CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN LIE-TELLING AND TRUTH-TELLING SURROUNDING SPORTING EVENTS

By

Carly Samantha Prusky

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto

© Copyright by Carly Samantha Prusky 2019
CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN LIE-TELLING AND TRUTH-TELLING SURROUNDING SPORTING EVENTS

Doctor of Philosophy, 2019
Carly Samantha Prusky
Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development
University of Toronto

Abstract

Sporting events receive international recognition and athletes are typically held to higher moral standards. However, when athletes engage in questionable moral behaviour all cultures may not evaluate this behaviour similarly or support their athletes similarly. This study investigated emerging adults’ moral rationalizations of fabricated scenario-based sporting events where an athlete engaged in questionable moral behaviour, such as taking performance-enhancing drugs, and the protagonist either told a lie and helped the athlete or told the truth and harmed the athlete. Scenarios incorporated different collectives where either athletes were representing their country or themselves as individuals. Emerging adults from North America and China were asked to evaluate the protagonist’s actions and indicate what behaviour they themselves would opt to engage in. With the continued increase in immigration to Western countries, acculturation was considered through comparisons between two North American ethnicities, Caucasian and Asian.

Cultural trends have been established in previous research where children and adolescents from Eastern cultures evaluate lie-telling more positively when protecting a larger group collective, such as a country, whereas children and adolescents from Western cultures evaluate lie-telling more positively when protecting a smaller collective, such as an individual or themselves (Dmytro, Lo, O’Leary, Fu, Lee, & Cameron, 2014; Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Fu, Luo, Heyman, Wang, Cameron, & Lee, 2016; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Xu,
Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010). These trends are mirrored with regards to engagement in lie-telling. Similar cultural trends were found within the current study’s emerging adult population and when utilizing scenarios with more severe consequences. Emerging adults from China illustrated greater loyalty for the athlete when representing their country, whereas emerging adults from North America illustrated greater loyalty for the athlete when representing themselves. When ethnicity was considered it was surprising to find that North American Asian emerging adults’ moral rationalizations were more similar to North American Caucasian emerging adults’ moral rationalizations rather than to emerging adults from China. These findings support theories of cross-cultural differences and highlight the blending and integration of cultures in North America.
Acknowledgements

I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Kang Lee, who provided me with the perfect balance of independence and support. Thank you for helping me find my voice and stepping in to make my graduate studies a success. I much appreciated your encouragement, guidance, and belief in me to achieve. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Esther Geva and Dr. Michel Ferrari, for providing valuable feedback and suggestions. Your insights will stay with me and will shape my future research. Thank you to Dr. Sandra Bosacki and Dr. Rick Volpe, my external examiners, for your insights, thoughtful comments, questions, affirmations, and participation in my final oral defence. A special thank you to Dr. Joan Peskin for your academic support and mentorship throughout my years at OISE.

This research would not have been possible without the participation of the University of Toronto, University of California in San Diego, the Zhejiang Normal University in Jinhua, and the Zhejiang Sci-Tech University in Hangzhou. Thank you to the students who took the time to participate and allowed us to discover more about the impact of culture when making moral decisions.

To my family and friends, thank you for your ongoing encouragement, support, and patience. You never doubted my ability to achieve this goal and were always there to talk through the struggles and celebrate the successes. I am certain that I would not be where I am today without you. Thank you for always pushing me forward.
List of Tables

Table 1. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on region (and ethnicity for North America), story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories (standard deviations in brackets) ................................................................. 57

Table 2. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories (standard deviations in brackets) ................................................................................................. 68

Table 3. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on region (and ethnicity for North America), story type, and story outcome for the individual stories (standard deviations in brackets) ........................................................................................................ 70

Table 4. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories (standard deviations in brackets) ........................................................................................................ 78

Table 5. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type for the country collective stories with a truth outcome and a lie outcome ............................. 89

Table 6. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the country collective stories with a truth outcome ........................................ 90

Table 7. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the country collective stories with a lie outcome ............................................. 91

Table 8. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the country collective stories with a truth outcome ........ 92

Table 9. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the country collective stories with a lie outcome ........... 93

Table 10. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a truth outcome ......................................................................................................................... 96

Table 11. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a lie outcome ......................................................................................................................... 96

Table 12. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type for the individual stories with a truth outcome and a lie outcome ................................. 98
Table 13. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the individual stories with a truth outcome ............................................. 100

Table 14. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the individual stories with a lie outcome ................................................. 100

Table 15. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the individual stories with a truth outcome .......... 102

Table 16. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the individual stories with a lie outcome ........... 104

Table 17. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a truth outcome..... 106

Table 18. Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a lie outcome ...... 107

Table 19. Frequencies for North American recoded responses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a truth outcome .............................................................. 113

Table 20. Frequencies for North American recoded responses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a lie outcome .............................................................. 113

Table 21. Frequencies for North American recoded responses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a truth outcome ........................................................................... 115

Table 22. Frequencies for North American recoded reponses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a lie outcome .............................................................................. 115
List of Figures

Figure 1. Mean ratings of how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on region, story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories ........................................... 58

Figure 2. Mean ratings of how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on ethnicity, story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories ........................................... 62

Figure 3. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories.. 69

Figure 4. Mean ratings of how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on region, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories...................................................... 71

Figure 5: Mean ratings of how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on ethnicity, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories...................................................... 74

Figure 6. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories .............. 79
Chapter One: Introduction

At the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, gymnastic events received a lot of attention as there were suspicions of unfair play and teams trying to give themselves and, in lieu, their country, a leg up on the competition. Gymnastic enthusiasts questioned the age of the Chinese female athletes due to their youthful appearance, short stature, and petite body size suggesting that the host nation was using under-age athletes to gain an advantage in the competition (Longman & Macur, 2008). During this time multiple reports came out about age falsification and documentation (e.g., birth records) was uncovered that indicated that the suspected athletes were 14-years of age rather than the eligible age of 16-years (Alfonsi, McHugh, Gaynor, & Ibanga, 2008; Beech, 2008; Flumenbaum, 2008; Fox News, 2008; Longman & Macur, 2008 NBC news, 2008). What was quite fascinating was how different countries reported on the female gymnastics competition. Reports from China focussed on the positive – the outstanding athletic performance from their athletes, which led to the winning of the gold medal (Xinhua, 2008). North American reports focussed on the negative – the wrong doing and unfair advantage these athletes had, which the athletes needed to be held responsible for (Alfonsi et al., 2008; Beech, 2008; Flumenbaum, 2008; Fox News, 2008; Gerstner, 2012; The Guardian, 2010; Longman & Macur, 2008; NBC news, 2008). With individuals from China clearly supporting their suspected athletes, it raised the question of whether individuals from North American countries would support and stand behind their own athletes if they were the ones suspected of unfair play.

This question uncovers two main themes; how individuals justify morally questionable behaviour, and how cultural differences, specifically between Eastern countries (i.e., China) and Western countries (i.e., the United States and Canada), influence moral reasoning. Sporting
events were focused on as large events, such as the Olympics, are attended by athletes from around the world where athletes are held to the same standards. This allows sports to be discussed/debated worldwide (Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006). Sports includes the moral virtue of sportsmanship and highlights the importance of learning a system of rule-governed behaviours (Sutton-Smith & Roberts, 1980). Unfortunately, many examples of questionable moral behaviour can be identified across a range of elite or professional sports. For example, 118 Russian athletes were barred from the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics due to the utilization of performance-enhancing drugs (Powell, 2016; Ruiz 2016; Shuster, 2016). Additionally, at the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics only 168 out of 500 Russian athletes were allowed to compete as Olympic Athletes from Russia, but not under their country’s flag (IOC News, 2018; Mather & Ruiz 2018). These examples illustrate how sports can be used as a platform for discussions about moral behaviour as spectators witness cases of collaborative unfair play between athletes, coaches, and even country officials.

When presented with questionable moral behaviour individuals may rationalize, justify, and reason differently depending on the environment and objective. Our moral reasoning is culturally defined, as how we rationalize and justify is dependent on the values that we have acquired and internalized from our families, teachers, religion, and culture. Today, countries across the globe are engaging in more world trade and globalization continues to increase. Therefore, understanding our cultural differences has never been more important. In addition, immigration, especially to North American countries, continues to rise. Understanding different cultural perspectives allows for more seamless integration of immigrants and more acceptance by those who already live in the host country.

This literature review is broken down into three components. The first component
examines morality, more specifically moral reasoning (Chapter 2). This chapter will provide context for how we reason about moral behaviour and how moral reasoning develops from childhood to adulthood. The second component evaluates culture differences (Chapter 3). In this chapter countries will be classified based on collectivistic and individualistic characteristics while a better understanding of both types of culture is provided. The third component explores current research investigating both culture and morality (Chapter 4). In this chapter research primarily involving children and adolescents is presented and discussed in terms of how the findings could apply to an emerging adult population. Each component of the literature review will lead back to the main question of whether individuals from different cultures would justify and rationalize immoral behaviour regarding sporting events in a similar manner.
Chapter Two: Morality

2.1 What is Morality?

Studies of morality focus on the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours regarding rules and conventions pertaining to lying, stealing, or cheating (Helwig & Turiel, 2004, 2014; Lapsley, 1996; Piaget, 1932/1965; Narvaez, Radvansky, Lycnhard, & Copeland, 2011; Turiel, 1998, 2006a, 2006b). Morality is understanding what is right and what is wrong based on upholding social order and following conventional rules (Helwig & Turiel, 2004, 2014; Turiel, 1998, 2006a, 2006b). Conventional rules are established through social consensus in order to control behaviour and maintain social order. Individuals behave in accordance with social order as violations can create conflict and tension due to ethical standards being offended and basic instincts not being controlled (Helwig & Turiel, 2004, 2014). Although these rules are not random or created by chance, individuals still partake in stealing, cheating, and especially lying, which disrupts our moral foundations for making moral judgments and providing moral reasoning.

2.1.1 The Truth about Lying. When engaging in conversation there are conventional rules that follow a hierarchical structure (Evans & Lee, 2014; Sweetser, 1987). At the top of the hierarchy is the general cooperative rule. This rule indicates that we should engage in helpful speech rather than harmful speech. Based on the understanding that knowledge is helpful, the second rule indicates that knowledge given should be honest and not meant to misinform (Evans & Lee, 2014; Sweetser, 1987). However, research has demonstrated that when honesty comes into conflict with certain social or moral values it is believed to not be appropriate and instead, in these particular circumstances, lying is viewed as being acceptable. For example, lies told to protect the feelings (i.e., white lies) or interests (i.e., blue lies) of others or to make others happy
have been morally justified, judged favorably, and condoned, while honesty is discouraged (DePaulo, Morris, & Sterglanz, 2009; Dmytro, Lo, O’Leary, Fu, Lee, & Cameron, 2014; Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Pontari & Schlenker, 2006; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Although lies are not honest, these lies are meant to be helpful and, therefore, are still consistent with the general cooperative rule of speech. These deliberately dishonest statements are judged less or more like lies based on motivation and social context (Lee & Ross, 1997; Sweetser, 1987).

Lying is inescapable as it is a common behaviour throughout the lifespan with children as young as 42-months engaging in lies (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Evans & Lee, 2013; Lee, 2013). When lying is uncovered it evokes strong emotional reactions, is judged negatively, and can cause unpleasant and less intimate social interactions, especially when told to cover up a misdeed (DePaulo et al., 1996; Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001; Perkins & Turiel, 2007). Knowing such an undesirable outcome may ensue, it raises the question of whether it is truly in one’s best interest to tell a lie even in the particular circumstances outlined above.

It is important to consider intentionality, motivation, and the social context when engaging in lying (Dmytro et al., 2014; Lee, 2013). Prior research makes it clear that loyalty may trump honesty, especially when friendship is considered (Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Pontario & Schlenker, 2006). This has become an increasing concern in team sports. There have recently been a number of high-profile scandals, such as those involving the 2008 Olympic gymnastics team from China or involving the 2014, 2016, and 2018 Russian Olympic teams, in which athletes and coaches conspired to cover up the misconduct of their teammates. In these situation-specific cases, lying may not reflect what an individual believes to be right or wrong, but rather what the best would be as a function of cultural values.
Lies made out of loyalty are important to study because how people reason about them can have important societal implications. For example, the magnitude of loyalty or disloyalty shown to a particular group may affect the group’s acceptance of and failure to report on misconduct. Loyalty can lead to the propagation of corruption. It is not clear the extent to which reasoning about loyalty would generalize to reasoning about different in-groups outside of friendship, such as nationalism, or if differences would emerge as a function of culture. The current study hopes to answer both of these questions.

2.2 The Development of Moral Reasoning

Moral reasoning is a part of morality that occurs both within and between individuals as they try to determine the difference between what is right and what is wrong by using logic (Bucciarelli, Khemlani, & Johnson-Larid, 2008; Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Reynolds, 2006). Moral reasoning conceptualizes morality based on the moral values of harm, fairness, reciprocity, in-group loyalty, and respect (Sachdeva, Singh, & Medin, 2011; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). Individuals are continuously faced with situations that challenge these moral values requiring moral decisions to be made (e.g., whether to lie or tell the truth). These decisions are made by reasoning about morality and weighing the potential action against the potential consequence (Bucciarelli et al., 2008). Examining how individuals think and feel about and would respond to a given situation is the basis of moral reasoning. Throughout the lifespan individuals continue to learn what is acceptable within society and expand their basic understanding from childhood about making moral decisions about what is right and wrong (Bucciarelli et al., 2008).

In order to expand our ability to make moral decisions, individuals engage in behaviour that tests ethical standards and conventional rules. For example, younger children may lie about
eating their vegetables, adolescents may disobey classroom rules by passing notes, and adults often test the rules while driving. As individuals engage in more complex questionable behaviour throughout their lifespan, their understanding of morality and moral reasoning becomes more complex based on their evolving social and cognitive experiences. Children’s understanding of morality is developed through their awareness of authority and punishment (Lapsley, 1996, 2006; Sugarman, 1987).


2.2.1 Piaget. Piaget’s (1929/1951) research is based on uncovering what conceptions of the world the child naturally understands at different stages within development. These conceptions include how children differentiate between imagination and the real world, between the external world and the internal/subjective world, and how children perceive reality. According to Piaget (1929/1951), children gain knowledge through interactions with others, which helps shape their social world. In order to assess children’s understanding, Piaget
(1929/1951) used natural observation or engaged in conversation with standard and simple questions that elicited spontaneous responses. It was concluded that children do not test their opinions as long as they believe that everyone thinks as they do. Children’s logic develops as their understanding of others and capacity to reason expands. Children are innately egocentric, therefore, until children have the capacity to dissociate their thoughts from others, objective opinions about reality cannot be formed. Taking these core findings into account, Piaget investigated children’s moral judgement with focus on how children learn from others’ rules and practices.

Piaget (1932/1965) asked children about ethical issues pertaining to theft, lying, and justice and discovered that children develop morality in two stages. Young children (i.e., ages 4-to 7-years-old) are rule-oriented, where social rules are fixed and unchangeable and consequences are only considered as a need for proportional punishment from authority figures, such as parents, teachers, or coaches. There are two types of punishment – expiatory punishment through constraint and reciprocal punishment. Expiatory punishment through constraint is when the punishment matches the badness of the behaviour by limiting what an individual can do. For example, if a student athlete is caught skipping a class their team privileges may be revoked making them unable to play and practice with their team for a given time period. Reciprocal punishment is when the punishment fits the badness of the behaviour by having an individual perform an alternative behaviour. For example, a student athlete who is late for a practice may be told to run suicides as a way for them to understand the consequences of their actions. The intentions of another individual are not considered at this age as children are just developing an understanding of others and may not yet appreciate that other people may have different sets of rules. Children view others with unilateral respect (Piaget, 1932/1965).
Older children (i.e., 10-years-olds and older) have developed diverse perspectives and are aware that rules and laws are created by people and, therefore, intentions become more important as rules may be broken under certain circumstances. By age 10, children start to consider the individual’s intentions for performing naughty behaviour as well as the consequence that would be appropriate for breaking the rules (Piaget, 1932/1965). Children now view others with mutual respect and understand that different people have different morals. Children’s moral thinking changes as their cognitive abilities develop further and social experiences expand. Clearly children want to understand more about their social world rather than just complying with society’s or parental standards or rules (Eckensberger & Zimba, 1997; Helwig & Turiel, 2004, 2014). However, Piaget has been criticized as underestimating children’s ability to think about intentions and for not accounting for cultural differences in morality (Bussey, 1992; Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973; Havighurst & Neugarten, 1955, Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996).

2.2.2 Kohlberg. Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1984) expanded the topic of moral development by focusing on moral reasoning when experiencing moral conflicts. Kohlberg characterized the first stages of moral reasoning as being concerned with obedience to authority and avoiding punishment (Helwig & Turiel, 2004, 2014; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1984; Lapsley, 1996, 2006). This differed from Piaget who classified children’s thinking as reflecting respect for rules. Kohlberg believed children took the perspective of authority due to consequences that may result. Perspective taking and interactions with peers provide individuals, especially children, with key social stimulations (Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1984). These social stimulations challenge individuals to adapt their moral reasoning based on the reciprocity of the relationship. Later stages of Kohlberg’s theory have moral reasoning shift focus to the legal system, in terms of
upholding laws, and then to developing an understanding of the abstract principles of justice and society’s rights (Helwig & Turiel, 2004, 2014; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1984; Lapsley, 1996, 2006). According to Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1984), an individual cannot follow moral principles until these moral principles are properly understood and believed in. Therefore, by the end of childhood, morality is understood as a combination of punishment, respect for authority, and maintenance of existing social rules and laws (Helwig & Turiel, 2004, 2014).

Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1984) suggested that his stages of moral reasoning are universal where individuals will go through the stages in the same order with few advancing over a stage or returning to a previous stage. Although individuals have been found to go through Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning in the same order, cultural differences have been found (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; Sachdeva et al., 2011; Snarey, 1985). Individuals from collectivist cultures explain their answers to the moral dilemmas by highlighting the importance of community rather than personal standards. Individuals from individualistic cultures explain their answers to the moral dilemmas by focusing on individual rights and obligations (Gibbs et al, 2007; Snarey, 1985). Kohlberg’s model has been criticized for not discussing unity of life or principles of cooperation, both of which are found in rural communities and within Eastern cultural traditions (Sachdeva et al., 2011). It should also be noted that the situations used in Kohlberg’s dilemmas may not apply to all cultures due to their hypothetical contexts (Eckensberger & Zimba, 1997). This current study will further investigate how individuals from different cultures reason about moral issues.

2.2.3 Social Domain Theory. Children are taught about the importance of sharing, being kind to others, what clothing is appropriate to wear, what food they should consume, and that you should not steal from others all at the same time. The social domain theory views morality as
part of children’s social knowledge, which also includes knowledge about social norms and conventions (Laupa & Turiel, 1995; Smetana, 2006; Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 1983, 2006b). However, the main emphasis is on how children distinguish moral conventions (e.g., acts that have consequences dealing with another’s welfare) from other social conventions (e.g., more arbitrary rules about personal hygiene, dress, eating practices) (Eckensberger & Zimba, 1997; Nucci, 1985; Smetana, 1982, 2006; Smetana et al. 2014; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991). As children make sense of their social world they consistently view moral violations about justice, fairness, rights, and others’ well-being, as worse than social convention violations (Helwig, Tisak, & Turiel, 1990; Laupa & Turiel, 1995; Sachdeva et al., 2011; Turiel, 2006b, Turiel et al., 1991). This is due to moral violations potentially resulting in harm to another individual through violations to human rights, unfair discrimination, or poor treatment (Helwig et al., 1990; Laupa & Turiel, 1995; Turiel, 2006b; Turiel et al., 1991). Therefore, children are able to understand and reason about the severity of moral violations in different social contexts. This theory illustrates the importance of understanding moral rules and how individuals apply their social knowledge and reasoning to help deal with complex moral issues.

**2.2.4 Model of Moral Reasoning.** Rest’s (1979, 1983, 1986, 1994) four component model of morality addresses how an individual’s views about morality will ultimately shape their ethical behaviour and integrity. This model answers the following questions: what do individuals require to act morally, and why would an individual not act morally even though they clearly know what is right, by combining cognitive, social, behavioural, and psychoanalytic developmental perspectives and approaches (Eckensberger & Zimba, 1997; Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Narvaez & Rest, 1995; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1994; Schweigert, 2016). Before this model, researchers were focused primarily on moral judgment (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Rest,
This model incorporates moral judgment with other significant factors that influence ethical decision-making, such as moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral character. Although the components follow a logical progression, according to Rest (1979, 1983, 1986, 1994) there is no fixed order as each component is distinct and can influence the others.

Moral sensitivity is being aware of the moral/ethical issue within a given situation and understanding how our actions will affect others by either being beneficial or harmful. Individuals need to interpret situations and recognize the moral content before selecting their course of action while taking into account who will be affected by the action and understanding the effect of the action on those affected (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1994; Reynolds, 2006).

Moral judgment is correctly reasoning about what should be done in a specific situation to solve a moral issue. This process requires reasoning through the possible action choices and potential consequences from these actions to determine what is most ethical. Individuals need to formulate and to judge the right action for a specific situation and then decide to act in this manner (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1994). Children make moral judgments based on issues of harm, fairness, rights, punishment, and explicit rules as they differentiate between moral conventions and social conventions. Children often model their moral reasoning after a trusted adult authority (DePaulo et al., 2009; Turiel, 2006b). Adults make moral judgments based on society’s standards and acknowledging justice.

Moral motivation is making a personal commitment to choose the morally valued action over another action that would lead to a solution representing a different value. Responsibility needs to be accepted for the outcome of morally valued actions whether it is positive or negative. Individuals need to consider what is valued more, actions that are morally best or actions that
serve a personal gain, and decide to act with moral intentions (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1994).

Moral character or courage is continuing to pursue moral actions rather than being tempted to take the easy way out. Individuals need strength, courage, determination, and the ability to continue on their intended moral path making moral decisions and engaging in moral behaviour (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1994).

Let’s consider how a gymnastics enthusiast would utilize this model of moral reasoning after viewing the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when female gymnasts were suspected of age falsification. Upon age falsification being identified as a moral issue and transgression, a course of action would need to be decided (i.e., reporting or not reporting the age falsification). Reporting the age falsification would be harmful to China, but would benefit the other countries competing in the gymnastics events. Not reporting the age falsification would be beneficial to China, but would harm the other countries competing in the gymnastics events. Reasoning and judging whether or not to act morally, even though age falsification has been identified as a major transgression, is dependent on personal gain. In this case the personal gain is for a country. Rationalizations would include whether China and the Chinese athletes should be acknowledged as acting immorally. Therefore, both ambition and loyalty to China are clouding moral values and, in lieu, compromising moral behaviour (Schweigert, 2016). Once it is determined that reporting the transgression is most ethical, a commitment would be made to act with moral intent. Although this outcome took strong moral judgment, motivation, and character, if age falsification was not identified as a moral issue then none of these moral skills would matter (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011). This example illustrates the importance of understanding societal and cultural perspectives of morality when acting morally.


2.2.5 Adult Morality. Adults typically have a strong moral foundation due to vast social experiences and navigating through multifaceted moral issues (Smetana et al., 2014). Adults can rationalize, judge, and evaluate complex moral issues due to previous experiences while understanding others’ perspectives and social responsibility (Narvaez, Gleason, & Mitchell, 2010). Greater autonomy and exposure to diversity in terms of social experiences and cultural values provide adults with a moral advantage (Turiel, 1974). This moral advantage impacts moral reasoning and moral behaviour as adults are able to make ethical decisions while considering multiple perspectives.

As adults are able to rationalize about moral issues, research has focused on whether moral reasoning changes throughout adulthood. Research has shown that when making moral judgments there is little to no change throughout adulthood (Arutyunova, Alexandrov, & Hauser, 2016; Chap, 1986; Pratt, Golding, & Kerig, 1987). However, older adults’ rationalizations are more varied and extensive as these are based on personal experiences solving moral dilemmas using moral reasoning (Narvaez, 1998; Pratt et al., 1987). These personal experiences are enriched with enhanced memories that stand out due to morally charged events (Narvaez et al., 2010). Morally charged events are both emotionally and socially meaningful, which adds to their importance in older adulthood (Narvaez et al., 2010). Younger adults (i.e., ages 18-30) often focus on the external constraints of their behaviour in personal moral dilemmas, whereas older adults (i.e., ages 60-82) focus on personal virtues (Narvaez et al., 2010; Pratt et al., 1987). Older adults are able to shift the focus of moral issues, activate moral background knowledge, and make moral inferences (Narvaez et al., 2010). Rather than focusing on specific information, older adults incorporate moral dilemma information into their own general cognitive framework and recall that information when necessary (Narvaez et al., 2010; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, &
Norris, 1988). This research emphasizes the importance of life experience when facing issues of morality, something which benefits older adults.

Longitudinal studies have found that adult moral reasoning increases according to Kohlberg’s stages (Armon & Dawson, 1997; Narvaez & Gleason, 2007). These increases occur in a sequential order throughout the lifespan, but with advancing age (i.e., 85 and older) there is a decline in moral reasoning compared to middle-aged adults (i.e., ages 35-54) and older-adults (i.e., ages 64-80) (Armon & Dawson, 1997). This result may be due to the degradation of complex social reasoning rather than moral reasoning, as a decline in perspective taking could impact moral reasoning. Both moral reasoning and perspective taking are influenced by education level, health, and social-cognitive support in an adult population. Adults with more education, better health, and supportive relationships are less likely to experience a decline in perspective-taking skills or moral reasoning (Narvaez & Gleason, 2007; Pratt et al., 1996). In fact, adults with higher levels of education have been found to use more complex moral arguments and rationalizations when faced with sophisticated moral problem solving (Narvaez & Gleason, 2007; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1994). This makes age and education the strongest predictors of moral development, specifically in terms of moral reasoning and making moral judgments (Rest, 1983, 1986; Rest et al., 1999).

Combining this research indicates that adults not only use their personal experiences, but also their education when considering moral dilemmas. Adults build moral schemas based on previous moral reasoning and moral behaviour (Narvaez, Bentley, Gleason, & Samuels, 1998; Narvaez et al., 2010; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999; Narvaez & Rest, 1995). Moral schemas are found to be well-constructed and solidified as moral issues are salient and dominant in everyday experiences (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez et al., 2010). Adults
become fixated on social problem solving, especially surrounding moral dilemmas as social interactions and maintaining moral standards are foundational to the human experience (Narvaez et al., 2010; Ybarra, Chan, & Park, 2001). As our moral reasoning develops so does our awareness of how our behaviour affects others. The question remains whether adults from different cultures will show similar awareness when engaged in moral reasoning.
Chapter Three: Understanding Cultural Influences

Culture is an important, ever present factor as it influences an individual’s thinking, feelings, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour. Culture has been defined as a refinement of the mind based on education, art, and literature and is a collective phenomenon utilizing everyday social practices (Hofstede, 1980/1984, 1984, 1991/1997, 2001, 2005, 2011; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006). Culture is shared between people living within the same environment during the same historical period and distinguishes the members of one group or category from members in another group or category. Culture can interact with race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and socioeconomic status as some experiences are interpreted similarly and others are interpreted uniquely (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Triandis, 1980a, 1995). Culture can also impact/shape aspects of psychological functioning (Triandis, 1980a, 1980b, 1995).

Culture is learned and derives from one’s life experiences and social environment and how the two interact (Hofstede, 1980/1984, 1991/1997; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997). According to Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory, aspects of social development (e.g., moral reasoning) are based on the direct or indirect experience that individuals have within particular interdependent environmental settings. This theory views the environment as incorporating interconnections between immediate settings and external influences from larger settings. Development occurs through reciprocity between an individual and the environment as they interact bi-directionally. Bronfenbrenner (1979) classified culture within the macrosystem, which represents the values, ideologies, and laws of society. Within a given society, settings (e.g., schools) may function alike as they have been constructed from the same set of blueprints, but differences emerge reflecting contrasting belief systems and lifestyles.
Societies differ based on culture. Although the macrosystem, and, in lieu, culture, is the furthest removed from having a direct connection to the individual, it influences the immediate settings (e.g., family, peers), how these immediate settings interact (e.g., relations among family, work/school, and social life), and indirect settings (e.g., a friend of a friend). Therefore, culture acts as a society’s overarching environmental setting providing the greatest potential for understanding development across the lifespan (Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997).

Culture is studied through the comparison of societies and determining what is culture-general and what is culture-specific. Establishing generalities in terms of knowledge, theory, laws, and values between cultures allows for the understanding of culture (Berry, 1980; Harkness, 2004; Jahoda & Krewer, 1997; Triandis, 1980b). According to Hofstede (1991/1997, 2005), cultural differences manifest themselves based on symbols, heroes, rituals, and values. Symbols include words, pictures, gestures, or objects that are particularly meaningful and recognizable by those who share the same culture. New symbols are easily developed and old symbols are easily replaced. Heroes are alive or dead, real, or imaginary persons who possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture. These heroes often serve as models for the replication of behaviour. Rituals are collective activities, such as greetings, respecting others, or ceremonies. Values represent the deepest manifestation of culture and are thus considered to be at the core of culture (Hofstede, 1991/1997, 2005; Sachdeva, Singh, & Medin, 2011; Zavalloni, 1980).

Values influence evaluations, attitudes, and goal-directed behaviours, thereby distinguishing what is regarded as important within the environment (Feather, 1975, 1994). Values provide standards and criteria by which actions and outcomes are evaluated, opinions and conduct are justified, behaviour is planned and guided, and comparisons between individuals are
Values are rooted in contrasts by setting a clear preference between a specific mode of behaviour (e.g., being honest/moral) or general goal (e.g., equality) and its opposite (e.g., being dishonest/immoral or inequality, respectively). Individuals define themselves based on values and the desire to meet standards by fulfilling values (Feather, 1992, 1994). Values are based on modality (e.g., being helpful), content (e.g., morality), and intent (i.e., preferred style of action) and can be classified as instrumental or goal oriented/terminal (Feather, 1994; Kluckhohn, 1951/1962; Rokeach, 1973).

Instrumental values are modes of conduct, such as being honest and responsible (Feather 1994; Rokeach, 1973). Goal orientated/terminal values have a specific aim or end-point, such as accomplishment and equality (Feather, 1994, Kluckhohn, 1951/1962; Rokeach, 1973). There is a hierarchy of values, which can be modified due to responsibilities and can vary across groups (Feather, 1994; Rokeach, 1973).

Cultural differences emerge based on how values are specifically defined, even those with universal significance and common core meanings (Feather, 1994), which can result in opposite and conflicting opinions (Lonner & Adamopoulos, 1997; Munroe & Munroe, 1980; Triandis, 1990, 1993). Cultural differences also emerge in terms of whether values are easily activated, which is based in value importance and situational context, and how values are expressed, which is based on whether outcomes/actions are perceived as positive or negative or attractive or aversive (Feather, 1994). Understanding what is culture-general and what is culture-specific is key as it allows for similarities and differences in values to be identified across
A common culture-specific distinction is between the importance cultures place on individual values versus in-group values (Greenfield, 2000; Hofstede 1980/1984, 1984, 1991/1997, 2001, 2005, 2011; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Triandis 1972, 1980a, 1980b, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Triandis, et al., 1986; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Within certain cultures/societies, the individual is the priority so individual values prevail over in-group values. These cultures/societies are considered individualistic. In other cultures/societies, the in-group is the priority so in-group values prevail over individual values. These cultures/societies are considered collectivist. In this paper, in-groups is in reference to an individual’s country, a high-level collective, rather than groups based on membership or family groups, which are lower level collectives (Dymtro, Lo, O’Leary, Fu, Lee, & Cameron, 2014).

The family unit is the fundamental group that provides individuals with necessary information regarding conventional rules about social order. Therefore, the family unit is important to both individualist and collectivist cultures, but the family unit is defined differently. In individualistic cultures the family unit refers to a nuclear family consisting of a mother, father, and children (Hofstede, 1991/1997). In collectivist cultures, the family unit includes extended family, such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins (Hofstede, 1991/1997). This extended family provides a distinct “we” group where individuals learn to think of themselves as part of a “we” and with the best interests of “we” (Hofstede, 1991/1997). The individualism-collectivism contrast is considered to be at the core of cultural differences (Greenfield, 2000; Hofstede, 1980/1984, 1984, 1991/1997, 2001, 2005, 2011; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Triandis, 1972, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Triandis
et al., 1985; Triandis & Suh, 2002).

3.1 What Defines a Culture as Individualistic?

Cultures where individuals prioritize personal identity, give precedence to their own personal goals over the goals of the collective, promote personal well-being, create distinctiveness from group membership, and think in the ‘I’ are classified as individualistic (Hofstede, 1991/1997, 2005; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Triandis, 1994, 1995). These core elements of individualism are based on the assumptions that individuals are independent of one another and are responsible for looking after themselves and their immediate family (Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Oyserman et al., 2002). Individuals are motivated by personal needs and wanting to maintain their rights (Triandis, 1994b, 1995). Values that serve individualistic interests are achievement, power, and self-direction (Feather, 1994).

Individuals’ behaviours reflect cultural values, but deviations occur when individuals are conflicted about which value to follow and which response would be best as there are multiple plausible options. These deviations are tolerated (Carpenter, 2000; Pelto, 1968; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Taking personal initiative, providing rational analyses, and being independent of the collective are seen as strengths as an individual’s survival is of outmost importance (Hofstede, 1991/1997; Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1994, 1995). On a global dimension, individualistic cultures exist in societies where individuals have loose ties between one another and everyone is expected to look after himself or herself, making autonomy a societal value (Carpenter, 2000; Hofstede 1991/1997; Triandis, 1988, 1990, 1995). Complexity is created in these cultures as individuals experience separation, distinction, and maintain different lifestyles (Pelto, 1968; Triandis, 1990, 1995).

Tönnies (1957) used the term “Gesellschaft” to describe individualist cultures.
Gesellschaft refers to industrial urbanized settings populated by unrelated and competitive strangers where the in-group mentality is nonexistent. Hsu (1983) emphasized this idea as a primary and defining characteristic of Western cultures. Western cultures are known for focusing on the individual and emphasizing individual rights, self-determination, and freedom from belonging to multiple groups (Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002).

A key virtue in individualistic cultures is speaking one’s mind by telling the truth and being a sincere and honest person. Individuals attain a sense of personal control and freedom as fulfilling one’s own wishes and desires is enjoyable (Triandis, 1980b, 1995). Individualistic cultures believe that a clash in opinions leads to a higher truth as everyone has their own private opinion, which allows individuals to learn to take direct feedback constructively. In fact, the purpose of education is learning how to learn rather than learning how to do (Hofstede). When conflicts arise, the primary goal is to achieve justice, which may involve going to court to settle disputes (Leung, 1997; Ohbuchi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999). A major philosophical belief within these cultures is that ideologies of individual freedom should prevail over ideologies of equality. Individualist cultures have also been described as guilt cultures where if societal rules are infringed upon, an individual will feel guilty as they face the consequences (Hofstede, 1980/1984, 1991/1997, 2001).

Individualist cultures can be classified as either vertical or horizontal (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Vertical individualist cultures believe that being “the best” and obtaining a high position within society are important making competitiveness high (Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Individuals seek to achieve independence from others while focusing on the discovery of unique inner attributes and dismissing overt group connectedness (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1993, 1995). For example, in the United States (U.S.), which is considered the most vertical individualistic culture, individuals want to stand out in all situations and do not be want to be considered average in any situations (Triandis, 1989, 1995; Weldon, 1984). Horizontal individualist cultures place importance on obtaining self-reliance and uniqueness while de-emphasizing variations in societal ranking (Triandis, 1989, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Individuals seek to achieve independence from others while maintaining a degree of group connectedness and harmony (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). For example, individuals in Australia achieve their inner desires while working with a cohesive and collaborative group (Triandis, 1995).

3.2 What Defines a Culture as Collectivistic?

Cultures where individuals prioritize the “we” group as a major source of identity, maintain lifelong loyalty, give precedence to the goals of the collective over their own personal goals, and think in the “we” are classified as collectivist (Hofstede 1991/1997, 2005; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Triandis, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). These core elements of collectivism are based on the assumptions that belonging to in-groups/collectives are binding and that individuals within these in-groups/collectives are mutually obligated to one another out of loyalty (Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Oyserman et al., 2002). In fact, these cultures do not distinguish between the individual and the group (Hsu, 1971). The individual is defined by the collectives they are a part of (e.g., family, tribe, nation), making an interdependent, but meaningful self (Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Hsu, 1971; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1998; Mills & Clark, 1982; Triandis, 1990, 1994b, 1995).

Values that serve collectivistic interests include tradition and conformity (Feather, 1994). Individuals’ behaviour hardly deviates from collective values as there are only a few appropriate
ways to respond to a particular situation, thereby increasing the probability of conformity (Bontempo, Lobel, & Triandis, 1990; Carpenter, 2000; Harkness, 2004; Pelto, 1968; Triandis & Suh, 2002). On a global dimension, collectivistic cultures pertain to tight, simplistic societies where individuals are integrated into strong cohesive in-groups with unquestioning loyalty and protection, making patriotism a societal ideal (Hofstede, 1991/1997, 2005, 2011; Pelto, 1968; Triandis, 1990, 1993, 1995).

Tönnies (1957) used the term “Gemeinschaft” to describe collectivistic cultures. Gemeinschaft refers to rural agricultural communities where solidarity, trust, and tradition were highly regarded and required to allow the community to prosper. Hsu (1983) emphasized this idea as a primary and defining characteristic of Eastern cultures. Eastern culture is known for focusing on the collective and fostering empathetic connections with others as a person belongs to a social system and in-group (Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002).

Key virtues in collectivist cultures are the maintenance of harmony and obtaining a societal consensus. In these cultures, individuals conform and follow the expectations/norms of the collective and do what is deemed as “right” from the perspective of the collective, which results in feeling good (Bontempo et al., 1990; Triandis, 1988, 1995). Most collectivistic cultures consider direct confrontation to be rude and undesirable. Opinions are typically predetermined by the group. Therefore, when conflicts arise the primary goal is to maintain relationships with others through conflict resolution and mediation (Leung, 1997; Ohbuchi et al., 1999). A major philosophical belief within these cultures is that ideologies of equality should prevail over the ideologies of individual freedom. Collectivist cultures have also been described as shame cultures where if rules of society are infringed upon an individual will feel ashamed due to their collective obligation and how their behaviour may have let down the collective.
Collectivist cultures can be classified as either vertical or horizontal (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Vertical collectivist cultures are traditional and emphasize in-group cohesion, respect for in-group norms, and being obedient to authorities (Bond & Smith, 1996; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Individuals express themselves by attending to others and achieving harmonious interdependence with others while expressing unique inner attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). For example, in Indian culture, individuals strive to stand out while attending to familial obligations and responsibilities (Triandis, 1972, 1995). Horizontal collectivist cultures emphasize empathy, sociability, and cooperation (Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Individuals express themselves by attending to others, achieving harmonious interdependence, and fitting themselves into the collective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1995). For example, individuals on Israeli kibbutzim value community needs rather than inner desires and take pride in blending in and working as a cohesive group (Triandis, 1989, 1995). In Japanese culture, sticking out is considered an embarrassment and being “different” is synonymous with being “wrong” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, Davis, & Takezawa, 1965).

3.3 Classifications of Countries based on Culture

Hofstede (1991/1997, 2005) compiled the largest matched-sample cross-national database by conducting a large attitude survey study where he compared responses of 117,000 IBM employees from 50 different countries. Hofstede thought that through this database he would be able to explain observed differences between cultures. One of the six indexes identified from initial analyses was the individualism index value, which explores the degree that individuals within society are integrated into groups.

When classifying countries based on their individualism index value, the U.S., Canada,
Australia, Great Britain, Italy, France, and New Zealand scored higher, illustrating their individualistic tendencies and more “independent” view of themselves (Hofstede, 1991/1997, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). According to Ho and Chiu (1994), North American culture views individualism as affirming individual uniqueness, autonomy, freedom, and intrinsic worth, while taking personal responsibility for one’s own behaviour. These cultures view individualism as being superior and bringing about greatness (Hofstede, 1980/1984; Oyserman et al., 2002). North American culture views collectivism as a lack of independence as the collective takes priority in terms of interests and obligations. As well, as individuals belong to several different collectives, complications arise in terms of which collective should take priority (Hofstede, 1980/1984; Triandis 1995; Triandis & Suh, 2002).

Eastern countries, such as Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Thailand, and China, score lower, illustrating their collectivistic tendencies and more “interdependent” view of themselves (Hofstede, 1980/1984; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This may be due to humble origins within these countries. Based on Chinese history, Confucius’ teachings were highly regarded as lessons in practical ethics and rules for daily life. According to these teachings, relationships are based on mutual and complementary obligation, protection, and consideration where social cohesion is emphasized (Hofstede 1980/1984; Ma, 1988; Triandis, 1995). In addition, an individual should learn to restrain themselves and overcome their individuality in order to maintain harmony. According to Ho and Chiu (1994) and Hofstede (1980/1984), Chinese culture views individualism as selfish, alienating, prioritizing self-interests, having a lack of concern for others, and an aversion to group discipline. Chinese culture views collectivism as affirming the solidarity of the group.

Classifying countries as either individualistic or collectivistic has led to the discovery of
how countries differ based on their goals, motivations behind behaviours, and what is considered achievement. These concepts would contribute to the rationalizations and justifications for why certain behaviours are engaged in, which would include moral behaviours. Hofstede (2005) examined the goals of the U.S. (an individualistic culture) and China (a collectivistic culture). The U.S. stressed growth, power, staying within the law, and respecting ethical norms. China also respected ethical norms, but in terms of national pride. China stressed patriotism, honour, reputation, and responsibility toward society (Hofstede, 2005). The goals of China align with nationalism where individuals have a strong sense of identification and loyalty to their country, a high level collective (Dymtro et al., 2014). In fact, individuals from China have rated nationalism as the most important human value (Echter, Kim, Kau, Li, Simmons, & Ward, 1998), highlighting the importance nationalism plays within a collectivistic culture. This is another key difference between Western and Eastern cultural perspectives.

Individuals within these different cultures also experience different motivations for behaviour. Individuals’ motivations are often considered using Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which advance from physiological needs to safety needs to love/belonging needs to esteem needs to self-actualization/self-transcendence needs (Maslow, 1943, 1996). The first four needs need to be met before an individual can realize their full potential and the impact they can have (Maslow, 1943, 1996). As Maslow’s hierarchical model was based on research from the U.S., an individualistic culture, it has been questioned whether Maslow’s hierarchy of needs can be applied to collectivistic cultures and whether motivations will the same (Gambrel & Cianci, 2003; Hofstede, 1984). Research concluded that collectivist cultures are more focused on the basic need of belonging (Gambrel & Cianci, 2003; Hofstede, 1984). For example, attaining self-actualization is based on meeting societal needs rather than an individual’s needs (Gambrel &
Cianci, 2003; Hofstede, 1984). As motivations are different based on culture it would make sense that reasoning and judgments regarding behaviour would differ based on culture as well. What an individual views as being acceptable is based on what is viewed as acceptable within their country’s culture.

Achievement is the effort, courage, and skill behind accomplishing an action successfully. How an individual identifies themselves through achievement differs based on their country’s cultural perspective. It is important to note that both individualistic and collectivistic cultures strive for achievement (Niles, 1998). The U.S. has a more universalistic achievement pattern where expectations of active achievement are based on individuals following standard and general rules/values (Parsons & Shils, 1951/1965). American achievement is focused on individual progress, status, and self-satisfaction. This impacts how American culture views athletic achievement, which is to focus attention on the athlete’s attributes separate from the actions of the others – a disjointed model (Markus et al., 2006). China has a more particularistic achievement pattern where expectations of active achievement are based on particular relational context and not a generalized ideal (Parsons & Shils, 1951/1965). Chinese achievement is focused on general satisfaction, responsibility, tradition, and peace. This impacts how Chinese culture views athletic achievement, which is to distribute attention holistically across the athlete’s life and the interdependent relationship they have with other people – a conjoint model (Markus et al., 2006). Understanding how achievement is viewed from Western and Eastern cultural perspectives can add insight into the moral evaluations and rationalizations given by individuals from different countries.

When Hofstede (1991/1997, 2005) classified countries using the individualism index value, individualism and collectivism were considered opposites. However, cultures can contain
both individualist and collectivist elements in different combinations (Triandis, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995; Triandis et al., 1986; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Typically, individualist cultures have a diminished set of collectivist elements and an augmented set of individualist elements, whereas collectivist cultures have an augmented set of collectivist elements and a diminished set of individualist elements. For example, the U.S. may contain 40% vertical individualism, 30% horizontal individualism, 20% horizontal collectivism, and 10% vertical collectivism (Triandis, 1995). As the U.S. emphasizes freedom, choice, and individual rights, it is no surprise that a higher percentage is assigned to individualist elements. A portion of the percentage for the U.S. is also assigned to collectivist elements as traces of familial, political, and corporate influences can be found.

The shift in individualist and collectivist elements can be due to situation, as individualism and collectivism are situation specific. For example, one of the greatest differences between countries that highly impacts culture is the allocation of resources (Huntington, 1993, 2013; Triandis, 1995). When resources are scarce there is an increase in vertical collectivism as a country’s authorities need to regulate who gets what or a cooperative action needs to take place. When resources are abundant or obtained through creative individual action there is an increase in horizontal individualism. According to Triandis (1995), communitarianism combines certain elements of both individualism and collectivism as it allows for the balancing of priorities between personal and group needs. Communitarianism becomes especially important in countries with large immigrant populations, such as North America, where individuals may combine elements of individualism and collectivism. (Berry, 1997; Kagitçibasi, 1997).

3.4 Acculturation and Immigration

As culture is a powerful shaper of perspective and behaviour, understanding
Acculturation is important (Berry, 1997; Kagitçibasi, 1997). Acculturation is the adaptation to new contexts resulting in cultural change (Berry, 1990, 1997). Due to immigration, many societies have become culturally plural, especially Western societies in North America. North America is known as a primarily individualistic culture, but as people with many cultural backgrounds have come to live together, there is societal/cultural diversity (Berry, 1997; Kymlicka, 1995).

Some countries embrace cultural diversity, while others enforce assimilation (Berry 1974, 1997). Some immigrants want to assimilate to their new cultural context. These immigrants do not want to maintain their cultural identity so they seek opportunities to interact with the new culture. Some immigrants want separation, placing great importance on maintaining their original culture by not seeking opportunities to interact with the new culture. Some immigrants want to integrate by maintaining their original culture while interacting with the new culture. According to the optimal distinctiveness theory, individuals strive to be both similar and different from each other (Brewer, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1995). Through integration immigrants are able to find their optimal distinctiveness point – their medium between assimilation and differentiation. Integration can only occur if the host country is open and inclusive towards cultural diversity, creating a multicultural country (Berry, 1991, 1997; Berry & Kalin, 1995; Kalin & Berry, 1995).

Multicultural countries appreciate cultural diversity, embrace different cultural values and perspectives with minimal prejudice, have positive mutual attitudes among differing cultural groups, and view having all cultural groups as part of the larger society as beneficial (Berry, 1992; Berry & Kalin, 1995; Hofstede, 1991/1997; Kalin & Berry, 1995).

To create a multicultural environment, intercultural understanding and communication is
Developing a comprehensive intercultural understanding starts by first understanding your own cultural values and then understanding the cultural values of others. Understanding your own cultural values stems from your parents who set the cultural tone. The way parents live in their own cultures aids in the formation of their children’s cultural identity. The manner in which parents approach other cultural groups will determine the willingness and open-mindedness of their children to understand cultural differences.

In addition to being willing and open-minded regarding other cultures, it is important to have awareness and knowledge when developing intercultural understanding and communication (Hofstede, 1991/1997). Having awareness is the recognition that one’s beliefs/opinions/thoughts are based within the culture that one was brought up in and that those brought up in different cultures/environments will, justifiably, have different beliefs/opinions/thoughts. Having knowledge is acknowledging the importance of learning about cultures that are unfamiliar, but that are being interacted with. It is not a requirement to share the values of another culture, but it is important to at least obtain an intellectual grasp of where, how, and why the values differ between the cultures as this can lead to more cooperative environments.

As immigrants begin learning new behaviours that are appropriate for their new cultural context, culture shedding is also occurring (Berry, 1992, 1997). Culture shedding is unlearning aspects of the original culture that are no longer appropriate in the new cultural context. As original cultural perspectives and values were acquired early in life and have become part of the unconscious, culture shock may be experienced (Hofstede, 2005; Berry, 1997). Immigrants may feel distress, helplessness, and even hostility toward the new cultural context and host country as learning new cultural behaviours, perspectives, and values can be overwhelming (Hofstede, 2005). Over time and through culture learning, immigrants will progress from culture shock to
what is described as “going native”. However, if culture shock persists, this can cause *culture conflict* and immigrants may feel discriminated against (Berry, 1992, 1997; Hofstede, 2005).

Culture conflict can also result if original cultural practices are misunderstood. For example, many North American Asian immigrants maintain an authoritarian parenting style. This is viewed in North America as being overly rule-based and lacking in support. According to Fung (2014), Asian parenting style is not well understood as it often includes “training”, which takes place within supportive and devoted parent-child relationships. This “training” requires Asian parents to be more demanding regarding their children’s diligence, self-discipline, and obedience (Fung, 2014). Promoting intercultural understanding and communication will hopefully reduce conflicts and misunderstandings between cultures.

With every immigrant generation living in North America, further degradation of original cultural perspectives and behaviours occur. First generation immigrants want to maintain their original cultural heritage through the continuation of practices, values, and behaviours (Hofstede, 1991/1997, 2005; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). These immigrants view the passing of their traditions to the next generation (e.g., their children) as very important (Hofstede, 2005; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Koh, Shao, & Wang, 2009). First generation immigrants who are adults (or even older children/adolescents) spent formative developmental years in their original culture and became fully enculturated (Berry, 1997). Therefore, adapting to the new cultural perspective will require more culture shedding and could perhaps create serious culture shock or even culture conflict (Berry, 1997).

Second generation immigrants are children who are either born in or are brought to the new host country early in life (Hofstede 1991/1997, 2005; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). These children’s cultural perspectives reflect an integration or fusion of parental cultural values and
new cultural values (Hofstede, 2005; Hong et al., 2000; Koh et al., 2009), as they are required to be independent to function within the mainstream host culture while remaining connected to their parents (Kagitçibasi, 2003). These immigrants are more adaptable and, as they were not fully enculturated into their parents’ culture, less culture shedding is required (Berry, 1997). Attending local school and being involved with the local community allows for smoother acculturation (Hofstede, 2005). Third generation immigrants are, for the most part, absorbed into the new cultural context and may only be distinguishable as foreign due to their family name (Hofstede, 2005). The current study will address multiple generation migration to North America and confirm whether parental cultural values have been maintained with regards to moral reasoning.
Chapter Four: Cultural Differences Regarding Honesty

Chapter 2 discussed how lie-telling, although considered a moral transgression, occurs depending on context. Chapter 3 discussed how culture dictates values and how different cultures, based on individualism and collectivism, value the self and the group from different perspectives. In this chapter, research regarding lie-telling and cultural differences will be discussed.

When investigating honesty and culture, comparisons are commonly made between Western cultures, such as the United States (U.S.) and Canada, and Eastern cultures, such as China and Japan (Cameron, Lau, Fu, & Lee, 2012; Dmytro, Lo, O'Leary, Fu, Lee, & Cameron, 2014; Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001; Fu, Luo, Heyman, Wang, Cameron, & Lee, 2016; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Genyue, Heyman, & Lee, 2011; Heyman, Itakura, & Lee, 2010; Lau, Cameron, Chieh, O'Leary, Fu, & Lee, 2012; Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Lee, Xu, Fu, Cameron, & Chen, 2001). As discussed in Chapter 3, Western societies are individualistic and define good acts as those that are proactive and view personal interests, self-autonomy, and the self as priorities in order to affirm the independent self (Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Lau et al., 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Markus, Uchida, Omorogie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Eastern cultures are considered collectivist and define good acts as those accounting for group interests, collective identity, and group harmony in order to affirm the interdependent self (Bontempo, Lobel, & Triandis, 1990; Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Lau et al., 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Triandis, Davis, & Takezawa, 1965; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Good acts need to be compatible with the ideologies of the in-group/collective, such as engaging in lie-telling to “save face” or acting out of duty-based responsibility (Hamilton & Sanders, 1983; Miller, 1984, 1994, 1997).
With such differing cultural perspectives it is not surprising that research has found differences in how honesty is perceived.

Among the first to investigate the influence of cultural and social context on children’s moral evaluations of lie-telling and truth-telling were Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, and Board (1997). When Chinese and Canadian children were asked to evaluate lie-telling and truth-telling in prosocial and antisocial settings, modesty (i.e., the avoidance of self-aggrandizement by not bragging about personal achievements/good deeds or seeking external praise) influenced ratings. Chinese children rated lie-telling less negatively and truth-telling less positively than Canadian children in prosocial settings. Both cultures rated lie-telling negatively and truth-telling positively in antisocial settings confirming the general cooperative rule (Lee & Ross, 1997; Sweetser, 1987). As children aged the modesty effect become more profound. Therefore, the maintenance of group cohesiveness over an individual receiving recognition for their good deeds became a more prominent collectivist value. These findings have been replicated with different communities of Chinese children (Cameron et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2001), with other Western and Eastern cultures (Genyue et al., 2011; Heyman et al., 2011), with distinction between public and private settings where the modesty effect was strengthen in public settings (Genyue et al., 2011; Heyman et al., 2011), and with adult populations (Fu et al., 2001; Genyue et al., 2011). Clearly modesty is influential, but it is not directly related to protecting the collective/in-group, which is another known difference between cultures.

In a study by Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, and Lee (2007), Chinese and Canadian children were presented with stories where a lie or the truth was told to either help a friend while harming
the collective/in-group or vice versa. In these stories the collective/in-group was the story character’s school class. Children were asked to evaluate the story character’s actions and indicate what they would do if in the same situation. Previous research has confirmed that intentionality (e.g., telling a lie to help) influences moral evaluations (Lee & Ross, 1997; Xu, Luo, Fu, & Lee, 2009). Cultural differences were found as Chinese children disapproved of lie-telling more strongly when lies were told to benefit a friend rather than the collective/in-group. Chinese children also rated being dishonest or honest more positively for the collective/in-group than Canadian children. On the other hand, Canadian children disapproved of lie-telling more strongly when lies were told to benefit the collective/in-group rather than a friend. Canadian children also rated being dishonest or honest for a friend more positively than Chinese children, which may be due to friendship being considered an interpersonal commitment and a matter of personal decision-making (Miller, 1984, 1994; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Pontari & Schlenker, 2006). These effects become more pronounced with age. These cultural differences indicate that Chinese children were more invested in the collective/in-group following the typically Eastern, collectivist philosophies, whereas the Canadian children were more invested in the individual following the typically Western, individualist philosophies. Therefore, moral evaluations of dishonesty differed by culture and by context (e.g., who the beneficiary was).

Chinese children not only evaluate lie-telling for the collective/in-group more favourably, but they also endorse lying for collective/in-group. Fu, Evans, Wang, and Lee (2008) and Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, and Lee (2010) found that as Chinese children aged their evaluations of lie-telling were related to their own lying behaviour and they became more inclined to tell a lie for the collective/in-group. Some even classified untruthful statements for the collective as not being a lie (Fu et al., 2008). Chinese children and adolescents were also found to favour different
collectives based on age when telling a lie to remain loyal. Fu, Luo, Heyman, Wang, Cameron, and Lee (2016) presented stories where lies were told to hide transgressions and benefit a class team, a school team, or a country team competing in sports, science, or language. The country stories were based on high school competitions between China and the U.S. where China’s team was transgressing. It was found that as age increased children become less critical of broader collectives (e.g., country group, which has greater distance from an individual). Therefore, as collectives increase in size and are more generalized they are valued similarly as smaller, more immediate collectives.

In order to discover if North Americans would develop in-group/collective loyalty with larger size collectives, Dmytro, Lo, O’Leary, Fu, Lee, and Cameron (2014) conducted a study where Canadian and Chinese children and adolescents evaluated lie-telling and truth-telling that either helped themselves while harming a collective or vice versa for different size collectives (i.e., individual, class, school, and nation/country). It was found that the socio-cultural environment impacted moral evaluations. Chinese children and adolescents evaluated lies told to benefit a collective as less negative and truths told to harm a collective as more negative than Canadian children and adolescents. As the size of the collectivity became larger, the negative evaluations became more pronounced for the Chinese children and adolescents, illustrating the importance placed on nation/country. The differing cultural perspectives with regards to benefiting their nation/country were explained through nationalism, or rather the lack of nationalism for Canadian children and adolescents. Research supports that nationalism is valued more in Eastern cultures (Echter, Kim, Kau, Li, Simmons, & Ward, 1998), especially in China where nationalism is incorporated in a large portion of education (Cheung & Kwok, 1998). It would be interesting to discover if nationalism for a home country would persist upon
immigrating to another country.

As North America is multicultural with assimilation, integration, and separation (Berry, 1991, 1997; Berry & Kalin, 1995; Kalin & Berry, 1995), research has been conducted to explore both mono- (e.g., mono-cultural Chinese community in China and a mono-cultural Canadian community in Canada) and multicultural individuals (e.g., bicultural Chinese-Canadian community). Cameron, Lau, Fu, and Lee (2012) extended the findings of Lee, Xu, Fu, Cameron, and Chen (2001) by including a multicultural group of children (i.e., Chinese-Canadian) to evaluate lie-telling and truth-telling in prosocial and antisocial settings. The multicultural Canadian children judged prosocial lies similarly to mono-cultural Canadian children, but slightly more positively. This confirms acculturation and how the modesty effect is not sustained within a more individualistic culture.

Lau, Cameron, Chieh, O’Leary, Fu, and Lee (2012) extended the findings of Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, and Lee (2007) by including a multicultural group of children (i.e., Chinese-Canadian) to evaluate lie-telling and truth-telling that either helped themselves while harming a collective/in-group or vice versa. Children’s evaluations revealed that mono-cultural Canadian children were aligned with individualist ideologies whereas Chinese children were aligned with collectivist ideologies, confirming Fu et al.’s (2007) findings. The evaluations from the multicultural Canadian children were quite fascinating as rather than taking an intermediate position, evaluations were sometimes more similar to mono-cultural Canadian children and at other times were more similar to Chinese children. The multicultural children held opinions that reflected both cultures as they alternated between their heritage and mainstream cultural perspectives, a phenomenon referred to as frame-switching, illustrating the importance of social context and norms (e.g., what is appropriate at home versus at school) and the fusion of values
(Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Koh, Shao, & Wang, 2009).

Through previous research many gains have been made to better understand how culture impacts lie-telling and truth-telling and interesting trends have been established. However, there are unanswered questions. Firstly, a large majority of this research involves children and adolescents. The question remains how adults would evaluate stories involving lie-telling or truth-telling that either helped themselves while harming a collective/in-group or vice versa. Secondly, it is unclear how lie-telling and truth-telling would be rated if stories did not incorporate an individual, but rather two different collectives. Thirdly, with immigration continuing to increase in North America and with immigrants being second and third generation, questions remain regarding cultural integration, assimilation, and nationalism. Fourthly, stories regarding loyalty typically involve smaller, more immediate collectives, where transgression severity may be considered minor. As age increases, minor transgressions are less likely to be reported to authority figures and major transgression are more likely to be reported (Chiu Loke, Heyman, Forgie, McCarthy, & Lee, 2011; Chiu Loke, Heyman, Itakura, Toriyama, & Lee, 2014). The lack of reporting of minor transgressions has been linked to group allegiance, having already felt moral superiority, and the better understanding of negative social consequences (Chiu Loke et al., 2011). Keeping this in mind, children and adults must feel that a transgression is truly worth reporting. Perhaps more serious transgressions would influence the observed cultural differences.
Chapter Five: The Current Study

5.1 Rationale for the Study

The present study seeks to build on previous research on differing cultural perspectives regarding honesty and loyalty by focusing on the question of whether individuals reason differently about lies that benefit different groups (i.e., their own country group, a competing country group, their friend, a competing opponent, or a neutral party). As outlined in Chapter 4, this has been investigated in children where cultural differences are compared between countries which emphasize individualistic values (i.e., Canada and the U.S.) and a country which emphasizes collectivist values (i.e., China). This study will continue this line of research by recruiting participants from North American countries and from China, but within an emerging adult population. Of interest is whether participants would flexibly apply moral values of honesty to support what they value regarding loyalty for individual interests and in-group interests (Feather, 1992, 1994; Hofstede, 1991/1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009).

Based on the findings from previous research, it is predicted that North American individuals will favour loyalty over honesty when honesty negatively impacts individual-interests whereas individuals from China will favour loyalty over honesty when honesty negatively impacts in-group/collective interests (Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Lau, Cameron, Chieh, O’Leary, Fu, & Lee, 2012). North Americans will be shown to favour individual interests by rating lie-telling more positively when helping their friend, rating truth-telling more negatively when harming their friend, and being more inclined to lie to help their friend, all in comparison to individuals from China. Individuals from China will be shown to favour in-group/collective interests by rating lie-telling more positively when helping their
country, rating truth-telling more negatively when harming their country, and being more inclined to lie to help their country, all in comparison to North Americans.

The present study builds on prior research in several additional ways. Firstly, the focus will be on situations that allow for the ruling out of direct benefit effects. Prior research has focused on groups where individuals may be personally affected by lie-telling or truth-telling decisions making it impossible to fully differentiate individual interests from group interests. For example, if a student tells a lie to protect her classmates from getting in trouble, she may personally benefit from the lie as well as members of the in-group. The present study focuses on nationality, an in-group so broad in scope that this issue does not come into play. Although previous research by Dmytro, Lo, O’Leary, Fu, Lee, and Cameron (2014) and Fu, Luo, Heyman, Wang, Cameron, and Lee (2016) included a collective national group it was in terms of a high school competition, which may not be seen as a national event or a major transgression.

Secondly, the present study focuses on contexts that are known to elicit strong feelings of group identification and pride. By framing reporting decisions in terms of high-profile international and national athletic competitions, the stakes of a decision about whether to lie have been increased as serious consequences may result.

Thirdly, the present study introduces a new population, emerging adults, to this field of research. Previous research has found that cultural differences regarding honesty and loyalty exist within adolescent populations from North America and China (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2016). Emerging adults (ages 18-25) are individuals who are within intervening years as they are transitioning from adolescence to early adulthood (Jensen Arnett, 2015). These individuals often think “yes, but not yet” when considering adult roles and obligations as they are not ready to give up their independence and sense of wide-open possibility (Jensen Arnett, 2015).
Emerging adults differ from adolescents as they are able to navigate through multifaceted moral issues through the development of a more abstract worldview. Emerging adults use previous experiences, perspective taking abilities, and new social responsibilities to rationalize, judge, and evaluate complex moral issues (Arutyunova, Alexandrov, & Hauser, 2016; Jensen Arnett, 2015; Narvaez, Gleason, & Mitchell, 2010; Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014). Therefore, this study is building on previous research and recognizing a new developmental age-group undergoing an adventurous transition.

Fourthly, the inclusion of a control condition allows for the examination of the specificity of any effects related to in-group/collective lies. This control condition examined lies told for friends. If reasoning about in-group/collective lies reflects a general willingness to lie for others, one would expect to see the same patterns within the control group. However, if reasoning about in-group lies has to do with a specific orientation toward the groups/collectives people belong to, it is expected to see distinct patterns regarding the in-group/collective lies.

Finally, the inclusion of immigrant communities within North America allows for the examination of assimilation and integration of cultural values. The collectivist perspective towards accepting lies to promote in-group/collective harmony and save face may only exist when living amongst the in-group/collective who value the in-group/collective over the individual. Previous research by Lau, Cameron, Chieh, O’Leary, Fu, and Lee (2012) has demonstrated that children frame-switch based on context illustrating the adoption of new cultural values and preservation of heritage cultural values (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Koh, Shao, & Wang, 2009), which could differ in an emerging adult population.

5.2 Research Objectives and Hypotheses

The overall objective of this study was to determine how emerging adults evaluate lie-
telling when it comes in conflict with the value of loyalty to one’s in-group and whether such evaluations vary as a function of cultural values. To accomplish this emerging adults from China and North America were recruited. More specifically, North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults were recruited, where North American Caucasian emerging adults represented individuals with only Western cultural individualistic influences and North American Asian emerging adults represented individuals with a mix of Eastern cultural collectivist influences and Western cultural individualistic influences.

According to the most recent Statistics Canada Community Profile for Toronto Ontario, the Canadian community where this study was conducted, 21.8% of individuals reported Southeast and East Asian ethnic origins (i.e., the cultural origin of the person and their ancestors), which includes countries such as China, Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Singapore (Statistics Canada, 2016). According to the most recent United States Census Bureau Profile for San Diego California, the American community where this study was conducted, 16.8% of individuals reported Asian ethnic origins (United States Census Bureau, 2017).

Emerging adults participated either in an experimental condition, where stories pertaining to international sporting events were judged and evaluated based on lie-telling and truth-telling, or a control condition, where stories pertaining to national sporting events were judged and evaluated based on lie-telling and truth-telling. International sporting events focused on countries as the in-group/collective. National sporting events focused on a friend as the individual.

The first objective was to determine whether emerging adults from China and North America would judge lie-telling or truth-telling more favourably when helping or harming the in-group/collective or the individual. Based on previous findings (Fu, Luo, Heyman, Wang,
it is predicted that emerging adults from China would rate lie-telling when helping the in-group/collective (i.e., their country) more positively and truth-telling when harming the in-group/collective less positively than emerging adults from North America. In addition, it is predicted that emerging adults from China would rate lie-telling when helping the individual (i.e., their friend) less positively and truth-telling when harming the individual more positively than emerging adults from North America.

The second objective was to determine whether emerging adults from China and emerging adults from North America would be more inclined to tell a lie helping the in-group/collective or the individual. Based on previous findings (Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Fu et al., 2007) it is predicted that emerging adults from China would be more likely to tell a lie helping the in-group/collective (i.e., their country) compared to emerging adults from North America. In addition, it is predicted that emerging adults from China would be less likely to tell a lie helping an individual (i.e., their friend) compared to emerging adults from North America.

The third and fourth objectives are focused on the comparisons between ethnicities/cultural groups, Caucasian and Asian, from within the sample collected from North America and whether cultural values have been assimilated or integrated. Based on the premise that Westerners emphasize individual rights and identity (Berry, 1997; Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Hofstede, 1991/1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1994, 1995) whereas Easterners emphasize group identity as a collective (Berry, 1997; Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Hofstede, 1991/1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1994a, 1994b, 1995), it is expected that North American Asian emerging adults have conflicting ideologies and would engage in frame-switching, where they shift between aspects of collectivism and individualism which have
been incorporated into their values pertaining to honesty, depending on social and situational context (Hong et al., 2000; Koh et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2012).

The third objective was to determine which cultural group (i.e., emerging adults from China aka Chinese Asian emerging adults or North American Caucasian emerging adults) North American Asian emerging adults would be more similar to when judging lie-telling and truth-telling to help or harm the in-group/collective or the individual. Based on Fung’s (2014) explanation of cultural practices and previous findings from Lau et al. (2012), it is predicted that Chinese Asian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults would rate lie-telling when helping the in-group/collective more positively and truth-telling when harming the in-group/collective less positively than North American Caucasian emerging adults.

A major difference for the cultural groups is who the in-group/collective is based on. For Chinese Asian emerging adults the in-group/collective was China whereas for North American Asian emerging adults the in-group/collective was Canada or the United States. It is still predicted that North American Asian emerging adults will protect the in-group/collective even though it is not their country of origin. In addition, it is predicted that North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults would rate lie-telling when helping the individual more positively and truth-telling when harming the individual less positively than Chinese Asian emerging adults. This is due to frame-switching (Hong et al., 2000; Koh et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2012) whereby North American Asian emerging adults’ evaluations will be based on the individualistic values of protecting and helping the individual.

The fourth objective was to determine which cultural group (i.e., Chinese Asian emerging adults or North American Caucasian emerging adults) North American Asian emerging adults would be more similar to regarding the inclination to tell a lie helping the in-group/collective or
the individual. Based on Fung’s (2014) explanation of cultural practices and previous findings from Lau et al. (2012), Fu et al. (2008), and Fu et al. (2007), it is predicted that Chinese Asian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults would be more likely to tell a lie helping the in-group/collective compared to North American Caucasian emerging adults. Again the in-group/collective was different, but the importance of creating harmony is expected to be integrated into the values of this multicultural group of North American emerging adults. In addition, it is predicted that North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults would be more likely to tell a lie helping an individual compared to Chinese Asian emerging adults due to frame-switching (Hong et al., 2000; Koh et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2012).
Chapter Six: Method

6.1 Participants

A total of 927 emerging adult participants were recruited from North America and China. For North America, as the Western culture, participants were recruited from Canada and the United States (U.S.). The Canadian sample was recruited from Toronto, Ontario, a metropolitan city with an approximate population of 2.7 million (Statistics Canada, 2016). The U.S. sample was recruited from San Diego, California, a metropolitan city with an approximate population of 1.4 million (United States Census Bureau, 2017). For China, as the Eastern culture, participants were recruited from Jinhua, Zhejiang and Hangzhou, Zhejiang, two metropolitan cities with approximate populations of 5.3 million and 8.7 million, respectively (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010).

Participants in both regions were recruited using an online advertisement posted on the local university’s website. The online advertisement provided a short synopsis of the study indicating the purpose and what was required from willing participants. Within the advertisement, an online survey hyperlink was provided, which granted willing participants the ability to participate in the study. Both consent and demographic information was obtained. Within the consent, a more detail explanation of the study’s purpose and procedure was provided, as well as any risks, benefits, and compensation. Demographic information included gender (male or female), age (open-ended), citizenship (open-ended), ethnicity (open-ended), and, for Canadian participants only, country of origin for themselves and their parents (both open-ended). Participants were informed that they were welcome to skip over any question for any reason or end the study at any time.
Participants were divided into two groups based on the stories given, which involved different competitors. One group of participants read stories where athletes from two countries were competing against each other. The second group of participants read stories where individual athletes from the same country were competing against each other in order to represent their country. The participants’ demographic information is provided below based on which group participants were randomly assigned to.

A total of 500 emerging adult participants were assigned to read the country collective stories. There were 290 participants (116 males and 174 females) from China between the ages of 18 and 24 ($M=20.19$, $SD=.93$). Participants from China were ethnically homogeneous (100% Asian) and were all Chinese citizens. There were 210 participants (80 males and 130 females) from North America between the ages of 18 and 25 ($M=21.12$, $SD=1.90$). Ethnicity was classified as either Caucasian (n=102) or Asian (n=108). Ethnicities included in the classification of Caucasian were Caucasian (58%), White (36%), Jewish (2%), Italian (2%), American (1%), and Dutch (1%). Ethnicities included in the classification of Asian were Asian (73%), Chinese (13%), Filipino (5%), Korean (4%), Vietnamese (3%), Southeast Asian (1%), and Taiwanese (1%). All participants from North America were either Canadian citizens or Permanent Residents of Canada or American citizens. Classifying ethnicity was quite important in order to investigate whether integration or assimilation with regards to cultural values is occurring in the vastly culturally diverse North American communities. Country of origin for participants and their parents allowed for the investigation of the generational differences within the Canadian Asian sample (n=61). The Canadian Asian sample consisted of 31 first generation immigrants and 22 second generation immigrants. Eight participants did not provide either their country of origin, their parents’ country of origin, or both.
A total of 427 emerging adult participants were assigned to read stories about individual athletes. There were 117 participants (49 males and 68 females) from China between the ages of 18 and 23 ($M=20.25, SD=1.38$). Participants from China were ethnically homogeneous (100% Asian) and all Chinese citizens. There were 310 participants (82 males and 228 females) from North America between the ages of 18 and 25 ($M=20.75, SD=1.53$). Ethnicity was classified as either Caucasian (n=120) or Asian (n=190). Ethnicities included in the classification of Caucasian were Caucasian (60%) and White (40%). Ethnicities included in the classification of Asian were Asian (42.6%), Chinese (15.8%), Korean (11.1%), Filipino (8.4%), Vietnamese (6.3%), Japanese (5.8%), Taiwanese (4.7%), Mixed (2.6%; e.g., Chinese/Japanese, Cambodian/Taiwanese/Vietnamese, Chinese-Vietnamese, Chinese-Korean), Thai (1.1%), Indonesian (1.1%), and Singaporean (0.5%). All participants from North America were either Canadian or American citizens. The Canadian Asian sample (n=50) consisted of 25 first generation immigrants and 23 second generation immigrants. Two participants did not provide either their country of origin, their parents’ country of origin, or both.

North American participants were excluded based on reported ethnicity, citizenship, age, and, for Canadian participants only, country of origin. Participants who reported any of the following ethnicities were removed from the study – African, African American, Chilean, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Hispanic, Indian, Latino, Mexican, Middle Eastern (e.g., Afghani, Armenian, Iranian, Lebanese, or Persian), Native American, Pacific Islander, Pakistani, Puerto Rican, Russian, South Asian, or Sri Lankan. If participants indicated a mixed ethnicity (e.g., Asian-Caucasian, Cambodian-American, Mexican-Caucasian, Vietnamese-Puerto Rican) they were also excluded. Participants whose ethnicity was reported as Korean were included as Korea, like China and other East Asian countries, is centered on Confucian heritage and core
Confucian values (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Koh, Shao, & Wang, 2009; Sivadas, Bruvold, & Nelson, 2008). In addition, Statistics Canada (2016) identifies Koreans within the same ethnic origins as China, where the Asian sample for this study was collected from. Participants were excluded if they reported citizenship of a country other than Canada or the U.S. (e.g., Germany, Korea, India, Taiwan, or Japan). Participants with dual citizenship between Canada and Britain or Canada and the U.S. remained in the study. The exclusion criteria for age was being younger than 18-years-old or being older than 25-years-old as the study specifically looked at emerging adults. Lastly, Canadian participants who did not report their country of origin as Canada, the U.S., or an East Asian country (e.g., China, Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan) were excluded from the study. The countries of origin that were reported and excluded were India, Pakistan, Romania, and Russia. Chinese participants were only excluded based on the age exclusion criteria.

6.2 Materials and Procedures

For this study, participation occurred online where participants were asked to provide demographic information (see Participant section) and evaluate two stories where a protagonist faced an ethical dilemma about whether to tell a lie or tell the truth regarding another’s questionable moral behaviour. The questionable moral behaviour was pertaining to sporting competitions where athletes engaged in behaviour that went against the rules. As outlined above, participants were either presented with stories where two athletes were in competition representing their countries or two individuals were in competition with each other to represent their country.

When countries were the collective, stories revolved around athletes engaged in an Olympic sporting event. Sporting events included gymnastics (vault or floor), track and field
(sprint or hurdles), and swimming (butterfly or backstroke). The ethical dilemma in the gymnastics story was about the winning athlete being too young to compete. The ethical dilemma in the track and field story was about the winning athlete taking performance-enhancing drugs. The ethical dilemma in the swimming story was about the winning athlete not being a citizen of the country they were representing. Both stories which participants received were about the same sporting event (e.g., gymnastics) and had the same ethical dilemma (e.g., winning athlete being too young to compete), but varied regarding the event discipline (i.e., vault or floor). In each story, the protagonist either told a lie to help the “target” country (i.e., “Yes, the athlete is old enough to compete in the Olympics”) or told the truth, which harmed the “target” country (i.e., “No, the athlete is not really old enough to be in the Olympics”).

Participants were randomly assigned to a story type: the patriotic story, the other story, or the irrelevant story. Story types varied based on the protagonist’s citizenship and the “target” country. The protagonist was always a citizen of the “target” country, which was the country the athlete who engaged in questionable moral behaviour was representing. In the patriotic story, the protagonist and the participant were citizens of the same country (e.g., Canada), which was the “target” country. Therefore, when telling a lie it helped the participant’s country and when telling the truth it harmed the participant’s country. In the other story, the protagonist and the participant were citizens of different countries. The protagonist was a citizen of the “target” country, whereas the participant was a citizen of the “other” country competing in the sporting event. Therefore, when telling a lie it harmed the participant’s country and when telling the truth it helped the participant’s country. In the irrelevant story, the participant’s country was not presented as either the “target” country or the “other” country. Therefore, the actions of the
protagonist did not affect the participant’s country. Australia and Great Britain were the supplementary countries used in the stories.

As participants were presented with two stories, the story outcome (i.e., lie-telling or truth-telling) and protagonist’s/athlete’s gender (i.e., male or female) were counterbalanced. A complete list of stories is presented in Appendix A. The following is an example of a patriotic story in which telling a lie helps the participant’s country and telling the truth harms the participant’s country.

Michelle [gender was counterbalanced between stories] is Canadian and quite a gymnastics fan. She was very happy and excited because she was able to go to the Olympics to watch Canada compete against Australia in the gymnastics vault event. Before the competition, Michelle found out that contestant number two from the Canadian team was too young to be in the Olympics, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number two won the Olympics vault event against the Australian contestant. Right after the competition ended, Michelle ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Michelle: “Contestant number two from the Canadian team is awesome, but looks kind of young. Is she really old enough to compete in the Olympics?” Michelle thought to herself: (1) if I say she is old enough, I would have to lie; but the Canadian team will look really good to have won this Olympic gymnastics event. (2) If I say she is too young to be in the Olympics, I would not have to lie; but she will be disqualified and make the Canadian team look bad to the rest of the world. Michelle thought about it for a moment, and answered: (A) “Yes, she is old enough to compete in the Olympics.” or (B) “No, she is not really old enough to be in the Olympics.” [Statements A and B were counterbalanced between stories].

When individuals were considered, stories revolved around athletes engaged in a National gymnastics sporting event to determine who would represent their country at the Olympics. The gymnastics sporting event was either the vault or the floor exercise. The ethical dilemma was about the winning athlete taking performance-enhancing drugs. Both stories which participants received were about gymnastics and had the same ethical dilemma (i.e., taking performance-enhancing drugs), but varied regarding the gymnastic discipline (i.e., vault or floor). In each story, the protagonist either told a lie to help the “target” athlete (i.e., “No, the
athlete is not taking performance-enhancing drugs”) or told the truth, which harmed the “target” athlete (i.e., “Yes, the athlete is taking performance-enhancing drugs”).

Participants were randomly assigned to a story type: the friend story, the other story, or the irrelevant story. Story types varied based on the “target” athlete, who was either the protagonist’s best friend or another competing athlete, who engaged in questionable moral behaviour. The protagonist was always a citizen of the participant’s country (e.g., Canada) and attending the National sporting event specifically for this country (e.g., Canadian National gymnastics competition to make the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team). In the friend story, the protagonist’s best friend was the “target” athlete. Therefore, when telling a lie it helped their best friend and when telling the truth it harmed their best friend. In the other story, the protagonist’s best friend was the “other” athlete competing in the sporting event. Therefore, when telling a lie it harmed their best friend and when telling the truth it helped their best friend. In the irrelevant story, the protagonist’s best friend was not represented as either the “target” athlete or the “other” athlete. Instead two random athletes were competing, neither of whom had a personal relationship with the protagonist.

As participants were presented with two stories, the story outcome (i.e., lie-telling or truth-telling) and protagonist’s/athlete’s gender (i.e., male or female) were counterbalanced. A complete list of stories is presented in Appendix B. The following is an example of a friend story in which telling a lie helps the protagonist’s best friend and telling the truth harms the protagonist’s best friend.

Christopher [gender was counterbalanced between stories] is a Canadian who is quite a fan of gymnastics. He was very happy and excited because he was able to go to the Canadian National gymnastics competition to see who will make the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team. Christopher made it just in time to see his best friend compete against contestant number four in the gymnastics floor exercise. Before the competition, Christopher found out that his best friend had been taking performance-
enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, his best friend won the floor exercise and a spot in the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team against contestant number four. Right after the competition ended, Christopher ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Christopher: “Your friend is really amazing. Have you heard that he is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Christopher thought to himself: (1) if I say he is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but my best friend will look really good to have won a spot on the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team. (2) If I say he is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but he will be disqualified and make himself look bad to the rest of the Canada. Christopher thought about it for a moment, and answered: (A) ““No, he is not taking performance-enhancing drugs.” or (B) Yes, he is taking performance-enhancing drugs.” [Statements A and B were counterbalanced between stories].

Scenarios regarding the Olympic and National sporting events were used as these types of competitions are the ultimate honour and dream as athletes are recognized to be the best, fastest, and most precise athletes in their country or in the world. These scenarios also present multifaceted moral issues with major transgressions leading to serious consequences. These scenarios require more complex moral reasoning, hence the recruitment of emerging adults rather than children or adolescents. Children and adolescents may have trouble grasping the moral theme within these scenarios and instead be distracted by the superficial details, which has been demonstrated in previous research (Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999).

Following each story, participants were asked three questions to assess how they evaluated the protagonist’s action (i.e., lie-telling or truth-telling). The first question asked participants to rate the action of the protagonist as good or bad on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very very bad (1) to very very good (7). The second question asked participants to explain their rating on the first question. The third question asked participants whether they would lie or tell the truth if in the same situation as the protagonist. Participants had to select one of the following options: lie, truth, or other. In cases where participants selected “other”, they were asked to explain their answer. Once participants completed the questions for both stories, the study was concluded.
Chapter Seven: Results

Participants were asked to reason morally by evaluating a story, judging the protagonist’s actions (the judgement question), and deciding what moral behaviour they would engage in (the moral behaviour question). The first and third objective predicted that culture would influence participants’ judgement (the judgement question). To assess these predictions analyses included repeated measure Analysis of Variances (ANOVAs) and two-way ANOVAs to investigate regional differences (China vs North America – first objective) or ethnic differences (Chinese Asians vs North American Caucasians vs North American Asians – third objective) by story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant or friend vs other vs irrelevant) and story outcome (whether the protagonist told a lie vs told the truth) when participants were asked to rate the action of the protagonist as good or bad. The second and fourth objective predicted that culture would influence participants’ inclined moral behaviour (the moral behaviour question). To assess these predictions analyses included chi-square tests to investigate regional differences (China vs North America – second objective) and ethnic differences (Chinese Asians vs North American Caucasians vs North American Asians – fourth objective) by story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant or friend vs other vs irrelevant) and story outcome (whether the protagonist told a lie vs told the truth) when participants were asked whether they would tell a lie or tell the truth if in the same situation as the protagonist. Chi-square analyses were used for the moral behaviour question as this data was categorical. No significant differences for gender or for story plot (for the country collective group) were found for either question. Therefore, these two variables were excluded from the remainder of the analyses. Data was assessed first based on participant story group (country collective vs the individual) and then comparisons were made between story groups.
7.1 The Judgment Question

7.1.1 Country Collective Stories by Region. A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type by story outcome on judgment ratings for China and North America (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations and Figure 1). The assumptions of sphericity and homogeneity of variance did not need to be met because the comparisons being made were pairwise comparisons and simple main effect comparisons.

For China, the interaction between story type and story outcome was significant, Wilks’ \( \Lambda = .811, F(2, 287) = 33.481, p < .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .189 \). Pairwise comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse when the protagonist told the truth and rated significantly better when the protagonist lied compared to the other story \( (p < .001) \) and irrelevant story \( (p < .001) \). However, the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story were not different \( (p = 1.000) \) for either story outcome. A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ \( \Lambda = .664, F(1, 287) = 145.307, p < .001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .336 \), where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this trend for the other story \( (p < .001) \) and irrelevant story \( (p < .001) \), but no difference was found for the patriotic story \( (p = .757) \) indicating that the ratings were similar for both story outcomes. The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, \( F(2, 287) = 1.089, p = .338, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .008 \). Therefore, no differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that participants in China favoured the outcome that was best for their country.

For North America, the interaction between story type and story outcome was not significant, Wilks’ \( \Lambda = .994, F(2, 207) = .637, p = .530, \) partial \( \eta^2 = .006 \). The stories were rated similarly across story type and story outcome. A significant main effect was found for story
outcome, Wilks’ $\Lambda=.758$, $F(1, 207)=66.048$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.242$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this trend for all story types ($p<.001$). The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, $F(2, 207)=.247$, $p=.781$, partial $\eta^2=.002$. Therefore, no differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that participants in North America rated truth outcomes more favourably than lie outcomes, but did not consider how it would impact their country.

Table 1

Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on region (and ethnicity for North America), story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories (standard deviations in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China (Asian)</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>3.84 (1.69)</td>
<td>4.68 (1.65)</td>
<td>4.94 (1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>5.22 (1.49)</td>
<td>4.88 (1.67)</td>
<td>4.57 (1.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5.32 (1.39)</td>
<td>5.19 (1.47)</td>
<td>4.88 (1.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lie outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>3.76 (1.65)</td>
<td>3.14 (1.42)</td>
<td>3.22 (1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>2.49 (1.47)</td>
<td>3.12 (1.69)</td>
<td>3.60 (1.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>2.59 (1.29)</td>
<td>3.00 (1.57)</td>
<td>3.20 (1.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A 3x2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant) by region (China vs North America) on judgment ratings for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). When comparing China and North America on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 494)=1.377, p=.213$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 494)=13.046, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.050$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse than the other story ($p=.001$) and irrelevant story ($p<.001$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.774$). No significant main effect was found for region, $F(1, 494)=.138, p=.711$, partial $\eta^2<.001$, meaning that the average ratings for China and North America were similar when story type was not considered.

The interaction between story type and region was significantly different, $F(2,$
Follow-up pairwise differences for the interaction between story type and region were conducted. It was found that there was a significant difference between China and North America within the patriotic story, $F(1, 494)=15.219, p<.001$. This indicates that China rated truth-telling significantly worse than North America when it directly impacted their country. A slight significant difference was found between China and North America within the other story, $F(1, 494)=4.095, p=.044$, indicating that China rated truth-telling significantly better than North America when it directly impacted their country. In addition, there were significant differences found between the patriotic story and other story within China, $F(1, 494)=38.663, p<.001$, and between the patriotic story and irrelevant story within China, $F(1, 494)=42.231, p<.001$. This indicates that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse than the other story and irrelevant story within China. The remaining comparisons were not significantly different, indicating that North America evaluated stories similarly when a truth outcome was provided.

When comparing China and North America on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 494)=2.787, p=.017$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. Bootstrapping produces robust estimates by using 1000 samples, therefore, the results are less likely to be affected by violated assumptions. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 494)=7.810, p=.001$, partial $\eta^2=.031$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly better than the other story ($p=.005$) and irrelevant story ($p=.001$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.660$). A slight significant main effect was found for region, $F(1, 494)=3.893, p=.049$, partial $\eta^2=.008$, but the pairwise comparison between China and North America with bootstrapping found no significant
difference ($p=.059$). This indicates that although participants from China had slightly worse ratings for lie outcomes than participants from North America across story types, the difference was negligible.

The interaction between story type and region was also significantly different, $F(2, 494)=10.136$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.039$. Follow-up pairwise differences for the interaction between story type and region were conducted. It was found that there was a significant difference between China and North America within the patriotic story, $F(1, 494)=5.895$, $p=.016$. This indicates that China rated lying significantly better than North America when it directly impacted their country. There were also significant differences found between China and North America within the other story, $F(1, 494)=13.641$, $p<.001$, and between China and North America within the irrelevant story, $F(1, 494)=4.652$, $p=.032$. For these story types, China rated lying significantly worse than North America, despite the impact on their country. In addition, there were significant differences found between the patriotic story and other story within China, $F(1, 494)=34.574$, $p<.001$, and between the patriotic story and irrelevant story within China, $F(1, 494)=27.446$, $p<.001$. This indicates that the patriotic story was rated significantly better than the other story and irrelevant story within China. The remaining comparisons were not significantly different, indicating that North America evaluated stories similarly when a lie outcome was provided.

7.1.2 Country Collective Stories by Ethnicity. To investigate ethnic differences, the North American participants were classified as Caucasian and Asian based on reported ethnicity and citizenship. As all participants from China were Asian, this group will be referred to as Chinese Asians in these analyses.

A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type by story
outcome on judgment ratings for North American Caucasians and North American Asians (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations and Figure 2). For North American Caucasians, the interaction between story type and story outcome was not significant, Wilks’ Λ=.991, $F(2, 99)=.430$, $p=.652$, partial $\eta^2=.009$. Therefore, the stories were rated similarly across story type and story outcome. A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ Λ=.713, $F(1, 99)=39.842$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.287$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes. The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, $F(2, 99)=1.220$, $p=.437$, partial $\eta^2=.017$. Therefore, no differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that North American Caucasian participants rated truth outcomes more favourably than lie outcomes, but did not consider how it would impact their country.

For North American Asians, the interaction between story type and story outcome was not significant, Wilks’ Λ=.986, $F(2, 105)=.747$, $p=.476$, partial $\eta^2=.014$. Therefore, the stories were rated similarly across story type and story outcome. A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ Λ=.795, $F(1, 105)=27.087$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.205$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes. The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, $F(2, 105)=.107$, $p=.951$, partial $\eta^2=.001$. Therefore, no differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that North American Asians participants rated truth outcomes more favourably than lie outcomes, but did not consider how it would impact their country. In addition, these findings illustrate that North American Asians’ evaluations were similar to North American Caucasians.
A series of 3x2 ANOVAs were conducted to evaluate story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant) by ethnicity (Chinese Asians vs North American Caucasians vs North American Asians) on judgment ratings for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). Two ethnicities were compared within each ANOVA in order to investigate the ethnic differences more closely. When comparing North American Caucasians and North American Asians on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 204) = .746, p = .590$. No significant main effects were found for story type ($F(2, 204) = .682, p = .507$, partial $\eta^2 = .007$) or ethnicity ($F(1, 204) = .278, p = .599$, partial $\eta^2 = .001$). As well, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not significant, $F(2, 204) = .713, p = .491$, partial $\eta^2 = .007$. This indicates that North American Caucasians and North American Asians had similar ratings between stories with a truth outcome.

Figure 2. Mean ratings of how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on ethnicity, story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories.
When comparing North American Caucasians and North American Asians on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 204)=.691, p=.631$. No significant main effects were found for story type ($F(2, 204)=.503, p=.606$, partial $\eta^2=.005$) or ethnicity ($F(1, 204)=1.323, p=.251$, partial $\eta^2=.006$). As well, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not significant, $F(2, 204)=.282, p=.754$, partial $\eta^2=.003$. This indicates that North American Caucasians and North American Asians had similar ratings between stories with a lie outcome.

When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 386)=1.212, p=.303$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 386)=11.883, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.058$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse than the other story ($p=.001$) and irrelevant story ($p<.001$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=1.000$). No significant main effect was found for ethnicity, $F(1, 386)=.473, p=.492$, partial $\eta^2=.001$, meaning that the total ratings for Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians were similar when story type was not considered.

The interaction between story type and ethnicity was significantly different, $F(2, 386)=4.283, p=.014$, partial $\eta^2=.022$. Follow-up pairwise differences for the interaction between story type and ethnicity were conducted. It was found that there was a significant difference between Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians within the patriotic story, $F(1, 386)=7.873, p=.005$. This indicates that Chinese Asians rated truth-telling significantly worse than North American Caucasians when it directly pertained to their country. The remaining comparisons regarding North American Caucasians were not significantly different. The
comparisons between story types within Chinese Asians yielded the same findings previously stated for China.

When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 386)=2.318, p=.043$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 386)=6.392, p=.002$, partial $\eta^2=.032$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly better than the other story ($p=.005$) and irrelevant story ($p=.005$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.979$). No significant main effect was found for ethnicity, $F(1, 386)=.663, p=.416$, partial $\eta^2=.002$, meaning that the total ratings for Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians were similar when story type was not considered.

The interaction between story type and ethnicity was significantly different, $F(2, 386)=5.168, p=.006$, partial $\eta^2=.026$. Follow-up pairwise differences for the interaction between story type and ethnicity were conducted. It was found that there was a significant difference between Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians within the patriotic story, $F(1, 386)=4.585, p=.033$. This indicates that Chinese Asians rated lying significantly better than North American Caucasians when it directly influenced their own country. There was also a significant difference found between Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians within the other story, $F(1, 386)=4.469, p=.035$. This indicates that Chinese Asians rated lying significantly worse than North American Caucasians when truth-telling directly influenced their country. The remaining comparisons regarding North American Caucasians were not significantly different. The comparisons between story types within Chinese Asians yielded the same findings previously stated for China.
When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Asians on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 392)=1.172, p=.322$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 392)=5.634, p=.004$, partial $\eta^2=.028$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse than the irrelevant story ($p=.003$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=1.000$). The difference between the ratings on the patriotic story and other story was nearing significance ($p=.066$), with the patriotic story rated worse than the other story, but was not significantly different. No significant main effect was found for ethnicity, $F(1, 392)=.001, p=.979$, partial $\eta^2<.001$, meaning that the total ratings for Chinese Asians and North American Asians were similar when story type was not considered.

The interaction between story type and ethnicity was significantly different, $F(2, 392)=9.353, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.046$. Follow-up pairwise differences for the interaction between story type and ethnicity were conducted. It was found that there was a significant difference between Chinese Asians and North American Asians within the patriotic story, $F(1, 392)=12.021, p=.001$. This indicates that Chinese Asians rated truth-telling significantly worse than North American Asians when it directly impacted their country. There was also a significant difference found between Chinese Asians and North American Asians within the other story, $F(1, 392)=4.466, p=.035$. This indicates that Chinese Asians rated truth-telling significantly better than North American Asians when truth-telling directly influenced their country. The remaining comparisons regarding North American Asians were not significantly different. The comparisons between story types within Chinese Asians yielded the same findings previously stated for China.

When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Asians on the lie outcome, the
assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 392)=2.31$, $p=.043$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 392)=4.21$, $p=.016$, partial $\eta^2=.021$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly better than the irrelevant story ($p=.005$), but not the other story ($p=.053$). No difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.511$). A significant main effect was found for ethnicity, $F(1, 392)=5.25$, $p=.022$, partial $\eta^2=.013$, meaning that in general Chinese Asians gave significantly worse ratings than North American Asians when the story outcome was a lie and when story type was not considered.

The interaction between story type and ethnicity was also significantly different, $F(2, 392)=7.72$, $p=.001$, partial $\eta^2=.038$. Follow-up pairwise differences for the interaction between story type and ethnicity were conducted. Significant differences were found between Chinese Asians and North American Asians within the other story, $F(1, 392)=14.05$, $p<.001$, and between Chinese Asians and North American Asians within the irrelevant story, $F(1, 392)=4.45$, $p=.036$. For these story types, Chinese Asians rated lying significantly worse than North American Asians. The remaining comparisons regarding North American Asians were not significantly different. The comparisons between story types within Chinese Asians yielded the same findings previously stated for China.

7.1.2.1 Country Collective Stories by Canadian Immigrant Generation. To further investigate cultural differences, North American Asian participants were separated based on immigrant generation. The following analyses investigate differences between first generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian immigrants. A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type by story outcome on judgment ratings for first
generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian immigrants (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations and Figure 3). For first generation Canadian immigrants, no significant differences were found for the main effect of story outcome (Wilks’ Λ=.998, $F(1, 28)=.053$, $p=.819$, partial $\eta^2=.002$), the main effect of story type ($F(2, 28)=.020$, $p=.980$, partial $\eta^2=.001$), or the interaction between story type and story outcome (Wilks’ Λ=.895, $F(2, 28)=1.637$, $p=.213$, partial $\eta^2=.105$). This indicated that the ratings were similar for both story outcomes and across story types.

For second generation Canadian immigrants, no significance differences were found for the main effect of story outcome (Wilks’ Λ=.822, $F(1, 19)=4.108$, $p=.057$, partial $\eta^2=.178$), the main effect of story type ($F(2, 19)=.175$, $p=.841$, partial $\eta^2=.018$), or the interaction between story type and story outcome (Wilks’ Λ=.916, $F(2, 19)=.869$, $p=.435$, partial $\eta^2=.084$). This indicated that the ratings were similar for both story outcomes and across story types.

A 3x2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant) by Canadian immigrant generation (first generation vs second generation) on judgment ratings for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). When comparing first generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian immigrants on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 47)=.240$, $p=.943$. No significant differences were found for the main effect of story type ($F(2, 47)=1.592$, $p=.214$, partial $\eta^2=.063$), the main effect of Canadian immigrant generation ($F(1, 47)=2.148$, $p=.149$, partial $\eta^2=.044$), or the interaction between story type and Canadian immigrant generation ($F(2, 47)=.054$, $p=.948$, partial $\eta^2=.002$) for truth outcomes. This indicates that both immigrant generations rated all stories similarly and with no country loyalty.

When comparing first generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian
immigrants on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 47)=.594, p=.705$. No significant differences were found for the main effect of story type ($F(2, 47)=2.264, p=.115$, partial $\eta^2=.088$), the main effect of Canadian immigrant generation ($F(1, 47)=1.720, p=.196$, partial $\eta^2=.035$), or the interaction between story type and Canadian immigrant generation ($F(2, 47)=0, p=1.000$, partial $\eta^2=0$) for lie outcomes. This indicates that both immigrant generations rated all stories similarly and with no country loyalty.

Table 2

Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories (standard deviations in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First generation Canadian immigrant</th>
<th>Second generation Canadian immigrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truth outcome</td>
<td>First generation Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>Second generation Canadian immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>4.33 (1.50)</td>
<td>4.80 (1.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>3.30 (1.64)</td>
<td>4.11 (1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>4.17 (1.85)</td>
<td>5.00 (1.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lie outcome</td>
<td>First generation Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>Second generation Canadian immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>3.44 (1.01)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>4.50 (1.78)</td>
<td>3.89 (1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>3.50 (1.78)</td>
<td>2.88 (1.78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the country collective stories.

7.1.3 The Individual Stories by Region. A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type by story outcome on judgment ratings for China and North America (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations and Figure 4). The assumptions of sphericity and homogeneity of variance did not need to be met because the comparisons being made were pairwise comparisons and simple main effect comparisons. For China, the interaction between story type and story outcome was not significant, Wilks’ $\Lambda=.964$, $F(2, 114)=2.143$, $p=.122$, partial $\eta^2=.036$. Therefore, the stories were rated similarly across story type and story outcome. A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ $\Lambda=.446$, $F(1, 114)=141.667$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.554$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this trend for all story types ($p<.001$). The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, $F(2, 114)=.325$, $p=.724$, partial $\eta^2=.006$. Therefore, no differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across
story outcomes. These results indicate that participants in China favoured truth outcomes regardless of whether it harmed a friend.

Table 3

Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on region (and ethnicity for North America), story type, and story outcome for the individual stories (standard deviations in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China (Asian)</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Combined Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caucasians</td>
<td>Asians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>4.65 (1.37)</td>
<td>4.83 (1.32)</td>
<td>4.88 (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>5.29 (1.55)</td>
<td>5.71 (1.08)</td>
<td>5.72 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5.00 (1.41)</td>
<td>5.72 (1.15)</td>
<td>5.73 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lie outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>2.73 (0.99)</td>
<td>3.09 (1.15)</td>
<td>3.05 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>2.34 (1.30)</td>
<td>2.35 (1.01)</td>
<td>2.38 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>2.47 (1.34)</td>
<td>2.57 (1.29)</td>
<td>2.49 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For North America, a significant interaction between story type and story outcome was found, Wilks’ Λ=.907, F(2, 307)=15.773, p<.001, partial η²=.093. Pairwise comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly worse when the protagonist told the truth compared to the other story (p<.001) and irrelevant story (p<.001). However, the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story were not different (p=1.000). When the protagonist lied, the friend story was rated significantly better compared to the other story (p<.001) and irrelevant story (p=.002). However, the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story were not different (p=1.000). A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ Λ=.364, F(1, 307)=536.940, p<.001, partial η²=.636, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than
lie outcomes. Pairwise comparisons confirmed this trend for all story types \( (p < .001) \). The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, \( F(2, 307) = 1.976, p = .140 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .013 \). Therefore, no differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that participants in North America favoured the outcome that was best for their friend.

![Figure 4](image-url)

*Figure 4.* Mean ratings of how participants judged the protagonist's actions based on region, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories

A 3x2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type (friend vs other vs irrelevant) by region (China vs North America) on judgment ratings for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). When comparing China and North America on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, \( F(5, 421) = 4.175, p = .001 \), so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, \( F(2, 421) = 10.754, p < .001 \), partial \( \eta^2 = .049 \). Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly worse than the other story
(ρ=.001) and irrelevant story (ρ=.003). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story (ρ=.483). A significant main effect was found for region, $F(1, 421)=10.887, ρ=.001$, partial $η^2=.025$, meaning that participants from North America gave significantly better ratings than participants from China. However, the interaction between story type and region was not significantly different, $F(2, 421)=1.099, ρ=.334$, partial $η^2=.005$. This indicates that differences between story type ratings were not dependent on region. Participants from China and North America had similar ratings for the friend story, other story, and irrelevant story when the protagonist told the truth.

When comparing China and North America on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 421)=.438, ρ=.822$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 421)=6.270, ρ=.002$, partial $η^2=.029$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly better than the other story (ρ=.002) and irrelevant story (ρ=.031). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story (ρ=1.000). No significant main effect was found for region, $F(1, 421)=1.016, ρ=.314$, partial $η^2=.002$, meaning that the total ratings for China and North America were similar when story type was not considered. As well, the interaction between story type and region was not significantly different, $F(2, 421)=.601, ρ=.549$, partial $η^2=.003$. This indicates that differences between story type ratings were not dependent on region. Participants from China and North America had similar ratings for the friend story, other story, and irrelevant story when the protagonist told a lie.

7.1.4 The Individual Stories by Ethnicity. To investigate ethnic differences, the North American participants were divided into Caucasian and Asian groups based on reported ethnicity and citizenship. As all participants from China were Asian, this group will be referred to as...
Chinese Asians in these analyses.

A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type by story outcome on judgment ratings for North American Caucasians and North American Asians (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations and Figure 5). For North American Caucasians, the interaction between story type and story outcome was significant, Wilks’ Λ=.929, $F(2, 117)=4.493, p=.013$, partial $\eta^2=.071$. Pairwise comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly worse when the protagonist told the truth compared to the other story ($p=.029$) and irrelevant story ($p=.038$). However, the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story were not different ($p=1.000$). When the protagonist lied, the friend story was rated better than the other story and the irrelevant story. However, the comparisons between ratings were not significantly different for the friend story and other story ($p=.105$) or for the friend story and irrelevant story ($p=.077$). In addition the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story were not different ($p=1.000$). A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ Λ=.363, $F(1, 117)=205.712, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.637$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes for all story types ($p<.001$). The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, $F(2, 117)=.340, p=.713$, partial $\eta^2=.006$. No differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that North American Caucasian participants rated truth outcomes more favourably than lie outcomes, and for truth outcomes took their friend into account.

For North American Asians, the interaction between story type and story outcome was significant, Wilks’ Λ=.895, $F(2, 187)=10.981, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.105$. Pairwise comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly worse when the protagonist told the truth compared to the other story and irrelevant story ($p<.001$). However, the ratings on the other story
and irrelevant story were not different ($p=1.000$). When the protagonist lied, the friend story was rated significantly better than the other story ($p=.003$) and irrelevant story ($p=.026$). However, the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story were not different ($p=.935$). A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ $\Lambda=.374$, $F(1, 187)=313.534$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.626$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes or all story types ($p<.001$). The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, $F(2, 187)=2.062$, $p=.130$, partial $\eta^2=.022$. No differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that North American Caucasian participants rated truth outcomes more favourably than lie outcomes and took into consideration what was best for their friend.

Figure 5. Mean ratings of how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on ethnicity, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories

A series of 3x2 ANOVAs were conducted to evaluate story type (friend vs other vs
irrelevant) by ethnicity (Chinese Asians vs North American Caucasians vs North American Asians) on judgment ratings for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). Two ethnicities were compared within each ANOVA in order investigate the ethnic differences more closely.

When comparing North American Caucasians and North American Asians on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 304)=2.016, p=.076$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 304)=13.567, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.082$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly worse than the other story ($p<.001$) and irrelevant story ($p<.001$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=1.000$). No significant main effect of ethnicity was found, $F(1, 304)=.145, p=.704$, partial $\eta^2=0$, meaning that the total ratings for North American Caucasians and North American Asians were similar when story type was not considered. As well, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not significant, $F(2, 304)=.077, p=.926$, partial $\eta^2=.001$. This indicates that North American Caucasians and North American Asians had similar ratings between stories with a truth outcome.

When comparing North American Caucasians and North American Asians on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 304)=.670, p=.646$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 304)=8.323, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.052$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly better than the other story ($p=.001$) and irrelevant story ($p=.003$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=1.000$). No significant main effect was ethnicity, $F(1, 304)=.480, p=.489$, partial $\eta^2=.002$, meaning that the total ratings for North American Caucasians and North American Asians were similar when story type was not
considered. As well, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not significant, $F(2, 304)=.426, p=.654$, partial $\eta^2=.003$. This indicates that North American Caucasians and North American Asians had similar ratings between stories with a lie outcome.

When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 231)=2.526, p=.030$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 231)=5.615, p=.004$, partial $\eta^2=.046$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly worse than the other story ($p=.001$) and irrelevant story ($p=.013$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.550$). A significant main effect was found for ethnicity, $F(1, 231)=7.734, p=.006$, partial $\eta^2=.032$, meaning that North American Caucasians gave significantly better ratings than Chinese Asians when story type was not considered. However, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not significantly different, $F(2, 231)=.497, p=.609$, partial $\eta^2=.004$. This indicates that Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians had similar ratings between stories with a truth outcome.

When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 231)=.696, p=.627$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 231)=3.688, p=.027$, partial $\eta^2=.031$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly better than the other story ($p=.039$). However, no differences were found between the ratings on the friend story and irrelevant story ($p=.079$) or the other story and irrelevant story ($p=1.000$). No significant main effect was found for ethnicity ($F(1, 231)=.145, p=.704$, partial $\eta^2=.001$), meaning that North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians gave similarly ratings for a lie
outcome across all story types. As well, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not significant, $F(2, 231)=.466, p=.628$, partial $\eta^2=.004$. This indicates that Chinese Asians and North American Caucasians had similar ratings between stories with a lie outcome.

When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Asians on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 301)=3.320, p=.006$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 301)=9.425, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.059$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly worse than the other story ($p=.001$) and irrelevant story ($p=.002$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.478$). A significant main effect was found for ethnicity, $F(1, 301)=8.295, p=.004$, partial $\eta^2=.027$, meaning that North American Asians gave significantly better ratings than Chinese Asians. However, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not significantly different, $F(2, 301)=1.082, p=.340$, partial $\eta^2=.007$. This indicates that Chinese Asians and North American Asians had similar ratings between stories with a truth outcome.

When comparing Chinese Asians and North American Asians on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 301)=.715, p=.612$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 301)=5.606, p=.004$, partial $\eta^2=.036$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly better than the other story ($p=.004$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the friend story and irrelevant story ($p=.068$) or the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.951$). No significant main effect was found for ethnicity, $F(1, 301)=1.214, p=.271$, partial $\eta^2=.004$, meaning that the total ratings for Chinese Asians and North American Asians were similar when story type was not considered. As well, the interaction between story type and ethnicity was not
significant, $F(2, 301) = .600, p = .549$, partial $\eta^2 = .004$. This indicates that Chinese Asians and North American Asians had similar ratings between stories with a lie outcome.

7.1.4.1 The Individual Stories by Canadian Immigrant Generation. To further investigate cultural differences, North American Asian participants were separated based on immigrant generation. The following analyses investigate differences between first generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian immigrants. A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type by story outcome on judgment ratings for first generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian immigrants (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations and Figure 6).

Table 4

Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories (standard deviations in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First generation Canadian immigrant</th>
<th>Second generation Canadian immigrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Truth outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>5.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lie outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.60)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For first generation Canadian immigrants, a significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ $\Lambda=.490, F(1, 22)=22.942, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.510$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes for the other story ($p=.007$) and irrelevant story ($p=.002$), but for the friend story truth outcomes were rated similarly to lie outcomes ($p=.106$), according to pairwise comparisons. The main effect for story type ($F(2, 22)=.846, p=.443$, partial $\eta^2=.071$) and the interaction between story type and story outcome (Wilks’ $\Lambda=.908, F(2, 22)=1.114, p=.346$, partial $\eta^2=.092$) were not found to be significant. Therefore, no differences existed between the story types within the different story outcomes or once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that first generation Canadian immigrants rated truth outcomes more favourably than lie outcomes, but not when a friend was considered.

For second generation Canadian immigrants, the interaction between story type and story outcome was significant, Wilks’ $\Lambda=.688, F(2, 20)=4.541, p=.024$, partial $\eta^2=.312$. Pairwise

\[\text{Figure 6. Mean ratings on how participants judged the protagonist’s actions based on Canadian immigrant generation, story type, and story outcome for the individual stories}\]
comparisons confirmed that the other story was rated significantly worse when the protagonist lied compared to the friend story ($p=.008$) and irrelevant story ($p=.023$). However, the ratings on the friend story and irrelevant story were not different ($p=1.000$). When the protagonist told the truth, no differences were found between ratings for the friend story and other story ($p=.115$), the friend story and irrelevant story ($p=1.000$), or the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.489$). In addition, the ratings on the other story and irrelevant story were not different ($p=1.000$). A significant main effect was found for story outcome, Wilks’ $\Lambda=.396$, $F(1, 20)=30.485$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.604$, where truth outcomes were rated significantly better than lie outcomes for the other story ($p<.001$) and irrelevant story ($p=.011$), but for the friend story truth outcomes were rated similarly to lie outcomes ($p=.205$). The main effect for story type was not found to be significant, $F(2, 20)=.301$, $p=.743$, partial $\eta^2=.029$. Therefore, no differences existed between the story types once ratings were averaged across story outcomes. These results indicate that second generation Canadian immigrants rated truth outcomes more favourably than lie outcomes, but not when a friend was considered. Lie outcomes were rated the least favourably when lying for an unknown person against a friend.

A 3x2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate story type (friend vs other vs irrelevant) by Canadian immigrant generation (first generation vs second generation) on judgment ratings for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). When comparing first generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian immigrants on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 42)=.065$, $p=.997$. No significant differences were found for the main effect of story type ($F(2, 42)=2.567$, $p=.089$, partial $\eta^2=.109$), the main effect of Canadian immigrant generation ($F(1, 42)=.114$, $p=.737$, partial $\eta^2=.003$), or the interaction between story type and Canadian
immigrant generation ($F(2, 42)=1.334, p=.274$, partial $\eta^2=.060$) for truth outcomes. This indicates that both immigrant generations rated all stories similarly and with no friend loyalty.

When comparing first generation Canadian immigrants and second generation Canadian immigrants on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 42)=.941, p=.465$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(2, 42)=4.504, p=.017$, partial $\eta^2=.177$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the friend story was rated significantly better than the other story ($p=.014$). However, no difference was found between the ratings on the friend story and irrelevant story ($p=.555$) or the other story and irrelevant story ($p=.279$). No significant main effect was found for Canadian immigrant generation, $F(1, 42)=.405, p=.528$, partial $\eta^2=.010$, meaning that the total ratings for first generation immigrants and second generation immigrants were similar when story type was not considered. As well, the interaction between story type and Canadian immigrant generation was not significant, $F(2, 42)=1.516, p=.231$, partial $\eta^2=.067$. This indicates that first generation immigrants and second generation immigrants had similar ratings between stories with a lie outcome.

**7.1.5 Story Type Similarities and Differences between Story Groups.** A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to evaluate similarities and differences across all story types (patriotic vs other country vs irrelevant country vs friend vs other athlete vs irrelevant athlete) on judgment ratings for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). Evaluating whether patriotic stories and friend stories had similar ratings was of specific interest. When comparing all story types on the truth outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 921)=8.216, p<.001$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(5,
Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse than all other story types ($p=.001$; friend – $p=.003$), indicating that country loyalty had a larger impact than friend loyalty. The friend story was rated significantly worse than the irrelevant country ($p=.025$), other athlete story ($p=.001$), and irrelevant athlete story ($p=.001$), but no differences were found between the ratings on the other country story ($p=.207$). This indicates that friend loyalty existed but was more prominent when individual athletes were considered. The other country story and irrelevant country story were rated significantly worse than the other athlete story ($p=.001$; $p=.010$) and irrelevant athlete story ($p=.003$; $p=.014$), indicating that truth-telling was evaluated as being better for the individual stories. No other comparisons were significantly different.

When comparing all story types on the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 921)=10.088$, $p<.001$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story types was significant, $F(5, 921)=13.220$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.067$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly better than all other story types ($p=.001$; friend – $p=.002$), indicating that country loyalty had a large impact on lie-telling evaluations. The friend story was rated significantly better than the other athlete story and irrelevant athlete story ($p=.001$), indicating friend loyalty. However, country loyalty had a larger impact than friend loyalty. The other athlete story was rated significantly worse than the other country story ($p=.004$) and irrelevant country story ($p=.002$), but no difference was found with the irrelevant athlete story ($p=.403$). In addition, the irrelevant athlete story was rated significantly worse than the other country story ($p=.037$) and irrelevant country story ($p=.033$). This indicates that lie-telling was evaluated more harshly when against a friend. No other comparisons were significantly different.
To further investigate judgment rating similarities and differences between all story types, additional one-way ANOVAs were conducted separating data by region, ethnicity, and by Canadian migration generation for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). As this data has been analyzed with these demographic independent variables and story type within each collective group, this section will focus on the comparisons between collective groups (country vs individual) when a significant main effect of story type is found for each story outcome.

7.1.5.1 Region. When comparing all story types on the truth outcome for China participants, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 401)=1.121, p=.348$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(5, 401)=12.724, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.137$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse than the other athlete story ($p<.001$) and irrelevant athlete story ($p=.001$), but no difference was found between the ratings on the friend story ($p=.064$). This indicates that country and friend loyalty impacted the favourable ratings for truth-telling, especially country loyalty. For the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 401)=4.300, p=.001$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story types was significant, $F(5, 401)=11.645, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.127$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly better than all other story types ($p=.001$), indicating that country loyalty had a larger impact than friend loyalty, which resulted in lie-telling being viewed as more favourable.

When comparing all story types on the truth outcome for North American participants, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 514)=7.993, p<.001$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story
type was significant, $F(5, 514)=10.171, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.090$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the other athlete story and the irrelevant athlete story were rated significantly better than all other story types ($p \leq .003$), but had similarly ratings to each other ($p = .908$). This indicates that telling the truth was rated more favourably when harming an individual. As well, country loyalty and friend loyalty had similar impacts on truth evaluations. For the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 514)=5.606, p<.001$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story types was significant, $F(5, 514)=7.893, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.071$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the other athlete story and irrelevant athlete story were rated significantly worse than all other story types ($p \leq .006$), but had similarly ratings to each other ($p = .498$). This indicates that lie-telling was evaluated more harshly when helping an individual. As well, country loyalty and friend loyalty had similar impacts on lie evaluations.

7.1.5.2 Ethnicity. When comparing all story types on the truth outcome for North American Caucasian participants, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 216)=3.654, p=.003$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(5, 216)=3.908, p=.002$, partial $\eta^2=.083$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the patriotic story was rated significantly worse than the other athlete story ($p = .002$) and irrelevant athlete story ($p = .004$). In addition, the other country story was rated significantly worse than the other athlete story and irrelevant athlete story ($p = .016$). These findings indicate that truth-telling was rated more favourably when harming a random individual than their own country. As well, country loyalty and friend loyalty had similar impacts on truth evaluations. For the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 216)=2.360, p=.041$, so the
ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story types was significant, $F(5, 216)=2.848, p<.016$, partial $\eta^2=.062$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the other athlete story was rated significantly worse than the patriotic story ($p=.016$), other country story ($p=.033$), and friend story ($p=.030$). In addition, the irrelevant athlete story was rated significantly worse than the patriotic story ($p=.003$), other country story ($p=.017$), irrelevant country story ($p=.044$), and friend story ($p=.017$). These findings indicate that lie-telling was evaluated more harshly when helping an individual. As well, country loyalty and friend loyalty had similar impacts on lie evaluations. Previous analyses indicated differences between the friend story and other athlete story, and the friend story and irrelevant athlete story, but only through the use of bootstrapping were these differences found to be significant. This indicates a preference by these participants for friend loyalty when making evaluations about lie outcomes.

When comparing all story types on the truth outcome for North American Asian participants, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 292)=4.627, p<.001$, so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(5, 292)=6.716, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.103$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the other athlete story was rated significantly better than the patriotic story ($p=.009$), other country story ($p=.001$), and irrelevant county story ($p=.006$). In addition, the irrelevant athlete story was rated significantly better than the patriotic story ($p=.010$), other country story ($p=.003$), and irrelevant country story ($p=.005$). These significant differences indicate that telling the truth was rated most favourably when harming an individual. As well, country loyalty and friend loyalty had similar impacts on truth evaluations. As well, country loyalty and friend loyalty had similar impacts on truth evaluations. For the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5,
so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(5, 292)=5.460, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2=.086$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the other athlete story was rated significantly worse than the patriotic story ($p=.002$), other country story ($p=.001$), and irrelevant country story ($p=.004$). In addition, the irrelevant athlete story was rated significantly worse than the patriotic story ($p=.024$), other country story ($p=.002$), and irrelevant country story ($p=.029$). These findings indicate that lie-telling was evaluated more harshly when helping an individual. As well, country loyalty and friend loyalty had similar impacts on lie evaluations.

7.1.5.3 Canadian Immigrant Generation. When comparing all story types on the truth outcome for first generation Canadian immigrant participants, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 50)=1.045, p=.402$. The main effect of story type was significant, $F(5, 50)=2.524, p=.041$, partial $\eta^2=.202$. Posthoc comparisons confirmed that the other country story was rated significantly worse than the irrelevant athlete story ($p=.035$), indicating that truth-telling was rated more favourably when harming a random individual and benefiting a random individual. For the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 50)=1.477, p=.214$. The main effect of story types was not significant, $F(5, 50)=1.258, p=.079$, partial $\eta^2=.139$, indicating that story type did not impact lie evaluations for these participants.

When comparing all story types on the truth outcome for second generation Canadian immigrant participants, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, $F(5, 39)=.564, p=.727$. The main effect of story type was not significant, $F(5, 39)=1.258, p=.301$, partial $\eta^2=.139$, indicating that story type did not impact truth evaluations for these participants. For the lie outcome, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not
confirmed using the Levene’s statistic, \( F(5, 39)=2.619, p=.039 \), so the ANOVA was rerun using bootstrapping. The main effect of story type was not significant, \( F(5, 39)=2.023, p=.097 \), partial \( \eta^2=.206 \), indicating that story type did not impact lie evaluations for these participants.

### 7.2 The Moral Behaviour Question

A series of chi-square analyses were conducted to investigate whether significant differences between truth-telling and lie-telling existed when considering story type, region, ethnicity, and, for Canadian participants, immigrant generation. When the protagonist told the truth, 589 participants agreed and indicated that they would also tell the truth. However, 157 participants chose to tell a lie instead. When the protagonist told a lie, 171 participants agreed and indicated that they would also tell a lie. However, 569 participants chose to tell the truth instead. Clearly truth-telling was preferred among the majority of participants (truth outcome - \( \chi^2(1)=250.166, p<.001 \); lie outcome - \( \chi^2(1)=214.059, p<.001 \)). When participants were asked whether they would engage in the same moral behaviour (i.e., tell the truth or tell a lie) as the protagonist, the option of “other” was given for those who were unsure or didn’t know what behaviour they would engage in. “Other” has been excluded from these analyses to allow for more concise and direct comparisons between truth-telling and lie-telling. “Other” has been provided in the following Tables to account for all participant responses.

#### 7.2.1 Country Collective Stories

Differences were found among the three country collective story types (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told a lie vs told the truth). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the patriotic story (\( \chi^2(1)=2.888, p=.089 \)), but significant differences were found for the other story (\( \chi^2(1)=66.694, p<.001 \)) and irrelevant story (\( \chi^2(1)=67.765, p<.001 \); see Table 5 for frequencies). This indicates that participants equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie.
for the patriotic story, but for the other story and irrelevant story, telling the truth was favoured over telling a lie. Follow-up comparisons between story types found significant differences between the patriotic story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=269)=23.056, p<.001$), and the patriotic story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=261)=24.796, p<.001$). These findings indicate that participants were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm their country and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped their country. No significant difference was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=280)=.086, p=.769$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped the participants’ country and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed the participants’ country.

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the patriotic story ($\chi^2(1)=.806, p=.369$), but significant differences were found for the other story ($\chi^2(1)=49.690, p<.001$) and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1)=58.667, p<.001$; see Table 5 for frequencies). This indicates that participants equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for the patriotic story, but for the other story and irrelevant story, telling the truth was favoured over telling a lie. Follow-up comparisons between story types found significant differences between the patriotic story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=266)=19.744, p<.001$) and the patriotic story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=256)=25.728, p<.001$). These findings indicate that participants were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped their country and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm their country. No significant difference was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=274)=.637, p=.425$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped the participants’ country and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed the participants’ country. Although not included in the analyses, other was chosen more for the patriotic story, indicating that the participants had a
greater struggle deciding whether to remain truthful or be patriotic.

Table 5

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type for the country collective stories with a truth outcome and a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Truth outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lie outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.1.1 *Country Collective Stories by Region.* To further investigate the story type differences depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie), participants were grouped based on where data collection took place (China vs North America). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for participants from China based on story type ($\chi^2(2, N=234)=45.989, p<.001$), but not for participants from North America ($\chi^2(2, N=171)=4.433, p=.109$; see Table 6 for frequencies). Follow-up China comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the patriotic story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=160)=34.995, p<.001$) and the patriotic story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=144)=23.316, p<.001$). These findings indicate that participants from China were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm their country and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped their country. No significant difference in moral behaviour was found between the other story and the irrelevant story, $\chi^2(2, N=164)=.893, p=.345$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped the participants’ country and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed the participants’ country.
Table 6

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the country collective stories with a truth outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Story Type</th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for participants from China based on story type ($\chi^2(2, N=229)=44.047, p<.001$), but did not for participants from North America ($\chi^2(2, N=169)=3.698, p=.157$; see Table 7 for frequencies). Follow-up China comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the patriotic story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=157)=31.641, p<.001$) and the patriotic story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=142)=26.396, p<.001$). These findings indicate that participants from China were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped their country and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm their country. No significant difference was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=159)=.038, p=.846$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped the participants’ country and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed the participants’ country.
Table 7

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the country collective stories with a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64.4%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons were also made between where data collection took place (China vs North America) within each story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the patriotic story ($\chi^2(1, N=125)=1.465, p=.226$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=136)=1.963, p=.161$; see Table 6). These findings indicate that participants from China and North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for these story types. A significant difference was found for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=144)=15.485, p<.001$), indicating that participants from China were more likely to tell the truth helping their country and less likely to tell a lie harming their country than participants from North America. For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the patriotic story ($\chi^2(1, N=124)=3.072, p=.080$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=132)=1.980, p=.159$; see Table 7). These findings indicate that participants from China and North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for these story types. A significant difference was found for the other story ($\chi^2(1,$
indicating that participants from China were more likely to tell the truth helping their country and less likely to tell a lie harming their country than participants from North America.

7.2.1.2 **Country Collective Stories by Ethnicity.** To investigate ethnic differences, the North American participants were divided into Caucasian and Asian groups based on reported ethnicity and citizenship. As all participants from China were Asian, this group will be referred to as Chinese Asians in these analyses. In addition, chi-square analyses for Chinese Asians are duplicates of the analyses conducted on participants from China (see previous subsection), therefore, these chi-square analyses will not be discussed in this section. Analyses with Chinese Asians will pertain to comparisons to Caucasian and Asian North American participants.

Table 8

**Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the country collective stories with a truth outcome**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly based on story type for North American Caucasian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=82)=3.656, p=.161$) or for North American Asian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=89)=2.277, p=.320$; see Table 8 for frequencies). For the lie outcome,
moral behaviour did not differ significantly based on story type for North American Caucasian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=80)=3.733, p=.155$) or for North American Asian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=89)=1.494, p=.474$; see Table 9 for frequencies).

Table 9

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the country collective stories with a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons were also made between ethnicity (North American Caucasian vs North American Asian vs Chinese Asian) within each story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and North American Asians for any story type (patriotic story $\chi^2(1, N=55)=2.376, p=.123$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=54)=.107, p=.743$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=62)=.252, p=.616$; see Table 8). These findings indicate that both Caucasian and Asian participants from North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for all story types. Moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians for the patriotic story ($\chi^2(1, N=101)=.034, p=.854$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=101)=2.157, p=.142$). These findings
indicate that North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for these story types. A significant difference was found for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=114)=9.494, p=.002$), indicating that Chinese Asians were more likely to tell the truth helping their country and less likely to tell a lie harming their country than North American Caucasians. Comparisons between North American Asians and Chinese Asians yielded the same results and trends as those for North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians (patriotic story $\chi^2(1, N=94)=3.610, p=.057$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=120)=13.846, p<.001$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=109)=.851, p=.356$).

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and North American Asians for any story type (patriotic story $\chi^2(1, N=54)=2.684, p=.101$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=55)=.001, p=.975$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=60)=.009, p=.925$; see Table 9). These findings indicate that both Caucasian and Asian participants from North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for all story types. Moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians for the patriotic story ($\chi^2(1, N=100)=.322, p=.570$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=99)=1.444, p=.230$). These findings indicate that North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for these story types. A significant difference was found for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=110)=7.209, p=.007$), indicating that Chinese Asians were more likely to tell the truth helping their country and less likely to tell a lie harming their country than North American Caucasians. Moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Asians and Chinese Asians for the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=105)=1.330, p=.249$), indicating that North American Asians and Chinese Asians equally chose telling the truth a telling a lie for these story types. Significant differences were found for
the patriotic story ($\chi^2(1, N=94)=5.588, p=.018$) and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=119)=8.428, p=.004$). These findings indicate that Chinese Asians were more likely to lie and tell the truth to help their country than North American Asians.

7.2.1.2.1 Country Collective Stories by Canadian Immigrant Generation. To further investigate differences among North American Asians, Canadian participants were divided into groups based on immigrant generation (first generation Canadian immigrant vs second generation Canadian immigrant). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for second generation Canadian immigrants based on story type ($\chi^2(2, N=16)=9.351, p=.009$), but not for first generation Canadian immigrants ($\chi^2(2, N=23)=.092, p=.955$; see Table 10 for frequencies). Follow-up second generation Canadian immigrant comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the patriotic story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=10)=4.286, p=.038$) and the other story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=13)=6.964, p=.008$). These findings indicate that second generation Canadian immigrants were more likely to either tell the truth or tell a lie harming their country. No comparison was able to be computed between the patriotic story and irrelevant story due to insufficient data for these stories.

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for second generation Canadian immigrants based on story type ($\chi^2(2, N=18)=8.654, p=.013$), but not for first generation Canadian immigrants ($\chi^2(2, N=22)=.220, p=.896$; see Table 11 for frequencies). Follow-up second generation Canadian immigrant comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the patriotic story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=12)=4.286, p=.038$) and the other story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=14)=5.833, p=.016$). These findings indicate that second generation Canadian immigrants were more likely to either tell the truth or tell a lie harming their country. No comparison was able to be computed between the patriotic story and irrelevant story.
due to insufficient data for these stories.

Table 10

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a truth outcome (percentages in brackets)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons were also made between Canadian immigrant generation (first generation
Canadian immigrant vs second generation Canadian immigrant) within each story type (patriotic vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for any story type (patriotic story $\chi^2(1, N=7)=.875, p=.350$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=17)=2.837, p=.092$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=15)=2.500, p=.114$; see Table 10). These findings indicate that first and second generation Canadian immigrants equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for all story types. For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for any story type (patriotic story $\chi^2(1, N=8)=1.143, p=.285$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=18)=1.901, p=.168$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=14)=2.864, p=.091$; see Table 11). These findings indicate that first and second generation Canadian immigrants equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for all story types.

7.2.2 The Individual Stories. Differences were found among the three individual story types (friend vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told a lie vs told the truth). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for all story types (friend story $\chi^2(1)=3.882, p=.049$, other story $\chi^2(1)=92.571, p<.001$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1)=69.377, p<.001$; see Table 12 for frequencies). This indicates that participants favoured telling the truth over telling a lie even when the truth harms a friend. Follow-up comparisons between story types found significant differences between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=219)=34.360, p<.001$) and the friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=215)=21.749, p<.001$). These findings indicate that participants were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped a friend. No significant difference was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=248)=1.882, p=.170$, indicating that telling the truth
did not increase when it helped a friend and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed a friend.

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for all story types (friend story $\chi^2(1)=5.149$, $p=.023$, other story $\chi^2(1)=88.200$, $p<.001$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1)=64.398$, $p<.001$; see Table 12 for frequencies). This indicates that participants favoured telling the truth over telling a lie even when a lie helps a friend. Follow-up comparisons between story types found significant differences between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=219)=29.683$, $p<.001$) and the friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=217)=17.293$, $p<.001$). These findings indicate that participants were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped a friend and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend. No significant difference was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=248)=2.165$, $p=.141$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped a friend and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed a friend. Although not included in the analyses, other was chosen more for the friend story, indicating that the participants had a greater struggle deciding whether to remain truthful or be loyal to a friend.

Table 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Truth outcome</th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truth story</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lie outcome</th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truth story</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2.2.1 The Individual Stories by Region. To further investigate the story type differences depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie), participants were grouped based on where data collection took place (China vs North America).

For the truth outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for participants from North America based on story type ($\chi^2(2, N=250)=46.698, p<.001$), but not for participants from China ($\chi^2(2, N=91)=1.515, p=.469$; see Table 13 for frequencies). Follow-up North American comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=158)=37.048, p<.001$) and the friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=158)=24.024, p<.001$). These findings indicate that participants from North America were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped a friend. No significant difference in moral behaviour was found between the other story and the irrelevant story, $\chi^2(2, N=184)=2.217, p=.137$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped a friend and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed a friend.

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for participants from North America based on story type ($\chi^2(2, N=249)=43.467, p<.001$), but did not for participants from China ($\chi^2(2, N=93)=.300, p=.861$; see Table 14 for frequencies). Follow-up North America comparisons found a significant difference in moral behaviour between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=157)=36.594, p<.001$), indicating that participants from North America were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped a friend and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend. A significant difference in moral behaviour was also found between the friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=158)=20.609, p<.001$), indicating that participants from North America were more likely to
tell the truth when there was no consequence to a friend. No significant difference was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=183)=3.495, p=.062$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped a friend and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed a friend.

Table 13

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the individual stories with a truth outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and region for the individual stories with a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparisons were also made between where data collection took place (China vs North America) within each story type (friend vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=126)=.198, p=.656$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=122)=.194, p=.659$; see Table 13). These findings indicate that participants from China and North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for these story types. A significant difference was found for the friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=93)=7.182, p=.007$), indicating that participants from North America were more likely to tell a lie helping a friend and less likely to tell the truth harming a friend than participants from China. For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=125)=.899, p=.343$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=123)=.597, p=.440$; see Table 14). These findings indicate that participants from China and North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for these story types. A significant difference was found for the friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=94)=9.730, p=.002$), indicating that participants from North America were more likely to tell a lie helping a friend and less likely to tell the truth harming a friend than participants from China.

7.2.2.2 The Individual Stories by Ethnicity. To investigate ethnic differences, the North American participants were divided into Caucasian and Asian groups based on reported ethnicity and citizenship. As all participants from China were Asian, this group will be referred to as Chinese Asians in these analyses. In addition, chi-square analyses for Chinese Asians are duplicates of the analyses conducted on participants from China (see previous subsection), therefore, these chi-square analyses will not be discussed in this section. Analyses with Chinese Asians will pertain to comparisons to Caucasian and Asian North American participants.

For the truth outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for both North American
Caucasian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=99)=25.206, p<.001$) and North American Asian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=151)=24.165, p<.001$; see Table 15 for frequencies). Follow-up North American Caucasian comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=68)=17.388, p<.001$) and friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=53)=15.313, p<.001$). These findings indicate that North American Caucasians were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped a friend. No significant difference in moral behaviour was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=77)=.130, p=.719$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped a friend and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed a friend.

Table 15

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the individual stories with a truth outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Follow-up North American Asian comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=90)=20.575, p<.001$) and the friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=105)=10.578, p=.001$). These findings indicate that North
American Asians were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped a friend. Moral behaviour between the other story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=107)=3.821, p=.051$) was close to being significantly different with North American Asians less likely to tell a lie harming a friend. However, the comparison was not significantly different indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped a friend and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed a friend.

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for both North American Caucasian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=100)=25.177, p<.001$) and North American Asian participants ($\chi^2(2, N=149)=23.391, p<.001$; see Table 16 for frequencies). Follow-up North American Caucasian comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=68)=16.126, p<.001$) and friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=55)=17.050, p<.001$). These findings indicate that North American Caucasians were more likely to agree with the protagonist and tell a lie when it helped a friend and were more likely to the opposite of the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend. No significant difference in moral behaviour was found between the other story and irrelevant story, $\chi^2(1, N=77)=.535, p=.465$, indicating that telling the truth did not increase when it helped a friend and telling a lie did not decrease when it harmed a friend.

Follow-up North American Asian comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between all story type combinations; the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=89)=22.516, p<.001$), the friend story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=103)=6.965, p=.008$), and the other story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=106)=7.690, p=.006$). These findings indicate that North American Asians were least likely to agree with the protagonist and tell a lie when it
harmed a friend and were more likely to do the opposite of the protagonist and tell the truth when it did not harm a friend.

Table 16

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and North American ethnicity for the individual stories with a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons were also made between ethnicity (North American Caucasian vs North American Asian vs Chinese Asian) within each story type (friend vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and North American Asians for any story type (friend story $\chi^2(1, N=66)=.485, p=.486$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=92)=.713, p=.398$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=92)=1.791, p=.181$; see Table 15). These findings indicate that both Caucasian and Asian participants from North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for all story types. Moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=80)=0, p=.984$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=61)=.255, p=.614$). These findings indicate that North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for
these story types. A significant difference was found for the friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=49)=6.944$, $p=.008$), indicating that North American Caucasians were more likely to tell a lie helping a friend and less likely to tell the truth harming a friend than Chinese Asians. Comparisons between North American Asians and Chinese Asians yielded the same results and trends as those for North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians (friend story $\chi^2(1, N=71)=5.322$, $p=.021$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=80)=.668$, $p=.414$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=91)=.671$, $p=.413$).

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and North American Asians for any story type (friend story $\chi^2(1, N=66)=.913$, $p=.339$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=91)=2.950$, $p=.086$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=92)=3.058$, $p=.080$; see Table 16). These findings indicate that both Caucasian and Asian participants from North America equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for all story types. Moral behaviour did not differ significantly between North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=79)=.008$, $p=.928$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=63)=.253$, $p=.615$). These findings indicate that North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians equally chose telling the truth a telling a lie for these story types. A significant difference was found for the friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=51)=10.137$, $p=.001$), indicating that North American Caucasians were more likely to tell a lie helping a friend and less likely to tell the truth harming a friend than Chinese Asians. Comparisons between North American Asians and Chinese Asians yielded the same results as those for North American Caucasians and Chinese Asians (friend story $\chi^2(1, N=71)=6.923$, $p=.009$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=80)=3.069$, $p=.080$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=91)=1.582$, $p=.208$).

7.2.2.2.1 The Individual Stories by Canadian Immigrant Generation. To further investigate differences among North American Asians, Canadian participants were divided into
groups based on immigrant generation (first generation Canadian immigrant vs second generation Canadian immigrant). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly based on story type for first generation Canadian immigrants ($\chi^2(2, N=19)=2.454, p=.293$) or for second generation Canadian immigrants ($\chi^2(2, N=17)=2.583, p=.275$; see Table 17 for frequencies).

Table 17

*Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a truth outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly based on story type for first generation Canadian immigrants ($\chi^2(2, N=20)=4.889, p=.087$) or for second generation Canadian immigrants ($\chi^2(2, N=16)=2.939, p=.230$; see Table 18 for frequencies). However, follow-up first generation Canadian immigrant comparisons found a significant difference in moral behaviour between the friend story and other story ($\chi^2(1, N=14)=5.091, p=.024$), indicating that first generation Canadian immigrants are more likely to tell the truth.
Table 18

Frequencies for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a lie outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian immigrant</td>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparisons were also made between Canadian immigrant generation (first generation Canadian immigrant vs second generation Canadian immigrant) within each story type (friend vs other vs irrelevant) depending on the story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for any story type (friend story $\chi^2(1, N=9) = .225, p = .635$, other story $\chi^2(1, N=15) = .938, p = .333$, and irrelevant story $\chi^2(1, N=12) = .171, p = .679$; see Table 17). These findings indicate that first and second generation Canadian immigrants equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for all story types. For the lie outcome, moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=8) = 1.600, p = .206$) or the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=13) = .034, p = .853$; see Table 18). These findings indicate that first and second generation Canadian immigrants equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for these story types. A comparison was unable to be commuted for the other story due to insufficient data.
7.2.3 Story Type Similarities and Differences between Story Groups. To investigate moral behaviour similarities and differences across all story types (patriotic vs other country vs irrelevant country vs friend vs other athlete vs irrelevant athlete), further chi-square analyses were conducted to compare the country collective story types (patriotic, other country, and irrelevant country) to the individual story types (friend, other athlete, and irrelevant athlete) for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). For the truth outcome, moral behaviour was significantly different between the patriotic story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=251)=41.937, p<.001$), the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=247)=28.047, p<.001$), the friend story and other country story ($\chi^2(1, N=237)=16.947, p<.001$), and the friend story and irrelevant country ($\chi^2(1, N=229)=18.581, p<.001$). These findings indicate that country loyalty and friend loyalty impact moral behaviour where telling the truth is less likely when harming a participant’s country or a friend and telling a lie is more likely when helping a participant’s country or a friend. In addition, moral behaviour was significantly different between the other country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=270)=5.015, p=.025$), indicating that telling a lie to harm was more likely when impacting a participant’s country. Of particular interest is whether moral behaviour differed significantly between the patriotic story and friend story, which it did not ($\chi^2(1, N=218)=.150, p=.698$). This indicates that participants were equally likely to tell a lie to help either collective. The remaining comparisons were not significantly different (see Tables 5 and 12 for frequencies).

For the lie outcome, moral behaviour was significantly different between the patriotic story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=249)=45.626, p<.001$), the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=247)=30.410, p<.001$), the friend story and other country story $\chi^2(1, N=236)=9.056, p=.003$), and the friend story and irrelevant country ($\chi^2(1, N=226)=13.466,$
These findings indicate that country loyalty and friend loyalty impact moral behaviour where telling the truth is less likely when harming a participant’s country or a friend and telling a lie is more likely when helping a participant’s country or a friend. In addition, moral behaviour was significantly different between the other country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=267)=8.225, p=.004$) and the irrelevant country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=257)=4.424, p=.035$), indicating that telling a lie to harm was less likely when impacting a friend. Of particular interest is whether moral behaviour differed significantly between the patriotic story and friend story, which it did not ($\chi^2(1, N=218)=1.286, p=.257$). This indicates that participants were equally likely to tell a lie and help either collective. The remaining comparisons were not significantly different (see Tables 5 and 12 for frequencies).

To further investigate moral behaviour differences between all story types, additional chi-square comparisons were conducted separating data by region, ethnicity, and by Canadian migration generation for each story outcome (whether the protagonist told the truth vs told a lie). Only comparisons between collective groups (country vs individual) will remain the focus.

### 7.2.3.1 Region

For participants from China, moral behaviour significantly differed between the patriotic story and friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=97)=6.700, p=.010$), the patriotic story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=104)=14.847, p<.001$), and the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=100)=12.574, p<.001$) for a truth outcome (see Tables 6 and 13 for frequencies). In addition, moral behaviour differed significantly between the patriotic story and friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=98)=12.228, p<.001$), the patriotic story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=104)=16.181, p<.001$), and the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=101)=16.748, p<.001$) for a lie outcome (see Tables 7 and 14 for frequencies). These findings indicate that participants from China were more likely to protect their country by telling a lie even more than for a friend.
remaining comparisons were not significantly different.

For participants from North America, moral behaviour differed significantly between the patriotic story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=147)=21.055, p<.001$), the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=147)=10.992, p=.001$), the other country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=146)=15.973, p<.001$), the other country story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=146)=7.267, p=.007$), the irrelevant country story and friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=128)=12.025, p=.001$), and the irrelevant country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=154)=5.910, p=.015$) for a truth outcome (see Tables 6 and 13 for frequencies). In addition, moral behaviour differed significantly between the patriotic story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=145)=21.344, p<.001$), the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=146)=9.068, p=.003$), the other country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=146)=18.874, p<.001$), the other country story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=147)=7.386, p=.007$), the irrelevant country story and friend story ($\chi^2(1, N=126)=9.845, p=.002$), and the irrelevant country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=151)=7.469, p=.006$) for a lie outcome (see Tables 7 and 14 for frequencies). These findings indicate that participants from North America were more likely to tell the truth or tell a lie when it helped either their country or a friend. However, the comparisons between the other country story and irrelevant athlete story found that participants were more likely to tell the truth harming a random individual than helping their country. Of particular interest is whether moral behaviour differed significantly between the patriotic story and friend story which, for the North American participants, it did not for either the truth outcome ($\chi^2(1, N=121)=1.799, p=.180$) or the lie outcome ($\chi^2(1, N=120)=1.585, p=.208$). This indicates that participants were equally likely to tell a lie and help either collective. The remaining comparisons were not significantly different.
7.2.3.2 Ethnicity. The comparisons for both North American Caucasians and North American Asians mirrored those for North American participants with the following few exceptions. For the truth outcome, moral behaviour for North American Asians did not differ significantly for the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=85)=.835, p=.361$), the other country story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=91)=3.365, p=.067$), and the irrelevant country story and other athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=81)=3.656, p=.056$; see Tables 8 and 15 for frequencies). For the lie outcome, moral behaviour for North American Asians did not differ significantly for the patriotic story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=84)=.255, p=.614$) and the other country story and irrelevant athlete story ($\chi^2(1, N=92)=2.300, p=.129$; see Table 9 and 16 for frequencies). These findings indicate that North American Asians are less impacted by country or friend loyalty when telling the truth. North American Caucasians’ moral behaviour also did not differ significantly for the irrelevant country story and other athlete story for the truth outcome ($\chi^2(1, N=73)=2.633, p=.105$) or for the lie outcome ($\chi^2(1, N=72)=1.610, p=.205$), indicating that friend loyalty did not impact truth-telling.

7.2.3.3 Canadian Immigrant Generation. For first generation Canadian immigrants the results were invalid due to a lack of sufficient data (see Tables 10, 11, 17, and 18 for frequencies). For second generation Canadian immigrants, moral behaviour differed significantly for the other country story and other athlete story for the truth outcome ($\chi^2(1, N=14)=7.778, p=.005$) and for the lie outcome ($\chi^2(1, N=15)=6.563, p=.010$). This indicates that second generation Canadian immigrants were more likely to tell a lie to harm their country and more likely to tell the truth to help a friend. The remaining comparisons were not significantly different or were not computed due to insufficient data.
7.2.4 Recoding “Other” Moral Behaviour. When participants were asked to select the behaviour they would engage in when in a similar situation, the option of “other” was provided and North American participants were requested to explain this choice. These explanations were reviewed and behaviour recoded to reflect either a truth, a lie, or remain as other. Truth was given when explanations included terms such as “I heard that” or “I would tell the truth if I could remain anonymous” or “I would give a hint about the truth”. Lie was given when explanations included terms such as “say I don’t know” or “tell the referee I didn’t hear that”. These explanations indicate that the participant would lie. Other was given when no explanation was provided (e.g., N/A) or when participants would deflect, avoid, or change the topic in their explanation.

For country collective stories with a truth outcome, 39 behaviours were recoded based on the explanations provided. Six behaviours became a truth, 10 behaviours became a lie, and 23 behaviours remained as other (see Table 19 for frequencies with recoded behaviour by ethnicity, immigrant generation, and story type). Two coders, with a level of agreement of 92.2%, $\kappa=.863$, recoded all 39 behaviours. When disagreement arose, discussion followed to determine the most appropriate behaviour based on the provided explanation.

For stories with a lie outcome, 41 behaviours were recoded based on the explanations provided. Eight behaviours became a truth, 14 behaviours became a lie, and 19 behaviours remained as other (see Table 20 for frequencies with recoded behaviour by ethnicity, immigrant generation, and story type). Two coders, with a level of agreement of 92%, $\kappa=.923$, recoded all 41 behaviours. When disagreement arose, discussion followed to determine the most appropriate behaviour based on the provided explanation.
### Table 19

*Frequencies for North American recoded responses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a truth outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Caucasian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown immigrant generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Asian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First generation Canadian immigrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation Canadian immigrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 20

*Frequencies for North American recoded responses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the country collective stories with a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Caucasian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown immigrant generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Asian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First generation Canadian immigrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation Canadian immigrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic story</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the recoding, some minor findings were altered. For the truth outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for participants from North America based on story type ($\chi^2(2, N=187)=6.214, p=.045$). Follow-up comparisons found significant differences in moral behaviour between the patriotic story and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=128)=5.754, p=.016$), indicating that tell the truth was less likely when harming their country. For the lie outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for the irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=141)=4.201, p=.040$), indicating that participants from China were more likely to tell the truth than participants from North America who were more likely to tell a lie. Moral behaviour did not differ significantly for the patriotic story ($\chi^2(1, N=96)=3.714, p=.054$) when compared between North American Asian participants and Chinese Asian participants. This finding was in line with the other ethnicity comparisons. As the recoding did not make many significant changes to the results, the original data was used.

For the individual stories with a truth outcome, 60 behaviours were recoded based on the explanations provided. Ten behaviours became a truth, 17 behaviours became a lie, and 33 behaviours remained as other (see Table 21 for frequencies with recoded behaviour by ethnicity, immigrant generation, and story type). Two coders, with a level of agreement of 85.9%, $\kappa=.972$, recoded all 60 behaviours. When disagreement arose, discussion followed to determine the most appropriate behaviour based on the provided explanation.

For stories with a lie outcome, 61 behaviours were recoded based on the explanations provided. Nine behaviours became a truth, 17 behaviours became a lie, and 35 behaviours remained as other (see Table 22 for frequencies with recoded behaviour by ethnicity, immigrant generation, and story type). Two coders, with a level of agreement of 85.7%, $\kappa=.972$, recoded all 61 behaviours. When disagreement arose, discussion followed to determine the most appropriate
behaviour based on the provided explanation.

Table 21

*Frequencies for North American recoded responses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a truth outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Caucasian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown immigrant generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Asian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First generation Canadian immigrant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22

*Frequencies for North American recoded responses for whether participants would tell the truth or a lie based on story type, ethnicity, and Canadian immigrant generation for the individual stories with a lie outcome*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Lie</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Caucasian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown immigrant generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North American Asian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First generation Canadian immigrant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend story</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other story</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant story</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the recoding, some minor findings were altered. For the lie outcome, moral behaviour differed significantly for the other story ($\chi^2(1, N=98)=6.429, p=.011$) and irrelevant story ($\chi^2(1, N=98)=5.026, p=.025$) when compared between North American Caucasian participants and North American Asian participants. These results indicate that North American Asians were less likely to lie when harming a friend. A key finding was also altered with the recoding – moral behaviour was found not to differ significantly for the friend story for the truth outcome ($\chi^2(1)=1.131, p=.288$) and for the lie outcome ($\chi^2(1)=2.701, p=.100$). This indicates that participants equally chose telling the truth and telling a lie for a friend. As the recoding only made one significant change to the results, the original data was used.
Chapter Eight: Discussion

8.1 Summary of Results

The current study’s overall objective was to determine how emerging adults evaluate lie-telling when it comes in conflict with the value of loyalty to one’s in-group and whether such evaluations vary as a function of cultural values. Evaluations were determined through judging actions and indicating hypothetical moral behaviour. Scenarios based on high level sporting events were considered as athletes, although wanting to represent their countries in the right way, often engage in behaviour that questions morality and has serious consequences. These scenarios allow participants to contemplate the values of loyalty and honesty. In order to address cultural differences, participants were recruited from China and North America. North American participants were further classified based on ethnicity and citizenship (i.e., North American Caucasian versus North American Asian) to investigate cultural integration. Based on this information, the overall objective was broken down into four objectives.

The first objective was to determine whether emerging adults from China and North America would judge lie-telling or truth-telling more favourably when helping or harming the in-group/collective or the individual. The second objective was to determine whether emerging adults from China and emerging adults from North America would be more inclined to tell a lie helping the in-group/collective or the individual. The third objective was to determine which cultural group (i.e., Chinese Asian emerging adults or North American Caucasian emerging adults) North American Asian emerging adults would be more similar to when judging lie-telling and truth-telling to help or harm the in-group/collective or the individual. The fourth objective was to determine which cultural group (i.e., Chinese Asian emerging adults or North American Caucasian emerging adults) North American Asian emerging adults would be more similar to
regarding the inclination to tell a lie helping the in-group/collective or the individual.

The current study was based on previous research showing that Eastern cultures exhibit more collectivistic tendencies while Western cultures exhibit more individualistic tendencies (Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Hofstede 1991/1997, 2005; Hsu, 1983; Lau, Cameron, Chieh, O’Leary, Fu, & Lee, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995; Triandis & Suh, 2002). The expectation was for emerging adults from Eastern cultures to support the in-group/collective illustrating unquestioning loyalty, protection, and patriotism regardless of the moral indiscretion (Bontempo, Lobel, & Triandis, 1990; Hofstede, 1991/1997, 2005; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1988, 1989, 1995). This trend has been confirmed in previous research where children and adolescents have rated lie-telling more favourably and have engaged in lie-telling more often when benefiting a collective group over themselves (Dmytro, Lo, O’Leary, Fu, Lee, & Cameron, 2014; Fu, Luo, Heyman, Wang, Cameron, & Lee, 2016; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Lau et al., 2012).

Based on the findings from previous research, it is predicted that North American individuals will favour loyalty over honesty when honesty negatively impacts individual-interests whereas individuals from China will favour loyalty over honesty when honesty negatively impacts in-group/collective interests (Fu et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2012). North Americans will be shown to favour individual interests by rating lie-telling more positively when helping their friend, rating truth-telling more negatively when harming their friend, and being more inclined to lie to help their friend, all in comparison to individuals from China. Individuals from China will be shown to favour in-group/collective interests by rating lie-telling more positively when helping their country, rating truth-telling more negatively when harming their
country, and being more inclined to lie to help their country, all in comparison to North Americans.

8.1.1 The Judgment Question. Through analyses of participants’ evaluations, the prediction was confirmed that emerging adults from China favoured the country collective more than emerging adults from North America. The results illustrated this in two ways. Firstly, it was found that in general, emerging adults from China rated telling the truth worse when it harmed their country and rated telling a lie better when it helped their country. This trend was also found when comparing ratings between emerging adults from China and emerging adults from North America. Emerging adults from China showed more loyalty to their country and preserving country pride was more important compared to emerging adults from North America. However, when truth-telling helped their country, emerging adults from China did not rate truth-telling better. In these stories, patriotism was not as clear and was not influencing evaluations in a similar manner. Secondly, emerging adults from both China and North America viewed truth-telling with high regard, as truth-telling was rated more positively than lie-telling, except when truth-telling harmed China. In these stories, ratings for lie-telling and truth-telling were similar for emerging adults from China. However, emerging adults from China viewed lie-telling as being worse compared to emerging adults from North America, except when lie-telling helped China. In these stories, emerging adults from China rated lie-telling as being better.

An unexpected, yet interesting finding was how emerging adults from China judged lie-telling and truth-telling more extremely compared to emerging adults from North America. For example, although both regions rated truth-telling positively when not harming their country, emerging adults from China rated truth-telling more positively. Similarly for lie-telling, although both regions rated lie-telling negatively when not helping their country, emerging adults from
China rated lie-telling more negatively. This may be due to stronger commitment to values, discipline, and standards within Eastern cultures compared to Western cultures.

The prediction that emerging adults from China would not favour the individual more than emerging adults from North America was partially confirmed. In general, emerging adults from China provided similar ratings for lie-telling and truth-telling no matter whether it helped or harmed a friend, whereas emerging adults from North America rated telling the truth worse when it harmed a friend and rated telling a lie better when it helped a friend. However, when direct comparisons were made between regions, emerging adults from China and emerging adults from North America were found to have given similar ratings for both lie-telling and truth-telling impacting a friend or another athlete.

It is important to note that emerging adults from North America did rate lie-telling more positively when helping a friend compared to China, but as this result was not significant, no lie-telling preference for a friend could be confirmed. Much like the country collective stories, both China and North America viewed truth-telling with high regard, as truth-telling was consistently rated more positively than lie-telling. Another unexpected, yet interesting finding was that emerging adults from North America provided better ratings for truth-telling compared to emerging adults from China. This may be due to the need to fulfill the individualistic cultural value of doing what is right for oneself over protecting others.

Comparisons between story groups confirmed the prediction of patriotic loyalty for emerging adults from China. When evaluating truth-telling, emerging adults from China provided similar ratings for stories that both harmed their country and a friend. However, when evaluating lie-telling, emerging adults from China provided more positive ratings for stories that helped their country compared to stories that helped a friend. Although emerging adults from
China showed some preference for a friend, the loyalty for their country was more pronounced, especially compared to North American emerging adults.

Emerging adults from North America evaluated truth-telling similarly for stories that both harmed their country and a friend and evaluated lie-telling similarly for stories that both helped their country and a friend. Therefore, emerging adults from North America show no story group preference, but the results did show that telling the truth was rated worse for a friend and telling a lie was rated better for a friend. This is most likely due to the more positive ratings for truth-telling and the more negative ratings for lie-telling for the individual stories compared to the country collective stories. Since data was collected from different participants it is impossible to determine if these are trends or chance findings.

When ethnicity was included in the analyses of participants’ evaluations, the prediction that Chinese Asian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults would provide similar evaluations for the country collective stories was not confirmed. In fact, North American Asian emerging adults provided evaluations more similar to North American Caucasian emerging adults. Both North American ethnicities rated telling the truth and telling a lie similarly whether it helped or harmed their country. Therefore, North American Asian emerging adults were not showing the same country loyalty as Chinese Asian emerging adults. This may be due to North American Asian emerging adults being asked to show loyalty to North America as their country rather than to China, or this may be due to acculturation. As both Canadian immigrant generations of North America Asian emerging adults provided similar evaluations, either of the explanations is possible.

More differences were found between ratings from Chinese Asian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults compared to Chinese Asian emerging adults and North
American Caucasian emerging adults. Some of these differences were even contradictory, with Chinese Asian emerging adults providing much more positive ratings and North American Asian emerging adults providing much more negative ratings for truth-telling and vice versa for lie-telling. Perhaps North American Asian emerging adults were overcompensating to be more similar to North American Caucasian emerging adults and to distance themselves from their heritage with no fusion or integration of parental cultural values as previously found (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000; Koh, Shao, & Wang, 2009).

When considering the individual stories, the prediction that North American Asian emerging adults would provide similar evaluations to North American Caucasian emerging adults was confirmed. Both ethnic groups rated telling the truth worse when it harmed a friend and rated telling a lie better when it helped a friend. Direct comparisons between all ethnic pairings found similar ratings for both lie-telling and truth-telling whether it helped or harmed a friend (or another athlete). When comparing Chinese Asian emerging adults to either North American Caucasian or Asian emerging adults, harming a friend through telling the truth was rated worse than helping a friend through telling the truth, and helping a friend by telling a lie was rated better than harming a friend by telling a lie by all groups. Therefore, clearly friend loyalty was important to all emerging adults.

It was surprising that helping a friend through telling a lie was rated similarly to helping an unknown random athlete through telling a lie. These findings are difficult to explain for the following two reasons. Firstly, telling a lie to help a friend was rated more positively than telling a lie to help an unknown athlete. Secondly, the ratings between telling a lie to help an unknown athlete and telling a lie to help an unknown athlete that also harms a friend were nearly identical. Had the average ratings for telling a lie to help an unknown athlete been a few hundredths lower,
a difference between telling a lie to help a friend and telling a lie to help an unknown athlete probably would not have been found, which would lead to more comprehensible results.

When considering Canadian immigrant generations, evaluations were similar when truth-telling occurred. When lie-telling occurred, helping a friend was rated better than harming a friend. It was also found that both first and second generation Canadian immigrants rated lie-telling and truth-telling similarly when it helped a friend and rated truth-telling more positively when it did not harm a friend. Therefore, immigrants held similar views regardless of generation.

It was interesting to find that second generation Canadian immigrants rated lie-telling the worst when it harmed its friend. These emerging adults either viewed lie-telling as being very very bad or were swayed by the friend being unintentionally harmed by a lie that protected an unknown athlete from their transgression. As these immigrants were the only group to view this scenario as being the worst, it would be intriguing to understand the motivation behind these ratings and why other groups did not show the same trend.

In summary, telling the truth was evaluated more positively than telling a lie. Honesty in sports is very important as winning by cheating is not viewed the same as winning based on merit nor should cheating be rewarded. In addition, fairness and sportsmanship are major themes of the Olympic Games. However, emerging adults’ views were swayed by defending their personal interests, whether that be country pride or maintaining friendships. Emerging adults from China showed more loyalty to their country than both North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults, who provided similar evaluations. Both Canadian immigrant generations provided similar evaluations. No differences were found between ethnic groups for the individual stories, although findings illustrated greater friend loyalty for North American emerging adults regardless of ethnicity or immigrant generation.
Evaluations were influenced by the consideration of reputational and international repercussions, which also supported rationalizations regarding why dishonesty would be evaluated positively in these scenarios.

8.1.2 The Moral Behaviour Question. When given the option to hypothetically tell a lie or hypothetically tell the truth, emerging adults preferred telling the truth over telling a lie. However, opinions changed and hypothetical behaviour differed when lie-telling or truth-telling would directly impact an individual’s country or friend. Both country and friend loyalty equally impacted whether emerging adults would hypothetically tell a lie or hypothetically tell the truth. Lie-telling was more likely when it helped either a country or a friend, and truth-telling was less likely when it harmed either a country or a friend, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour.

For the country collective stories, it was found that emerging adults were equally as likely to select telling the truth when it harmed their country or telling a lie when it helped their country no matter whether the protagonist told the truth or told a lie. Therefore, a large majority of emerging adults would hypothetically choose to be dishonest in order to be loyal to their country. Furthermore, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour, engaging in truth-telling was selected more often when it did not harm an individual’s country and engaging in lie-telling was selected more often when it helped an individual’s country. However, having an individual’s country as the secondary country did not prompt more emerging adults to engage in truth-telling and fewer emerging adults to engage in lie-telling. For these stories, it appeared that emerging adults forgot that their country would be affected by the protagonist’s actions.

The current study investigated these country collective behaviour findings further by examining whether cultural differences were exhibited as indicated by previous research (Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2007). The prediction that emerging adults
from China would be more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling for their country compared to emerging adults from North America was partially confirmed. Emerging adults from China were more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling when it helped their country, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour, a result not found for emerging adults from North America. Furthermore, emerging adults from China were more likely to tell a lie to protect their country than to protect a friend compared to North American emerging adults, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. However, when comparing hypothetical engagement in lie-telling, emerging adults from China and emerging adults from North America were equally likely to tell a lie to help their country.

An unexpected finding, which could be interesting to explore with further data collection, was that emerging adults from China were more likely to engage in truth-telling when it helped their country and less likely to engage in lie-telling when it harmed their country compared to emerging adults from North America, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. As emerging adults from both China and North America were equally likely to select telling the truth to help their country or a random country, it raises the questions of whether this cultural difference was a chance finding and whether this finding indicates a significant cultural difference.

Through further investigation based on ethnicity, the prediction that Chinese Asian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults would be more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling for their country compared to North American Caucasian emerging adults was not confirmed. The results illustrated this in four ways.

Firstly, North American Asian emerging adults and Chinese Asian emerging adults were not more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling when it helped their country, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. In fact, North American Asian emerging adults consistently chose to
engage in truth-telling regardless of the impact it would have on their country and regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour.

Secondly, North American Asian emerging adults and North American Caucasian emerging adults chose similar hypothetical behaviour regardless of how it impacted their country and regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. Approximately the same proportion of North American Asian emerging adults and North American Caucasian emerging adults selected to hypothetically engage in lie-telling for their country.

Thirdly, when comparing hypothetical engagement in lie-telling, Chinese Asian emerging adults and North American Caucasian emerging adults were equally likely to tell a lie to help their country, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour.

Fourthly, when comparing Chinese Asian emerging adults’ and North American Asian emerging adults’ likelihood to engage in lie-telling to help their country when the protagonist engaged in lie-telling, Chinese Asian emerging adults were more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling to help their country than North American Asian emerging adults. Chinese Asian emerging adults were also more likely to hypothetically engage in truth-telling to help their country than North American Asian emerging adults.

Clearly North American Asian emerging adults were not showing the same heritage country loyalty as Chinese Asian emerging adults. This may be due to North American Asian emerging adults being asked to show loyalty to North America rather than China. North American Asian emerging adults could have less loyalty to North America, especially when compared to the loyalty that Chinese Asian emerging adults have to China. It could also be due to acculturation, indicating that North American Asian emerging adults have adopted the Western individualistic values of protecting the individual. Unfortunately, due to insufficient
data it was not possible to make comparisons between Canadian immigrant generations to further investigate acculturation.

For the individual stories, it was found that emerging adults would choose to hypothetically engage in truth-telling more often when it did not harm a friend and to hypothetically engage in lie-telling more often when it helped a friend, regardless of whether the protagonist told the truth or told a lie. This came as a surprise, as truth-telling was favoured over lie-telling even when the truth harmed a friend. The favouring of truth-telling may be due to participants’ unwillingness to admit that they would engage in lie-telling behaviour. When responses were recoded, it was found that emerging adults were equally as likely to tell the truth when it harmed a friend or tell a lie when it helped a friend regardless of whether the protagonist told the truth or told a lie. Having a friend as the secondary character did not prompt more emerging adults to engage in truth-telling and fewer emerging adults to engage in lie-telling. Again, it seems as if emerging adults were only focused on the main character of the story.

The current study investigated these behavioural trends further by examining whether cultural differences were exhibited as indicated by previous research (Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2007). The prediction that emerging adults from China would be less likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling for a friend compared to emerging adults from North America was confirmed. The results illustrated this in four ways. Firstly, emerging adults from China were not found to opt to hypothetically engage in truth-telling over lie-telling no matter how it impacted a friend and regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. Secondly, emerging adults from China were less likely to tell a lie to protect a friend than their country compared to North American emerging adults, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. Thirdly, emerging adults from North America were more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling when it
helped a friend, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. Fourthly, comparisons between emerging adults from China and emerging adults from North America found that emerging adults from North America were more likely to choose to engage in lie-telling to help a friend than emerging adults from China, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. This trend was further reinforced as both emerging adults from North America and emerging adults from China were equally likely to tell the truth when it did not harm a friend and tell a lie when it did not help a friend, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. Clearly, emerging adults from North America are willing to engage in behaviour that demonstrates their loyalty to a friend. This raises the question of whether North American emerging adults with differing cultural heritages and ethnicities would exhibit differences or similarities when asked to tell a lie to protect a friend.

When considering ethnicity, the prediction that North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults would be more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling for a friend compared to Chinese Asian emerging adults was confirmed. The results illustrated this in four ways. Firstly, both North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults were more likely to hypothetically engage in lie-telling when it helped a friend, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour, a trend which was not found for Chinese Asian emerging adults. In fact, North American Asian emerging adults were even more likely to tell the truth when it helped a friend and less likely to tell a lie when it harmed a friend when the protagonist engaged in lie-telling behaviour. This illustrates North American Asians’ extra effort to protect a friend.

Secondly, North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults chose similar hypothetical behaviour taking into account how it impacted a friend, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour.
Thirdly, when comparing hypothetical engagement in lie-telling, both North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults were more likely to engage in lie-telling when it helped a friend than Chinese Asian emerging adults, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour.

Fourthly, all ethnicities equally chose to tell a lie and tell the truth when a friend was not directly impacted. Clearly, both North American Caucasian emerging adults and North American Asian emerging adults were choosing to behave according to a friend’s best interest, whereas Chinese Asian emerging adults were not. The similarities between North American ethnicities is most likely due to acculturation. Unfortunately, due to insufficient data it was not possible to make comparisons between Canadian immigrant generations.

The finding regarding the choice of the “other” option by participants for the moral behaviour question is quite significant. When selecting a behaviour to engage in, participants were given an option of “other” in case making a decision between telling a lie and telling the truth was too difficult. Although not included in the analyses, it was interesting to note that when an individual’s country or an individual’s friend were directly impacted, “other” was selected more often. In these instances, emerging adults clearly experienced a greater moral dilemma. On the one hand, they could decide to continue to behave morally and select being honest, but negate the best interest of their country or a friend. On the other hand, they could do what is in the best interest for their country or a friend and negate being honest. With emerging adults’ strong moral foundation (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014) and ability to rationalize, judge, and evaluate complex moral issues (Narvaez, Gleason, & Mitchell, 2010), the increased use of “other” was surprising. Perhaps personal experiences and perspective taking were overshadowing the moral standard of honesty causing greater difficulty making a decision in
these instances.

North American participants were asked to provide a reason for selecting “other” and the hypothetical behaviour was recoded. Although recoding did not drastically impact the findings, more behaviours were recoded as a lie than a truth. The decision to be loyal rather than honest was difficult to admit illustrating the importance placed on being honest, especially within a sports setting.

In summary, telling the truth was always favoured over telling a lie which illustrates the importance placed on behaving honestly, especially in sports. However, fewer emerging adults would hypothetically engage in telling the truth when it harmed their country or a friend and more emerging adults would hypothetically engage in telling a lie when it helped their country or a friend, regardless of the protagonist’s behaviour. Although engaging in lie-telling is morally wrong, loyalty provided a reason for hypothetically choosing to engage in this behaviour. However, cultural differences were found. Emerging adults from China were more likely to engage in lie-telling when it helped their country. Emerging adults from North America were more likely to engage in lie-telling when it helped a friend. Although frame-switching was considered, North American Asian emerging adults and North American Caucasian emerging adults hypothetically behaved more similarly than North American Asian emerging adults and Chinese Asian emerging adults for both the country collective stories and the individual stories. Behaviour was impacted by both loyalty and moral standards of honesty, even in the decision to not select a behaviour.

8.2 Making Sense of the Results

From this study it can be concluded that culture influences how emerging adults evaluate lie-telling when serious consequences involving international and national sporting events are
considered. Emerging adults from China based evaluations of questionable moral behaviour on whether it benefited the collective (i.e., their country). Emerging adults from North America based evaluations of questionable moral behaviour on whether it benefited the individual (i.e., a friend). The current study confirmed previous research (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2012; Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010) and built on previous research by confirming that individuals’ reason differently about lies that benefit different groups. In this section the results of the current study will be discussed based on how the findings add to previous research.

**8.2.1 Direct Benefits of Lie-Telling.** Previous research has focused on scenarios where individuals may be personally impacted by lie-telling or truth-telling making it difficult to differentiate between their individual interests and in-group/collective interests (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2010). For example, telling a lie to protect classmates from getting in trouble both benefits the in-group/collective (i.e., the class) as well as the individual because the reputation of the class is maintained allowing all students within the class to continue to be held in high regard. In addition, Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory includes school and friends within the microsystem, immediate settings with the most direct impact on an individual. Therefore, telling a lie to protect classmates will have the most direct impact on an individual due to the large amount of bi-directional interactions (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Although country is not incorporated as a setting in Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory, the macrosystem, the largest and most remote setting, incorporates national ideologies and establishments, which best represents an individual’s country. Therefore, telling a lie to protect a country collective would have the least direct impact on an individual according to
Bronfenbrenner (1979).

In Dmytro, Lo, O’Leary, Fu, Lee, and Cameron’s (2014) and Fu, Luo, Heyman, Wang, Cameron and Lee’s (2016) research, a further removed collective was incorporated. In these studies children and adolescents were asked about hiding a transgression through lie-telling for their class, school, or nation/country. The cultural differences found for the stories based on high school competitions involving the nation/country were of particular interest. These studies found that Chinese children and adolescents showed loyalty not just to the collectives with direct impact, but also to the broader, further removed collective (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2016). The current study confirmed that Chinese emerging adults showed a similar cultural influence in loyalty to a further removed collective, their country, which has the least direct impact on the individual.

8.2.2 Group Identification. Through the use of sporting events, the current study provided contexts that generally elicit strong feelings of group identification and pride. Typically, during the Olympics individuals will root for their country to excel within the competition and believe that the successes of the athletes are successes for their country. During National events, individuals will root for athletes they know (i.e., a friend) or enjoy watching, which adds a personal dimension to these sporting events and pride may result when the rooted for athlete succeeds. Although previous research did incorporate sporting events within scenarios (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2016), the larger scale sporting events within the current study would result in more serious consequences if transgressions are reported.

These more serious consequences with negative social ramifications could either provoke stronger group allegiances or greater moral superiority. Previous research has found that major transgressions are more likely to be reported as morality is developed through the awareness of
authority and punishment (Chiu Loke, Heyman, Forgie, McCarthy, & Lee, 2011; Chiu Loke, Heyman, Itakura, Toriyama, & Lee, 2014; Lapsley, 1996, 2006; Sugarman, 1987). The cultural differences in the current study confirmed that different collectives elicited different feelings of pride and in turn loyalty, with emerging adults from China having stronger allegiance to their country and emerging adults from North America having stronger allegiance to a friend. However, participants’ comments revealed that National events were considered a step towards the Olympics and telling the truth could also protect an individual athlete, particularly a friend. It was believed that a friend would face more serious consequences if they continued transgressing and authorities found out about the transgression later. Therefore, it is best to tell the truth earlier in order to stop the future transgressions in the more important and world-level sporting events. As emerging adult participants deeply thought about the stories it was revealed that truth-telling is not just about honesty, but also about allegiance, as keeping a friend safe was a concern illustrating the interpersonal commitment within friendship (Miller, 1984, 1994; Perkins & Turiel, 2007; Pontari & Schlenker, 2006).

**8.2.3 Emerging Adulthood.** By recruiting emerging adults, the current study expanded the field of research. Previous research has found that cultural differences regarding honesty and loyalty exist within child and adolescent populations from North America and China (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2010). The current study confirms that cultural differences regarding honesty and loyalty also exist within an emerging adult population. The transition from adolescence to early adulthood involves diminishing parental dependence and gaining responsibility (Jensen Arnett, 2015). The gaining of responsibility involves the established of careers, financial independence, and the forming of conjugal unions. Emerging adulthood is a unique period where individuals are becoming
independent, but have not fully immersed themselves in adult obligations (Jensen Arnett, 2015). This developmental period is marked by “yes, but *not yet*” thinking. During this period, individuals are known to expand their worldview by incorporating and questioning different perspectives (Arutyunova, Alexandrov, & Hauser, 2016; Jensen Arnett, 2015; Narvaez et al., 2010; Smetana et al., 2014). This is demonstrated in the current study as North American Asian emerging adults have changed their way of thinking by adopting Western individualistic values and not maintaining their parents’ Eastern collectivist values regarding loyalty and honesty.

**8.2.4 Comparing Lie-Telling and Truth-Telling.** Previous research evaluated lie-telling and truth-telling with stories that either helped a collective/in-group while harming an individual or helped an individual while harming a collective/in-group (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2012; Lee & Ross, 1997; Xu et al., 2010;). These stories, although uncovering cultural differences between children and adolescents from China and North America, presented an *either or* type of dilemma between a collective/in-group and an individual in terms of who to intentionally benefit. With Eastern culture considering the entire community as part of the collective/in-group, incorporating unassociated collectives would determine whether true loyalty for the in-group collective existed.

The current study still used stories with an *either or* type of dilemma, but the options were between groups of equal weighting, an in-group and an unassociated group. Therefore, in the country collective stories, two countries were considered (i.e., the participants’ country and a random country), and in the individual stories, two individuals were considered (i.e., a friend and a random athlete). To determine whether cultural trends were more about selecting the in-group/collective over the individual (or vice versa) or were more about showing loyalty, comparisons were made. Similar cultural influences were found as emerging adults from China
preferred to help their country and emerging adults from North America preferred to help a friend, illustrating that loyalty based on personal connection influences intentionality (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Lau et al., 2012; Lee & Ross, 1997; Xu et al., 2010). Furthermore, through using the individual stories as a control condition, emerging adults from China showed loyalty for the collective, their country, and not the individual, a friend, both in terms of evaluation (they rated lie-telling more positively for their country than a friend) and in terms of hypothetical behaviour (they were more likely to tell a lie to protect their country than a friend). Surprisingly, emerging adults from North America showed no specific loyalty group preference. Therefore, the willingness to lie for emerging adults from China is consistent with the collectivistic cultural perspective of maintaining in-group harmony (Bontempo et al., 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2003; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Suh, 2002). By providing participants with both a country collective story and an individual story, true group preferences could be discovered.

### 8.2.5 Acculturation through Immigration

Identification of cultural differences has been well researched, especially in terms of the individualism-collectivism contrast (Greenfield, 2000; Hofstede, 1980/1984, 1991/1997, 2011; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Triandis, 1972, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985; Triandis & Suh, 2002). Western societies (e.g., Canada and the United States) are individualistic and define good acts as those that are proactive and view personal interests, self-autonomy, and taking personal initiative as priorities in order to affirm the independent self (Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Lau et al, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Markus et al., 2006; Oyserman et al., 2002). While Eastern societies (e.g., China) are considered collectivist and define good acts as those accounting for group interests, national
pride, and group harmony in order to affirm the interdependent self (Bontempo et al., 1990; Echter, Kim, Kau, Li, Simmons, & Ward, 1998; Harkness, 2004; Helwig & Turiel, 2004; Lau et al., 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 2003; Triandis & Suh, 2002). The current study confirmed the individualism-collectivism contrast between emerging adults from China and emerging adults from North America, but also went one step further by comparing different ethnic communities within North America.

Through immigration, North America has become culturally plural (Berry, 1990; 1997; Kymlicka, 1995), with some immigrants assimilating to new cultural ideologies and others wanting to maintain cultural separation or obtain integration of multiple cultures. Previous research found that multicultural Canadian children held opinions that reflected both cultures, and when asked to evaluate lie-telling and truth-telling they alternated between cultural perspectives, a phenomenon referred to as frame-switching (Hong et al., 2000; Koh et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2012). These children were able to integrate multiple cultures through culture shedding and culture learning (Berry, 1992, 1997; Hofstede, 1991/1997). The current study found that multicultural North American emerging adults did not frame-switch, but rather had integrated into North American culture, even when immigrant generation was considered. Traits, such as the need to belong (Gambrel & Cianci, 2003; Hofstede, 1984), may account for why North American Asian emerging adults had more similar opinions and views to North American Caucasian emerging adults than to Chinese Asian emerging adults. Another reason could be that stories for these participants were based on their North American country, for which they may not feel loyalty. These rationales are further discussed in the section on future directions and limitations.
8.3 Implication

When individuals are asked whether they would tell a lie or tell the truth, their choice may not reflect what they believe to be right or wrong, but rather what the best outcome would be as a function of cultural values. Judging an act as morally right does not guarantee moral behaviour (Nisan, 1995). In fact, individuals allow room for moral deviations, such as lie-telling, but only if these deviations maintain their perceived acceptable level of morality (Nisan, 1995). An unexpected finding in the current study was the difficulty emerging adults experienced when selecting to either tell a lie or tell the truth when their country or a friend was transgressing. Lie-telling would help their country or friend, but would harm another country or athlete. Truth-telling would harm their country or friend, but would help another country or athlete. As both lie-telling and truth-telling would result in harm, it was difficult to decide which behaviour would be morally acceptable to engage in.

As indicated by Rest’s (1983, 1986, & 1994) four component model of morality, moral motivation is a key factor in how individuals view morality and decide to shape their behaviour according to society’s standards. Individuals need to consider which behaviour would produce the most ethical consequences, those that are morally best or those that will serve a gain, whether personal or out of loyalty (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011; Nisan, 1995; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, & 1994). Emerging adults were either unable to decide on the best behaviour or were unable to admit that they would be disloyal or dishonest. As participants were projecting what behaviour they would most likely engage in, it is hard to know with one hundred percent certainty what behaviour they would have actually engaged in or how they came to make that decision (i.e., what their motivations and rationalizations were). Making sense of moral violations based on fairness is clearly not easy, but is necessary to better understand the social world (Helwig, Tisak,
Adults have a strong moral foundation due to vast social experience and better understanding of social responsibility (Narvaez et al., 2010; Smetana et al., 2014), but emerging adults are commonly influenced by personal experiences (Narvaez, Radvansky, Lynchard, & Copeland, 2011; Pratt, Golding, & Kerig, 1987). Personal experiences that could be influencing decision-making include an individual’s relationship with others (e.g., friends, sports officials, athletes, or coaches), participation in national, international, or larger scale sporting events, and personal incidents of engaging in questionable moral behaviour resulting in serious consequences. In addition, as emerging adults most likely have never experienced a situation similar to that described in the current study’s stories (e.g., being questioned by an sports official with regards to an athlete’s eligibility due to a rumoured transgression), their moral schemas would not include the correct social problem solving to maintain moral standards causing a greater debate regarding how to behave (Lapsley, & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez et al., 2010). Considering personal experiences and debating never experienced situations allows individuals, specifically emerging adults, the opportunity to morally reason and rationalize before determining their moral position, the behaviour they would engage in, and the motivation for engaging in that behaviour.

8.4 Future Directions and Limitations

While the current study found cultural differences regarding lie-telling and truth-telling in sporting events and expanded previous research by exploring new directions, limitations in design and sampling also existed. Firstly, the fabricated stories surrounding Olympic and National sporting events were difficult for participants to relate to. Although there have been
many examples of questionable moral behaviour identified across a range of elite and professional sports, having a spectator know about these transgressions beforehand or even be questioned by a sports official is unlikely. Participants commented that is really none of the protagonist’s business to engage the sports official nor was it the protagonist’s role to report transgressions based on rumour, even though the stories clearly indicate that the protagonist has gained this knowledge before being confronted by the sports official (see Appendices A and B). In addition, participants commented that there was little to no risk to themselves when telling the truth as it would be difficult for the athlete to confirm who put them jeopardy by confirming the sports official’s suspicion of a transgression. When a friend was considered, truth-telling was even believed to be positive as a friend could get in more serious trouble later during a more important sporting event, such as the Olympics.

Participants also found the stories confusing. Not only did they miss the key piece of information about the protagonist being informed about the transgression, but they also did not respond/react when their country or friend was the secondary country or character in the story. As the secondary country or character were still impacted by the protagonist’s lie-telling or truth-telling, it was interesting that participants’ evaluations and engagement in lie-telling and truth-telling did not change. This could suggest a more universal “citizen of the world” perspective or perhaps the participants were not clearly reading the stories or considering the perspectives of the two different countries or the two different characters. As participation occurred online, participants were unable to express their opinions about the study or provide feedback regarding the stories.

Secondly, a between-subjects design was used rather than a within-subjects design. Using a within-subjects design would have allowed the same set of participants to provide their
opinions for both the country collective stories and the individual stories. It would be interesting
to see if an individual’s opinions and moral judgments differed and whether cultural differences
would continue to be found. However, a within-subjects design might create further
complications due to carryover effects since the stories are very similar between the two story
groups. Participants may also confuse the two story groups, especially if stories were not being
clearly read.

Thirdly, no measurement was given to determine an individual’s degree of individualism
and collectivism. Previous research has classified countries through an index value, which allows
for a better understanding of the dominant cultural values that best describe the social system of
the particular country (Hofstede, 1980/1984, 1991/1997, 2005). However, statements about
culture in general are not statements about individuals. Although a country’s culture will shape
an individual’s values, each individual could be incorporating both individualistic perspectives
and collectivistic perspectives into their values and knowing how much is important. In addition
to individuals having their own unique blend of individualism and collectivism, previous
research has indicated that countries can contain both individualist and collectivist cultural
elements in different combinations (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1995;
Triandis et al., 1986; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis & Suh, 2002).

Furthermore, previous research has found that China, which is mainly identified as a
collectivist culture, also has individualist values, especially within Mainland China (Cheung &
Kwok, 1998; Lau, 1992; Niles, 1998). This surge of individualist tendencies in Mainland China
is thought to be due to years of international exposure and urbanization (Chen, Cen, Li, & He,
2005; Fu, Brunet, Lv, Ding, Heyman, Cameron, & Lee, 2010; Helwig, Arnold, Tan, & Boyd,
2003). The hypothesis is that urbanization weakens the once-valued important attributes
associated with traditional Chinese culture, such as modest lie-telling (Chen et al., 2005; Fu et al., 2010). Furthermore, Chinese adolescents have been found to endorse individualistic concepts, such as personal autonomy and individual rights in decision-making process (Helwig et al., 2003). As young adults from China may value individualistic concepts, it would be extremely useful to know where they are on the spectrum of individualism and collectivism. In addition, many individuals from China who value individualism immigrant to individualistic countries such as Canada and the United States (Cheung & Kwok, 1998). Therefore, these individuals have already started assimilating to North American culture. This could explain why North American Asian emerging adults showed more similarity to North American Caucasian emerging adults than Chinese Asian emerging adults in the current study. Obtaining a measurement of individualism/collectivism would provide a more complete understanding of participants’ values and perspectives.

Fourthly, more detailed and specific background information needed to be obtained from participants. Having forced-choice selections for participants rather than open-ended questions would have allowed for specificity and easier establishment of participant groups. As the current study was cross-cultural, data was collected from three different countries (Canada, China, and the United States), which led to acquiring different background information depending on the country. For example, Canadian participants were asked to provide their country of origin as well as parental country of origin, information not obtained from American participants. Due to this difference in background information, Canadian participants were able to be grouped by immigrant generation whereas American participants were not. This led to a very small sample within each immigrant generation group making it difficult to come to conclusions about acculturation.
It would have also been useful to ask North American participants for the number of years they have lived in their respective countries and immigrant generation. Having this information would have provided a deeper discussion about ethnicity and potentially led to different findings and conclusions about ethnic similarities and differences. As well, it would have allowed for larger samples of participants to be obtained for the different groupings.

Socioeconomic status (SES) would have also been useful to obtain as previous research has found that moral violations are viewed differently based on SES (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Sachdeva et al., 2011). For example, disrespectful/disobedient behaviours and harm-based offensive behaviours (e.g., hitting) were viewed as equally bad by a low SES sample whereas a high SES sample did not view disrespectful/disobedient behaviours as a moral violation (Haidt et al., 1993). Perhaps participants in the current study with high SES did not view the stories as moral violations. This could have impacted their rationalizations and altered results, but without this information it is impossible to know.

Fifthly, adapting stories based on participants’ ethnicity or country of origin would have allowed for more impactful comparisons, especially between North American participants. The current study uses country and citizenship to investigate in-group loyalty. As three different ethnic groups are established, North American Caucasian, North American Asian, and Chinese Asian, altering story design could have led to a deeper analysis into ethnic differences. The specific concern is with the country used in the stories for North American Asian emerging adults. Currently, the study utilizes Canada or the United States as country of the protagonist who is engaging in morally questionable behaviour or is being directly affected by the morally questionable behaviour of another country. However, perhaps participants are not identifying with their North American country, thereby indicating a lack of loyalty to that country.
Specifically, individuals who have immigrated to North America or whose parents immigrated to North America may maintain loyalty to their country of origin. As similarities were found between North American ethnic groups, it would be interesting to change the stories to see whether the country provided in the story impacts loyalty and in turn lie-telling and truth-telling. Stories could be provided to some participants using Canada or the United States while other stories use China. Comparing responses to the different stories by North American Asian emerging adults could yield interesting findings related to acculturation.

Finally, participants were only asked about the behaviour they would engage in and were not required to actually act on the behaviour. Moral people, even those who sincerely value morality, often fail to act morally and blatantly disregard moral principles even in low pressure situations (Batson & Thompson, 2001). Therefore, it is unknown if the participants in the current study would have acted with the behaviour they indicated. Participants were asked to make a moral decision, but moral decision-making incorporates both the judgment of proper behaviour and the decision to behave in this manner (Nisan, 1995; Rest, 1979, 1983, 1986, & 1994). By not being asked to actually act on behaviour, it is unclear what true motivations for lie-telling would be. Children from both China and the U.S. have reported both self-serving and prosocial motivations for telling a lie (Sweet, Heyman, Fu, & Lee, 2010; Xu, et al., 2010).

Being part of a collectivist culture does not guarantee that group needs come first for all individuals. Adults from Korea and the U.S. were found to report different reasons to explain lie-telling and truth-telling where neither group used one reason consistently as motivations and reasoning were related to behavioural intentions (Choi, Park, & Oh, 2011). With participants being asked to hypothetically engage in lie-telling or truth-telling it is unknown what their actual intentions and motivations would be. Having participants take part and actually engage in
behaviours and provide rationalizations would have provided greater insights into why cultural differences occurred (assuming that cultural differences would have been found).

An important direction for future research is to gain a better understanding of why individuals would tell a lie and whether individuals are acting out of their own volition to help others. The current study bases motivation around loyalty. Previous research has also found modesty and familiarity are motivators for lie-telling behaviour (Cameron, Lau, Fu, & Lee, 2012; Fu, Lee, Cameron, & Xu, 2001; Genyue, Heyman, & Lee, 2010; Heyman, Itakura, & Lee, 2010; Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Lee, Xu, Fu, Cameron, & Chen, 2001; Miller & Bersoff, 1994; Sachdeva et al., 2011). The stories in the current study are meant to elicit loyalty by participants as the basis for their decisions. However, participants’ decisions could be motivated by other factors or values (e.g., the strict adherence to rules). Having explanations from participants would allow for a better understanding of their actual motivations.

Another important direction for the future research is to explore generational differences. Previous research has found age-related distinctions in children and adolescents with regards to cultural differences for lie-telling and truth-telling (Cameron et al., 2012; Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Lau et al., 2012; Lee et al., 1997; Xu et al., 2010). Perhaps age-related distinctions would also be found amongst adults. An adult’s rationalizations of moral issues change with age as older adults provide more varied and extensive rationalizations due to a well-developed cognitive framework of moral issues, personal experience facing issues of morality, and education (Narvaez, 1998; Narvaez et al., 2010; Pratt, Golding, Hunger, & Norris, 1988; Pratt et al., 1987). Conducting future research with different aged adult populations or across the lifespan (e.g., children, adolescents, young adults, middle-aged adults, and older adults) would not only allow moral generational differences to be uncovered, but also cultural
generational differences.

8.5 Conclusion

The current study demonstrates that cultural differences exist when taking into account emerging adults’ perceptions of lie-telling and truth-telling when a serious consequence is considered. Consistent with prior research there is a divide between Eastern cultural perspectives and Western cultural perspectives regarding loyalty and honesty (Dmytro et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2010). Emerging adults from China showed collectivist tendencies by maintaining in-group harmony whereas emerging adults from North America showed individualistic tendencies by focusing on the individual rather than the in-group. Surprisingly, all emerging adults from North America, both Caucasian and Asian, showed these tendencies, illustrating that these two ethnicities are more similar than they are different. However, more research is needed to further explore acculturation within North America. From this study, it can be concluded that honesty is not black and white, but a large grey area exists, even in situations where right and wrong should be clearly defined. In addition, loyalty is prioritized over honesty when loyalty for an in-group/collective or an individual is considered.

In Chapter One an example was provided regarding the Beijing Summer Olympic Games, where news reports were drastically different between China and North America with China supporting their suspected athletes. The question was asked whether North American countries would also be supportive of their suspected athletes. Based on the results of the current study, it is unlikely that North Americans would support their suspected athletes.
References


146


Appendix A: Country Collective Story Examples by Story Type

**Please note that these examples were used for Canadian participants. Participants from the United States and China received the same stories, but references to Canada was replaced with the participant’s country.**

Patriotic Story:
1. Joshua is Canadian and is quite a gymnastics fan. He was very happy and excited because he was able to go to the Olympics to watch Canada compete against Australia in the gymnastics floor exercises. Before the competition, Joshua found out that contestant number three from the Canadian team was too young to be in the Olympics, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number three won the Olympics floor exercises against the Australian contestant. Right after the competition ended, Joshua ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Joshua: “Contestant number three from the Canadian team is awesome, but looks kind of young. Is he really old enough to compete in the Olympics?” Joshua thought to himself:

   1) If I say he is old enough, I would have to lie; but the Canadian team will look really good to have won this Olympic gymnastics event.
   2) If I say he is too young to be in the Olympics, I would not have to lie; but he will be disqualified and make the Canadian team look bad to the rest of the world.

Joshua thought about it for a moment, and answered: “No, he is not really old enough to be in the Olympics.”

a. Is what Joshua said good or bad? (circle one number below)

   1 very very bad
   2 very bad
   3 a little bad
   4 not good
   5 a little not good
   6 very good
   7 very very good

b. Why did you give this rating? ______________________________________________________
____________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? _____Lie _____Truth _____Other
(If ‘other’, please explain)_________________________________________________________________

2. Michelle is Canadian and quite a gymnastics fan. She was very happy and excited because she was able to go to the Olympics to watch Canada compete against Australia in the gymnastics vault event. Before the competition, Michelle found out that contestant number two from the Canadian team was too young to be in the Olympics, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number two won the Olympics vault event against the Australian contestant. Right after the competition ended, Michelle ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Michelle: “Contestant number two from the Canadian team is awesome, but looks kind of young. Is she really old enough to compete in the Olympics?” Michelle thought to herself:

   1) If I say she is old enough, I would have to lie; but the Canadian team will look really
good to have won this Olympic gymnastics event.
2) If I say she is too young to be in the Olympics, I would not have to lie; but she will be disqualified and make the Canadian team look bad to the rest of the world.

Michelle thought about it for a moment, and answered: “Yes, she is old enough to compete in the Olympics.”

a. Is what Michelle said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>a little bad</td>
<td>not good bad</td>
<td>a little good</td>
<td>very good</td>
<td>very very good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? ______________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? _____Lie    _____Truth    _____Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)_________________________________________________________

Other Story:
1. Christopher is an Australian who is quite a fan of track and field events. He was very happy and excited because he was able to go to the Olympics to watch Australia compete against Canada in the 400 meter sprint track and field event. Before the competition, Christopher found out that contestant number four from the Australian team had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number four won the Olympics 400 meter sprint event against Canada. Right after the competition ended, Christopher ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Christopher: “Contestant number four from the Australian team is really amazing. Have you heard that he is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Christopher thought to himself:

1) If I say he is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but the Australian team will look really good to have won this Olympic track and field event.
2) If I say he is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but he will be disqualified and make the Australian team look bad to the rest of the world.

Christopher thought about it for a moment, and answered: “Yes, he is taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Christopher said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>a little bad</td>
<td>not good bad</td>
<td>a little good</td>
<td>very good</td>
<td>very very good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? ______________________________________________________

____________________________________________________
c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? ______Lie ______Truth ______Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)_________________________________________________________

2. Anna is an Australian who is quite a fan of track and field events. She was very happy and excited because she was able to go to the Olympics to watch Australia compete against Canada in the 400 meter hurdles track and field event. Before the competition, Anna found out that contestant number five from the Australian team had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number five won the Olympics 400 meter hurdles event against Canada. Right after the competition ended, Anna ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Anna: “Contestant number five from the Australian team is really amazing. Have you heard that she is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Anna thought to herself:

1) If I say she is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but the Australian team will look really good to have won this Olympic track and field event.
2) If I say she is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but she will be disqualified and make the Australian team look bad to the rest of the world.

Anna thought about it for a moment, and answered: “No, she is not taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Anna said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>a little bad</td>
<td>not good</td>
<td>a little good</td>
<td>very good</td>
<td>very very good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? ______________________________________________________

______________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? ______Lie ______Truth ______Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)_________________________________________________________

Irrelevant Story:
1. Jacob is an Australian who is quite a swimming fan. He was very happy and excited because he was able to go watch Australia and Great Britain compete in the 200 meter butterfly swimming event in the Olympics. Before the competition, Jacob found out that contestant number two from the Australian team was not really an Australian citizen, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number two from Australia won the Olympics 200 meter butterfly event against Great Britain. Right after the competition ended, Jacob ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Jacob: “Contestant number two from the Australian team is fantastic. Is he really an Australian citizen?” Jacob thought to himself:

1) If I say he is an Australian citizen, I would have to lie; but the Australian team will look really good to have won this Olympic swimming event.
If I say he is not really an Australian citizen, I would not have to lie; but he will be disqualified and make the Australian team look bad to the rest of the world.

Jacob thought about it for a moment, and answered: “No, he is not really an Australian citizen.”

a. Is what Jacob said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 very very bad</th>
<th>2 very bad</th>
<th>3 a little bad</th>
<th>4 not good</th>
<th>5 a little good</th>
<th>6 very good</th>
<th>7 very very good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? ______________________________________________________

______________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? ______Lie ______Truth ______Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)________________________________________________________________

Katherine is an Australian who is quite a swimming fan. She was very happy and excited because she was able to go watch Australia and Great Britain compete in the 200 meter backstroke swimming event in the Olympics. Before the competition, Katherine found out that contestant number four from the Australian team was not really an Australian citizen, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number four won the Olympics 200 meter swimming event against Great Britain. Right after the competition ended, Katherine ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Katherine: “Contestant number four from the Australian team is fantastic. Is she really an Australian citizen?” Katherine thought to herself:

1) If I say she is an Australian citizen, I would have to lie; but the Australian team will look really good to have won this Olympic swimming event.

2) If I say she is not really an Australian citizen, I would not have to lie; but she will be disqualified and make the Australian team look bad to the rest of the world.

Katherine thought about it for a moment, and answered: “Yes, she is an Australian citizen.”

a. Is what Katherine said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 very very bad</th>
<th>2 very bad</th>
<th>3 a little bad</th>
<th>4 not good</th>
<th>5 a little good</th>
<th>6 very good</th>
<th>7 very very good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? ______________________________________________________

______________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? _____Lie _____Truth _____Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)________________________________________________________________
Appendix B: Individual Story Examples by Story Type

**Please note that these examples were used for Canadian participants. Participants from the United States and China received the same stories, but references to Canada was replaced with the participant’s country.**

**Friend Story:**
1. Christopher is a Canadian who is quite a fan of gymnastics. He was very happy and excited because he was able to go to the Canadian National gymnastics competition to see who will make the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team. Christopher made it just in time to see his best friend compete against contestant number four in the gymnastics floor exercise. Before the competition, Christopher found out that his best friend had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, his best friend won the floor exercise and a spot in the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team against contestant number four. Right after the competition ended, Christopher ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Christopher: “Your friend is really amazing. Have you heard that he is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Christopher thought to himself:

   1) If I say he is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but my best friend will look really good to have won a spot on the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team.

   2) If I say he is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but he will be disqualified and make himself look bad to the rest of the Canada.

Christopher thought about it for a moment, and answered: “Yes, he is taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Christopher said good or bad? (circle one number below)

   1  2  3  4  5  6  7
   very very very a little not good a little very very very
   bad bad bad not bad good good good

b. Why did you give this rating? ______________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? _____Lie   _____Truth   _____Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)______________________________________________________________

2. Anna is a Canadian who is quite a fan of gymnastics. She was very happy and excited because she was able to go to the Canadian National gymnastics competition to see who will make the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team. Anna made it just in time to see her best friend compete against contestant number two in the gymnastics vault event. Before the competition, Anna found out that her best friend had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, her best friend won the vault event and a spot in the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team against contestant number two. Right after the competition ended, Anna ran into the referee and they started talking. The
referee said to Anna: “Your friend is really amazing. Have you heard that she is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Anna thought to herself:

1) If I say she is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but my best friend will look really good to have won a spot on the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team.
2) If I say she is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but she will be disqualified and make herself look bad to the rest of the Canada.

Anna thought about it for a moment, and answered: “No, she is not taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Anna said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very very bad</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>a little bad</td>
<td>not good</td>
<td>a little good</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>very very good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? __________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? _____ Lie _____ Truth _____ Other

(If ‘other’, please explain) ____________________________________________________________

Other Story:

Matthew is a Canadian who is quite a fan of gymnastics. He was very happy and excited because he was able to go to the Canadian National gymnastics competition to see who will make the Canadian Olympics gymnastics team. Matthew made it just in time to see contestant number two compete against his best friend in the gymnastics vault event. Before the competition, Matthew found out that contestant number two had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number two won the vault event and a spot in the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team against his best friend. Right after the competition ended, Matthew ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Matthew: “Contestant number two is really amazing. Have you heard that he is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Matthew thought to himself:

1) If I say he is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but contestant number two will look really good to have won a spot on the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team.
2) If I say he is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but he will be disqualified and make himself look bad to the rest of the Canada.

Matthew thought about it for a moment, and answered: “No, he is not taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Matthew said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very very bad</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>a little bad</td>
<td>not good</td>
<td>a little good</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>very very good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Why did you give this rating? ________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? ______Lie ______Truth ______Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)________________________________________________________________________

2. Julia is a Canadian who is quite a fan of gymnastics. She was very happy and excited because she was able to go to the Canadian National gymnastics competition to see who will make the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team. Julia made it just in time to see contestant number four compete against her best friend in the gymnastics floor exercise. Before the competition, Julia found out that contestant number four had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number four won the floor exercise and a spot in the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team against her best friend. Right after the competition ended, Julia ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Julia: “Contestant number four is really amazing. Have you heard that she is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Julia thought to herself:

1) If I say she is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but contestant number four will look really good to have won a spot on the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team.

2) If I say she is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but she will be disqualified and make herself look bad to the rest of the Canada.

Julia thought about it for a moment, and answered: “Yes, she is taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Julia said good or bad? (circle one number below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very very bad</td>
<td>very bad</td>
<td>a little bad</td>
<td>not good</td>
<td>a little good</td>
<td>very good</td>
<td>very very good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? ________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? ______Lie ______Truth ______Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)________________________________________________________________________

Irrelevant Story:

1. Nicholas is a Canadian who is quite a fan of gymnastics. He was very happy and excited because he was able to go to the Canadian National gymnastics competition to see who will make the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team. Nicholas made it just in time to see contestant number four compete against contestant number five in the gymnastics floor exercise. Before the competition, Nicholas found out that contestant number four had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have
been disqualified. Later, contestant number four won the floor exercise and a spot in the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team against contestant number five. Right after the competition ended, Nicholas ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Nicholas: “Contestant number four is really amazing. Have you heard that he is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Nicholas thought to himself:

1) If I say he is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but contestant number four will look really good to have won a spot on the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team.
2) If I say he is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but he will be disqualified and make himself look bad to the rest of the Canada.

Nicholas thought about it for a moment, and answered: “Yes, he is taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Nicholas said good or bad? (circle one number below)

1 very very very a little not good a little very very very
2 bad bad bad not bad good good good

b. Why did you give this rating? __________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? _____Lie _____Truth _____Other

(If ‘other’, please explain) ______________________________________________________________

2.
Amy is a Canadian who is quite a fan of gymnastics. She was very happy and excited because she was able to go to the Canadian National gymnastics competition to see who will make the Canadian Olympics gymnastics team. Amy made it just in time to see contestant number two compete against contestant number six in the gymnastics vault event. Before the competition, Amy found out that contestant number two had been taking performance-enhancing drugs that were not detectable, and should have been disqualified. Later, contestant number two won the vault event and a spot in the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team against contestant number six. Right after the competition ended, Amy ran into the referee and they started talking. The referee said to Amy: “Contestant number two is really amazing. Have you heard that she is taking performance-enhancing drugs?” Amy thought to herself:

1) If I say she is not taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would have to lie; but contestant number two will look really good to have won a spot on the Canadian Olympic gymnastics team.
2) If I say she is taking performance-enhancing drugs, I would not have to lie; but she will be disqualified and make herself look bad to the rest of the Canada.

Amy thought about it for a moment, and answered: “No, she is not taking performance-enhancing drugs.”

a. Is what Amy said good or bad? (circle one number below)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Very Bad</th>
<th>Very Bad</th>
<th>A Little Bad</th>
<th>Not Good</th>
<th>A Little Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Very Very Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>very very</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>very</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>a little</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>not good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>a little</td>
<td>good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>very</td>
<td>good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>very very</td>
<td>good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Why did you give this rating? __________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

c. Would you lie or tell the truth in this situation? _____ Lie _____ Truth _____ Other

(If ‘other’, please explain)____________________________________________________________