists in this struggle, the goal has always been to bring their own version of the Thatcher/Reagan revolution to Canada (Patten 2013, 73).

As part of this revolution, what the archive of Reform Party speeches, issue statements, assemblies, and of course the Blue Book make clear is that policy reform has always been of utmost importance for the Reform’s political leaders including their former chief policy officer and author of the Blue Book, Stephen Harper. Flanagan refers to a March 10, 1989 memo from Harper challenging Manning, "The Reform Party must continue to be moderate in tone, but it is pointless to attempt to avoid the "Right" label" (Flanagan 2009a, 61). Harper argued that as part of a Reform vision of Canada, the party needed to “…draw a clear line around party policy on the right to exclude extremists” (Harper 1991). Thus, the Reform Party’s policy committee – Manning and Harper – prepared several resolutions which were brought to motion at the 1991 Saskatoon assembly. On immigration, Reform emphasized the value of independent class economic immigration and the need to crack down on “false refugees” set on abusing Canada’s lenient immigration system (Blue book 1992; Flanagan 1992; Manning 1992). The effect of such policy guidelines on Canada’s parliamentary discourse on immigration and Canadian identity is undeniable and has been documented by both supporters and critics. Immigration policy was also revised to remove any reference to ethnicity, to ensure that it would be purely economic in character. On multiculturalism, the Party declared that it would repeal the Multiculturalism Act as well as “cease funding and programs for ethnic and racial organizations” (Manning 1992; Green book 1991/92). Retention of language, culture and traditions were articulated as private matters and not under the purview of federal responsibility. Rather, the centrality of national culture and Canadian values were emphasized (Blue Book 1990, 1991; Flanagan and Pantazopoulos 1992, 1). Still, in the field of multiculturalism, the phrase "national culture" was also removed to counter the misconception that the Reform Party favoured forcible assimilation
of immigrants”\textsuperscript{71}. By 1992, Reform’s immigration policy was designed to be “non-racist, non-discriminatory” and based on Canada’s economic needs (Caucus Issue Statement No. 25 February 22, 1992 CACA009209E). Evidently, since the days of Reform, Harper recognized overt racism as a liability and that some tempered moderation, even only at the rhetorical level was necessary to sustain a digestible public persona and to unseat the Liberals. This would be the way to garner more support, climb the way to the top, gather new members, grow a neutral populist party, seemingly without a social conservative agenda but very much anchored in it. Like the Blue book, the CPC “Policy Declaration” first adopted in March 2005 and amended in 2008 is a mixture of general principles and specific policies. Both in government and in opposition, “the leader has been accorded wide latitude to develop policy for strategic purposes” (Flanagan 2013, 88).

At the same time, party leaders tried to justify the 1990 Blue Book’s reference to “national culture”. When Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party Sheila Copps called this evidence that Reform had “an assimilationist, even racist agenda”, it was argued that Dr. Rais Khan, Professor of Political Science at the University of Winnipeg and “a Canadian of South Asian origin” had first suggested its use. In a speech to the 1989 Edmonton Assembly, Khan had argued:

If I want to nurture my culture, speak my language, sing my songs, play my music, wear my traditional clothes, cook my traditional food and feed it to others, display the handicrafts from my former country, it is my business. I should not expect government grants for that purpose nor should I get them. But, at the same time, I should not be impeded from doing any or all of the above. Whether or not I preserve my cultural background is my personal choice; whether or not an ethnic group preserves its cultural background is the group’s choice. The state has no business in either. The responsibility of the state is to promote, preserve, and enhance the national culture. When it comes to the ethnic components, the state may assist, and should encourage, ethnic cultures to integrate into the national culture. But it is not the state’s business to promote, preserve, and enhance them (Flanagan and Pantazopoulos 1992, 1)

Parts of Khan’s speech here were directly integrated into the Blue Book’s multiculturalism policy and even Flanagan would refer to Khan in his 1992 articles on multicultural policy. Indeed, Khan became a kind of point person for Preston Manning who implored him as to how the issue of multiculturalism could be raised while avoiding charges of racism. Khan’s response

is quoted: "I told Mr. Manning… They'll be accused of racism. I was accused of racism for saying this. If I can be called a racist with my skin being brown. People with white skin would be called racist” (Winnipeg Press 1991). As early as 1991, the Reform party relied on the narratives of Asian Canadians to authenticate racial rule. In a 1992 speech entitled “Reducing the Potential for Racism in Canada”, Manning again referred to Khan’s narrative as a way to authenticate the party’s approach to multiculturalism:

Immigrants come here to become Canadians; to be productive and contributing members of their chosen society. I am one of them. I did not come here to be labelled as an ethnic or a member of the multicultural community, to be coddled with preferential treatment, nurtured with special grants… I came here to be a member of the mainstream of Canadian life (Khan quoted in Manning 1992, 4).

Foreshadowing the content of Asian Conservative MP statements, Khan provided the Reform Party an early alibi for its draconian multiculturalism and immigration policies; more of such people would become necessary. Indeed, Manning concluded this speech with a special appeal to non-white immigrants in Canada:

I conclude by appealing for your help, particularly if you are a Canadian of neither French nor English extraction, and are perhaps a recent immigrant or refugee yourself. Assist us in communicating these positions clearly and effectively to members of your family and community. If you concur with these positions – if you want to sweep away those vestiges of constitutional, immigration, and cultural policies which tend to relegate the 12 million Canadians of neither French nor English extraction to second-class status – please join with us. Your presence at Reform meetings, and in Reform councils, will not only strengthen and broaden our base, but will inoculate us against the viruses of extremism and racism which can be fatal to a new party. With your help, and the reforms to constitutional, immigration, and cultural policy which I have mentioned, it is entirely feasible to ensure that the New Canada of the twenty-first century is a country where all our citizens feel at home because all citizens are assured equality before the law and the Constitution regardless of their race, language or culture” (Manning 1992, 5 emphases added).

Khan’s example became a program of early ethnic outreach for Manning’s Reform party. Arguments that Khan made against multiculturalism and in favour of racelessness were mobilized as an alibi for Reform’s uncontainable xenophobia. Manning’s invitation and appeal to minorities to support the Reform Party are very specific indeed: “If you are a recent immigrant… If you concur with these positions… if you want to sweep away existing policies… please join us so that Canadians will stop seeing us as racist”. Similar appeals to minorities to inoculate Reform
against charges of racism can also be found in the Green Book’s Caucus Issue Statement in response to the question, Does the Reform Party promote or tolerate racism?:

The Reform Party of Canada wishes to thank members of the Jewish community in Calgary, the Chinese community in Vancouver, the East Indian community in Winnipeg, and the aboriginal community in Beaver River for assisting us in the development of measures to safeguard and inoculate the Party against racism and extremism. We invite all Canadians, including members of visible or non-visible minority groups, to help us as well (Green Book 1991/1992 p2 CACA009133E).

It is significant that such efforts to appeal to minoritized groups whose contribution amounts to immunizing the Party against racism and extremism becomes the political pathway that Asian conservative MPs since the 1990s would have to walk.

Despite parliamentary influence, policy discourse revisions, and the contribution of figures like Rais Khan, the Reform Party continued to face electoral challenges. It is not my intent to repeat what researchers have already documented as tenuous ideological struggles among the various factions of Canada’s political right including social conservatives, libertarians, red Tories, and fiscal conservatives. Conservatives themselves have argued that conservatism is neither a unified nor fixed philosophy or politic. However, extremist factions had stifled conservative parties’ electoral success, which, for Reform, has always been the objective (Flanagan 1992). In October 1993, Manning was publicly confronted at a speaking event at Osgoode Hall, York University about Reform member John Beck who had made racist remarks reported by the Globe and Mail: "I feel the time has come for white Anglo-Saxons to get involved... We're destroying ourselves hourly...and these people (immigrants) coming from another country, one evil is just as bad as another" (Flanagan 2009a, 152). Beck was urged to resign within an hour of this confrontation. In another instance in February 1992, which Flanagan describes as “the most damaging publicity event,” the Toronto Sun reported a story that “four members of the neo-Nazi Heritage Front, including the leader Wolfgang Droege, had joined the Reform Party. The members were expelled as quickly as possible but “the headlines still reinforced the impression that the Reform Party was a magnet for extremists and would not clean house until forced to do so by exposure in the media” (Flanagan 2009a, 92). Flanagan identified public impression management (media) as one of Reform’s major weaknesses and thus it became a vital part in the conservative racial realignment strategies.
Flanagan, as a political campaigner, was most concerned with public perceptions of the Reform Party and its leaders and thus the party’s need to spin public events to their advantage. This is made further obvious in his comments regarding Sheila Copps’ 1991 comparison of Manning to American David Duke as reported in the Toronto Star. Flanagan says the “obvious response would have been to refer the media to Reformers who belong to racial minorities. While most Reformers are white, there are non-white activists in the party. Manning's own brother-in-law, an active Reformer later elected to executive council, is a Metis. The husband of another member of executive council is from Nigeria. The numbers many not be large, but probably every major ethnic group and racial group is represented somewhere in the party" (Flanagan 2009a, 94). That spotlighting minority party members seemed an obvious response is reflected in how such race-appeals became integral for the Harper Conservatives. Rather than having to continuously manage such outbursts, manufacturing a new image of the party became integral in political realignment. It was surprising though that opposition members generally censured Copps’. Flanagan recalls:

The NDP's Howard McCurdy, the only black MP in the House of Commons...Even the prime minister intervened... But that does not mean her manoeuvre backfired. It sent a strong negative signal to Liberal supporters who might otherwise have taken a closer look at Reform, and it thus helped erect barriers to expansion... by not responding quickly and vigourously, Manning missed an opportunity to display the party's multiculturalism policy in an attractive light (Flanagan 2009a, 94).

The most important take-away for Flanagan was that Manning was unable to spin these events to lessen their electoral impact. Reform members and leaders who publicly expressed sexist, xenophobic, and homophobic comments featured frequently in news media as well as in the critiques of fellow parliamentarians and civil society. Sexist and racist outbursts from Reform members were so frequent that it became impossible to dismiss these as isolated incidents. Reform and Alliance candidates, activists, and media continued to articulate hostile views towards immigrants, suggesting that Asian immigrants in particular “would overrun the Western provinces” (Byfields BC Report and Alberta Report in Laycock 2002, 90). Certainly, racism was not contained in mere sporadic outbursts but rather could be found coded in party literature and policy as well; the very policies that Flanagan argues could have been displayed in an attractive light. Appearance rather than actually existing racism were identified problems.
Rather than challenge Reform’s attack against multiculturalism and immigration policy, Canada’s other political parties participated in challenging state consensus on the value of multiculturalism. At their 1991 convention, the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (PC) decided to “abandon the policy of multiculturalism and instead try to foster a common national identity for one people living together in harmony as equal citizens, loyal to the Canadian ideal” (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992, 374). By 1997, the PC Party election platform included a policy agenda fully committed to neoliberal ideals as a way to replace Canada’s “welfare state” (Patten 2013, 68). It was also observed that while the NDP did not endorse Reform’s position on multiculturalism and immigration, they did not develop “a policy position that overtly counters the emerging criticisms of multiculturalism and immigration” (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992, 375). As the government of the day, Chretien Liberals also circulated Reform-influenced discourse, which expressed concern about “weakening national symbols and identity” and argued that multiculturalism should “serve as a device for immigrant integration – i.e. as more of a homogenizing than a pluralizing force” (The Spicer Commission 1991 as referenced in Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992, 370). Much like Rais Khan was spotlighted by Reform to justify its position on multiculturalism, so too did the Spicer Report refer to minority and immigrant groups who were also critical of the policy to justify its criticisms of multiculturalism. More than this, even ethnic minority Liberal MPs like John Nunziata at this time were also openly critical of multicultural ideals and infrastructures arguing that it is divisive.72 In effect, the 1990s marked a sharp right turn in the Canadian racial state’s discourse of racelessness. Under such a racial state, multiculturalism is effectively vilified as the root cause of Canadian disunity. Instead, governing ideals and ideal citizen subjects would become configured through neoliberal ideals of bootstrap individualism and upward mobility.

**Discourses and Subjects of Neoliberal multiculturalism as Governance**

Despite their success in shifting parliamentary discourse, Reform continued to suffer in the polls. In 1997, polls revealed that the Reform Party was not even a viable second choice for members of the Progressive Conservatives who indicated that they prefer the Liberals and even NDP to Reform. According to Canadian Elections Studies: "Visible minority voters did not find the Alliance party very appealing. Outside Quebec, only 13.6 per cent of those identifying

themselves as visibly minority citizens voted Alliance; 81.5 per cent voted Liberal. Members of visible minorities made up only 2.4 per cent of all Alliance voters, as compared to 12.1 per cent of the Liberal total" (Laycock 2002, 19). By 2000, the Alliance saw minor improvements but still the Liberals remained Progressive Conservative voters’ second choice preference while statistics for Alliance and NDP were comparable (Laycock 2002, 179-219). It was clear that conservative voters “saw Reform and its leader as "too extreme" on matters of federalism, treatment of Quebec and social policy" (Laycock 2002, 219; Flanagan 2009a, 225). Party leaders recognized the need to not only inoculate Reform from supposedly rogue extremists but also to rebrand their image for electoral victory. For Flanagan, the objective was clear: if a Canadian Conservative Party hoped for any chance to implement policies as outlined in the Blue Book, it would need to rebrand itself as non-discriminatory, non-racist and non-sexist though definitely not anti-racist nor feminist as this would betray their policy commitments. Flanagan clarifies, "Winning elections and controlling the government as often as possible is the most effective way of shifting the public philosophy… If you control the government, you choose judges, appoint the senior civil service, fund or de-fund advocacy groups, and do many other things that gradually influence the climate of opinion" (2009b, 274).

By the 1990s, Stephen Harper and a twenty-six year old leader of the Canadian Taxpayer’s Federation called Jason Kenney, also realized that a change was necessary; in order to survive, the Right needed to expand their membership, reorient around a different kind of mission statement that would appeal to fiscal conservatives and centrist liberals and disassociate from social conservative (racist, homophobic, patriarchal) factions. During a 1994 conversation at a Reform party congress Kenney recalls presenting an incredulous Harper with his vision that conservatives would have to cross the “final frontier”, that of immigrants:

Look at demographic trends—it’s the future. Immigrants have the same values as us, we have to talk to them, to convince them.” Harper, skeptical, responded that this very liberal segment of the population would never vote Conservative. Better, in his opinion, to focus on native-born Canadians (Kenney quoted in Castonguay Feb 2, 2013).

It is no wonder that Harper kept Kenney in mind for the role of “ethnic outreach” minister once he became prime minister. Talks of political realignment began in the 1990s as evidenced by events including the May 1996 Winds of Change meeting in Calgary organized by David Frum and Ezra Levant "to discuss a possible rapprochement between Reform and the Progressive
Conservatives" (Flanagan 2009a, 201-202). The question of merging Reform and the Progressive Conservatives was also raised and rejected at the 1999 United Alternative convention. 1999 Angus Reid polls suggested that less than a quarter of Reform voters in BC and Alberta supported such a new party (Laycock 2002, 167). It would not be until 2003 that Harper realized his vision for a united Right.

What these conservative leaders realized was that multiculturalism as public persona and being “a country of immigrants” were assets that could be wielded towards profitable political and global economic ends; its terms however would need to be resignified. Harper recognized that a balance needed to be struck between a firm conservative approach to multiculturalism and immigration while broadening the conservative appeal. On the rationale behind moderate conservative campaigning, Flanagan writes, “Canada is not yet a conservative or Conservative country. We can't win if we veer too far to the right of the median voter… the Conservatives cannot afford to get too far away from the median without conceding too much space to the Liberals" (Flanagan 2009b, 278-279). A Conservative definition of multiculturalism and neoliberal hegemony could be achieved through the neoliberalization of multicultural discourse; that is, the flexible resignification of multicultural discourse through neoliberal logics as a way to govern various racialized populations while preserving whiteness as the normative core.

Sensitive to the emergence of a shifting discourse on race in Canada, Della Kirkham (1998), has analyzed the Reform Party’s “discourse on race, ethnicity and equality”. Kirkham observed the use of “code words” in the Party’s articulation of immigration policy and like other critical race scholars found that abstract liberal language such as “equality” as mobilized by the Party are not neutral but are rather highly ideological and integral to sustaining unequal social hierarchies. Indeed, identifying problematic social conservative elements of Reform as barriers to electoral success does not mean that the conservatives suddenly abandoned such ideologies. This distinction must be understood clearly. The problematic factions of Reform needed to be isolated in order to recast the image of the party in a way that made the conservative party palatable enough to a wider net of Canadians during elections. The very ideologies and policy orientations that originally garnered social conservatives would then be implemented once elections were won. Thus, the solution to the crisis of whiteness and representation was to encode the management of race in neoliberal terms.
Scholars of American conservative politics have tracked how neoconservatives manufactured themselves as having had the good sense to move beyond the traditionalist stances on race of the Far Right and their racist Southern Strategy (Pierson and Skocpal 2007; Winant 1994; Ansell 1997; Giddens 1994; Griffin 2004). In Canada it was of course the Reform Party that came into existence precisely to reignite traditionalist stances on race only to realize soon after that it would need to realign these positions as part of its electoral strategy. That Conservative racial governance - its codified policies on multiculturalism and immigration as well as its appeal to minority candidates – is reflective of a superficial race appeal rather than a genuine race-consciousness can be found in Reform’s reaction to the Mulroney Progressive Conservative government. The extent of Conservatives’ disdain for Mulroney was specifically around his adoption of certain liberal social programming and his approach to multiculturalism and racial others. The extant literature shows that Conservatives laud Mulroney’s neoliberalizing, militarizing and Americanizing accomplishments including repealing the Foreign Investment Review Agency, establishing the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and other bilateral achievements with the US, and negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Kherreidin and Daiffallah 2005). Mulroney’s achievements as prime minister including a key speech called “Multiculturalism means business” delivered in 1986 helped to emphasize the “free” private market rather than the welfare state as central in Canadian policy making processes. What Reform could not accept was Mulroney’s adoption of official bilingualism, medicare, and other social policies. In particular, Mulroney’s constitutional changes including the 1988 Multiculturalism Act and the subsequent creation of a department of Multiculturalism alienated the party's core conservative supporters. That a supposedly conservative government would recognize minorities and redistribute resources based on a multicultural politics became intolerable for conservatives committed to dismantling the welfare state in favour of a neoliberal ideal of marketplace individualism. Such neoliberal logics cast “special interest groups” as problem groups – a group onto which the ills of society can be displaced. Thus, the Mulroney government’s funding of so-called “special interest groups” was cast as the source of the country’s economic deficit.

Recasting equality and freedom as terms of opportunity rather than outcome were thus central to the turn to neoliberal discourse. Defined as a political ideology, neoliberalism refers to “a set of individualistic and market-oriented values, assumptions, and beliefs that shape how
adherents approach politics and the challenges of policy and governance” (Patten 2013, 60).

Defined as an economic ideal, neoliberalism is “a set of economic regulatory policies including the privatization of public resources, financial liberalization, market liberalization, and global economic management” (Melamed 2011, 14-15). According to Rose, as an advanced liberal mode of government, neoliberal rationality involved:

organizing all features of one’s national policy to enable a market to exist, and to provide what it needs to function. Social government must be restructured in the name of an economic logic, and economic government must create and sustain the central elements of economic well-being such as the enterprise form and competition. As this advanced liberal diagram develops, the relation of the social and the economic is rethought. All aspects of social behaviour are now reconceptualized along economic lines – as calculative actions undertaken through the universal human faculty of choice (1999, 141).

Indeed, for adherents of neoliberalism, “capitalistic enterprise is the core of all that is good about modern civilization. A competitive market system not only maximizes economic efficiency, it is the main guarantor of individual freedom and of social solidarity” (Giddens 1994, 34). As such, the state is seen as a force that interferes with the freedom of markets and redistribution under the welfare state towards expanding rights of citizen-subjects is seen as wasteful and unjust. In order to limit the welfare state, it had to be argued that policies advancing rights and citizenship went against equality of opportunity and individual freedom. This is precisely why Dean has described the ethos of neoliberalism as at once conservative and radical: “It is conservative in its revival and restoration of the values (or ‘virtues’) and rules of conduct associated with these orders, particularly those of the market. And it is radical because, by the process of reduplication and folding back, it multiplies and ramifies these values and rules into ever-new spheres, including its own instruments and agencies” (Dean 2010, 190). In other words, neoliberal rationality refers to how the market shapes and is shaped by socio-political conduct.

Thus, rather than reject terms used in equitable multicultural discourse, the racial realignment relied on further codifying the party’s racial policies in neoliberal language of freedom and equality. Approaches to Canadian immigration and multiculturalism policies needed to be neoliberalized. Previously associated with the welfare state and multiculturalism as a project and policy of equity and social justice, concepts not limited to freedom, equality, diversity, and representation have been commodified to promote bootstrap individualism and capitalist competition. Immigration and multiculturalism policies would no longer emphasize
social justice but rather focus on “selling diversity” and neoliberal ideals (Abu Laban & Gabriel 2002, 174). In a context where everything is oriented to the market, equity becomes a question to be resolved in the market by private organizations or in civil society rather than by the state. Supposed unfettered competition in the marketplace ensures equality of opportunity and thus it is assumed that any existing inequalities are the results of “naturally unequal distributions of abilities within the population” (Laycock 2002, 88). That is, the language of equality, diversity, and freedom have been mobilized to erode infrastructure that would ensure equality, diversity, and freedom.

More than a purely political or economic theory, neoliberalism defines governance over life. Critical race theorists writing on neoliberal governance have noted how racial reference has gone from codification of social policy under a welfare state to “being an attribute of global capitalism itself”. These conditions are made possible because neoliberal multiculturalism has “deracialized” racial reference “to an unprecedented degree” (Melamed 2011, 43). This is to say that the conservatives have adopted “a subtextual approach to politics” (Winant 1994, 46). Public policy debate directly affecting racialized populations not limited to multiculturalism, citizenship, immigration, indigenous affairs, and foreign affairs among other policy areas are imagined as raceless. According to neoliberal logic, to recognize race or any other category of difference would be to recognize “special interests”. However, Goldberg has noted, “If state intervention is dramatically curtailed, the state of being will “naturally” carry forward those racial privileges historically reproduced by restricting active delimitation against racial privileges by the state order. This informal racial reproduction” (Goldberg 2002, 235). That is, in order to preserve conditions of racial inequity, race cannot be referenced in reference to race. Central to modern state formation and state of being, not only are race and racialized populations deracialized, they are also delegitimized and depoliticized (Goldberg 2002, 234). The Canadian conservative racial realignment demanded an appeal to racial anxieties without drawing upon explicit racial reference. Instead, in discursive moves that would change the way public debate is conducted, categories such as immigration, refugees, crime, and welfare are mobilized to evoke race implicitly. Just because party documents and parliamentary statements do not explicitly sound racist or use epithets, does not mean that racism is not coded into these policies.

As neoliberal discourse becomes hegemonic, racism is rendered increasingly invisible and treated as an artefact of the past. Political spaces are meant to be evacuated of race where
freedom and equality are instead coded in an abstract language of diversity and values that protect the rights of capital rather than human beings. Despite declarations of race’s irrelevance, race and multiculturalism continue to function as a unifying discourse at the federal political level. Reform’s, Alliance’s and the Harper Conservatives’ stance on multiculturalism and immigration were key to every federal election campaign fought. As it will be explored in the next section, the Harper Conservatives applauded Canada as “a nation of immigrants” and celebrated non-European immigration – in particular, from select Asian countries. Indeed, new national myths have been created and alternative political imaginations have been articulated as the Harper government frequently argued that multicultural Canada can serve as an example for other nations divided by race and religion, even arguing that it is Canada’s obligation to spread our democracy to these race-torn nations; orientalist logics that configure heroic modern nations against so-called barbaric cultural nations and that inform policy determination. Recoding policies in a neoliberal vernacular of equality and freedom met the challenge of attracting the support of a wide range of possible conservative voters - libertarians, social conservatives, populists, Red Tories, and Canadian nationalists – without having to abandon the conservative policy agenda. As concisely argued by Flanagan: "While being conservative in substance, be transpartisan in style" (2009b, 328). Indeed, laissez faire conservatism has become mainstream in that Canadians, like most of the Western world, had come to accept neoliberalism’s supposed inevitability.

Depicting Mulroney as well as Liberal Prime Ministers Chretien and Martin as their nemeses, even calling the period between 1993 and 2003 “Conservatism’s wasted decade,” (Kheirridin and Daifallah 2005) Conservative writers such as Kheirridin and Daifallah (2005) may undermine the extent to which these administrations paved the way for the Harper-led Conservative government. During the era of conservative realignment (1993-2003), rather than reversing the neo-liberalizing seeds of Mulroney and social conservative racism of Reform, the Liberals conceded to Reform’s demands. As neoliberal themes such as equality, difference, and freedom could not easily be reversed, the Liberals learned how to manage these political themes. However, such concessions send a powerful message that Reform was correct in its interpretation of the political landscape. The Liberal party’s rhetoric and resolutions around citizenship, immigration, and multiculturalism during the Liberal Chretien and Martin administrations expanded on policy orientations of the Reform and Alliance parties. While
Liberals critiqued Manning, Day and Harper for manipulating racial anxieties, they too blamed victims while denying the significance of race. Flanagan has proudly asserted, "Chretien's Liberal Government (1993), pushed from the right by Reform and without much pressure from the weakened NDP on the left, was at least as conservative in practice as Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives" (Flanagan 2009a, 208-209). Indeed, the Liberals produced some heinous documents and policies during their reign not exclusive to the 1995 Right of Landing Fee imposed on refugees, the 1996 Brighton Report evaluating federal multiculturalism, the 1997 Not Just Numbers report as well as 1994’s "sweeping consultation process that would determine immigration policy directions for the next century" (Abu Laban & Gabriel 2002, 63). Indeed, the Reform Party’s voice lived on in Liberal party evaluations of multiculturalism programs. This is not to say that the Liberal governments did not make their own neoliberal appeals to multiculturalism as business. In 1996, former Liberal Secretary of State for Multiculturalism, Hedy Fry, “emphasized the cost-effectiveness of ethnic diversity in terms of corporate business strategies”. MP Fry noted:

> following the federal government's leadership in promoting the value of diversity, Canadian businesses are seeing the dollars-and-cents value of managing diversity effectively. Many companies have improved their profitability and competitiveness by linking diversity to corporate strategies, especially in marketing and international business (in Abu Laban & Gabriel 2002, 116).

Similarly, "In 2000, Prime Minister Jean Chretien continued the theme by arguing that ‘in the global economy, maintaining our diversity strengthens our trading links with other countries’" (2002, 116). These appeals to multiculturalism as business are reminiscent of how MP Jung emphasized his unique contribution, that is, his native informant credentials, to Canada’s role in the post-war/Cold war era as linked to his race. In elaborating what he has to contribute in this global political stage as linked to his own racial position, MP Jung crafted a position in parliament that reinforced that the racial minority politician sits in parliament because of rather than in spite of his race. In these governing capacities, multiculturalism remained a way to manage differences while systemic racism persisted. Simultaneously, neoliberal multiculturalism has relentlessly asserted itself as raceless or race-neutral thus leaving the state unaccountable. By the time the CPC came into government in 2006, they did not have to revolutionize, rather they simply needed to augment conditions already in place. The supposedly “wasted decade” was actually the era of the conservative racial realignment; the decade in which Harper’s blueprints
for racial governance started with memos to Manning and which by 2004 became an organized political stratagem.

A number of transitions between 2001 and 2006 resulted in Harper becoming the first Conservative prime minister that Canada had seen in thirteen years: In March 2002, Harper won the leadership race for Alliance defeating Stockwell Day. In May 2003, Peter MacKay won the Progressive Conservative leadership race when Joe Clark resigned. In December 2003, the two conservative parties merged to become the Conservative Party of Canada and in March 2004 Harper won the leadership race for the new party. Supporters and critics of the merger between the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives realized that this was Stephen Harper’s vision. According to Flanagan, “He conceived the idea, raised it first in public, and hounded Peter MacKay for months until the deal was consummated” (Flanagan 2013, 85). Indeed, former prime minister Joe Clark blocked the merger as long as he was leader of the PC Party and publicly expressed that he “would be extremely worried about Mr. Harper” (Scoffield and Fagan 2004). Resistance to the merger was felt even in its aftermath: “The new Conservative party, as they like to call themselves, is really the old Reform Alliance party of Preston Manning, Stockwell Day and – we must never forget – Harper. Even though they called it uniting the right, it was really a takeover of the Progressive Conservative party by the Alliance” (Ingram 2004). Several Progressive Conservative MPs protested the merger and joined the Liberals or sat as Independents. Senator Lowell Murray emphasized, “The merger of the Reform/Alliance and the Progressive Conservative parties purports to unify two parties whose core convictions were not only different but also fundamentally opposed and contradictory to one another” (Murray 2004). That most of the key players of the new Conservative party were former Reform/Alliance MPs meant that policy determinations would be steered by these players as well. Farney and Rayside have observed, “The transition to a new party system was effected by decade’s end with the creation of the Conservative Party of Canada… with policy dominance effected by those who came from the Reform/Alliance side” (2013, 12). Indeed, the Harper Conservatives’ stances on immigration and multiculturalism such as “acceptance and integration of immigrants into the mainstream of Canadian life… endorsement of ‘the principle that individuals or groups are free to preserve their cultural heritage using their own resources” have generally remained committed to the days of Reform and Alliance (Blue Sheet 1996; CPC Policy Declaration 2005).
A moderate incremental strategy (that is, neoliberalization of multicultural discourse and political inclusion) to unite the right and remain tough with policy paid off as the federal elections in 2004 brought the Martin Liberals down to a minority government. According to Flanagan, it was Harper’s “mastery of both strategy - long-term thinking about how to achieve goals - and tactics - day-to-day political management" that finally in 2006, the new CPC became the minority government under Harper (Flanagan 2009b, 15 emphases added). Harper was able to unite the right by expanding the right with neoliberal ideals and appeals. A consistent free-market outlook and “special interest free zone” by no means meant that the Conservatives would abandon their social conservative foundations that originally drew “ordinary Canadians” to the party. Indeed, the newly merged Conservative Party of Canada would develop strategic tactics and day-to-day political management programs to code racist policy orientations in free-market neoliberal vernacular and to wield the language of diversity towards capitalist ends.

Raced in the name of Racelessness: Ideal Citizen Subjects of Neoliberal Multiculturalism
By now it is clear that the raceless racial state relies on a flexible hold over the racial populace. By the 1990s, neoliberal (social, political, economic, and cultural) logics had a stronghold over Canadian policymakers but the state could no longer govern without negotiating how racial others would configure into governance blueprints. Neoliberal multiculturalism’s national myths required the invention of subjects distinguished by their potential economic value or threat and where these valuations would determine whose lives would be protected and from whom our lives and livelihoods would need to be protected against. That is, neoliberal multicultural governance describes a valuation system and a set of dominant normative distinctions that police the border between legitimate and illegitimate diversity (Melamed 2011). Under such a regime of rule, multicultural discourse simultaneously provided symbolic recognition of minorities while diverting attention away from the material effects of racism. That is, the racial state declares its commitments to diversity while firmly repositioning racial populations outside the national political imaginary. Indeed, race figures heavily into the conservative inclusion agenda.

Where allowable racial inclusion is determined by economic value, cultural difference, race, and ethnicity have become commodified and capitalized upon under neoliberal multiculturalism. The state craves difference when made palatable to its existing terms of rule whereas actual political pluralism is made unacceptable and its termination is thoughtfully
legitimized. Of this era, the Lewis Report (1992) highlighted systemic anti-Black racism in Ontario as a stark contradiction to neoliberal rationalities, which insisted that racial inequities had been neutralized. More recently, Grace-Edward Galabuzi’s research has detailed the economic exclusion of racialized communities in Canada by examining unemployment, labour-market participation, and employment income of both immigrant and Canadian-born racialized groups (Galabuzi 2008, 279). These are just a few studies that reveal the contradictions of the myths of neoliberal multiculturalism. As observed by Abu-Laban, neoliberal discourses have transformed “victims into victimizers” not exclusive to “single mothers, the poor, and immigrants” who are scapegoated as the cause of “our” social and economic ills (1998, 196). If these figures – single mothers, the poor, and immigrants that stubbornly refuse to integrate – are identified as undesirable economic threats and drains on the state then so-called self-sufficient bootstrap immigrant entrepreneurs are identified as ideal citizen-subjects. As such, governed by neoliberal logics, discourses of integration and this ideal citizen-subject figure discipline the range of possible political pathways.

The significance of “multiculturalism as business” as introduced in 1986 by prime minister Mulroney emphasized the opportunity to exploit Canada’s racial diversity to seize both local and global markets. This significance is also apparent in Flanagan’s depiction of ethnic voters as clientele (2009b, 281). Globalizing the state’s trade relationships were made evident again in Sheila Finestone’s 1994 address entitled “Asian Canadians: Canada’s Hidden Advantage” to the Asian Pacific Foundation of Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage: “In facing the challenges of globalization, Canada must make the most of its internal globalization - the competitive advantage of a multicultural population” (Abu Laban & Gabriel 2002, 116). As the Liberal Secretary of State for multiculturalism, Finestone identified Asian Canadians as Canada’s hidden advantage or the state’s “internal globalization” in an increasingly global marketplace. That Asian Canadians would be targeted as economically and politically beneficial to the racial state would intensify under Finestone’s Conservative successor, Jason Kenney, who continued to tap into Asian Canadians as the state’s hidden advantage. This ideal neoliberal figure would prove beneficial to the Conservatives in 1997 as the election of four new

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Asian Reform MPs – raced in the name of racelessness - prompted the party to declare itself raceless.

In 1997, forty years after Jung’s electoral victory and ten years after the formation of the Reform Party, four new Asian conservatives, Deepak Obhrai, Rahim Jaffer, Inky Mark, and Gurmant Grewal won seats in the House of Commons. That all four MPs were elected as Reform party candidates further indicates that Reform’s objectives were not entirely as “race-neutral” as they proclaimed. Indeed, Carty et al noted, "Prior to the 1997 election, the party organized half a dozen meetings with leaders of ethnic communities, and among the new Reform candidates nominated in winnable ridings were several members of visible-minority groups” (Carty et al 2000, 97). That two of these MPs were elected in Alberta made media headlines as the province is known as the birthplace of the Reform Party and its famous leaders, which had steadfastly argued against race and gender based policies, let alone race recruitment strategies. The commotion around the arrival of these MPs reflects the overwhelmingly white demographic of elected officials in Edmonton and Calgary (Sampert 2008, 92). News media suggested that the arrival of these four MPs meant that “the Liberals' dominance among at least some visible-minority communities” was "being contested by Reform" (Simpson 1997, A20 in Sampert 2008, 105-106). Using frontier imagery, Sampert has described racialized Albertan politicians such as Jaffer, a refugee born in Uganda and Obhrai born in Tanzania as well as their provincial and municipal counterparts as “the true pioneers of the West” for their entrepreneurial spirit and individualism as well as for having supposedly overcome “hegemonic cultural and gendered barriers” (Ibid 92). Another study showed that overall "visible minorities performed exceptionally well in 1997, with 36 percent emerging as victors” leading scholars to predict that over time the percentage of visible minority MPs would likely increase “providing that the candidate was well-financed and running for a locally competitive party" (Tossutti and Najem 2002, 104).

Despite such optimism, tensions were ongoing, in particular with Jaffer’s nomination contest in Edmonton. According to media accounts, “anti-Jaffer forces had stirred up controversy during the campaign by insisting that their opponent was the candidate favoured by the party’s head office. Mr. Fletcher's campaign manager Margaret Rutsch also attracted media attention when she called Mr. Jaffer a "boy with off-colour skin" and suggested he be screened for "exotic foreign diseases" (Cosh 1997, 1). Rather than examine, never mind name, such anti-Jaffer
statements and activities as reflective of persistent racism in and among Reform, racial realignment strategies focused on what the new Asian MPs could do for the party’s image. A 1997 Alberta Report article reproduced in the BC Report titled, "The Old WASPish Face of Reform Gets a Makeover: New Candidates Suggest a Changing Demographic that may Broaden Party Appeal,” insisted that the new Asian MPs have “given Reform an important new weapon in the struggle for nationwide acceptance” (Cosh 1997, 1). What does it mean that the arrival of racial otherness becomes a weapon in the struggle for political acceptance? What is the role of such a racial political weapon when its celebrated arrival refuses to name persisting resistance against it? The answers to these questions can be found in narrative descriptions of just who these new MPs are:

Despite his Ismaili Muslim heritage, Jaffer is not the stereotypical ethnic politician. He never speaks of representing his racial group in the House of Commons. "I refuse to buy into racial quotas or government handouts to ethnic groups,"... "I want to be judged for what I do and say, not what I look like. I'm a real Reformer, not a token." Nor did he win the nomination by bussing in dozens of compatriots; the Strathcona nomination was, like most Reform meetings, overwhelmingly white. If there was a minority group responsible for Mr. Jaffer's victory, it was 20-somethings (Cosh 1997, 1).

Alberta Report readers are ensured that Jaffer is not “the stereotypical ethnic politician” presumably one that makes demands upon the state with superfluous reference to their race. While the Report insists that Jaffer and his colleagues are valuable despite his race, it becomes clear that it is precisely because of his race, that his election is meaningful. The audience must also be ensured that their fellow white compatriots rather than a busload of ethnics voted Jaffer into office. Jaffer himself must attest against affirmative action or any other system that would supposedly rely on any criteria other than merit thus demonstrating his neoliberal commitments. In other words, in his public introduction, Jaffer must assure Reformers that his race will not matter in how he conducts himself as a parliamentarian. And yet, Jaffer’s value to the party is clearly defined by his race. The value of what he says is inextricably linked to the colour of his skin. That he is “unlike any Reformer who has entered the House of Commons,” is frequently referenced as important for Reform’s national ambitions. That the arrival of the new Asian MPs becomes the opportunity to rearticulate the party’s race-blind position while refusing to acknowledge persisting racism against the very same MPs in 1997 proves how little basis there is in equating the Conservatives’ racial appeals with a genuine commitment to equity; as anything
more than a crass vote grab. The statements offered here by the Asian MPs indeed reveals what it means that the arrival of racial otherness is a political weapon in the struggle for political acceptance. In 1997, the arrival of Asian MPs amounts to a recommitment to Reform’s discourse on racelessness and integration with a new face.

While collectively blaming the media for unfairly portraying Reform as xenophobic, sexist and homophobic, party leaders admit that “All Reform's MPs are Caucasian, with the exception of B.C. MP Keith Martin, who is one-quarter East Indian. None are identified as Roman Catholic. And the baby of caucus turns 40 next month” (Cosh 1997). The problem, as identified by Reform, is their presumed “lack of inclusiveness” which is a deliberate avoidance of xenophobia as materialized in their policies and campaigns. Instead, it is presumed that “the presence of Rahim Jaffer and other visible minority candidates, like Inky Mark, the Chinese-Canadian mayor of Dauphin, Man., will help disarm the media elites in central Canada. The critics won't be able to use that against them” (Cosh 1997). It is presumed that their race problem can be solved by simply including racial others as members and candidates; figures that - rather than add an actually diverse voice to the existing Reform core – would reproduce the same narratives. Again squarely placing the blame on the so-called Liberal media for Reform’s reputation, Gurmant Grewal, described as “a Sikh real estate agent” suggested:

visible-minority candidates are able to circumvent that media influence. It's unfortunate to have to say so, but I think that ethnic minorities are blindfolded to some extent…They don't read the policies of the various parties. What they do is listen to their friends and relatives and the people they work with, and when they hear something one or two or three times, they start believing it even when the information is wrong (Cosh 1997).

While seemingly disparaging the assumption that “ethnic minorities are blindfolded” from actually understanding party policies, by using Asian MPs to front intensely xenophobic legislative amendments (covered in chapter 7) the Conservatives have demonstrated their reliance on such assumptions. Moreover, Grewal’s statements presume that minorities in Canada hold the political beliefs they have because they have simply been duped by the media. As the major tool of political communication, racial realignment strategists began to realize how they had to wield news media to their advantage. Foreshadowing his future political trajectory, in 1997 a newly-elected MP Jason Kenney remarked: “Direct contact is the answer because we're dealing with an antagonistic media; in my own riding, I come across Chinese-Canadian families who are hesitant about Reform's immigration policy. But if you sit down and talk to them
rationally, they generally come around. A battle like this is won person-by-person” (Cosh 1997). Indeed, ethnic media targets and organized ethnic community outreach became part and parcel of the Conservative campaign strategy moving forward. Part of this racial realignment strategy was to not only to recruit racial minority candidates but also ensure that they will circulate Reform discourses on multiculturalism and immigration. On the 1997 election results, Flanagan advised, "If Reform is ever to win over youth and ethnics, it needs individual candidates to sell its message… It's great that Rahim is present now for the purpose of mobilizing new constituencies, and he shouldn't be afraid to let himself be used as an emblem. He's young and he's non-white; he can play two different roles; and, yes, absolutely, he should do it" (Cosh 1997 emphasis mine). The conservative race-appeal cannot be stated more clearly: Jaffer is called upon to perform both race and racelessness for his party. Heeding Flanagan’s call, Jaffer’s maiden speech delivered on September 29th, 1997, as the first elected Muslim Canadian MP can be described as a narrative of redemption and upward mobility:

There are people who told me that I would never make it in the Reform Party, a party without official racial preferences for its candidates. There are people who told me that a young minority would never make it on his own in a political world dominated by the old boys club, and yet I stand here today... I think that what my personal experience helps to illustrate is that in a truly free country merit is the only requirement for success…”

Again, Jaffer must emphasize his neoliberal commitments against any system that would supposedly rely on any criteria other than merit. Similar to the party’s partial inclusion of female candidates while remaining “firmly anti-feminist in its policy directions” (Bird and Rowe 2013, 177) so too has the party remained firmly anti-anti-racist in its policy commitments. Jaffer finds himself at once celebrated for being “the first elected Muslim Canadian MP” – a point that would feature heavily in his parliamentary statements – and simultaneously finds that he must argue not only that his race makes race irrelevant but that any racial reference henceforth is not only unnecessary but divisive. That the public takes the existence of racial conservative MPs and the neoliberal revaluation of multiculturalism and immigration through discourses of integration as evidence of the Conservatives’ commitment to equity and without considering their implications only demonstrates the resilience of racial logics and the urgency of countering such dangerous determinism. In the aftermath of the 1997 elections, their celebrated arrival squarely centres on

the Asian MPs’ race – as that which gives the Reform party a makeover and that may broaden the party’s appeal. Concomitantly, their arrival supposedly signifies how race no longer matters. The arrival of Asian Reform MPs thus decidedly places the spotlight on their racial otherness in order to insist that racial reference is no longer necessary. That they are paradoxically raced in the name of racelessness will continue to shape the parameters of their parliamentary contributions.

1997’s Asian conservative electoral wins would become part of the Canadian Alliance’s campaign in 2000. In a speech to the Reform Assembly on January 29, 2000, Manning asked the crowd:

Do you remember that night in June when we celebrated becoming the Official Opposition? As we looked at the new members who had been elected, it wasn’t just the expansion in our numbers that was exciting… The new additions also made Reform the most ethnically diverse of the opposition parties – with Rahim being the first Ismaili MP, Gurmant Grewal the first Sikh MP to sit in opposition, Deepak Obhrai the first Hindu MP, and Inky Mark with his Chinese Canadian heritage.

Reform, which had been so unfairly labelled as anti-immigrant and anti-this ethnic group or that, now has more diversity among its MPs than all the other opposition parties combined. And it happened not by imposing some quota system, but by a democratic expansion of our party’s scope and depth at the grassroots” (2000)75

All four Asian MPs were re-elected as Canadian Alliance candidates in 2000, which became the official Opposition in the House. The conservative Asian MPs had become active members of the Reform/Alliance including Gurmant Grewal who proclaimed himself to be one of the founders of the Canadian Alliance and CPC. However, we must be cautious of suggestions that Reform and Alliance’ high profile efforts in 1997 and 2000 to recruit minority members is a testament to these parties’ shift to racial inclusiveness and evidence that Reform is more tolerant of immigration and multiculturalism. Inclusion becomes a solution to the problems of Reform’s explicit racist reputation. Suggestions that Canada has accepted minorities and has largely resolved immigration and multiculturalism debate presumes that the existence of minority conservatives reflects race-consciousness and that inclusion brings equity. As Rita Dhamoon has observed, state inclusion “is a troubled ideal” for at least two reasons:

First, the language of inclusion de-politicizes the problem of power. This occurs by defining social transformation in terms of the expansion and pluralization of an existing core/centre, rather than in terms of fundamental change of the conditions

that give meaning to that core/centre, and by collapsing all kinds of exclusions… Second, the goal of including Others into the mainstream falsely assumes that those who are currently included are equally included and that inclusion brings equity… modes of exclusion, or hierarchies of difference, are masked, however, by simply pluralizing the core and leaving the unequal character of that core intact (2009, 37).

The inclusion of select Asian conservative MPs and their narrative contributions in 1997 and 2000 reveal that inclusion does not guarantee substantial representation never mind justice and equity. Unlike other figures on the Canadian political racial landscape – Indigenous and Afro-Caribbean populations – the Asian conservative MP as representative of an ideal neoliberal subject fits into the existing conservative core without challenging persistent structural inequities. Moreover, despite the celebration of these four new Asian Reform MPs, studies of visible minority candidacies and parliamentary ranks have shown that progress "toward increased ethnic representation in the 1980s has not yet reversed, but that visible minorities continue to be under-represented in relation to their presence in the population" (Black & Lakhani, 1997 in Tossutti and Najem 2002, 86).

In the 2000s, wooing minority support (votes and candidates) became a pronounced conservative mission. Within this conservative mission, that certain Asian Canadian groups would be clearly targeted and that Flanagan – a devout anti-Native activist - would be the one to articulate this target is salient. Indeed, branding a conservative party - especially one with roots in the Reform Party and with a lead strategist who openly voiced anti-Native politics (Flanagan 1983, 1990) as non-racist seems implausible. These contradictions evaporate however through racial discourses that configure Indigenous populations as ones that incessantly make demands upon the state and that configure certain Asian Canadian populations as ones that do not. Reform’s acute anti-Indigenous racism was demonstrated in a long list of activities not limited to their campaign against the Nisga'a Treaty and a 1995 report “on Native policy without consulting any of Canada’s 607 band councils” (Laycock 2002, 144). Reform and Alliance campaigned vehemently against Aboriginal self-government, land protection, and any initiative not aimed at fully assimilating Indigenous people into state not exclusive to treaty or institutional support. In the Reform, Alliance, and the CPC imaginary, Indigenous people were just another “special interest” cultural group that was demanding “special” consideration from the government “to the detriment of the white majority" (Ibid 185). Even while acknowledging Reform’s extreme anti-Native racism, those that declare Reform – and the CPC for that matter - as “not as bad” as
European right-wing parties can only do so by completely disregarding the state’s ongoing settler colonial commitments. By trivializing Reform and the CPC’s racist policies and programs and undermining the legacy of settler colonial violence, such apologist analyses ultimately reproduce the myths of the dual-white settler racial state.

Flanagan’s rationale behind targeting ethnic and visible minority Canadians is embedded in the context of Canada’s multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, which emerged through the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism and was entrenched in multiculturalism policy in 1971 (Haque 2012). Flanagan reproduces the founding myth in his argument that Canadian politics has an identity dimension of ethno-linguistic conflict between French and English which “has been interlaced with related cleavages between… whites and ethnics or visible minorities” (Flanagan 2009a, 219). While reproducing the dual white settler myth here, Flanagan’s logic displaces colonialism out of sight and reduces the state’s governance over racial populations to mere conflicts between seemingly neutral parties. As discussed in chapter 2, multiculturalism within a bilingual framework worked to quell Quebec nationalists through the dual white settler myth that racialized and minoritized ethnic Canadians and further betrayed treaties by reducing Indigenous populations to mere cultural historic others. In this framework, white settlers remain the normative political authorities that consult others as part of their governing capacities while Indigenous and ethnic minorities become subjects to be consulted, included when palatable, and discarded when necessary. This framework, which establishes the authority to define political projects along settler colonial and racial lines informed the terms of political inclusion outlined in the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (1989-1991) and remains the framework through which the Conservative party imagines the management of Indigenous and racial populations. Those whose politics potentially expose the gaping contradictions of the neoliberal multicultural state are re-racialized as backward and their dispossession is attributed to their cultural unfitness for “proper neoliberal subjectivity” while those deemed proper neoliberal subjects are ascribed value for being law-abiding representations of legitimate diversity (Melamed 2011, 44; Dhamoon 2009, 37).

In 2003 the Progressive Conservatives and Canadian Alliance parliamentary caucuses officially merged to form the current Conservative Party of Canada. Leading up to the newly merged conservative party’s leadership race in 2004, Flanagan gifted Harper with a book by President Clinton’s former political advisor, Dick Morris, entitled Power Plays: Win or Lose-
How History's Great Political Leaders Play the Game (2003). Specifically, Morris’ concept of “triangulation,” which referred to appropriating part of one’s opponent’s program would help contour the new party’s racial strategies. According to Morris, examples of triangulation can be found in “George W. Bush Moves the GOP towards Compassionate Conservatism” and "Bill Clinton Leads his Party to the Center" as well as “Tony Blair's acceptance of Margaret Thatcher's economic reforms” (in Flanagan 2009b, 78). The merger of Canada’s two conservative parties was just the beginning for Harper who was determined to build a “long-term coalition that can win victories and survive defeats” (Flanagan 2009b, 290). Integral to this long-term conservative coalition were racial and ethnic voters. Specifically, Asian Canadians became targeted in expanding conservative support. Flanagan in particular argued that the new party would need to replace the Liberals in bringing “ethnic voters” into the Conservative coalition by studying their successes and co-opting their methods. Made apparent in CPC campaigns for the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2011 federal elections, this strategy would include the accumulation of data on Canadians or ethnic accounting as well as “opposition research, negative advertising, and putting out a coordinated message using all media simultaneously” (Flanagan 2009b, 290).

Flanagan’s third commandment of effective political campaigning specifies the necessity yet, conditionality of inclusion. The conservative brain trust recognized the need to appeal to minorities before they could become the country’s dominant political force, again, preserving the traditional Anglo, Protestant, white base of the party remained the core priority (Flanagan 2009b, 279-280). Specifically, Flanagan notes that given the Liberal stronghold over minority groups, it is necessary that the conservatives manoeuvre this electoral edge to their own advantage. The Liberals were condemned for supposedly betraying the interests of Canadians by appealing to minorities. However, at the same time it is argued that the Conservatives must replicate these same tactics in order to win elections. Under the Liberals, immigration levels and official multiculturalism are characterized as ploys to win elections while under the Conservatives, these same tactics are narrated as genuine acts of inclusion and commitments to diversity. The bottom line for all politicians is winning elections and Flanagan realized that winning the support of “new Canadians that have been duped into a state of grateful loyalty” to the Liberals and replacing the Liberals as “masters of ethnic politics” was what it took to meet the challenge.

Without a doubt, once Harper won the leadership race, hunger for electoral victory only intensified. In 2004, triangulation, turning new Canadians into new conservatives, wooing the
fourth sister, crossing the final frontier and other metaphors for wooing minority support (votes and candidates) became a pronounced conservative mission. To the “three sisters” approach designed in the 1990s to bring together Ontario Tories, prairie populists, and Quebec nationalists, Flanagan adds ethnic minorities as the “fourth sister” as part of a long-term plan to expand the conservative membership. Descriptions of the “fourth sister” clearly distinguish Asian Canadians as “new” Canadians whose “social values and capitalist work ethic” supposedly naturally align with the values of the Conservative party. Systemically described as an entrepreneurial, aspirational class with a remarkable work ethic, the Conservatives had to insist that so-called “new Canadians” are naturally conservative. The case was made that these Canadians were not keen on so-called leftist causes such as “environmentalism, feminism, gay rights, and animal liberation” (Flanagan 2009b, 315). It was also argued that most “new Canadians,” specifically Chinese, Vietnamese, Koreans and Filipinos are Christian thereby conveniently dismissing Muslim Canadians. First, codifying “new Canadians” as Asian in this way problematically relies on the myth that Asians are perpetually foreign thus dismissing centuries of Asian presence in this country. Second, Flanagan presumes that the reason why these Canadians had not already been voting conservative all along was that the Liberals had been so successful in “courting ethnic communities”. Thus, by providing such a caricature of “new Canadians” what this meant was that the only thing the Conservatives would need to change is its courting of ethnic communities rather than its actual policies or positions. In his own words Flanagan has argued:

The underlying assumption of the Conservative outreach was that many ethnic voters “ought” to be voting Conservative rather than Liberal… In other words, many immigrants look like Conservative core voters, except that they may have a different skin colour and mother tongue. The task, as Conservative strategists saw it, was not to win over these voters by promising them a potpourri of new benefits; it was to help them realize that their convictions and interests would be better represented by the Conservatives than by any other party (Flanagan 2011).

For the Conservative campaign to be effective, it became necessary to invent good neoliberal multicultural citizen-subjects and turn them into new conservatives. Relying on stereotypes about Asians, the Conservatives have perpetuated the myth that so-called “new Canadians” are naturally socially conservative. What this ideal neoliberal subject offered the Conservatives was the capacity to supposedly appeal to ethnic supporters while doing nothing to change their existing positions and policies; an invaluable contribution indeed.
It was suggested that “the new multicultural pillar” of the Canadian Conservative electoral coalition is well connected “demographically and psychographically” to the “older western populist and traditional Tory pillars:

Middle-class Asian families in the suburbs of Vancouver and Toronto make few demands. They want to feel accepted, and they have understandable concerns about aspects of immigration policy; but beyond that they are mainly interested in the issues that motivate all conservatives- a favourable business climate, lower taxes, safe streets, and family-friendly policies. (Flanagan 2009b, 315-316 emphasis added).

The notion that Asian Canadians as ideal potential conservatives made few or no demands was repeated frequently by Conservative strategists. The idea that Asians make no demands on the government is provided in direct contrast with francophone nationalists who by Flanagan’s estimation “always present a problem, even when they support the Conservatives” (Flanagan 2011). Indigenous populations are not even mentioned in this formulation because the Conservatives have never made an effort to appeal to populations that they have actively attempted to eliminate. As such, Conservative ethnic outreach including frequent visits to ethnic events, recruiting racialized candidates and political organizers, printing political materials in languages other than English and French have been part of a discourse of integration that regulates representations of difference. Indeed, neoliberal multiculturalism has been “a mode of social organization that seeks to manage racial contradictions” through a discourse of racelessness where racial populations are either folded into state representation as an ideal or pathologized as threat to the state (Melamed 2011, 3). That is, racelessness ultimately offers a “reordering of racial rule” (Goldberg 2002, 230). By suggesting that the ideal neoliberal subject desires stability, are devoted to family and tradition, and are intolerant of crime and disorder displaces racially codified concepts of instability, crime and disorder onto those deemed lacking in neoliberal subjectivity. The relational racialization of the figure of the good bootstrap immigrant versus the figure of the welfare cheat demonstrates that “as a unifying discourse, neoliberal multiculturalism has disguised the reality that neoliberalism remains a form of racial capitalism” (Melamed 2011, 41-42). Under neoliberal governance, the promotion of diversity is an integral part of regulating difference. Thus, representations of proper diverse subjects as self-

76 Made further apparent in the most recent 2015 federal election. While the NDP and Liberals made concerted efforts to appeal to Indigenous voters in this election cycle, the Harper conservatives not only did not appeal to these voters, several ridings with heavy Indigenous voter populations ran out of ballots on election night.
sufficient enterprising individuals are key to a normative racial violence that polices the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate diversity.

In 2004, the Martin Liberal government was demoted to a minority government and the same four previously Reform/Alliance Asian MPs were re-elected as members of the newly formed CPC, which formed the official opposition in the House that year. Given that expanding the right to Ontario was one of Harper’s priority agenda items, it is no surprise that of the three new representatives elected this year included the first two Asian conservative Ontario MPs, Bev Oda and Michael Chong. Before this, all of the Asian Canadian Conservative MPs hailed from Western Canada, predominantly from British Columbia and Alberta. By 2011, there were just as many racial Conservatives serving in Ontario as there were in British Columbia, demonstrating in many ways, Harper’s centrist-appeal to Bay Street neoliberals, while still holding onto the party’s Western core. 2004 was marked by a few other famous firsts: Nina Grewal became one of three South Asian women (including Ruby Dhalla and Yasmin Ratansi) elected to the House and one of two first Sikh female MPs. Oda became the first and remains the only Japanese Canadian to have served in the House. The arrival of more South Asian MPs in the House inspired The Hill Times to report that “Punjabi is now fourth language in the House” (Rana 2004) and that “5 MPs are Sikhs, 3 are Muslims, and 1 is Hindu” (Rana 2004 in Black 2008, 235-236).

Along with these headline grabbing electoral firsts were reports that the CPC had begun giving the Liberals a run for their money in terms of minority MP representation despite denials of race-based recruitment.

It should be noted that in 2004, in general, Canadians elected a larger number of ethnoracial MPs and in particular, a larger number of visible minorities: “The 22 who emerged victorious in the June 2004 election made up 7.1 percent of the House's membership, the largest percentage ever recorded. This compares with 17 individuals (5.6 percent) who won in 2000, and 19 (6.3 percent) who successfully contested the 1997 election " (Black 2008, 234-235). As already discussed, all political parties were committed to recruiting minority votes and candidates. This year, Prime Minister Martin supported three minority candidates and “the NDP continue to promote minority diversity within its ranks" (Black 2008, 240). Yet, contrary to their claims of not having a race recruitment strategy, “the CPC nominated the largest number of visible minority candidates among all parties in the 2004 elections” (Bird 2011, 216). As a shock to many and yet consistent with Harper’s and Flanagan’s plans to woo the fourth sister, “the
party recruited 33 visible minority individuals, so that it could claim that one of every ten of their candidates belonged to an origin category associated with visible minority status (10.7 percent). Four years earlier, 15 visible minority individuals stood for the Alliance (5.0 percent of all their candidates), while only 7 ran on behalf of the old Progressive Conservatives (2.4 percent), making this a fairly impressive augmentation” (Black 2008, 242). Black continues, "Even over the 1993-2000 period, the Reform Party and then the Canadian Alliance were able to claim the allegiance of between 21.1 percent and 23.9 percent of minority MPs, but the new party was able to boast holding a 32.9 percent share. This means that the new party was indeed one important source of the larger number of minorities elected to the 38th Parliament….among the newly elected minority MPs, almost as many won as Conservatives (40 percent) as did as Liberals (48.4 percent)” (Black 2008, 243). Before continuing, it must be stated that this incline in the number of minorities elected to parliament diminishes by 2008. In his study of “ethnoracial minority” presence as MPs in the 38th parliament, Jerome Black has profiled how many “minorities of non-British, non-French backgrounds won in the June 2004 election” in comparison to numbers in 1993, 1997, and 2000 (Black 2008, 229). I argue that the notable 1993 election outcome that led to “a record number of ethnoracial minorities entering the 35th parliament” (Black 2008, 230) was a result hot off the trails of the recommendations of the 1991 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform. Elsewhere, scholars have observed that “the percentage of visible minorities among candidates for federal election grew steadily between 1993 and 2004” (Black and Hicks 2006; Bird 2011, 211). However, beginning in 2008, these numbers began decreasing for the first time in over a decade.

In a post-election interview, Harper attributed the CPC’s 2004 developments largely to the “party's open nomination process” (Black 2008, 241). However, during this election cycle, conservative campaign activities included “a ‘bridge building’ committee that was given the responsibility… to encourage Canada's ethnic communities to get involved in the party… as the Conservatives have had to fight the anti-immigrant reputation of the Reform and Alliance parties” (Black 2008, 241). At the same time, Deepak Obhrai was identified as “one of the party's incumbent MPs of South Asian origin [that] engage(d) in outreach into visible communities” (Canadian Press 2004 in Black 2008, 241). Harper discussed how Obhrai continued “to consult regularly with cultural community leaders and that the party had set up a community relations office, which is designed to foster good relationships with cultural communities” (Canadian
Press in Black 2008, 252). Despite evidence of race-based recruitment strategies, the Harper Conservatives would continue to voraciously deny any suggestion that the party had organized a race-based campaign.

Harper’s ethnic targeting strategy proved effective in bringing the Liberals down to a minority government but their mission was not yet complete. Strategists realized that in order to win a majority government, Conservatives had to increasingly make the conservative option appealing to “Chinese and South Asian voters” (Flanagan 2009b, 194). Harper insisted that the 2005-6 platform contain specific measures including an apology for the Chinese head tax further examined in chapter 6. Leading up to the 2006 federal election, the Harper Conservatives planned to seduce these voters away from the Liberals by wielding the notion of “traditional marriage” as a wedge issue. Late in 2004, Harper decided that same-sex marriage could be mobilized as a wedge issue to “make inroads into ethnic communities” and by 2005, it was on the Parliamentary agenda (Marwah et al 2013, 106-107). This strategy insisted that Harper Conservatives would do what the Liberals failed to do for twelve years: that is, listen to what “newcomers” actually want. Rather than contest such seamless associations of racial identity with homophobia as problematic, some researchers have agreed that “visible minorities and immigrants tend to be more conservative than non-visible minority and non-immigrant Canadians on a number of contentious social issues….The 2006 Canadian Election Study, for example, shows that on the issues of same-sex marriage, abortion, and the role of women in society, immigrants from outside Europe are more likely than other Canadians to hold socially conservative positions” (Marwah et al 2013, 107). The appeal to ethnic votes through the “traditional definition of marriage” and the determinist research that legitimizes such race-appeals emerge out of the context of a homonational orientalist binarization, which presumes that racialized others are inherently more homophobic than white people (Puar 2007). In the context of an election campaign, such binarization ostensibly works to attract ethnic voters by aligning them with conservative values but in the broader context of the racial state, it also legitimizes military intervention against those same people and nations demonized for their supposed inherent homophobia and sexism.

Harper’s plan of attack was not only isolated to championing the “traditional definition of marriage” in advertising campaigns. Other important components of the 2005/6 campaign’s ethnic strategy included the leader’s attendance at so-called “ethnic events” and targeting ethnic
media outlets. Flanagan recalls how he was instructed “to develop some simple print ads on marriage, translate them into appropriate foreign languages, and run them in ethnic weeklies in early 2005. Ethnic voters- especially Chinese, Indo-Canadians, and Italians- were the main target” (Flanagan 2009b, 200-201). Ethnic media became targeted as an important communication outlet for the new Conservatives who had learned how damaging bad publicity could be from the days of Reform and what they saw as a Liberal monopoly of “urban ethnic communities”. Similarly, in their blueprint for a conservative revolution, Kheiriddin and Daifallah have insisted:

Whether it's conservative politicians posing for photo-ops at the local Chinese community centre, conservative journalists producing a radio program on employment issues in the Somali community or conservative writers contributing editorial copy to the local Punjabi paper, ethnic media is a key venue for reaching immigrants (2005, 167).

During the span of only a few weeks in 2005, the Harper Conservatives spent approximately $300,000 "to produce, translate, and run print ads in dozens of ethnic, Catholic, and rural weeklies” (Flanagan 2009b, 201-202). The trend developed out of the 2005-6 campaign continued in subsequent national election cycles. For example, one study of Toronto-area ethnic newspapers and the 2011 federal election revealed that both Citizenship and Immigration Canada and The Privy Council Office spent $463,300 in January 2011 “on a two-year contract with the same ethnic media monitoring company that Citizenship has paid almost $750,000 over the past three years” (Lindgren 2014 in Cheadle and Levitz, 2012). The Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s 2011 contracts, obtained by The Canadian Press under access to information laws, make it clear that prime minister Stephen Harper and his ethnic outreach minister, Jason Kenney “consider ethnic media a critical source of intelligence” (Cheadle and Levitz, 2012). Race was indeed central for the conservative leaders in the year leading up to the 2006 election: "After fifteen years of being smeared by the Liberals as redneck racists, we were hitting back, and hitting back hard" (Flanagan 2009b, 250).

Proving these ethnic outreach strategies effective, in 2006, the CPC won a minority government (39th parliament) ending over twelve years of Liberal rule. All racial conservative MPs were re-elected except for Gurmant Grewal who did not seek re-election after years of scandals. His wife, Nina Grewal, representing Fleetwood-Port Kells, BC, was re-elected. While no new Asian conservatives were elected in 2006, this year marked another important milestone
as the new PM appointed two Asian MPs to the Cabinet of Canada. Bev Oda was named Minister of Canadian Heritage and Status of Women. A year later, she was appointed Minister of International Cooperation. Michael Chong was appointed Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and Minister of Sport making him the second ever Chinese Canadian Cabinet minister since Raymond Chan. While the 2006 campaign revealed that ethnic pandering worked and a minority government was achieved, Flanagan lamented, “the election results were disappointing. None of our numerous new visible minority candidates across the country got elected, and we didn't win the ridings in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver where the ethnic vote is decisive” (Flanagan 2009b, 202). Leading up to the 2008 election the ethnic targeting strategy would have to be intensified and the CPC brought in what *Maclean’s Magazine* called “Harper’s Secret Weapon” to do the job. Former CPC Minister of Multiculturalism and Minister of National Defense, formerly Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism (2008-2013), formerly the Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and Canadian Identity (2007-2008) and endearingly known as the “ethnic outreach minister”, Jason Kenney has been appointed the man to manage the “ethnic clientele”. Kenney’s contribution has been monumental to Harper’s vision for an expanded ethnic conservative membership. It was Kenney who in 1994 presented Harper with the idea that the conservatives would need to cross the “immigrant” final frontier (Castonguay 2013). It is no wonder that Harper kept Kenney in mind for the role of ethnic outreach minister once he became prime minister. In a 2013 *Macleans* exposé “The inside story of Jason Kenney’s campaign to win over ethnic votes” Kenney recalled a 2006 confrontation with an ethnic community leader:

A leader from the Korean community…squarely asked him why Conservatives are racist and anti-immigration. Kenney… launched into a speech about the values they share: family, a strong work ethic, the fight against criminality. The Korean… then interrupted... If the Korean community had voted for the NDP and the Liberals in Vancouver, he said, it was because those MPs helped immigrants settle and find housing... “Elected officials take part in our celebrations, they’re present in our media.” “It woke me up,” he says. “I understood that I would have to be everywhere at all times. Personal contact is crucial for new immigrants.”

Ever since then, the minister has been on the road three weekends out of four. Some Sundays, in Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal, he takes part in as many as 20 cultural activities (Castonguay 2013 emphasis added).

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Thus, began a journey of ethnic outreach that has arguably won the Conservatives its majority government. Since this fateful encounter, the CPC has increasingly tried to present itself as immigrant friendly and in 2007, Kenney and the prime minister’s office organized an “ethnic outreach team” targeting key ridings and ethnic communities that were viewed as “CPC accessible”. However, while insisting that Kenney must become “the link between the government and cultural communities in order to increase the party’s odds of success in the next election,” Harper also specified that immigrants must be integrated into Canada rather than “ghettoized” (Castonguay 2013). Indeed, crossing the “final frontier” is not to be mistaken with actually diversifying the political realm; rather ethnic inclusion is meant to, first and foremost, win elections and preserve existing structures of inequity. Media accounts tended to circulate the same imagery that Kenney “has shaken thousands of hands, put away hundreds of very spicy meals and pulled off his shoes an incalculable number of times in entering mosques, temples or integration centres to give speeches” (Castonguay 2013). To equate such platitudinous gestures with a genuine commitment to political diversity, equity, and social justice is not only misleading, it detracts from the CPC’s discourse of integration. In a 2009 speech entitled “Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate,” Kenney described the “song, sari and samosa” multiculturalism of the 1970s as outdated; Canada’s new immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism programs should focus on “the successful and rapid integration of newcomers to Canadian institutions that are rooted in our history” (Marwah et al 2013, 109). The Harper Conservatives’ discourse of integration now mobilized Reform policy positions on multiculturalism and immigration while Canadians were supposed to be convinced that “ethnic outreach” signalled a newly race-conscious immigrant-friendly conservative party. Moreover, the notion of building bridges with “new Canadians” is misleading insofar as the Harper Conservatives have tended to “bypass national minority organizations in favour of individual minorities, and specific groups, who may support the Conservative Party’s vision” (Abu Laban 2014b, 165). That is, by insisting that “ethnic politics is clientelistic in nature because people coming to Canada from different cultures and whose English is imperfect naturally band together in ethnic communities,” the Harper Conservatives select which “community leaders and intermediaries” will be consulted as representatives of racial populations en masse (Flanagan 2009b, 281). Anti-racist organizations and groups committed to dismantling structures of inequity are not counted among those ethnic community groups that the Harper Conservatives
have consulted.

The Conservative campaign proved effective once again however, according to Black’s research findings, for the first time since before the 1993 landmark election year, there was not even an incremental increase to the percentage of visible minorities MPs elected. In 2008, the CPC won its second minority government forming the 40th Canadian parliament and three new racial conservative MPs from Alberta and British Columbia were elected – Uppal, Wong, and Shory. All incumbent racial conservatives were re-elected except for Rahim Jaffer who, after ten years in parliament, was defeated in Edmonton-Strathcona, after several scandals and waning party support. In an update to his study based on the 2008 federal election, Jerome Black has noted,

Only 21 visible minority MPs were elected, compared to 24 in 2006. Nearly all previous elections over the period from 1993 to 2006 had witnessed increases, even if only modest ones, so the 2008 election does stand out as a deviation… Given that the MP-population ration was actually lower for 2008 than it was for 1993, it is hard to be optimistic that 20 years from now visible minorities will comprise 30% of the House of Commons” (Black 2011a, 34).

That the MP-population ratio in 2008 was lower than it was for 1993 is a grim contradiction to the supposedly diverse scenario that Kenney and the CPC had been boasting. Moreover, Black has noted that visible minorities report ongoing “barriers including discrimination and exclusion, minorities feeling neglected, unwelcome and subtle discrimination” (Black 2008, 239). He has also noted "the seat-share/population-share index for visible minorities in the 38th Parliament is virtually identical to what it was in 1993. Eleven years on, this element of sameness keeps to the forefront many important questions about obstacles to deeper change” (Black 2008, 251). These trends indicate that “the “inevitable, over time” argument is neither true nor useful” (Andrew et al. 2008, 19).

In 2011, the CPC won its first majority government forming the 41st parliament and a record number of five new racial conservatives were elected, four from targeted Ontario ridings: Willowdale, Brampton-Springdale and Bramalea-Gore-Malton, which comprise electoral ridings with predominantly East and South Asian voters or what the MPs call “new Canadians”. This year was also significant because three of the MPs, Tim Uppal, Alice Wong, and Bal Gosal were appointed to the Cabinet of Canada as Ministers of State. Leung was appointed Parliamentary secretary for multiculturalism. Wong was appointed to this post in 2010. Of this election year, “Kenney notes the Conservatives won 24 of 25 suburban Toronto ridings: “Without the support
of the ethnic communities, we could never have done that…I have no intention of stopping now” (Castonguay 2013). The minister insisted that in 2011, immigrant Canadians helped the Tories clinch a “166-seat majority… Polls indicate that we won at least 42 per cent of the votes of immigrants to Canada…giving us a 20 per cent lead over the Liberals among new Canadians" (Chase 2011). Events leading up to this election reveal how the “fourth sister” remained an integral target group in conservative campaigning. On March 3rd, 2011 the Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism accidentally leaked a campaign called *Breaking Through - Building the Conservative Brand in Cultural Communities: Conservative Ethnic Paid Media Strategy*. The document indicated, “by 2017 about half of the 7.1 million people living in GTA will belong to a visible minority; 1.3 million will be South Asian; 900,000 will be Chinese. The “Take Away” is three-fold: There Are Lots of Ethnic Voters, There Will be Quite a Few More Soon, and They Live Where We Need to Win. In polls that are more than 40% Chinese, the Conservative vote has grown 8.5% across the GTA between 2004 and 2008. The document continues to say, “In 2004 in the nearly 350 polls that were more than 40% South Asian, CPC averaged 11.9% of the vote. The “Take Away” here is that: Data Proves Hunch: We Are Losing; We Are Losing Less Badly Now; Need to Positively Brand CPC in Target Communities”78. The leaked document also included preliminary scripts for accompanying brand advertisements as part of the ethnic media strategy. Unsurprisingly, opposition parties demanded that Kenney resign. A more interesting finding though is that “while Conservatives aren’t necessarily losing with new Canadians they aren’t winning either – yet” (Delacourt 2011).79 A post-election *Toronto Star* column called “the ethnic Conservative myth” reported that “as political scientists have been sifting through the data of May 2, they’re learning that immigrant voters did not flock to the Conservatives in any large way in the election”80. Researchers involved with the Canadian Election Study observed “The Conservatives …are still getting more votes from non-immigrants than they are from immi-grants, and the vote gap hasn’t changed much since 2008”81. At the time of writing, only twelve Asian Conservative MPs can be counted in the House, which is a mere

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80 Ibid
81 Ibid
3.8 percent of the lower chamber. This hardly reflects the CPC’s proclamations that it better represents newcomers than the Liberals.

Leading up to the 2011 elections, Minister Kenney remained relentless in his ethnic community outreach efforts while simultaneously emphasizing a discourse of integration. Some researchers have described these activities as evidence that the “Conservatives have clearly grasped the significance of immigration policy… as a strategic policy field integral to their progression from minority to majority government status” (Bradford and Andrew 2012, 273; Farney and Raysia 2013, 343). It has simply been suggested that “anti-immigrant sentiments have been almost entirely absent from the party’s platforms or policies” (Marwah, Triadafilopolous, and White 2013, 112; Farney and Raysia 2013, 340), which actually encourages “comparatively high levels of immigration and that avoids targeting ethno-religious minorities as threats to the dominant culture” (Farney and Raysia 2013, 349; Marwah et al. 2013, 95). More than this, these researchers have critiqued critics of the Conservatives, suggesting that they have overlooked “the more interesting pull to the centre that Reform experienced during this period” (Marwah et al 2013, 104). Suggestions that the party’s efforts to devise a conservative ideology that includes immigrants and that aims to draw the support of new Canadians are evidence of a new pro-immigrant Conservative party takes for granted the notion of a supposed “immigrant ideological predisposition” and mistakes racial realignment strategy for actual commitments to racial equity (Marwah et al. 2013, 108-112). To argue that the Harper Conservatives’ ethnic outreach efforts and integration-focused immigration policies are about balancing consensus politics on the one hand and on the other hand ensuring subtle restrictions in citizenship and refugee policy ignores critical elements, namely the question of power. Shifts in electoral strategy are mistaken for a committed ideological shift. Conservative race appeals can only be understood as anything more than symbolic by ignoring how multiculturalism’s meaning and values have been resignified by the Reform party; vital insights brought to light by Canadian political scientists and legal scholars. Abu-Laban contends that when it comes to multiculturalism, the Harper Conservative government’s agenda has been “reform by stealth” (2014, 153). That is, even while the Harper Conservatives “have never overtly attacked multiculturalism or sought its elimination as policy” they have engaged in a systematic remaking of symbols and discourses relating to Canadian identity (Abu Laban 2014b, 156-157). Specifically, Abu-Laban has made the convincing case that multicultural policy’s long-standing
inadequacy in addressing social inequality “since it was contested by Reform and neoliberalized under Mulroney and Liberal governments of Chretien and Martin…has been exacerbated by the reform-by-stealth agenda pursued by the Harper Conservatives” (2014b, 150).

Also taken for granted is the CPC’s claim that “immigrant voters” are naturally conservative; that it is possible to declare that immigrants naturally vote in this way or that and espouse a range of political beliefs about topics such as immigration, family values and entrepreneurship amounts to a dangerous determinism. The Conservatives’ appeal to “ethnic voters” since its inception has more than depended on an essentialist, homogeneous and deterministic conception of ethnic and visible minority groups in Canada where some are ideal neoliberal clients and others make ungrateful demands on the state. The party has advanced a fiction that ethnic groups are inherently conservative – where CPC MPs who are Asian are valuable insofar as they advance the ideal neoliberal immigrant subject and present themselves within such parameters – one embedded in neoliberal principles of free-market, small government, and individualism. The neoliberal racial state manufactures conditions and subjects that justify its rule and claim that it is also supported by racial populations to argue that the inequitable conditions of neoliberal racial state are inevitable.

It is not simply coincidence that “Harper and Kenney attended religious ceremonies, donned “ethnic” attire in numerous meet-and-greet sessions, granted interviews to the “ethnic press,” promised repeatedly to maintain an expansive immigration policy, while cracking down on “human smugglers” and “queue-jumpers” (Marwah 2013, 110). It is not simply coincidence that in its first term in office, “the Conservative government undertook several high profile and targeted initiatives: an apology for the Chinese head tax; the introduction of lower landing fees for immigrants… as part of the Conservative Party’s strategy to rid itself of a lingering anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism image” (Bradford and Andrew 2012, 273). These activities do not signify necessarily that Reform was pulled to the centre but rather that the Conservatives, formerly the Reform party, learned to campaign from the centre so that they could govern from the right. Indeed, researchers note that the Harper government “has developed a more muscular nationalist discourse, prioritizing the military” and its “antipathy to equity-seeking initiatives exceeds those of conservative parties in Britain and France” (Farney and Rayside 2013, 342-344).
In an article called “A Road Map to a Majority,” Flanagan underscored that the “Conservatives operate within a multiculturalism framework that emphasizes integration and traditional Canadian values more than diversity” (Bradford and Andrew 2012, 273). Similarly, in a 2010 speech entitled “The Future of Immigration in Canada”, Kenney captured the government’s steadfast integration approach to multiculturalism and immigration:

I want to see an integrated society based on active and engaged citizens, not a series of separated ethnic silos. I want Canadians, whether they’ve been here for a few months or all of their lives, to embrace our shared values, our shared history and institutions. I want newcomers to integrate into our proud and democratic Canadian society.82

The discourse of integration mobilized here establishes a binary between an implicitly monolithic conception of “Canadians/Canadian values/Canadian society on the one hand, and all newcomers/immigrants on the other” (Abu-Laban 1998, 202). Rather than fostering equitable and just citizenship, self-sufficient entrepreneurial immigrants have become valued over family reunification; neoliberal ideals of equality have replaced a social justice oriented politics. In line with Reform’s original attack against multiculturalism as divisive, the Harper Conservatives’ focus on integration demands that difference emulate the notion of a Canadian core. As such, conservative strategists and Asian conservative MPs have insisted that one’s ethnic background should not have any political consequences. Such a neoliberal approach is a commitment to “a standard of justice protective of individual rights and not group results” (Goldberg 2002, 228). This conception of integration secures white dominance par excellence because it simultaneously makes the argument that racialized groups are incompletely modern and that whites are always ready to assist the elite strata of difference into modernity. This notion of integration achieves exclusion insofar as it is bound to an ideology that casts Black and Indigenous populations as antithetical to the modern. This thesis has begun to show how the arrival of racialized MPs allows the raceless state to shift its concern away “from redressing past and present racist exclusion to protecting the expression of private racial preference in the ‘racial marketplace’ from state restriction” (Crenshaw 1998: 283 in Goldberg 2002, 229). In other words, as racism becomes unspeakable in public political spaces, it becomes a privatized matter and under the terms of “a liberal legality state protected in its privacy” (229). Raced in the name of

racelessness, the arrival of race has been mobilized to protect the persistence of racism. That is, as the next chapters will demonstrate further, racelessness reorders racial rule.

While scholars have tended to take the CPC’s resuscitation of a federal multiculturalism portfolio and race-appeals directed at racial minoritized groups as reflection of a genuine commitment to race-based equality, I have argued that the current Harper Conservative government’s race-based appeals are located in a longer history of racial governance. In Canada, thus, examining the move from the third party system to the fourth party system is in part observing how the state remains committed to racial ordering and its disavowal as modern state orthodoxy. That is, “Neoliberal emphasis is less to get rid of the state... than to radically shift its priorities, to redirect it to represent different interests, to do different work... Far from dismantling the state, or drowning it, then, neoliberalism would remake it. The state would become more robust in its controlling than enabling or caretaking conditions, more intrusive, more repressive” (Goldberg 2002, 333). Neoliberal rationality now governs the dual-white settler racial state by normalizing racial hierarchy through obscuring the salience of race. Neoliberal discourses of integration now produce and manage the range of racial subjects and subjectification.

The arrival of racial otherness amounts to the foreclosure of any possibility of redressing enduring structures of racial inequity. That the public takes the existence of racial conservative MPs and the neoliberal revaluation of multiculturalism and immigration through discourses of integration as evidence of the Conservatives’ commitment to equity and without considering their implications only demonstrates the resilience of racial logics and the urgency of countering such dangerous determinism. The celebrated arrival of Asian MPs has squarely centred on their race as that which may broaden the party’s appeal. Simultaneously, their arrival supposedly signifies that race no longer matters. The arrival of Asian MPs thus decidedly places the spotlight on their racial otherness in order to insist that racial reference is no longer necessary. That they are paradoxically raced in the name of racelessness will continue to shape the parameters of their parliamentary contributions as examined in chapters five through seven.

Conclusion
This chapter has traced the evolution of the race-based appeals of conservative Canadian political parties with focus on the era of political realignment that gave birth to the most recent,
Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) between 1993 and 2003, which I call the era of Conservative racial realignment. Since 1987, the Reform Party has shifted the conversation about immigration and multiculturalism policy and has generally pushed mainstream Canadian politics to the right. Reform not only influenced Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives but many of their critiques were folded into the Liberal Chretien and Martin administrations and then entrenched during Harper's reign. Canada's new Conservative Party has learned to realign its discourse and strategies as an attempt to shed Reform/Alliance's xenophobic reputation without abandoning its policy commitments. In effect, under the guise of racelessness, the Harper Conservatives represent a renewed commitment to the Canadian nation-building project in all its settler colonial and imperialist infamy. By tracing the evolution of Reform’s race based appeals as a key part of the Harper Conservatives’ lineage, it becomes evident that a commitment to racial and cultural essentialism has been inherited. As the following chapters will explore in depth, changes to immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism under Harper Conservatives reveal that the policy ends have justified the party’s strategic means; they have campaigned from the centre and governed from the right. Racial and political diversity has never been the objective. The appropriation of language has been integral to the right’s reframing of the terms of equality and justice. Parameters of race discourse in Canada have been shaped by multicultural discourse making it necessary to manoeuvre racist agendas through employing the language of multiculturalism. Such discursive strategies reveal how it is possible to be “pro-immigrant” without actually having to commit to an equity-centred multiculturalism.

This chapter has explored how the inclusion of Asian MPs in Reform party membership became increasingly important for electoral success. Party strategists understood that racial minority voters would have to be courted and that Canadians did not like to see themselves as openly racist. The recruitment of racial conservative politicians was the solution they adopted. In this respect a racial conservative politician was necessarily an Asian, someone who could be depended upon to limit talk about racism, confine it to the past and model the neoliberal, self-governing individual. A politics of guarantee insists that the presence of minority parliamentarians guarantees the representation of minority interests in parliament, that is, that race will take us to our politics – a notion that becomes increasingly complicated in the remaining chapters of this thesis. As Asian Canadians have been identified as integral to racial governance, the following chapters continue to examine the content of their political contribution
as Reform and Alliance opposition members as well as MPs under the Conservative Party of Canada government. Once these conservative Asian MPs take office, how do they negotiate their visible minority identities as members of a supposedly colour-blind party? What have been their contributions to the state’s governance over minorities in relation to immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism policies?
Chapter 5:
Playing by the Racial Rules, Becoming the Conservative Race-Appeal

*Canada opens her arms to those who are willing to work hard and play by the rules*\(^8^3\)

- MP Devinder Shory

The previous chapters have shown how Canada’s political parties have had to negotiate changes to immigration policy and the development of official multiculturalism in the 1960s and 1970s. Post-war liberalization of the racial state meant that Canada’s three-party system had to appeal to multiculturalism as a unifying national discourse to varying degrees. The augmentation of these policies by Canada’s Progressive Conservative party under the leadership of Brian Mulroney became the last straw for the Canadian right resulting in the formation of the Reform Party announcing itself as the party of “Ordinary Canadians” (read: White Canadians). Yet, despite Reform and later, the Canadian Alliance’s self-proclaimed race-blind/gender-blind approach to policy, chapter 4 has demonstrated how even these right wing parties have had to manoeuvre away from explicit xenophobia and adopt more insidious race-appeals, even re-narrating themselves as “immigrant-friendly” through co-opting classic liberal language of equality. I have distinguished early Reform from the present-day Conservative Party of Canada, where the latter has become considerably sophisticated in their race-based appeals as way to appear less racist than Reform without abandoning a conservative racial project. Simultaneously, the previous chapter found patterned and intensifying attacks against multiculturalism within parliament not only from Reform/Alliance MPs but also notably among ethnic and visible minority Liberal MPs beginning in the late 1980s and into the 1990s and 2000s. The period I call the era of Conservative racial realignment thus involves parliament’s marked departure from humanitarian policy inclinations of racial 1960s into the early 1980s, moving further rightward in the late 1980s and setting the tone of the state governance into the present. Conservative racial realignment and the Liberal government’s adoption of Reform/Alliance rhetoric on immigration and multiculturalism prepared the political terrain that made the Harper Conservatives’ electoral success as well as their immigration and citizenship policy amendments not only possible but also palatable.

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The previous chapter examined the development of a neoliberalizing multiculturalism in Canada at the federal party-level in the late 1980s and 1990s as a response to the crisis of whiteness. That is, out of the wreckage of “ethnic pluralism under siege” (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992) multiculturalism as commodity was salvaged while abandoning its equity-centred possibilities. This shift involved re-articulating the racial terms and conditions of becoming suitable citizen-subjects – not as the figurative state-dependent other but rather as the figure of the bootstrap individual immigrant: the multicultural citizen-consumer-subject. The shift in conservative racial discourse as a way to appear less racist has been facilitated by the Asian conservative MPs. By focusing on the political discourse of Asian conservatives elected in 1997 and onwards, chapter 5 begins to trace the emergence of a racial Conservative narrative paradigm – one that departs from MP Jung’s example examined in Chapter 3. In this new narrative paradigm, there are undesirable racial others in Canada that organize, make demands upon the state and whose collective existence demystify the seamless story of raceless benevolent Canada exposing ongoing white supremacist racial violence. On the other hand, desirable multicultural subjects – the MPs themselves - offer individual stories of struggle, triumph and even stories of escape from places unlike Canada – profiled as pre-modern and authoritarian. In this formulation, the racial state is reinvigorated and those categorized in the latter group become a justification for casting out those in the former. The remainder of this thesis explores this dialectic construction and racial configuration of citizenship in a nation that once began to embrace multiculturalism as equity and then abandoned it for its neoliberal interpretation. By analyzing the parliamentary contributions of Asian Conservative MPs elected since 1997, this chapter traces what it has meant to play by the rules under this new racial state.

In his research on Black political elites, Reed has observed how playing the role of an official “opponent of preferences and public assistance” brings notoriety, recognition, and financial rewards (Reed 1997, 18). Even as they attack liberal orthodoxy for denying Black individuality, Black conservative elites have crusaded against “race-based policies”. Instead, they mobilize narratives of overcoming – poverty and discrimination – as part of a disciplinary politics against the Black working class and poor. Through similar overcoming narratives that adhere to a militant colourblind ideology, Asian Conservatives have positioned themselves as a more racially authentic voice of visible minorities in Canada. Moreover, by attacking equity-centred multiculturalism and “hyphenated identity” as divisive, the Asian MPs have practiced a
neoliberal politics that caters to the investor class and that aligns comfortably with the conservative orthodoxy.

**Special appointments – becoming the person that turns up when race turns up**

As demonstrated in the last chapter, the statistical representation of visible minorities in parliament has generally stagnated since 2008. However, the manufacture of the image of a diverse Conservative party has been largely predicated on the increasing number of elected Asian MPs despite the party’s disavowal of its race-recruitment strategies. What comes in the aftermath of these celebrated elections once the Asian Canadian MPs take their seats in the House of Commons? In what ways do these MPs negotiate their roles as members of a supposedly race-blind/gender-blind party? To answer these questions, this chapter analyzes the public profiles, special appointments, and parliamentary statements of the fifteen East and South Asian Members of Parliament elected between 1997 and 2011, affiliated with the Conservative Party of Canada and its antecedents, Reform and Canadian Alliance. This parliamentary archive illustrates how Asian conservatives MPs are appointed and establish themselves as native informants and experts on ethnicity and race-related issues. In other words, we are able to understand how and why Asian racial conservatives have come to be the people that turn up when race turns up.

As already discussed in chapter one, research on race and politics have been occupied with the question of statistical or numerical representation (Black 2008; Andrew et. al. 2008). Also called “mirror representation”, the case has been made that “in order to be “representative,” the characteristics of elected officials must be similar to those of the population. This form of representation is primarily concerned with what elected officials look like or, as Hanna Pitkin might suggest, with who you are and not necessarily what you do” (Pitkin 1967 in Andrew et al 2008, 14 emphasis added). Studies in statistical representation thus takes inventory of how many minority (race and gender) MPs are elected each election cycle, often with the presumption that increases in numerical representation over time signal improving electoral representation and even evidence of broader societal racial progress. Recognized in some of these studies are the limits of the concept of mirror representation and the relative gap in research on substantive representation. Despite these recognized limitations, scholars have maintained that such statistic increases are symbolically important for both minority groups and the legitimacy of Canadian political institutions (Black 2011b, 1176; Andrew et al 2008, 14). Exploring the impact of
elected officials on government policies and programs requires analysis of their interventions during legislative debate. By doing so, studies in substantive representation can determine “whether or not having more women in politics or more minority MPs will affect policy outcomes or lead to legislation that is more favourable to these groups” (Andrew et al 2008, 15).

It might be argued that these MPs have been elected through a fair electoral system under a representative democracy wherein parliamentarians vow to serve the interests of their constituencies. However, political scientists have argued that this official delegate model takes for granted conditional and delimited support and access to political spaces as well as “the existence of party discipline, which can often pull representatives to vote according to their party ideology or party line rather than according to their constituents’ wishes” (Andrew et al 2008, 11-13). That is, candidates receive support such as party nomination in winnable ridings based on aligning/alignable views and approaches and their perceived ability to tow the party line. In other words, there are various factors in which a candidate’s success is not wholly determined by voters. As an example Parm Gill, who finished second to Liberal MP Ruby Dhalla in Brampton-Springdale in 2006 and 2008 began appearing at Minister Jason Kenney’s side during events. He also accompanied Kenney on a 2009 trip to India and appears in photos of Kenney, Conservative MP Tim Uppal and one of Kenney’s staff members on the Citizenship and Immigration website. Minister Kenney even appeared at Gill’s campaign fundraisers to lend his support. In 2011, Gill defeated Dhalla by 10,397 votes (Payton 2012b). As one of the target ridings in the 2011 Breaking Through ethnic media campaign, Gill’s win in Brampton-Springdale signaled an achievement in the CPC electoral objectives. Gill was appointed as a parliamentary secretary and continued to appear at Minister Kenney’s and PM Harper’s sides during events. Thus, it can also be argued that selective party support of certain candidates and organizational discipline play a significant part in not only the success of a candidate but also their parliamentary portfolios once elected. Indeed, the power of special appointments is another method as determined by the Prime Minister and his advisors to keep “caucus and party members in line by rewarding those who have followed the party’s wishes” (Bottomley 2008, 143).

Prior to winning seats in the House, the Asian MPs had varying degrees of political experience where some worked in a variety of local party positions as volunteers or supporters and participated in local and national conferences and conventions for the Conservative Party and its antecedents and in some cases even the Liberal Party. Others such as Tim Uppal served as a senior advisor to the CPC and campaigned for seats numerous times before being elected. For instance, Uppal ran unsuccessfully for the Canadian Alliance in 2000 and for the Conservatives in 2004. After losing a nomination battle in 2006, Uppal won a bitterly-contested nomination battle in Edmonton-Sherwood Park and in 2008 became an MP for the first time (O’Neil 2011). Some have only been elected since the Conservatives formed the federal government. Other subjects in this study have served as MPs extending back to the days when the further rightist Reform Party and Canadian Alliance formed the opposition and thus have sat on both sides of the House.

Nearly all of the MPs in this study have been trained at the university level. One MP, Alice Wong has a PhD while Gurmant Grewal recently received an honorary doctorate. Three MPs have Master’s in science, engineering and business administration. Two of the MPs – Douglas Jung and Devinder Shory - are trained in law. Seven subjects have earned one or more bachelor degrees in the arts, sciences and education. Still, level of education is not always conditional for political success; Deepak Obhrai has served over seventeen years in the House yet does not have a University degree. Prior to entering federal politics, the Canadian parliament’s website identifies MPs professions as: Businesspersons, mainly Entrepreneur; Teacher; Barrister and Solicitor; Broadcasting and communication; Information technology, Bank manager; Consultant, Community activist, and Financial agent. In fact, eleven of the subjects identified as businesspeople or entrepreneurs prior to becoming elected politicians. Only Inky Mark served as an elected politician prior to being an MP when he was Mayor of Dauphin, Manitoba from 1994 to 1997.

These findings correlate with Jerome Black’s 2008 study, which showed that visible minority MPs in the 1993-2000 period had stronger credentials in comparison with MPs of “Northern and Western European origin”. Black found that 90.5 percent of visible minority MPs

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had completed university (and 52.4 percent had a second degree) while only 50 percent among those in the Northern/Western European category and 70.1 percent of MPs overall achieved such educational levels. Also 66.7 percent of the visible minority MPs had a professional occupation versus 40.9 of the MPs in the Northern and Western European group (and 60.4 percent of MPs as a whole) (Black 2008, 248). Studies have shown that “middle-class status is a virtual prerequisite for candidacy for major office; an ethnic group’s development of sufficient political skill and influence to secure such a nomination also requires the development of a middle class” (Wolfinger 1974, 49 in RCERPF Final Report 1991, 102). This is to say that the MPs in this study have impressive educational and professional backgrounds. Their collective CVs demonstrate exceptional accomplishments, which suggest that they have the skills, experience and training to serve as valuable members of parliament in any number of government areas. However, these educational and professional backgrounds do not involve specialization in diversity and race-related issues.

An appointment into the Executive branch of the government as part of the Queen’s Privy Council of Canada as well as part of the Cabinet of Canada is one of the most powerful and coveted political positions a parliamentarian can hold. Members of Parliament, including several of the subjects in this study, may also be invited to serve in one of the most influential institutions of the Canadian political executive, which is the Cabinet. The Cabinet, as selected and directed by the prime minister and formally appointed by the Governor General, constitutes the active seat of executive power in Canada, with vital influence over the workings of the House of Commons and the legislative agenda of Parliament. In choosing his Cabinet, therefore, the prime minister weighs these political and public obligations and will usually appoint individuals who have been elected to the House of Commons and who, collectively, will embody “Canadian regional, linguistic, ethnic and gender interests”. As such, there is typically a minister from each province in Canada, ministers from visible minority groups, and female ministers whenever possible. Also, according to parl.gc.ca, efforts are further made to “indulge interest groups” that support the incumbent government and the party’s internal politics must be appeased, with Cabinet positions sometimes being a reward for loyal party members. However, in “2006 Stephen Harper’s first cabinet had only six women ministers out of 27 in total (22 per cent). In 2007, Harper increased the size of his cabinet to 32 members, with only seven women ministers (22 per cent). Harper was also criticized for having only one visible minority member in his first cabinet
(3.7 per cent)” (Bottomley 2008, 145). In 2006, Bev Oda and Michael Chong were appointed as cabinet ministers. In 2008, Harper added eleven Ministers of State to his Cabinet, including Gosal, Wong, and Uppal. Other MPs have been appointed as parliamentary secretaries for multiculturalism (Wong 2011, Uppal 2013), foreign affairs (Obhrai), International cooperation (Obhrai), and veterans (Gill).

Members of Parliament are by definition elected to represent and speak for their constituents. However, "Women and visible minorities, for example, are frequently entrusted with the responsibility of representing not just their constituents, but also the views of all women or all visible minorities (Andrew et al 2008, 14). The Lortie Commission found that in 1988, women accounted for only 13.2 per cent of Members of Parliament (Final Report 1991, 42-44). Of these women MPs, “21 per cent are given responsibilities in the social policy fields, such as human rights or multiculturalism, while only 7 per cent are responsible for economic or monetary policy portfolios” (Ibid 144). As such, interveners argued that “in relegating women ministers and critics to topics such as abortion or education and keeping them out of areas such as defence and finance, women are given only partial power, since they do not control the levers that influence the rest of the political agenda (Ibid 144). Similar patterns are found for visible minority MPs where ministers and critics are relegated to topics such as citizenship, immigration, and multiculturalism. Despite their adverse stance on feminist and multicultural notions of representation, these patterns can be found operating in the Conservative party as well. In general, it is overwhelmingly obvious that Asian Conservative MPs have been appointed into positions that entail portfolios on race-related issues which thereby ensure that their public political appearances and speeches will indeed make mention of ethnic-related issues and make use of the language of “diversity,” “immigration,” and “citizenship”. In other words, the fact that race matters to the conservative government is further exemplified in the special appointments of the racial conservatives. In fact, every MP in this study has been assigned to parliamentary roles that involve race-related issues. In particular, every MP has at once point in their career served on the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, which is the ad hoc committee that closely debates and reports on citizenship and immigration bills. Otherwise, the subjects are also frequently members of standing committees on Status of Women, Foreign Affairs and the Sub-Committee on International Human Rights, Canadian Heritage, CIDA, Public Safety and
Comparisons of special appointments made by the Reform Party and Canadian Alliance reveal consistency in racial conservative appointments to race-related portfolios and a notable increase of such appointments since the formation of CPC. Moreover, Asian MP appointments to race-related positions do not significantly vary whether the Conservative Party forms the opposition or the government. For instance, these MPs will speak to issues of immigration, multiculturalism and foreign affairs either as opposition critics or as government spokespersons. To be sure, the tenor and content of their interventions as critics differ from their contributions as representatives of the governing party. This difference is most clearly elucidated in debates regarding government funding for areas such as multiculturalism and “newcomers”. As critics, the MPs uniformly follow their party’s stance that these are mismanaged Liberal wastes of taxpayer money whereas Conservative government spending on “newcomer integration” is characterized as a significant investment not necessarily in multiculturalism but for the sake of filling labour shortages and thus for the prosperity of “all Canadians”.

Just as the Conservative Party continues to deny mobilizing race-based recruitment and governing strategies, the Asian MPs in this study have in numerous cases reiterated their party’s stance that race (like gender) does not and should not factor into organizing the party nor in governing the nation. Moreover, it is not uncommon for minority MPs to deny suggestions that they represent minority groups outside of their constituencies “whether they are women, visible minorities, Aboriginals, immigrants, youths, gays or lesbians, religious, linguistic, or ethnic minorities, or, significantly, combinations of any of these” (Andrew et al 2008, 14; Mah 2004). Even while Conservative Asian MPs have been appointed to particular parliamentary roles, which require that their interventions and contributions revolve around so-called “ethnic-related issues,” this does not mean that the MPs have necessarily entered into these native informant roles intentionally, explicitly or without ambivalence. For instance, Bird has argued that for CPC members there is a direct link between descriptive and substantive representation of ethnic minority interests and as such “substantive representation arises wholly through the presence of visible minority members” (2011, 220-221). Bird speculates that most likely “visible minority MPs are explicitly tasked with the ‘burden’ of ethnic representation based on Black and Hicks (2006) survey that found that visible minority CPC MPs showed low concern for visible minority
representation in parliament and also showed negative attitudes toward affirmative action. That is, though these MPs would not have chosen to act as representatives of ethnic interests, they have nevertheless been designated as such by their party” (Bird 2011, 221). From this, we can speculate that these MPs may not, on their own volition, choose to “engage in strong substantive representation on behalf of minority interests” (Ibid 221).

As seen in chapter 4, Asian Conservative MPs were often reported in news media and party literature as having transcended stereotypes in a way to suggest that race has become irrelevant. In general, the Asian MPs’ public political ideologies and stances on policy issues do not deviate from their white colleagues. Beyond their race, ethnicity and religion, Jaffer and Obhrai’s conservative politics do not vary from their white counterparts. Still, it was Asian conservative MPs that have been appointed to speak about race related issues. Analysis of their parliamentary profiles, statements and speeches reveals that their political concerns are the concerns of the conservative party in general: a community safer for our children, lowering burdensome taxes for our families, keeping our government accountable and continuing to make our economy strong, striving to contribute to a community and a country that is based on crime control and making sure our justice system stands up for victims and the vulnerable, economic growth, equality for all and support for our immigrants. For example, MP Uppal has notably attended anti-abortion rallies (Delacourt 2010)\(^{86}\), the Grewals have frequently spoken out against same sex marriage, and as documented in Hansard, and every Asian MP has passionately argued in favour of Canadian military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other than being marked as visible minorities, there is nothing actually diverse about the presence and political contributions Conservative Asian MPs in the House of Commons. In fact, several of the MPs have served and continue to participate in debates regarding supposedly non-ethnic related issues such as those issues affecting intergovernmental affairs and the federal budget. One should not be surprised to find lengthy parliamentary statements where Asian MPs address Canadian industry, agriculture, seniors, and veterans. Yet even in these instances, one should not be surprised if an MP brings in reference to race-related issues and uses their ethnicity, race, or religion to make their case on supposedly non-race-related issues in legislative debate. A la Goldberg, race is ostensibly irrelevant; yet race is everything.

As discussed in chapter 1, Bird’s (2011) content analysis of parliamentary speeches made by minority MPs (2006-7) argued that the very presence of visible MPs in the House “promotes greater attention” to ethnic related issues (Bird 2011, 224). By tallying MP speeches coded for mentions of ethnic related issues, Bird declares that it is possible to identify a so-called “minority agenda”, that is, “a set of political issues that likely hold heightened significance for most visible minorities” (2011, 215). The most frequently discussed of these issues are those related to citizenship and immigration followed by issues related to ethnic/racial discrimination (2011, 219) as well as “refugees, multiculturalism and cultural diversity, racial/ethnic discrimination and violence, and the socio-economic status/conditions of immigrants or ethnic groups” (2011, 217). What the study cannot account for however, is how minority MPs matter; an issue I take up here and in chapters 6 and 7 when I analyze the content and impact of their contributions to so-called “minority agenda” debates. I argue that it is neither surprising nor a coincidence that Conservative visible minority (specifically Asian) MPs are more likely than any other group to speak about women and ethnic-related issues in the House when we consider the special appointments of Asian MPs. In fact, these appointments, in an official capacity, require them to speak to these issues and attend events, consultations, roundtables here and abroad about these issues, often in the company of the PM or the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. The tone and content of Asian conservative parliamentary contributions to these topics reveal more about the relationship between race and politics than questions about a “minority agenda” allow.

If we believe the Conservative government’s adamant disavowals of race-based recruitment and government then we should expect that the narratives (the archive of parliamentary interventions and public political speeches) of Asian MPs do not use the language of diversity nor make reference to racialized difference. My findings reveal that visible minority MPs, especially the Conservative ones, do indeed make race- and gender-based interventions in parliamentary debate. However, my findings cannot substantiate arguments that the frequency of visible minority MP references to race and gender signal heightened feminist and race-based consciousness. A closer qualitative analysis of this political archive reveals that the majority of these “ethnic-related” interventions involve race-based appeals as defined in chapter 1; that is, instances in which parliamentarians make claims to racial authenticity and insider knowledge into ethnic communities by invoking personal narratives thereby characterizing themselves as native informants or experts on matters related to race. While such race appeals feature in an
overwhelming majority of the data, MP maiden speeches have served as insightful entry points into understanding the race work that Asian conservatives do.

As described in my research design, maiden speeches are a special space in the House devoted for newly elected MPs to address their colleagues, constituency and the nation at large for the first time. Maiden speeches functioned to “educate,” to present “a particular political perspective,” and “present your ‘credentials’”. Of Rasmussen’s five categories of maiden speeches, anecdotal speeches - where a Member draws extensively on personal experience – have been found to constitute less than a quarter of the maiden speeches (Rasmussen 1988, 538-539). While anecdotal maiden speeches are generally rare, this chapter will continue to show that nearly three quarters of the Asian MP maiden speeches and parliamentary statements in general are categorically anecdotal with specific references to personal and familial stories of immigration, citizenship, and racial diversity. Concurring with Horn, Rasmussen states that the subject of the speech should be something on which the Member possessed some expertise (Rasmussen 1988, 528). If three quarters of the Asian MP speeches are anecdotal then, it is clear from the outset, contributions as racial experts underscores an Asian MP’s political value. Like MP Jung’s maiden speech, Jaffer’s 1997 maiden speech as the second only Asian Canadian conservative MP and the first Muslim MP elected to parliament, outlines the role and expectations of an Asian conservative MP in Canada. Yet, unlike MP Jung, MPs Jaffer, Obhrai, Mark, and Grewal as well as Asian MPs proceeding them depart from Jung’s example. No longer do Asian Conservative MPs speak to advocate for and make tangible parliamentary recommendations to protect ethnic and racial communities. In their discursive contributions to the hyphenated identity debate as well as post-September 11 debates on citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism, these Asian conservative MPs establish a new narrative paradigm.

**Against the Hyphen, Against Multiculturalism as Equity**

Chapter 4 identified the spectacle that was made in 1997 as four Asian Canadians were elected as Reform MPs. Even as Jaffer, Mark, Grewal, and Obhrai’s electoral wins became framed as reflective of some sort of ontological shift in the Reform Party/Canadian Alliance – key political interventions made by these politicians – specifically in debates regarding “hyphenated identities” reveal much more about the new roles and responsibilities of racial conservative MPs in 1997.
As already discussed, the Reform Party roared into existence in 1987 with racial concerns about Canada’s national identity as supposedly under threat because of multicultural policies and the constitutionalization of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. By the 1990s, ethnic pluralism was under siege as exemplified by national inquiries about Canada’s future not limited to the 1991 Spicer Commission, which recommended “multiculturalism to serve as a device for immigrant integration – i.e. as more of a homogenizing than a pluralizing force” (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992, 370). As Abu-Laban and Stasiulis identify in their analysis of the Spicer Commission, the concern was that state-funded multiculturalism would promote not Canadian identity but rather “professional ethnics” (1992, 371). These attacks against multiculturalism first, assume that minorities have chosen their marginalized social locations and second, elude state-sanctioned racial barriers that perpetually remind racialized citizens that they are not in fact ordinary Canadians. Rather, those categorized as hyphenated Canadians in national debates were reminded of their perpetual non-Canadianness through being supposedly tolerated. Ironically, resisting the hyphen in parliamentary debate meant – to borrow from Ahmed (2012) - becoming the racial expert who turns up when race turns up. Speaking out against the hyphen as an expert effectively secures one’s political value - such as MP Grewal’s - in their racial otherness. More than ever, in speaking against race, these politicians do not escape race in the way that they oppose it, rather in a paradoxical sense they become the “professional ethnic” but one that will argue against multiculturalism as equity rather than advocate for it.

In their analyses of the 1990s culture clash disputes in Canada, critical race scholars have examined Neil Bissoondath’s manifesto against the “cult of multiculturalism in Canada” as an example of the hollowed conservative conceptions of the politics of antiracism (Razack 1999; Bannerji 2000). In Selling Illusions (1994) Bissoondath levels an impassioned critique against multicultural policy, arguing that the “burden of hyphenation” is the true barrier to immigrant integration and blames the policy for creating “unease,” disunity and ironically, for commodifying diversity. Bissoondath’s arguments are reminiscent of anti-multiculturalism claims made by Rais Khan for the Reform Party as examined in chapter 4. It becomes evident that the “unease” Bissoondath speaks of is white Canada’s continued anxiety around the proximity of racial others where accountability for racial discrimination is displaced onto those who dare challenge the systemic racism that has constituted the nation. Razack has described “Bissoondath [as] the neo-conservative for whom anti-racist initiatives such as employment
equity or culturally specific strategies all lead to embracing narrow tribal and regressive identities” (Razack 1999, 179). Such rejections of Canadian multiculturalism tenets assumes that the nation can only be held together by sameness, which thus normalizes racism. The implications of Bissoondath’s diatribe can be found in parliamentary debate where racial conservatives have formally made a case against hyphenated identity.

On November 26, 1997, only a few months after he was first elected and six years since he arrived in Canada, Reform MP Gurmant Grewal moved to introduce a private members’ bill “on behalf of the silent majority” “that a legislative committee of the House be instructed to prepare and bring in a bill to prevent the “reference to and designation of any Canadian or group of Canadians in a hyphenated form, based on race, religion, colour or place of origin”87. Grewal begins with a typically Conservative populist manoeuvre by saying that even though personal experiences in his life have compelled him to introduce Motion No. 24, he is not alone and that the motion has generated “an outpouring of support from across Canada”. He states: “There are many more Canadians across this great land who feel the same way. One Canadian even sent me a five dollar bill to have a drink in his name”88. We can only speculate from whom Grewal received these telephone calls, letters and e-mails and what these messages actually articulate. Even though he says there are so many quotes to share, he does not actually share any of the comments he has received. Instead he suggests that the motion is non-partisan as it puts forward “the best interests” of the people and future of Canada.

To understand the conservative contempt for hyphenation, we must first understand what the hyphen signifies for the conservatives and the threat that it represents. Grewal argued:

Hyphenation of Canadians weakens and dilutes the Canadian identity and belonging. Hyphenation inhibits integration and rather assists segregation of our population. Hyphenation of Canadians fosters barriers to equality rather than eliminating those barriers. Hyphenation does more harm than good.89

For Grewal, like Bissoondath, Canada is effectively conceived of as a white space that has weakened with the arrival of those bearing the racial mark of the hyphen. The colourblind approach adopted by Grewal appeals to abstract liberal ideals wherein “every individual is equal

88 Ibid, 2270
89 Ibid 2268
before and under the law and free from discrimination”. Such an understanding of Canadian identity effectively erases histories of colonial genocide as well as the racialized and gendered exploitation that have constituted the nation – the very things that multicultural and antiracist policies were intended to address. For Grewal, adherence to abstract liberal tenets like meritocracy displaces the roots of racism in Canada onto those immigrants that adopt what he calls a “psychology of separation from mainstream culture” and that isolate “ethnic racial groups in distinct enclaves”. Rather than confront legacies of differentiated citizenship that have already rationalized process that create “tiers of Canadians”, it is instead suggested that it is hyphenation that causes segregation, fuels “division, frictions, jealousies” and even become “a precursor to discrimination”.

And yet, at the same time, as an integral part of the racial conservative script, Grewal must emphasize that the Reform Party does not oppose “the multicultural fact of Canada”. Here and elsewhere, racial conservatives frequently use phrases such as “Canada is a country of immigrants” or “As an immigrant to Canada” as a preamble to their race-related (racist) parliamentary interventions. For example, on October 2, 1997, Deepak Obhrai – prior to even delivering his maiden speech made these statements in the House:

> Mr. Speaker, Namaste, Sasri-Kal, Ram-Ram, Ya Ali Madat and Jambo. These greetings emphasize that Canada is a multicultural society. Our multicultural policy was intended to build bridges but it has been manipulated in the past and therefore faces growing criticism today. Canadians are looking to strengthen their roots in this country. They want to be Canadian first, especially when the very existence of our country is in question. Often people ask “am I a Canadian or am I a hyphenated Canadian?” I can attest to the fact that today culture and multiculturalism are thriving not because of government funding but because people choose to do so on their own.

Bracketed from antiracist politics, “multicultural” is conceived of here as a mere characteristic of the nation and a way to describe particular racialized immigrant groups rather than a politics grounded in a position against state violence that continues to justify the hierarchization of Canadians along racial lines. Here, “multicultural” is used as a racial descriptor and made interchangeable with other terms such as “newcomers,” “multicultural communities,” “visible minorities,” “ethnics,” and “new Canadians”. The conservative racial script is thus the

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90 Ibid 2269
91 Ibid 2270
operationalization of such an emptied colourblind conception of “multiculturalism” as a way to
remain committed to racist claims. Race as cultural difference becomes associated with this
conceptualization of multiculturalism – the version that Reform can accept. What it cannot
accept is reckoning with power inequities towards an actual political diversity.

Grewal attempts to further argue his case against multiculturalism by depicting “African
and Middle Eastern countries” as having been torn apart because of division based on “tribe.”
Racist allusions such as this are revealed to be the norm rather than the exception in racial
conservative depictions of Africa, Asia and the Middle East – explored also in chapter 6. Nearly
two years later, on February 17, 1999 during a parliamentary debate on peacekeeping, Grewal
continued to argue against hyphenation and multiculturalism in such racist terms:

In most African countries, including central Africa, ethnic and tribal problems
lead to these bloody civil wars. Did any member of the international community
do anything to stop the branding of the people based on their ethnic origin, based
on the tribes they belong to? That is a root cause of the civil war and tribal wars
in those countries… What can we expect from the Canadian government? There
are no efforts to do that even in our country. This government encourages the
concept of hyphenated Canadians. With the hyphenation concept we divide
people, not unite them. Unfortunately this government has done absolutely
nothing on that.93

In this passage, Grewal insinuates that multiculturalism breeds tribal war and that the
hyphenation debate is indeed a civilization debate. As part of a western civilization, the MP
reasons that there is no place for groups to make claims of the state. Cultural diversity and
multiculturalism as celebration of certain holidays, customs, cuisine, and costumes is fine; race
as cultural difference does not require changing institutional values. It is made clear that the
hyphenated identity debate is about demonizing those that mobilize race as a politics for
institutional change. In his statements, Grewal specifically accuses the Liberal government for
propagating hyphenation – for differentiating Canadians according to their racial and ethnic
identity: “This government encourages new Canadians to be called something like Indo
Canadians, Chinese Canadians, Italian Canadians, not just Canadians”.94 Specifically, he lodges
his critique against identity politics directly at Hedy Fry, then-Secretary of State for
Multiculturalism and the Status of Women and her identification as a “proud Trinidad

Number 183. February 17. Page 12079-12080.
Canadian”. Grewal argues, “She is a Canadian government minister. When will she call herself a proud Canadian?” to which Fry responded that Grewal himself would not be standing in the House were it not for the very multicultural policies he was deriding. A deep anxiety can be detected in these speeches directed against hyphenation as an identity politics. Grewal, would soon officially be appointed as Canadian Alliance’s chief multiculturalism critic, making him literally Fry’s shadow in parliament. His party had chosen him specifically – just as the Liberal government appointed Fry - to speak as the expert on matters of multiculturalism and matters related to race – a position that would seem to go against his desire to be thought of at all times as “just Canadian”. In this same speech, Grewal argues,

Like everyone else, I am equally proud of my ethnicity, my culture and my religion. Like everyone else, I have chosen Canada as my home. This is the future of my children and my family. This is where our hopes and opportunities are and I am proud of that, like everyone else. Canada has been generous to me and my family. I and my family are proud to hold a Canadian passport. Like everyone else, I am proud to be a Canadian. But the hyphen still interferes with my pride…

How foolish it sounds when someone says even Canadians voted for Chinese Canadians or Indo Canadians or Italian Canadians.

Such comments indicate a level of resistance against being regarded as the person that is appointed to turn up when race turns up – of being thought of as unlike everyone else. And still, these declarations do not preclude racial conservatives including Grewal from making race-based appeals. While Grewal argues that he would like to cleanse the public sphere of “identity politics,” the evidence of his ghettoized position of authority on minority issues reveals a paradox. Despite Asian conservative MP resistance against identity politics, they continue to make statements as representatives of ethnic communities and as experts on race-related issues. Only a month before introducing his anti-hyphenation private member’s bill, Grewal began making statements about Sikhs in Canada and their contributions to Canadian social, cultural and economic prosperity even speaking about the Komagata Maru incident and demanding that the Canadian government apologize. Then on February 20, 2001, in one of his longest parliamentary statements, Grewal again introduces a private member’s bill, this time asking that the House officially recognize Sikh Canadians:

Mr. Speaker, as a Sikh member of parliament and as the chief critic for multiculturalism for the official opposition of Canada, I am very pleased to

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95 Ibid.
speak in favour of Motion No. 32: that this House recognize the importance of April 13 to all Sikhs and the contributions that Canadian Sikhs have made to our country…

The history of Sikhs in Canada is about 100 years old. During this period, Sikhs have contributed in the making of railway tracks and in work in the sawmills and have made professional contributions in the fields of medicine, law, education, engineering, et cetera. Sikhs own big businesses and industries and of course contribute in politics, as we see by their contributions in the House…

Recognizing the importance of Vaisakhi, the Reform Party of Canada and now the Canadian Alliance, Her Majesty's Loyal Official Opposition of Canada, proudly celebrates Vaisakhi in parliament every year since 1998. This year's annual celebration of Vaisakhi will be celebrated on Wednesday, April 4, in Room 237-C, Centre Block, from 4 to 6 p.m. As always, I invite members of all parties and the public in general to join us in the celebration.

In 1998 the leader of the Reform Party was the first and only federal leader of any political party in Canada to visit the Golden Temple, the holiest shrine of the Sikhs and the Durgiana Mander in Amritsar.96

The significance of Grewal making this statement at all comes at the ending of this script when he ties all the platitudes invoked to the Reform Party leader’s visit to the Golden Temple. This gesture is meant to signify that the Reform Party stands out and stands for a particular version of multiculturalism – a strategy that will continue throughout the Harper Conservatives’ reign. And yet again, these statements and gestures can only accept diversity as consumption and celebration of culture rather than reckon with state violence.

Until as recently as June 2006 racial conservatives including Gurmant Grewal’s wife, MP Nina Grewal argued that the Conservative government would not promote the hyphenation of Canadians. And yet by 2011, the notorious hyphen would no longer be condemned as the barrier to integration, rather it becomes folded into the CPC vernacular and adopted by the very people who once scorned it. By 2011, the hyphen and what it once promised – the possibility for political diversity – was no longer the same perceived threat; invocations of diversity and multiculturalism would become resignified in neoliberal terms for mainstream political discourse. This section has examined how despite Asian conservative MPs’ resistance to identity politics, they also "get stuck in institutions by being stuck to a category" (Ahmed 2012, 4).

Evidently, conservative Asian MPs are “continually interpellated not only as signs of diversity, but also as responsible for it” (Ahmed and Swan, 2006, 98) and this, I argue, includes

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responsibility for its disavowal. The next section’s analysis of MP Jaffer’s speeches demonstrates how such racial rule would become further acute in post-September 11 parliamentary debates.

**Negotiating the liberal paradox after 9/11**

As discussed in chapter 4, Jaffer’s electoral win played an important part in Reform’s effort to shed its “old WASPish” identity. On September 29th, 1997, at only twenty-five years old, Rahim Jaffer of Edmonton-Strathcona stood in the House as only the second ever Asian Conservative MP to deliver a maiden speech since Jung in 1958. More importantly, Jaffer was the first and to this day, has been the only Muslim Conservative MP elected to the House of Commons. Elected prior to the events of September 11, 2001, Jaffer’s maiden speech invokes his family’s refugee story of daring escape from authoritarian rule. After September 11, Jaffer’s family’s refugee story is referenced in every parliamentary interventions he makes. While the threat of race and spectre of illegal migrants are not unique to this particular historical moment in Canadian parliamentary debate, the perceived racial threat did intensify post-September 11. Scholars have noted that Jaffer “became the unofficial voice for the Canadian Muslim community after the September 11 attacks in New York” (Andrew et al 2008, 14). However, framing Jaffer’s contribution in this way creates the impression that the MP advocated on behalf of Canadian Muslims. Beyond the problem of homogenizing “the Canadian Muslim community,” such framing eludes the racial conservative narrative that was circulated in the post-September 11 moment. That is, the anti-multiculturalism discourse that had erupted in the 1990s became fully integrated into mainstream political discourse by 2001. Any reference to systemic racism as a way to advocate for racial populations became impossible in that discursive space. The impossibility of speaking race in Canadian parliament became most evident in September 2001. As part of the family of nations, Canadian Members of Parliament from all political parties including minority-identified MPs coalesced around an intensifying racial discourse.

To clarify, as examined in chapter 3, the political interventions made by MP Jung from 1958-60 explicitly appealed the Canadian government to amend its citizenship policies and allow family reunification in recognition of the history of anti-Asian legislation. Despite the suspicion of race that continued to loom in parliament, Jung advocated on behalf of Chinese people in
Canada by emphasizing the ideological and infrastructural inequities that had barred them from full citizenship rights. As such, part of Jung’s major parliamentary contributions included championing the bill of rights and the amnesty program for Chinese immigrants so that they may adjust their citizenship status. In September 2001, the collection of parliamentary statements from Mark, Grewal, Obrai and Jaffer significantly depart from Jung’s example. As it will be further examined in chapter 7, these MPs were already participating in the dominant anti-refugee narrative in the aftermath of the arrival of Chinese migrant ships off the coast of British Columbia in 1999. However, in the aftermath of September 11, the figure of the fraudulent “queue jumper” in anti-refugee parliamentary debate became the spectre of the terrorist. Rather than challenge the dominant narrative’s racial profiling of Arab, Muslim and South Asian men, Asian conservative racial scripts reproduced such racial tropes. Rather than advocate for policy amendments that would make human rights more accessible for racialized communities that had been systemically discriminated against, these MPs would mobilize their immigrant and refugee stories to further justify the state’s promise to extract the figure of the undesirable, the state-dependent, threat to the nation. The statements offered by Asian conservatives immediately after September 11 and leading up to the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan participated in reproducing dominant narratives about the US-led war on terror.

Indeed, invocation of his South Asian descent and Muslim religious identity permeate the archive of Jaffer’s parliamentary statements. Almost every statement he makes at least references, if not focuses entirely on his family fleeing Uganda:

My family arrived in Canada in 1972. They were penniless refugees who fled Uganda and the brutal regime of Idi Amin. They came to Canada to rebuild their lives. They came to escape tyranny and embrace Liberty. They came to find a haven from racial prejudice in a country renowned for its tolerance and equality.97

Stories about refugees escaping persecution can illustrate the plight of war and incite action to welcome refugees into Canada and to create policies that will support them once they arrive. That is, refugee stories can work to help refugees. However, the collection of statements offered by Jaffer does not appear to serve such policy objectives. Rather, Jaffer’s statements cast Uganda as a model of political tyranny and Canada as the model of political freedom or “haven from racial prejudice”. In this narrative, state-sanctioned violence takes place elsewhere, not here. His

statements also consistently evoke the trope of meritocracy in order to reproduce this Orientalist binarization. That is, the state ostensibly has no part to play in the success and failure of immigrants and refugees in Canada. State “interventions” – this story cautions – spiral into civil war: a line of racial thinking that permeated debates against multiculturalism. In this narrative, a family like Jaffer’s succeeded in Canada because of their own will and ethic while the struggles of those immigrant families that do not fare as well are their problem alone. None of Jaffer’s references to his refugee story accompany a plea for the government to help refugees in the present-day nor do his statements address challenges that refugees face in Canada not limited to language training, access to employment opportunities, social and community services as well as blatant encounters with racism. Only Jaffer’s particular refugee story is repeated and is always accompanied by appeals to meritocracy and re-inscriptions of Orientalist binaries.

I saw that my parents were allowed to pursue business opportunities and were allowed to keep the fruits of their labour. There was no dictator who could confiscate our property because he did not like the colour of our skin. That was the freedom Canada offered.

I saw that my parents, even though they were small business owners, were treated with the same respect as other Canadians. That was the equality Canada offered.

Jaffer’s framing of Amin’s human rights offences as offences against capitalist enterprise and private property ultimately serves to depict Canada as a just and humane state when it is a conservative and capitalist neoliberal state. The injuries suffered by Jaffer’s family are reduced to economic terms. In this refugee story, it is not humanitarian violation but rather violations against capitalist enterprise that are cast as the ultimate offence. When Jaffer speaks of the “values” he brings to political life - values that were shaped in the shadow of his family’s escape from Africa – the MP appeals to capitalist modernity’s meta-narrative about freedom and independence. This escape connotes strength where it is implied that even the chains of socialism and terror could not contain a leader committed to the values of Canadian democracy. In this narrative, what sets Jaffer apart from all the fraudulent refugees that featured so heavily in Canadian parliamentary debate at the time is this enterprising spirit and commitment to modernity. MP Jaffer becomes the “good” or “legitimate” refugee who severed ties to the place from where he came in order to contribute to the economic wealth of Canada. This position takes

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98 Ibid
on intense significance in post-September 11 debates, as Jaffer ostensibly became a spokesperson for South Asian and Muslim communities.

Since September 17, 2001, Jaffer’s statements nearly always included the phrase, “As the only Muslim elected to parliament in Canada”. His racial-religious identification becomes necessary to the dominant discourse, which he must reproduce and legitimate. What accompanied this phrase were arguments in favour of increasing national security and investing in Canadian militarization against potential terrorists as a way to protect trading and diplomatic relations with the United States “thereby serving to stabilize our economy and protect our citizens”. In 2003, as Canada was debating its role in the United States-led war in Iraq, anti-racist critiques were leveled against the state. As the only Muslim elected to parliament, MP Jaffer staked a claim in his racial authenticity and authority in order to trivialize and delegitimize these critiques. As a refugee and as a Muslim Canadian, surely this MP would challenge the racial state. However, his example demonstrates the ways in which ideology proves to cut across race, ethnicity and gender. Jaffer and his Asian conservative colleagues would challenge the notion that racial minorities stand against the racial state. In 2003 debates on Iraq, Jaffer stated: “Although I would not care to blanket the whole Islamic community, I think there is definitely some concern as to how action has been taken in the past”.99 While the MP states that he does not care to blanket the Muslim community, he consistently does so anyways. His refugee story figures critically in the Iraq debates. For instance, on March 17, 2003, Jaffer stated:

As I have said on past occasions, being the only Muslim in the House of Commons, I have concerns about taking action against dictators who need to have action against them for the freedom and democracy of individuals around the world…
When we say that we have to support our allies, it is because we believe that despite our differences with the American government, we believe democracies must stick together. This is the bond of democracy. It is a love of freedom and a real wish for all of the world's citizens to live in peace. The Canadian Alliance firmly believes this. We do not equivocate like our government. We do not depend on how the wind is blowing, especially when it comes to popular opinion on the issue…My family fled a radical dictator similar to that of Saddam Hussein … Unfortunately there are dictators who hijack their own form of democracy and institute a form of democracy that is not compatible with the democracies we see in the western world. This is why, if we want democracies to work and we want many of these countries to be a part of the large nation in respect for human rights

for women and for various cultural groups and religious beliefs, all these different diversities that exist in Muslim countries…

Invoking the clash of civilizations thesis, these statements epitomize Jaffer’s post-September 11 arguments in favour of Canadian militarization because so-called “democracies must stick together”. The state attempts to adhere to the mythology of its reputation as a peaceable “middle-power” while simultaneously committing to aggressive militarization. Until his final days as a sitting MP, Jaffer invoked his refugee story as a way to make a case for Canada’s participation in imperial wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: “The reason I wanted to share that story briefly with the House is that I see many similarities with what the people of Afghanistan are faced with”. In this narrative, Idi Amin is Saddam Hussein is Muammar Gaddafi and so on. The particular historicities of Uganda, Iraq, and Libya matter less than the notion that these people represent an essential figure in the western imaginary – the representation of modernity’s antithesis whose necessary destruction legitimizes military interventions without end. In the narrative, Jaffer becomes the expert on “what sort of action we should be taking in other countries to stop similar dictators”. In these passages, as someone who escaped terror, Jaffer becomes someone who knows what it means to live without freedom and knows what we must do to avoid similar fates: democracies stick together.

The modern state is depicted as a place where we can put racism behind us; it is tolerant, follows the rule of law not like “monsters” over there. Crimes against humanity happen elsewhere. Here, racism is a mere scar in the history of an otherwise peaceful, harmonious nation. For example in a parliamentary debate on Bill C19, the Crimes against humanity and war crimes act, which took place in the spring of 2000 Gurmant Grewal used the following language to describe those far away nations:

I lived in Liberia, a country in west Africa, for about eight years… The Canadian Alliance will oppose this bill because the bad countries will not sign such a treaty… Without belligerent countries signing on this treaty will be meaningless

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...the Canadian Alliance, myself included, would strongly want those monsters who have blood on their hands, those who have committed crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, brought to justice…

This passage shows that while such themes existed in Asian conservative statements prior to September 11, they are newly anchored in the tropes of heroes and villains in the war on terror. That is to say, Canada becomes a “beacon of hope for many in that region” that has been turned “backward”. State policies under the banner of the ‘war on terror’ have been integral to the legitimization of anti-Muslim racism. In this crude conception, there are “good” Muslims that commit to Western, secular modernity and there are “bad” irredeemable terrorist Muslims – both are subjects configured out of an Orientalist binarization. MP Jaffer steps into the role of the “good” Muslim that will support Canada in its war against the spectre of the irredeemable terrorist. However, despite discursive efforts to distance moderate from radical racial others, in this racial formulation. According to Razack: “No one of colour is free from the possibility that he or she will be considered illegitimate, fraudulent, and out to get more than is her due” (Razack 2000: 187). That is, relying on stereotypes or myths about racial difference ultimately constructs all people of colour as potential threats to the nation. Governance over minorities is predicated on the inclusion of a few representatives on the condition that their stories of racelessness reinvigorate the racial state. The so-called raceless state defines “who is a political actor, what is a political interest, and how political claims will be made and negotiated to achieve the political retreat from race” (Cho 2009, 1621). That is, at core of their post-racial politics, these Asian conservative MPs continue to be defined and confined by race.

Asian Conservatives that have arrived in Canada by way of African countries have staked their own claim to political legitimacy by contributing to a globally anti-Black discourse. In their contributions to parliamentary debate about foreign policy, national identity and national security, these MPs invoke stories about Africa - Uganda for Jaffer, Tanzania for Obhrai, and Liberia for Nina and Gurmant Grewal - that rehearse myths not only about Canada being a beacon of hope for “undeveloped nations” but also the myth of rescue and improvement that relies on representations of Black life as antithetical to the modern. As such, these MPs have appealed to anti-Black racisms that lend legitimacy to brazen imperial intervention abroad and to targeted racial violence at home. Like Jaffer, MP Nina Grewal has argued that witnessing

atrocities of war left her with a deep appreciation for freedom, democracy, and good government. However, Jaffer’s reference to Uganda, the Grewals’ reference to Liberia, and Obhrai’s reference to Tanzania are not invoked as a way to incite social change and policy amendments to support refugees but rather to justify re-invigorations of racist representation. For instance, on November 1, 2006, MP Grewal stated:

Speaker, I express my condolences, sympathy and prayers to the families of the three women murdered or attacked in Surrey. Mrs. Manjit Panghali, a mother of a three year old and a mother to be, had earlier disappeared and her burnt body has been found. Mrs. Gurjeet Ghuman, who is in critical condition, was shot in the face, allegedly by her husband, apparently in a family dispute. Mrs. Navreet Waraich, mother of a four month old son, was stabbed to death, allegedly by her husband, in a family dispute. The role of violence in these situations is undeniable and tragic. Newcomers to Canada face many challenges, but domestic violence and fearing for one's own safety should not be among them. There is no place for domestic violence in Canada. Before more lives are lost, all that needs to be done must be done. Members of the official opposition should stop digging in their heels and allow the new Conservative government to make tougher and effective laws. It is already 13 years too late. Perhaps some lives could have been saved. (Emphasis added)105

When it comes to communities of colour, Grewal argues that there is no place for gendered violence in Canada. Yet again, state-sanctioned violence against Indigenous women and women of colour are entirely eluded. MP Nina Grewal’s statements here evoke the gendered relationship between colonizer and colonized critiqued by Gayatri Spivak (2007) as “white men saving brown women from brown men”. Rather than challenge the dominant narrative that displaces problems characterized as racial and gendered to places elsewhere and people that come from these places, MP Grewal mobilizes the Orientalist binary here “to augment the role of the nation as an icon of tolerance and as a “rescuer” of those who are victims of barbaric cultures and practices” (Razack, 1998 quoted in Jiwani, 2005 53).

In terms of gender, scholars have insisted that Conservative women of colour paid more attention to gender issues than any other group and paid more attention to ethnic-related issues than men of colour, even that visible minority women’s interventions are evidence that they have both heightened race-based and feminist consciousness. Bird (2011) speculates two possibilities

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for these results: 1) “female visible minority MPs are recruited by their party with a more or less explicit expectation that they will address symbolically and substantively two under-represented groups” and 2) “visible minority women may, as a result of the intersection of gendered and racialized experiences in their lives, have a heightened and somewhat unique perspective on both women’s and ethnic issues. They may in turn be more likely to bring these perspectives to bear in parliamentary debates” (Bird 2011, 224). These speculations rely on a politics with guarantees – that is, an essentialist, determinist understanding of politics and identity. The speculation relies on a particular reading of the experiences of woman of colour as evidenced in Bird’s words: “these women might be especially familiar with both patterns of patriarchy within their cultural communities, and with the structures of racism and prejudice that affect many immigrants and visible minorities” (Bird 2011, 223). In her own words “most concern recent immigrants and visible minorities in Canada are being addressed in the House of Commons”. Thus by this racial logic, that female politicians of colour speak in the house means that, “changes in Canadian politics over the past decade have expanded opportunities for involvement and contributions to policy debates” (Bird 2011, 225).

It is true that MPs such as Nina Grewal and Bev Oda may speak most frequently to issues affecting women and visible minorities. There have only been four female conservative Asian Canadian MPs. Already stated in chapter 4, Nina Grewal and Bev Oda were the first two female visible minority MPs elected in 2004. In 2008, Alice Wong defeated the incumbent Raymond Chan in Richmond, BC and most recently Wai Young was elected in Vancouver South, BC. All four of these subjects have been assigned to the Status of Women as Minister (Oda), vice-chair of the committee (Grewal), and as members (Wong and Young). The position for Minister responsible for the Status of Women in cabinet was created in 1971 as a product of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women. Then in 1996 Minister of Canadian Heritage in the Canadian Cabinet position was created by the Liberal party to combine the posts of Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship and Minister of Communications. As a result, a parliamentary secretary – a junior minister not represented in Cabinet, now oversees multiculturalism. The "Status of Women" was merged from the Minister responsible for the Status of Women in 2006. In this same year, Bev Oda was appointed Minister in charge of Canadian Heritage, the Status of Women, and The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). A closer examination of the content and context of visible minority MP interventions gives us a better idea as to whether
minority interests are actually being advanced by minority MPs. Oda’s statements on October 6th, 2006 exemplify her patterned use of the language of gender-blindness evacuated of any analysis of power to articulate abstracted notions of gender equality:

Mr. Speaker, we have to stop this narrative of victimhood. We as women and as Canadians do not see women as victims. We know they are leaders. We know they have aspirations. We want to give them the opportunities that they deserve. Just by talking about it, we have not made much difference, but we will act. We will not stand by while international communities say we have not done enough. We are acting, and we will make a difference.\textsuperscript{106}

The idea here is that stopping the “narrative victimhood” will end sexist employment practices, wages and sexual violence. Similarly, on November 10th, 2006, Oda’s comments suggest that it is the naming of gendered inequality rather than ongoing structural barriers that causes gendered inequality and violence. Such comments suggest that recognizing the obstacles that women and visible minorities face fosters an internalized defeatist mentality in disenfranchised groups whereas meritocratic approaches are seen as more productive and democratic:

Mr. Speaker, we have to understand that if women are continually told they are not equal, they will continue to believe that. We say that everyone in Canada is equal. We recognize there are challenges and barriers. We will use taxpayers dollars to ensure that all women have equal opportunity and can participate as equal citizens.\textsuperscript{107}

Here, the MP speaks of gender inequity as though women do not experience sexism in their own lived experiences and that these inequities only exist because critics continue to speak against it. Such a manoeuvre is reminiscent of Gurmant Grewal’s argument that multiculturalism divides the nation. Of course as Minister, Oda often spoke about Canada’s diversity and the importance of diverse representation in the House, stressing the participation of women. She spoke frequently about equal opportunity but emphasized her party’s disdain for affirmative action over meritocracy. Examining her speeches and activities in detail demonstrate that for Oda, like other conservative MPs, attempts to address historically ongoing and systemic race and gender based violences are the very things that perpetuate these violences. For these MPs, such inequalities can simply be resolved through neoliberal meritocracy, which evades the fact that material disparities have been perpetuated by neoliberalism. Instead, like her counterparts – and even as

evidenced in Bird’s conclusion - Oda would assert that the very existence of minority MPs is evidence of dissipating inequalities, a dangerous determinism that makes it possible to say that race and gender have become irrelevant. For instance, on April 17th, 2007, Oda stated:

> It was the Conservative Party that elected the first woman in the House of Commons as well as the first woman prime minister. As we work together and continue our efforts to encourage more women to run for elected office, we must also ensure all Canadians that as a government we recognize our responsibility to address their issues and needs.

Indeed, Oda and other Asian MPs have argued that the Conservative party is the party of such famous firsts like Ellen Fairclough, Lincoln Alexander, Douglas Jung and Oda herself as the first and only Japanese Canadian MP, let alone cabinet minister. Without qualifying how visible minority parliamentarians debate “ethnic-related issues,” there is danger in suggesting that the frequency of mentions of women and race or ethnicity guarantees that minority interests are being advanced. By this line of reasoning, we should say that prolific D’Souza (1995) and Bissoondath (1994) are also race and feminist conscious. We know, however, that such writings are neoliberal exemplars that promote the principle of colour-blind race neutrality. Similarly, while the arrival of conservative minority MPs in Canadian political parties is notable, “the persistence of glaring racial inequality – that is, of an ongoing dimension of white supremacy and racism that pervades the entire society – demands a level of concerted action” (Winant 1994, 178). Thus, while extant literature has drawn equivalencies between minority MPs statements and heightened feminist or race-consciousness, these studies’ lack the contextual components of discourse analysis and underestimate the flexibility of race discourse. Based on critical discourse analysis of Conservative Asian MPs’ parliamentary interventions, the rest of thesis continues to demonstrate that the frequency of ethnic-related interventions does not necessarily correlate with heightened feminist and race-consciousness. In other words, by asking how minority MPs matter, the data shows that there is little basis for a politics with guarantees. Thus, statements as made by Nina Grewal and Bev Oda challenge the assumption that female and racialized MPs necessarily stand opposed to the racial state. Indeed, MP Grewal’s statements racializing sexual violence in 2006 have continued to feature in Harper Conservatives’ targeted attacks against veiled Muslim women as the site of gender inequity and “not the way we do things” in Canada.

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The statements examined here reveal the extent to which MPs can use diversity words without having to change the structures of inequity at all. Indeed, as part of their policy declarations, the Harper Conservatives claim to “celebrate Canada’s diversity” and multiculturalism:

107. Diversity Principles: The Conservative Party believes that Canada’s multicultural society is a valued reality and accepts the need to foster understanding and equality of opportunity, while expecting Canadians to adopt Canadian common values such as equality, democracy, and the rule of law.

108. Multiculturalism: The Conservative Party recognizes the rich, diverse make-up of the Canadian population and the contribution of these communities to our history and the Canadian way of life. The government should ensure that each community is able to enhance and contribute to Canada without discrimination and barriers.109

While Reform’s language used to debate against hyphenated identities has been abandoned, what remains in the Harper Conservatives’ multiculturalism policy is the point of integration. The CPC has not suddenly adopted multiculturalism as an anti-racist politics. Rather, multiculturalism is simply taken as a fact or a description of racial otherness. The ultimate goal as outlined in the hyphenated identities debate remains the same: a core of cultural sameness – that is Canadianness as whiteness remains the goal of the CPC position on diversity and multiculturalism. As discussed in chapter 4, by remaking discourses of multiculturalism, the Harper Conservatives’ agenda is “reform by stealth” (Abu Laban 2014b, 153). The effects of rejecting hyphenated Canadianness are produced through rehistoricizing Canadian identity and history. The Harper Conservatives’ policy commitments can also be traced back to Reform in discourses of national security. In Asian conservative scripts, the conservatives find an ideal neoliberal multicultural subject that champions integration and also provides justifications for intensifying national security. Thus, while the Conservatives may have not overtly attacked multiculturalism, they also “Stand up for Security” by manufacturing the idea that we our borders are under threat from foreign criminals within and abroad and thus rationalizes “effective deportation laws”.110

By 2008, Asian Canadian political scripts under Harper’s Conservative government are clearly abandoned of any advocacy and equity oriented objective – concepts such as multicultural, diversity are invoked in the same breath as references to the Magna Carta, the rule of law, western civilization, the founding myth – multicultural and diversity can only be invoked

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109 CPC Policy Declaration as amended by the delegates to the National Convention on November 2, 2013. Pg 41.
as platitudinous celebrations and as demographic descriptors but mobilized in a way to promote integration – the end (objective) is a monoculturalism. On May 14, 2008, MP Michael Chong argued:

As Canada becomes an increasingly diverse population, with peoples arriving here from around the world, it is incredibly important that we maintain the civic traditions our society is based on. I note that over the last number of years Statistics Canada has released data which establishes that one in six Canadians is an identifiable minority and shows that the number is going to increase in the coming decades, such that we could quite quickly see a country where one in four, and possibly even one in three, will be an identifiable visible minority. In the context of a country that is rapidly changing and whose demographics are rapidly changing due to our high rates of immigration, it is incredibly important that we preserve the traditions on which this country and our society are based. (Emphasis added) 111

The racial project is clear – uncomfortably so – yet Asian Canadian political representatives – figures of model modernity obscure the violence of this racial governance.

**Neoliberal Racial Rule: From Asian shores to Canadian MP**

The Harper Conservatives have represented Asian Canadians as people who have persevered by their bootstraps *despite* structural racism. As a disciplinary discourse, this is to also invoke the idea of racial populations that have *not* persevered through structural racism. In such a discursive formulation, this bootstrap enterprising immigrant figure now sits as an MP in Canadian parliament as a proper political subject unlike those racial populations that continue to make demands upon the state. In this narrative, histories of anti-Asian state violence are replaced with a story of a “vibrant past” where Asians “overcame” this past without making demands upon the state. The visualization of MP Jaffer’s story of escape from tyranny to freedom is revived in MP Leung’s 2011 editorial called “From Taiwan’s shores to Canadian MP”. 112 In this narrative, Asians become the model modernity (Lye 1999); the racial others that have moved into modernity *despite* racism unlike those that continue to make demands while exposing ongoing state violence. In both stories, the protagonists leave a place of racial unrest and political

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instability and enter into modernity as signified by their parliamentary seat. Yet, as already revealed in Jaffer’s example, these MPs appear to be unable to actually escape. Their inclusion into political modernity as a testament to Canadian racelessness actually sustains the racial state. As their statements reveal, the MPs continue to be defined and confined by race as their political value comes from their capacity to reproduce the racial order. By 2011, MPs Leung, Shory and Uppal are able to restate this racial rule with impunity.

After having been sworn in as Parliamentary Secretary for Multiculturalism, Chungsen Leung tabled “a brief chronology of 160 years of the Chinese Canadian history from segregation to integration”113 in the House on October 6, 2011:

Our Government, under Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s leadership is proud to have recognized these contributions. We have taken many steps in acknowledging the significance of the Chinese community in Canada, including apologizing for the shameful Chinese Head Tax, by providing redress payments and by funding commemoration projects under the Canadian Historical Recognition Program.114

What is apparent in these statements is that the story here is not about Chinese Canadians but rather the story of a benevolent Canadian state replaces histories of grassroots political action. The “contributions” that Leung speaks of - stated explicitly on economic terms and taken directly from the CPC multiculturalism policy script - are also elucidated in Wai Young’s maiden speech:

These are the people who helped build railways to unite Canada and to open the west to trade and growth. From this vibrant past, our families and our community continue to contribute toward building Canada’s economic railway, as we continue to lead in a region for expanded trade for Asia. Our diversity, our work ethic, our shared Canadian values are our strength and together we form a world-class city.115

In these scripts histories of state sanctioned anti-Asian exploitation becomes renarrated as the Chinese community’s “contribution” to nation-building. Past legacies of anti-Asian exploitation, now depicted as a “vibrant past” is referenced as a segue into the Conservative governments’ plans to expand trade in Asia. Secondly, Leung’s contribution as parliamentary secretary of multiculturalism is to recite a particular script about the Conservative government’s diversity record. In this script, the Harper Conservatives are depicted as the leaders of racial recognition.

and representation. As such, Leung’s statements as parliamentary secretary of multiculturalism takes stories of diversity are turned into “institutional success stories” (Ahmed 2012, 10). Thus, the duty of the parliamentary secretary is not necessarily to identify ways through which race-based justice will be enacted but rather, to gesture to diversity documents already in circulation, thereby repudiating the need for any further commitments moving forward.

Recitation of such overcoming narratives as an integral part of Asian MP special appointment’s is made further evident in an editorial that Leung wrote for the National Post on October 18, 2011 and which still appears on the Canadian Citizenship and Immigration website called “From Taiwan’s shores to Canadian MP in one generation”.

The title of the article already alludes to the classic “immigrant story” wherein the immigrant protagonist escapes his backwards birthplace, pulls himself up by the bootstraps and perseveres in the new host nation, which has graciously opened its arms to him:

> There are few countries in the world that provide such opportunities. I count myself very fortunate. I was born in Taiwan. As many readers know, in the 1960s, Taiwan was becoming an "orphan state" – with many of the world’s nations having recognized the mainland People’s Republic of China instead. I was aware that I could soon become a stateless person should China decide to force unification with Taiwan…

> Many immigrants who come to Canada do so because we may have lost our sense of belonging in our home country – in some cases due to natural or manmade disasters. Canadian citizenship means having a new sense of belonging…

The morals of the story are of course that Canada is the quintessential safe haven for the world’s hapless and that because the protagonist has excelled in this supposed meritocratic new host nation, the futures of every immigrant who should find themselves facing adversity are determined by the individual alone. Stories such as this align with the neoliberal mythology where by their own will such figures escaped horror and by that same individual will they created a successful life in a new country. Leung’s personal immigrant story emphasizes his racial otherness in order to align his narrative with the experiences of all immigrants. Indeed, the category of immigrants, as referred to in Leung’s article, are implicitly racialized immigrants as the author illustrates them as evacuating homelands which are depicted as antithetical to his portrayal of Canada as a multicultural modern Western nation:

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116 Leung, Chungsen. 2011. “From Taiwan’s shores to Canadian MP (Member of Parliament), in one generation”. The National Post, October 11.

117 Ibid
Canadian citizenship means respect for many cultures. It means being open
minded to a variety of ways of thinking and how we could integrate them into a
unique Canadian culture…\textsuperscript{118}

Racial governance under the Harper Conservatives can indeed be summed up in Leung’s words:
Being open minded to cultural difference is the first step to integrating them into Canada. That is,
the government recognizes that multicultural groups must be folded into a Canadian
monoculture. Similarly, in his September 27, 2011 maiden speech, Leung elucidates a definition
of Canadian citizenship through the abstract liberal tenet of “freedom”:

When I became a Canadian citizen, over 35 years ago, I was moved by the words
of the Right Hon. John Diefenbaker in his definition of a “Canadian”. He said: I
am a Canadian, free to speak without fear, free to worship in my own way, free to
stand for what I think right, free to oppose what I believe wrong, or free to choose
those who shall govern my country. This heritage of freedom I pledge to uphold
for myself and all mankind”. These words from our former prime minister
describe the Canadian values that we all hold and that we all, in this place, must
defend.\textsuperscript{119}

Yet, we know this is not the lived experience of particular Canadians who have been cast as
racial threats to these freedoms. The abstract liberal values described here universalize and
rationalize the disciplinary state that thrives on the exclusion of racial others through their
inclusion. The ideal citizen-subject is not only expected to “integrate” into modernity and its
geopolitical space but also reproduce it – that is, conserve the conditions that will ensure
continued race-based dehumanization. This racialized immigrant responsibility – elucidated as
“participation,” “contribution” and “a chance to give back” - is stated clearly in Leung’s
conclusion to his \textit{National Post} editorial:

In Canada, we believe that immigrants have a positive influence in our society.
This simple yet powerful belief makes Canada stand out in the world. Newcomers
are given a much higher importance in Canada than many other countries.
Canadian citizenship pro-vides an opportunity to participate in our society in
many roles, including through the call to public service. It means that we as
Canadians can give back to the country that we have adopted. Canada has one of
the highest proportions of foreign-born legislators in the world. I am honoured to
fulfill this role and represent the constituents of Willowdale.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid
\textsuperscript{119} Leung, Chungsen. 2011. Statements. House of Commons Debates. 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 41\textsuperscript{st} Parliament. Volume 146,
\textsuperscript{120} Leung. 2011. “From Taiwan’s shores to Canadian MP”.
Here Leung reiterates comments made by Jaffer on May 18th, 2005: “Very few countries, as we know, would allow a family like mine to have their son serve in the federal Parliament. I think that says a remarkable thing about our country and our values”. The very presence of Asian conservatives is what makes Canada a categorically developed modern state. In an article published in Canadian Parliamentary Review, MP Tim Uppal states:

A free and democratic society is based on the premise that the citizen must be heard. Canada’s political history is a story of progressively giving citizens a greater voice in our political institutions… We have independent, free and fair elections; we have a free and healthy press; and we have strong oversight and regulation of money in our political process (2011, 1-2).

The sheer frequency and repetition of this (nearly exact) script in the written and oral statements of the Asian conservative MPs under the Harper Conservatives indicates how much the administration has undermined the tenets of democracy. According to Goldberg’s analysis of Mill’s racial rule: “The difference between a developed and undeveloped country, between those more or less civilized, was defined by Mill in terms of the country’s capacity to enable and promote representative self-government and individual self-development” (Goldberg 2002, 66). That is, the Canadian racial state cannot sustain itself without the promotion of liberal representative government. The measure of a modern state is determined by whether or not it recognizes and “accommodates” diversity. The very fact of Asian Canadian presence in parliament is meant to serve as testament to a raceless Canadian modernity. Thus it is necessary that Uppal points out,

The franchise is no longer defined by being a ‘Male British Subject, aged Twenty-one Years or upwards, being a Householder, as it was in 1867. Today, the franchise extends to all adult citizens of Canada... Distinctions based on gender, race, or property no longer serve as markers for the right to vote (2011, 2)

The premise that every “citizen must be heard” and that “multicultural communities are heard” centres on the notion that including those who were once excluded in the democratic process is the sign of modernity.

Elsewhere in Canadian Parliamentary Review, MP Devinder Shory not only recites his own immigrant story but also addresses what it means to represent “pluralistic constituencies” or diverse cultural communities in Canada; that is, he presents a blueprint of racial rule. He argues

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that “promoting an open, two-way dialogue” is at the heart of representing a pluralistic constituency. This dialogue, however, explicitly takes place with select representative individuals and groups. As Shory outlines: “This means engaging respective community leaders, attending community association meetings, taking part in community events” (2011a, 2–3). This means that the state is able to ignore those voices that may present dissenting positions and consult exclusively with individuals and groups that will support its approaches to policy that will affect entire populations. Moreover, stating that “we must aim to unite and not divide” pre-empts critique of the state as that which divides the nation. The notion of dialogue “between converging interests” also depoliticizes the political terrain by presuming that a neutral political terrain already exists. The notion of dialogue, like the notion of race relations, presumes a power neutral terrain thereby eluding brutalities of racism. In Shory’s guidelines, there is no indication beyond stating that “Canada opens her arms to those who work hard and play by the rules” as to how Canada contributes to this “two-way dialogue”. In contrast, the article outlines many guidelines for “newcomers,” first and foremost, that it is vitally important for them to integrate. Shory insists that it is “the newcomers' obligation to strive to be a part of society--to wholeheartedly accepting Canadian values” (Shory 2011b, 9). Without qualifying in structural terms what it means that Canada opens her arms to newcomers, this message suggests that Canada has already done its part -- the onus is now on the “newcomers” to integrate. In this blueprint of conservative racial rule, Shory uses “pluralism” as a trope to remake Canada’s histories of governance over Indigenous populations and racialized immigrant populations. Historical and contemporary violent race-based rule is reduced to a “pragmatic and practical” Canadian grappling with diversity “be it between British and French settlers, or Europeans and First Nations peoples. Even though the pluralism of yesterday does not look exactly like the pluralism of today, the goal is the same--to knit newcomers into the fabric of Canadian society and build bridges between immigrants and settled Canadians” (Shory 2011b, 8). In one short article, the MP attempts to collapse varied but related experiences of state violence and also disavow histories of state violence as a way to delegitimize contemporary critiques of the settler colonial racial state. To equate relations between British and French white settlers with European colonization of Turtle Island as similar instances of “converging interests” that were resolved through “two-way dialogue” is not just a reductive historicization, it is a deliberate and concise political move. That “free institutions and tolerance are the hallmarks of parliamentary
democracies, and part of our British Commonwealth heritage,” or that Canada has always been
free and tolerant at once insists that we have come so far yet we have not moved at all.

In her examination of Korean immigrant entrepreneurship, American sociologist Tamara
Nopper (2011) has challenged the myth of imported immigrant success, which she argues does
nothing to dismantle the inequitable social order. Nopper has examined how the sociology of
ethnicity as a study of successful immigrant integration has employed notions of “ethnic enclave
economy,” “network hiring,” “social capital,” and the “disadvantage thesis” to explain why
certain immigrants have higher employment rates and have achieved success as entrepreneurs
than others (Nopper 2006, 2010, 2011). Elsewhere, Nopper suggests:

Although whites continue to own an overwhelming number of businesses
including those with employees (Office of Advocacy 2007: 5) and receive the
lion’s share of SBA loans (US Small Business Administration, 2008), the
growing economic disparity among people of color deserves attention […] While
continuing to lag behind whites when it comes to important aspects of business
ownership, Asian Americans and Latinos are nevertheless surpassing African
Americans on this scores, a process that may indicate what Bonilla-Silva (2003s:
272) describes as the state’s effort to incorporate ‘safe minorities’ to ‘signify the
nonracialism of the polity’ (Nopper 2011, 666).

This research shows how relying on notions of immigrant virtues and values not only detracts
away from a substantial critique of racial capitalism that has always disproportionately affected
Black Americans but that it also amounts to what she calls “new” color-blind racism and what
Jared Sexton has called “people-of-color-blind racism” (Sexton 2010).

Nopper’s research suggests, “As an explanation for Korean immigrants’ concentration in
entrepreneurship, the disadvantage theory reinforces cultural tropes it was purported to replace.
Although drawing attention to the difficulties that communities face in various sectors of the
economy, the disadvantage theory ultimately focuses on group characteristics as the major
determinant for mediating their disadvantages… it is this emphasis on group characteristics that
requires the deployment of colorblind racial ideology” (Nopper 2010a, 82 emphasis added).

What Nopper’s research finds problematic is this tendency to associate particular behaviours and
psychologies to cultural groups as a way to explain economic disparities. Thus, the racial logic or
the neoliberal rationality that associates Asian immigrants with “cultural and social capacity to
adapt to a competitive and hostile environment” (Nopper 2010b, 911) simultaneously can be
lodged against Black Americans as psychologically and behaviourally incapable of entering into
modernity. As such, the disadvantage thesis works to reproduce hegemonic ideologies about
The statements offered by Uppal, Shory and Leung leave unchallenged the question of “inclusion into what?” As Goldberg insists, “It leaves unquestioned the prevailing assumption of institutional and structural homogeneity, and the accompanying codification of existing racial powers and frames of reference” (2002, 254-5). Put in another way, the “story of diversity thus becomes a story of diversity's inclusion into the terms of an institution” (Ahmed 2012, 9). In this paradigm, Canada’s reputation, defined by its treatment of “newcomers” is meant to reimagine the state as exceptionally race-tolerant. Moreover, the nation is constituted through its juxtaposition with “other countries,” implicitly those countries from which “immigrants” have escaped. By gesturing to the “fact” that Canada is a space wherein everyone is already free to speak and worship as they choose – a fact made irrefutable, then the very claims that identify human rights violations and race-based violence that constitute the modern nation state (and its limits), instead become targeted as racist and thus un-Canadian.

Finally, Leung specifically identifies the proportion of “foreign-born” legislators as a marker of the (Conservative) Canadian government’s exceptionality on the world stage. In fact, this myth of multicultural exceptionality is so entrenched in Canada’s imagination of itself that Leung does not find it necessary to substantiate his bold claim. The racial conservatives specifically claim that it is the Conservative, not Liberal, government that has been able to achieve a more representative proportion of visible minority MPs. This argument is stated explicitly by MP Michael Chong (Halton Hills, ON) on April 30th, 2007:

If we look at the Liberal Party in Toronto, a city that is over 50% visible minorities today, and we look at the number of seats in the city of Toronto, roughly about 21 or 22 seats, the Liberals hold all but three seats, Trinity--Spadina, Parkdale--High Park and Toronto--Danforth, yet among their members from the Toronto caucus, I count one member of a visible minority. The party likes to talk large about its record on minorities, but its record speaks otherwise. The other thing I point out is that in the previous Liberal government, if we looked at the members of the cabinet who sat on the frontbench of that party, I did not count any visible minorities.

By arguing that they represent the needs and values of “multicultural groups,” the CPC message is as clear as it is strategic: the voice of the new Conservative Party - via the Asian MP narratives - is the voice of new Canadians. Immigrant-by-the-bootstrap stories like the one offered by Leung thus become integral to mobilizing the Conservative party’s racial project. The collective archive of Asian Conservative MP appointments, activities and statements demonstrate clearly
that these MPs are not only appointed to be committed to the voices of Canada’s “multicultural communities” – a category made interchangeable with “immigrants,” “newcomers,” “new Canadians,” and “visible minorities” – but also that they necessarily become the voice of these groups by turning up when race turns up.

As established in chapter 4, the CPC racial realignment was meant to distance itself from Reform/Alliance’s reputation and to capitalize on Canada’s multicultural brand without having to compromise the party’s historical race project. Thus, it is possible and necessary in this context to use “diversity” discourse, which has already largely been evacuated of antiracist possibilities in the mainstream political realm to further depoliticize race. In other words, not only is it possible to say the right things without having to make further commitments to race; it has become necessary to say the right things in order to execute racist commitments. It is thus not surprising that racial conservative MPs, the Minister of Citizenship and even the Prime Minister would make use of race words in speeches. Rather than laud the appearance of race-related words in Hansard as evidence of race-consciousness, what is more important for us to understand is how these words have been mobilized and whether or not they have actually been mobilized in feminist and race-critical ways.

Assuredly, one or more of the MPs will speak on Lunar New Year, Asian Heritage month, Ramadan, Eid, Vaisaki, Diwali, and even Black History Month always with a reminder of the “many contributions” of Chinese, Muslim, Sikh Canadians in making Canada strong (militarization) and prosperous (capitalization). We can be sure that Obhrai will host a Diwali party on behalf of indo-Canadians – now an annual event on Parliament Hill. Gurmant Grewal hosted celebrations for Vaisaki and Jaffer always mentioned Eid on behalf of the official opposition, traditions that go back to the days of Reform. Without exception, one or more of the MPs remind the House on Canadian Multiculturalism Day and the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of their party’s recognition of the contributions that “cultural communities have made to the enrichment of our heritage” (Obhrai 2005). The MPs remind Canadians that these occasions are also opportunities to “remember the difficulties and discrimination they have endured” and “to appreciate all that multiculturalism brings to this great nation and to remember that our diversity is an asset” (G. Grewal 2005). These are also

opportune days where a member may make a statement, always stated on behalf of the Conservatives, that by introducing the Multiculturalism Act in 1988, it is the Conservative party, not the Liberals, that is “committed to breaking down barriers and promoting understanding so all Canadians can enjoy the richness that our nation affords” (Obhrai 2005). Such statements illustrate how parliament becomes thought of as diverse when these racialized others arrive.

By making culture the terrain on which race is brought up, the language of diversity is used to recentre whiteness. For example, on March 18, 2010, Alice Wong describes a peace and harmony forum she attended as the parliamentary secretary for multiculturalism where participants “sang and recited scriptures from the Bible, chapters from the Koran, quotes from Confucius… This is the mosaic we proudly present to the world… The government recognizes the importance of new immigrants to Canada. We are committed to a system that will provide the best opportunities for newcomers to succeed, while protecting the interest of all Canadian citizens” (Wong 2010). It is extremely important that Wong include the last part of this statement. This example reveals how ultimately diversity is only tolerable insofar as the supposedly racially unmarked norm, that is, the “interest of all Canadian citizens” – “ordinary Canadians” – is protected and preserved. In another example of how whiteness becomes recentred through the language of diversity involves the Asian MPs’ annual statements about Christmas. For example on December 9, 2009, MP Uppal’s office released the following message:

I am sure the last thing you expected was to read a column from a turbaned Sikh on the meaning of Christmas…We sing our national anthem with the words "God keep our land glorious and free..." We are also a multicultural society…So why is it that now, when we have more national awareness and celebration wishes from department store flyers and television ads to government officials during Diwali, Eid, Hannukah, and Vaisakhi, that on the other hand there is more resistance to say Merry Christmas, and instead people say happy holidays?

Similarly, in 2002, Gurmant Grewal lamented that the spirit of the season has been bruised by unnecessary political correctness. He stated, “I am a non-Christian and a visible minority. I am

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not in any way offended when Christians celebrate Christmas”.\textsuperscript{127} Seven years later, Nina Grewal repeated, “I am a Sikh and I am not offended when Christians celebrate Christmas”.\textsuperscript{128} Then in 2010, Nina Grewal again stated, “Let us not strip Christians of their identity”.\textsuperscript{129} Evacuating any analysis of systemic racism, the Asian MPs frame Christmas is simply another identity marker and faith rather than the racially unmarked norm that centres whiteness as Canadianness.

As members and vice-chairs of the standing committee on citizenship and immigration and as parliamentary secretaries of multiculturalism, the majority of the subjects in this study have frequently appeared at public events with former Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney. After all, it is apt that the bodies officially representing the ethnic outreach minister are made visible minorities. For instance, as part of their official duties as parliamentary secretaries of multiculturalism, Wong and Uppal were asked to represent and accompany Minister Kenney at events, sign immigration agreements between the federal government and provinces, and hold consultations and roundtables with Kenney and “various groups”, as well as represent Canada in conferences abroad. Part of this role includes travel across Canada as well as internationally, particularly to Asia, often in the company of the Prime Minister and/or senior Cabinet Ministers. In a June 2010 press release, Wong stated, “Tolerance and non-discrimination are cornerstones in Canada’s multiculturalism policy. The promotion of mutual respect and understanding through inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue are two important aspects of living in a multicultural society like Canada” (Wong 2010).\textsuperscript{130} Thus, multiculturalism appointments deal also with reproducing the mythology that “to be Canadian is to show the world that people drawn from every nation can live in harmony” - not an actual commitment to people but rather to the appearance of commitment to “newcomers”.

Asian MP statements demonstrate that these occasions are opportunities to highlight Canada’s growing economic relationships with Asian nations even suggesting that these strong ties are naturally resultant of “our great country having more than one million Canadians of

\begin{footnotes}
Chinese Vietnamese or Korean descent” (Wong 2011). For the Asian MPs like Jaffer, Asian Heritage Month is a time to remind the House of the value of Asia and Asians to Canada: “Last year Canada imported $53 billion worth of goods from Asia and we exported over $20 billion worth of goods there. Some 1.3 billion Asian tourists visit us every year and over 39,000 study here at universities and colleges. Three million Canadians are of Asian origin and that is 10% of our population” (Jaffer 2003). Indeed, difference remains in the service of the greater task of economic development.

Often, the parliamentary secretaries are asked by the Immigration Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to attend citizenship ceremonies, speak to Asia/Canada relations, and hold consultations with community (seniors, veterans, immigrants, business owners) groups. As an example, in a March 2011 press release, “Grewal Attends Roundtable with immigration Minister Jason Kenney,” Nina Grewal states “Today’s meeting was a great opportunity to meet with community members and to hear their concerns first-hand. It was also a chance for me to offer my suggestions on how we can proceed to protect the integrity of our immigration system while at the same time offering the right services to help those interested in immigrating and investing in our great country”. First of all, attending the roundtable were predominantly members of the Pakistani Canada Cultural Association and thus, when Grewal refers to “community,” it is suggested that members of this particular group effectively represents Pakistani Canadians. The press release continues to state that attendees raised concerns regarding textile trade between Canada and Pakistan: “Suggestions were made to the minister that a better trade relationship would be beneficial to Canada and Pakistan. Minister Kenney and Nina provided responses that in the past 10 years the trade has expanded rapidly, rising to over $650 million in 2009…”. Whether or not there were other concerns brought forward by attendees of the roundtable is unstated. Despite references to “community” in her statement above and in Minister Kenney’s and MP Grewal’s response to the “community”, the integrity of Canada’s immigration system is effectively reduced to economic terms by narrowing in solely on trade and

134 Ibid
investment. A roundtable ostensibly on immigration does not actually talk about immigrants but rather is turned into a roundtable about Canada’s economic relationships with Asia.

We notice also that the Minister and MP respond to “community” suggestions by re-stating already existing trade relationships and trends. There is no evidence that the consultations with the “community” in this case have actually influenced the plans of the Minister and MP moving forward. As such this case demonstrates Ahmed’s theory in diversity that "consultation can thus be a technology of inclusion” wherein “others” are included as a way to legitimize already existing structures “whether or not their views are actually included” (Ahmed 2012, 94 emphasis in original). In this way, the plethora of consultations with “community groups” examined here remain but an “organizational ideal” or a way to appear inclusive without having to commit to equitable outcomes.

Only a few months later in Ottawa, MP Parm Gill (Brampton-Springdale) and MP Bal Gosal (Bramalea-Gore-Malton) accompanied Ed Fast, Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway in a roundtable discussion with Indo Canadian business leaders to discuss the government’s progress in forging closer economic ties between India and Canada. In a news release, Gill makes clear that increasing economic relations with India are an integral part of Canada’s economic recovery plan. He stated “Our Government understands the importance of a strong economic relationship between India and Canada in regards to our domestic recovery and stability”.135 In fairly abstract neoliberal terms, Gill’s office states, “Canada’s investments and trade agreements with India can help create more domestic jobs and directly contribute to Canada’s economic success”.136 Beyond these two roundtables, the Harper Conservative archive shows that citizenship and immigration issues as well as foreign affairs, particularly with relation to Asian countries become narrated as Asian Canadian issues and are generally and acceptably understood and debated in economic terms: arguably an inheritance from Canada’s original approach to Asian immigrants and immigration to Canada as described in chapter 1 as at once economically desirable and potentially duplicitous.

What is most interesting in this case is the title of the press release “MPs forge ties with India”. While Ed Fast held the title of Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, it is Gill and Gosal, two South Asian MPs who are featured and quoted as the
MP’s forging the ties with India. The liberal ideals of representation would have us believe that the physical arrival and statements of these Asian MPs’ guarantee that “minority interests” are actually represented. Such are the ‘politics with guarantees’ that have enabled the state to declare itself “raceless”. Already embodying diversity by providing “an institution of whiteness with color” (Ahmed 2012, 4) means that the politician of colour becomes enough. That is, the deterministic assumption that minority politicians necessarily work in the interests of minority groups - that race will take us to our politics – has become folded into the Conservative racial project.

Many Asian conservative MPs have been and continue to hold inter-parliamentary committee memberships including China, India, the US, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Several of the MPs are also members of up to a dozen parliamentary associations and friendship groups. For example Obhrai is the founding president of the Canada-India Parliamentary Friendship Group dedicated to further strengthening Canada’s relations with India. In recognition of his “many contributions to the Indo-Canadian community” and for the role he has played in strengthening ties between Canada and South Asia, Obhrai has been honoured by the Indo-Canadian Chamber of Commerce of the Ottawa Business Council and the National Indo-Canadian Council. Along with becoming the voice of “multicultural communities” in Canada, it is evident that a significant part of Asian MP duties is to participate in broadly conceived Canadian interests in Asia. Narratives seamlessly and unproblematically tie issues affecting Asian Canadians with Canadian economic interests in Asia. For instance, on September 30th 2010, parliamentary secretary of multiculturalism Alice Wong spoke to China-Canada relations:

Our ties are strong in business and education and in cultural exchanges…China is our second largest source of imports and our third largest source of exports. Today over 1.3 million Canadian residents are of Chinese origin and form one of the largest groups within Canada's multicultural mosaic. Chinese is now Canada's third most spoken language after English and French.137

Similarly, in a November 17, 2010 statement, Parliamentary Secretary of Foreign Affairs Obhrai stated:

Canada is on the threshold of a new partnership with India. Yesterday, the Minister of International Trade launched free trade negotiations with India, one of

the world's fastest growing markets. Enhancing and securing trade opportunities for Canadian businesses is a key initiative for our government... I have long promoted stronger ties and better trade relations with India. We must capitalize on our common ties and the large and thriving Indian community in Canada to create new jobs and new opportunities. In this capacity, the racial conservatives claim the authority to speak deterministically about not only Asians in Canada but racialized populations all over the world; authority that they use to impact policy and legislation. Additionally, the mere fact of the Asian MPs’ race comes to signify the Conservative government’s supposed commitment to diversity, an image that the state needs to cultivate. As covered in Chapter 1, Canada’s perceived treatment of Asians in Canada has always been predicated on the country’s imperial interests in Asia and thus its need to prove their inclusivity of racial others to the world. Part of this strategy was to not only finally extend franchise to Asian groups but to ensure that a few racial others take up seats as members of parliament. The point of departure is that laws were forced to change at that time while laws today no longer need to change. It becomes enough that the Asian conservative MPs turn up. Racelessness sustains the racial state.

By embodying diversity in the House, Conservative Asian MP stories of success, become the story of a rebranded Conservative party even arguing that it is party that is “really working for immigrants”. Racial conservatives wish to speak, not as ethnic minorities but as individuals. However, “they are constantly forced to concede that the power of their critiques relies heavily on their socially constructed identities, despite the novelty of their political identities as conservatives” (Dillard 2001, 14). They speak not only as conservatives but, more important, as conservative Asians. As they speak from essentialist positions of authority, they assert that they are more representative of ethnic communities than their liberal counterparts. What this “position of authority” does is allow white conservatives to preface racist and sexist remarks with the phrase “as Bev Oda says…” or “as Rahim Jaffer says…”. Asian conservative MPs’ parliamentary contributions include a common set of discursive maneuvers:

A) We are a country of immigrants/ as an immigrant to this country, I know first-hand…

B) Canada is a humanitarian and compassionate nation unique among nations. Canada’s diversity is our strength and source of pride. Everyone wants to come here for a better life.

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C) The Conservative government recognizes this diversity and the contributions of newcomers and has implemented strategies (policies/programs) to bring only the best to grow our prosperity “for all Canadians”
D) On the flip side, the government also recognizes the “severity of those who abuse our hospitality” thus we must combat immigration fraud.

The racial conservative not only serves as official representative figures mediating their ethnic communities and state-level governments, but they also expand the boundaries of the sayable and sanctionable as somehow more legitimate and authoritative voices on matters of race-related issues. Thus, in race-related political debates, the racial conservative has been emplaced in positions of legislative and executive authority. Secondly, their racial emplacement in these positions of authority functions, as supposed evidence that race is no longer a matter. The paradox here is that the racial conservative as a racialized figure is absolutely necessary to the legitimation of racism, and underlying all of these is to insidiously embed the notion that race no longer matters. The state recognizes that it must govern but also that that governance needs to make its people feel good about themselves. In the statements examined in this chapter, it becomes clear that pluralism refers not to political nor cultural diversity. Canadians want to hear from racial others that affirm the goodness of the state and not from those that continue to be disavowed. Asian conservative MPs authorize a language of racism that white politicians can no longer accomplish alone. These MPs do not invent but rather newly justify existing racial logics.

I want to emphasize that multiculturalism discourse has given rise to the ideal multicultural subject as necessarily a narrowly imagined Asian Conservative subject. It is clear that power arrangements under the Harper Conservatives have left very little space for the advocate of colour. For Reed, the privileging of elite-brokerage politics has limited the “range of claims on the policy agenda” as well as “the boundaries of the politically reasonable” and thus preserves the existing regime of power and hierarchy (Reed Jr. 1999, 121). As theorized by Reed, political incorporation has been a source of demobilization as it facilitates the narrowing of the place where racialized political officials can stand on the contemporary political terrain; that is, the narrow range of admissible political performances does not include the performance of advocacy. Moreover, Asian Conservative elites give the impression that Asians are a singular and homogenous class where all Asians are upwardly mobile, bootstrap-immigrant sell-outs eager to exploit the racial hierarchy. Here, I want to emphasize that it is a particular kind of
Asian – as the upwardly mobile, bootstrap-immigrant elite - that has been necessary to the new regime of racial management.

Conclusion

By analyzing the parliamentary statements and special appointments of the fifteen Asian conservative MPs elected since 1997, this chapter has shown how racial conservatives have shaped national racial discourse. Special appointments have allowed racial conservatives to speak expertly and with authority on what scholars call “ethnic related issues,” including citizenship and immigration, identity, and multiculturalism. Integral to such speech have been personal and familial immigrant-by-the-bootstraps stories told with emphasis on racial, ethnic, gender, and religious difference wherein the MPs become the conservative party’s race appeal. Conservative Asian MPs become not only representatives of their party and the federal government, but also speak on behalf of their racial and ethnic communities in Canada and abroad. The personal and familial immigrant stories of Asian MPs that emphasize their racial, ethnic, and religious identity or “experience” are circulated as part of an official narrative about the Conservative party. Beyond rebranding the Conservative party, the parliamentary contributions of Asian conservative MPs points to persistent inequities behind this image. Evaluating the content of conservative Asian MP statements reveals that the frequency of race-related interventions does not necessarily correlate with a feminist or race-based consciousness.

This chapter has begun to show that race has not only been a factor in the Conservative Party’s recruitment of candidates of colour but that racial expertise also becomes central in Asian MP parliamentary contributions and that this contribution is grounded in the MP’s narration of themselves as racially other than “ordinary Canadians”. And yet, Asian MPs have argued the Conservative colourblind position that race does not and should not factor into understanding oneself as Canadian. That is, even if a visible minority MP desires only to be thought of at all times as a Canadian – they are forced to reckon with the larger Conservative racial project and take on the role of native informant, even if reluctantly. Building on this, the following chapters demonstrate how the CPC has re-branded their image as inclusive of once-excluded racial others through apologies for historically anti-Asian regulations in Canada. Canada is portrayed as a country without racism, a model of tolerance. Racelessness sustains the racial state.
This chapter has explored how Conservatives oppose overt discrimination but resist confronting enduring white privilege. Indeed, the neoliberal racial project reifies institutionalized racial inequality so that they appear above or outside history as natural and or inevitable, invents a homogeneous national unity over and above political diversity, and constructs racialized enemies as scapegoats for political discontents. Moreover, the state mystifies complex structures of inequity by blaming victims of racism for their own subordinate social location. It is evident already that minority MP contributions to ethnic-related issues do not necessarily work in the “interests” of minority groups. The paradigm within which non-western non-white populations are imagined as inferior to the West is not only sustained, it is augmented and justified by the Asian MPs. That is, through race-based appeals, racial conservative scripts authorize the conservation of global racial hierarchies in the production of flexible new race regimes wherein Canada remains racially innocent, even benevolent. The next chapter will continue to explore how Asian Conservative parliamentary scripts have contributed to the production of discourses and subjects of racial rule.
Chapter 6:

“That’s why I’m a Conservative”: Discourses and Subjects of Apology

When we sat down to listen to the acknowledgement, we were still in the unredressed state; when we stood up and clapped for the prime minister’s statement, we became different subjects.  
- Roy Miki

Scene: Wearing a blue jumper over a white-collared shirt, a South Asian woman looks at a photo-montage on a home projector including archival photographs of the Komagata Maru incident. She shakes her head in discontent and laments, “For over 100 years Indo-Canadians have worked hard to build Canada. Things haven’t always been fair for us”. Sipping from a mug, the woman looks on at two photos of Prime Minister Harper delivering a speech and then adorned in traditional clothing. Seemingly comforted by these images she continues, “But the Conservatives have always recognized our history and our community’s sacrifice. The conservatives fight for our values: belief in hard work, respect for tradition and the importance of family”. At this point, the camera shifts focus from the woman and onto a family photo of her with her husband and two sons. As the commercial ends, a banner appears below the speaker indicating that she is Nina Grewal, indeed the Member of Parliament of Fleetwood-Port Kells, BC and to her right appears the CPC slogan “Here for Canada”. She ends, “That’s why I’m a conservative. Isn’t it time to vote our values?” This commercial entitled “Nina-South Asian” is one of four versions of a CPC political advertisement aired specifically during ethnic television programming as part of the Conservative “Breaking Through” campaign leading up to the 2011 federal election. Tim Uppal, MP for Edmonton-Sherwood Park, AB appeared in a near identical version of this commercial. In Uppal’s version, he speaks in both Punjabi and English: “For more than a hundred years, our (people) also worked very hard to make Canada strong. It was not always easy for our community.” Photos of Harper wearing a head covering in front of the Sikh Golden Temple accompany this version. Uppal then extols Harper’s promotion of business and immigration ties. In a third ad, Taiwanese-Canadian Harry Tsai, an unsuccessful candidate who ran in Scarborough-Agincourt, ON, makes his appeals in Mandarin while archival images of Chinese railway workers appear in his slideshow. In a fourth version of the advertisement, Alice Wong, Richmond, BC delivers the commercial’s message in Cantonese thus rounding out the target ethnic groups outlined in the leaked Conservative ethnic media campaign.

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All versions of this political advertisement were quickly pulled from television and YouTube when it was reported that the CPC had used stills from Ali Kazimi’s 2004 film, *Continuous Journey*, without his permission. Kazimi was reportedly baffled as to why the CPC would choose to use images depicting the Komagata Maru incident, “one of the lowest moments” in Canada’s relationship with South Asian immigrants in their campaign ads (Allen 2011).\(^{140}\) Exactly why would a party that historically participated in establishing the Continuous Journey order-in-council as well as other anti-Asian regulations choose to use these histories as part of their campaign to woo ethnic voters?\(^{141}\) This chapter demonstrates how such a public reference to the Komagata Maru and other “low moments” of Canadian history used in CPC race-based appeals are not baffling at all but rather are vital to the party’s manufacture of its innocence and integral to its broader racial project. Each version of this political advertisement features an Asian conservative MP candidate and each tells a particular Conservative national story. The 2011 CPC campaign ads refer to particular histories that are framed as containable and repairable and which manufacture the conservative party’s innocence. They reflect the aftermath of state redress, the workings of discourses of apology and the making of states and subjects transformed by these discourses.

In the previous chapters, I have shown how despite their persistent disavowals, the Harper Conservatives have methodically executed a campaign to rebrand the party’s explicitly racist reputation. The CPC rebranding campaign entailed manufacturing an image of CPC that would displace the Liberals as the reputed champion of minority interests under the third-party system. Chapter 5 explored how Asian conservative MPs have become integral to racial rule in their parliamentary appointments. This chapter showed that the very existence of Asian parliamentarians has been used to argue that race is no longer relevant in parliament and that state multiculturalism is divisive; arguments now impossible to make without Asian conservatives. Chapter 6 explores how racial rule is reproduced in state discourses of apology. Race is made further irrelevant through depicting injustices as resolved in an effort to isolate and contain racism as an aberration of days gone by rather than as a paradigm that continues to orient


\(^{141}\) CPC, the most recent incarnation of Canada’s conservative party, has both associated and dissociated itself with the Progressive Conservative party. While technically, the party may argue that they formed in 2003 and thus did not participate in specific cases of historic anti-Asian regulation, the CPC is a merger of PC and Canadian Alliance, thus unable to absolve itself of being complicit in Canada’s anti-Asian legacies.
the state. In effect, this chapter continues to track elusions of state violence in the context of official apologies. Without discounting the significance of redress for populations that have been wronged, redress can also be wielded by the state as it envisions its various capacities to govern different racial populations. These state practices and discourses complexly and unevenly produce both political possibilities and impossibilities moving forward. This chapter examines the CPC’s official apologies for the Chinese Canadian Head Tax and exclusions (2006) and the Komagata Maru incident (2008) as part of discourses that produce Chinese and South Asian racial subjects as populations that ostensibly persevered despite racism thereby disciplining all wronged populations and their (im)possible political relations with the state. The apologies form part of a dominant discourse wherein Asian Canadians (Chinese and South Asian) are cast as those that persevered despite racism; “vibrant, despite”. These subjects become part of national history by demonstrating that they were able to get over racism and so should everyone; the inclusion of Asian conservatives pre-empts dissent from groups that were not selected for redress – for whom it would be more challenging to evade institutional change as part of redress.

None of this is to suggest that activist struggles for apology and recognition are necessarily futile or misguided. To borrow from Gayatri Spivak (2007), redress - like rights – is something we cannot not want. Complexities around the paradoxes of redress, like the paradoxes of rights (Spivak 2007) involves tension between material urgencies for political recognition and an awareness of liberalism’s concealment of inequities through its promises of freedom and equality. With regards to Japanese-Canadian redress, Roy Miki has observed that in mounting a redress movement, Japanese Canadians “had to remake themselves as ‘proper’ citizens of the nation, citizens whose voices could not be denied because they were ‘of’ that nation. Some people might be very critical of this, describing this remaking in words like "compromise" and "complicity" (Beauregard 2009, 4). Like Miki, I am less interested in isolating individuals or groups for navigating narrowed pathways to secure personhood. What is more productive is to trace how the racial state remakes itself by envisioning new capacities for governing various populations. In these capacities, state-sanctioned exclusionary practices are assembled through discourses of inclusion and apology.

Roy Miki has explored what it means to go from a state of un-redress to the redressed state. He found that redress transforms wronged people into redressed subjects and transforms the perpetrator of wrongdoing into an apologizer who may be redeemed. With reference to
Foucault, Mackey has suggested that apology, like confession is a “ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it; it exonerates, redeems and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation” (Foucault 1978, 61-2 in Mackey 2013, 49). Miki has observed that anti-Asian racism and histories of grassroots community organizing became absorbed into the official history of Canada – a state mediated and managed history – the presentation of a resolution to groups that have been wronged by government policies: “So redress, from that moment, is born as a discourse. We may no longer have control over where that discourse is going to go or how we are going to be framed in it. And we will no longer be able to complain that we are unredressed” (Beauregard 2009, 2). This is to say that discourses of state redress often involve manufacturing an official singular narrative at the expense of contesting representations and narratives of racial experience and struggle. Scholars have observed how “Control over representations of the nation’s past is as critical to maintaining legitimacy and moral authority as is control over its present” (Thobani 2007, 152). Indeed, central to modern state formation according to Goldberg is “guilt-shedding displacement from historical racial definition and conditions” (2002, 234). Thus, considering that the possibilities for redress have emerged in the House on numerous occasions in the past, we must examine the socio-political context that required state apologies. For instance, Winter has observed that “both the Japanese and Chinese redress claims were eventually accepted by politicians seeking electoral advantage” (Winter 2008, 137). Citing Letitia Hickson, Mackey argues that apology is “essentially a political act… a way in which one can secure one’s own interests... Apologizers, therefore, apologize out of their own interest, and this is why it is important to explore what apologizers receive by apologizing” (Mackey 2013, 48-49). The apologies examined in this chapter displace responsibility for anti-Asian policies onto past Liberal governments as an attempt to disassociate the apologizing conservative government from governments that enacting “real racism”. Grewal, Uppal, and Wong are also subjects of apology discourse; they are needed in staging these apology events, as much as they are needed in the Breaking Through political advertisements.

This chapter thus explores Mackey’s questions about state redress: “What is an apology? What does it do?” (2013, 47). My examination of the official apologies for past anti-Asian policies focuses on the prime minister’s apologies, the staging of the apologies, as well as Asian
conservative MP narratives and involvement with bringing about the apologies in the House: How they frame past anti-Asian regulations, their case for or against apology, and how they conceptualize what the apologies signify. Moreover, building on chapter 5, I trace how the Asian MPs mobilize concepts like race, racism, diversity, multiculturalism and Canadian identity and how these work to constitute Canada’s exceptionality and CPC’s innocence in the context of apology discourse. My focus here is to explore how Asian conservative parliamentary statements regarding apology affirms the racial state and displaces more critical voices in order to reproduce the story of a “good” Canadian state that initiated consultations with community and by their own good will, delivered apologies. While Harper’s apology for Chinese exclusion took place in the House in an official capacity, his apology for the Komagata Maru was not official per se as it took place in Bear Creek Park, Surrey, British Columbia. This particular apology event included speeches from Minister Kenney, endearingly known as the apology minister as well as MP Nina Grewal, which demand attention.

**Contain and Neutralize: Chinese Canadian Exclusion**

Bill C-333, the Chinese Canadian Recognition and Restitution Act, was tabled at least three times in the House before it was finally passed in 2006. Previously, as immigration critic, Inky Mark had presented his private members bill and petitions calling for redress numerous times as a Reform, Canadian Alliance, and Independent MP. Largely ignored by the Conservative party before, MP Mark’s private members bill on the apology for Chinese Canadian exclusion suddenly became an integral part of the 2006 federal elections. Prior to the Martin Liberal governments 2005 Acknowledgement, Commemoration, and Education Program (ACE), the Liberals had been steadfastly opposed to state apology. Newly demoted to a minority government in 2004, the Liberal ACE program adopted significant parts of MP Mark’s private members bill. By 2004, the Conservatives began to support MP Mark and after winning its first minority government in 2006, the Harper Conservatives established their own version of ACE, the Community Historical Recognition Program (CHRP). Ironically, only five years prior, Asian conservative MPs were criticizing the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties for making promises to apologize for past injustices as political ploys. As an example, on October 23, 2001, Canadian Alliance MP Gurmant Grewal argued, “Promises for apologies and recognition have
been used to buy political votes”.

The promise to apologize played a major part in the CPC win that year when it won its first minority government. In the 2006 federal election, Toronto and Vancouver remained Liberal but by 2008, the Liberal incumbent Raymond Chan was defeated by CPC MP Alice Wong. The apology - as part of the CPC’s larger race-based strategies - played no small part in unseating the Liberal incumbent in Richmond and elsewhere.

The CCHT debate in the House goes back decades. On September 29, 1997 Inky Mark delivered his maiden speech in the House as the Reform party representative for Dauphin-Swan River, the only racial conservative to hail from Manitoba. In his statements, Mark began speaking about his experiences as “a third generation immigrant to Canada”. But five days before his Maiden speech, Mark gave a statement in the House to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Chinese Canadian exclusion repeal. In his statements, Mark singles out the King Liberals for imposing the head tax and the 1923 exclusion act. By pinning the exclusionary legislation on the Liberals exclusively, Mark’s statements suggest that the Conservatives were not complicit in legislating or even sustaining anti-Asian racism. Mark’s statements insinuate that the conservatives were de facto innocent in the historic racism leveled against Chinese Canadians especially because he now stands in the House as a Reform party representative. In 2002, Mark introduced Bill C-333 and challenged the Liberal government to “do the right thing” to no avail. Finally, on November 15th, 2004, only a few months after being elected, MP Bev Oda moved to re-introduce Bill-C33, an act to recognize the injustices done to Chinese immigrants by head taxes and exclusion legislation, to provide for recognition of the extraordinary contribution they made to Canada, and for redress and to promote education on Chinese Canadian history and the promotion of racial harmony. In her statements, Oda invoked her Japanese-Canadian identity as an entry point into addressing the “historical injustice done to Chinese immigrants”:

As a Japanese-Canadian, I remember the efforts of my father and the Japanese community to achieve the Japanese-Canadian redress agreement in the 1980s. I would not be fulfilling my father's legacy if I did not demand the same redress for the Chinese-Canadian community. I recognize the significance this bill would have within the Chinese-Canadian community. It would allow Canada to truly

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move ahead with pride in its declaration as a truly multicultural country.\textsuperscript{145}

Oda’s statements frame redress as a significant part of re-imaging Canada’s reputation “as a truly multicultural country”. Her support for the bill does not make note of systemic anti-Asian regulations that affected both Japanese and Chinese i.e. the 1901 Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration (Price 2011, 18). Absent, also, is what redress means for wronged communities. While Asian MP statements leading up to redress certainly detail the pain and suffering of Asian groups targeted by racist legislation – more so than the prime minister’s apologies - these Asian conservative scripts emphasize Canada’s ability to “move forward” by way of these apologies. This notion of “moving forward” as a nation as well as characterizing Harper and the CPC as exceptional is clearly a predominant part of the Asian MP statements leading up to the redress and continues to feature in their statements years after redress.

Moreover, MP Oda problematically misrepresents that the terms of redress for Japanese Canadians in 1988 are the same as the terms of redress for Chinese Canadians. This is to say that Japanese Canadian resistance and redress produced results in 1988 that depart from the Harper Conservatives’ apologies in 2006 and 2008 (Kobayashi 1992; Beauregard 2009; James 2013). Bill C-63 involved cooperation between the National Association of Japanese Canadians (NAJC) and the government and resulted in the creation of the Canadian Race Relations Foundation as a way to combat racism in Canada (Kobayashi 1992, 6). The policy and institutional commitments that accompanied redress for Japanese Canadian internment included the creation of a foundation committed to dismantling institutional racism, a commitment unmatched by the Harper Conservatives.

In both Oda’s and Mark’s statements, the MPs trace Chinese presence in Canada back to the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century while Harper’s speech depicts Chinese arrival as beginning in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Asian MP statements building up to the official apologies detail the human anguish inflicted by government sanctioned anti-Asian legislation. To varying degrees, both Oda and Mark discuss the implications of disenfranchisement and exploitation of Chinese labourers that came to Canada as carpenters and gold miners. They detail how these regulations were put in place to deter immigration especially harsh in British Columbia. Both Oda and Mark described

how despite the fact that Chinese Canadians fought in both World War I and II, they were still considered personae non gratae. Mark elaborated:

They were paid half the wages the white workers received... The Chinese were tolerated in Canada only because they were a cheap source of labour... They were finished using them to build the railroad and did not need them any more so they found a way to keep them out... This demonstrates that at that time Canada had an apartheid system, one for regular Canadians and one for Canadians of Asian descent...

Mark continues by sharing “how he ended up in this place” including his family stories as directly impacted by Canadian anti-Asian regulations:

Both my grandfather and my father paid the head tax. In fact, I still have my father’s head tax certificate at home. It is time for me to tell my story. My grandfather came to this country to work on the CP Rail in the late 1800s... My father was 12 years old when he arrived in Canada in 1922. He arrived here by luck because in 1923 the exclusion act was put in place. He came to join his father in a place called Russell, Manitoba, where my grandfather had started a laundry, and ended up working in a restaurant... My mother, my younger sister and I did not join my father until after the repeal of the exclusion act in 1947.

It would be unfair to insist that MP Mark did not genuinely work for redress. It is safe to assume that Mark’s statements in the House detailing his family’s struggles were offered in order to truly bring some sort of closure or resolution. My critique of the apology events is not to discount these engagements and struggles. These narratives and histories are certainly needed in educating Canadians about the nation’s role in deliberately excluding and exploiting racial others; these histories teach us how Canada was founded in colonial genocide and built through racial exploitation. What these apology events do, however, is trivialize such histories by depicting the PM, the CPC and the Canadian government as having initiated these conversations on their own, by their own moral compass and judgment, to apologize. By also evading anti-racist institutional commitments that should accompany apologies, the Harper Conservatives refused to commit to genuine redress. In effect, the conservative government is more concerned with disassociating itself from past governments by taking credit for these apologies in order to contain racism as an aberration of Canada’s past. Through apology the state attempts to move forward as one that is

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147 Ibid
outside the purview of racial governance; that under the Harper Conservatives, Canada is truly post-racial.

On April 18, 2005, even while she described the systemic disenfranchisement of Chinese Canadians, Oda immediately reduces these legacies to mere “human frailties”:

“We have much to be proud of; however, we have at times in our history, faced with our human frailties, succumbed, and taken action that has tarnished our history. During this debate we have been told of the hardships brought upon the Chinese adopted by previous governments… Before we go forward, we must acknowledge that the Chinese were targeted and recognize the racially motivated acts undertaken by our country. The head tax and the exclusionary legislation were directly intended to limit the Chinese from entering Canada… We cannot go back and change the racist attitudes of the times…but we can go forward and look to the future of our country… Bill C-333 will not eliminate racism, but for the Chinese community it will acknowledge that Canada and Canadians today do not condone acts taken by a Canadian government, even a past government, based on racism. Bill C-333 will demonstrate that we, currently in this House, are willing to take that step and further steps to ensure that Canada, today and in the future, welcomes its diversity and the contribution of every community regardless of one's race… (Emphases added)"

By suggesting that these concerted anti-Asian regulations came about in a moment of weakness trivializes histories of state violence even as the MP outlines their horrors. The MP eludes the fact that these policies were debated and rationalized by multiple parties. The state references race “only to restrict it to a past better left behind, cut off from the present behind symbolic apologies lacking almost any material implication” (Goldberg 2002, 224). MP Oda speaks as though the Canadian government no longer discriminates based on race; Liberals enact racist legislation and Conservatives apologize for them. Indeed, the apology discourse manufactures the conditions under which claims of structural racism can no longer be waged against the state becomes the objective of these apologies. That is, moving “forward” is precisely to disassociate the present from these pasts because “we, currently in this House” are different than those previous governments. In his official apology for Chinese Canadian exclusion, the prime minister underscores this political objective:

The Government of Canada recognizes the stigma and exclusion experienced by the Chinese as a result… We also recognize that our failure to truly acknowledge these historical injustices has led many in the community from seeing themselves as fully Canadian. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, on behalf of all Canadians and the

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Government of Canada, we offer a full apology to Chinese Canadians for the head tax and express our deepest sorrow for the subsequent exclusion of Chinese immigrants. Gar nar dai doe heem…

This apology is not about liability today: it is about reconciliation with those who endured such hardship, and the broader Chinese Canadian community, – One that continues to make such an invaluable contribution to our great country. And while Canadian courts have ruled that the head tax, and immigration prohibition, were legally authorized, we fully accept the moral responsibility to acknowledge these shameful policies of our past.\(^\text{149}\)

As per the apology’s displacement manoeuvre, it was important for Harper to declare that this apology is not about liability. For Harper and the CPC the apology event was more about taking credit for apologizing for racist legislation enacted by previous governments. In effect, the apology read like an apology for the wrongs committed by the Liberals. Harper insists that it is not because of liability but rather a good moral compass that he, as leader of the new Conservatives, is apologizing. Indeed, “the state’s capacity to define and carry out projects as well as its capacity to authorize official narrations of historical memory rests on the state’s prior claim to power: the power to define the terms of its representations, and to exercise itself and those over whom authority its claimed in light of those terms” (Goldberg 2002, 8). The language of reparation mobilized here imagines that the state and wronged populations can work together on a neutral political terrain and that we can close the chapter to a shameful past if only these populations can come to the table to get along with the state. Similarly on February 21, 2005 Oda argued:

Today, despite a history of racism, struggle and alienation, the Chinese Canadian is a thriving, contributing community across Canada… I am asking the House to support Bill C-333 as recognition of these acts of government that were based solely on race and to signify that despite their hardships the Chinese Canadian community has historically played a key role in the making of this country. I am proud to be a member of the House and, almost 50 years after Mr. Jung, the first Chinese Canadian to serve here, to have an opportunity to redress a wrong that for over a century has never been recognized by our governments…\(^\text{150}\)

Oda invokes former Asian Conservative MP Douglas Jung here as the original figure of racial resolution in Canadian parliament. Bill C-333, like Jung’s election as the first Asian Canadian MP, is entered as evidence that historical racism is being resolved. To argue that a community

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has persevered despite systematic racism firstly reduces the terms of success to a deterministic economism thus trivializing ongoing legacies of those regulations on Asians in Canada.

Secondly, in this formulation, the Asian Canadian figure that “persevered” despite structural barriers and in spite of government sanctioned exploitation becomes the ideal neoconservative subject that pulls themselves up by the bootstraps without “depending” on the government. In this formulation, this figure becomes the ideal immigrant subject or the racial solution to Canada’s racial problems: Indigenous populations, Afro-Caribbean Canadians, and refugees depicted as illegal and fraudulent. Insofar as these “racial problem” groups threaten to expose the contradictions of multicultural Canada, it is at these moments of possible rupture that the ideal immigrant subject in the shape of the conservative Asian MP is deployed as “solution”.

Even while Stephen Harper recites many of the themes in MP Oda’s and MP Mark’s statements leading up to the apology event, the prime minister concisely reduces Canada’s legacies of racism to “old arguments”. The prime minister’s apologies suggest that the objective of the apologies is to put these “arguments” behind us. Harper’s apologies for Chinese Canadian exclusion and the Komagata Maru incident follow the same pattern of argumentation. The PM states that he is standing before the nation to right historic wrongs deliberately lodged against Asian Canadian groups by previous governments. He then describes the cultural and economic contributions of Chinese Canadians and Punjabi Canadians as that which makes this nation unique. Despite these historic barriers, the PM argues that Canada is a place of limitless possibilities for all Canadians including (and especially) new Canadians. While the apology is meant to redress Chinese Canadian exclusion, that only surviving head tax payers and spouses of survivors would receive symbolic payments presumes that there were no repercussions of exclusion acts on anyone but those that paid head taxes. Generations affected by exclusionary acts are excluded again and institutions that originally legitimized those acts remain unquestioned. This compounded by the fact that the apology discourse systematically refers to an imagined political community called “new Canadians” illuminates the racial rule incited by apology discourse: the Chinese and South Asian communities in these discourses are not the figures that have been wronged rather they are narrated as always newly arriving, as immigrants, as perpetually foreign. Deliberately, these are not representative of figures that were stolen from elsewhere nor are they figures that represent populations that were colonized. Institutional changes would be much more difficult to evade in reckoning with these other legacies of racial
violence. The limited imagination of Asian Canadians only as figures that are perpetually foreign, newly arriving, and culturally different is productive for this new inequity regime because such an imagined figure does not require the state to reckon with its racial violences.

Ultimately, the PM’s apologies end up depicting Canada today as the multicultural gold standard. In the official parliamentary apology for Chinese Canadian exclusion Harper begins first and foremost by stating that with this apology, the Conservative government can “formally turn the page” on what is merely an “unfortunate period in Canada’s past”.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to formally turn the page on an unfortunate period in Canada’s past. One during which a group of people who only sought to build a better life was repeatedly and deliberately singled out for unjust treatment. I speak, of course, of the head tax that was imposed on Chinese immigrants to this country, as well as the other restrictive measures that followed…

…Beginning in 1881, over 15,000 of these Chinese pioneers became involved in the most important nationbuilding enterprise in Canadian history – the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway… This transcontinental link was the ribbon of steel that bound our fledgling country together. It was an engineering feat – one for which the backbreaking toil of Chinese labourers was largely responsible – That was instrumental to the settlement of the West and the subsequent development of the Canadian economy… But in spite of it all, these Chinese immigrants persevered, and in doing so, helped to ensure the future of Canada. But from the moment that the railway was completed, Canada turned its back on these men.151

Using a trope of conquest, the prime minister describes early Chinese migrants as “pioneers”. By articulating his admiration for their “nation building enterprise” and their contribution to “the settlement of the West and the subsequent development of the Canadian economy”, Harper indeed restates the valuation of immigration and racial others in Canada through a logic of settler political economy. The apology discourse’s emphasis on Asian contributions is easily registered and “manageable within prevailing ideologies of liberalism and neoliberalism” (Mackey 2013, 50). That is, presenting early Chinese and South Asians in Canada as people that have contributed so much to the nation despite structural barriers takes Canada’s histories of state-sanctioned racism and turns them into “paternalistic occasions for congratulating victim groups on their “contributions” (James 2013, 38). As part of what James has called “neoliberal heritage redress” historical injustices have been turned into “unremarkable objects of consensual commemoration” where the “resultant onset of an official routine of predictable commemorative

procedure thus helps to quell potentially unwieldy debates about past conduct and contemporary responsibility” (James 2013 38).

**Contain and Neutralize: the Komagata Maru incident**

Since the late 1990s, Asian Conservatives like Gurmant Grewal and Deepak Obhrai have brought up the horrors of the Komagata Maru incident in their parliamentary statements, calling it a “black scar” on Canada’s history. Unlike the apology for Chinese exclusion, the apology for the Komagata Maru was informal in two senses: the apology was not debated in the form of a bill and the apology event took place in Surrey rather than in Ottawa. Nonetheless, the prime minister’s apology script and the staging for this event are critical in our understanding of state apology as governance.

In much the same way that Oda and Mark have detailed the horrors of Chinese exclusion, so too does Nina Grewal on May 15, 2008, describe the suffering of the passengers on the Komagata Maru in greater detail than the PM’s apology. She calls the ship a floating prison where passengers were denied legal rights and basic needs such as access to food and medicine. Grewal describes what transpired as inhumane and that the government had conspired to kill twenty-six of the passengers once they returned to India. She describes the 1914 events and the continuous journey regulation as deliberate and organized:

> Upon arriving in British Columbia, early East Indians encountered hate, ostracism and negative stereotyping that resulted in discriminatory immigration restrictions, social and economic deprivation, and political disenfranchisement. Discrimination was legislated, legal and official. Injustices, humiliation, prejudice and exploitation were rampant. The Komagata Maru incident was not an error but rather an intended, deliberate action of the divisive, exclusionist and racist policies of the provincial and federal governments of the day. These policies included: a head tax on Chinese immigrants; keeping families separated; and threats to expel legitimate Canadian Sikh immigrants to the British Honduras. As well, the requirement to possess unusually high amounts of cash as a precondition for the South Asians to arrive in Canada was nothing short of a head tax…

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In much the same way that Oda quickly shifted from recounting the violence of Chinese exclusion to then lauding Canadian multicultural values and the Conservative prime minister, Nina Grewal also contains the heinous events of 1914 to days gone past. Nor do her statements speak to the Komagata Maru in the context of the Continuous Journey order-in-council. Instead the “incident” stands alone as a historical mistake isolated from the political institutions that continue to rationalize racial exclusion in the language of national security. The Komagata Maru is depicted merely a moment in Canada’s history depicting the “extreme racism that once existed in Canada”. What Asian MP scripts in both cases of redress seems to indicate is that it is possible to name and describe past incidents as systematically racist insofar as the liability of the events is placed squarely on the Liberal government alone – again the CPC is cast as being outside of this and thus not responsible. In these cases, the conservative leaders allow themselves to look back at these struggles and the systematic disenfranchisement of Asian Canadians only in order to characterize the present moment and present leadership as outside these histories. The narratives argue that Canada has improved and with these apologies, Canada can decisively and unfailingly declare itself as having gone beyond race or indeed, post-racial; that we are indeed living in a more tolerant Canada. In these cases, what “moving forward” means is the new conservative government can move forward with Reform’s original policy plans (chapter 7).

A May 20, 2007 press release quotes Nina Grewal at a Stanley Park rally commemorating the 93rd anniversary of the Komagata Maru:

Prime Minister Stephen Harper is ensuring proper redress for the Komagata Maru tragedy. Historically our government is the only one to ever acknowledge the Komagata Maru tragedy. We are now in the process of negotiating a fitting memorial to the Komagata Maru and the events surrounding it. In the last few months I have been working hard with Minister Jason Kenney and my colleague Jim Abbott to recognize this historical grievance and bring an appropriate close to a tragedy in our nation’s history…

*Prime Minister Harper initiated discussions* on how best to recognize the tragedy of the Komagata Maru more than nine months ago. Members of the Conservative Party have been vocal on the issue of recognizing and atoning for the incident for

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154 The 1908 “Continuous Voyage” Order-in-Council prohibited “the landing... of any immigrants who have come to Canada otherwise than by continuous journey from the country of which they are natives” (Raj 1980, 67). Then in 1910, Ottawa introduced a new Immigration Act, which “ordered all Asian immigrants, except Japanese and Chinese who laboured under different laws, to be in possession of $200 upon landing in Canada” (1980, 68). the Komagata Maru, a Japanese steamship leaving from China, to Japan, to Vancouver arrived on 23 May 1914 carrying 376 British subjects from Punjab (Basran and Bolaria 2003). After a two-month standoff, the boat was forced to leave, disembarking only 22 passengers who had resident status in Canada. A later Order-in-Council, passed in 1919, allowed “British Hindus residing in Canada” to bring their wives and children into the country, but the continuous journey regulation remained in effect until 1947” (Bloemraad 2008, 48).
many years. My husband, Gurmant Grewal, has presented petitions and motions in the House of Commons calling for government action. But, unfortunately, Liberal governments of the day did nothing…

Canada’s New Government does more than spout empty rhetoric. We provide action and results. For years Liberal leaders have rejected our calls for justice and fair treatment…

As a member of the Parliament and Sikh I am proud to speak to you today. I hope all parties join with the Prime Minister in acknowledging the Komagata Maru and the events of 1914. This should be a non-partisan issue that unites people of every political stripe. The memory of those poor people on that ill-fated ship deserve better than the inaction of past governments.¹⁵⁵

MP Grewal’s statements here echo the dominant narrative circulated at this time. The MP must state that the government does more than spout empty rhetoric precisely because that is exactly what the apology discourse has committed to. Such statements demonstrate that the CPC’s desire to apologize was rooted in a larger campaign to unseat the Liberals as the party of immigrants. By arguing that the CPC government is the only one to acknowledge “sad moments” like the Komagata Maru and Chinese Canadian exclusion, the predominant objective of the apologies is to recast the Conservative image. The so-called sad moments “momentarily brought to the foreground through the apology process, become contained in the past so that nation may move forward into a unified future” (Mackey 2013, 49). Similarly on May 15, 2008 Grewal brings our attention to Canada’s history of explicit racism only to cast them away to another time:

Canada's history is filled with tales of racism. No one is proud of the expulsion of the Acadians, residential schools for aboriginal children, the wartime internment of Japanese Canadians, or the turning away of the Komagata Maru.¹⁵⁶

In her statements, Grewal collapses these related yet varied legacies of state racism. The racial logics that made the Komagata Maru incident possible become undifferentiated from the logics that enabled residential schools, Japanese internment and the expulsion of Acadians as if to suggest that redress for one might tie them all up into a state of repair. However, the Conservative Community Historical Recognition Program (CHRP) would only consider injustices understood as “wartime measures or immigration restrictions”. For instance, “As the African Canadian Legal Clinic, which has focused on redress issues such as slavery, the

destruction of Africville, and the mistreatment of the Black Loyalists, observed in 2005: “African Canadians are not even contemplated”, given the ‘wartime measures and immigration restrictions’ provision” (James 2013, 37). Indeed Grewal insists that historical wrongs cannot be undone but they can be righted but is this truly justice served?

Grewal argues that redress will restore pride and dignity for new Canadians and indeed make new Canadians more patriotic moving forward. In this way, the discourses of apology emphasize how victimized populations will continue to contribute to the nation once racism is made irrelevant through redress. However, the structural commitments of the state to these populations are not made apparent:

…They will salute their forefathers, provide loyalty, dedication and commitment, and contribute and move forward as equal and patriotic citizens of Canada. The painful memory of the Komagata Maru inspires us all to continue to build on our nation’s reputation as a land that embraces tolerance above intolerance, diversity above discrimination, and openness above exclusion. The Komagata Maru tragedy is a reminder of just how far we have come as a society since that incident. We are a stronger and better country than we were 94 years ago. We are better and stronger precisely because of the contribution of all those who have crossed oceans to share this land. Today, there are more than one million people of Indian descent living in Canada. They have worked hard and prospered, and Canada has prospered because of them. Our society is richer and more inclusive today because of the different waves of new immigrants.

… Last month, at the Vaisakhi celebration hosted by me on Parliament Hill, the Prime Minister commended the contribution of the Sikhs to Canada. He said, “As Canadians we believe we learn from history, but we are not enslaved by it. We put old arguments behind us, in order to focus on the opportunities that lie before us and I especially know that Canadians of Sikh faith will always be leaders in moving our country forward unified, strong and free. He was absolutely correct. (Emphases added).”

Both MP Oda’s and MP Grewal’s scripts around the apologies work to re-suture this narrative of Canadian exceptionality. These MPs frequently reiterate statements made by minister Kenney and prime minister Harper as a way to exalt them as exceptional race-conscious leaders. By ensuring that she mentions her friend Harper’s presence at the Vaisakhi event she hosted on Parliament Hill, she places him at the scene of otherness. Being near racial others and having racial MPs vouch for their authenticity is necessary precisely because the state will only commit to such superficial platitudes rather than to institutional re-evaluation so that incidents like the

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Komagata Maru never happen again.

MP Nina Grewal was not only active leading up to redress, it was important that she would be physically present at PM Harper’s apology event for the Komagata Maru incident, even addressing the crowd herself and introducing Minister Kenney. As the diversity person “already in place” Grewal’s participation at the apology event works to conceal those who felt betrayed at the informality of the event when they were alternatively promised that these proceedings would take place in parliament. Grewal’s, Kenney’s and Harper’s smiling faces conceal these contradictions and instead present the apology event as a seamless national resolution to the incidents of 1914. Grewal’s role at this apology event indeed was to introduce Jason Kenney, a role she had been familiar with during question period when she frequently asked the minister to elaborate on “how Canada's new government is addressing the needs of new Canadians and ethnocultural communities” and “give us an idea of how many meetings and events he had attended since being appointed”\(^{158}\). As we have already seen in chapter 4, Kenney, the ethnic outreach minister, had decidedly made it his business to attend as many events as possible as though showing up to meetings and events equates to substantial representation and a supposed state of race-consciousness. Asian MPs like Grewal’s business was to keep reminding Canadians of the minister’s activities. Using her time in the House to introduce Kenney as the main speaker indicates how diversifying political spaces or the arrival of “others” into political spaces is how organisations stay orientated around whiteness, around those who are ‘already in place’. Indeed, the 2008 apology event represents the recentring of whiteness as Canadianness through state apology for racial injustice, which not only conceals ongoing inequalities but also works to evacuate critical voices against state-sanctioned inequities moving forward. MP Grewal begins:

I would like to thank the Surrey India Arts Club for such a wonderful performance. Let’s give them a big hand. They also went to Ottawa and had a wonderful performance during the Vaisakhi celebrations that I hosted in Ottawa… [and] during the Vaisakhi celebrations that I hosted in April. I know that the Prime Minister is a big fan of the bhangra… Ladies and Gentlemen, Our first speaker has been the voice of newcomers and cultural communities since our party took government. He is both a friend of our (sic) and an advocate for the Indo-Canadian community. It is both an honour and a

privilege to introduce my friend, Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and Canadian Identity, the Honourable Jason Kenney. (from Somani 2011, 14)\textsuperscript{159}

Grewal’s statements deliver the necessary multicultural platitudes of the racial conservative script. The apology event takes place during a mela and opens with a bhangra performance. Like any other message track, that the same group of performers would perform the same performance and that the MP and prime minister repeat the same narratives whether it is in Ottawa or Surrey sums up the neat apology package to which the Harper Conservatives would adhere. We must take Grewal’s word that the then-newly elected conservative prime minister is someone who loves bhangra – a supposed reflection of his race-consciousness. As seen in Breaking Through political advertisements, Harper and Kenney have been no strangers to “ethnic events” as these are rich opportunities to appear in official photographs that will be used in campaign materials. It was not uncommon for Harper and Kenney to attend such events and even recite some words in Asian languages, which is how they both open their speeches: “Good afternoon. Bonne après-midi, Sat Sri Akaal, Namaste, As-Salamu Alaykum”. Such discursive moves suggest that Asian languages can be comparable to English and French as the state’s two official languages and depoliticizes the very political history that language has played in Canadian racial rule (Haque 2013). Harper begins his apology by lauding the “spectacular showcase of Punjabi culture”:

The vibrant dance and musical traditions, exquisite art and timeless literature being celebrated here today are the fruits of a millennial old civilization whose influence spans the globe. Canada now shares this rich cultural legacy; it has become an integral part of our own cultural diversity. Today over one million Canadians are of South Asian descent. These hardworking men and women passionately devoted to their families and communities are helping make our country even stronger for the generations yet to come, our country that affords opportunity to all, regardless of their background, our country that offers sanctuary to victims of violence and persecution, our country of freedom and democracy, of prosperity and peace, second to none in the world. As Canadians we have before us, and before our children and grandchildren, a future of literally unlimited possibility. A lot of that promise stems from the confidence, the ideas, and the energies brought here by successive waves of newcomers drawn to our shores by the promise of a new and better life. (from Somani 2011, 15-16)\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159} Somani, Alia. 2011. “The Apology and its Aftermath: National Atonement or the Management of Minorities?” Postcolonial Text, 6 (1): 1-18. The transcript for the Komagata Maru apology event that took place on August 3, 2008 is referenced only in full in Somani’s (2011) article. In this piece, Somani notes the virtual absence of the transcript of the apology from Canadian government archives and futile attempts to retrieve it from the Prime Minister’s office. The author obtained a full transcript from an activist who had video-recorded the event.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, 15-16.
As he did in the Chinese Canadian exclusion apology, here again Harper emphasizes the economic and cultural “contributions” of South Asians to Canada thus demonstrating how "the discourse of diversity is one of respectable differences - those forms of differences that can be incorporated into the national body” (Ahmed 151). He uses this as a jumping off point to narrate Canada as a global sanctuary – a place of democracy and freedom in juxtaposition to those nations that are unfree and undemocratic. That is, the PM redefines what Gill calls “categorically nonracist zones here and racist zones out there” (Gill 2002, 182).

Crimes against humanity happen elsewhere, not here. In this way, the discourse of apology revives the Orientalist binary; the apology narratives mobilize a blueprint for racial governance. There is no mercy for violences that take place over there as opposed to over here where Canada’s legacies are effectively reduced to minor infractions against humanity in the past. The state does not wait for a response or desires a reckoning. Even in recognizing historic racism, the state insists on its own redemption. Canada remains the reputed multicultural modern state. That is, “the national subject remained empowered by displacing the patterns of discrimination and racial hatred onto the now disclaimed past or onto its own rejected, obstreperous, and stubborn minority in the present” (Thobani 2007, 154). Harper’s apology thus continues:

Canada is renowned the world over for its welcoming embrace of immigrants. But like all countries, our record isn’t perfect. We haven’t always lived up to our own ideals. One such failure, as has been mentioned, was the detention and turning away of the Komagata Maru in 1914, an event that caused much hardship for its passengers… and which for many of them ended in terrible tragedy…

Similarly in his apology for Chinese Canadian exclusion, Harper said:

*No country is perfect. Like all countries, Canada has made mistakes in its past,* and we realize that. Canadians, however, *are a good and just people, acting when we’ve committed wrong.* And even though the head tax – *a product of a profoundly different time lies far in our past,* we feel compelled to right this historic wrong for the simple reason that it is the decent thing to do, a characteristic to be found at the core of the Canadian soul.*

Placing these portions of the apology scripts as they appear in both events side by side reveals how in both cases, legacies of anti-Asian racism in Canada are ultimately made excusable. In both apologies the prime minister states that “no country is perfect” and that Canada too has

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made “mistakes”; that the vast legacies of anti-Asian racism are not in fact part of our national character which is fundamentally good and moral. Much like Asian conservative MP statements, even while the prime minister describes these histories as concerted and deliberate, they continue to be characterized as perversions of Canada’s principled moral core rather than as consistent with Canadian racial rule. In this narrative, racism becomes registered as something that happens accidentally. Racism also becomes anachronistic “a sign of a time that is no longer” (Ahmed 2012, 48) and displaced elsewhere (Goldberg 2002, 234). Harper’s argument that these racist policies are aberrations isolated to “a profoundly different time far in our past” pre-empts critical interventions made against ongoing state violence. In this way, Harper’s apologies reproduce racism by suggesting that we are “over race” or that race is ostensibly receding from view. As in Asian MP statements, the notion of “moving forward” as a nation as well as characterizing Harper and the CPC as exceptionally moral was clearly a predominant part of the discourse of apology. The objective is to manufacture a seamless closure to the past where racism can be contained and separated from the present and future of the new conservative government. The statements make the prime minister’s speech a categorical non-apology. The state assumes that the apology and its terms will be accepted and yet they did not require that wronged populations actually do so (Mackey 2013, 55). That Nina Grewal appears to accept the apology is supposed to be enough. We are to believe that Canadians are a good and just people and as such the apology is mobilized “contribute to Canada’s global mythology as a benevolent multicultural nation” (Ibid. 49). Anti-Asian regulations like the Continuous Journey order-in-council – framed as a mistake by the discourse of apology – were in fact legitimized in the same Canadian parliament as part of national security and immigration debates to protect the character of the Canadian state.

In these apology events, the prime minister’s script trivializes ongoing histories of racist legislation and governance by depicting himself, the CPC and the Canadian government as having initiated these conversations on their own, by their own moral compass and judgment. As detailed in Chapter 1, historically anti-Asian racism was non-partisan. Only CCF leaders advocated for the “Oriental” franchise in the House at the disdain of Liberals and conservatives. These parties were unisonant in their anti-Asian racism. In such cases, the CPC likes to disassociate itself from previous governments but in other cases finds it beneficial to associate itself with the Progressive Conservatives. As one example, on December 12, 2007, Rahim Jaffer
made a statement about Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and Canadian Identity Jason Kenney sending out a video greeting to the Ismaili community, supposedly a first for a government minister. In these statements he says the government’s initiatives “build on the pioneering work of previous Conservative governments, culminating in the passage of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988”\textsuperscript{163} However, in the case of the apologies, the Conservative government is more concerned with disassociating itself from political parties of the time - including the Progressive Conservatives - by taking credit for these apologies in order to contain racism as an aberration in Canada’s otherwise good history.

The discourse of apology rearranges how Canadians understand what is and is not racist policy. Through the apologies, the CPC appears to be one that apologizes for rather than enacts racist policies. After the prime minister delivered the apology scripts, the state transformed into one that redresses racism rather than one that perpetrates racial violence. The discourse of apology provides the state a kind of immunity from being challenged as racist. That is, the “raceless” racial state invokes race to make it unspeakable, as already spoken:

one is at once claiming racial conditions as unspeakable and yet spoken for; unmentionable and yet spoken to; non-referenced and yet spoken about. If racial reference is unavoidable as a state of being and yet as a form of governance the state is required to be raceless, it means that the state or state agencies are silenced. They are restricted more or less from addressing, let alone redressing, the effects of racial discrimination. Race supposedly could not even be discussed as a public policy concern save to render its expression off-limits to public political and policy debate (Goldberg 2002, 222).

By closing the so-called chapter of unfortunate incidents that is, to render race already spoken for, another national history unfolds. That is, the state is remembered as one that apologizes for rather than one that perpetrates ongoing racism. The apology discourse insists that Canada becomes the truly multicultural, tolerant, and racially harmonious place that it always claimed to be. In a state of redress Canada has come so far by not having changed at all. Moreover, the discourse of apology produced the figures necessary in energizing state governance capacities. Like racial states before it, in this newly raceless racial state, Canadian exceptionality is produced through the management of foreigners within. From that moment of apology, this story

becomes part of the national narrative whenever injustices are brought to light. In this sense, just as inclusion is not just an act of inclusion, apology is not just an apology, it is a political act.

Both Oda and Grewal falsely stated that neither the Chinese nor Punjabi communities sought financial reparations. Both MPs’ statements attempted to justify the conservative government’s decision to limit financial reparations as well as rationalize how government funds would be distributed. Trivializing the question of financial reparations, both have argued, “there is no price that can be paid to make amends.” On April 18, 2005 Oda declared, “the scars of racism cannot be healed monetarily”.164 Similarly, on May 15, 2008 Grewal argued, “The consensus in the south Asian community is that a sincere official apology is sufficient and it is not demanding any compensation”.165 By October 24, 2006, multiculturalism critic MP Oda was making statements in the House about how she had made the “first (symbolic) payments to three living head tax payers” emphasising their gratitude and the prime minister’s greatness: “they asked me to thank the Prime Minister and to say that he was a great man”.166 However, what such testimony erase is that the Chinese Canadian exclusion apology was challenged for considering “symbolic payments” of $20,000 for only surviving head tax payers and spouses of surviving head tax payers thereby defining a border in the terrain of injuries suffered by the state’s anti-Asian policies. By excluding descendents of head tax, the terms of apology presumed the containability of the harms done by state policy to a particular generation without ripple effect. The National Anti-Racism Council of Canada issued a statement calling for more inclusive payments: “Head tax payers and their families experienced poverty, family separation, lost opportunity and discrimination... Failure to include the families where the head tax payer and spouse are both deceased overlooks the impact of the historic wrong” (2006). In response to such criticisms, Jason Kenney simply responded that cabinet needs to "draw the line somewhere" (Siddiqui, 2007).167

In line with the Liberal ACE intent to not compensate victims, Harper and the Asian Conservative MPs stressed other funding commitments including educative programming. As part of Bill C-333 MP Inky Mark had argued, “I don’t agree that [people] should receive an

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apology or receive individual compensation… The purpose … is education, acknowledgement, recognition”. As redress scholar James has observed, “neoliberal heritage redress was from the outset a deliberate and quite explicit departure from more activist and reparatory approaches” (James 2013, 36). For instance, on February 21, 2005 Mark thanked Oda for re-introducing the bill and acknowledged those who have participated in the decades of struggles for redress including members of the National Congress of Chinese Canadians, the GTA Chinese Community Association and others in cities across Canada – a gesture of acknowledgement that Harper does not make in his apologies. However, it is significant that MP Mark does not include in this list of acknowledgements the Chinese Canadian National Council – an anti-racist organization that has called for institutional changes as part of head tax redress. Instead, only organizations committed to commemoration and education or “cross-cultural understanding” under terms dictated by the state were ever mentioned during debates and funded after apology. That is, included in redress conversation, programs and funding were associations, companies, and community projects that would accept and celebrate a depoliticized version of state redress. This funding regime took shape in Kenney’s 2008 Community Historical Recognition Program (CHRP) with a $13.5 million budget “to acknowledge, commemorate, and educate future generations about that sad event” as described at the Komagata Maru apology event. As the “conductor to correct historical wrongs” minister Kenney’s CHRP would finance commemorative projects and the erection of statues to honour key historical figures” at locations associated with “wartime measures and immigration restrictions” (Castonguay 2013). That is, the “funding regime aims not only to discipline groups, but also to resituate Canadian redress politics on a sanitized field of official remembrance created to tame the past’s politically disruptive potential” (James 2013, 36). As Goldberg has observed,

Racelessness is the neoliberal attempt to go beyond- without (fully) coming to terms with –racial histories and their accompanying racist inequities and iniquities; to mediate the racially classed and gendered distinctions to which those histories have given rise without reference to the racial terms of those distinctions; to transform, via the negating dialectic of denial and ignoring, racially marked social orders into racially erased ones” (Goldberg 2002, 221).

This is not to say that the initiatives funded by the CHRP are worthless. Indeed, education is an important part of dismantling structures of inequity. This is not however, the objective of the

funding program and redress policy. Rather, the criteria for funding requires the reproduction of the state’s language – one that avoids structural changes and reckoning with ongoing inequities. For example, on January 23, 2009, Parliamentary secretary for multiculturalism Alice Wong announced four projects designed to reach out to youth and the Chinese community: “These projects will increase understanding of the impact of these policies on the Chinese-Canadian community…committing to raising awareness of these policies, which are inconsistent with the values that Canadians hold today” (emphasis added).\(^\text{169}\) Similarly, on March 9, 2010, MP Shory stated:

The Komagata Maru incident was a sad time in our nation's history… After being elected in 2006, our Conservative government took action. The Prime Minister publicly apologized in the presence of thousands of Indo-Canadians. We set aside $2.5 million for the historical recognition program and recently made two funding announcements to recognize and preserve the facts of the sad incident… I call on the Liberals to stop playing cheap politics and appreciate our government for taking action...\(^\text{170}\)

Indeed, once the Conservative Party of Canada won their first minority government in June 2006, the racial conservative script became all the more aggressive. Whether the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was Monte Solberg or Diane Finley or Jason Kenney, Asian MPs like Nina Grewal were at their side whether she was hosting roundtables in her own home or attending events with the Minister. Press releases and parliamentary statements made between 2006 and 2007, demonstrate how the CPC and MP Grewal, as a member of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, detailed the ways in which the new Conservative government delivered on its campaign promise to immigrants by highlighting the ways in which Liberal policies failed new Canadians. In these statements, MP Grewal’s script always includes an emphasis of the $307 million that the new government has dedicated $307 million dollars in funding for immigrant settlement including language training and other support and services.\(^\text{171}\)


Part of how these $307 million in funding was distributed include the Multiculturalism Grants and Contributions Program, which was described on August 11, 2010 by Parliamentary secretary for multiculturalism, Alice Wong as an initiative: to fund events that promote interaction among cultural and religious communities, as well as community events celebrating the historic contributions of a particular ethnic, cultural or religious group, including events that support such initiatives as Asian Heritage Month and Black History Month. MP Wong reiterated, “Through Canada’s new Multiculturalism Grants and Contributions Program, we are investing in Canada’s future — a future that depends on intercultural understanding and equal opportunity for people of all cultures and faiths”. Included in such a program are events such as the March 2011 Harmony Dialogue Group event called “Sharing the Tradition: Building Bridges among cultural and mainstream communities,” which received $15,000 for that single event or the February 2011 Black History Month Celebration in Edmonton. An emergent racial conservative script can be identified in the series of press releases about events, funded by the Multicultural Grants and Contributions Program. For example, MP Uppal made the following statements on behalf of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism minister Jason Kenney about the aforementioned events:

1. By funding events like this one, we help showcase the diversity of our country, and the many talents of younger Canadians. With this support from the Inter-Action program, events such as this one celebrate this community's diversity as well as our shared values, history and institutions.
2. By funding events like this one, we help showcase the diversity of our country, while promoting settlement and integration efforts.

These statements are about showcasing so-called shared values and history through non-performative vacuous platitudes. That is, even while the CPC argues that they are delivering results where the Liberals failed, such events dedicated to celebrating diversity stand in for actual meaningful confrontations with ongoing structural racism. Furthermore, repetitive mentions of the $307 million dollar Conservative investment toward immigrant settlement and multicultural

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programming illustrates that "the amount they spend on us becomes a sign of their commitment" (Ahmed 2012, 154).

Framed as an investment in Canada’s prosperity, the Asian conservative MPs repeatedly celebrate the $307 million the new government dedicated to “immigrant integration” including funding multicultural projects and programs. However, as opposition members, the Conservatives relentlessly attacked similar Liberal spending as government handouts and wasteful uses of taxpayer money. As one example of this, in October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2001, Gurmant Grewal argued the classic neoconservative script, which less than a decade later could just as likely describe the CPC government’s own budgetary commitments:

> We are not against the concept of multiculturalism, harmony in Canada or accepting other communities and groups in Canada. However, when the government uses grants or contributions as a means for political propaganda and creates different tiers in the communities by giving more money to one group and less to another, it creates disparity in the community. That is what we are against. We are against government funds, taxpayer money, being used for political purposes to give handouts…\textsuperscript{174}

The difference in the funding criteria for immigrants and multiculturalism is clear: any funding that might contribute to alleviating systemic racial barriers for immigrants and commitments to anti-racist infrastructure are deemed “handouts” in favour of events involving intercultural dialogue and shared values.

Parliamentary references to the apologies remained in high circulation long after the apology events ended. As recently as November 2014, MP Parm Gill and the Conservative government announced a new Komagata Maru commemorative stamp.\textsuperscript{175} Indeed, it is necessary to continue circulating the story of how the CPC apologized for the Komagata Maru and Chinese Canadian exclusion. It is necessary to continue reminding Canadians that the Liberals supposedly failed them and now the conservatives are here to mend all that has been broken. It became necessary to continue circulating this particular script about Conservative innocence and benevolence precisely because of the resilience of race. As the race regime envisions new capacities to govern different populations, the state does not change in a substantive sense,


rather, it becomes “even more of a “white man’s country” (Price 2011, 318). The state continued to have reasons of being accused as racist; indeed it was guilty of using the same racist logics that brought about Chinese Canadian exclusion and the Komagata Maru in order to enact racist regulations as the new Canadian government. To borrow from sociologist Joan Acker, "an equality regime can be an inequality regime given new form, a set of processes that maintain what is supposedly being redressed" (in Ahmed 2012, 8). The apology events become a way to cover over the CPC’s renewed commitment to racist legacies that built this nation. In this way, apology can be read not only as commitment to non-commitment; apology marks a renewed commitment to racial rule.

“When I first came to Canada”: No nonsense guide to getting over racism

By now it is clear that it is not that Asian Conservative MPs never talk about race. To the contrary, as members of the official opposition, Conservative Asian MPs uttered words such as “systemic racism” and even “white supremacy” while invoking personal experiences with racial discrimination in their members statements. Notably, the same Asian MPs no longer utter these terms once the Harper Conservatives formed government in 2006. Both Deepak Obhrai and Inky Mark, for example, have spoken about ongoing racism in Canada stressing that Reform stands firmly against it. On March 19, 1998, Obhrai stated that Reform is the party that fights discrimination: “Therefore we pledge to work with all Canadians in order to ensure that discrimination is eradicated in Canada”.176 And on March 21, 2000, Inky Mark argued that the existence of racism in this country is irrefutable: “There is no question that racism exists in Canada. We have embarked upon a new millennium. Let us all continue in the fight to end it”.177 Thus, while these MPs have addressed racism in their statements, it is more important to understand how they speak about racism. For example, on March 27, 2003, before giving a statement on the budget implementation act, Obhrai recounted an encounter with racism the day before:

I would like to talk about something which is extremely important that happened yesterday and I would like to bring it to the attention of the House, to the Canadian public, and to the Solicitor General.

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Yesterday evening I was in a grocery store shopping. As I was walking down the aisle a gentleman walked by... and said to me, “Muhammad, you bloody” something. He walked away mumbling these words. For a second I was stunned and shocked. I turned around and walked over to him and said, “Exactly what did you say. Did you abuse me? Did you use racist remarks?” He was a little stunned that I had stopped him and wanted to talk to him. I told him that this kind of behaviour was not acceptable. He then tried to say that he did not say it, but the next words that came out of his mouth were “September 11”. I asked him what he was trying to say. In light of the fact that there is war going on in Iraq, the fact that there is tension among communities, and that there are those who are against something, this should be totally unacceptable.

I want to say to people of visible minorities and others who are targets of these kinds of racist remarks to challenge the people who make these racist remarks, ask them to repeat it, and tell them that there are hate crime laws in this country that will hold them accountable. We should not tolerate this kind of comment or insult against the dignity of Canadians. Every Canadian, irrespective of race, religion or creed, has the right to walk down the street with dignity and respect. We should tell these people who make these comments, especially now, that in Canada this is unacceptable. I hope and I am sure every member of the House will send that message out that it is unacceptable. I will now go back to my speech on the budget. 178

In his comments, Obhrai displaces the responsibility of fighting racism onto victims, which among other problems undermines the brutalities of racism. Rather than addressing a culture of widespread and embedded racism - that is, structural racism - Obhrai insinuates that victims of racism allow themselves to be victimized if they do not speak up – in the vein of Oda’s statements about gendered violence. Nowhere in this preamble to his budget statements is there a word about holding perpetrators accountable. Nor does the MP contextualize his encounter within a larger context of post-September 11 islamophobia and anti-Asian racism, which the Canadian Alliance participated in fanning (see analysis of Jaffer’s statements on September-11 in the previous chapter). By delimiting the definition of racism to individuals on streets and in grocery stores and assuming that “every member of the House” would find such racism unacceptable publicly disavows racisms that proliferate in the ostensibly raceless multicultural Canadian state. Framing racist violence in this way eludes state violence, in particular, the anti-Muslim racism at the root of MP Obhrai’s encounter. By coding racial reference in state debates on immigration, national identity, and national security such everyday racism persists. The

profiling, arrest, and torture of people in the post-September 11 industry including Canada’s own role in sustaining this violence here and abroad - become justified.

Still as a member of the opposition, CPC MP Obhrai spoke again on May 4, 2004 about his experiences with racism but in this instance it is evident that racism is slowly becoming framed as receding from view:

Mr. Speaker, when I came to Canada in 1977, I found myself on many occasions a victim of racial discrimination. At that time it was widespread in Canadian society. Since that period I have noticed tremendous improvements in Canadian society as the evils of discrimination were exposed, but the battle is far from over. There continues to be pockets where hidden discrimination or systemic racism as it is known, rears its ugly head.\(^{179}\)

Indeed, it is not that Asian conservative MPs always deny that they experience racism or that it simply does not exist. Rather they propose something else: it is up to victims to do something about racism and also get over it. Such statements insinuate that if one is fit enough to simply withstand the inevitable (racism) then one can prove oneself a suitable citizen-subject. It becomes the responsibility of victims of racism to do the work. And again on March 21\(^{st}\), 2005, a year before the CPC took hold of its first minority government, Obhrai insisted that the Conservative Party strongly endorses “the multicultural nature of our nation”; a careful phrasing that further demonstrates that what the CPC “endorses” is multiculturalism as business rather than as state supported equity:

When I first came to Canada in 1977, I encountered racism in every aspect of our society. It was tough going. We can tell numerous stories about racism. Over the years tremendous progress has been achieved thanks to efforts by all Canadians. However, a new national study states that one in six Canadian adults have become victims of racism… The Conservative Party, at its convention this weekend, strongly endorsed the multicultural nature of our nation. Together with all Canadians, we will stand strongly against racism and bigotry.\(^{180}\)

It is possible to trace the shifting conservative racial project in Asian MPs statements especially in instances where a Liberal or NDP member accuses them of “intolerance” and racism. In these cases, Asian conservative statements become increasingly clear that their very act of speaking in the House as representatives of conservative parties is meant to prove that their party is not racist


and is actually better equipped to speak to race-related policy issues. For instance, on February 16, 1999, during debate on the Citizenship of Canada Act, Reform MP Gurmant Grewal had to defend himself against such accusations,

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member made some racist comments. She said that since I was not born in Canada why was I trying to stop immigration. That is not true. I have frequently been accused of this by members opposite. They say that my party or myself is trying to stop immigration. That is complete nonsense and out of order… \(^{181}\)

By February 26, 2001, in another debate on immigration, it appears that then Canadian Alliance MP Grewal had developed a script to pre-empt possible accusations of racism against his party:

I would like to tell the House and Canadians who are watching that I am a new immigrant to Canada. The Canadian Alliance and I respect the multicultural diversity of our country. I and my party also respect the contribution made by immigrants to our great country. Canada is a country of immigrants. Contrary to remarks made earlier by some members in the House during debate, our policies are pro-immigration… \(^{182}\)

Grewal argues that because he is an immigrant, the notoriously anti-immigrant policies of the party he represents suddenly become pro-immigrant. Similarly, the next day in parliament, Obhrai argued:

When the immigration minister said the Alliance Party attracted bigots, racists and Holocaust deniers, who was she talking about? Millions of people voted for our party… Can it not respect the views of the opposition and other Canadians? \(^{183}\)

Here, Grewal presents a defence of racists as any other legitimate view or perspective. Four years later, the racist policies of Reform and Canadian Alliance, as inherited by the CPC continued to be a target for the Liberal government. More than ever, the newly formed Conservative Party needed to not only shed this image but also manufacture a new identity, as the party that “understands immigration”. In the lead-up to the 2006 federal election, this point would be underscored in Asian Conservative MP statements. As one example, in April 2005, former Liberal organizer Beryl Wajsman gave the CPC fuel for fire when he said in *Le Devoir*: “The Liberal Party of Canada needs the cultural communities only for two purposes, as slaves during


an electoral campaign, or to buy tickets.” Both Nina Grewal and Rahim Jaffer took this opportunity to put the Liberal Party in the hot seat. On April 13, 2005, Jaffer argued

…the real truth has come out and it is not pretty. [The PM’s] conspirators in the Liberal Party have revealed their utter contempt for Canadians of non-white origin…This is outrageous coming from one of the Prime Minister's closest organizers. It shows the real Liberal attitude toward ethnic communities. They expect them to show up and vote Liberal, but really think of them as nothing more than their personal property….184

A careful look at Grewal’s comments on the matter on April 18, 2005 reveals that what is taken as offensive about the Liberal party’s ethnic electoral strategy was not that it took on such a strategy but that minorities were not given meaningful positions. What supposedly differentiates the CPC strategy from their opponents is that clearly visible minorities have been appointed into meaningful positions.

Mr. Speaker, last week former Liberal organizer Beryl Wajsman wrote that the party used ethnic minorities “as campaign slaves and to buy tickets”, without ever giving them meaningful positions. Liberal politicians use words like “tolerance” and “diversity”, but their actions speak of bigotry. This is typical Liberal hypocrisy. Is it not true that Mr. Wajsman's statement reveals the real Liberal attitude toward cultural communities?

These MPs argue that it is the CPC race appeal that is authentic and genuine. They argue that unlike the Liberals, the Conservatives have taken a genuine approach to cultural communities. This seeming outrage is ironic when we read this incident against the electoral campaign blueprints of the CPC as outlined in chapter 4.

On May 4, 2005, three CPC MPs Obhrai, Oda, and Nina Grewal came to the defence of their party. All three MPs argue in their statements that because they are clearly visible minorities, it is outrageous and impossible that they would be associated with a party that has been accused of being white supremacist. In his statement Obhrai argued boldly:

Mr. Speaker, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has a bad habit of race-baiting. Yesterday, he accused a huge group of Canadians, including me, of being members of the KKK. I have heard about being colour blind, but that is outrageous. Does the minister take pride in inciting hatred against Canadians?185

On the same day, MP Nina Grewal expressed the same outrage at charges against the Conservative party’s commitments to white supremacy and instead called for action against “real racism”:

   Mr. Speaker… Yesterday the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration tarnished his office and the public image of all politicians… As immigration minister he should be combating real racism… The Conservative Party understands immigration and is looking for constructive ways to improve the lives of new Canadians…  

A year before the CPC won its first minority government, ending nearly thirteen years of Liberal rule, Grewal’s statements here begin to articulate the new racial conservative script: that the CPC is not only not racist, but that it understands immigration and “new Canadians” better than the Liberal government. Just what exactly she means by “real racism” is not made clear but rather than engage with critiques about Reform racism, the MP makes a case for integration. What appears to be a debate about racism is not at all – it becomes an opportunity to address the need for immigrant integration. The Asian Conservative MP statements suggest that racism is not only an attack on target communities but on core Canadian values without any further meaningful engagements with ongoing commitments to racism. In such a context, the CPC characterizes the legacies of the Liberal government as “real racism” while codifying racial reference in the language of integration as a way to install their own supposed innocence.

The year 2005 indeed saw Asian MPs like Nina Grewal work very hard to help manufacture the new CPC image. In November 2005, with the federal election six months away, MP Grewal became very vocal about “Who really stands up for immigration”. In a series of press releases that characterized the Liberal government’s immigration policies and rhetoric as phony and distorted, Grewal commented, ”There is no party and no person more committed to efficient and fair immigration into Canada than myself and my Conservative colleagues. A Conservative government will stand up for fair immigration and put an end to Liberal distortions and immigration inefficiency”. 

   Like other Asian Conservatives, Nina Grewal’s identification “as an immigrant” becomes integral in these statements and press releases. For example, a November 15, 2006 press release

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www.ninagrewal.ca/index.asp?fxoid=FXMenu%2C6&cat_ID=18&sub_ID=143&offset=10
states, “Mrs. Grewal is also an immigrant herself and was at the funding announcement with Minister Solberg. ‘Not only is this government taking immigrants concerns seriously, but we are following through on our promises to immigrants,’ said Mrs. Grewal… “I am proud to be part of a government that supports immigrants,” concluded Grewal.\(^{188}\) Similarly on January 31, 2007, Grewal insisted: “Mr. Speaker, when it comes to new Canadians, our government cares and we show we care by delivering real results… As Canada’s new government we are seeking to turn the chapter on failed Liberal policies. Already, in just one year in office, we have achieved more than the Liberals did in 13-years… We’ve apologized for the Chinese head tax… and are engaging in talks on how best to recognize the Komagata Maru tragedy. We are producing concrete results for new Canadians”\(^{189}\)

On February 22, 2007, Jaffer reiterates Grewal’s points: “We have done a lot for the immigrant community. I am proud to be associated with a government that has done so much in so little time”.\(^{190}\) Canadians are supposed to believe that within thirteen months in government, a party born of Reform and Canadian Alliance has done more for immigrants than the Liberals ever have. It is possible to read the apologies as a way of recentring whiteness. Because MPs Grewal and Jaffer insist that the government supports immigrants, because the new government has apologized, we must put racism behind us. It should be noted again how stark the racial conservative script differs when the CPC forms the government rather than the opposition. This is not to say that Asian Conservative MPs have not highlighted legitimate Liberal government inconsistencies and reproductions of racism including the Right of Landing Fee, the racist comments lodged against Chinese and South Asians by Liberal MPs like Joe Volpe and Warren Kinsella. Yet even in these cases, the bottom line argument sustains the manufacture of Conservative innocence. It becomes further evident that the CPC opposition to racism may emanate less from a moral compass and more from an awareness of the possible economic consequences of being seen as anything other than the reputedly multicultural Canada that the world has come to “envy”. For example in 2009, when Warren Kinsella lodged racist comments against the Chinese community in Canada, parliamentary secretary for Multiculturalism, Alice


Wong, took arms. More importantly, Wong argued that Kinsella’s statements had travelled to Asia where Chinese newspapers and talk radio shows were condemning his “hurtful comments”. On January 30th, 2009 Wong stated:

As Chinese Canadians and as people who appreciate the freedom and opportunity that Canada provides, my community and I are deeply offended by these racially ignorant comments from an official spokesperson for the Liberal Party. What hurts the most … is that he refuses to apologize to the Chinese community. When will the leader of the Liberal Party realize the seriousness of this and when will we see an apology? 

A week later, on February 9, 2009 Wong again argued: “The Liberal Party's top strategist's comments are quickly becoming an international embarrassment for Canada. During these economic times, we cannot afford to needlessly offend a billion potential customers. We do not need to offend the world's most populous country… The Liberal Party has hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and offended our community”. In Wong’s demand for apology, racism is framed as hurtful comments and attributed to individual ignorance. The effects of racism are thus reduced to “hurt feelings” and to the extent that the incidents mean possible economic ramifications for the nation’s economic relationship with Asian nations, the Liberal party has shamed Canada.

Wong’s statements reflect the impetus behind the CPC race appeals including their apologies for past anti-Asian policies. That is, in these global economic times, Asia comprises a billion potential customers and these business relationships are hinged on our government’s perceived treatment of Asians in Canada. Thus, the lack of financial reparations in Harper Conservative apologies in favour of symbolic payments can be read in another way. Consider how much the new government boasted of its $307 million investment in multiculturalism and immigrant integration as well as the $13.5 million for commemorative projects and then consider the tens of billions in import and export between Asia as well as the billions in spending that Asian tourists bring each year as well as the tens of thousands of students coming to study here from Asia – all economic facts recited in Asian MP parliamentary statements. In this way, the limited symbolic payments that were offered head tax survivors can be read as investment in the context of a broader political economy. Considering the billions in global trade consequences at

stake, delivering $20,000 to four-hundred surviving head tax payers and spouses of deceased head-tax payers seems a worthwhile investment indeed. State apology contributes to the global mythology that Canada treats its Asian immigrants well; an impression that is necessary to maintaining lucrative trade agreements with Asian countries, most significantly China and India.

Asian conservative MP speech authorizes how Canadians can and cannot speak about racism, multiculturalism, national identity and security – in their collective statements Canadians find that correct way of speaking about race, diversity and multiculturalism. When the language of diversity takes the place of other more critical language, “then it is extremely important that we ask what this word actually does, in the sense of what are its effects” (Ahmed 2006, 96). Thus, even while Asian MPs have made statements about race and racism in the House, this chapter demonstrated how discourses of apology have made race unspeakable. The apologies for Chinese Canadian exclusion and the Komagata Maru demonstrate how Canada continues to maintain its supposed innocence through Asians as a way to further elude the white settler nation and its appendages. The Asian Conservative MPs have mobilized the term “racism” in parliament as a way to ultimately disavow it. Racial reference is only made allowable in arguing its irrelevance. The Harper Conservatives apologies signal a lack of commitment to structural change and even allows the state to conceal persisting systemic inequities. Indeed, the apologies have the potential to govern different populations by managing more radical or dissident elements. Discourses of apology thus function as a containment strategy. The existence of Asian conservatives not only ostensibly neutralizes histories of anti-Asian racism but all legacies of state racism.

And yet even when Asian MPs work to manufacture the party’s innocence, their inclusion remains precarious and conditional. Race is only allowable invoked in order to disavow it. And the limits of its speakability are clearly exemplified in the case of Inky Mark. One possible reason why Mark was unsuccessful the many times he tabled Bill C-333 may have to do with how he spoke about race, which exploded in one 2001 exchange with Canadian Alliance leader Stockwell Day193. As the Canadian Alliance's parliamentary critic for Immigration at the time, Mark was responsible for articulating his party's position on the Liberal government's proposed amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which had

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not been revised since 1976. As part of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Mark contributed to the parliamentary committee's work in drafting the final version of the bill and his contributions were relatively amicably received by other parties. However, on June 13, 2001, Stockwell Day proceeded to make scathing comments against the bill for what he perceived to be leniency on refugee claimants even arguing for tighter restrictions on the appeals process. These comments coming from the Alliance leader were indeed perplexing as they opposed everything that MP Mark had been working towards. Conservative Asian MP Gurmant Grewal also present at this session only spoke insofar as to defend Stockwell Day’s statements on the bill as well as his treatment of his Asian conservative colleague. For morally and socially conservative Day, MP Mark’s supposed racial justice endeavors and narratives crossed a line. According to the book *Tragedy in the Commons: Former Members of Parliament Speak out About Canada’s Failing Democracy*, MP Mark is and has been an outspoken critic of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister’s Office, and several sitting and former Conservative MPs. While a sitting MP, Mark was known as "an outsider" of the Conservative caucus (Loat and MacMillan 2014). Thus, deviating from the proper racial conservative script means that one can easily slip into becoming seen the problem: "To talk about racism is thus to be heard as making rather than exposing the problem: to talk about racism is to become the problem you pose" (Ahmed 2012, 153). MP Mark found himself on the line that cannot be crossed. Indeed, Mark’s private members bills (with all its limitations in its terms and conditions) were largely ignored by his party until the conservative brain trust discovered that apology could be wielded for electoral advantage. Thus, even for the Asian MPs positioned as racial solutions to racial problems faced by the state, the un/speakability of race continues to determine the parameters of their parliamentary speech and activities.

In addition, whether we look at Jung’s experience in 1958 or Uppal’s experience in 2008, it is clear that Asian conservatives have not been as fully embraced as their white counterparts despite declarations of racial transcendence. As discussed in chapter 3, one particular issue during Jung’s tenure revolved around a scandal where Liberal Senator Farris unapologetically declared in Senate on July 1958 “What right has this Chinaman to make statements in the UN on behalf of the Canadian people?” (July 12, 1958). In the 2007 biographic film *I Am the Canadian Delegate*, Jung is quoted in response to this event, “An oriental is an oriental and when

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our skin stands out we wont be accepted as Canadian unless we can show our fellow Canadians that we wont betray them” (Lowe, 2007). Jung’s response illustrates how “people of colour recognized that they had to work harder, that they were held to a higher standard, and that they were repeatedly forced to prove themselves in these sites” (Thobani 2007, 153 emphasis added). That is, Jung appears aware that even while occupying the position of acceptable racial minority on Canada’s racial landscape, the Asian politician remains duplicitous. Regardless of their contributions to state legitimizations of racial rule, the figure of the Asian as first and foremost the perpetual foreigner at once casts the figure in terms of its potential value and its potential peril. Caught in a foreignness that is at once acceptable as the newcomer and thus outside the parameters of historical Canadian state violence (which would force the state to reckon with its unsavoury self) and that is unacceptable as the always potentially perilous racial other, the figure of the Asian in the Canadian political imaginary cannot escape race.

Similarly, in 2008 Donna Clarkson, a former member of the executive of the local Conservative constituency association, complained to reporters that Uppal never approached the board to express an interest in running in Edmonton-Sherwood Park: “He’s not part of our community – never has been,” Clarkson said. The protesters planned to keep reminding senior officials in the party that they were not happy with the “tactics” Uppal used to gain office, and there will be more protests in the future, she added: “They broke every rule in the book to get Tim Uppal in here,” said Clarkson. “It has nothing to do with discrimination or that he’s a Sikh”. Fifty years apart, Farris and Clarkson’s reactions to the increased presence and proximity of race point not only to racial anxiety but more importantly, to the paradox of the racial state: race is irrelevant yet race is everything. It is not that Uppal’s parliamentary seat breaks every rule in the book but that the rulebook can no longer be enforced without him. That is, as I argued in chapter one, Asian conservatives are absolutely crucial to the racial state because it is from a discourse of inclusion that exclusion is now made possible.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how state apology is integral to the governance over minorities. By studying discourses of apology as circulated in parliament by conservative MPs, it is apparent

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that apology is transformative in that both those that offer and receive apologies are transformed. That is, the discourse of apology opens up possible political futures and shapes how we imagine ourselves as citizen-subjects within with various limitations. By authorizing the conditions of life through which populations are governed, racial rule shapes the parameters of political (im)possibility. The chapter discussed how state apologies for the Komagata Maru incident and Chinese Canadian exclusion received mixed responses yet critical voices were silenced by giving space to voices that accepted the state’s terms of apology and thus affirmed the state’s commitment to racial rule. Discourses of apology make it possible to contain, archive and supposedly unify Canadians as innocent subjects of an innocent nation. For example, in light of the electoral effectiveness of the 2006 and 2008 Harper government apologies, in 2014, British Columbia premier Christy Clark made a formal apology for past provincial legislature that is known for its particularly heinous history of anti-Asian racism. As part of this new race regimes, infrastructures have been created including funds and programs for commemorating and educating Canadians about histories of racism – framed as aberrations of days gone by – histories of racism that the nation has transcended. Through selective redress and non-commitments to institutional change, a whole range of injustices have been eluded.

Conservative Asian MPs do speak about race-related issues but the content and context of their speeches indicate that we cannot draw equivalencies between the existence of minority MPs and minority issues being represented. Asian Conservative contributions to the discourse of apology have ultimately maintained rather than dismantled existing organizational values structured through racial logics. That is, racial conservatives are absolutely crucial to the racial state because it is from a discourse of inclusion that exclusion is now crafted. However, this chapter also discussed the borders or limitations of speaking about race – the Asian conservative MP is at once the figurative solution to and problem of race. In the aftermath of apologies, race remains a potent force.

In the aftermath of the apologies, racism is narrated as an aberration of an otherwise racially harmonious nation. The state remains committed to the myth of Canada’s innocence. Apology without attention to systemic racism leaves unquestioned racial logics that made historical anti-Asian laws possible in the first place. That is, the discourse of apology, like other post-racial discourses, is less “a recognition of Canada’s racist past: it was its sanitization” (Price 2011, 306). The next chapter’s examination of racial rule in discourses of immigration under a
Conservative majority reveals how access to national belonging is secured at the expense of others. By becoming the new state of race repair, the conservative government permits itself to enact racist legislation moving forward with impunity. If citizenship and immigration debates count for the bulk of the ethnic related issues cited in Hansard, it is then integral that we examine the legislative debates on citizenship and immigration under CPC government rule. Thus, the next chapter explores how in the same session of parliament, Asian conservative MPs can make passionate claims about the significance of redress as tied to reckoning with racist histories in Canada. However, when the debate moves on to matters of citizenship and immigration in the same session, they will mobilize the same racist language and logics of exclusion to justify CPC bills. These debates demonstrate that in the twilight of repair, the Harper conservative government including Asian MPs continues to differentiate between “legitimate” versus “illegitimate” outsiders. Even with promises to ensure that the nation will make sure race-based exclusions like the Chinese Canadian exclusion and Komagata Maru incident will never happen again, discourse that depicts racial others as queue jumpers and foreign criminals have not dissipated especially in debating who does and does not belong in Canada.
Chapter 7:
“It Takes a Good Immigrant Story to Make a White Country”

Mr. Speaker, queue jumpers are paying human smugglers to abuse Canada’s immigration system. Our country is being treated like a doormat. Canadians are sick and tired of illegal human smuggling boats coming to our shores. Yet the Liberals are siding with the immigration industry rather than ordinary Canadians by refusing to get tough on human smuggling.

- MP Tim Uppal

These are all measures that are set up and that we have invested in to better identify the criminality of immigrants.

- MP Chungsen Leung

On October 17 2009, one year after the CPC government apologized for the Komagata Maru incident, 76 men travelled to Canada on a ship called Ocean Lady and in August 2010, MV Sun Sea carried 492 asylum seekers from Sri Lanka to Canada’s west coast. Before they even entered Canadian shores, the Conservative government decided that these boats were possibly diseased and likely criminal. Soon after the second ship arrived, Minister of Public Safety commented that the federal government “must ensure that our refugee system is not hijacked by criminals or terrorists” (Derosa 2012). The asylum seekers were detained after authorities examined them for disease. According to Vancouver refugee lawyer, Douglas Cannon, Sun Sea carried typically one week’s worth of refugees to Canada “but it was treated as a national crisis”. After disembarking, “The men were sent to a maximum-security facility in Maple Ridge, the Fraser Regional Correctional Centre, where they were subject to the same rules as the criminals in detention. Women without children were detained at the medium-security Alouette Correctional Centre, while those with kids were held at the Burnaby Youth Custody Centre” (Raj 2012).
The government wasted no time in tabling Bill C-49 on October 21, 2010 The Preventing human smugglers from abusing Canada’s immigration system Act. One year after assuring the House in his Komagata Maru apology that “this government will continually strive

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199 Ibid.
to ensure that similar unjust practices are never allowed to happen again,” Harper and his then-minority government began launching its program of anti-immigrant/anti-refugee legislation. Based on the narratives circulated during and after the apologies, we should expect that the party produce legislation in the best interest of minorities. We should expect that racial conservative MPs do not appeal to “negative stereotypes, resentments and prejudices associated with the racial group to which they belong” (McIlwain and Caliendo 2011, 17). Instead, the Harper Conservatives, beginning with their reaction to the arrival of Sun Sea and Ocean Lady, have demonstrated the full extent of the apology’s vacuity. As reflected in the parliamentary excerpts above, this chapter explores how racial conservative immigration scripts have contributed to demarcating a category of moderate law-abiding immigrants that “play by the rules” from a category of supposedly illegal and criminal foreigners unfit for Canada.

The previous chapters have shown how Asian Conservative MPs have become integral to the Conservative racial project (chapter 4), have circulated stories of authenticity as a way to establish racial expertise (chapter 5) and ultimately, have participated in advancing an agenda that Abu-Laban has called “Reform-by-stealth” and insisting that the government is post-racial. These chapters made evident the Harper Conservatives’ race-appeal strategies through the parliamentary contributions of the Asian conservative MPs. These MPs have used race appeals to make interventions on behalf of conservative policy positions and political projects including CPC apologies for Chinese Canadian exclusion (2006) and the Komagata Maru incident (2008). By declaring itself the new party of diversity and race repair, the conservative government has permitted itself to enact racist legislation moving forward with impunity. In the aftermath of the apologies, race intensifies as a unifying discourse in parliamentary debates on immigration and asylum seekers. The premise that racialized Members of Parliament could not possibly advance anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments has been mobilized in parliamentary debates that led to the successful passage of legislation that scholars, opposition members, civil society, and human rights organizations across Canada and around the world have called unconstitutional, excessively punitive and the intensification of the “discursive disappearance of the refugee” (Macklin 2005, 369; Mann 2009, 203-4). As such, chapter seven continues to examine the operationalization of race appeals in the Asian MPs’ parliamentary activities particularly in their contributions to immigration and refugee policy debate.
This chapter examines parliamentary discourse surrounding three related bills passed under a majority CPC government as entry points into the analysis of broader parliamentary contributions and interventions made by Asian Conservative MPs pertaining to immigration, citizenship, and refugees. My primary focus is Bill C-31 *Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act* introduced by Minister of Immigration Kenney that received royal assent in June 2012. Parliamentary debates related to two other bills focusing its provisions on “foreign nationals” overlapped with those of Bill C-31: Bill C-43 *The Faster removal of foreign criminals act* tabled by Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews received Royal Assent in June 2013. Bill C-10 *Safe Streets and Communities Act* introduced by Justice Minister Rob Nicholson received Royal Assent on March 13, 2012. That race became a formally pronounced legislative concern for ministries managing immigration, public safety, and justice immediately after they won their majority government confirms the Harper Conservatives’ highly prioritized racial project.

Together these parliamentary debates cast immigrants and refugees as criminals threatening the health, wealth, and security of “law-abiding” ordinary Canadians. The bills represent a broader program of changes to Canadian immigration policy that politicizes the judicial process, giving unprecedented authority over the lives of immigrants and refugees to select politicians, eliminating processes of accountability under the rule of law deemed as wastes of time and taxpayer money.

*How have Racial Conservative MPs contributed to and justified these racist laws? How have such racist laws become possible in Canada?* To explore these questions, it is also important to consider the larger context and content of immigration policy discourse involving racial conservative MPs specifically debates in reaction to the 1999 arrival of “Chinese boat people”, September 11, 2001, and the arrival of *Ocean Lady* (2009) and *MV Sun Sea* (2010). These events triggered intense rightward shifts in parliamentary debate tying immigration policy with national security policy. This data demonstrates how racial conservative scripts become acute during times marking a perceived national crises of whiteness. That is, rather than temper racist discourse around immigrants and asylum seekers, racial conservative scripts contributed to demarcating a category of moderate, law-abiding immigrants from a category of illegal, fraudulent, criminals unfit for Canada; thus, providing justifications for their containment and removal. Emerging in the discourse we find racial logics and rhetoric apparent in the deliberative processes that brought about past anti-Asian exclusionary regulations suggesting that the federal
legislature is anything if post-race. A critical discourse analysis of these debates reveals how racial violence becomes justified through racial conservative scripts in a so-called post-racial parliament. I outline the fundamental changes to immigration law before examining Asian Conservative discourse contributions.

**Fundamental changes to Immigration and refugee policy**

On February 16, 2012, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney introduced Bill C-31 *Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act*: An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act. Just six months later, the bill passed with 159 to 132 votes and received royal assent on June 29, 2012. Bill C-31 was an amalgamation of Bills C-11 (40th parliament, 3rd session) *The Balanced Refugee Reform Act* and Bill C-4 (41st parliament, 1st session) *The Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act*. Previously, in March 2010 Kenney had introduced Bill C-11 *the Balanced Refugee Reform Act* based on “extensive consultations with refugee groups, human rights activists and immigration lawyers, and fruitful negotiations with opposition parties” wherein compromises were reached and the bill received royal assent in June 2010 (Goar 2012). Bill C-31’s other antecedent, Bill C-4 was the reintroduction of its failed predecessor, Bill C-49 that was tabled in reaction to the national crisis spurred by the arrival of two ships *Ocean Lady* (2009) and *MV Sun Sea* (2010). Indeed, despite its tempered title, *The Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act* comprises the same provisions of Bill C-4 *The Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act*. Both sponsored under a minority Conservative government by Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews and Immigration Minister Kenney, Bills C-4 and C-49 received wide criticism from opposition parties and many human rights organizations and thus failed as a result of proposed unconstitutional changes to Canadian policy towards immigrants and asylum seekers. Then in February 2012, without even giving Bill C-11 a chance to be implemented, Kenney introduced Bill C-31, only this time with a majority government compromises were withdrawn. The Conservatives would no longer need to temper their policy goals.

The 2013 Report to the Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship states that

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Bill C-31 amended The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA 2002) in significant ways, such as introducing a new regime for designated foreign nationals who are part of an “irregular arrival” (Tilson 2013). The report also declares that the Bill modified the refugee determination system in Canada with the consequence of “placing more emphasis on removals” (Tilson 2013). Officially, Bill C-31 claims to speed up the refugee protection process making it faster and fairer for genuine refugees while targeting human smugglers and “irregular arrivals” (CIC Backgrounder 2012c). Officially, the government argues that Bill C-31 focuses on holding “human smugglers and traffickers, terrorists or individuals who have committed crimes against humanity” accountable (CIC Backgrounder 2012a; CIC Backgrounder 2012b). Officially, the government argues that detaining asylum seekers will deter criminals from “disappearing into Canadian cities”. In actuality, the Bill’s provisions diverge from international law and punish people escaping grave danger, death, sexual violence and war for not having their papers in standard order. Indeed, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) has denounced all incarnations of Bill C31, pointing out that almost none of its provisions have anything to do with smugglers (who in any case are usually not in Canada). Amnesty International asserted that “human rights violations at issue are so fundamental, numerous, and inter-related” (CCLA 2012). In a rare move, the Justice for Immigrants and Refugees Coalition composed of nearly sixty national organizations across Canada including Amnesty International, the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and the Canadian Council for Refugees called for the withdrawal of Bill C31 in its entirety. The coalition stated, the changes are unconstitutional and undermine "Canada's

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203 Ibid. 
humanitarian traditions" and violate "Canada's international obligations" (Corrigan 2012). Moreover, in their contributions to the 2013 Report, the Liberals stated that they could not support the report and recommendations in their entirety while the NDP argued that “The Punishing Refugees Act,” does not reflect the balanced view of Canada’s immigration system that witnesses presented, and thus recommended that the Conservative government “abandon its ill-considered legislative approach” (Tilson 2013, 67).

Arbitrary and Indiscriminate Detention

Previously, Canada formally disallowed the arbitrary detention of asylum seekers. While the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) did have the authority to detain refugees where there was evidence that an individual posed a danger to Canada or represented a flight risk, the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) was required to review the reasons for detention within 48 hours and subsequently after seven days and then every thirty-day period to ensure that detention continued only when reasonable – a process that Kenney has accused of creating a “revolving door” allowing disingenuous claimants to stay in Canada (Arbel and Showler 2013). No longer. Bill C31 gives the Minister of Public Safety - the same minister that believed MV Sun Sea carried Tamil Tigers – the authority to unitarily designate a group as few as two people as “irregular arrival” – particularly those arriving by sea - if the minister “has reasonable grounds to suspect that, in relation to the arrival in Canada of the group, there has been, or will be, a contravention of subsection 117(1)” of the Immigrant and Refugee Protection Act’s (2002) human smuggling provisions (Amnesty International Canada 2012). That is, under Bill C31, no substantial evidence is required for the Minister to designate a category of “foreign nationals” as irregular arrivals - administrative convenience and suspected criminality suffice. The original draft of the bill proposed the automatic detention of such designated foreign nationals for a minimum period of one year without judicial review. These measures prompted

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208 Tilson. 2013. Standing on Guard for thee. CIC.


public and political outcry forcing Minister Kenney to come back with amendments so that a review would take place within fourteen days of arrival and then again every six months (Tilson 2013).

Once in detention, refugee claimants categorized as “irregular” have two weeks to submit a Basis of Claim document and if they are unable to prove their identity, they remain detained until removed. Amnesty International has argued that the imposition of such strict timelines on those that have just been incarcerated in a so-called “safe haven” after long journeys escaping trauma - not exclusive to torture and sexual violence - is not only inhumane, but also contravenes international laws to which Canada has been party. These challenges notwithstanding, the new timeline does not mean that the government will expedite access to reliable legal counsel, translators and other support. Officials may read any perceived hesitation or withholding of information as a reflection of fraudulent behaviour and suspected criminality becomes sufficient grounds for deportation. Moreover, “designated foreign nationals” are denied the right to access the Refugee Appeal Division if their claim is rejected. In several articles and reports, Peter Showler, former chairperson of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada, argued that the Canadian government, as a signatory of the United Nations Refugee Convention “cannot punish refugee claimants who do not have prior identity documents” (Arbel and Showler 2013). Yet, this is exactly what Bill C31 does: asylum seekers as young as sixteen years old are required to endure this process of mandatory detention. Indeed, as part of the Minister’s new authority, children under the age of sixteen are either detained with their mother or forcibly separated from their parents by being placed with a welfare agency. The government presents this fate as though it is a humane set of options (Mallick 2012; CIC Backgrounder 2012b).

Detaining asylum seekers who have committed no crimes and who are protected under international laws is hardly punishment according to the Immigration Minister who has described Canada’s holding centres as “former three-star hotels”. When confronted by CBC News with photographs of children in detention “surrounded by razor-wire fences, guards, surveillance cameras and rooms with barred windows” the Minister had no comment. Of the 289 child

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211 Tilson. 2013. Standing on Guard for thee. CIC.
214 CIC. 2012b. “Backgrounder-Protecting our Streets and Communities from Criminal and National Security Threats”, February 16
refugees detained in Canada at the time, “75 are under 5 years old, 65 are aged 6 to 9, 55 are 10 to 12 and 92 are between 13 and 17, the CBC reported. It would be one thing if these children were allowed to live with their families, but no. Canada keeps the fathers in a separate section of the building. Children and their mothers can visit them only at set times” (Mallick 2012). What makes the immigration minister’s comparison of detention centres with hotels further confounding is that according to a McGill University study on the impact of detention on the mental health of asylum seekers in Canada, those detained for three weeks or longer are more likely to suffer from depression, anxiety or posttraumatic shock. Moreover, detainees deemed suicidal or experiencing behavioral problems are isolated or transferred to a maximum-security prison (Nicoud 2012). Adding a further layer of dehumanization, the immigration minister also declared that refugees would have limited access to healthcare, as the Interim Federal Health Program (IFH), first established in 1957, would be scaled back (Black and Keung 2012; CIC Backgrounder 2012a). In examining Hansard it becomes clear that the minister is able to justify these harsh measures because his statements and actions expose his disdain for the very idea of refugees. Kenney has capriciously argued, “Many of the refugees who make it to Canada’s shores are not fleeing persecution”, suggesting that if their lives were truly at risk they would disembark in other countries along the route rather than making the long trip to Canada. What the federal government proposes is modest compared to other jurisdictions, Kenney added” (Raj 2012). By this logic, it would be indeed pointless to review individual cases through a system of accountability. Nor would it be necessary to consider international conventions because the minister has already decided that refugees are inherently fraudulent simply set on stealing Canada’s healthcare and other imagined benefits reserved for “deserving” ordinary Canadians.

The fate of “genuine” refugees

After enduring this process of detention, even if a claimant is successful and the state determines that a refugee is “genuine,” there is now a five-year mandatory wait time for permanent resident status (CIC Backgrounder 2012a).\(^{219}\) This means that recognized refugees are not allowed to leave Canada (minimizing employment opportunities) and doing so could result in expulsion. Nor are they able to sponsor their family members abroad thus prolonging family reunification. This aspect of Bill C-31 reflects the Harper Conservatives’ broader effort to close the doors to family class immigrants. For example, in 2011, the Harper Conservatives introduced a moratorium on thousands of applications from parents and grandparents with family in Canada as part of the *Action Plan for Faster Immigration* (Tilson 2012).\(^{220}\) Indeed the migration of older immigrants supposedly unable to contribute to Canada’s economy is framed as a drain on already overburdened social services. As part of their recommendations, NDP members of the Standing Committee indicated how this perceived family class drain as well as the Harper Conservatives’ supposed commitment to family reunification have been misrepresented: “The government has steadily reduced the number of family class visas issued from 2006 through 2010 - CIC figures: 70,517, 66,242, 65,582, 65,204, 60,220 (Tilson 2012, 41).\(^{221}\) In light of these numbers and considering that one if the Harper Conservatives’ three-point platform is indeed “Standing up for Families”\(^{222}\), then we are forced to ask “whose families”?

On March 9, 2011, in making arguments in favour of Bill C-566, *An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (sponsorship of a relative)*, MP Devinder Shory has used his own family overseas as an example to invoke the stereotypically anti-immigrant trope of unknown masses of racial others coming to abuse Canada’s generosity:

> As a first generation new Canadian, this gives me the opportunity to analyze the bill as it could affect millions of new Canadians such as myself… Today, one in five Canadians is foreign born and is likely to have extended family overseas. If every newly sponsored relative could bring their own immediate family over, and every one of those newcomers could sponsor one of their extended relatives, the potential number of new applicants would be enormous. I myself have five siblings and more than seventy-five extended family members living outside of

\(^{219}\) CIC. 2012a. “Backgrounder” February 16.


\(^{221}\) Ibid.

Canada. I ask hon. members to imagine what the impact of this bill would be on our system if all of them were eligible as proposed.223

Indeed the bill would affect new Canadians inasmuch as it would restrict family reunification but Shory is not invoking his “new Canadian” position of expertise to make a case for the interests of new Canadians at all. Instead, Shory’s statements appeal to negative stereotypes about racialized immigrants that have been circulating throughout these debates when he asks parliament to imagine the national crisis that would arise if, heaven-forbid, people that look like him were able to sponsor into Canada all of their foreign siblings and extended family members. The imagery depicts the threat of race par excellence. These examples demonstrate the extent of the Harper Conservatives’ trenchant alienation of two of the three historical immigrant classes to Canada: the family class and refugees, in favour solely of business class immigrants.

New powers vested in Ministers

Along with vesting the minister of public security with the authority to detain “irregular arrivals”, Bill C-31 also authorizes the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to designate a country as “safe” without the advice of independent experts and then impose discriminatory limitations on the rights of refugee claimants originating from that country. Under the previous act, Bill C-11, this list of Designated Countries of Origin (DCO) – countries considered “safe” and thus unlikely to produce refugees – was to be determined by an expert panel that would then advise the minister (Bill C-11 2011). Refugees from supposedly “safe” countries “will have their case fast-tracked through the refugee process, with their claims heard within 30 to 45 days. They will not be able to appeal the decision and will be removed from Canada in a year” (Payton 2012).224

Furthermore, under Bill C31, refugee status and permanent resident status guarantee no protections. Instead, the immigration Minister has been given the power to apply for cessation, which means “the Minister will be able to apply for an order that a person is no longer a refugee because the conditions in their country have changed…the significant change is under the new law if the Minister applies and if the Minister is successful in obtaining an order of cessation that

will immediately strip the person of their permanent resident status” and is subject to immediate deportation.\textsuperscript{225} This means that after waiting five years for status, after settling, working, and building a home in Canada for years, the government can still decide to deport permanent residents if the immigration minister decides he would like them to go. Indeed citizenship is the only protection against this perpetual threat of deportation; a path that the government has made further challenging with amendments to the citizenship act in Bill C-24 (Canada, 2014).\textsuperscript{226} NDP immigration critic Don Davies has remarked that C-31 “politicizes a process that should be judicial…impartial, fair and arm’s length”. Instead, vesting such power onto a single minister aligns with the Conservative party’s objective to delegitimize the Charter and recentre the supremacy of parliament. In addition, the Justice for Immigrants and Refugees Coalition objects to the Bill as bad policy, “The concentration of enormous and vaguely defined powers in a Minister, with no mechanisms of judicial accountability, displays a dangerous inclination away from the rule of law and principles of responsible and democratic governance”.\textsuperscript{227} In their expert witness testimonies to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, which studied Bill C-31, and in media editorials, professors of law and immigration lawyers have argued, “The power that the legislation confers on the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration is broad, unfettered and virtually immunized from judicial oversight. He can throw people in jail, deny them a fair opportunity to present their refugee claim, inflict five years of forced family separation on recognized refugees, and hang the threat of deportation over their heads for many more years. All of this should be unimaginable in a country that respects the rule of law” (Macklin and Waldman 2012).\textsuperscript{228}

**Speaking as “Legitimate” Immigrants and children of immigrants**

Indeed, for critics of the Harper Conservatives’ reconstruction of Canada’s immigration policy, that all of these provisions are now law seems outrageous. Despite the public and political

\textsuperscript{225} Corrigan April 4, 2012; CIC Backgrounder 2012c.


\textsuperscript{228} Macklin, Audrey and Lorne Waldman. 2012. “Ottawa’s bogus refugee bill: Immigration Minister Jason Kenney’s proposed new bill on ‘bogus’ refugees is arbitrary and cruel”. The Toronto Star, February 22. 
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/02/22/ot.html Accessed April 15, 2014
outcry, the Conservative government has insisted that the control provisions outlined in Bill C-31 as well as C-43 and C-10 are not at all anti-immigrant. Conversely, they have argued that immigrants themselves are demanding that the Conservative government usher in these new restrictions. In an interview with the Huffington Post, Kenney announced: “It might shock some people, but based on what we’ve seen, most Canadians think that the approach that we’ve recommended is far too lenient”. In fact, the minister contended that he has only received suggestions from these groups to make the provisions even stricter. Kenney concluded: “We found when the human smuggling vessels arrived on the west coast, that by far, the strongest negative reaction was from newcomers. Why? Because the vast majority of them came through the legal system”. Such discourse that pits “legitimate” racial others against so-called illegitimate foreign nationals has certainly been echoed in racial conservative parliamentary statements.

Like the Prime Minister, the immigration minister, and Public Safety Minister, Asian Conservative MPs have also mobilized a “racialized discourse of illegality” (Jiwani 2006, 49) through “lexical selectivity” (Greenberg 2000, 523) that is, by repeatedly using phrases such as “queue-jumpers,” “bogus refugees,” “fraudsters,” ”and “foreign criminals” to delegitimize refugee claimants. That is, the participation of racial conservative MPs in immigration debate has not correlated with the dissipation of discourse that depicts racialized immigrants in negative stereotypes. MPs Parm Gill, Chungsen Leung, Joe Daniel, Devinder Shory, Bal Gosal, Tim Uppal, Michael Chong, Wai Young and Nina Grewal – most of whom are immigrants to Canada themselves - have all contributed the racial conservative script to parliamentary debate on Bill C-31 and its antecedents. The Asian MPs have reiterated versions of the CPC’s immigration policy bottom line statement: "Canadians take great pride in the generosity and compassion of our immigration and refugee programs. But they have no tolerance for those who abuse our generosity or take advantage of our country” (Kenney 2012). Like immigration bills that have preceded it, Bill C-31 offers legislative framework that claims to “reap the economic, social and cultural benefits of immigration, while protecting the health, safety, and security of Canadians”

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As repeated in Asian MP parliamentary statements, immigrants and refugees are welcome in Canada and are a necessary part of economic stimulus but never at the expense of national security. Indeed Asian MP contributions always include the parliamentary discourse strategy that van Dijk has called the “disclaimer”. These parliamentary statements begin with long sections of “positive self-presentation in the form of nationalist glorification of ‘long traditions of tolerance’ or ‘hospitality for the oppressed’” (van Dijk 2002, 156) before launching into anti-immigrant and anti-refugee declarations.

In C-31 debates, frequent disclaimers are not limited to: “immigration is an important part of Canada’s history”, “Canada is a land of immigrants built by immigrants,” ”legal migration enriches us all,” “this government is a strong advocate and supporter of the humanitarian division of our immigration program” and “Canada stands for freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law”. Such disclaimers are followed by associations of racial others with financial burdens, unwillingness to integrate, drugs, gangs, crime, and threats to national security. That is, rhetorical disclaimers suggesting that the government is not racist always accompany the legitimization of restrictions in immigration policy. Part of making the case for immigration restrictions is thus maintaining the appearance or impression of legitimacy and credibility. Appeals to unnecessary and unjust immigration restrictions thus necessarily include frequent references to “specialized knowledge sources” or evidentials (van Dijk 2003 111). As detailed in chapter two, “Politicians in their own way, need to show the evidence of what they claim, and therefore also have recourse to a set of evidentials” (van Dijk 2003 111). For instance, white Conservative MPs refer to statements made by their Asian CPC colleagues.

Such appeals often mobilize hyperbolic stories of immigration fraud where isolated cases become generalized representations of the supposed inherent criminality of all immigrants. van Dijk’s study of post-9/11 British parliamentary discourse revealed frequent reference to “credible Muslim sources” as a way to assert that the “negative words concerning terrorists are not understood as being against Muslims and in order to express the support of Muslims for the campaign against terrorists” (van Dijk 2003, 112). Reference to “credible” racial sources as well as frequent and explicit claims of admiration for legitimate immigrants and refugees thus function as forms of impression management “to disclaim possible prejudice or racism” in the

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very process of legislating racism (van Dijk 2008, 169-170). Unlike van Dijk’s British study, in the Canadian context, the “specialized knowledge sources” and evidentials are not only mentioned in parliamentary statements but rather the “credible racial sources” themselves physically stand in parliament to make these same appeals that work to justify racial violence through the law.

Statements made by the Asian MPs in Bill C-31 debates – as in debates for Bill C-49 and C-4 as well as immigration debates prior to these bills - nearly always make reference to their “being an immigrant” and in these cases, they not only speak as MPs but as immigrants or children of immigrants who properly “waited in the queue.” Both MPs Shory and Leung have repeatedly used their immigrant story as a way to authenticate their support for Bill C-31. On March 15, 2012 Shory spoke in support of Bill C-31:

> Canadians are enormously generous people. For decades, Canadians have welcomed millions of immigrants into our country with open arms. I know this because I was one of them. I know first-hand that whether we fly, sail or drive here, Canada had a place for those who work hard and play by the rules. …However, Canadians also demand that our immigration system keep out those who mean our country harm, those who aim to take advantage of our generosity and those who pretend to need our humanitarian protection but are actually just queue jumpers who do not want to wait in line like everyone else.

I often like to describe my constituents in Calgary Northeast as the hardest working constituents in Canada. Our people are industrious, enterprising, skilled workers and many of them are new Canadians. They have immigrant stories similar to my own. I can tell this House that the message I get from my constituents is that they support a fair and balanced immigration system that does not punish those who play by the rules. They want us to keep out those who break our laws. They demand that we close the doors to those who lie and cheat their way into Canada.\(^{232}\)

It is apparent that the disclaimer portion of the speech ends with the words “however” where statements that follow underscore the CPC bottom line on immigration. Following Shory, NDP MP John Rafferty (Thunder Bay-Rainy River, ON) expresses his unease with the bill’s provisions on detention:

> Canadian governments in the past have had no problem turning refugees away from our shores to their death. Governments in the past have had no problem with detaining Canadians, Japanese Canadians, Ukrainian Canadians, Italian Canadians, and the list goes on. Whenever we talk about detention, I get a little concerned. I

would like to ask my friend across the way what he really thinks about the
detention provisions that are in the bill.\(^{233}\)

In response to MP Rafferty’s request that we consider the provisions outlined in Bill C-31 within
a larger historical framework, Shory stated:

Mr. Speaker, let me tell my colleague what I think and what my constituents
think. I am an immigrant. The constituency I represent has a lot of new Canadians.
They are all outraged by the abuse of our system. Talking about detention, as a
matter of fact the bill would give potential immigrants an opportunity, I would say
a fair chance, of dealing with the issue in a very timely manner. If we talk to
Canadians, in the existing system, it takes years and years to find out the fate of a
genuine refugee.\(^{234}\)

Instead of engaging with an important question raised more than once in the Bill C-31 debates,
Shory conveys for the House that as an immigrant – and as a spokesperson of new Canadians -
he believes that the arbitrary detention of refugees is actually fair and argues that the government
is indeed considering the interests of minorities. The MPs have gone so far as to argue that
detention is actually a service to the refugees because their (il)legitimacy will be adjudicated
more quickly unlike the previous system which involved several hearings. None of these MPs’
appeals acknowledge that these processes existed so that refugees would not be wrongfully
expelled from Canada. Similarly, on the same day, MP Leung echoes Shory’s statements that
harken back to the Reform Party’s position that “criminal immigrants” are only able to abuse
Canada because our immigration system is truly a loophole that enables people to jump the
queue:

Madam Speaker, I am also an immigrant to this country and it took me four years
to wait in the queue. If I were to see other people jumping the queue, I would be
pretty upset. People do abuse the Canadian immigration system because they
think it is so lax.\(^{235}\)

On March 12, Leung, who is also the parliamentary secretary for Multiculturalism spoke at
length about so-called “bogus refugees”:


Bill C-31 would restore integrity to our asylum system by making Canada's refugee determination process faster and fairer, resulting in faster protection for legitimate refugees and faster removal of bogus claimants. Canada has a well-deserved international reputation for having the most generous and fair immigration system in the world. Canada provides protection to more than one in ten refugees resettled each year worldwide, more than any other developed country in the world. However, the fact is that Canada's asylum system is vulnerable to abuse. Canadians are generous and welcoming but we have no tolerance for those who refuse to play by the rules and abuse our generosity. The current flawed refugee system has made Canada a target for those who are all too happy to take unfair advantage of us. As a result, too many taxpayer dollars are being spent on people who are not fleeing genuine persecution, but seek to exploit Canada's generous asylum system to receive lucrative taxpayer-funded health care, welfare and other social benefits…

Again, Canada’s humanitarian reputation is invoked in this statement only to betray said reputation. What Canadians are supposed to glean from such statements is that our immigration program must indeed be lax if these men who came to Canada as immigrants themselves argue so. Moreover, Leung references “countless stores in the media on almost a daily basis about bogus refugees” as part of his statement with the presumption that such reports present an accurate portrayal of events. Similarly, on June 10, 2010, Nina Grewal relied on a *Globe and Mail* report to argue:

> Mr. Speaker, thousands of people are obtaining Canadian citizenship fraudulently, by lying about how much time they have spent in Canada. The *Globe and Mail* found 300 people claiming to live at the same address in Mississauga and *Radio-Canada* exposed a similar scheme going on in Quebec.

Aside from news media reports that have highlighted the exaggeration of moral panic incited about the figure of the “bogus refugee,” scholars have also extensively examined widespread negative representations of immigrants and refugees as criminals in Canadian news media (Bradimore and Bauder 2011; Hier and Greenberg 2002; Mahtani 2001; Bauder 2008; Henry and Tator 2002).

Similarly, the statements often refer to the supposed “obvious bogus refugee” without qualifying the criteria that makes someone supposedly unfit for entry into Canada, which in turn

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has the effect of criminalizing all asylum seekers – a problem that Conservative MPs generally refuse to acknowledge in the debates. Statements made on March 15th, 2012 reflect the conservative government’s intention of not only punishing human smugglers but also anyone that would seek the service of human smugglers to enter Canada “by way of dangerous voyage”. That is, Bill C-31 does not distinguish between smugglers and refugees who have no other way of escaping persecution than to board a ship. For example, on March 15, 2012, Parm Gill spoke to the “fact” of “obvious bogus refugees”:

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned earlier, our immigration system is far too generous to bogus refugee claimants, who would like to take advantage of our system and all of the services that federal and provincial services provide in terms of social assistance, education, health care and so on. If a legitimate refugee comes to this country, Bill C-31 would actually help that person…The bill targets bogus individuals who are trying to take advantage of our country and our system and Canadian taxpayers.238

Gill continues:

We know that it takes on average four and half years to get an obvious bogus refugee out of this country, and that is what is costing Canadian taxpayers billions of dollars. While these bogus refugees are here, they are obviously costing taxpayers in social assistance, health care and education.239

Here Gill suggests that the unspecified – yet supposedly excessive - number of “bogus refugees” is a fact that has cost taxpayers for too long. Indeed, the government also attempted to justify the bill’s provisions in terms of all the taxpayer money that will be saved. This myth was dispelled by the Auditor General, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and the Canadian Council of Refugees, which found that arbitrary, indiscriminate and mandatory detention provisions will actually cost the country approximately $70,000 per detainee. This figure does not include "the social cost and the cost to the proper integration of immigrants that will be incarcerated for 12 months" (Corrigan 2012; CCLA 2012; CCR 2012).240 As another reference, the interception, processing, and detention of migrants aboard MV Sun Sea in 2010 as well as subsequent CBSA anti-smuggling efforts abroad cost the government $24 million dollars. Moreover, “The cost to the Immigration and Refugee Board, largely for detention reviews was $900,000” (Derosa

239 Ibid.
As yet another reference, Bill C-10, which includes providing “for victims of terrorism who are seeking to sue the perpetrator” something Canada’s budget watchdog estimated will cost the provinces $145 million a year. The government has been coy about the overall cost to the provinces and has insisted the entire Safe Streets and Communities Act will run the federal government $78.6 million over five years” (Cohen 2012). These figures hardly reflect prudent government spending or a commitment to reducing the budget. Nor do these figures suggest that citizens as taxpayers will save money anytime soon because of these provisions. Rather, what it reveals is the Harper Conservatives’ spending priorities. While the costs of accountability in duly processing refugee claimants is intolerable, the higher costs incurred in detaining and criminalizing immigrants and refugees as per C-31, C-43 and, C-10 are lauded as the Harper Conservatives “bent on taking back the reins of justice, no matter the price” (Kheiriddin 2012).

On March 26, 2012, Wai Young (Vancouver South, BC) responds to NDP immigration critic Don Davies (Vancouver Kingsway, BC) who questioned the criminalization of refugees arriving by boat with reference to Vietnamese community in Vancouver and the government’s use of the term “jumping queues”, Young stated:

Mr. Speaker, I am shocked and appalled that the member opposite would say that Canada should be opening its doors and borders to anyone who happens to arrive on a boat. That is precisely what he just said. We know in this day and age of national security risks and the different events that have happened worldwide, even in Canada, there are risks inherent in people arriving on our shores illegally without any documentation or sense of purpose. I think it is entirely reasonable that Bill C-31 would detain people until those things can be clarified. I would urge the member opposite to support our communities and protect Canadians and our country by supporting the bill.

It is worth examining the outrage expressed by MP Young in reaction to reflections on the provisions of C-31 in the greater context of Canadian history that specifically reference examples of past exclusionary laws as well as the humanitarian tradition that enabled many refugees to

seek asylum in Canada. Young’s example here is not unique rather such reaction is patterned in the debate as well as in committee meetings. Indeed, Young’s reaction can be registered through the Prime Minister’s statement against “committing sociology” in reaction to the question of structural violence. It must be noted that Young does not specify refugees as a single threat in this statement, rather the MP says “we know,” with vague reference to “events” worldwide and “even in Canada”, that there are people that come with inherent risks. Young is “shocked and appalled” because “we know” despite any amount of evidence that suggest otherwise that not only refugees but foreign bodies in general both here and worldwide are a national risk to us where “us” is not “we” Conservatives but “we” Canadians and more generally “we civilized people” where the general “polarization between “us” and “them” and its political implications could not be more clear. van Dijk (2003) has observed such patterns in parliamentary statements where under states of perceived crisis, “unity and consensus must be respected” (115) and “that whatever the democratic freedom of opinion, there are limits to such freedom” (Ibid 116). That is, it is not just the content of Davies’ statement that infuriates Young and the Harper Conservatives; it is that the opposition question the Bill at all, whereby doing so has been equated with opposition members siding with prospective foreign criminals rather than prospective Canadian victims. As such, the testimony and contributions of opposition members, civil society, human rights organizations and news media to the deliberations of proposed government legislature – sine qua non for democracy – have received blanket accusations of being naïve, undemocratic and unpatriotic.

In the Meetings of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

The 2013 Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration aptly titled “Standing on Guard for Thee: Ensuring that Canada’s Immigration System is Secure” indicates that on December 8, 2011 – only months after the Harper Conservatives won their majority government – the Committee “determined that a security study regarding the immigration system was necessary” in order to “provide recommendations to the Government as to what further actions should be taken to improve the security of Canada’s immigration system” (Tilson 2013, 1). Bill C-31 was referred to the Committee on April 23, 2012 and was studied during a total of fifteen meetings. As the only racial Conservative member of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration at the time that Bill C-31 was debated, Leung’s contributions to Bill
C-31 discourse extend beyond parliamentary debate. While Leung’s contribution to the Committee are not as prolific as some of his colleagues’, his involvement in four Standing Committee meetings between April 30, 2012 and May 3, 2012 stand out. Interestingly, of these meetings, Leung’s contribution was most powerful in the second of two meetings held on April 30, 2012, a meeting where Leung himself was present but did not pose any questions. In the final minutes of the meeting, NDP MP Jinny Sims has the floor when she is interrupted by Conservative MP Rick Dykstra whose argument against her concern about fearmongering “rhetoric” is as concise and illustrative as it is meant to powerful:

Jinny Sims (Newton-North Delta, BC): I think that some of the rhetoric—and I'm going to use the word “rhetoric”—I have heard today is fearmongering. It leads people, if they were to listen to certain testimony, to think that everybody who comes on our shore, including the grandparents of many of us sitting here or relatives of many of us sitting here, has come here because they want to defraud the system, that all they've come here for is to bypass and use and abuse the system. I can tell you that I've worked with refugees over the last number of years who don't like getting money from the state, who get out and work. They work very hard and they get on; they get their education, and they become contributing members in this society. That's what Canada is.

Rick Dykstra (St. Catherines, ON): You mean like Chungsen Leung?

David Tilson (Chair): Mr. Dykstra

Jinny Sims: Canada is a nation that is filled-

Rick Dykstra: Yes, that’s exactly-

David Tilson (Chair): Mr. Dykstra, this is not debate. She has her time.

Jinny Sims: Canada is a nation that has a citizenship—

Rick Dykstra: If we're going to have a debate, we'll have a debate.

Jinny Sims: —from all over the place. That's what I'm saying, and they're just like Mr. Leung, and Rathika's family as well. But what I really want us to focus on here is the human element. I've never lived in a refugee camp. I'm very grateful for that. But I've read and seen enough and worked with enough children who've lived in refugee camps to know that we, as Canadians, cannot forget our humanity in some kind of bogus quest to think we can fix what's going on in other countries.
If there is fraud, let's go after it, and let's do it in a way that targets those who commit fraud and not the victims…

Before Sims can have her final question answered, the Chair notes the bell indicating that the meeting must be adjourned. A nearly three-hour meeting, that heard both arguments for and against the Bill, including the testimonies of expert witnesses from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI), and the Director of the Human Rights Research and Education Centre, detailing legal and humanitarian concerns, ends with an important final scene. The extent of Dykstra’s objection to Sims’ comments on what she has observed as anti-immigrant, anti-refugee rhetoric in the course of the meeting is to gesture to MP Leung sitting to his right - his colleague, a Conservative of colour and immigrant to Canada - who has also experienced being “stateless.” Of course Dykstra’s argument in this gesture is that Leung’s support for the Bill as a Conservative MP proves that Sims’ claims are unfounded. Dykstra’s refutation against the charge that the Bill propagates the criminalization of all immigrants and asylum seekers, put simply as “You mean like Chungsen Leung?” is meant to serve as evidence that Canada is a nation of immigrants – like Leung – not like Sims and her colleagues. In Chapter 4, the significance of MP Leung’s story “From Taiwan’s shores to MP” for Citizenship and Immigration Canada was analyzed. In this story and in his parliamentary statements, Leung has repeated that he became stateless when PM Trudeau recognized the Republic of China. The story that Leung offers has pedagogical significance as he is cast as an immigrant to Canada who too was once “stateless” and yet has overcome the hardships that immigrants and refugees suffer. In this final scene, as in his immigrant story, Leung is cast in the role of the “good immigrant” opposite the allegorical figure of the “bogus refugee”. In the end, after being confronted with three hours of expert testimony, a gesture to MP Leung concludes the meeting. Dykstra’s final appeal is paramount. The Harper Conservatives find themselves able to ignore evidence of racism and evade any meaningful engagement with equity-based multiculturalism simply by gesturing to the existence of racial Conservative MPs. That this gesture has any effect at all demonstrates the resilience of the Canadian racial state.

On May 1, 2012, Leung defends the Bill’s proposed changes to detain “irregular arrivals” by associating immigrants to Canada with the 2003 SARS pandemic in his question for witness Dr. Meb Rashid, MD, Crossroads Clinic, Women’s College Hospital:

Leung: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My concern deals with the medical aspect. Dr. Rashid, you probably experienced SARS in 2003. It's probably at that time where it was necessary to contain people in a safe environment. What I'm suggesting to you is that if there's a mass arrival of refugees, it is our responsibility to first of all identify their documentation and then to at least medically screen them to make sure they do not cause some pandemic in our society. I think that is only fair to safeguard the health and welfare of Canadians.

Now, for that reason, if we have to go through a whole lot of, let's say, illegal arrivals on a mass basis, then it is not possible to separate those who are genuine refugees versus those who aren't, because they all have to be detained in order to clear that medical process. Would you not agree with that?

Dr. Meb Rashid: I assume what you're getting at is the immigrant health exam.

Liberal MP Jim Karygiannis Scarborough-Agincourt, ON: I have a point of order

David Tilson (Chair): Mr. Karygiannis

Jim Karygiannis: Thank you, Chair. I'm totally confused as to SARS and the question that is put, because with SARS we never confined people to a jail situation or a holding tank situation. I want, for the record, to be perfectly clear that with SARS people were asked to voluntarily put themselves into their houses. There was absolutely, categorically, no sense that these people, as soon as they got off the plane, were to be detained.

Chair: Thank you

Jim Karygiannis: I want to make that perfectly clear, and I want my colleague to make a clarification on it.

Leung: Your point is well taken.

Dr. Meb Rashid: I just want to turn the question to you. Do we not need a central point to at least have some clarification that these people do not bring a pandemic into this country?

As far as I know, and again this is not my area of expertise, there is something called an immigrant health exam, which people get before they migrate here. People who arrive through other means get an immigrant health exam once they put in their refugee claim. If you're a visitor who comes for less than six months, you don't have an immigrant health exam. The idea of immigration being a control on infectious disease probably is not the way the current scenario is laid out. It perhaps wouldn't even be very effective. If so, what we would be doing is targeting the 500 million people who are coming through Canada for short visits, because I think the risk of infectious disease extends across the globe, and—
Leung: You're correct, but in the current situation, if... [Technical difficulty] I said if they are coming in as proper immigrants, they are medically pre-screened before they arrive in Canada, but if they come in as irregular arrivals, they are not pre-screened and they have to be pre-screened. 246

Technical difficulties end the meeting and Leung is not able to fully articulate the point of his question. Yet, in this justification of arbitrary detention provisions proposed in C-31, Leung’s clumsy association of the detention of refugees to Canada with the 2003 SARS pandemic invokes the trope of diseased foreign bodies (Murdocca 2002). Leung presents a hypothetical and hyperbolic situation where Canada would have to “go through a whole lot of illegal arrivals on a mass basis” to argue that processes in determining “genuine refugees” from “bogus refugees” would put the health and welfare of Canadians at risk. The witness makes the point that if infectious disease indeed were the worry then all visitors to Canada would have to be pre-screened. Leung’s attempted argument falls apart but he holds onto the figures of the “proper” immigrant and the “irregular” refugee.

On May 2, 2012, Leung again defends the Bill’s proposed changes to the detention of “irregular arrivals” in his question for Mary Crock, Professor of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney:

Leung: As parliamentarians, we're here to look at the interests of Canadians first. Canada, like Australia, has a fairly generous immigration policy. It is also our task to make sure we spend the taxes of Canadians in the most expeditious way. Now, within that immigration framework, if we detect people coming in and abusing our system, we need to have laws to deter this. If it's an economic migrant, then yes, they can certainly apply through our regular system, but if they're irregular arrivals and they're abusing the system, we need to take adequate measures to prevent this from causing disruptions in our society. From that, we need to medically pre-screen some of these people. We need to establish their identity. We need to do all of this. That is, I think, one of the primary reasons why we need a certain amount of detention period—in order to ascertain that.

I've worked with refugee camps in Thailand, in Taiwan, and also in Hong Kong. In every place I've seen, they do use detention. I believe in Australia they do, too, so perhaps you can elaborate for me on what your suggestion would be if you don't use this method. Or how would you document these people before you let them into your country?

Prof. Mary Crock: …There is no law that prevents a country from looking after its own national interest in terms of protecting itself against people who might

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present a threat to security or to health. It's quite different, however, when you start introducing laws that are not based on any reason but are just blanket, mandatory laws that have no reason for them that relate to national interest.

The problem for me is that there is an assumption being made that if you copy the laws Australia has been using for a number of years, it will somehow have the effect of deterring irregular arrivals. What I'd like to put to you is that Australia's experience does not bear that out at all. Mandatory detention has never deterred anybody, and it's not about to here. What it will do, if you're interested in knowing what the cost to the taxpayer in Canada is going to be, is put your bill through the roof. The cost of building detention centres... We've spent half a billion dollars building a detention centre on Christmas Island. The cost of construction alone is phenomenal, when you start looking at this. I advise you to look at that. The social costs, however, that I've been trying to explain are also quite enormous.

Leung: You mentioned that the U.K. as one of the best examples. Perhaps you can share with us your research in this area and tell us whether they detain irregular arrivals or not.

Prof. Mary Crock: They don't. Look, Canada I think was the best until you proposed these laws. The short answer is that it doesn't make any sense to lock people up for no reason. If you're doing it because you think it's going to deter people, it's not going to deter a single asylum seeker. I put it to you that the real reason you're doing this has nothing to do with deterring irregular arrivals; it has everything to do with telling the Canadian public that you're doing something about irregular arrivals. It seems that electoral gains might be outweighing the financial costs.

What I'm trying to put to you is that it's a false assumption. I know that countries are looking at each other's laws and that political parties are sharing their experiences. My complaint is that claims made by the politicians and even by the administrators about the effect of legislation...and there is really no evidential base for the claims that are accepted quite blandly by politicians around the world.

Leung: Let me suggest that Canada is very generous in its acceptance of refugees around the world. We take in 14,000 to 15,000 a year. However, there is the rule of law. Fairness is important, and people who come in who are economic migrants or who are some—

The Vice-Chair (Jinny Sims): Mr. Leung, if you could just finish up…

Leung: There are some others who want to shortcut the system – or jump the queue, those need to be dealt with.247

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Leung’s statements here and on the previous day, invoke Reform era language in the phrase “Canadians first” as a way to rationalize excessively punitive immigration reforms. The witness warns of the costs that will likely be incurred in replicating the Australian model. Like his colleagues, when confronted with expert testimony detailing how Bill C-31 will not solve the problems of Canadian taxpayers, there is no engagement with the contents of the testimony, only a return to the figure of the “queue jumper” and an abstracted reference to the rule of law as though the legal scholars and practitioners themselves do not understand the meaning of the rule of law.

Finally, on May 3, 2012 Gina Csanyi-Robah, Executive Director of the Roma Community Centre gave a testimony to the plight of Roma people across Europe and in particular, Hungary – one of the many nations that Minister Kenney has designated as a safe country of origin. The witness recounted anti-Roma riots, houses being burned, people being killed, noting that Jason Kenney had visited their community centre that October and listened to first-hand testimony of these violences perpetrated against the Roma. In response to such testimony, Leung asks the witness to elaborate on gypsy fiction versus Roma reality, expressing his confusion as to how people that can “ethnically or racially blend into the society” could possibly be the victims of discrimination. In another poignant example of Harper’s Conservatives’ misunderstanding of how race operates, Leung’s question casts doubt on the credibility of the Roma’s reports of discrimination by arguing that they can pass ethnically and racially. The witness clarifies that the plight of Roma community is based on a legacy of systemic oppression and dehumanization despite negative stereotypes about “gypsies”. She concludes by stating that it is indeed very clear to ethnic majorities in Europe who the Roma are. To which, the MP responds: “I appreciate that distinction. It's just that in my travels in eastern Europe, I have come across them, and sometimes, when you're coming as an outsider, it's not easy to understand” (Leung 2012). Given that Leung’s as well as his Asian Conservative colleagues’ statements have readily associated refugees with disease and crime in general as well as refused to connect the history of anti-Asian racism in Canada with the debate at hand, it appears it is not easy to understand as a supposed “insider” either.
Before C-31: Racial Conservative scripts on immigration

That Bill C-31 is a direct reactionary response to the 2009 and 2010 arrival of migrant vessels to Canada’s west coast has been made apparent in the debates. On March 16, 2012, MP Joe Daniel (Don Valley East, ON) reminded the House:

In 2010, Canadians were given a sober reminder that our country is not immune from organized criminal groups intent on making a profit from human smuggling. The arrival of the migrant vessel Sun Sea came less than one year after the arrival of the Ocean Lady. The fact that these vessels reached our shores less than 12 months apart clearly demonstrates that human smuggling networks are targeting Canada as a destination and that they can use the generosity of our immigration system and the promise of a new life in Canada as a means of profit. Yes, Canada is a welcoming nation but our government has clearly stated that we cannot tolerate the abuse of our immigration system, either by human smugglers or by those who are unwilling to play by the rules. Canadian immigrants who waited in line have no tolerance for those who use illegal means to jump the queue. That is why today our government is moving forward with the protecting Canada's immigration system act. Through this act, our government would crack down on those criminals who would abuse our generous immigration system and endanger the safety and security of Canadian communities. We would ensure the integrity and fairness of Canada's immigration system for years to come. (Emphases added)

In these statements, Daniel draws definitive lines in the bifurcation of the figure of the suitable immigrant from the unsuitable refugee. Here and elsewhere identified in this thesis, Asian Conservative statements have identified differing categories of “Canadians”. In racialized terms, there are “ordinary Canadians” and “Canadian immigrants,” categories that further reify the myth that white Canadians are not immigrant settlers in Canada. Here, Daniel argues that it is not “ordinary Canadians” that have most disdain for “queue jumpers” but rather “Canadian immigrants”. Such a discursive strategy illustrates that the defense of immigration restrictions, once articulated by the Conservatives (and their antecedent Reform Party) as a defense on behalf of “ordinary” white Canadians can no longer be articulated in the same racial terms. While the anti-immigration/anti-refugee discursive strategy has expanded to include the figure of the “good immigrant”, the semantic elements of immigration debate have not been abandoned. For example, in her April 20, 2009 statement, Alice Wong speaks explicitly “As an immigrant” that “embraces our values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. She then

argues that without immigration restrictions, “we are opening up the floodgates and other genuine refugees will be deferred”. It is evident in Asian conservative statements on immigration that “As an immigrant” has become the most frequently invoked discursive disclaimer as a way to justify anti-immigrant/anti-refugee legislation in racial terms.

Even after the government’s original suspicions in 2009 and 2010 were unfounded, the spectre of illegal and criminal hordes coming to Canada was revived in C-31 debates. Apart from the moral panic incited in 1999, 2009 and 2010, normally “no more than five per cent of claimants would be detained, most of them for short periods of time” (Arbel and Showler 2013). Parliament capitalized on the moral panic generated by these events to produce tougher immigration legislation but the mission to restrict immigration policy has always been a key objective for the Harper’s Conservatives and CPC antecedents. Indeed, parliamentary debate following the arrival of Ocean Lady and Sun Sea as well as debate following the 1999 arrival of “Fujian boat people” that led to the passage of Bill C-11, which became the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2002 are worth examining.

On October 28, 2010, during C-49 debate, MP Uppal also Minister of State for Multiculturalism stated:

It is a loophole for illegal immigrants to come and, frankly, to jump the queue. This is something that always upsets new Canadians who have immigrated to Canada through the proper channels in order to experience everything that is Canada. When my parents came over to Canada, they went through a process and were very pleased to go through that process in a legal way… This is not a new issue. This is not something that just happened because of the previous ship that landed on our shores.250

In cases such as this, Canadian-born Asian MPs like Uppal and Chong refer to their parents’ immigration stories to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate immigrants. These MPs will argue that their parents “played by the rules” and “happily came to Canada through legal streams” and for that reason the government must crack down on the abuse of Canada’s Immigration system. On this same day, Conservative MP Steve Blaney (Levis-Bellechasse, QC) read letters that the government had received from “the people of Calgary and the people of ethnic communities” as well as from the president of the Association of the Coptic Orthodox Community, the Canadian Druze Society, the Lebanese Islamic Centre, and from an unnamed “representative of an ethnic

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community” namely, the Arab and Syrian community of Montreal, which were meant to illustrate that ethnic communities also supported Bill-C49. It must be noted that every letter – or at least the portions read aloud by the MP - while denouncing human smuggling, did not necessarily articulate support for the Bill itself, thus making their presentation as evidence dubious. Nonetheless, the exercise of presenting the supposed support of ethnic communities for Bill C-49 is one that attempts to prove that the legislation could thus possibly not be racist.

Blaney’s statements may indeed have been motivated by MP Shory who on the previous day also presented the House with a list of community organizations that “endorsed Bill C-49”:

Madam Speaker, being an immigrant to this country, I have a lot of interest in this legislation and I listened to the member opposite very carefully. I understand that quite a few immigrant community organizations have endorsed Bill C-49…What does the hon. member e attribute all those immigrant communities lining up in support of this bill? (Sic)251

Indeed these attempts to argue that racial CPC MPs and entire minority groups are supposedly in favour of the Bills is offered as supposed evidence that the provisions are legitimate and non-racist.

Scholars have examined news media and policy responses surrounding Sun Sea and Ocean Lady (Bradimore and Bauder, 2011), the 1999 arrival of four ships carrying Fujian “boat people” (Hier and Greenberg, 2002; Hari 2014; MacIntosh 2012; Mahtani 2001; Henry and Tator 2002; Jiwani 2006, 49), as well as the 1986 arrival of 152 Sri Lankan Tamils off the coast of Newfoundland and 1987 arrival of 174 Sikh refugees off the coast of Nova Scotia (Creese 1992, 192; Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002, 46; Chan 2004; Hari 2014, 39). In their examination of these cases, scholars have remarked that discourses of security and risk were the dominant modes of representation (Bradimore and Bauder 2011). They have remarked on the deterioration of the figure of the refugee – noting violations to their right to have their claim determined and right not to be detained - and have described changing immigration legislation as betrayals of Canada’s humanitarian tradition (Macklin 2005; MacIntosh 2012). Mann (2009) has also drawn from official statements made by former ministers of immigration (Kenney) and public safety (Van Loan) on Ocean Lady. In a comparative study of official discourse surrounding 1914, 1986 and 2009, Mann observes that the trope of the refugees as illegal can be traced to the 1980s but the

“characterization of asylum seekers as “illegals” is more intense now than in earlier periods” (Mann 2009, 203). For example, Bill C-84 *The Refugee Deterrents and Detention Act* and Bill C-55 *The Refugee Reform Act* were introduced after the arrivals of ships in 1986 and 1987 and Bill C-11, which became the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA 2002) was first introduced as a response to the 1999 arrival of ships even though it was passed shortly after 9/11. In another comparative study, MacIntosh (2012) also notes that while policy efforts to deter “bogus” refugees are not new, they are notably more punitive under the Harper Conservatives. MacIntosh refers to an early 2001 report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, which stated: [e]ven if refugee claimants' manner of arrival is irregular, we recognize that the flight to freedom is often fraught with peril, speed and the necessity to use whatever means are available to reach safety," and that persons with "genuine" claims may employ smugglers and use fraudulent documents” (MacIntosh 2012, 187). The same report cautioned that “migrants must not be presumed to be criminals or security risks” (ibid 1987). With reference to the 1980s cases, MacIntosh refers to a statement made by then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney: “it's not the presence of 155 frightened human beings searching for freedom and opportunity that's going to under- mine Canada or our immigration policies" (ibid, 207). None of this is to diminish the hostile responses received by past asylum seekers. The Canadian Council for Refugees notes that in the summer of 1999, “Most of the Chinese were kept in long-term detention and some were irregularly prevented from making refugee claims (CCR 2011).252 Reference to Canada’s past encounters with arrivals of migrant ships is meant to present the historical contexts which have provided the conditions of possibility that give rise to excessive legislative amendments as found in Bill C-31. At the same time, these historical contexts provide the realization that the Harper Conservative era truly departs from this history in its extensively punitive scope.

Previous chapters have already discussed the Reform Party’s influence on Canadian immigration discourse whereby economic immigration could be justified but so-called “illegal” immigrants had to be strictly deterred. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Reform and Canadian Alliance members had opposed the Liberal government’s amendments to immigration policy, not for their mounting restrictions but because they had, in their esteem, “not gone far

“enough” (Chan 2004, 37; Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002). In her examination of Bill C-11, Chan highlights the bill’s far-reaching focus on enforcement, punishment and the fortification of Canada’s borders where undocumented migrants were conveyed no longer as refugees needing protection but rather described through a racialized discourse of “immigrant criminality”. In other words, beginning with the rise of the Reform party, it became “normal” to debate immigration and refugee legislation in this way. Moreover, Hansard of the day challenge any assumption that Asian Canadian parliamentarians would intervene on behalf of Canada’s humanitarian tradition towards immigrants and refugees in these debates. Indeed, the strategic use of disclaimers is found in these parliamentary debates where Asian Conservative MPs state that the Canadian Alliance is “pro-immigration” and that “Canada is a nation of immigrants”. At the time of Bill C-11 debates, the only Asian Conservative MPs in the house were Canadian Alliance MPs Gurmant Grewal, Rahim Jaffer, Deepak Obhrai and Inky Mark whose contributions are observed here:

Grewal: I myself am an immigrant, and I did not come to Canada a long time ago…We are proud that our country has provided a safe haven for displaced people from across the world. To ensure fairness and put an end to queue-jumping, we would immediately deport bogus refugees, those who would abuse the system and other illegal entrants. We would severely penalize those who organize abuses of our system... We would end the abuse of refugee claims as a fast track to gaining the benefits of landed immigrant status. The system should work for the legitimate, genuine people who want to come to Canada, not for those who are criminals or who would enter through the back door and abuse the system.  

Obhrai: Who takes advantage of those loopholes? We all know that. All we have to do is look at the stories in the newspapers. Chinese boatloads came here because of a loophole in the system created by the government. Everywhere around the world it is becoming quite clear that the loopholes existing in Canada are numerous, which has created human smuggling that plays with people's lives. The minister of immigration has said that she would be very tough on human smugglers. The bottom line is that a market was created for human smugglers because of our lax law. Our lax law has given them a market of which they are taking advantage and playing with people's lives… It bothered Canadians that our laws were being abused. It bothered people who had applied for family members to come here or people in general who wanted to come to Canada. It bothered everybody, prospective immigrants, recently arrived immigrants, Canadians who have been here for generations. The bottom line was that the laws were being

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These statements exemplify important themes that emerged in Bill C-11 debates. First, the statements isolate the “Chinese boatloads” or “bogus refugees” as Canada’s national security risk. Secondly, in identifying Canada’s racial problem, the MPs argue that the root of the problem is that “Canada’s laws are lax and have created loopholes for ‘foreign criminals’”. Finally, as a key element of parliamentary debate on immigration, the MPs present the disclaimer and bottom line, which stresses, “Canada has provided a safe haven for displaced people” and “The Canadian Alliance is pro-immigration but never at the expense of national security.” The MPs stress that were they the party in power, they would emphasize the punishment of “bogus” refugees; a promise that was kept as evidenced by recent legislative amendments. Also evidenced here in Obhrai’s statement is the public panic that was manufactured in news media, which has been used to support his argument for restrictive amendments to Canada’s immigration law.

In their examination of Bill C-11, Abu-Laban and Gabriel have noted how then-immigration Minister, Elinor Caplan described the objective of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act was to “open the door” to desirable immigrants while “closing the door” to illegal immigrants (2002, 76). On several occasions in Bill C-11 debates, Gurmant Grewal made it clear that Minister Caplan had co-opted Reform language on immigration and that it was he that first introduced this language to the House. On May 30, 2001, Grewal emphasizes this point:

When I was first elected in 1997 I gave an analogy in my first speech on immigration that the immigration system in Canada was just like a home… At the same time we must close the back door because we do not know who is entering through it. It could be a criminal, a bogus refugee, or anyone who is not wanted in the country. In my speech in 1997 I urged the then immigration minister to open the front door and monitor them but to close the back door and plug the loopholes…

Indeed, the “open door/closed door” analogy offered by Grewal was repeated not only by Minister Caplan but also by his Canadian Alliance colleagues. As we have already seen in Bill C-31 debates, Bill C-11 debates show that the Asian Conservative MPs presented themselves as examples of “good immigrants” in juxtaposition to the “Chinese boatloads” that had arrived in

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1999. In this case, statements made by MP Inky Mark and his interactions with other MPs as the only Chinese Canadian Alliance MP in a markedly anti-Chinese debate are important. On June 13, 2001, Mark also makes it clear “the Canadian Alliance in pro-immigration” and “We promise to welcome new Canadians and at the same time keep out the criminals”. On February 26, 2001, Mark mobilizes a racialized discourse of immigrant illegality when he refers to Canadians who are angered by “illegal migrants” “jumping the queue.” At the same time, Mark suggests, “Immigration is the story of Canada… Canada’s only option for population growth is through immigration” and even “I must say that 95% of the refugee claims are credible”. There is some faint ambiguity in Mark’s statements in raising the point that the supposed threat of race posed by “bogus” refugees is extremely slight. Still, he concludes, “It is the 5% that we are concerned about and many of them are criminals who we do not need” and “The Canadian Alliance believes there needs to be a balance between access to Canada and security of our country form the world’s criminals and terrorists”.

On February 26, 2001, Mark addresses explicitly racist comments made by a fellow Canadian Alliance member who used the phrase “Asian invasion” in her comments on Bill C-11:

I do not need to tell members that one of our Canadian Alliance candidates by the name of Betty Granger made the statement “Asian invasion” in her comments in Winnipeg. I truly believe that it was taken out of context. I assure the House that comment was pretty common language, going back to the late seventies and early eighties when the economic class of Hong Kong were scrambling to leave that country for fear of the Communist takeover. In my own family, my older sisters who are about 20 years older than I am did the same. They liquidated all their assets and brought all their money into Canada during that same time period. It made sense and people used the statement “Asian invasion” quite frequently during the late seventies and early eighties.

In his address, Mark does not condemn his colleague but rather excuses her language and thereby excuses the racist ideology that motivated them. By explaining that the phrase “Asian invasion” was common in the seventies and eighties, Mark casts racism in a temporal logic eluding the fact that his colleague has mobilized the phrase in the year 2001. In his explanation, Mark attempts to rationalize his colleague’s statements by suggesting that there was indeed something akin to an

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258 Ibid. 1197-1198.
“Asian invasion” in the time that he and his sisters entered Canada. Moreover, if we read Mark’s apologist reaction next to the wide-ranging official parliamentary condemnation against Senator John Farris for calling Douglas Jung a “Chinaman” in 1958 (chapter 3), the attempt to excuse anti-Asian racism as an artefact of the past falls apart. Juxtaposing these two cases elucidates the broader contexts that have facilitated two such stark responses; that is, the racial state in which it was necessary that Jung’s colleagues – of all political stripes - condemn Farris in post-war 1958 versus the racial state in which it is necessary for Mark to defend his colleague’s racist statement in post-Reform 2001.

In the course of C-11 debates, Mark and his Canadian Alliance colleagues would certainly argue that “one thing we do not want to do in this country is reignite any kind of anti-immigrant fervour”. Indeed, such strategic disclaimers are also evident in parliamentary debates immediately after September 11. Nonetheless, these disclaimers are followed by defenses in support of legislative amendments based on systemic racial profiling. As examined in Chapter 4, Rahim Jaffer made it known in his parliamentary statements that he was the only Muslim MP in the House. Indeed, he has also been the only Asian Conservative MP who entered Canada as a refugee. Like his colleagues who have presented themselves as legitimate immigrants, Jaffer has presented himself as a “legitimate refugee”. On June 1, 2000, Jaffer stated:

> We have seen more cases of people profiting from the trafficking of illegitimate refugees. They have become more numerous, as we have seen from the news. We have seen it more than ever… I want to touch on the idea of enforcement in light of the people smuggling and the number of refugees who have come from China in the recent past. This has raised a lot of questions about our immigration system and specifically the track record of the government on the management of the department. …Necessary changes to re-establish the integrity of the immigration system and protect our borders from organized crime, terrorists, people smuggling and illegal immigration. These are things that are very important to Canadians in light of some the things that have happened recently. They want to see their immigration system work and their borders patrolled effectively… as an immigrant to this country it disappoints me greatly that this government will not act to implement the changes which Canadians want.\(^{259}\)

Jaffer argues that the refugee process is broken and continues to indict the Canadian Immigration Act of 1976 and the precedence set by 1985 Singh v. Canada Supreme Court decision:

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Since that time successive governments have interpreted the decision to mean that all refugee claimants, in fact any foreign national on Canadian soil, should be given the full protection of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This interpretation of the Singh decision is a major contributing factor to Canada becoming the number one target for people traffickers and asylum seekers the world over. It has allowed our immigration and refugee system to become overly bureaucratic and prone to legal delays.\(^{260}\)

Jaffer’s statements on Bill C-11 challenge the assumption that his experience as a refugee would vest him with more sympathy towards the plight of asylum seekers fleeing violent situations much like his family did. On the contrary, his identification as a refugee is used to grant him authority to argue that Canada must protect its borders from “illegitimate” or “bogus” refugees.

As part of the *Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act* the government allows Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), in partnership with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to collect biometric information from all temporary visitors and resident applicants as part of the visa, study, and work permit application process (CIC 2012).\(^{261}\) According to the government, this collection of fingerprints and photos from applicants in twenty-nine specified countries “will be sent to the RCMP for storage and will be checked against the fingerprint records of refugee claimants, previous deportees, persons with Canadian criminal records and previous temporary resident applicants before a visa decision is made” (Black and Keung 2012). This information “could be collected from as many as half a million people a year, and amounts to privacy infringement” (Bernard 2012).\(^{262}\) The introduction of biometrics is the latest in the Canadian government’s efforts to augment previously existing securitization technologies including the introduction of identity cards post-September 11. As evidenced by the archive of Asian Conservative parliamentary statements, the conservative party has been arguing in favour of screening technology since before 9/11. On October 24, 2001, Jaffer emphasized that “the Canadian Alliance has called for similar initiatives in the past, including overseas interdiction programs and the use of digital photography and scanning of traveller documentation to ease in

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\(^{260}\) Ibid Page 7355.


determining the identity of spontaneous refugee claimants who arrive in Canada without documentation”. On September 17, 2001, in a speech that begins with “As the only Muslim in Canada, I want to extend my condolences on behalf of the Canadian Muslim community” ends with a call for synchronizing security efforts with the United States: “Thus must include sharing intelligence, including exit and entrance data and criminal profiling” (Jaffer 2001). Indeed, parliamentary debates in the period immediately after September 11 reveal Asian Conservative MPs calling for anti-terror legislation by identifying not only terrorists as the threat but all “potential terrorists” - a less than subtle call to systemic racial profiling. As one example, on October 2, 2001, Gurmant Grewal has argued:

We should focus not only on terrorists but on suspected terrorists. They should not be allowed to repeat their terrible acts. We should also focus on organized criminals. Terrorism and organized crime go hand in hand... We are all Canadians. No one is more Canadian than another. All Canadians are proud of that... We should accept everyone, whether they are ethnic minorities, no matter what religion, colour or whatever the criteria may be. ... I urge the government to be proactive and take action, introduce anti-terrorism legislation and other things that we have been recommending.

These examples from parliamentary debate surrounding Bill C-11 reveal that Reform and Canadian Alliance proposals foreshadowed Harper Conservatives’ immigration discourse and amendments to immigration legislation where the racial conservative script suggests: not all immigrants are criminals but all criminals are immigrants.

**Intensifying Criminalization of Immigrants and Refugees**

Bill C-43 *The Faster removal of foreign criminals act*: An act to amend the immigration and refugee protection act (including amendments to the Citizenship act) was introduced on June 20, 2012 and received royal assent on June 19, 2013. Much like the official script around Bill C-31 Minister Kenney has repeated: "Canadians are generous and welcoming people, but they have no tolerance for criminals and fraudsters abusing our generosity. We want an immigration system that is open to genuine visitors, while at the same time prevents the entry of foreign criminals

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and denies them the ability to endlessly abuse our generosity…The Harper Government is putting a stop to foreign criminals relying on endless appeals in order to delay their removal from Canada during which time they continue to terrorize innocent Canadians,” said Kenney (CIC 2013). CIC has argued that the amendments are supported by many law enforcement and immigrant organizations, including the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs, the Canadian Police Association, Victims of Violence, and Immigrants for Canada. Like Bill C-31, Bill C-43 has received wide-ranging criticism as “reflective of the Government's pattern of prejudicial and prosecutorial approaches to immigration reform” (Cotler 2012). The bill paints permanent residents and new Canadians as though these groups are more prone to criminality than “ordinary” Canadians. Like the Bill’s name, parliamentary debates surrounding Bill C-43 suggests that Canada is swarming with terrorists, war criminals and foreign nationals on the loose. By creating the sense of such crisis, the Bill proposed changes that would give the immigration minister the authority to bar people from entry into Canada for three years due to vague and undefined “public policy considerations”. The changes have made it easier for the Canadian government to deport permanent residents who have been sentenced from previously two years to now a minimum of six months. This means permanent residents can be deported for petty crimes such as getting into a fistfight, shoplifting, reckless driving, and general mischief. That the right to make an appeal has been eliminated prompted critics to call this the “one strike and you’re out” rule (Black and Keung 2012; Cotler 2012). Expert witnesses from the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers (CARL) have made the case that existing laws already enable authorities including immigration officers, members of the Immigration and Refugee Board as well as judges to review each case and make assessments based on the facts of the case at hand. CARL has cautioned that Bill C-43 will not make Canadians any safer given that “The law already allows the Minster the authority to deny criminals and terrorists access to Canada. Under the current system, those who do pose a threat to national security are not granted Ministerial relief, nor are they granted relief on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The only thing these provisions accomplish will be to deny to innocent individuals processes meant to exonerate

them from the overbreadth of our security laws” (CARL 2012).268 In their testimony to the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, the organization referred to the “Mandela rule” where “innocent people who have peacefully stood up for human rights against despotic regimes have been incorrectly and unfairly labeled as members of terrorist groups”.

Like Asian MP contributions to C-31 debate, statements in support of C-43 emphasize that the proposed changes are in the interest of “newcomers”. On January 30, 2013, Wai Young has stated,

Our government knows that a vast majority of newcomers to Canada are honest, hard-working and law-abiding. Because of this, newcomers, maybe even more than those born in Canada, want us to crack down on crime. What is more, immigrants are more likely to be victims of dangerous foreign criminals than those who are Canadian-born. Permanent residents would be safer, thanks to this bill and the actions of our Conservative government. …When the hon. members opposed to this legislation stand up and claim that changing the eligibility to appeal a deportation to the Immigration Appeal Division would potentially negatively affect innocent well-intentioned permanent residents, it is the crimes of the dangerous foreign criminals that they are actually defending. Make no mistake: these criminals who have been found guilty are also often repeat offenders, dangerous foreign criminals who should not be on Canadian streets. …I am very disturbed by the NDP and Liberal attempts to defend dangerous foreign criminals. I am shocked that they have repeated in this House, in contradiction to what the police association has said, that a six-month sentence is not a serious crime. If it were up to the NDP and Liberals, we would be debating a bill entitled “the slower removal of foreign criminals act”, or “the keeping foreign criminals in our communities act”.

Our Conservative government is finally putting a stop to dangerous foreign criminals relying on endless appeals to remain free to make more victims of innocent Canadians. Canadians are a generous and welcoming people to newcomers and the vast majority of them are honest and law-abiding, whether Canadian-born or immigrants to Canada. They have no tolerance for our generosity being abused.270

In her statements, Young attempts to argue that immigrants are more likely to be victims of “foreign criminals” than those who are Canadian-born. In reaction to critiques waged by opposition members about the violence that these very legislative amendments would enact on permanent residents, the MP’s statements are most insightful. The defense of permanent

269 Ibid.
residents is registered as the defense of dangerous foreign criminals. Young’s statement in “shock” is a pattern in Asian Conservative statements as MP Leung and Shory both repeated it the day before in similar statements. For the MP and her colleagues, the petty crimes listed above including shoplifting inconsequentially warrant deportation for some Canadians. Indeed, permanent residents may be the victims of state violence but in this case, state violence is completely eluded.

Post-September 11, 2001, scholars have examined the synchronized intensification of immigration policy as national security policy in Canada (Dhamoon 2009, Abu Laban 1998; Jiwani 2006), in Britain (McGhee 2008, van Dijk 2003), and in the United states (Mamdani 2004, Nguyen 2005, Volpp 2002; McIllwain and Caliendo 2011). These scholars have observed patterned justifications for state-enforced violations of civil rights as well as fierce reactions against public and political commentary on the expansion of the security state. In her book aptly titled *We are all Suspects Now*, Nguyen (2005) has remarked that “In the expanded security state system” - the criminal deportee, family seeking asylum, undocumented migrant and a Muslim post-9/11 detainee - “all these people are treated as threats to national security” (139). Thus, two tiers of justice are rationalized in the expanded security state where “foreign criminals” must be deported rather than tried and jailed in Canada revealing “that the state regulates and re-entrenches norms of whiteness, nation building, and citizenship through the law” (Dhamoon 2009, 68). In her examination of changing immigration policies post- 9/11, Chan has observed the criminalization of race and the racialization of crime: “If immigrants’ activities are regarded as criminal, then their treatment is depoliticized because it is transformed from an issue of race into an issue of law and order. It is much more difficult to be opposed to punitive treatment of a racial group. Thus any resistance is silenced” (Chan 2004, 53). The parliamentary debates on Bill C-43 must thus be read as part of the political discourse that emerged in the period immediately after 9/11. This is not to say that racial profiling in immigration discourse began in this period but that it intensified and gained new acceptability. For instance, prior to the events of September 11, then-Reform MP Gurmant Grewal made statements pertaining to Bill C-16 the *Citizenship of Canada Act* on March 23, 2000:

> Among us are those who do not respect law and order, those who know only their rights and not their responsibilities. There are criminals and terrorists unfortunately. We have to take appropriate measures to protect our citizens and secure their safety and future. We have to make Canada a better place. It should
not be a sieve where terrorists and criminals pass through and jeopardize the safety and security of our citizens and the future of this great country.\footnote{Grewal, Gurmant. 2000. Statements. House of Commons Debates. 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session, 36\textsuperscript{th} Parliament. Volume 136, Number 70. March 23. Page 5158.}

Parliamentary debates immediately following September 11 invoked many statements from Canadian Alliance MP Rahim Jaffer. Although many of his speeches sound conflicted and ambivalent ultimately, Jaffer’s arguments suggest that “a clear message must be sent”. On September 21, 2001, Jaffer stated:

Our immigration policies must be generous. However they must be rigorous. We can no longer have a policy of admit first, ask questions later. Our policies and laws must protect the lives and livelihoods of Canadians… We want to help as many legitimate refugees as possible, however, we believe stringent and secure refugee determination processes are in the best interests of genuine refugees seeking entrance to Canada… A message must be sent out to the world that Canada is a home for those in genuine need of humanitarian support, however, those attempting to take advantage and abuse our humanitarian generosity will be punished severely and swiftly.

…As a refugee I feel that we have to do as much as we can, but we have to be rigorous. Some of the most ardent proponents of reforming Canada’s immigration and refugee determination laws are new immigrants themselves. They all went through the hoops and met every requirement. Not only are they upset with those who abuse the refugee system, they are livid with those of their community who abuse the system and commit crimes in Canada, casting a negative light upon their community.

…The government is not doing its job properly. This is evident with the backlash experienced by Canada's Islamic and Sikh communities. Government mismanagement of the refugee system is a disservice to the immigrant communities that are working hard to contribute to a country which has given them so much… I would like to state the fact that the Canadian Alliance demand is for anti-terrorist legislation to strengthen national security and eradicate terrorist activity within Canada.\footnote{Jaffer, Rahim. 2001. Statements. House of Commons Debates. 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 37\textsuperscript{th} Parliament. Volume 137, Number 83. September 17. Page 5422-5423.}

While Jaffer makes reference to his family that arrived in Canada as refugees and while he points out that “those who abuse the law are in the minority,” he nonetheless unequivocally concludes that immigration policies must be made more rigorous. In several of Jaffer’s speeches after September 11, the MP chastises the Liberal government of the day for “not doing its job properly” and specifically argues that racial profiling has targeted Muslim and South Asian Canadians. These speeches in their whole are conflicted to say the least because accompanying...
such remarks against racial profiling are arguments for much more rigorous anti-terror legislation and synchronized border security efforts with the United States. Such conflict and ambivalence can be found in all Asian Conservative statements on immigration and national security where it can be construed as speaking in the interests of ethnic and visible minority groups. However, the statements as a whole ultimately in the context of these policy debates, the MPs speak in support of more immigration restrictions. Similarly on October 15, 2001, Inky Mark argued that legal immigrants must be differentiated from “illegal refugees”:

In our debate about terrorists we all need to separate the legal immigrants and refugees whom this country needs, from the illegal asylum seekers whom we do not need…As an immigrant myself, I believe these illegal and fraudulent asylum seekers give all legal immigrants in the country a bad name (Emphasis added).\(^{273}\)

Statements made on September 18, 2001 by Canadian Alliance MP Deepak Obhrai expand on sentiments expressed by Mark:

The debate concerns the adequacy of our laws to protect us from those who intend to break our laws and use our laws to promote these hideous crimes. We are talking of a small minority but nevertheless a minority that has no conscience. We must guard against them. …Immigrants and refugees themselves run this course of action because in the end they become the victims of those who break the laws and commit these hideous crimes. Unfortunately we are witnessing these acts. …Therefore I urge the government to act to ensure that the weak links in our immigration laws are tightened. We must listen to the suggestions of Canadians. Calling people who are pointing to the flaws in our immigration laws racists and bigots has the effect of strengthening racists and bigots because terrorists are racists and bigots. I hope the minister of immigration will take note of this… Canada should fight this new war, but Canada should also assist those developing states that are also joining the fight against terrorism… (Emphasis added)\(^{274}\)

First, in his statement, Obhrai suggests that we already know the criminal “intentions” of “potential” terrorists – an example of indifference to the rule of law where mens rea is determined by lawyers, judge, and jury during trial. Second, Obhrai insinuates that the good name of legitimate immigrants are being dragged through the mud by the few “foreign criminals”. Obhrai insists that it is not the Canadian government that should be held accountable for the racist backlash where all immigrants have in effect been profiled in this moment rather it is the immigrant communities themselves that must take responsibility. Obhrai continues to insist


that focussing on the possibility that the laws are racist means that the terrorists have already won. State violence is again eluded by arguing that the “real” racists and bigots are not Canadians but terrorists “over there”. Themes identifiable in Asian Canadian Alliance MP statements nearly fifteen years ago continue to feature in C-43 debates. On January 29, 2013, both Shory and Leung invoked their “good” immigrant identification to support Bill C-43:

Shory: Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Winnipeg North should know, first of all, that I am an immigrant. The vast majority of immigrants who come to this country want to work hard and play by the rules. They value Canada and seek to be productive members of our great nation. Those who would come to this country and break our laws and victimize our fellow Canadians do not deserve a break. That is my belief, and I deal with immigrants on a day-to-day basis in my riding, because mine is one of the most multicultural ridings in Canada… The bottom line is that this man should never have had the opportunity to appeal his deportation in the first place… With Bill C-43, we want to send a clear message to foreign criminals. If they commit a serious crime in Canada, they will get their day in court, but they will then be sent packing as quickly as possible.275

Leung: There are far too many foreign criminals in Canada who manage to remain in this country long after they have been ordered deported… Canadians have a long tradition of being welcoming. Our country is one of immigrants. I myself am one. However, in order to maintain that generosity, Canadians must have confidence and integrity in our system. They want to know that we are letting in honest, law-abiding visitors and immigrants while keeping out dangerous foreign criminals and others who pose a risk to the country… … In regard to the member's question about foreign criminals, our job as parliamentarians is to protect the borders of Canada. Our job here is to save taxpayer money. Therefore, “foreign criminal” is a nomenclature that refers to criminals who are not Canadian citizens. The fact that they are permanent residents and have not made that commitment to become Canadian citizens, perhaps they could be described as “foreign”. Therefore, the reason that we refer to them as “foreign criminals” is that they are not Canadian citizens. (Emphasis added)276

In their statements, Shory and Leung, invoke significant “bottom line” statements. Shory makes it clear that a foreign criminal’s day in court is a formality and that it does not change the fact that they will be promptly deported. In his statement, Leung provides definitive parameters of what the Harper Conservatives mean by their use of the descriptor “foreign criminals”. In his definition, Leung makes the argument that citizenship and status should not factor into the

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question of national security. That is, permanent residents who have not demonstrated loyalties
to the nation according to the satisfaction of the Harper Conservatives are de facto no longer
Canadians in the eyes of the law. Resistance and critique become associated with being un-
Canadian and became the foundations for Bill C-51 (2015). In other words, “foreign” here is
meant to serve as a much broader signifier whereby insufficient commitments to the nation,
which very well include ideological differences are not only deemed foreign but also de facto
criminal. Indeed, such broad significations of “foreign criminal” in C-43’s provisions allow the
immigration minister to ban those without criminal conviction from entering Canada. Quoted in
a CBC news report, former Immigration minister Kenney gave the example of “an imam who
calls for the execution of gays and lesbians, justified domestic abuse and makes anti-
Semitic remarks” has stated: "Sometimes we have foreigners who do not have a criminal conviction and
are therefore not strictly inadmissible to Canada under our current law, but who, for example,
may have a long track record of promoting violence or hatred against vulnerable groups” (Payton
2012).\textsuperscript{277} The parameters within which the Harper Conservatives define violence are deeply
ideological. In his statement, Kenney’s choice example of a potentially dangerous Muslim imam
is indicative of the Harper Conservatives ideological investment in the perpetual war on terror
whereby terror signifies “bad” Muslims who are “premodern” from “good” Muslims who are
“modern, Western, and secularized” – a simplistic conception that scholars have widely
challenged.

Scholars have reminded us that within statements such as these “Selective definitions of
violence and terrorism clearly serve to divert attention away from the murderous foreign policies
of the United States and Canada” (Thobani 2007, 222). Racializing crime and “foreignizing”
crime is a way for the nation to distance itself from definitions of violence whereby the Canada
places itself categorically outside the realm of violence and onto a higher moral ground. Thus,
statements found in debates surrounding policy such as Bill C-43 involve the normalization,
trivialization, and erasure of certain types of violence including the constitutive violence of
ongoing colonialism. In Discourses of Denial, Jiwani (2006) has stated that “it is the
normalization of violence that renders it invisible” (9). The normalization of such violence is
made possible because “law is conceived as being a product of consensus of liberal social
values” (Razack 2002, 213). Through the mobilisation of abstract liberal notions such as “the

rule of law,” “freedom of choice,” “fair and balanced,” “colour blindness,” and “equality”
“liberal democratic values are translated into discursive and symbolic violence. The violence
enacted by these dominant discourses strategically neutralizes, if not erases charges of racism
and sexism” (Jiwani 2006, 204-5). What these debates prove is that governance requires the
inclusion of some – that is, state violence relies on an elusive “shared values” to sustain the
state’s commitment to preserve the national identity as fundamentally white. It becomes
necessary to identify those that play by the rules versus the radical undesirable element in order
to govern in this racial state.

On October 4th, 2012 Leung repeats his immigrant story in his support for Bill C-
invokes the significance of “shared values”:

What the bill specifically talks about are those people who are in Canada who
have chosen not to become Canadians. They are just permanent residents who
have broken our laws. When we asked people to come and build this country, we
asked them to come and join in our shared values, the same shared values that all
Canadians enjoy, appreciate and abide by. If they choose to go against that and
break our laws, that is the undesirable element. I came here and transitioned from
an international student to a landed immigrant, to a permanent resident, to a
citizen and eventually to representing my constituents. That is what we are asking
for, that people come here and share and abide by our shared values.278

In his examination of the decline of multiculturalism and a shift to monoculturalism in post-
September 11 Britain, McGhee has observed that "The emphasis on shared values takes on a
rather more authoritarian tone whereby the expectation associated with the sharing of British
values is transformed into a patriotic duty that becomes the basis from which an individual can
call themselves British" (2008, 9). Van Dijk has also commented on the growing emphasis - in
Western European political discourse – on the notion of shared values as “basic democratic
values” based in “the civilized world,” which signify underlying ideologies and norms especially
in parliamentary debates (van Dijk 2003, 115). The implication of such emphasis on “Canadian
values” or “American values” or “British values” is that "These discourses and the range of anti-
terrorism laws that have been introduced in response to the terror threat since 2001 have ushered
in a new ethics of inhospitability and an even stronger sense of the precariousness and
conditional nature of citizenship for certain/ communities. This has in turn influenced the new

Number 159. October 4. Page 10883.
Bill C-10 Safe streets and communities for whom?

The Harper Conservatives’ omnibus crime bill - Bill C-10 Safe Streets and Communities Act An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act was tabled on September 20, 2011. As promised, the bill was rushed through debate and was passed within 100 sitting days by a vote of 154 to 129 and received Royal assent March 13, 2012. Combining amendments from nine separate bills that previously failed, the bill has been criticized by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) as deeply polarizing. While the bill made “fundamental changes to almost every component of Canada’s criminal justice system,” the primary focus of the bill is made evident in its name. In a joint statement by justice minister Nicholson and minister of public safety Toews (2011):

the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and related amendments to the State Immunity Act (former Bill S-7), which would allow victims of terrorism to sue perpetrators and supporters of terrorism, including listed foreign states, for loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act of terrorism committed anywhere in the world; and The Preventing the Trafficking, Abuse and Exploitation of Vulnerable Immigrants Act (former Bill C-56), which would authorize immigration officers to refuse work permits to vulnerable foreign nationals when it is determined that they are at risk of humiliating or degrading treatment, including sexual exploitation or human trafficking.279

Not made clear in this official statement is that the Bill removes the appeals process and humanitarian and compassionate relief as well as new discretionary power granted to the immigration minister to deny work permits to any “foreign national” ostensibly for their own safety. The CCLA has made the important point that this presents a “hollow expansion for the rights of victims. Both torture and terrorism are serious crimes of international concern. Numerous Canadian victims of torture have been unable to access meaningful justice in Canadian courts – and yet the government has chosen only to make these amendments available to victims of terrorism. Even victims of terrorism would have to have their cases ‘preapproved’ by the government, which has the ability to decide which governments can and cannot be sued” (CCLA 2011).280 The provinces, former superior court judges, NDP’s justice critic and former

chairman of the Justice committee, David Daubney have been just a few sources that have argued that the bill focuses too much on punishment rather than on prevention and the involvement of community. Justice critic Harris has argued that the Bill will “lead to more punishment but not safer streets, not a deterrence against criminals and in fact there will be more victims, more crimes and less safety on our streets” (Cohen 2012).\(^2\) Indeed, critics have also warned that Bill C-10 “will exacerbate the ongoing crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration” (Newell 2012; CCLA 2011).

On September 27, 2011, Parm Gill spoke in support of Bill C-10:

> We have a very strong record when it comes to combatting criminal activities, be they crimes committed here or terrorist activities abroad. That is exactly why our very brave men and women are serving our great country around the world. They are protecting us and the democracy and freedom that we so much enjoy here in Canada… a Conservative government is a government that will put the protection of law-abiding Canadians first. We have taken strong action to fulfill our commitment to protect Canadians by taking a tough on crime approach and giving our law enforcement agencies the resources and tools they need to do their jobs. We have also moved forward in many areas to crack down on crime and to ensure that our streets and communities are safe and secure…We will continue to reverse the shameful trend which began under the Trudeau regime… that the protection of society was a secondary objective to protecting the rights of criminals. Our Conservative government completely rejects that premise and will continue to work to return common sense to the correctional system… We have also seen the successful prosecution of homegrown terrorists who were arrested before they had a chance to carry out their sadistic plot. It is starkly clear that Canada has a large role to play in the global fight against terrorism, a role that we have played and will continue to play in the battle against those who use senseless violence against civilians…

> Terrorist groups rarely act alone. The scale and sophistication of terrorist operations demand a vast amount of financial and organizational support. That support often comes from within states led by radical anti-western governments. Many observers have often described the relationship between terrorist groups and certain governments as one of a state operating within a state…I especially urge my colleagues in the NDP to support the bill and put the rights of victims and law-abiding Canadians ahead of the rights of terrorists and their supporters.\(^2\)

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Gill makes it explicit that the Harper Conservatives’ agenda has been to reverse established Canadian policy directions. As detailed already, Asian Conservative MPs’ investment in anti-terror policy in the post September 11 era has been profound. The arguments made by MPs such as Jaffer and Grewal regarding national security and “criminal” immigrants in 2000/2001 have carried into debates like the C-10. In these statements, the threat of foreign criminals within our borders is directly associated with Canada’s “duty” to fight terror at home and abroad. Under the expanded security state, undocumented migrants, potential terrorists including “radicalized” second generation children of immigrants, and “radical anti-western governments” are all classified as a threat to Canada and “our way of life”. Such an expanded security state explains why the debates at hand pertaining to C-31, C-43, and C-10 are so ideologically invested in a perpetual war against an enemy that continues to be cast in racial terms. Indeed, provisions outlined in Bill C-10 are not new. In a June 2, 2009 news release, Nina Grewal reminded Canadians that she had been lobbying the government to move forward with legislation to protect victims of terrorism since 2006 with her own private members bill: Bill C-346. Later, on October 30, 2009, Grewal spoke in support of the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act by stating:

By tabling this legislation, the Government of Canada is sending a very clear message that perpetrators of terrorism and their supporters will be held accountable for their actions… Canada is not immune from this threat… We have also seen the successful prosecution of homegrown terrorists before they had a chance to carry out their plans. We, therefore, cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand and pretend that our country has no stake in the global fight to put terrorists out of business. We need to continue to take firm and decisive action… We are not going to back down from terrorists or give in to fear. We are going to meet the threats they pose head on and take the necessary steps to protect this country, protect our fellow citizens, and help ensure that terrorists do not succeed in reigning havoc among our friends, neighbours and allies overseas.283

Grewal’s statements reflect patterns observed in existing studies examining post-September 11 discourses whereby “the call for justice turns in to a vendetta, the pursuit of revenge” (Mamdani 2004, 256). In Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, Mamdani has insisted that we must reflect on “the difference between law and violence”. Mamdani asks: “Against whom do we use the law and against whom violence? What is the point of distinguishing between two kinds of terrorists, Americans and non-Americans at some point,

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If to live by the rule of law is to belong to a common political community, then does not the selective application of the rule of law confirm a determination to relegate entire sections of humanity as conscripts of a civilization fit for collective punishment?" (2004, 257). Mamdani’s study reveals how the law has been unevenly applied so that white Americans accused of terrorism receive due process while “nonwesterners” suffer indefinite detention and torture. Similarly, as part of the family of nations in the war against terror, Canadian parliamentary discourse has mobilized the rule of law to legitimize the state’s racial profiling of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian Canadians as well as the state’s participation in military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On September 29, 2011, Parm Gill argued that “cultural communities” - where “cultural” is a racialized signifier – worry about their children will be targeted by “drug pushers and thugs”:

That is why the cultural communities voted for their values in the last election. They voted for getting tough on crime and for safer streets. I urge the Liberal and NDP parties to listen to the concerns of Canadians from communities most affected by crime, such as the South Asian community. Let us pass this bill. Let us get tough on crime. Let us get on with the work Canadians expect of us.

(Emphasis added)\textsuperscript{284}

Evident in this statement is a theme that recurs in Asian Conservative MP speeches already examined in previous chapters. Gill’s statement suggests that safety is a Conservative value shared by “cultural communities”. The “you’re either with us or you’re against us” ethos permeates these debates where critiques waged against Bill C-10 by opposition members and civil society (as seen also in debates around C-43 and C-31) have been cast as siding with criminals. By characterizing an issue as broad as “safety” as solely a Conservative value, the Harper Conservatives have cast any critiques of their excessively punitive methods of addressing issues such as “safety” as a stance against “safety” in general. In their parliamentary debate interactions with concerns raised by opposition members and civil society groups, Asian Conservative MP have reacted with “shock and appal” at not the content of the concerns per se but that there are questions raised at all about the government’s agenda. In effect, the very essence of deliberative democracy becomes characterized as some sort of mutiny against the government.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the normalization of repressive state responses to immigration and the regulation of desirable versus undesirable migrants under the Harper Conservatives. Together, Bills C-31, C-43 and C-10 distinguish those who need “our” protection from those “we” need protection from. The debates differentiate the civilized from the uncivilized, the patriot from terrorist and their sympathizers, the legitimate from illegitimate asylum seekers, the preferred from the non-preferred migrants, and the moderate from radical racial other. The government provisions outlined in these bills create the conditions that force migrants into social assistance programs and then blame them for being unable to “integrate”. I have attempted to show that while these Bills can be situated in a longer history of immigrant criminalization in Canada, legislative amendments in the era of Harper Conservatives are distinct. Dauvergne has argued, “We must let go of the idea that Canada’s refugee system is better, fairer, more generous or more humanitarian than other systems in the world. It is easy to dismiss the current debate about changes to Canada’s refugee process as the same-old Standoff between the soft liberal left and a strong reformist government. But the tenor of the recent changes has irrevocably altered the terrain… All Canadians must now understand that our humanitarian tradition and our openness towards refugees are historic artifacts (Dauvergne Jan 29, 2013). By focusing on enforcement and taking accountability out of immigration processes, ministers of immigration, public safety, and justice have been given carte blanche authority over the lives of immigrants and refugees. Refugees are no longer regarded as vulnerable, persecuted, endangered individuals requiring protection; they are not just any criminals, they are criminals that “take advantage of our generosity” and potentially threaten the health, safety, and security of Canadians. Linking immigration issues with the question of broader national security including foreign policy in parliamentary debate explains coinciding representations of immigrants within and foreigners abroad (McGhee 2008; McIlwain and Caliendo 2011). This explains the veracity of the argument that we must fight the enemy within our borders as much as we fight them in wars of intervention – the potential enemy of the state continues to be cast in racial terms.

The fact of racial conservative MPs participating in the debates has not minimized the recurrence of a racialized discourse of illegality. Nor can it be easily argued that the existence of racial MPs has demonstrated heightened feminist or race-based consciousness in parliamentary debates. Rather, the contributions of Asian Conservative MPs become the very justification for
the further restrictions on immigration policy. The logic presumes that a government that includes immigrant MPs could not possibly advance anti-immigrant policy. As Razack has argued, the national story that Canada likes to tell is the one where “generous, legitimate Canadians welcome genuine refugees and construct a wonderland, racially and culturally diverse society which is undermined by illegal immigrants as well as by citizens of colour who are disloyal to the nation” (Razack 1999, 173 in Chan 2004, 54). This is also the national story that Asian Conservative MPs repeat. In this story, the villains are “designated foreign nations,” “fraudsters,” and “bogus claimants”. In their parliamentary statements, the Asian conservatives have supported the state’s legitimization of violence against immigrants and refugees. In these statements, the MPs also distinguish the suitable immigrant from the unsuitable refugee.

In this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis, Asian Conservative statements have identified differing categories of “Canadians”. In racialized terms, the discourse insists that there are “ordinary Canadians” and “Canadian immigrants,” categories that further reify the myth that white Canadians are rightful proprietors of the land that accommodate the integration of immigrant settlers while invisibilizing the ongoing settler colonial state. In the parliamentary debates examined in this chapter, the MPs have argued that it is not “ordinary Canadians” that have most disdain for “queue jumpers” but rather “Canadian immigrants”. Such a discursive strategy illustrates that the legitimization of immigration restrictions, once articulated by the Conservatives as a defense on behalf of “ordinary” white Canadians can no longer be articulated in the same racial terms. While the anti-immigration/anti-refugee discursive strategy has expanded to include the figure of the “good immigrant”, the anti-immigration discourse has not been abandoned. The CPC government - including Asian MPs continues - to criminalize immigrants and asylum seekers, distinguishing “legitimate” from “illegitimate” outsiders. The Conservative message has been made consistently and clearly in racial terms: there are ordinary law-abiding Canadians who deserve protection from criminal foreigners. Immigrants feature at once as a desirable economic stimulus and as abusers of Canada’s borders and benevolence; a pattern of Canadian immigration and citizenship debate that has been traced to early parliamentary debates regarding Asian others.
Conclusion:
The State of Race beyond Conservative and Liberal Rule

[In the era of new liberalism] “The only way you can tell the difference between those who are supposed to be liberals and those who are supposed to be conservatives is by self-proclamation and organizational affiliation; their ideas and programs are otherwise indistinguishable.” Adolph Reed Jr.

With particular attention to one figure on the racial landscape, this thesis has traced how racial governance has come to be shaped through racial inclusion. I have argued that the political integration of the figure of the Asian Conservative MP has become part of racial governmentality, a part, that is, of how racial minorities are governed. In Canada, official multiculturalism emerged and evolved as the dominant discourse to regulate political heterogeneity. As such, liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism discourses have given rise to a variety of subject positions including the racial conservative, which then legitimize those discourses as inevitable and just. My research has found that the neoliberalization of multicultural discourse as led by the Reform Party of Canada has configured the Asian Conservative member of parliament (MP) as the upwardly-mobile, bootstrap-immigrant, difference-that-integrates into the modern polity. Through overcoming narratives that adhere to a militant colourblind or post-racial ideology, Asian Conservatives have positioned themselves as the more racially authentic voice of visible minorities in Canada. Moreover, by attacking equity-centred multiculturalism and “hyphenated identity” as divisive, the Asian MPs have practiced a neoliberal politics that caters to the investor class and have circulated a definition of so-called Asian political interests that aligns comfortably with the conservative orthodoxy.

By analyzing their text and talk, particularly their contributions to parliamentary debate on national identity, multiculturalism, and immigration policies, this thesis has investigated how Asian Conservative MPs, particularly since 1997, have contributed to the reproduction of racism in the Canadian context. Paradoxically raced in the name of racelessness, my research finds that the figure of the Asian Conservative MP has become vital to the state’s narrative of progress and tolerance. At the same time, speaking in the name of race, these politicians promote a discourse

of integration and lend legitimacy to the project of managing racial populations. With focus on the figure of the Asian Conservatives, the study finds how politicians of colour also have the capacity to uphold the racial order, leave inequities uncontested, and often augment them with renewed vigour.

With this, I risk leaving the impression that all Asians are conservative and that the category of Asian is a homogenously organized class. Scripted in the dominant narrative as both ideal neoliberal difference and as perpetual foreigners, Asian Canadians have been well positioned to be the sell-outs however, not all have been. Among those that have been excluded - as Asian Conservatives have been included - are working-class and poor Asians, as well as those categorized as “foreign criminals” and organizations committed to a critique of capitalist incorporation that leave the social order unchallenged. These are groups and strata of Asians that have not been consulted by the Harper Conservatives and that do not appear in Conservative campaign materials. Yet, the Asian Conservative MPs have claimed to speak on behalf of all Asians as the supposedly authentic and representative voice for the majority. Drawing on critical race political scientists such as Adolph Reed Jr., this thesis has addressed the limitations and corrosiveness of the rhetoric of racial authenticity, which is made possible through identitarian discourses and practices constitutive of neoliberalism. By focusing on descriptive representation or who is in the room, such identity politics shift focus away from redistribution and a critical look at deeper structures that reproduce durable inequalities. Through this formulation, racialized elites reap the material benefits of incorporation while a banal notion of diversity comes to stand in for social justice. For Reed, the privileging of elite-brokerage politics has limited the “range of claims on the policy agenda” as well as “the boundaries of the politically reasonable” and thus preserves the existing regime of power and hierarchy (Reed Jr. 1999, 121). Political incorporation has been a source of demobilization as it facilitates the narrowing of the place where racialized political officials can stand on the contemporary political terrain. That is, the narrow range of admissible political performances does not include the performance of advocacy. Moreover, Asian Conservative elites give the impression that Asians are a singular and homogenous class where all Asians are upwardly mobile, bootstrap-immigrant sell-outs eager to exploit the racial hierarchy. Here, I want to emphasize that it is a particular kind of Asian – as the upwardly mobile, bootstrap-immigrant elite - that has been necessary to the new regime of racial management.
As a practice of racial governance, it is clear that the ideal and promise of civility is profoundly productive. It is not my intention to demonize ethnic communities or the subjects I examine in this study because in a material sense, civility has been made the apparent pathway to full political realization. That is, a moderate politics promises racial others entry into modernity through the trope of civility as legitimate and valuable subjects of the state. As such, civility moderates populations, quells critique of the state and its appendages, disciplines Canadian citizen-subjects of their various possible political parameters, and regulates the boundary of legitimate and illegitimate racial diversity. That is, civility as a mechanism of racial governance manufactures subjects that “make no demands” upon the state. What this thesis finds is that as racial others are included or recognized by the state as civil, suitable, and legitimate emblems of diversity, so too are other others cast as uncivil, unsuitable, and illegitimate racial threats; those that make too many demands upon the state. The Asian Conservative MP as an ideal subject of neoliberal multiculturalism and the “foreign criminal” constituted as the threat to neoliberal multiculturalism become disciplinary subject-positions in the regulation of racial populations. It is this regulatory function of the subject-position of the Asian Conservative MP that justifies state violence and the reproduction of inequities. Strategies of inclusion as racial government can be traced in parliamentary discourses which claim: “we know there are illegal migrants terrorizing Canadians thus they must be contained and deported;” “we know there are visible minority members of the Reform Party, thus they must not be racist;” “we know Canada is a nation of immigrants, thus it must not advance anti-immigrant legislation;” “we know the MP is an immigrant thus she must not advance anti-immigrant sentiments in her parliamentary statements;” “we know the MP is a woman and immigrant thus she must be feminist and race-conscious;” “we know the Harper Conservatives have apologized thus they must not be racist”. That is, expert knowledge has been drawn upon as a way to justify a wide range of endeavours such as the containment and deportation of racial populations categorized as “foreign criminals”. Similarly, narratives of immigrant success as native informant knowledge have been deployed as expert knowledge, which in part determines the valuableness of economic migrants and the valuelessness of refugees and family class migrants. The Asian Conservative MP figure has obscured clearly racist implications of a renewed assault on “illegal” immigrants under the Harper Conservatives. This is a trend that is not likely to reverse considering the historical legislative context from which the Harper Conservative amendments have arisen. This thesis has
tracked how racial inclusion as part of racial governance or how the state governs minority populations has developed since the post-war era through the participation of both Liberal and Conservative governments. Ethnic pluralism – specifically, political pluralism - has been under siege for decades whether the state is represented by a Liberal or Conservative government.

As such, Reed has called for a dispensing of the “communitarian mythological frame” (Reed Jr. 1999, 156). For Reed one of the first steps towards substantive political representation is recognizing “political interests and activity as internally differentiated in ways that are grounded in social structure” (ibid 143). That is, a substantive representational politics must recognize that all racialized people “are not affected in the same ways by public policy and government practice” (ibid 153-154). What is more important is to think about “how concrete group interests are determined, who determines them, and how those determinations, including the strategies and objectives they warrant, affect different elements of the black American population” (ibid 39). Similarly, political scientist, Cathy Cohen has argued against a project of integration as well as “policies and programs that are deeply rooted in and preserve the structural legitimacy and order of neoliberalism” (Cohen 2012, 21). For Cohen, interrogating the assumptions of “what constitutes resistance, opposition, and agency” means moving towards “a political strategy that is not centered around Barack Obama, but instead is focused on attacking neoliberalism, bringing the state back in on the side of the 99%” (Cohen 2012, 25; 2004, 42). In essence, Cohen and Reed call for a politics that is actually and rigorously political or deliberative rather than consensual; to move away from demobilizing preoccupation with negotiation and integration and towards substantive public debate and a broader program of social justice.

Examining the political inclusion of Asian-Canadian Conservatives as part of racial governmentality also means paying critical attention to who else is on this racial landscape. I have thus argued that insofar as multiculturalism as incorporation is a project of assisting racial others into modernity, it requires the utter exclusion of those that have been cast as antithetical to the modern: Indigenous, Black, and working class or poor life. The political incorporation of Asian-Canadian Conservatives as figures representing cultural difference, immigrant bootstrap individualism, upward mobility, and neoliberal subjectivity allows the state to avoid substantively or critically engaging with race or class; this incorporation does not rupture any political categories. Indeed, such a configuration re-energizes Flanagan’s conviction that Indigenous populations are uncivilized, wasteful and unassimilable. Additionally, Stephen
Lewis’ 1992 report documenting systemic anti-Black violence in Ontario in the era of supposed colour-blind neoliberalism, as well as the election of Douglas Jung and the eviction of Africville are just some examples that reveal how Indigenous and Black Canadians have experienced a social order that contradict the celebrated discourse of racial liberalism. In other words, the post-war era of racial liberalism unevenly affected the lives of racialized populations in Canada. Scholars have demonstrated how 1960s and 1970s changes to immigration and multiculturalism policies did not improve the lives of Indigenous and Black Canadians. To say Canada is a nation of immigrants is to say that it is not a nation of indigenous people but it is also that this desirable immigrant is specifically not Black. That is, every time there is an Asian claim for inclusion something else on the racial landscape is being given context. In this way, the thesis has partly explored how multiculturalism discourse has been critical to furthering the white settler state’s ongoing regulation of heterogeneity as it continuously dispossesses and categorically excludes Indigenous and Black populations. That is, the inclusion of Asians as difference-that-integrates precludes the state from any meaningful discourse about racial and class inequities and forestalls any substantial political engagement with ongoing white settler-colonialism and “the afterlife of slavery” (Hartman 2007, 6). Thus, this thesis has traced how multiculturalism discourse has given rise to the ideal multicultural subject as necessarily a narrowly imagined Asian Conservative subject. Specifically, power arrangements under the Harper Conservatives’ left very little space for the advocate of colour. That is, the thesis has explored how the Asian Conservative MPs take up the narrowly imagined space of legitimacy that has been carved out for racial others – in which they remain regarded as duplicitous - as conduits to a settler colonial, anti-Black politics.

On October 19, 2015, a red wave re-swept the nation as Canada elected the Justin Trudeau’s Liberals into government. Leading up to the election, poll after poll indicated that Canadians wanted a “change” after nearly a decade under the authoritarian rule of the Harper Conservatives. A growing discourse of hope and optimism was undeniable. It cast Justin Trudeau as Harper’s antithesis and it won him his seat as prime minister. In the aftermath of the election, pundits and journalists became preoccupied with whether or not the new Trudeau government would be able to keep all of its campaign promises related to the economy, to the inquiry into missing and murdered Indigenous women, and to Canada’s role in the war on terror. A more productive question concerns not whether the Trudeau Liberals might break their promises but
rather how the Liberal government will fulfill the state’s ongoing commitment to the racial order.
In just nine years, did the country forget the legacy of liberal and Liberal commitments to racial rule? As this thesis has shown, the legacies of anti-Native, anti-Black, and anti-Asian racism, that is, the state’s commitment to the national project has been upheld by both Liberal and Conservative participants. For those who remember these legacies under various Liberal governments, October 19, 2015 marks a new era of commitments to state violence under the guise of another inclusionary discourse, that is, “Inclusion secured through violence” (Razack 2004, 109). Indeed, both the Liberal and Conservative parties continue to recalibrate their methods in their competition for governmental rule. With the careful selection of Rona Ambrose as their interim leader as Stephen Harper stepped down but surely not away, the CPC likely does not consider October 19, 2015 a failure. For nearly a decade, the party effected monumental changes to policies affecting citizenship, militarization, the economy, and national identity. This is no small feat for CPC party leaders that began in the fringes and moved their way into the centre of Canadian parliament. Racial governance is an incremental and long-haul commitment and the changes installed since 2006 will not easily or likely reverse since it was the Liberal governments before Harper that paved the policy pathways for him. The racial state continues to reorganize itself through inclusion so the legitimization of racial hierarchy continues to produce new subjects, rationalities, and narratives of regulation.

This thesis set out to examine Asian members of parliament who were elected as Conservative candidates: who they are and their contributions. The study became an historical unmapping of racial governance at the level of political party institutions. Flexible racial rule has been sustained by multiple, at times, competing parties, which all rely on and reproduce racial and gendered hierarchies of power. The thesis has been more than a critique of racial political conservatives that have participated in sustaining and justifying state violence. A critique of racial conservatism is fundamentally a critique of racial liberalism, of the constitution of the modern state as a racial state and its assertions of racelessness as it preserves racial order.
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