THE MARGINAL URBAN SECTOR:
SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
IN LIMA, PERU

Hubert Campfens*

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*Faculty of Social Work
Wilfrid Laurier University

Centre for Urban and Community Studies
University of Toronto
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1. Introduction

Experiences in addressing the basic community and human needs of shanty-town dwellers in the context of the urban and economic crisis facing Latin American countries, indicate that a fundamental change is called for in:

- development policies and plans of government and the private sector;
- the methodology of intervention in community activities and development;
- the nature and use of technical, human and material resources; and
- the control exercised over the process of establishing priorities and decisions made on the use of resources, that aim at improving living conditions and quality of life of the marginal urban population sectors.

In those instances where popular urban organizations have emerged to deal collectively and autonomously with their survival needs, governments have traditionally tended to ignore, coopt or repress such dynamic popular movements at a heavy economic and social cost.

This paper focusses on Peru and analyzes the new emergency and development plans and programs introduced in recent years by the national government and the municipality of Metropolitan Lima, from the perspective of the above-mentioned dimensions for fundamental change. Particular attention will be given to how popular participation is built into government plans and programs and how human resources are mobilized. As part of the municipal scene, the paper will include a brief analysis of the "barrio" movement and NGO Centres of social promotion, development and research as two other major actors besides national and municipal government. In closing, various alliances between these four major actors will be examined for their major characteristics and impact on the marginal sector of the population.

This analysis forms part of a larger research project carried out in Mexico, Colombia and Peru from June 1985 until September 1986. A central part of that project consisted of an in-depth study of two shanty-towns in each of the three countries selected as representative cases that would permit a more thorough assessment of the interactions that unfold between government policies and practices, voluntary agency initiatives and local popular community organizations.
Apart from systematic interviews conducted by experienced students from participating Universities on a sample of barrio dwellers and leaders, the researcher himself lived for a short period in the two Lima shantytowns of Villa El Salvador and Villa Ventura, selected as examples for the study on Peru. Albeit limited, the experience served to gain the trust of barrio dwellers who invited him to visit their homes and participate in their community activities. It also helped the study to obtain a more accurate picture of the extent of transformation at the grass-roots as a result of the various initiatives undertaken.

In the analysis of government policies and programs for this paper, the researcher relied on data derived from interviews with highly-placed officials, studies from independent research centres and a review of other literature.

The project was financed by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and Wilfrid Laurier University. Two finished papers on this work have been accepted for publication in Latin American journals. One deals with survival characteristics of the marginal urban population in Mexico City,¹ and the other on violence in a state of social and political crisis in Peru.² A third, on the struggle of settlement and land tenancy in Mexico City,³ is available from the author.

In grasping the severity of the growing phenomenon of urban social marginality and survival, the present paper will begin by highlighting some dimensions of poverty.

2. Dimensions of Urban Poverty

2.1 Land and Housing

The marginal urban barrios in Peru and particularly in Metropolitan Lima have increased in a chaotic and alarming way over the last two to three decades. Two factors are singled out by independent studies⁴ as principal causes of this phenomenon; namely the country's existing centralism in economic policies, and the monopoly of the private sector over the urban uses of land.

The capital region became the focal point of unprecedented migration from the interior, placing such pressures on the urban housing market that prices began to sky-rocket well beyond the means of the poor. Those with limited economic means who lived in the inner city and the new arrivals
from Peru's depressed rural regions were forced to resort to the illegal practice of invading unoccupied land, frequently assisted by those owners of large land holdings around the capital who have profited enormously from these invasions. This has become the principal model of urban development throughout this period.

There are actually about 1,000 "Pueblos Jovenes" or poor shanty-towns which have been formed in this way, lacking those services necessary to meet basic human needs. Combined, these alone constitute 37% of the total population of Metropolitan Lima which, with an estimated 6 million people, harbours close to a third of the nation's population (20.2 million). Furthermore, 44.7% of the total marginal urban population of Peru is concentrated in Lima, residing in these "Pueblos Jovenes" or "Urbanizaciones Populares". The latter are barrios that formed some 20 to 30 years ago, similar to the current "Pueblos Jovenes", but which differ from them in having obtained urban status and a basic infrastructure with water, a sanitation system, roads and electrification.

Apart from the current deficit of approximately 500,000 houses, 20,000 additional families are in search of housing each year. Not being able to meet adequate conditions in the private market, poor people will take advantage of the first opportunity to tie-up their straw matting and plant their flag wherever they can locate an open space in the city or in the desert area surrounding Lima, claiming thereby their constitutional right to housing. If they may be able to circumvent the constant harassments of police and the military in being forced off the land, they still have to deal with the sharp increases in cost of housing materials for self-help construction upon which they have to rely. A bag of cement in 1984 had increased 13 times over what it cost in 1979; bricks, 300 times; while the installation of a simple domestic water system cost 11 times the legal minimum wage ($32 U.S./month in October 1985).

In the meantime the migratory flow towards Lima goes on unabated. New figures released by the national institute of statistics in May 1986 presented a rather disturbing picture with a dramatic increase in migration implying an anticipated acceleration in new land invasions. Many homes, which a few months earlier had 4 to 6 members, in May 1986 counted as many as 14 to 16 persons, especially those in "Pueblos Jovenes". Migrants are
reported to communicate to their families and friends back home mistaken
versions of new government policies and programs that give away land,
create new jobs, distribute food, and facilitate the establishment of new
small businesses.’

2.2 Water
In addition to the continuing crisis in housing there is the problem
of potable water. For example, the northern and eastern sectors of Lima,
where 30% of the capital’s population resides, lack a water system. People
in those regions receive their water supply through water tanks trucked
into the communities. They consume an average low of 20 litres a day com­
pared to the 600 litres a day consumed by 50% of Lima’s population served
through a regular installed water system. In those marginal zones of the
city, such as Villa El Salvador where waterlines have been installed, there
still is no water service in many areas during the day due to low water
pressures. This forces barrio dwellers who are blessed with water tanks to
rise during the night in order to take advantage of restored pressure and
fill them for use in the daytime.

Besides the problem of lack of availability of water for large sectors
of the population, unequal distribution, and water pressure, there is the
problem of loss and contamination through leaks in the watermain. Many
projects have been approved to address these problems but don’t get carried
out because of financing difficulties and priorities set by SEDAPAL, the
national authority responsible for water provision, 8 that usually neglect
the marginal urban communities.

2.3 Income and Prices
The inverse relationship in income and prices of consumer goods has
impacted strongly on living conditions, pauperizing larger and larger
sectors of the population. Taking as an indicator those fortunate enough
to have adequate employment, and 1979 as the base year, real incomes had
fallen 34% by 1984. Real incomes had already dropped 36% in the preceding
5 years. On the other hand, 1985 costs to the consumer in relation to the
"basic family basket" increased at a dizzying ten times the 1980 price.
On the approximately 38% of the basic family basket devoted to food and drinks, prices increased 136% in 1983 and 102% in 1984. Similar increases occurred in clothing, medical and health services, transportation, education, recreational activities, etc. For those 60-70% of the population earning less than the minimum wage essential for subsistence, the impact of inflation was even more dramatic and intolerable.

While the Garcia government during its first year was able to slow down the inflationary rate and allowed for some gains in salaries and wages in line with inflation, the inverse relationship between income and consumer good prices did not improve.

2.4 Health and Mortality

The incidence of tuberculosis, typhoid and malaria is on the increase again in Peru where ten years ago such cases were rarely found. The 1984 Census on Villa El Salvador, a large marginal community of Lima, found that 3 in 24 families had a T.B. patient. Gastrointestinal infections at 21% and respiratory diseases at 23% were found to be the most common causes of child mortality. The former are directly related to the water situation, inadequate sanitation and health practices; and the latter to desert conditions, high humidity levels with the proximity of Lima to the Pacific coast combined with high levels of air pollution.

Population data for 1983 show that child mortality for Peru, at 95 per 1000 live births, is among the highest in the world (see Table 1). Most of the deaths among children occur below the age of one, registering 32% of all deaths in 1983 and 45% for the age group from birth up to and including age four (see Table 2). Maternal deaths count a high of 31.8% of live births according to 1976 data, against 20.4% for neighbouring Ecuador, 6.8% for Venezuela and 0.7% for Switzerland.

Many of the child deaths caused by infectious diseases, according to a 1980 World Bank report, could have been prevented through an effective policy in public health, water service and sanitation. However, expenditures for public health in real terms stagnated throughout the 1970’s and declined on a per-capita basis and as a share of government recurrent expenditures. And as pointed out earlier, many deficiencies in the State agency SEDAPAL caused an abominable service in water and sanitation.
TABLE 1

Estimated Child Mortality Rates for Peru and Selected Countries, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate per 1000 Live Births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Population Reference Bureau Inc. 1983 World Population Data Sheet

TABLE 2

Proportional Mortality by Age Grouping, Peru, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198,200*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 yr.</td>
<td>65,455</td>
<td>33.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>11.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 14</td>
<td>8,290</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 64</td>
<td>60,880</td>
<td>30.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>35,675</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Boletin de Analisis de Demografia, No. 25 INE, LIMA, 1983

* Approximate 1983 population for Peru: 19 million
Child births continue to be high with 37/1000 of the population for 1983, although much lower than the 1960 rate of 48.5/1000. In comparison with other Latin American countries, Peru is surpassed only by Bolivia (43/1000) and Ecuador (41/1000) but is significantly higher than Cuba (14/1000). The Latin American average is 31 births per 1000 population.

With regard to life expectancy, Peru with 59 falls well behind Cuba (72) and Switzerland (75). The Latin American average is 64.

2.5 Malnutrition

The strong upward trend in infant morbidity and mortality has been interpreted as an indirect measure of malnutrition, since malnourished children are too weak to fight off diseases effectively. Therefore, findings of studies on malnourishment in Peru have been a great cause for alarm, particularly by the new municipal government of Lima.

### TABLE 3

| % of Malnutrition in Children Less than 6 years, Peru |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Total           | First Degree    | Second          | Third*          |
| 43.3            | 34.6            | 7.7             | 1.0             |

Source: Instituto de Nutricion, 1975-76

* First degree - 11-25% malnourished in diet  
  Second - 26-40%  
  Third - 41% and more

Forty-three percent of children under 6 were found to be malnourished (see Table 3). Most of these were of first degree which means that they suffered a nutritional deficiency of 11 to 25%. Close to 9% of the Peruvian child population, though, registered an extreme malnutrition of 26% or more. These figures conform with the 1984 census on one of Lima's large poor settlements13 which also showed 43% of all children to be malnourished. However, the disturbing finding of that study was that no less than 13% were extremely deficient in nutritive diet, with most of the third degree. Certainly, malnutrition of these proportions has become one of the strongest indicators of marginality experience by the poor.
The most effective long-term measure to improve the nutritional situation, as recommended by a 1980 report of the World Bank, is accelerated income growth through more productive employment and basic needs programs in education, health, and housing, which would release certain portions of disposable income to be spent on food and other essential items. This, of course, presupposes a high priority given by government to employment and agricultural production.

In addition, the World Bank report suggested that considerable short-term improvement could be made by specific initiatives targeted on the extremely poor, particularly through community self-help approaches as reflected in subsequent program developments discussed in this paper. Location of low-cost food operations and facilities in low-income areas is a critical factor in such a policy, both to reach the target population effectively and to discourage use by higher income people, thereby keeping the program cost-effective. Together with health centres, these food programs could serve as important elements of a comprehensive system of primary health care.

2.6 Conclusion

The Comedores Populares (popular kitchens) which emerged in great numbers across the metropolitan region of Lima since the late seventies (estimated at 900 by August 1986) formed one of the organizational vehicles to which thousands of women turned, with the help of voluntary domestic and international agencies, in order to help their families survive.

Based on its analysis of the deteriorating situation, the new municipal government of Metropolitan Lima (elected in November, 1983) decided to align itself with the struggle of the popular sector for survival. That government took as its point of departure the right of children to health, growth and normal development, and their need for protection against malnutrition and death. Concretely, this translated into the introduction of a highly successful "Vaso de Leche" (glass of milk) program and support for the "Comedores Populares" as part of a general emergency program. An integral part of these so-called "Survival Programs" was the pursuit of a strategy for local participation in their organization and execution.
Similarly, the new national government elected in July, 1985 responded to this general condition with a series of short-term emergency and medium-range development plans and programs which relied on popular participation. These included a temporary make-work program as a form of income assistance (PAIT); a community development program relying largely on voluntary labour (Cooperacion Popular); and a program of direct assistance (PAD) to local community organizations such as Comedores Populares and cooperatives that would generate income producing jobs.

Some of these major social policy and program initiatives will be examined in greater detail. However, we will first highlight briefly the political and economic shifts that have occurred since the late sixties that explain the spate of new social policy and program development introduced in recent years.

3. Political and Economic Background

In April 1986 the national government formed by the social democratic APRA party, unveiled a series of short- and medium-range community-based socio-economic plans and policies as part of a national plan of development. It was an attempt to address in an integrated and planned fashion the widespread problems and needs of the marginal urban and rural sectors of the population.

This was not the first time, though, that a Peruvian government has attempted to deal with the social and economic inequalities in this country. The populist-oriented military regime of General Velasco, in power from 1968-75, searched for a third option to the capitalist/modernization and communist options, attracting to his government elements of both the left and right. His political and policy platform was essentially utopian and authoritarian, introducing land reform, cooperative programs, and a national system of social mobilization (SINAMOS). The latter program aimed to develop urban neighbourhood organizations, particularly in the rapidly growing shanty-towns, with the State providing resource assistance for community services and facilities.

Through this set of populist reform programs Velasco hoped to remove the sharp divisions between the social classes and thereby reduce the social tensions that had plagued the country for some time. These reforms
though, were nothing like those introduced by the current Allan Garcia regime. By their lack of a planned and integrated approach and by their authoritarian imposition, they generated new contradictions leading eventually to massive protest movements and the fall of Velasco, replaced by General Bermudez, a far rightist in orientation.

The new military regime, ruling from 1975-1979, pursued a capitalist/modernization policy and used repressive measures in dealing with the restless popular classes. The economic policies, following the guidelines established by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), produced a dynamic of recession, inflation and devaluation of currency that in turn resulted in growing unemployment and lower standards of living. And by expelling leftist elements from his military government Bermudez was instrumental in leftist parties becoming aligned at the grass roots level with the discontented, unattended marginal urban and rural sectors of the population, growing in popularity, and eventually becoming unified in 1980 as the United Left alliance (Izquierda Unida).

Continuing popular demonstrations and labour strikes forced democratic elections upon the Bermudez regime. These brought to power the liberal capitalist-oriented "Accion Popular" party of Terry Belaunde, who introduced a much publicized popular cooperation program ("Cooperacion Popular") that through locally initiated community development and self-help schemes was to address the poverty among the marginal sectors of society. With little capital and resource investment going into this program (relying basically on voluntary manual labour) and lacking an integrated development plan, it did little to meet the pressing needs of an increasingly pauperized population which had already been suffering for several years the effects of an austerity program forced upon the government by the IMF as a condition for receiving further loans for its modernization policies.

And thus the policies of both the military regime of Bermudez and the so called liberal democratic government of Belaunde, in their intent and results, had made a mockery of the principles of democracy, equality and social justice. The ruling classes in collaboration with international capitalist interests manifested gross abuses, engaged in corrupt practices, and exercised their liberties at the expense of the vast majority of the population. Unemployment in the non-farming sector passed from 8.1% in
1975 to 16.4% ten years later in 1984; while in the same period underemployment had increased from 25% to 53%.

Table 4 shows the dramatic changes that occurred in two year intervals over the 10 year period of the two governments.

Not surprisingly the Sendero Luminoso Maoist style revolutionary movement had already declared war on the State in 1980. The United Left party headed by its moderate leader Barrantes gained control over the municipal government of Metropolitan Lima through democratic elections in November 1983 introducing the popular "Vaso de Leche" program (glass of milk) and other social and community programs. And the social-democratic APRA party assumed power at the national level in July, 1985 with 50% of electoral support, on a political platform that was decidedly anti-IMF, nationalistic and for more social justice.
TABLE 4

Occupational Changes of the Economically Active Population (EAP) in the non-farming sector: 1975-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAP Total(^a)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed(^b)</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underemployed(^c)</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequately employed(^d)</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^a\) EAP includes all persons of 14 years of age and over who are working or actively searching work, desire to obtain employment and have done something about it to acquire it.

\(^b\) Those officially registered persons who have no employment in the formal sector of the economy but are actively seeking work. This category does not include the % who have given up searching, discouraged by ever encountering work in the formal labour market, and most of whom are incorporated in the "underemployed" category.

\(^c\) All those in the non-farming sector who work 35 hours/wk or less, who like to work more hours, and/or receive less than the legal minimum wage whether as mechanics, cleaners or parking lot attendants, etc. This category also includes all those active in the "informal sector" as street-vendors, self-employed, micro enterprises etc., many of whom may work long hours to earn subsistence income.

"Informal" work encompasses diverse factors, such as:

- the type of work agreement drawn up that is rarely laid down in written contract;
- the relation with the State marked by habitual laxeness for deliberate negligence in observing the norms of labour legislation whereby taxes and social security contributions are avoided;
- the loose organization of work without a fixed time schedule and definite workdays;
- etc.

\(^d\) Persons who receive income through work equal to or more than the legally established minimum wage. The minimum wage assumes that income is superior to what a family requires to subsist.
I. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES

I.1 Short-Range Emergency Plan and Medium-Range Marginal-Urban Development Plan

The overall objectives of the two new plans introduced in April 1986 by the APRA government are:

- To recover and improve the quality of life and productive capacity of the marginal urban sectors of the population.

- To increase and improve the basic services of their settlement areas, encouraging organization, and participation of the local population with the assistance of the State.

- To decentralize development policies and programs giving priority to marginal rural sectors in the interior of the country, thereby hoping to stem the continuing flow of migration to the cities.

A multi-sectoral Commission and a Direct Assistance Program (PAD) were set up within the Office of the Presidency of the Republic to assume responsibility for the implementation of these new government policies in coordination with those private sector institutions that engage in research and development activities in the marginal areas. Whereas the short-term emergency plan has as its principal objective the solution of immediate problems of survival through programs that provide basic infrastructure services of water, sewage and light in marginal settlements, and general social services such as "Comedores populares" (popular kitchens), day care centres, and temporal employment (PAIT); the medium range five year plan (1986-1990) directs itself to the fostering of productive activities, whether it be through the initiation of community businesses or domestic arts and crafts workshops and cooperatives. Intensive training efforts are planned that either will precede or form an integral part of these program developments to assure meeting policy objectives. In addition savings and development banks, and credit institutions would be adapted to these new policy ventures.

It is expected that once the policies of the Medium Range (5 year) Development Plan are in full force, the temporal employment and income assistance program (PAIT) will have become integrated into permanent employment programs thereby also reducing State subsidies in this and other social programs.
With respect to popular participation and organization, the Plan perceives that the success of the programs of production and employment will depend on the organized participation of the population through such vehicles as community enterprises and cooperatives and expansion of the "Cooperacion Popular" program. Equally, the Plan stipulates program developments that support popular organizations such as mothers' clubs; community associations; social, cultural and sports clubs; and parent associations. Priority, however, is given to neighbourhood barrio organizations since these are expected to administer the "Communal Modules of Basic Services" consisting of such social services as education and health.

These plans are innovative in their integrative approach, addressing the immediate survival needs of the large marginal urban sectors by emergency programs; and reducing economic, social, and political marginality through medium range development strategies. Furthermore, they are placed within a wider national context of rural as well as urban development needs, addressing long standing patterns of inequality and privilege.

From a social policy perspective, these plans indicate a significant shift in the way the needs and problems of the poor are viewed. Peru, like other Third World countries, traditionally has focussed on development strategies which were primarily concerned with economic growth and modernization. Socially-oriented policies in health, education, housing, employment and community infra-structure services in popular barrios, were developed as an afterthought, introduced frequently as a crisis intervention to deal with only the worst social consequences of economic and social change; and motivated primarily by a concern among the country's elite with the potential and sometimes real threats to the established social order.

These new policies and plans do not involve, however, the radical changes in political machinery, mass mobilization, and more equitable distribution of societal resources, required to correct the sharp inequalities of the whole social and economic fabric of Peruvian society, and which form the basis of the political platform of the United Left party. Even if these radical changes were to be introduced, such policies would have to contend with external factors in the world political economy (i.e. prices of its export goods, unfavourable trade relations and a large external debt) that have placed this country like other Third World countries in a
position of weakness in terms of power and influence, leaving little room to effect changes more favourable to its domestic development.

The APRA government has decided on policies that shift the pattern of resource distribution to one more in favour of the poor, with programs organized from below focussing on the basic needs of these popular sectors and relying heavily on popular mobilization through cost-efficient participation schemes. The most significant shift, therefore, is in the increasing awareness of those factors that lead to a continuing underdevelopment of vast sectors of the population, and the need for a social policy orientation that moves from a residual function, peripheral to economic development to one that is equated with social development. The increased focus on the poor and their access to resources, as implied in these new government plans, reflects a slight shift in favour of social and not just economic goals for the purpose of achieving social development.21

The real test of these new statements of intent depends on the ability of the State to allocate sufficient resources for the implementation of its development goals, to which the present social and political crisis and the characteristics of underdevelopment provide serious obstacles. The dominant social classes, deriving their power from their ability to attract international capital and from their control of the machinery of State administration, will demand their share from available scarce resources to maintain the standards of living and the modern facilities they are used to and expect. In addition, they will continue to pressure government to step up its security measures to deal with the Sendero guerrilla movement and growing violence in society. This will deplete those limited resources even further in the face of clear evidence which shows that severe continuing poverty and marginality among the larger population enhances the phenomenon of violence, particularly among the young, many of whom have given up hope of ever attaining employment.

The real challenge, therefore, of these new social development-oriented policies is for government to balance them with the interests of the powerful and privileged social classes that are in apparent conflict with that basic philosophy of development. Part of the solution is organizational, both in mobilizing at the community level, and at the bureaucratic level. The multi-sectoral commission lodged within the office of the
Presidency gives the medium-range plan the kind of power that can force integration of plans emanating from different Ministries into the central plan of development. On the other hand, unless central planning is balanced by and rooted in vigorous democratic self-management and control, with popular and community involvement based on decentralized administrative units for policy-formulation and programming, new forms of inequality and domination cannot be avoided. 22

From a Community Development perspective, the new policies require an active generation of genuine participation that counter-balances the temptations and dangers of too much State-controlled planning. Furthermore, these policies must accommodate and support other effective autonomous community-initiated and controlled development efforts, as for instance the internationally recognized, highly successful case of the marginal barrio of Villa El Salvador reported on in this research project as a case study. The previous record of the State in emphasizing local control, initiative and participation has not been encouraging. Media reports seem to indicate that even with the introduction of the newer social development-oriented policies, State organs continue to either reject, denigrate or coopt such autonomous local development initiatives.

We will turn now to examine in some detail the new programs that form part of the social development-oriented policies.

I.2 Cooperacion Popular (C.P.)

The National System of C.P. was established by Legislative Act on November 4, 198023 during the Accion Popular Government of Belaunde Terry, a liberal democratic government favouring modernizing economic policies. Its goal as stated in the Act is "to guarantee the permanence and realization of the ancestral practice of voluntary work for the common good". The program was introduced "as a means by which people and communities, exercising their initiative and disinterested efforts, try to achieve their well-being within the context of a dynamic form of community development, and thereby become fully integrated into the economic and social life of the country, thus reaffirming a national identity". The APRA Government, essentially social democratic in orientation, assumed power in July 1985,
and introduced some substantive changes to the program though not to its fundamental goal.

The principal functions of C.P. can be summarized as follows:

- To stimulate the conception and execution of community works with the contribution of manual labour and other local resources

- To encourage initiative-taking and creativity of communities through capacitation and training that facilitate the creation as well as transfer of technology

- To promote and optimize the participation of people, communities and other social groupings in the execution of integrated development projects; and foster ability in applying adequate or intermediate technology in accordance with the needs and interests of communities

- To channel and coordinate technical, financial and other types of assistance from international, national and local, public and private sectors, so as to attain the policy goals and program objectives of C.P. aimed at improving the quality of life of the local population.

When C.P. was introduced in 1980, President Belaunde perceived its underlying principle as recapturing the practice of the pre-hispanic Ayllu or Clan system that formed the social and economic basis of the Wari and Inca empires. In a context in which people and the country lack sufficient income to satisfy the most pressing needs, he saw the necessity of resorting to the established Andean tradition of community and cooperative work and mutual aid. This idea, he claimed incorrectly, received widespread acceptance by those intellectuals the world over who were concerned with social conditions within a context of economic underdevelopment.

The two main operational objectives consist of:

1. Generating and implementing projects in the agricultural and economic sectors, as well as health, education, employment, crafts, sanitation, construction, energy, forestry, transportation, and the communication system, all to the "presumed" benefit of rural and marginal urban areas.

2. Encouraging popular mobilization, participation and voluntary contribution of the community to these projects as a basis for the solution of problems of poverty and marginality.

Organizationally, the C.P. functions through a national office, and regional offices established in all Provinces of the 25 Departments (States) that make up the country; each is headed by a management group and "promotores" responsible for stimulating initiative-taking and participa-
tion of local communities. The current APRA government has departed from the much criticized previous government practices, by emphasizing its priority of working through those local organizations that are truly representative of the popular sectors and which are expected to identify their most pressing needs, establish priorities and propose viable alternatives to solve their problems.

Government investments in projects related to marginal urban communities have, so far, been heaviest in the construction and improvement of school facilities and medical/health posts. Through a special agreement with the International Development Bank, C.P. has begun recently a project in support of the development of small enterprises in crafts, services and agro-industry. Also worth noting is the attempt at basic infra-structure development in the newer squatter communities. In these projects labour is expected to be provided by local community residents in exchange for donations of food from such institutions as OFASA (a philanthropic organization of the Adventists Church) and other international assistance programs with which C.P. has a special agreement.

While the proposed government allocation to the C.P. program is to be five times larger than that of 1986, its expected total of close to US$6 million does not measure up to the ambitious goal stated in the Legislative Act. Much of the funding is apparently to come from income generated by the projects themselves, relying heavily on participatory schemes and voluntary contributions of manual labour. Thus the program could be regarded as largely self-financing, with the hope of credit forthcoming from internal and external sources.24

I.3 PAIT - The National Program in support of Temporary Income

On September 18, 1985 this much publicized emergency program was created by Presidential Decree as a special project of C.P.25 with an initial government investment of US$3.5 million for the financing of 17 programs. As part of the medium range 5 year national development plan and with a planned 150% annual increase in resource investment, this program is conceived to generate thousands of new employment opportunities from 88,500 in 1986 to an estimated 107,000 in 1990 (in a total estimated population for Peru of 20 million in 1986). This social program of income and employment distribution, together with an incentives policy for the development of
small community businesses and self-employment, is to assist in the alleviation of poverty experienced by the marginal urban and rural population.26

The activities of PAIT consist of a range of small and intermediate size projects that give priority to the least developed economic areas and social sectors. The essential characteristics of the program are:

- The use of unskilled manual labour
- Generation of temporal employment for large numbers of the poor
- Redistribution of income that will reach those sectors that have been marginal to the employment market, especially those who are considered the poorest among the poor.

The operational objectives are:

- To increase the capacity of consumption and quality of employment among the poorest of shanty-town dwellers, the unemployed, underemployed and self-employed
- To bring about improvements in community services, social infrastructure, and productivity of the marginal urban and rural regions of the country
- To execute programs that will generate income through small and medium-sized, labour intensive projects
- To reactivate the productive apparatus of the country, as well as to improve conditions for those with limited resources.

Besides recovering the marginal condition of the poorest sectors of the population, the policy goal underlying the PAIT program is to reactivate market conditions through a boost in the acquisitive capacity of this large sector of the population. Furthermore, the program hopes to instill some confidence in the marginal population in their own capacities, actualizing available human and natural resources so that the benefits of contemporary life can be brought within their reach and not remain the preserve of the privileged few.

It is expected that in the course of the project execution, participants will acquire new skills while carrying out specific tasks that have value in the open employment market. The formation of small community businesses is a supplementary idea developed with the assistance of UNFPA (United Nations Fund for Population Activities) that aims to generate new sources of income. A new spin-off project linked to PAIT consists of
"Family Planning and Capacitation" carried out in an agreement with UNICEF through its Child and Youth Assistance Program; the fact that the majority of workers of the PAIT program are women provides planners with an opportunity to address problems in the personal and family realm through this link-up project.

While the program has been hailed by government officials as a major step in overcoming the marginal conditions of the poor, critics take issue with both its overriding policy and operational practices. First, only a certain proportion of the large supply of unskilled labour willing to participate in PAIT can be employed at any time at a rate of one to every five applicants. Furthermore, the selection of workers occurs through the casting of lots to assure impartiality; but even so, many instances have been reported of political favouritism.

Second, the program employs workers for only a three month period, based on the rationale that all those willing to work should have the opportunity to participate through a rotation system. The social consequence of this rule is that those who have received a temporary increase in income and improved their life style accordingly, experience serious frustrations on returning to their former unemployed and insecure status. Efforts are purportedly made to integrate beneficiaries of the PAIT program into other remunerative jobs through planning of projects that in themselves generate income.

Third, the only condition for acceptance in the program is that the person has no work and lives in conditions of extreme poverty. This criterion itself is open to abuse by those responsible for implementing it in the absence of concrete guidelines.

Fourth, the program at large has been criticized from a policy perspective for relying on "cheap labour" in responding to the legitimate claims of the poor that the State address their basic community and human needs just as they are attended to for the middle and upper classes. In defence, those who conceived PAIT argue that the program is a beginning response to a massive social and economic problem that has not been of the making of this Social Democratic government. The program planners claim to build a society in which the popular sectors, historically oppressed and exploited, are inserted into a democratic system beginning with the democratization of the economy with increased access to the means of produc-
tion, and a social democracy where people participate in the resolution of the most important social problems, i.e. food, health and employment. This approach coincides with strategies recommended by planners in other Third World countries who prefer a gradual elimination of poverty rather than an immediate one which they argue would call for radical changes in society for which there would be no political support among those sectors that hold effective power. The policies, therefore, focus more on providing technical assistance to self-help community projects with limited financial investment and heavy reliance on manual and voluntary labour; at the same time they allow the most essential needs of the most poor to be attended to in the shortest time possible.24

Finally, contrary to stated policy at the highest political levels, instances have been reported in the media of PAIT projects and workers being deployed for political ends. The most blatant example of this occurred in May 1986 in Villa El Salvador where leaders of the governing APRA party mobilized PAIT workers to march in protest against a nation-wide strike held by teachers and against the mayor of this huge barrio.29 They were ordered to take the barrio's municipal building where they held up activities for three hours. APRA organizers had assured the presence of the major media outlets so as to beam this protest demonstration across the country for national consumption. This staged mobilization and misuse of the poorest among the poor, employed temporarily by the PAIT program, was designed to discredit on the one hand teachers who were suffering from severe IMF dictated austerity programs, in force for several years; and on the other hand to embarrass a highly popular mayor, who in the 1983 municipal elections as a candidate of the United Left Party, received the largest electoral support of any mayor in Peru.30 The confrontation coincided with the 15 year celebration of the success and progress of this poor barrio, that has become a symbol across Latin America of what a shanty-town population can achieve through a self-governing community organization.

I.4 Program of Direct Assistance (PAD)31

PAD was set up as a special multi-sector Commission in the Presidential Office to coordinate program initiatives of direct assistance under-
taken by: the public sector (through the Departmental Development Corporation, Special Projects such as Cooperacion Popular and PAIT and local governments); by private institutions engaged in research and development activities in the marginal urban areas; and international aid organizations. This coordinated thrust was to be instrumental in assisting existing local organizations, or through the formation of new ones, to address local survival or development needs.

Examples include the assistance given to mothers clubs in the formation of popular kitchens or the introduction of pre-school educational programs in collaboration with local parent associations; or assistance to neighbourhood committees or associations of barrio dwellers in the development of production cooperatives such as arts and craft operations or small businesses; and other such community projects and activities.

PAIT's link to PAD is in its contribution of labour for the construction of locales related to the popular kitchens, educational programs, etc. Specifically, in relation to popular kitchens, it is PAD which provides the technical assistance to mothers' clubs, PAIT workers construct the kitchen facility while international organizations such as CARE, OFASA or AID donate food and kitchen equipment; all of which is coordinated by the multi-sector Commission of PAD.

I.5 Comedores Populares

- Background -

Popular Kitchens did not come about as a result of policy initiatives of central or municipal governments. Instead they emerged as a new popularly initiated organizational vehicle in urban centres along with mothers' clubs, local community health and educational committees, and other such neighbourhood organizations mobilized largely by barrio women struggling to survive in an environment of continuing economic crisis, deteriorating living conditions, and with successive governments that have shown little concern for their basic needs. The popular kitchens are a relatively new and rapidly spreading phenomenon. While the first began to appear at the end of the seventies, there were an estimated 900 of them by July, 1986 in Lima alone. No accurate figures are available for the country as a whole.32
The interesting feature of what might well be referred to as a new social movement, is that the popular kitchen is much more than a simple place where barrio families can obtain a relatively inexpensive meal and thus reduce their food budget. Values such as solidarity and equality implicit in the collective activities undertaken in the acquisition, preparation and distribution of food in those instances where barrio women took the initiative, convert these popular kitchens into an alternative form of popular organization. The exercise of democracy and autonomy practiced daily in their interior by these women, allows for an independent and effective form of management related to one of life's most basic needs.

The importance of this new form of community organization is that barrio mothers function as social and political subjects, instead of being targeted as objects of government or private sector programs. The fact that their roles as mother and citizen converge in these operations helps them to draw on their household experience and develop the capacity to plan, negotiate and present proposals to State and private sector aid agencies. In this process, women have received support and technical advice from various specially established committees of the Catholic Church, the municipality, and non-governmental institutions that in large part have honoured the popular and autonomous nature of these small local women's organizations.

- Government Initiatives and Criticisms -

The previous government of Belaunde initiated its "family kitchens" project in late 1983 through the Support Group of Government, headed by the wife of the President. The Garcia government followed suit with the creation of the so-called "Comedores del Pueblo" promoted by the Program of Direct Assistance (PAD) headed again by the wife of the current president. They have taken the autonomous popular kitchens as their model, being promoted now by the State as part of its overall social policy.

An open brief directed to the country's President by representatives of the autonomous, self-managed popular kitchens from across the country, criticizes the new policy for provoking divisions and confrontations between barrio dwellers through lack of knowledge of existing barrio organizations and practices in the operation and needs of their kitchens.
The severest criticism is aimed at a new government decree which requires that, in order to receive support from the special project of PAD, the soliciting local popular organization must constitute itself as a Civil Association under the name of "Mothers' Club" registered properly with the Public Registry and open to government examination. This is viewed as a direct attack on the principle of local autonomy, forcing on communities an exclusive form of organization easily manipulated by government for political ends and favouritism, and ignoring the diversity in models of popular kitchens that have developed over the years.

In defence of the autonomous popular kitchens, the brief presented a series of measures for consideration by the President that went beyond the criticism on political favouritism:

- that the Fund of Farm Reactivation and Food Security give top priority to the popular kitchens as primary beneficiaries;

- that government pursue a policy of control of those trans-national companies which monopolize the production of basic food items such as wheat, oil, milk and whose prices permit these companies not only high profit margins but also make such products inaccessible to the poor;

- that special incentive programs be put into place for small farmers for the production of essential food items, together with a policy revision on the importation of food;

- that in the carrying out of PAIT projects the dignity of human work be respected, and that their workers not be used for political ends (like sabotaging independent community initiatives).

The first published and research-based study on the different types of Comedores Populares in Lima concludes that many of them are addressing the nutritional needs of the most needy among the participating poor. They also seem to function as a vehicle of change in traditional family patterns of behaviour. Above all, so the findings seem to indicate, the Comedores facilitate the introduction of women in community life and economic activity, thus having a liberating effect. On the other hand, the study finds that the greater the economic need of women, the less possibility for them to participate in these collective mutual aid models, unable to pay their share of the monthly quota. Based on this particular finding it questions the model as a government initiated development strategy among this sector of the poor.
A large in-depth research project is currently under way in Lima attempting to compare different types of Comedores and their impact on family and community life, as well as to determine the most desirable institutional strategies in promoting these forms of social organizations. In a July 1986 interview the researchers of that project shared with this author some of their major hypotheses to which their study is directed:

- Participation of the poor in the "Comedores" is an attempt to optimize consumption of food and minimize their costs.

- Institutional and state attempts to introduce other objectives in the functioning of "Comedores" are most frequently based on goals that negate the perspective of the problem situation as experienced and viewed by those women in the barrios who initiate and administer them.

- Official attempts which aim to "increase productivity and maximize income" through existing Comedores Populares initiated by barrio women, is mixing economic goals by fostering small business ventures with a strategy among the poor to survive in the face of a severe economic crisis.

- Strategically, the "Comedores Populares" offer only a potential for educational training in nutritional care of the family, reduction of the family budget on food, and organizational experience.

It appears from preliminary evaluations that the autonomous self-managing mutual aid model of "Comedores familiares", receiving some supplementary food donations from State or charity organizations, provides a more realistic albeit limited solution to an economic problem within a general cultural pattern of norms and social relations.
II. THE MUNICIPALITY OF METROPOLITAN LIMA AND NEW INITIATIVES

II.1 The Changing Political Context at the Municipal Level

The political context and official practices in dealing with the survival and development needs of the marginal urban sector changed radically with the municipal elections of November, 1983. A leftist political alliance was voted into power in several urban municipal districts across the country, including Metropolitan Lima, for the first time in Peru's history. The Izquierda Unida (I.U.) or United Left gained control of local governments in no less than 19 of the 37 municipal districts in the capital region, in contrast to 5 in 1980. These gains included all those districts where more than 50% of the population live in the "Pueblos Jovenes" or new marginal urban settlements. The other political party that made considerable gains was the conservative Christian Popular Party (PPC), elected in 11 districts of Lima which include all the middle and upper class communities. The big loser was the liberal democratic Accion Popular Party of former President Belaunde Terry that governed the country from 1980 until 1985 with support from the PPC, following policies favouring the private business community. That party lost all of the 20 Lima districts it controlled from 1980-1983, thus leaving it completely unrepresented on the municipal scene of Lima.

APRA, a social democratic party currently governing at the national level since the July 1985 elections, gained 5 Lima districts in the 1983 municipal elections, improving its position from one district in 1980. The mayor of Villa El Salvador, representing the I.U., gained the largest plurality of votes of any municipality across the country with 60% of the popular vote. That marginal settlement of approximately 350,000 inhabitants is the largest of all Lima districts and the sixth largest urban municipality in the country.37

II.2 New Social Policy Initiatives and Administrative Structure of the Metropolitan Municipality (see Table 5)

II.2.1 Food and Nutrition

The struggle against hunger and survival had assumed such proportions in the capital region that the newly elected government of Metropolitan Lima called for emergency action. It introduced a series of policies and programs, with those on food and nutrition receiving highest priority.
TABLE 5

Organizational Chart of the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima

- Assembly of Metropolitan Mayors
- Metropolitan Planning Council
- Metropolitan Council of Participation & Cooperation
- Special Commissions of Assessment
- Community Committees

- Auditor General's Office
- General Office of Social Communication
- General Office of Neighborhood Participation
- Municipal Admin. Office
- Planning
- International Cooperation
- Budgets
- Rationalization

- Secretariat Urban Devel
- Secr. City Services
- Secr. of Urban Transp.
- Secr. of Social Serv
- Secr. of Educ & Cult

- Human Settlements & Popular Urbanizations
- Food
- Health
- Social Welfare

- Fund of Investment
- Popular Credit Bank
- Program of Promotion for Employment
- City Parks Service
- City Cleaning Enterprise
- Public Transportation Service
This action was reflected in the creation of a special "Directorship on Food and Nutrition" within the Social Services Secretariat, with one division established to administer the "Vaso de Leche" program and another to administer the program dealing with "Comedores Populares". The "Vaso de Leche" program will be discussed in greater detail below. The general purpose of the second program was to assist the marginal urban communities in existing "Comedores Populares" and to form new ones by offering technical advice and educational programs.

Barrio women were to be encouraged to become involved in the organization and execution of the two programs at the community level, the objective being for the women to acquire new organizational and administrative skills as well as a greater awareness of nutritional value in the purchase and preparation of food.

II.2.2 Health and Social Welfare

The other program initiatives not reported on in detail in this study relate to health and social welfare. Each has its management structure within the Social Services Secretariat. The Health program responds less to the immediate emergency situation; its concern is with the general deterioration in the economy, employment, nutrition and hygiene in the capital region that have resulted in high rates of child mortality and a sharp increase in infectious and contagious diseases.

The Social Welfare program responds to those groups with limited economic resources who require effective legally established social services. These services aim to safeguard the integrity of the poor and their integration into the social and economic life of society as "useful people" through protection, orientation and other such program activities. Groups receiving special attention from this program include pre-school children, the handicapped, women, the elderly, the family, the impoverished, and abandoned children.

II.2.3 Neighbourhood Organization and Participation

An additional program of significance to the general theoretical interest of this study, is that administered by the newly formed "General Office of Neighbourhood Participation", directly accountable to the Mayor
of Metropolitan Lima. This office carries out promotional activities in the formation of neighbourhood organizations and special projects. As in the case of the "Survival Programs" field personnel work directly with the popular sectors, focussing on their marginal status in society.

Analysis indicated the need to give popular sectors increased access to participation in the political life of the city and the nation, thereby improving their conditions. In fostering such a participative democracy, new organizational structures have been created in the form of: local committees for the emergency food programs such as the "Vaso de Leche" and for health and education; mixed municipal - neighbourhood committees on water and sewage installation; inter-district urban planning councils; and cultural participation committees.

Popular assemblies, open "town-hall" type meetings and local workshops for policy formulation are the more general community organizational vehicles introduced to obtain optimum participation of the marginal popular sectors of the urban population.40

II.3 Urban Development and Land Entitlement

Some observations are in order on policy initiatives in this area because of their impact on living conditions of shanty-town dwellers. Besides the Social Services Secretariat reported on earlier, the municipal government of Metropolitan Lima includes 4 other Secretariats, namely one each for urban transportation, city services, education and culture, and urban development.

The Urban Development Secretariat has gained considerable importance since 1981, when national legislation established that matters related to urban affairs were henceforth to come under municipal jurisdiction. This move towards decentralization has made the processing of land entitlement six times faster. The Urban Development Secretariat of Lima has a special department on "Human Settlements and Popular Urbanizations" that handles land entitlement, legalization of newly invaded settlements and carries out special programs and projects.

In spite of this vastly improved service, President Garcia ruled in April 1986 that in those cases where municipalities did not process land entitlement within 120 days from the day of announcement for the hundreds
of thousands of shanty-town dwellers awaiting legalization, he would charge the National Ministry of Housing and Construction to take over this responsibility. This decision, highly criticized by the U.S. funded Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD), was perceived as a crash political move to undercut the popular leftist municipal government of Lima.

This institute, which had done years of research on the subject and presented proposals to government, argued against a return of this function to central government. It claimed that one fundamental reason why innumerable Peruvians opted for land invasion is because the complicated adjudication process of land obliged State agencies to follow a sequence of 207 steps lasting an average of 4 years and costing $230 US/person over and above the value of the land, a price well beyond the reach of the poor.

These long and expensive transactions were viewed as one of the principal reasons for having produced 284 invasions in 1985 alone, while the State was able to achieve legalization of only 4 of these. ILD recommended that the process be simplified by reducing the cost of adjudication, introducing low cost rental housing, and elevating the cost of new land invasions. The side-effect of encouraging construction of various floors would be to limit the continuing horizontal growth of an already sprawling city and reduce the high cost of transportation and the installation of other urban services to shanty-town dwellers.

II.4 The "Vaso de Leche" (V. de L.) Program
II.4.1 Introduction

The V. de L. or "glass of milk" program introduced in April 1984 was the central and most popular feature of the new municipal government's plan to fight against hunger and survival. Observers perceived it also as one of the principal reasons why the United Left alliance was voted into power in Metropolitan Lima.

The Municipality has met all its objectives for the program, including legislation which extends it to all other municipalities of the nation. From a community and organizational perspective the success of the program in Lima is astounding when one considers that by March 1985 100,000 women were participating actively in assuming responsibility for the program,
organized into 7,500 local V. de L. committees, involving 1,300 neighbourhood organizations from 33 out of the 41 municipal districts making up the capital region; attending to 1 million children up to age 13 in their daily consumption of milk.43

All of these developments in social mobilization occurred in less than one year, making this program successful by any standards. Not only has it responded directly to the serious concern about growing malnutrition among children and begun to attend to maternal needs, but it has also brought about a growing awareness among mothers of the importance of proper nutrition and their role in the organization and distribution of one of life's most vital food products.

Furthermore, through popular organization and self-management, it has been able to counter the commercialization of milk and exploitation of the poor, at least in this area of food consumption. Finally, although a sizeable fund is being allocated from the national budget for the purchase of milk powder, the little to no bureaucracy involved in the program signifies considerable savings in public administration and service delivery.

Nevertheless, the initiation, development and maintenance of the program has not been without its share of problems and conflicts. These will be highlighted later.

II.4.2 Policy and Plan

In response to the general problem of high levels of malnutrition, the Municipality of Lima decided to join the struggle of the marginal population against hunger as the basis of its social policy. The general objective of that policy was to participate and share in the efforts of barrio dwellers to establish new popular organizations that aim to improve levels of nutrition. In this sense the policy pursued a bottom-up development model instead of a top-down bureaucratically administered system of delivery. Specifically the operational objectives were to secure the provision of a glass of milk or its nutritional equivalent for children, pregnant women and those in the breast-feeding stage; and help in the implementation of new popular kitchens (Comedores Populares) with technical advice and educational programs.
With respect to the V. de L. program the plan involved the following actions:

- Formulation of norms and procedures for an adequate functioning of the organizational framework to be set up across the metropolitan region.
- Setting up a central registry and computerization of data obtained on the beneficiaries of the program.
- Promotion of preventive health activities through immunization, rehydration and T.B. control.
- Carrying out campaigns on the rights of children, defence of life, and encouraging families to register for the program.
- Developing educational programs directed at new supervisors, district and barrio coordinators, and beneficiaries on such matters as organization and administrative management at all levels, short courses on nutrition, breast-feeding and early stimulation.
- Coordinating efforts with the municipal health administration in the assessment of nutritional advancement; with district and provisional councils; and with the media.

In terms of major policy achievements the original plan obtained some important results besides improving diet quality among the marginal population. First, the State eventually, albeit reluctantly, came to accept the right of the child, the pregnant and breast-feeding mother to receive protection through proper legislation and adequate resource allocation. Second, the program's decentralized funding and administration contributes to the democratization of the State apparatus. Third, the program is controlled and managed by the community for the community's benefit with optimum participation of barrio women. And fourth, popular pressure has been building to demand that central government pursue an agricultural policy that would focus on domestic production of essential food items and minimize the purchase of these products on the international market.

II.4.3 Evolution of the Program

The program started with 50,000 beneficiaries in April 1984 growing week by week until it attained its objective of reaching the 1 million children of the marginal population of the capital region. Initially, it used milk supplied by the European Economic Community. The Municipality,
however, together with local committees of the V. de L. program decided to take action in December 1984 as part of the original strategy plan to pressure national government to enshrine the program in law, and thereby include all provincial municipalities of the country. 47

While the law was passed, no provision had been made for the program in the budget of the Ministry of Economies and Finance. A huge march on Congress obtained a positive response; a special Article on financing was incorporated into the original law to assure that funding would start in January 1986, not only for Lima but all municipalities wishing to participate, thus affecting a potential 3 million beneficiaries. Funds would now have to be transferred by the Ministry directly to the municipalities which in turn purchase the milk from ENCI, the semi-autonomous national corporation that has State monopoly over the commercial trade in agricultural food products.

Manoeuvres by ENCI (influenced by the ruling APRA party) were perceived by various observers to be aimed at undercutting this community program and thereby embarrassing the United Left controlled municipal government of Lima, responsible for this popular program. 48 ENCI at the beginning of 1986 decided unilaterally to reduce the production of milk required for this program from 40,000 cartons to 9200. This action was taken while at the same time keeping up full milk supplies for the emergency program of direct assistance (PAD)49 administered by the President’s own office.

Once this news leaked out and the V. de L. program ran short on milk by the end of July 1986, there was a general reaction of anger by barrio women who insisted on their rights and strongly protested against this form of manipulation by a State agency for political ends. They mobilized themselves, again marching to Congress on August 27 with 20,000 women and children led by municipal politicians and community leaders. They were confronted by a large, intimidating, fully militarized police force which reportedly used repressive means in some instances. The President that same night ordered ENCI to make arrangements for the immediate delivery of the 40,000 cartons required to meet the program’s monthly needs. It was a major victory for the more than 7500 organized local committees functioning in the thousands of poverty-sticken human settlements of greater Lima. 50
II.4.4 Municipal Administration and Community Organization

The 1986 budget for the purchase of milk for the Lima program is $43.5 million U.S. This includes the cost of milk for all barrio children up to 6 years of age plus pregnant and breast-feeding women, and many school age children from 7-13. Legally, school children in this age range are entitled to receive milk from the Ministry of Health. Since that law in effect is not carried out by the Ministry, the municipality of Lima has agreed to serve these children as well, as long as school administrators apply for inclusion into the V. de L. program.

The program has continued to grow with new applications coming in from "Pueblos Jovenes" (new settlements) and "Urbanizaciones Populares" (legalized settlements) across the city. To qualify for the milk provisions women are required to form a local V. de L. committee with technical assistance from the Municipality, thereby assuring local popular mobilization and participation of women who usually do not involve themselves in male dominated neighbourhood organizations.

By August 1986, 33 out of 41 districts of Lima were organized with local committees responsible for the preparation and distribution of milk. In achieving a certain homogeneity in the program, the Municipality of Lima has encouraged each of the participating district municipalities to appoint a local alderman with responsibility for the program in their respective area.

The Municipality takes care not to enter a community where there is internal conflict between local leaders. Its entry depends on the agreement of the central neighbourhood organization which would have to approve the distribution of milk by the women-run local committees. Furthermore, the Municipality does not impose any political conditions, thus hoping to avoid inter-party rivalry at the barrio level.

To illustrate the administration and organization of the program at the district and community level as well as to highlight some problems and conflicts that have arisen, we will turn to the Municipal District of Chorillo in the southern region of Lima (see Chart). That district with 33 "Pueblos Jovenes" set up a provisional committee in March 1986 with 8 Pueblos Jovenes participating. The committee has a president, vice-president, general secretary and treasurer, and special secretaries
CHART

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PARTICIPANTS IN THE V. de L. PROGRAM
August 1986

-Provincial Municipality Metropolitan Lima-

- Municipal District Chorillo-

- 33 in 41 municipal districts participate involving 300 neighbourhood organizations-

- 8 in 33 Pueblos Jovenes of the District of Chorillo participate in the municipal V.de L. committee-

- Pueblo Joven Villa Ventura-

- 11 in 17 area committees of Villa Ventura participate-

- Area Committee #3-

- 53 children, 1 pregnant and 4 breast feeding women-

for organization, economic affairs, health, public relations and information. Meetings were held with the local aldermen to plan and develop organizational statutes and eventual incorporation of the committee as a civil association.

At the barrio level in Villa Ventura\(^1\) the local V. de L. committee is comprised of a general coordinator and secretaries of health, finance and control. The function of the secretary of control is to assure that children rather than their older brothers, sisters or father consume the milk. Distribution and consumption is primarily controlled by having mothers encourage their eligible children to drink the milk where it is prepared.

Preparation and distribution is the responsibility of the local committee. For instance, barrio committee #3 in Villa Ventura has charge of 53 children, 1 pregnant and 4 breast feeding women, for whom it receives 10 bags of milk from the barrio coordinator or president of the V. del L. barrio committee. In addition, it receives oatmeal for nutritional enrichment through donations from national and international voluntary aid agencies such as ONAA (a national organization of food assistance), OFASA...
(a philanthropic organization of the Adventists) and CARITAS (the R.C. charity).

The secretary of finance of the V. de L. coordinating committee for Villa Ventura has to ensure that responsibility in the preparation of the milk rotates among the participating families. Some are not able to do this due to poor health. The program does require that women who prepare the milk are in good healthy condition and also have a clean kitchen.

Of the 17 area committees in Villa Ventura, 6 do not participate in the V. de L. program. Reasons given are lack of kitchen equipment, no available time or other such reason. The author in his more detailed study of this barrio found also that some husbands do not wish their wives to participate for fear of losing control over them, demanding full attention to family needs by their spouse.

II.4.5 Summary and Conclusions

Conflicts have arisen between administrators of the program and communities over the question of who among local barrio women should be appointed as coordinator. Recognizing the power of this important role, the program dictates that in selecting such a person she should be politically impartial, have administrative experience and a capacity for working with people. In spite of this, inevitable conflicts have arisen due to human envy and distrust in the honesty of the appointed person by a population whose survival is threatened daily. Psychologists recognize this phenomenon as a natural psychological defence system. It functions also as a major obstacle to achieving solidarity among individual barrio dwellers and to gaining their collaboration in local community organizational work.52

There has been criticism also about the milk powder having produced diarrhea, but evaluations show that there are no more incidences of this disease than there were prior to the introduction of the program. It is believed that the phenomenon is more related to the general conditions of water and hygiene in the poor barrios requiring better care in the preparation of the milk for consumption through training and supervision; and a concerted national plan for water and sewage installation. To address some of these and other difficulties experienced in the V. de L. program, local committees across Lima decided to hold their first conference in September of 1986.
In spite of the above mentioned problems and conflicts, the V. de L. program has resulted in many achievements and benefits. Its significance has been in restoring the value and rights of children; in promoting the participation of poor women in organized community activity where men have tended to be the dominant force; and in achieving a measure of much needed self-worth, respect and liberation that is likely to have long-range repercussions in the movement towards fundamental social transformation at the family, community and societal level.

Social transformations are already evident in the extent of social mobilization of women at the various organizational levels from the local barrio, district and municipal levels; and in the two protest movements which led government to include a financing formula for the V. de L. program in the prior legislation, and which forced a reluctant and manipulating State agency to reinstate the provision of milk. At another level, social pressure has been growing for the introduction of an agricultural policy more oriented to domestic production of vital food items such as milk rather than spending much needed currency on their purchase from multinational agro-businesses, with higher prices, or having to depend on international charitable donations. In this respect the V. de L. program as a short-range survival and emergency strategy is instrumental in fostering a change in mid-range development planning.

Above all, the V. de L. program appears to function as an effective tool for the movement towards the liberation of women from various forms of oppression. A large proportion of the marginal urban population of women is indigenous as well, and suffer from what Blanca Chancoso calls a triple oppression namely for being indigenous, poor and woman in a "macho", racially discriminating and exploitative society. The V. de L. program addresses these conditions of oppression directly through its highly effective community organizational and participant action.

II.5 Neighbourhood Organization and Popular Participation

II.5.1 Introduction

A number of initiatives besides those taken by government have achieved some success in improving living conditions and in broadening the base of democracy for the marginal urban sector of the population in Lima. Some have emanated from the popular barrio movement itself with leaders
mobilizing the local population either to claim their rights as citizens or to undertake community development projects and meet basic human needs through self-help and participatory schemes. Others have issued from the non-governmental centres of social promotion, development and research, many of whom aligned themselves with the barrio movement, focusing on popular education and training of specific sectors of the marginal population.

The most notable examples of these attempts include the so-called "Self-Managing Urban Community of Villa El Salvador" (CUAVES) and the Municipality-initiated "Vaso-de-Leche" program discussed earlier (section II.4). Activities of the barrio movement and non-governmental centres will be briefly reviewed below taking neighbourhood organization and participation as a focus.

It is the intent of the Municipal Plan of Lima to develop and implement a long-term policy on participation through a process of systematization based on these diverse experiences and projects. This responsibility has been assigned to the General Office of Neighbourhood Participation accountable directly to the Mayor of the Municipality of Lima.54

It is becoming clear that the dynamic forces unleashed through increased participation of shanty-town dwellers in the barrio movement directly impacts on governmental operations. This demands a re-evaluation of the functions and procedures particularly of municipal government which is that level of government that theoretically provides closest access to the citizen. While limited in its ability to bring about large scale changes in the living conditions of people, being only one organ of the State apparatus in which central government is the dominant actor, municipal government does have various options at its disposal whereby it can exercise relative autonomy in the local space of human settlements. These options and some examples of how they promote or hinder popular mobilization and social democracy will be reviewed as part of the paper's conclusion. (See Section III).

II.5.2 Problem Analysis

Several problems have been identified by municipal planners and independent researchers that will need to be addressed in the formulation of a long-term policy on participation. Some of these will be highlighted here.
(i) Lack of political space for those who constitute the marginal urban sector prevents their effective legal access to the formal decision-making processes of municipal and national government. In view of this situation, "Pueblos Jovenes" originally had to rely on the formation of neighbourhood organizations and voluntary local labour to address their most pressing community and human needs. A centralizing trend during the 70's, similar to Mexican experiences, transformed these local organizations as part of a city-wide popular urban movement (MUP) into a coordinated social and political force at the regional level which began to impact on the national scene. The reaction of government in the face of massive popular manifestations frequently has been to resort to repressive measures rather than negotiation. The repressive measures were rationalized on the basis of maintaining social order, but carried a heavy social and political cost. In the meantime little was done by successive governments to relieve the general frustration that resulted in such confrontations.

(ii) A second obstacle to participation relates to the nature of local organization. The majority of "Pueblos Jovenes" did not have the diversity in their organization to represent the totality of community and human needs. Traditionally the popular struggle in new invasions focused on land title, water, sanitation, electrification and transportation as basic community needs, to the near exclusion of the social and human needs of food and nutrition, health, education, culture and recreation, income, etc. In this struggle it was the men who assumed the dominant role, leaving responsibilities for meeting needs in the social area to women. With little support from the men, who often discouraged their own wives from participating in local socially-related committees (as part of the "machismo" phenomenon), little progress was made in the human needs area.

The continuing economic crisis changed the dynamic nature of organizing in the 80's. While basic community needs remained an important issue for the newer invasions, the concern of most families shifted to survival. The preoccupation with food led women, traditionally responsible for this area, to become organized around "Comedores Familiares", emerging in the late seventies and accelerating in their growth across Lima. Voluntary sector and different government agencies rapidly followed suit with their respective programs of assistance.
The municipal "Vaso de Leche" program was probably the first example of an effective organizational vehicle for barrio dwellers that resulted in social mobilization and a sustained form of participation in a government initiated program. The daily participation in the organizational aspects of this program of large numbers of women who were previously little involved in community and political affairs, was beginning to affect government and public administration at the municipal and national level (see section II.4: the V. de L. program).

(iii) A third obstacle to community involvement and participation by people from the marginal urban sector relates to the level of consciousness; namely, the limited critical capacity of connecting one's individual problem with that of the general collective condition and the causal structure of poverty. One reason for this lies in the conventional conception of politics which places its practice in the hands of a few specialized people who perceive themselves as the vanguard for a particular interest group, in this case the marginal urban sector. The vanguard may be a political party advocating on behalf of this sector through the formal political process, or a group of community leaders functioning in the Latin tradition of the "caudillo" or chief who dictates rather than mobilizes.58

The other reason for the lack of critical consciousness is psycho-social in nature. The very condition of marginality and survival leads to a form of psychological oppression and a permanent struggle against a condition of "incomplete death".59 This translates into relying on certain psycho-social defence mechanisms. These express themselves through:

- distrust in politicians and community leaders who are often viewed in terms of what is in it for themselves,
- escapist behavior that responds to the immediate need for illusions and a world of make-believe found in watching T.V. novels and soap operas, alcohol or drugs, thereby temporarily forgetting the hardships and drudgery of the daily life of survival,
- a search for compensations at a more profound level by turning to dogmatic religions or political fanatacism.

II.5.3 The General Office of Neighbourhood Participation (OGNP)

The Municipality of Metropolitan Lima has moved generally towards decentralizing many of its municipal operations. In this context the OGNP plays a significant role. Of the 41 municipal districts 22 currently have neighbourhood participation offices themselves. The aim is to have them
established in all districts of the capital and provide, among others, workshops that will train neighbourhood leaders in how to diagnose problems and respond to them appropriately. In order to set up a central registry for neighbourhood participation offices, OGNP will require an ordinance of the Council of Metropolitan Lima that will both recognize and support such an entity as a sort of clearing house.

Resistance has been offered to this decentralizing thrust by traditional elements in the administrative structure of the Municipality. In addition, criticism has been levelled at the Municipality's administrative policy of participation from opposite ends of the political spectrum; it is viewed both as a form of manipulating citizens and coopting leadership of existing autonomous community groups or organizations, and as a disguised form of communism.

Regardless, serious problems do exist in those districts where no municipal or participatory mechanisms are in place. For instance, the central district of Lima, where a large floating population resides in chaotic conditions, does not have a municipal government or any vehicle for citizen input and participation. The management of part of the city falls under provincial jurisdiction. The Municipality of Lima has, since June 1985, decentralized six of its operations to various sectors of the inner city, including city cleaning, taxes, transactions in documents, public works, culture and neighbourhood participation. Changes are already apparent. For example, many neighbourhoods now have citizens who inspect and control their own streets for garbage collection and street maintenance and who organize public campaigns. Fifteen percent of the local population in the inner city has been organized over this short period of time through the creation of 320 city block community organizations. This activity has been carried out by 15 social animators assigned to central Lima. They form part of a 20 member strong staff currently deployed by the OGNP. The other 5 work in 5 municipal districts with high concentrations of "Pueblos Jovenes".

Another significant component of the General Office's program consists of promoting cultural participation. In this it works closely together with the Municipal Secretariat of Education and Culture. Specifically, the Office promotes the production of and exchanges in popular spectacles,
fostering the expression of popular culture among barrio dwellers, democratizing thereby the expression of art and opening up cultural spaces in such areas as fine art, music, theatre and sports. Appropriate infrastructures have been developed so far only in a limited number of municipal districts, which on certain days of the week will close streets to permit the staging of popular activities. Villa El Salvador has developed a core group of artists in popular theatre that is gaining increased recognition but until now has lacked the kind of support that can bring its art to other "Pueblos Jovenes" and the larger public.

The neighbourhood participation program as it has begun to evolve within the realm of the Municipality of Lima can be divided into:

- urban development
- city services
- popular culture
- survival strategies

Several meetings have been planned for September 1986 between the Municipality and community organizations across Lima to assess experiences in these various areas that fall under the responsibility of the Municipality. These will be preceded by meetings at the district levels. Preliminary evaluation seems to indicate that the participatory strategy pursued has been most successful through the food and nutritional program, second in urban development, with only limited success so far in popular culture.

II.6 The Popular Barrio Movement

This movement is a relatively new phenomenon that grew out of a burst of activity in the spontaneous formation of local committees and community organizations across the capital region during the fifties. The desperate situation of shanty-town dwellers was linked to problems arising from processes of industrial growth, urbanization, diversification within the labour force, and Andean rural migration to the cities.

It was not until the reform and economic crisis decade of the seventies that a truly unified social movement began to emerge, acquiring its own organic and centralized structure. Distinct categories of people converged, ranging from industrial workers, artisans, street salesmen, commerce workers, the underemployed and unemployed, etc., forming a hetero-
geneous collectivity in social composition, mostly coming together through invasions and forming the so-called "Pueblos Jovenes".

Where in the fifties and sixties local shanty-town organizations were approached and treated by the APRA party and other parties from the political right as "clients", the dynamic changed drastically during the seventies when the military regime of Velasco attempted to achieve direct control over neighbourhood organizations in a search for a popular base. The State under this regime between 1968-71 created its own neighbourhood organizations that substituted for the traditional autonomous associations, attracting a good number of local persons through the new block committees. The more experienced leaders of the original associations applied their skills in assuming direction of the State-imposed local structures, and in many cases reaffirmed their autonomy from the State.

In defending their independence these neighbourhood organizations relied much on those local residents who had gained their experience from in the labour movement. This also strongly influenced the direction taken in the barrio movement. Thus, between 1973 and 1979 this movement as an independent force not only claimed urban services and facilities for their barrios by right of being citizens but also began to align itself with labour and other popular movements in protest manifestations against the increasing cost of living. New types of community organizations have arisen in the form of barrio committees, community kitchens, defence fronts, and others. In the process participants become increasingly politicized and radicalized, involving themselves more and more in the general dynamic of country-wide strikes.62

The limitations of this highly centralized manipulation of the barrio movement began to be felt with the deepening of the economic crisis from 1980 onwards. As Tovar points out, a barrio movement that was born essentially out of local struggle around land issues and urban services and later joins in with the national strikes of 1977 and '78 focusing on the cost of living issues, had become largely characterized by its "reactive" and "defensive" posture confronting an especially complex national crisis situation. Consequently, leaders of the barrio movement who had assumed that orientation in their struggle with the State were not able to respond to all the other various dimensions of the local reality that required their attention.
In recent years the barrio dwellers have begun to branch out in their social activities, going beyond the concerns of the seventies that focussed on the cost of living and the capitalist ordering of the City of Lima. Their activities now also include the practice of social democracy in terms of voting patterns, the nature of community participation and organizing. In orientation and practice the barrio movement began increasingly to develop an identity based on the perception of shanty-town dwellers being inhabitants of the poorest and least cared for zones of the city. This emerging identity became the new factor in creating a solidarity and basic personality within an otherwise heterogeneous and very complex community.

Thus, barrio dwellers began to extend their organizing efforts from the neighbourhood level, taking into account this new identity as neighbor and citizen, to include the municipal level. And furthermore they began to organize along sectoral and functional interest lines, linked to the daily life concerns of specific sectors of the barrio population.

Neighbourhood or territorial organizing along traditional lines of street blocks continues to be the fundamental approach in mobilizing the local population. However, serious obstacles have arisen in recent years (with a few exceptions, notably "Villa El Salvador") that undermine the effectiveness of such organizations as a single base for a barrio movement. There are difficulties in coordinating these organizations at the intermediate level while ideological infighting occurs between popular leaders affiliated with different political parties, in addition to the traditional "caudillo" phenomenon where leaders impose their views and direction instead of consulting and responding. Second, new initiatives undertaken by the Municipality of Lima that are more favorable to the marginal sector of the population have the side effect of coopting the more dynamic among barrio leaders into running for electoral office of mayor or alderman. Third, the increasing struggle for family survival in the face of a growing economic crisis limited the actual leadership (also functioning as heads of families) in their commitment and dedication to their organizational tasks.

The municipal level, in contrast to the barrio, has taken on greater importance for residents of popular barrios as a target of their organizing efforts since that political space has opened up significantly in the last two years, with growing opportunities for citizen participation. Such participation would still do little to improve economic conditions of barrio dwellers, as long as municipal governments have few funds at their
disposal. This is particularly true for those districts with a high concentration of "Pueblos Jovenes" that provide a weak base for generating taxes essential to finance economic development and income producing programs. In these instances, organized popular barrios have on occasion joined their Mayor in marches to Congress, demanding a larger share of the national government's budget. An example of this is the municipal district of San Martin de Porres in Lima, where the Mayor has assumed an active role in lending support to local organizing efforts and joined with shanty-town dwellers in claiming their rights as citizens before national government.

The most active and widespread form of recent grassroots organizing in popular barrios happens at the sectoral and functional level, and is similar to trends reported in Mexico and other Latin American countries. In these efforts, people come together as special interest groups of the barrio community and engage in an ever-growing range of human activities. Some of these include:

- economic activities - artisan and craft cooperatives, micro-businesses and others aimed at generating income,
- sales and commercial activities - association of street-vendors, small merchants or market stall operators,
- survival strategies in food and nutrition - popular family kitchens or canteens, "Vaso de Leche" committees, etc.
- women's activities - mothers' clubs, day nurseries, defence committees of mother's or women's rights, women's committees for the release of political prisoners or disappeared family members, and federations of local women's organizations,
- health activities - commissions of health, committees of primary health assistants, groups and federations of medical patients such as those suffering from T.B., alcohol rehabilitation groups or of those assisting alcoholics,
- cultural activities - popular barrio library groups, media groups, popular theatre groups, communication committees, youth groups and federations,
- religious activities - Christian base communities practising "Liberation Theology", brotherhoods, and sister fraternities,
- recreational activities - sports groups, committees and federations,
- educational activities - parent and student associations, preschool centres, etc.
- social clubs
Researchers have begun to systematize this blossoming in popular organizing, developing various typologies to provide some conceptual clarity. The most advanced in this respect is that of popular women's organizations in Chile, undertaken by Desling and her colleagues, which also has applicability to Lima. Their typology classifies group organization according to organic structure, objectives pursued and their degree of autonomy:

- by their organic structure as formal organizations or as informal groups,
- by their objectives as either internally oriented to satisfy the immediate needs of their membership whether that is through activities dealing with their subsistence level, education, reflection on their condition, or technical training; or externally oriented turning their attention to problems or situations that transcend the group's members through consciousness-raising activities that will in turn lead to denouncing unfair governmental or institutional policies and practices, or taking issue with the nature of service delivery or assistance provided by outsiders, or other such social action oriented activity,
- by their character as either autonomous associations or dependent on interventions from external agents for their constitution and functioning, whether in a material, technical or institutional sense.

Using these three criteria as a point of departure, Desling divided groups further according to the nature of their activities:

- denouncing external actions taken by government and NGOs; or claiming their rights as citizens, women, seniors or any other assumed status,
- training for dealing with subsistence conditions, either as mothers' associations or social action centres,
- animation and promotion for the creation of human rights groups, health committees, recreational groups, etc.
- human growth and rehabilitation such as women's consciousness-raising groups or those attending to alcoholism, etc.
- formation of self-help and mutual aid groups such as "comedores familiares", housing cooperatives, artisan and craft cooperative workshops, etc.
- giving assistance or service to each other, or such groups as pensioners or widows, committees of local health assistants, recreational groups, fraternal groups and Christian base communities, etc.
As a third variable entering the typology, groups were divided by viewing their participants as either, in seeking social or political space for themselves, becoming quite prominent through the formation of women's solidarity and rights groups; or in considering them as more effective instruments than individual efforts in addressing needs; the "comedores familiares", pre-school centres or sports clubs for recreation serve as examples.

What is evident is the growing diversity in the popular barrio movement in the midst of a continuing economic and urban crisis. It is apparent also that the traditional neighbourhood block-based organizations have failed to address the multitude of needs articulated by these sectoral and functional organizations and groups. Block-based organizations also have been incapable of absorbing these new entities into their own organizational structure. While yet lacking a structural unity, all these activities and groups do project a collective expression of the barrio dwellers into the social and political arenas, and become more liberated through their participation. This is a totally new phenomenon.

The significant actors who have emerged are the women. In some large barrios such as Villa El Salvador they have formed a Federation of Popular Women's Organizations, bringing together a great diversity of such groups into one central organization that based on the collective membership's own assessment of their needs as women as well as citizens, has started to formulate its own policies and to influence the political decision-making process at the municipal level.

II.7 Non-Governmental Centres and Popular Education

The new thrust in the popular barrio movement has been aided in a significant way by a growing number of voluntary centres, most of which have appeared since 1980. One of these centres will be examined in a follow-up case study. The centres serve in a promotional, developmental or research capacity and are largely supported through international funding, with Canada, Germany, Holland, Italy, England, Switzerland, France, Spain and recently the U.S. (through the Inter-American Foundation) being the principal donor countries in approximately that order.

Of the 255 NGO centres in Peru, 61 focus on the urban scene of Lima. The independent National Association of Centres is currently conducting a
survey, and systemization of the specific functions engaged in, the particular popular sector they serve, and what concrete services are provided. Centres might work with shanty-town dwellers in their role as "neighbours", as "women", as "children", or they may work through neighbourhood block organizations.

Their functions might be in promoting primary health care practices among women as their main objective, through participation of local women in community organizations and through popular education. Their function might consist of promoting women's involvement in mutual aid organizations such as "comedores familiares" and their training in the management of such operations; or in training local barrio health promoters; in promoting community business; researching the impact of traditional medical practices on the local population; investigating the patterns of women's participation in community organizations; promoting family planning; etc.

Services range from providing business skills, financial planning and accounting, legal assistance, crafts training, nutritional training, developing communication and media skills, and putting pamphlets or news bulletins together. Furthermore, organizational skills provided by some centres range from setting up cooperatives, developing self-managed democratically-run community organizations, chairing meetings, taking notes, workshop or conference planning, organizing youth clubs, etc. Others provide information through presentation of panels of experts, documentation on various aspects of barrio life and their publication, etc.

The State has recently begun to decentralize its own work with barrio sectors through PAIT (program on assistance of temporary income), mothers' clubs which are now required to register if they are to be eligible for government assistance in local projects, or through health committees connected with the Ministry of Health. The little direct experience the government has in working with "Pueblos Jovenes" and its temptation to gain political control of the autonomous local organizations brings it into conflict not only with the barrio movement, but also with the NGO centres.

Recognizing the experience of the NGOs, government has set up a special consultative office within the "Cooperacion Popular" office under the auspices of the National Institute of Planning to promote technical cooperation with the barrio movement and NGO centres. The centres, being
well accepted and trusted by the autonomous local barrio organizations for their dedication, commitment and emphasis on popular education, view this new action by the State as questionable, with the ulterior motive of under­
mining them as a major force in the social development arena of the margi­
mal urban sector. President Velasco before, in the late sixties, tried through the creation of a lofty National System of Popular Mobilization to gain a foothold among the popular masses, but when his real intentions came through the experiment turned against him.

The current APRA government does not seem to have formed a clear posi­
tion on popular education. Its major strategy appears to be to alleviate the conditions of the marginal sector by means of programs that are prin­
cipally economic in design and content and devoid of input through popular education.69
III. CONCLUSION: ALIGNMENTS OF THE FOUR MAJOR ACTORS ON THE MUNICIPAL SCENE AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION

National government and its various administrative branches have for long been regarded by elements of the barrio movement as the only worthwhile target for their organizing activities and for attempts to recover their rights as citizens. In more recent years barrio leaders have begun to redefine their strategies, viewing the municipal arena as a more accessible and manageable political space. The municipality, also an organ of the State apparatus, has the advantage of being closer to them with municipal elected authorities being better known. Furthermore, most municipal functions and current program priorities relate more directly to the immediate concerns particularly of the poorest inhabitants, whether in urban development, health, social services, education and culture, or urban transportation. Under these changed conditions, municipal government, at least at the Metropolitan if not at the district level, is viewed as potentially more sensitive and likely to respond, without repression, to the pressures and demands of popular organizations. In some instances the municipality has joined forces with popular organizations to pressure national government, as occurred in the case of the "Vaso de Leche" program (see section II.4.3).

National government chooses to enter the municipal arena through its distinct policies and programs emanating directly from the Presidential Office, such as the Accion Popular, PAIT and PAD programs, or from its Ministries or decentralized operations. It thus becomes a major actor at that level either in cooperation or in competition with the municipality. With the election of the United Left to the government of Metropolitan Lima and many of its municipal districts in 1983, and with the APRA social democratic party assuming power at the national level in 1985, there has been increasing competition between the two levels, frequently to the apparent immediate benefit of the inhabitants of popular barrios.

In short, several major actors have entered the municipal space of Lima and have turned it into a dynamic arena of interacting forces in the span of a few years. Before, the major axis of operation was that between national government and popular social movements, in which central govern-
ment carried all the trump cards, using repressive measures if it did not get its way. The new major actors now include, beside the popular barrio movement and national government, the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima and its various municipal districts, and the NGO centres of social promotion, development and research.

Theoretically and in practice, these have transformed the social and political process into a number of identifiable models of alliances and oppositions arranged around diverse axes of operation that differ in intent and in the results obtained in improved living conditions and transformation of the popular barrio sector.

One such central axis focuses on the dynamic relationship between national and municipal government, in which the local population is a mere bystander and passive beneficiary of the initiatives taken by either level of government. In the case of municipal initiatives the principal task consists of clearing up those ambiguous areas in which ascribed functions and activities of both levels coincide. The clearest example of this is the jurisdictional function of urban development (see Section II.3). Another is the "emerging food and nutritional program" in the social services domain where the Municipality took the initiative, with central government responding after pressure. It should be added here that in the case of the "Vaso de Leche" program the barrio movement, while not an active participant in its conception and planning, did play a major role in its implementation and in joining forces with the Municipality to confront national government.

A second axis is that in which central government seeks a direct alliance with the marginal sector of the population. In this, government either unilaterally introduces and executes its programs without involving the popular sector, as is often done in health, education, and economic development programs; or, as in the case of Cooperacion Popular and PAIT, it seeks the participation of the local marginal community in the prioritization of projects in which barrio dwellers are perceived as the principal beneficiaries.

A third axis involves the relationship between the municipality and the barrios. In this case several variations have been identified:
The "traditional bureaucratic" management model, the most common form of municipal practice, where in spite of its proximity, the local community is considered a passive recipient of services; or, as often is the case with "Pueblos Jovenes", reluctantly dealt with or completely ignored unless pressured through an effectively mobilized barrio population.

The second model based on this axis has been referred to as the "advocacy" model, in which the municipality advocates unilaterally on behalf of the popular barrios, reclaiming their rights and representing their interests. An example of this in Lima is the municipal district of Chorillo headed by a politically independent Mayor. Barrio Villa Venturo, reported on in a follow-up case study, is located in this district.

A third is the "organizing and participant" model in which the municipality takes upon itself the task of actively mobilizing and organizing the community. The intent of this activity may be either for mutual benefit and interest in relation to local development issues independent from central government; or with the expressed purpose of strengthening the hand of the municipality in negotiating with central government as the opponent. A good example of this is the municipal district of San Martin de Porres, consisting of a large number of older settlements (previously invasions), that have achieved legal status and a basic urban infrastructure. A committee of development integrates representatives from both the municipal government and community organizations who jointly address and plan development programs.

The fourth and final municipal model has been identified as the fully "integrated" model in which the municipality is basically the organized community, being almost interchangeable with it. The only existing case of this model is Villa El Salvador. This "self-managing urban community" (CUAVES) functioned as the only effective representative community organization of local settlers long before its creation by Congressional decree as a new municipal district in June 1983. The first Act of the newly elected local government (whose members were former CUAVES leaders) was an Agreement between the district Municipality and CUAVES, approved in a general com-
munity assembly and signed in January 1984, in which various municipal powers were to be fully delegated to the central neighbourhood organization (CUAVES). Coordinating and collaborative structures in general planning and program implementations were established under a system of equal partnership.

A fourth and final axis relevant to this study and widely practised in Lima involves the relationship between popular organizations (or sub-groups of the community) and NGO centres of a domestic or international character (see Section II.7). It has been noted already that this model will be examined through a case study involving Villa Ventura as a "Pueblo Joven" and CELATS as a NGO centre. In this instance, the alignment principally consists of technical cooperation and assistance.

Taken together, the findings of the systematic analysis on social development initiatives reported on above lead us to several important conclusions:

1. That conditions of the marginal urban as well as rural sector of the population have taken on alarming dimensions.

2. That both the national government and municipality of Metropolitan Lima have responded belatedly with survival and development strategies that are for the first time integrated and targeted to that sector of the population.

3. That popular participation, while considered significant in the formulation of these new plans by each level of government, is accorded different emphasis, leading to varying results in the broadening of the base of democracy.

4. That the poor, in spite of considerable personal and structural obstacles, do become fully involved and participate ably in government or N.G.O. initiated programs when they perceive that they have a direct stake in the outcome, or are given responsibility and a degree of control in the mediating local community organizations.

5. That in responding effectively to widespread conditions of hardship, official and N.G.O. initiatives must take into account the growing diversity in human needs and heterogeneity reflected in the popular barrio movement.

6. Finally, the analysis suggests that the success of any program, both from the viewpoint of cost effectiveness in the use of human resources and of liberation from oppressive living conditions, calls for autonomous functioning in local community organizations and popular education input.
References and Footnotes

1. Hubert Campfens, "Survival characteristics of the marginal urban population within the context of Latin American economic and urban crisis - the case of Mexico City" in the journal Humanidades, Universidad Industrial de Santander, Colombia, 1986.


3. Hubert Campfens, "The struggle of settlement and land tenancy in Mexico City - the case of El Cerro del Judio and Las Tres Cruces", Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada, 1986.


5. A recent article in a Peruvian weekly exposed a particular instance of shrewd operators banking on the desperate housing needs of the poor by trafficking with land that belongs to the State, thereby adding to this informal and illegal practice of urbanization. See "La estafa de tu vida" in Cambio, No. 15, July 24, 1986, Lima. This phenomenon is not dissimilar to that of Mexico City, documented by the author, see reference #3.

6. "Pueblos Jovenes" (young towns) is the new name given to what before 1968 were called "barriadas" or poor city districts, usually squatter communities lacking legal status and urban infrastructure services.


15. APRA stands for "Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana", a political movement founded in 1928 in Mexico by Peruvian-born Victor Raul Haya aimed at achieving an integrated Latin America. The APRA party in Peru attempts to integrate the urban popular sectors, middle class, campesinos, and the nationalist-oriented capitalist sector into one social force. Its platform consists of a popular nationalist line, viewing the role of the State as going beyond its traditional administrative function to that of exercising distributive justice.


20. Rodrigo Nunez, "Para entender a la izquierda" in *Cuadernos Urbanos*, Vol.16, March 1986, Lima. The United Left Party (Izquierda Unida) is an alliance of six political parties ranging from the radical left to the more moderate centre left. This alliance of the left is presided by Alfonso Barrantes, the actual Mayor of Lima since the 1983 municipal elections, whose political orientation approximates that of the left position of the governing social democratic APRA Party. The three dominant parties that make up the "Izquierda Unida" are PUM (a hardline Marxist party), Patria Roja (Maoist in origin, but now following the new China policy line that is more open to negotiation, with popular and labour support, particularly from the militant national union of educators - SUTEP), and PCP (the Peruvian Communist Party, a well-organized party with little support from the popular masses, following the Moscow policy line). In addition there are the small parties of P.S.R. (the Communist Revolutionary Party), and FOCEP (the Worker, Farmer, Student and Popular Front).

The Izquierda Unida gained 25% of the popular vote in the July 1985 election, forming the second largest political force in Peru following APRA with 50%. The Christian Democratic PPC, a far right party, gained 12% of the popular vote; followed by the Accion Popular with 7%, which formed the previous government pursuing a liberal policy of modernization that became highly unpopular, and almost led to its demise.


24. Much information on "Cooperacion Popular" has been obtained through personal interviews with senior officials of the program.


27. Most of the information on PAIT is drawn from a report of a national conference on "Cooperacion Popular": Peru, PAIT, 1ª Reunion nacional de centrales del sistema de Cooperacion Popular, Jan.3 - Feb.3, 1986.


Galofre notes that since 1974 there have been a broad range of reports published that demonstrate international preoccupations with the design of strategies and alternative policies searching for ways to alleviate extreme poverty in the context of social and political crisis situations. Those that seem to come closest to achieving such a goal are those that focus on the creation of employment opportunities and redistribution of income. However, these socially oriented policies conflict most often with the interests of the powerful elite producing a political crisis and repression. Furthermore, the large external debts of many Third World countries limit their options.

29. Refer to a report in the weekly Peruvian magazine Cambio, No.5, May 15, 1986.


32. See: "Memorial del encuentro nacional de comedores convocado por la Comision Episcopal de Accion Social (CEAS), julio, 1986" included in the Lima daily La Republica, August 17, 1986.
33. See: Informe del proyecto cocinas familiares, Presidencia de la Republica de Perú, December, 1983.

34. See: Plan de desarrollo urbano-marginal del corto plazo, op. cit.


36. Violeta Sara - La Posse, Comedores Comunales: la mujer frente a la crisis, Grupo de Trabajo, Servicios Urbanos y Mujeres de Bajos Ingresos, Lima, 1984

37. The principal researchers are Anna Boggia, CIED - Centro de Investigacion de Educacion y Desarrollo, Lima; and Diego Palma, DESCO - Centro de Estudios y Promocion de Desarrollo, Lima.


Villa El Salvador as one of the two shanty-town case examples on Peru included in this research project will be reported on in a follow-up paper.


41. Interview with the director of the Oficina General de Participacion Vecinal, Municipalidad de Lima Metropolitana, August 1986.

42. Instituto Libertad y Democracia (ILD), "Derecho de propiedad para todos los Peruanos", Diario La Republica, May 7, 1986.


44. For comments on Comedores Populares refer to Section I.5 of the paper.


46. Interviews by the author with the alderman and chief administrator of the "Vaso de Leche" program for the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima.

47. Each of the 35 Departments that together make up the country, is divided into a number of provincial municipalities; thus the Department of Lima contains also the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima.

49. For an account on PAD see section I.5 of this paper.


51. This barrio was included as one of the two barrios selected in Lima that forms part of the research project by the author on shanty towns in Peru, Mexico and Colombia; and from which data reported on the case illustration were derived.

52. Rocío Valdeavellano, "Informe sobre sobrevivencia siquica y liberación", in *Cuadernos Urbanos*, No. 16 (CENCA) March 1986, Lima.

53. Blanca Chancoso is a highly respected Ecuadorian indigenous feminist leader who appeared as major speaker at the XII International Socialist Conference held in Lima in July 1986. See *Cambio*, No. 15, July 24, 1986.

54. Data related to policy and projects of the municipality of Metropolitan Lima on neighborhood organization and popular participation is based on an interview with the director of the General Office of Neighborhood Participation and other senior officials of the municipal government.


58. Vargas, idem.


60. Information derived from interviews with staff of the General Office of Neighborhood Participation and official documents.

61. Teresa Tovar, op. cit.


66. Interviews with leaders of the Federacion de Organizaciones Populares de Mujeres de Villa El Salvador.

67. CELATS - Educational Centre of Social Work for Latin America, Lima.


69. Information on this section has been derived from interviews with the Asociacion Nacional de Centros and executive personnel of a representative sample of centres of social promotion, development and research, affiliated to the national association.
