Security Entrenchment and the Dynamics of Politicide: Evidence from Indonesia

Mark Winward
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto
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Abstract
This dissertation examines variations in violence during politicide. Why do some areas have greater levels of killings and long term detentions than others, controlling for the size of the victim group? Moreover, why do some areas have greater rates of killing relative to detentions? Using process tracing to compare three Indonesian provinces that experienced politicide in 1965-66, I argue these dynamics are shaped by two factors: the degree to which security forces are entrenched at the local level, and the strength of civilian networks willing to collaborate with security forces. The first two chapters develop my theoretical framework, situate it in current debates of mass violence, and outline the methodology used. Chapter three overviews the origins of the Indonesian politicide, in which the Indonesian army killed an estimated 500,000 civilian communist supporters. The following three chapters trace the dynamics of this politicide in Central Java, East Java, and West Java. Through these cases, I demonstrate that low security entrenchment leads to higher levels of violence and higher rates of killing, as security forces lacked the ability to use violence more selectively. The strain of caring for these detainees then poses a logistical problem and incentivizes mass executions. Collaborator networks can further increase killings when security forces are weak by pressuring them to use additional lethal
violence or engage in lethal violence unilaterally. I conclude by demonstrating how these findings are likely to apply across cases of politicide more broadly, and reflect on the relationship between security capacity, mass violence, and repression.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1 Introduction

Sri Muhayati was born in 1941 in Yogyakarta, an administratively distinct province geographically located in Central Java, Indonesia. The daughter of a local Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI) member, Ibu Sri attended the local Gadjah Mada University in her youth with the goal of becoming a doctor. Just prior to the completion of her studies, a subsection of the PKI leadership, along with dissident members of the Indonesian army, launched a failed purge of members of the army high command who they believed were plotting a coup against then-President Sukarno (Roosa 2006). In the weeks that followed Sri’s father was arrested, and the military police summoned Sri some days later. In prison, she witnessed the torture of other suspected communists, as well as forced disappearances from the prison system. While she herself was spared torture or execution, Sri was held without trial for five years, and upon release her state identity documents labelled her a former political prisoner, severely limiting her potential for future employment. Her immediate family was barred from post-secondary education, while her father disappeared from the prison system, one of an estimated 500,000 Indonesians executed by the Indonesian army and their civilian allies (Cribb 1990:12). Sri’s father was but one victim in one of the largest episodes of politicide to occur since the end of the Second World War. By politicide, I mean the mass repression of a group in which a portion of the group is intentionally targeted with lethal violence based on their role within the group – in other words selective violence. Unlike episodes of genocide, when ones purported membership in an identity group is sufficient grounds for killing, in politicide, perpetrators seek to limit killing to specific members of a larger identity group. Rather than attempt to physically exterminate an entire identity group, perpetrators instead attempt to target specific role-identities within a group such as leaders, activists, intellectuals, or cadres.¹

¹ I elaborate on this definition in the following chapter.
Sri’s story is far from a unique one in Indonesia at that time. Still, the likelihood of her experience varied substantially depending on where one resided in Indonesia during the time of the killings. Had Sri and her family lived three hundred kilometers west, in the province of West Java, the likelihood of her being arrested would have decreased fourfold. At the same time, had she and her family lived six hundred kilometers to the east, in the province of East Java, it is four times as likely that Sri would have been killed rather than face prolonged incarceration. Such differing magnitudes of repressive violence and variations in the ratio of killings to detentions existed despite each province having large numbers of communist party supporters.

These differences in politicide dynamics are not unique to Indonesia. Studies of the 1972 killings in Burundi, for example, in which the Burundian Army sought to eliminate Hutu intellectuals and elites, also show marked regional differences. In the province of Ngozi, killings reached extremely high levels, and were often characterized by mob violence and public killings. In contrast, other northern provinces had less killings, comparatively more arrests, and the politicide campaign was much more orderly, insofar as arrests and killings were not marked with public brutality (see Russell 2015:440-441). The scale of killing was still enormous, but also far less than if there had been an attempt to exterminate the Hutu populace writ large (Lemarchand 1974).

The killings and disappearances that characterized Pinochet’s rule in Chile are another example of politicide. There, the ruling military junta waged a campaign of widespread violence against suspected “communists” and “terrorists” from 1970-1989 – especially 1973-1974.

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2 Because killings were not directed against the entirety of the Hutu population, René Lemarchand dubbed the killings “selective genocide” (1974). I include these in the category of politicide due to the selectiveness of the killings. That the victims were selected based on a subsection of a racial category is immaterial to the categories of genocide and politicide advanced here. I discuss this at greater length in the following chapter.

3 As Aidan Russel describes the violence: “Barriers were raised to sift the population for chosen targets, and lists of names of people to be arrested, abducted and murdered were handed out to the state’s agents. Prominent political leaders, including Tutsi who opposed the ruling clique, were liquidated; Hutu across the country who were able to, or learning to, read were arrested; and any who had achieved a marginal level of exceptionality in economic success or other social achievement were taken, under the same terms of categorized violence, by the army and the state that it dominated” (2015:437).
that included mass detentions and executions. Like Indonesia and Burundi, the forms and levels of violence differed dramatically over time and space (Valdia Ortiz de Zarate 2003:186-189). While some segments of the population – such as trade unionists – were especially likely to be victims, they were not targeted in their entirety, nor were other sectors of the civilian population spared violent repression. In both cases, the regime took at least some steps to collect information for the purpose of screening particular subsets of individuals from broader social categories in order to deploy violence (see also Matei and de Castro Garcia 2017:341-343). The violence also took on countintuitive patterns, with some areas having high numbers of arrests even when the population was seen as generally loyal to the regime (Esberg 2018).

These differing dynamics – variations in the scale of repressive violence and rates of killing – are not captured well by existing theories of violent conflict. Top down explanations of mass killing, for example, fail to capture why there would be such differences in magnitude across regions, controlling for the relative size of the victim group. Moreover, these explanations explicitly leave out different forms of violence deployed by the state at the same time as mass killings, such as mass incarceration (eg: Valentino 2004). Similarly, explanations centered on the need to prevent collaboration with opposition forces are a poor fit for explaining these dynamics: as violence in politicide is frequently one sided, there is often no opposition to which to defect (eg: Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2017). Finally, explanations rooted in state breakdown or local grievances fail to account for differing scales of violence: why in some cases victims are detained rather than killed – and at varying rates, especially when mass arrests and killings erupt simultaneously across broad swathes of territory (eg: Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010; Su 2011).

In this dissertation I seek to explain regional variations in levels of repressive violence and rates of killing during politicide. Why do some regions experience greater levels of repressive violence – the combination of long term detention and killing relative to the size of the victim group in the region – than others? Moreover, why do some areas experience greater rates of killing relative to the number of those detained for long periods of time? Over the course of this dissertation I develop and test a theory to explain both of these dynamics. In doing so, I introduce a framework for understanding when violence in politicide is likely to spiral, as well as the conditions under which security forces are more likely to opt for lethal violence as a
strategy. Neither of these dynamics are explained by current theories of violent conflict, mass killing, and repression. In this introductory chapter I summarize my main arguments, as well as their significance for the study of violence. I also briefly consider their policy significance. I follow this with an overview of the remaining chapters in this dissertation.

2 The Argument, in Brief:

In this dissertation I argue that the magnitude of repressive violence during politicide is conditioned by two factors: what I term security entrenchment and the strength of the collaborator network. First, politicide is likely to be greater in areas in which the organization responsible for repression, usually the security organs of a state, is only partially entrenched at the local level. Politicide is the deployment of doubly selective violence on an enormous scale: individuals are targeted not just on their membership of a group, broadly defined, but also based on their role within this group. Because of this, implementing politicide requires large amounts of private information. This information allows security forces to identify members of the subgroup they intend to target from the larger population. As targeting is often based on an individual’s role-identity within a larger identity group, perpetrators must seek greater private information than if targeting were based only on previous political membership, ethnic identity, or other broad characteristics (Kalyvas 2006:173-183). Not only does this information allow for the identification of potential targets, it also helps to limit violence to its intended victims.

Security forces are only able to collect the private information required to successfully implement politicide unilaterally if they are deeply entrenched in local society. When this occurs, security forces often have access to detailed local intelligence, formal networks of informants, and the ability to independently verify claims of individual identity (see also Eck 2015; Greitens 2016). In contrast, when local security entrenchment is lacking, security forces are forced to turn to local civilians – especially civilian elites - to provide private information through denunciation and to help form or empower civilian militia (Kalyvas 2006:176-181; Eck 2015; Balcells 2017:31-32). When so empowered, civilian elites have an incentive to use professional security forces as a force multiplier with which to resolve their own private and political grievances via false denunciations. As security forces lack the ability to properly assess civilian denunciations, empowering civilians to provide intelligence increases the magnitude of repressive violence. Elites are often also instrumental in encouraging violent action, such as...
that of civilian militiamen, during conflict. These militia, in turn, can use their newfound authority to arrest and/or kill to further increase the magnitude of repressive violence as they move against local opponents.

I also argue that low security entrenchment is likely to increase the rate of killing relative to detentions. This is for two reasons. First, the information-poor conditions that incentivizes security forces to turn to civilian organizations in the first place means that these same security forces are often ill-equipped to screen individuals once arrested. This, in turn, is more likely to make security forces deploy lethal violence against the detainee population in a more indiscriminate manner as they seek to eliminate a subsection of the detainee population. This problem can be further magnified by the use of torture, which information-poor environments encourage, thus increasing the level of false confessions and misidentification (Dubois 1990; Roosa 2008). The second reason is what I refer to as the logistical problem: the massive influx of detainees caused by outsourcing intelligence collection to civilians places a huge burden on security forces to house and feed these detainees. The logistical challenge of doing so incentivizes local commanders to rely on mass executions to bring the detainee population to a level that they can materially provide for. Rather than all killings flowing directly from central intent, I argue that in areas of low security entrenchment, mass killings are often a brutal strategy to deal with an acute logistical problem. Together, these factors suggest that rates of killing will be higher when security entrenchment is low.

The second factor governing variations in violence during politicide is the strength of the collaborator network. When civilian elites antagonistic to the group being targeted in politicide are both well coordinated and have access to their own source of organized violence at the local level, they can increase rates of killing. They do this by encouraging militia under their influence to unilaterally engage in lethal violence, and by using the threat of this to pressure local security force commanders to raise rates of killing. This is most likely to occur where previous political competition had been especially fierce, and when local elites fear future marginalization at the hands of the group being targeted in politicide. I refer to these civilian elites as the collaborator network. This network only important when security entrenchment is low: when security entrenchment is high, there is no need to empower civilian elites, and any threats by these elites can be resisted by security forces themselves. The relationship between
security entrenchment, collaborator networks, and rates of killing are summarized in Table 1.1, below. I expand this argument in the following chapter.

**TABLE 1.1: Rates of Killing in Politicide Relative to Detentions**

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<th>Collaborator Network</th>
<th>Security Entrenchment</th>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Low rates of killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low rates of killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Medium rates of killing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>High rates of killing</td>
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Over the course of this dissertation I test this argument in three case studies, all of which are Indonesian provinces that experienced politicide during the army’s anti-communist campaign in 1965-66. In the conclusion, I also show that the implications of this argument can be observed broadly across cases of politicide at the national level.

3  **Research Significance and Policy Implications:**

This project makes six important contributions to our understanding of repressive violence, mass killing, and the use of violence against civilians more generally. First, I demonstrate that studies of mass killing or violence would benefit from disaggregation based on the selectivity of violence. Most events in the Political Instability Taskforce database are not genocides as occurred in the cases of Rwanda or Armenia. Instead, most are events fit the description of doubly-selective violence (see Harff 2003; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017). Rather than build a set of theories around outright genocide such as those of the Holocaust or Rwandan Genocide – the type of events that occur the least frequently – more theoretical attention needs to be paid to more common forms of mass violence such as those that I label politicide. Doing so will help to better understand how these types of events flow from the decision to implement to conditions on the ground. In doing so, I show how factors such as entrenchment lead to variations in overall levels of violence.
Second, this project helps to explain the conditions under which mass repression is more likely to be lethal, even when mass killings were not the explicit goal of the state or its security forces (see also chapter one). Even when mass executions are the explicit goal of security forces, their relative frequency varies considerably based on the ability of security forces to unilaterally identify those whom they initially intend to kill, and on the initiative of powerful civilian actors. This finding is especially important for studies of mass killing, which often emphasize the top-down nature of the violence (eg: Valentino 2004). Rather than mass killings flowing directly from state policy, this study suggests that reaching the high threshold of killings required for inclusion as an incidence of mass killing may instead be a product of state weakness. States with a weak security apparatus that cannot properly entrench itself at the local level cannot unilaterally collect sufficient private information with which to use violence – including killing – as selectively as it otherwise could. Moreover, these security forces are also less able to resist outside pressure. It is possible – and perhaps likely – that “negative cases” of mass killing are so because of greater state capacity to implement more selective killings. Moreover, this project provides a mechanism to understand how mass killing can unfold in situations in which it is not the initial intent of security forces.

Third, I introduce a new explanatory factor governing the treatment of political prisoners during repression: what I term the logistical problem (see chapter one). To date, studies of repression and violence have not considered the cost that security forces face in caring for large detainee populations. When resources are scarce, this logistical problem can incentivize security forces to rely on executions as a means of lowering the costs of detainee care. As per above, this suggests that the degree of lethal violence may not be tied to the initial intent of security forces.

Fourth, this research makes a contribution to the study of anti-civilian violence in areas in which there is no contested sovereignty. Studies that focus on the information problem that targeted repression and killing represent most frequently do so in the context of a two-sided civil war, in which sovereignty can be contested by both the state and insurgent groups (eg: Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Balcells 2017). This study demonstrates that targeted killings outside of civil war are governed by the same information problem that occurs within it: namely that security forces must still identify their intended victims from within a broader community through obtaining private information. Rather than control being a product of military dominance over a territory, this study demonstrates that control – conceived here as
entrenchment – also involves substantial effort in integrating security forces into local society, rather than the brute force of occupation. This study also suggests a potential reason by which weak states come to imprison or target so many perceived opponents in peacetime. Denunciations, should they be solicited by security forces, may actually be higher outside of civil wars: in these cases, there is no potential opposition with which to counter-denounce ones opponents. Similarly, this project suggests that it is not simply control over a territory that governs degrees of violence, but what I call security entrenchment. Simply holding territory does not mean that security forces can collect intelligence accurately from within said territory. Instead, security forces need to actively engage in forming intelligence networks over long periods of time if they are to be able to successfully implement selective violence.

Fifth, this project helps to bridge gaps between state-centric accounts of mass violence and those that emphasize the importance of local factors. A focus on the capacity of security forces provides a link between top-down explanations – those centered on the initial decision to rely upon repressive violence – with local studies that emphasize the importance of local political factors, relationships, and grievances for facilitating violence at the local level (eg: Fujii 2009; Longman 2011). Without discounting the importance of the latter, this project suggests that the importance of local level factors is heavily conditioned by the entrenchment of security forces at the local level. When security forces do not need to rely upon local actors, the ability for local grievances, family ties, and other such variables to influence the process of repressive violence is significantly more limited. This project makes a similar contribution to the emerging literature on pro-government militia (PGM) and their impact on violence against civilians (eg: Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014; Cohen and Nordas 2015; Koren 2015). This study suggests that such PGM have an impact on violence, but only to the extent to which security forces have to rely upon them due to shortcomings in their own organizational capacity.

Finally, the theory that I present here ought to hold across varying units of analysis. The main focus of this dissertation is on differing politicide dynamics in three Indonesian provinces. However, in both chapters five and six I demonstrate that the links between entrenchment and collaborator networks on one hand, and violence and killings on the other, also can help explain variations below the provincial level. In the conclusion, I also provide some preliminary evidence that my findings are can help to explain variations in violence across national-level instances of politicide.
I also make two contributions to the study of the Indonesian killings specifically. First, I provide the first in-depth account for regional differences in both repressive violence and rates of killing across different provinces. I show how these variations are due to both differing levels of security entrenchment across the country, as well as differences in the relative strength of the collaborator network. While the Army was ultimately in control of the arrests and killings in a direct physical sense, its reliance on civilian actors for information precluded the ability to limit violence towards those to which it was initially intended. Once civilians were empowered to identify communist party supporters, the sudden spike of detainees this created incentivized security forces to rely on mass executions to alleviate the burden of feeding and housing such huge numbers of political prisoners.

Second, I help to clarify the relative role of the Army and civilian actors in perpetrating the Indonesian killings. The consensus as to who is ultimately responsible for implementing the killings has only recently coalesced on the central role played by the Indonesian Army under the command of Suharto for unleashing politicide (Roosa 2016; Robinson 2018; Melvin 2018). In a broad sense, I do not challenge this interpretation. However, following Mathias Hammer (2013), I find that while the Army is responsible for unleashing killings, they were not always able to fully control said violence. Anticommunist civilian elites, and the organizations in which they played a central role, were key actors in providing the Army with the necessary information and manpower to move against the communist party. In providing these, this collaborator network also expanded the scale of politicide in Indonesia, frequently bringing in those with little or no ties to the communist party into the crosshairs of the army. In doing so, I integrate earlier studies focused on the role of local conflicts (eg: Young 1990; Sulistyo 1997) to show the conditions under which they influenced a campaign of politicide directed by the Army. Rather than exonerating the Indonesian Army in one of the largest atrocities of the 20th Century, my findings suggest that the leadership and membership of some of Indonesia’s largest mass organizations were instrumental, rather than incidental, perpetrators of this violence.

In terms of policy implications, this project helps to clarify against whom, and where, international pressure ought to be directed in order to pre-empt or end politicide. My research strongly suggests that powerful civilian collaborators are likely to continue to implement violence, once empowered to do so, absent external constraints. Given this, it is not enough to focus international pressure only on state and military leaders seeking to implement politicide.
Instead, pressure must be brought to bear on powerful civilian actors in regions experiencing politicide to end violence. This can be done directly by the international community, or indirectly, through pressuring the security forces who once empowered these civilian actors to use their capability to repress remaining armed groups.

A somewhat more promising policy implication is that intervention in politicide is most likely to be successful in the same cases in which politicide is likely to be most severe. As I show throughout this dissertation, politicide is likely to be most intense in areas in which security forces are only weakly entrenched, and when they are weak relative to civilian actors. In these conditions, security forces are also likely to be more susceptible to international pressure, as they are unlikely to be able to inflict significant costs on a potential humanitarian intervention. This means that potential interveners will be the most likely to succeed in the instances of the worst violence, and that they will be able to do so without major casualties. Knowing this trade off should help to better allocate the scarce resources available for potential humanitarian intervention.

4 The Layout of the Dissertation:

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter I develop a theory of politicide dynamics. I define and discuss the key terms of this project: politicide, security entrenchment, repressive violence, rates of killing, and collaborator networks. I note how my use of these terms at times deviates from the established literature, and what is gained from this deviation. I also review existing explanations for variations in the magnitude of repressive violence and killings. I establish that as doubly-selective violence, politicide perpetrators face similar problems of screening targets from a broader population group as do armed groups in civil wars. I also introduce a new theoretical insight with which to understand the relationship between detentions and killings in politicide: the logistical problem. I argue that security forces face a growing logistical problem as the number of detainees rises, as they must confront the challenge of feeding and housing a growing prison population. Should they be unable to do so, they have an incentive to rely upon mass executions as a means of lowering the prison population. This is most likely to happen in areas of low security entrenchment, as targeting is likely to be less accurate, and security forces are unlikely to have as great a capacity to muster resources to house detainees. I also argue that when security forces are weak, strong
collaborator networks can further raise rates of killing by pressuring security forces to use additional lethal violence, and by attacking targets unilaterally.

In chapter three I overview the research methods, data used, and case selection in this project. I show how this project follows practices of good process tracing (see Bennett and Checkel 2014). I elaborate on the parts of my hypothesized causal process that I am looking to observe in each of the case studies that form chapters four through six. I also review the sources of data that I use, including archival materials, Indonesian military sources, and interviews conducted during fieldwork. I reflect on the interview process, and overview the means through which respondents were identified and approached during fieldwork. I conclude by discussing case selection for this project.

In chapter four I overview the main perpetrators and victims during the Indonesian politicide: The Army, the PKI, and Indonesia’s various anticommunist sociopolitical organizations. I demonstrate that in the years preceding the politicide, the PKI became the most powerful civilian actor in Indonesia while simultaneously challenging the entrenched interests of both the Army and competing civilian organizations. I show how the PKI’s opponents threatened by the prospect of the PKI eventually gaining power, leading them to form a loose anticommunist alliance alongside army leadership that would be crucial for later implementing politicide. I also overview the September 30th Movement that served as a catalyst for politicide and Suharto’s ascent to power as the leader of the Armed Forces. I follow this by a brief summary of how politicide unfolded in Indonesia.

In chapter five I test my theoretical argument in Central Java, a case in which security entrenchment was low and the collaborator network weak. I establish how a lack of security entrenchment led the Army high command to rely on civilians to provide intelligence and auxiliary manpower with which to implement politicide. In turn, this led to a proliferations of arrests of those with no or only marginal ties to the communist party. The Army in Central Java would eventually rely on mass executions as a means of lowering the detainee population. However, the collaborator network was not able to substantially raise rates of killing further, and unilateral attacks by civilian militia were generally curtailed by the armed forces.

In chapter six I test my argument in East Java, where security entrenchment was low and the collaborator network strong. Like Central Java, troop redeployments and perceived disloyalties
incentivized commanders to turn to civilians to provide additional information and manpower. This led to huge numbers of arrests in the province. It also incentivized mass executions as a means of overcoming the logistical problem of feeding the detainee population. However, in East Java civilian elites, especially from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) drove rates of killing still higher. Having access to a large and capable militia in the form of Banser, NU was able to coordinate its activities to attack suspected communists, even in areas in which local commanders were initially reluctant to move against the PKI. In some instances, the collaborator network was also able to successfully pressure local commanders to increase executions. This led to both high rates of repressive violence and a high killing to detention ratio.

In chapter six I test my argument in West Java, a case in which security entrenchment was high. There, the local Siliwangi Division’s experience in combating an insurgency known as Darul Islam encouraged it to develop well integrated commands all the way to the village level. This allowed for a greater ability to collect intelligence on the PKI at the local level. Once politicide began, the Army had little need to empower civilians in West Java, leading to low levels of repressive violence and lower rates of killing than the other two cases. Underscoring the importance of security entrenchment, it appears that the majority of violence occurred in a small number of regencies in which the Siliwangi Division was comparatively less entrenched. Politicide was generally mild in areas that had previously been Darul Islam strongholds. My conclusion overviews the main contributions of this project and considers its policy implications. I also demonstrate the generalizeability of my findings, and suggest avenues of future study.
Chapter 2
A Theory of Politicide

5 Introduction

What explains differences in magnitudes of repressive violence and rates of killing in politicide, relative to the number of potential victims? Most comparative accounts of mass killing, genocide, and repression have not addressed spatial variations in the magnitude of violence. When comparisons have been made, the focus is most commonly on why killing occurred, what processes facilitated violence at the local level, or under what conditions civilians become perpetrators (eg: Valentino 2004; Midlarsky 2005; Straus 2006; Fujii 2009; McDoom 2014). However, such a focus has largely obscured the differences in scale: why some regions have relatively more repressive violence than others, and why some regions have more killings – relative to both the size of the victim group and the number of individuals targeted for repression more broadly. The few studies that do take up this issue often do so in contexts separate from politicide, such as civil war or state repression (eg: Eck 2015; Greitens 2016; Balcells 2017). There is no current theory to account for these differences when the state or its security forces attempts to implement politicide.

In this chapter I develop a theory to explain variations in repressive violence and rates of killing during politicide. In short, the dynamics of politicide are strongly conditioned by the entrenchment of the organization committing repressive violence – usually the security organs of the state - at the subnational level. I argue that repressive violence is likely to be higher when the security forces orchestrating such violence are only weakly entrenched at the local level. In these locations, security forces come to rely upon civilian elites for intelligence collection and, frequently, manpower. This allows these elites to capture elements of the campaign from below, resolving local political, personal, and organizational competition through false identification. Rates of killing, in turn, are driven by interaction effects between security force entrenchment, the logistics of caring for prisoners, and local collaborator networks. The rapid increase in prison populations brought about by relying on denunciations incentivizes security forces to rely on mass executions as a strategy for overcoming the logistical challenges of feeding and housing such a large number of prisoners. This problem is magnified by the fact that security forces often
lack the intelligence capacity to properly screen detainees effectively, making mass releases an unappealing option as security forces attempt to identify their initially intended targets. In addition to the logistics problem, collaborator networks may use their position to either direct militia under their influence attack targets unilaterally or pressure security forces to increase rates of killing still further. Both increase the number of killings relative to the number of incarcerations at the subnational level providing security forces are not well entrenched.

This chapter reviews existing literature and develops these theoretical arguments in greater detail. In the first section, I define the main theoretical terms in this study: politicide, repressive violence, rates of killing, and collaborator networks. I note here how my definitions depart from some of those previously established in the literature, and my justification for doing so. In the second section, I review existing theoretical explanations for varying levels of repressive violence. I focus on theories of why killings of civilians occur, state capacity, political competition, information problems, and the outsourcing of violence to civilian militia. In the second section, I develop an original theoretical account for varying rates of killing relative to detention at the subnational level. I focus here on intrinsic preferences of commanders, information problems, pressure from civilian elites, and especially what I term the logistical problems of caring for a large detainee population. In the final section I integrate these insights to develop a theory of violence during politicide that explains both levels of repressive violence and rates of killing.

6 Key Concepts

6.1 Politicide:

I define politicide as the repression of a group in which a portion of the group is intentionally targeted with lethal violence based on their role-identity within the group. Unlike episodes of genocide, when purported membership in an identity group is sufficient grounds for killing, in politicide, perpetrators seek to limit killing to specific members of a larger identity group. Rather than attempt to physically exterminate an entire identity group, perpetrators instead attempt to target specific role-identities within a group: leaders, activists, potential combatants, etc. However, Politicide typically aims to remove the public challenge that a particular group
represents, removing the group itself from meaningful participation in public life.\(^4\) As discussed in the introductory chapter, an example of this is the killings in Burundi 1972, in which the Tutsi-led military massacred an estimated 80,000-100,000 Hutu civilians (Lemarchand 1974:5).

Politicide differs significantly from what we commonly view as genocide, as well as many cases of mass killing more broadly. In the most unambiguous cases of genocide – such as the Holocaust, Armenian Genocide, and Rwandan Genocide – perceived membership in the broad categories of “Jew,” “Armenian,” or “Tutsi” was sufficient to become a target of violence (see also Midlarksy 2005). The same can broadly be said of the Great Terror (1936-1938) in the Soviet Union, in which anyone that fell under the category of “kulak” was targeted for destruction. Episodes of ethnic cleansing in places such as Bosnia, the Darfur region of Sudan, or Rakhine State in Myanmar also broadly fit within this category of genocide as group-selective violence. In all three membership in a particular group was a sufficient reason to be targeted by armed actors, even if every individual in a group was not necessarily the target.\(^5\) Rather than target members of a group “in whole or in part” – as is the international legal requirement – politicide targets only a specific part of a group – and membership in the broader group ought not to be sufficient to become a target of violence. In Indonesia, for example being a “communist party supporter” did not make one an automatic target for violence, nor did the category of “Hutu” in Burundi in 1972 or “Mayan” in Guatemala.

Politicide also differs from what I term indiscriminate mass killings – episodes of mass lethal violence directed at a civilian population that does not differentiate victims based on individual or group attributes. The most common examples of these types of violence are the mass starvations that accompanied collectivization efforts in the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia (Rummel 1994; Valentino 2004: 91-152). In these cases, starvations were a direct result of intended government policy that was not reversed even when the effects of such a policy were abundantly clear. Similar types of violence have been deployed in cases such as Nigeria (1967-

\(^4\) In this sense, politicide can be said to represent the “social death” of the group itself (see Card 2010).

\(^5\) For more on these dynamics, see Gagnon (2004) and Toal and Dahlman (2011) for Bosnia, Human Rights Watch (2010) for Darfur, and UN Human Rights Council (2018) for Myanmar.
in which the government effectively blocaded Eastern Nigeria (Biafara), causing mass starvation and exposure to disease (Marshall, Harff, and Gurr 2017). Even though in each of these cases privation was intentionally worse in some areas than others, there was no way to effectively limit the privation to specific groups or individuals beyond the territory in which they resided. This is in marked contrast to what I term politicide, in which the violence is doubly selective based on both group and role within the group.

In terms of process, a key area in which politicide differs from genocide and what I call indiscriminate mass killing is the extent in which perpetrators attempt to screen potential victims. Given that the intent is to kill a specific section of an identity group, perpetrators must seek additional information to identify particular leaders, cadres, activists, participants, and so forth. Unlike genocide, in which the targeting of an identity group is only limited by the boundaries of the group itself, in politicide perpetrators limit the violence to particular role-identities within said identity group. This can be a daunting logistical challenge: while group identity may be easier at times to ascertain, identifying roles within a group requires substantial degrees of private information (see Kalyvas 2006:181-182). Politicide is thus doubly selective violence: victims are chosen based not only on group membership, but also their role within the group. This type of violence is especially common when a state seeks to target the leadership of a mass party or movement, as occurred frequently during so called “dirty wars” in Latin America, as well as within Indonesia and Burundi. The relationship between politicide and other forms of intentional killing of civilians, based on the selectivity of killing, can be seen in Table 1.1 below:

**TABLE 2.1: Intentional Killing of Civilians and Selectivity**

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6 Of course, virtually all attempts to limit violence to certain role-identities of a population group on a massive scale leads to numerous targeting errors, such as through mis-identification or collateral damage. However, the key difference between politicide on the one hand, and genocide and indiscriminate mass killings on the other, is that the former tries to differentiate a subsection of an identity group as the principle targets of violence. Even in cases like Burundi in which the burden of proof was extremely low and the identity subgroup extremely broad, one could still potentially escape violence even if recognized as a member of the Hutu populace by state authorities.

7 It is worth mentioning that these categories represent ideal-types of categorizing mass violence and some cases do not unambiguously fall into a single category. The mass repression during the Guatemalan civil war, for example, can be broadly categorized as politicide for much of its duration, an exception
Selectivity | Indiscriminate Mass Killing | Genocide (Group selective) | Politicide (Doubly selective)
--- | --- | --- | ---
Examples | Soviet Union Collectivization (especially) 1932-33 | Holocaust 1941-1945 | Indonesia 1965-66
 | China (Great Leap Forward) 1958-62 | Rwanda 1994 | Chile (especially) 1973-76
 | Khmer Rouge collectivization/de-urbanization 1975-79 | Armenia 1915 | Burundi 1972
 | Indonesia (East Timor) 1975-79 | Soviet Union (Great Terror) 1936-38 | Guatemala 1978-1990
 | | Sudan (Darfur) 2003-2011 | El Salvador 1980-89

Source: Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017

The killings that occur during politicide do not occur in a vacuum, rather, they always coincide with larger campaigns of repression and broader repertories of violence. In addition to killing a subset of members of a particular group, security forces often detain, incarcerate, or torture other group members. States implementing politicide also often deny legal rights to the targeted group or formally exclude them from participation in sociopolitical life. Moreover, these varying and escalating forms of violence can often form a processual ladder that security forces move up and down as they attempt to repress large groups (see Straus 2012). For this reason, I focus on what I term repressive violence. I define this below.

For this study I adopt a more mutable definition of identity for what constitutes an identity group. An identity group is any bounded collectivity of individuals that is recognized as such by out-group members. Strictly speaking it is irrelevant if individuals self-identify as members of a group that is targeted for mass killing – if their identity is clear in the minds of perpetrators the group identity functions as-if they self-identified within it. Moreover, I am not concerned here with specific identity types, be they religious, nationalist, ethnic, political, linguistic and so on.

being some areas of rebel-controlled territory in 1982, where the military regime targeted indigenous Mayans en-masse (see Valentino 2004:206-217). Similarly, there is overlap in the cases such as those of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, China’s Great Leap Forward, and collectivization in the Soviet Union, insofar as there was a combination of targeted repression and comparatively indiscriminate episodes of starvation as a direct result of government policy (Valentino 2004: 91-152).
Provided the identity group is a bounded one that is acknowledged to exist by out-group members it is a sufficient identity group with which to direct violent action.

My definition of politicide differs from that most frequently used in the literature – which is that politicides and genocide are identical save that in the former “the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics” (Harff 2003:58). My definition has three primary advantages. First, it provides a useful means of delineating cases of killings directed against civilians. It highlights a particular kind of killing process – what I call doubly selective violence. As I establish above, this process of killing is different from that of genocide, especially the unambiguous cases of Armenia, the Holocaust, and Rwanda (see also Midlarsky 2005). Understanding the process through which killings are carried out opens new possibilities for comparison and inquiry that current definitions do not easily facilitate. Crucially, my definition highlights how security forces must screen members of a larger group for their intended targets to successfully implement doubly selective violence.

Second, this focus on process rather than the type of identity group targeted is more consistent with current conceptions of identity groups more generally. A growing number of studies have found that what have previously been considered to be more static identity categories – such as race, ethnicity, religion, and nationality – vary considerably based on context (eg: Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Brubaker 2004). As I mention above, even the self-identification of victims is potentially irrelevant for understanding genocide or politicide, as it is the identity perceptions of perpetrators and not victims that are central for establishing who is victimized. Moreover, security forces have frequently demonstrated that they are capable of unleashing extreme violence against all manner of ethnic, religious, and political groups, suggesting there is nothing inherent in the identity type that fundamentally changes the nature of the violence. As such, it makes little sense to delineate types of killing directed at civilians solely on the identity category

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8 For example, it makes less sense to compare differences in relative magnitude when the entirety of a population and only a subset of it are being targeted for destruction. Similarly, it is plausible (and indeed likely) that there is a different set of motivations underlying what I term politicide and forms of mass killing such as those that occurred during collectivization or those commonly understood to be cases of genocide.
itself. However, the selectiveness of killings can vary greatly: defining killings based on this selectiveness, I argue, is a more useful way of differentiating them.

Finally, the killings that I define as politicide are the most frequent form of mass lethal violence directed against civilians by their respective states. Because of this, it is essential that we construct better theories to understand the causes and dynamics of these types of violence. Aggregating politicide with genocide has meant that discussion of these doubly selective killings has been dominated by studies of the Holocaust and Rwanda (see Finkel and Straus 2012:64) – both cases in which violence was directed at groups writ large. I base this assessment of frequency on descriptions of violence compiled by the political instability taskforce, as well as extensive readings of the secondary literature (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017; see also Midlarsky 2004; Gerlach 2010).

6.2 Repressive Violence

Repressive violence refers to the use of prolonged detention or lethal violence against at least some of the civilian populace. In this sense, the types of violence examined here resemble those of state violence employed by Sheena Greitens in a comparative study of repression across authoritarian regimes (2016). However, given that the focus here is not on the coercive institutions of the state itself, I prefer to avoid definitions that limit violence only to agents of the state. Indeed, insurgents have proven perfectly capable of utilizing mass repression in territories they control, and security forces have occasionally broken from the state writ large to pursue repression against their own domestic opponents, especially in cases in which security forces are not fully subject to the ruling institutions of the state (eg: Aliyev 2016; Balcells 2017). Repressive violence as conceived here thus involves the removal of individuals from public life, through incarceration, targeted killing, or some combination thereof. It is also selective, insofar as security forces deliberately select victims based on some sort of differentiating criteria (Kalyvas 2006). However, on its own, repressive violence says nothing about who is being targeted, nor is it

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9 Indeed, dissatisfaction with the issue of which groups are targeted, and to what extent, has led to a proliferation of definitions about phenomena commonly understood to be genocide, such as “mass killings”, “democide”, and “extremely violent societies” (Valentino 2004; Rummel 1994; Gerlach 2010).
I focus on killing and incarceration for two reasons. First, both involve the removal of the individual from society. The removal of often prominent members both reduces the public visibility of the entire identity group from which individuals are targeted and reduces their capacity to organize themselves. As these are often the goals of repression – precluding or preventing organized public action – these types of violence differ from physical, non-lethal violence. Second, unlike non-lethal physical violence, killing and detention often involve greater degrees of organizational infrastructure. Prolonged detention requires prison systems, guards, and the means of feeding inmates. Killings also, when implanted on the scale of mass killing, require significant coordination across large swaths of territory. Victims must be identified and often brought together to execution sites to be killed en-masse, collaborators must be mobilized or recruited, and security forces must be redeployed from other tasks to unleash violence upon the citizenry. While other forms of violence are obviously important, they remain outside the scope of this study. Moreover, violence such as beatings, torture, and sexual violence vary substantially in the rate in which they are reported, making them a poor comparative measure of the magnitude of victimization in most contexts (see Wood 2009:133-134; Balcells 2017:21; but see also Roth, Guberek, and Hoover Green 2011; Gutierrez-Sanín and Wood 2017).

In this project I am primarily interested in repressive violence that is directed towards particular identity group(s), rather than the populace writ large. As such, I consider repressive violence relative to the size of the group(s) towards which it is being directed. In assessing the scale of repressive violence, it makes little sense to compare absolute levels of killing and detention in cases in which the size of the potential victim group is drastically different. Doing so is likely to falsely attribute far greater intensity in cases in which the victim group is especially large, and low intensity for small groups – even if such small groups are jailed or killed in their entirety. Comparing rates of repressive violence better capture the intensity of repressive violence across sections of territory.

Most studies comparing or assessing magnitude of victimization do so with an exclusive focus on killings; however, expanding the scope to what I refer here to as repressive violence has two
interrelated advantages. First, it provides greater insight into the total number of individuals intentionally targeted by perpetrators for removal from socio-political life. Incorporating other forms of mass repression – such as prolonged incarceration – allows for a better understanding of the magnitude of violence directed towards particular group(s), situates physical killings within the repressive context in which they are used, and provides insights into the degree of lethal force used compared to other forms of violence. Moreover, limiting the category of targeting to incarceration and killing helps to avoid problems of over or under-reporting other types of violence such as beatings, torture, or sexual violence (Kalyvas 2006:19-20; Wood 2009:133-134).

Second, including wider repertoires of violence, somewhat paradoxically, allows this work to make a more substantive contribution to the literature on mass killing and genocide (eg: Valentino 2004; Midlarksy 2005). These outcomes, normally compared only with each other, are the products of a longer causal chain that involves many activities: the decision to implement, identification, arrest, and (potentially) execute. Should the data be available, arrests help to paint a clearer picture of intermittent steps in the causal process leading to events on the scale of mass killing. I argue that being able to better examine intermittent stages in this process is crucial to understanding the final magnitude of killing. Considering non-lethal forms of violence can help to illustrate the conditions under which mass killings are less likely, or less severe. On a similar note, adding non-lethal forms of violence to the analysis helps to bridge gaps between the study of mass killing and the study of repression: two subfields that have largely been studied in isolated silos (Verdeja 2012). Given that both rely upon similar practices of identification and often detention/physical violence, explanations of process between the two ought to be fruitfully compared. As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, this is indeed the case.

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10 Most scholars of genocide, politicide, and selective violence focus exclusively on killings (eg: Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017; Valentino 2004; Straus 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2017). For examples including arrests see Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) and Greitens (2016).

11 Valentino, for instance, sets a minimum threshold of 50,000 intentional deaths which occur during five years or less, to delineate mass killing (2004:10-11).
6.3 Rates of Killing

In addition to repressive violence in the aggregate, I also focus on rates of killing. By rates of killing I refer to the ratio of killings relative to long term detentions. I also consider the number of killings relative to the size of the victim group. Taken together, these measures provide an indication of the extent to which security forces utilize lethal violence against a specific segment of an identity group.

I focus predominantly on relative levels of killing for two reasons. First, politicide, as argued above, is doubly selective violence, in which killings are limited to specific role-identities within a larger group. Because of this selectivity, victims are often screened before execution. The ratio of killings to long term detentions helps to capture part of this screening process, as it provides an indication of how many detainees meet the threshold of inclusion in the execution group. Moreover, this number helps to contextualize the killings within the larger repressive context within which they occur.

Second, much like repressive violence writ large, assessing killings relative to the size of the entire victim group from which victims are initially selected avoids the problem of automatically correlating the scale of politicide with the size of the victim group itself. It may be the case, for example, that some regions have both large numbers of both killings relative to the size of the victim group and a high ratio of killings rather than detentions, despite the total number of killings being comparatively low. In such cases, it may be erroneous to consider the violence to be of lesser scale than in those that experienced high numbers of killings in an aggregate sense, but ultimately had far fewer killings relative to the size of the victim group.\textsuperscript{12} The former process suggests a much higher degree of intensity than the latter – a factor that is often unaddressed in current comparative studies of mass violence (eg: Valentino 2004; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017).

\textsuperscript{12} For examples of this during the Indonesian Killings, contrast the provinces of Aceh and Central Java. In the former, the killings totaled approximately 76% of communist party supporters, resulting in an estimated 6,000 deaths, while in Central Java the total number of killings was perhaps as high as 140,000 - but accounted for instead 5.2% of communist party supporters.
6.4 Security Entrenchment

By security entrenchment I refer to the degree of regular, non-violent contact between security forces and civilians. Security entrenchment facilitates trust-building between soldiers and civilians, helping the former to build strong local intelligence networks that can then be used to implement violence more selectively should they choose to do so. Security entrenchment, in turn, is affected by four factors. First, length of time of local deployments. When security forces have been deployed in a single location for long periods of time, troops and officers to are able to form close relationships with local stakeholders, gain knowledge of local practices and customs, and generally build a degree of trust with segments of the community (Eck 2015). Second, security forces are also more likely to be able to build this trust if they are representative of and recruit from the local community (Greitens 2016:27-28). Third, civic-action programs also facilitate relationships between local security forces and parts of the local civilian community, encouraging the latter to provide information (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Khanna and Zimmermann 2017). Fourth, security forces are likely to be able to collect more intelligence unilaterally as the ratio of soldiers to civilians increases, especially when these troops are distributed throughout society. More locally based troops facilitate more relationships with the civilian population, and consequently, more local knowledge (Greitens 2016:29). In addition, more soldiers relative to civilians makes repression easier in the physical sense, as security forces have more troops available with which to directly wield violence against a local population. Taken together, I refer to these conditions as security entrenchment. In contrast, exclusionary recruitments, separation of troops from the community, and low ratio of soldiers to civilians are likely to hinder the collection of private information by security forces (see also Eck 2015). Only security forces perceived as loyal by their overarching command structures are capable of providing entrenchment. Should security forces be seen as unreliable, or potential collaborators with the victim group, their commanders are unlikely to trust them with providing reliable intelligence or manpower under the areas in which they are deployed.

Security entrenchment can also be disrupted by the redeployment of troops, especially when security forces are increasingly personalized rather than professional. The reason for this is that over time, local troops and their commanders develop relationships and trust with the local community that allows them to gather fairly accurate local intelligence. It takes time for these
networks to be established, and even the replacement of a commander can significantly disrupt intelligence collection (see Eck 2015). For this reason, redeployments significantly hinder intelligence collection even if new troops are brought in immediately from another location. These troops will not have had time to develop the levels of trust, and understanding of, the local community to receive, process, and evaluate any intelligence collected at the local level (Eck 2015).

It should be noted that there are likely other factors that condition security entrenchment as presented here, as well as whether these types of regular interactions are likely to produce useful information for security forces. It is certainly possible, for example, that the nature of past interactions between security forces and a population will condition the kind of trust that is capable of being established. In-group recruitment, economic involvement, religion, and ethnicity, among other factors that may be of importance here (see also Eck 2015). The organization of security forces—whether they are united or fragmented—is also likely to condition this type of intelligence collection capacity (Greitens 2016). I focus on the factors that I do in the name of more generalizeable theory building: because they are easily observed across cases, without requiring detailed knowledge of often extremely local context. I also avoid looking at fragmentation in this case due to the fact that each of my cases is a different province in the same state. While under different army divisions, the general structure of these security factors is largely the same, in terms of what branches of the security apparatus are present. In exporting this theory to attempt to explain politicide at varying levels—such as the national or extremely local levels—it may well be necessary to adjust the specific observable measures of security entrenchment.

6.5 Strength of Collaborator Network

By strength of collaborator network, I mean the ability of civilian elites to directly or indirectly promote increased lethal violence. At times civilian elites themselves possess sufficient strength to increase rates of killing through direct action or the threat thereof. Civilian elites, for example, may have strong influence over militia groups operating locally (see Balcells 2017:33; see also Forney 2015). Lacking access to detention facilities of the state, this type of unilateral violence is much more likely to result in killing rather than incarceration (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014:826). Moreover, the threat of this type of violence can encourage local commanders
to engage in additional lethal violence if it is demanded of them by powerful civilian elites capable of challenging them at the local level. Civilian elites are most likely to demand additional violence in cases under which previous political competition had been especially fierce, and when there is a fear of substantial material loss or marginalization should the targeted group successfully gain power (see also Toal and Dahlman 2011:65-76; Balcells 2017:129). This pressure, however, is only likely to exist in areas of low security entrenchment. When security forces are well entrenched at the local level, they have the capacity to be the dominant armed actor in that territory and consistently resist such pressure.

I rely on two principle measures of collaborator network strength. The first is the unity of this network. If the collaborator network is dominated by a single organization, it will be better able to control the activities of its membership, and the various nodes of the network are less likely to be in direct competition with each other. In contrast, a collaborator network spanning numerous organizations is likely to have a large degree of intra-network competition and coordination problems that would hinder the ability of this network to utilize force outside the control of security forces or to put pressure on local commanders. The second measure is the extent to which the collaborator network has access to an armed wing. Should the collaborator network have access to a pre-existing militia, they can use it both to engage in violence directly and to put pressure on local commanders. Absent such an armed wing, collaborator networks have a more difficult time engaging in violence – especially sustained violence (see also Hoover-Green 2018:25-45). The strongest collaborator networks are thus those that are both well coordinated and have access to a substantive armed wing with which to challenge local security forces.

7 Existing Explanations of Variations in Repressive Violence

This section reviews the literature on mass killing, repression, and the delegation of violence to civilian actors. As my definition of politicide differs from the more common one of genocide directed against a political group (eg: Harff 2003:58), I consider potential mechanisms underlying processes of killings and repression directed at the civilian populace more generally – such as the targeting of civilians during civil wars. Following Valentino, I aggregate theories of large-scale killings against civilians under the wider category of mass killing when discussing
the literature on genocide (2004). I first briefly consider explanations rooted in genocide studies, noting that they offer little in terms of explaining regional variances in scale. Following this, I explore existing explanations for variations in violence in civil wars and during periods of repression to emphasize the interaction of security force capacity, political competition, and information in driving variations in the magnitude of violence. In the next subsection I expand these interaction effects by considering civilian militia: establishing the circumstances under which security forces are likely to outsource the authority to commit violence to civilians and how this might further impact levels of repressive violence.

### 7.1 Studies of Genocide and Mass Killing

Few cross-national studies of mass killing consider variations in the magnitude or form of violence. Instead, most work has been concerned with the circumstances under which mass killings or genocide are most likely to occur. To explain this, a number of scholars stress top-down factors such as regime type (Kuper 1981; Rummel 1994; Mann 2005) or the decisions made by state elites (Valentino 2004; Midlarsky 2005). Others have stressed societal factors, such as ideology, inter-group hatreds, or racism (Goldhagen 1996; Weitz 2003; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). These theories offer little in terms of hypotheses to test the scale of mass killing, or why states choose to employ lethal rather than non-lethal repressive violence.

Even single case study approaches to mass killing rarely consider regional variations in the magnitude of violence, limiting the comparative scope instead to if, when, or why genocide occurred in different regions (eg: Longman 2011; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2011). A likely reason for these binary comparisons is that most mass killing scholarship at the sub-national level has fixated on the Holocaust and Rwanda: both cases in which the entirety of an identity group was targeted for annihilation (Finkel and Straus 2012: 64). In the case of Rwanda, for example, Scott Straus found that there were no significant variations in the number of killings relative to the size of the Tutsi population across Rwanda, with the main difference being instead when genocide began (2006:55).

An exception to this is the work of Yang Su, who focuses on communal killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Su argues that in this case killings were not a direct product of societal factors or elite decision making, but instead a breakdown in the ability of the central state to reign in local party officials in the periphery. In a comparative study of killings at the
provincial and sub-provincial levels, Su finds that killings were more likely to occur – and with greater severity – in the most rural counties in which central state control was more limited (2011:223-230). Moreover, within provinces, killings were more likely in counties away from provincial capitals, further underscoring that killings occurred outside the will of central authorities. Moreover, “in most counties, the upsurge in killings happened only once, indicating that external conditions were imposed from higher levels,” thus preventing ongoing violence (2011:184).

The principal mechanism underlying variations in violence and killings is the combination of state mobilization and breakdown. The state re-categorizes elements of the population through framing in-group and out-groups, prescribing that there must be some action done to remedy current social ills. However, at the same time, the state can lack the ability to restrain lethal activity on the part of local political elites and activists, providing them the opportunity to physically exterminate perceived enemies (Su 2011:222-224). While the state is a crucial actor, its impact under this model is indirect: it can define categories of enemies, yet not fully control the actions taken against them.

State breakdown provides some explanation as to why violence may at times spiral out of control: when the ability of the central state to project its reach to the local level is limited, local political elites may have no constraints on continually escalating violence. Missing, however, is what is likely to occur when the state or its security forces do intend on committing killings. How do we account for differing magnitudes of violence and rates of killing in instances in which sustained killings are the goal of the state, but also in which they are intended to be limited to a subset of a specific identity group? Does control facilitate or discourage additional violence? It is also unclear under what conditions local elites themselves are more likely to escalate violence. I take up these issues below in the context of studies of repression and civil wars.

7.2 Repression and Civil Wars:

Most studies that consider regional variations in levels of violence directed against civilians do so either in the context of civil war or during periods of state repression (eg: Kalyvas 2006; Eck 2015; Greitens 2016; Balcells 2017). Most studies of these studies also focus explicitly on killing, rather than including additional forms of violence (eg: Balcells 2017; for exceptions see
Roth, Guberek, and Hoover Green 2011; Gutierrez-Sanín and Wood 2017). Still, the use of violence or prolonged incarceration against individuals is likely to have similar underlying causal mechanisms as killing. Both involve identifying and removing individuals from public socio-political life. Killing is a comparatively easy form of repression to measure; however, it is not the only one (see also Kalyvas 2006:20). The number of incarcerations can also be represented in the category of repression, providing such information is available. This is also consistent with studies on selective violence that have access to more detailed data that includes capture and incarceration rates (eg: Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).

I find that there are two main explanatory clusters regarding varying levels of repressive violence across different regions: local competition and information availability. On their own, neither is sufficient for explaining variations in repressive violence during politicide. However, when integrated together these clusters can help to provide a useful framework for understanding differing magnitudes of repressive violence in politicide. At the same time, these clusters still do not provide an explanation as to why security forces are more likely to use lethal violence in some contexts rather than others.

7.2.1 Political Competition

The first explanatory cluster is local political competition. The main causal mechanism for theories focused on political competition is the interests and ability of local political elites to direct or encourage violence against a subset of the local population to create or maintain their political advantage. Laia Balcells argues that elites can better coordinate with local troops or militia of their own political faction, thus facilitating greater violence against their political opponents (2017:31-32). Both Toal and Dahlman, and Kopstein and Wittenberg, similarly argue that the use of violence by members of one group forecloses the ability of other political groups to express different preferences for national character of the state – albeit at a more local level. For all, violence and killings occur as a means of foreclosing future political challenges. The primary difference is whether these killings stop once an electoral challenge is foreclosed (Balcells 2017), or when the group is removed entirely via relocation or extermination (Toal and Dahlman 2011; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010).

Political competition highlights the crucial role that civilian elites often have in facilitating violence at the local level; however, it does not on its own explain this same phenomena during
politicide. When does the state or its security forces empower these elites to contribute to campaigns of violence? Moreover, if the purpose is to eliminate political competition, why does violence often continue past a point where the targeted group could mount any sort of effective political challenge? Also, political competition cannot account for violence in cases in which a group not composing a political challenge at the local level are targeted. It is also unclear how the goals of the central state condition the extent to which local elites can eliminate their political competition. While in Rwanda and during the Holocaust the willingness of the central state to deploy violence against particular groups appears to be unlimited, this is unlikely to be true in politicide, in which violence is intended to be limited towards a subsection of a particular group.

7.2.2 Information

The second primary explanation of variations in repressive violence is the availability of local information. The main figure of this branch of scholarship is Stathis Kalyvas, who argues that civil war violence at the local level is often based on local grievances unrelated to the causes of the civil war itself (2006:179,330-363). The main thrust of this argument is that both insurgents and state forces seek to prevent civilian collaboration with their opponents. Both the state and rebels have two principal means with which they can do this: they can utilize either selective or indiscriminate violence against a population. To deploy selective violence, both the state and rebels require private information: who amongst the populace is collaborating with their opponent. I have already argued that similar dynamics exist in politicide. As an episode of doubly selective violence, perpetrators must screen population groups for their intended victims: a process that is contingent on the availability of local information.

It is generally assumed that armed groups and/or state security forces tend to favour selective rather than indiscriminate violence. There are several reasons for this. First, indiscriminate violence can lead to international backlash (Balcells 2017:31). Leaders seen as responsible for crimes against humanity face potential sanctions, loss of contracts, and other potential costs should their crimes become publicly known and condemned. Second, the use of indiscriminate violence can turn the civilian populace writ large against the group performing such violence (Kocher et al. 2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012). This is especially important given that the armed group perpetuating politicide generally does so with the aim of governing the territory later. Ensuring that the violence is at least plausibly selective helps to ensure that armed groups can
maintain some legitimacy at the local level, even if their actions do not win them many outright friends. Because of this, armed groups do have incentives to exercise some restraint at the local level, and to use selective, rather than indiscriminate violence.

To obtain local information, rebels or state security forces often must rely upon denunciations: the provision of information by local informants against their neighbours – a process likely to increase the use of selective violence. Rather than just provide the names of collaborators, civilians are likely to use denunciation as a tool to eliminate local rivals. Indeed, this phenomena has been observed in the context of Nazi domestic repression, civil wars in Greece and El Salvador, and the US Phoenix program in Vietnam (Gellately 1997; Kalyvas 2006:331-363; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Huge numbers of false denunciations appear to be ubiquitous when civilians are provided the opportunity to make them.

The principal conditioning factor in whether false denunciations are likely to have an impact on targeting is thus whether the state has enough of its own intelligence to accurately screen false denunciations. Civilians have a greater incentive to denounce rivals in a situation in which both local forces are weak enough to solicit them and in which the other side is not sufficiently strong to provide a potential avenue of counter-denunciation. In other words, denunciation is most likely “when one actor exercises dominant but incomplete control” (2006:174). Because of the threat of counter-denunciation, denunciation is less likely to occur in contested territories in which both the state and its challengers exercise equal control. Focusing more on local elites, Laia Balcells argues that the use of direct violence against civilians is more common in areas that previously experienced high levels of political mobilization, as local elites use the opportunity of denunciation to eliminate local political rivals (2017:5).

It is worth noting, however, that this relationship between information and territorial control exists in the context of competing armed groups capable of contesting sovereignty. Existing rationalist explanations for regional variations in levels of violence against civilians typically do so in the context of a two-sided, conventional civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Balcells 2017). Because of this, violence dynamics and collaboration are modelled under the assumptions that armed actors seek primarily to control territory, that once they physically control this territory they do not need to actively solicit and act upon denunciations by the populace, and that a major constraint on denunciations is the threat of retaliatory denunciations
to a rival armed actor (see Kalyvas 2006:194-209). These assumptions do not hold in the context of politicide.

The goals of politicidal violence itself are different from that in civil wars. In politicide, violence is typically one sided, and always intended to eliminate a subsection of a particular group. Because of this, killings occur even when security forces have total control over a given territory. Not only does this mean that killings will occur when there is no territorial contestation, but also that this degree of contestation is not likely to drive a natural end point to the violence. Instead, repressive violence and killing are only likely to end once security forces are confident they have fulfilled the operational requirements of eliminating a subsection of the population.

Moreover, unlike civil wars, politicides are not characterized by large areas in which sovereignty is contested. Because of this, there is no opposing side to defect to, nor is there an opposing armed group that can serve as a deterrent by providing an avenues for counter-denunciations (see Kalyvas 2006:194-209). Politicide, as modelled here, always occurs under state control – at least in terms of exercising broad physical control over a given territory. This also means there is also no territory in which there is no security entrenchment as defined in the introduction. States do not typically hold territory inaccessible to its security forces, and when this occurs, such regions are rarely considered to be under the sovereign control of the state at all.

Sheena Greitens has recently expanded this relationship between information and violence to consider variations in levels of repression across authoritarian states. Combining insights from state breakdown and the need for information in civil wars, Greitens demonstrates that the ability to collect private information can be an institutional feature of the security forces themselves – one which dependent on the context in which these forces were created, evolved and operate (2016; see also Belge 2016) Greitens argues that states with fragmented and socially exclusive security forces are less likely to collect reliable intelligence on regime dissidents (2016:41-42). Because of this, these regimes are more likely to use higher levels of violence against their own citizens, as their inability to collect detailed local intelligence precludes the use of extremely selective violence (see also Dimitrov and Sassoon 2014). Security forces that are effective at collecting private information preclude the necessity of mass violence, as they allow for the removal of potential protest leaders before challenges form. Greitens stops short, however, of extending such an argument to situations when massive numbers of killings are the intended
strategy of security forces, or in spatial variations of violence within authoritarian regimes. Given that like repression, politicide is the use of selective violence, the ability to collect private information ought to have a profound effect on its scale. Moreover, given that security entrenchment is rarely even across a given territory, differences in security entrenchment within borders are likely to have a corresponding impact on the delegation of intelligence collection to civilian actors. This in turn is likely to lead to profound differences on the scale of violence at the subnational level.

7.3 Empowering Militia and Violence Dynamics

Security force collaboration with civilians during repression or mass killing is rarely limited to intelligence provision. Civilian auxiliaries in the form of militia, home guards, or death squads are a common feature in periods of mass repression and mass killing. Well known groups include Serbian paramilitary groups such as Seselj’s Men (also known as White Eagles), and Arkan’s Tigers (also known as Serb Volunteer Guard), the Rwandan Interahamwe, Janjaweed in Darfur, and Red Guards in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In this subsection, I establish the conditions under which the state or other organizational body intent on implementing politicide are more likely to empower civilians to use violence, and what effect this empowerment is likely to have on levels of repressive violence. I am interested here in pro-government militias (PGM), rather than those that form in opposition to the state. I find that states are likely to empower civilians to use violence under similar conditions in which they solicit denunciations: when they are only weakly entrenched at the local level. Also like denunciations, empowering militia tends to raise levels of repressive violence.

I find that there are two primary explanations for why a state may tolerate, empower, or create civilian militia: to provide plausible deniability for human rights violations and as a low-cost force and intelligence multiplier. Turning their focus to the incentives of state elites to avoid sanctions, several scholars have argued that state elites delegate “shameful violence” to militias to maintain plausible deniability and avoid international sanction (Ron 2002; Alvarez 2006). Under this explanation, state elites seek to avoid becoming associated with human rights violations under the territory they control, as accusations of such violations can lead to exclusion from international benefits such as foreign aid and influence within international institutions. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for example, argued that the Sudanese state was unable to
reign in the behaviour of *Janjaweed* militia in Darfur—despite mounting evidence to the contrary—to separate the legitimacy of his rule from the human rights violations that were later labeled a genocide (see Human Rights Watch, 2010).

Still, plausible deniability is an unsatisfying explanation for several reasons. First, militia are not necessarily more likely to violate human rights than conventional security forces. Recent studies have suggested that rather than such violence being a product of militia, practices of shameful violence tend to be employed simultaneously by both PGM and official forces, suggesting this is an acquired practice, rather than a specific feature of militias (Cohen and Nordas 2015). Second, plausible deniability rests on the assumption that state elites believe they will face significant costs if they are linked to human rights violations. This assumption is problematic in situations in which states are not heavily dependent upon aid, as well as in situations in which they may otherwise be incentivized to crack down on a particular group. In the case of the former, regimes have had little problems engaging in human rights violations regardless of international protestations. In the case of the latter, numerous client or dependent regimes have been encouraged to eliminate ideological rivals—particularly during the Cold War.

Alternatively, security forces may create PGM or delegate the use of violence to civilians as a low-cost force multiplier. PGM allow for the deployment of more combat-able troops elsewhere, and as such, are often formed to defend territory from insurgents, and “sweep the rear” of potential opponents (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015; Balcells 2017:4). This use of PGM as a stop-gap for limitations on the ability of the armed forces is not limited to when troops are re-deployed to the battlefield: in a cross-state comparative study of PGM formation in Myanmar from 1962-2010 Kristine Eck finds that the state is far more likely to create or delegate the use of violence to PGM in areas either experiencing armed conflict or those that recently underwent military purges. For the patrimonial Myanmar army, purges at the top of provincial commands resulted in massive disruptions to the capacity of the military to organize and collect intelligence at the local level (2015:927-929). To make up for this intelligence and organizational deficits, new local commanders are forced to turn in the short term to pro-government militia to fill gaps in their own operational capacity. These gaps in capacity cannot be solved merely be redeploying troops stationed elsewhere: not only are troops strategically placed prior to purges, thus limiting overages to redeploy, but an influx of troops from outside the sub-national state does nothing to compensate for the lack of local intelligence gathering capacity.
The force multiplier explanation suggests that states or their armed forces are likely to empower or create PGM in the same situations in which they are likely to solicit denunciations from the local population. When security forces lack entrenchment at the local level, they have an incentive to turn to the civilian population to fill gaps in their own operational capacity. Furthermore, these gaps cannot be immediately filled through redeploying troops from elsewhere: troops foreign to the locale have yet to establish the types of local relationships necessary for the adequate collection of intelligence (Kalyvas 2006:170; Eck 2015; Greitens 2016).

Empowering civilian militia is likely to lead to an increase in repressive violence for two related reasons. First, the lifting of legal restraints on violence allows civilian militia members to use this violence for private ends (see Eck 2015). This can include jailing or killing local rivals based on personal grievances, much in the same way that civilians can use denunciations to eliminate local opponents. Moreover, militia members can use their newfound ability to use force to engage in activities of extortion, using repressive violence against those that refuse to pay (eg: Anderson 2006:161-168). In doing so, militia are likely to increase the scale of repressive violence. The second manner through which civilian militia increase repressive violence is by the provision of intelligence in the field. As mentioned above, militia are most frequently formed in areas in which security forces are not well entrenched, and as such, have less of an ability to collect local intelligence. Indeed, one of the main incentives for creating or empowering PGM is that they can identify potential targets in the field (Eck 2015). This freedom to provide intelligence directly during operations – even if done under the supervision of regular troops – allows PGM to increase levels of repressive violence. Like denunciations, this means that militia members can expand those targeted based on their own criteria and not that of security forces. In addition, and as will be crucial to explaining rates of killing, the empowerment or creation of PGM also creates potent alternative centres of armed force at the local level that can be used to influence the preferences of local commanders when it comes to using mass executions.

8 Rates of Killing

The theories discussed thus far, even when focused exclusively on killing, offer insights for understanding repressive violence in the aggregate. In this section, I consider the relationship between killings and incarcerations with the aim of explaining this relationship during politicide.
Rates of killing, relative to the number of incarcerations, are affected by a number of factors. These factors can be divided into intrinsic preferences of local commanders; and pressures, incentives, and constraints extrinsic to these preferences. I focus here especially on these extrinsic factors. I find that low security entrenchment and subsequent empowerment of civilian communities for intelligence and manpower is likely to increase the level of killings relative to detentions. I also introduce a new explanation for varying rates of killings relative to detentions: the logistics problem. I argue here that the cost of feeding and housing a growing detainee population can exceed the capacity of security forces to do so. Under these conditions, security forces are more likely to rely on mass executions as a means of reducing the prison population. This logistics problem also has interaction effects with security entrenchment. I take up these issues below.

8.1 Commander Preferences

Individual commanders may have their own individual preferences as to the extent to which they are willing to utilize mass executions as a strategy. Some commanders, harbouring extreme views on either the targeted groups or counter-insurgency/repression strategies in general, may opt for policies of mass execution even without explicit orders to do so. During the Second World War, for example, some Soviet commanders pursued policies of extermination towards captured troops, despite receiving orders not to do so (Edele 2016:347-350). Similarly in Indonesia, the military commander in Aceh, Brigadier-General Ishak Djuarsa, opted for a policy of annihilation when it came to communist party detainees, despite high levels of security entrenchment and seemingly absent direct orders to do so (see Melvin 2018; Robinson 2018: 150,227). Providing they have the means to implement such a campaign, this is likely to lead to extreme rates of killing, with perhaps the entirety of the larger targeted group from which intended victims were to be drawn annihilated totally. On the other hand, when commanders explicitly desire not to utilize mass killing as a repressive strategy they are unlikely to do so absent some sort of external pressure or limitation. When such pressures are absent, areas under the control of such restrained commanders are likely to experience low rates of killing, with those killings being strictly limited to the execution criteria flowing down the chain of command. A third potentiality is that individual commanders lack strong preferences over the use of executions as a strategy – in such cases their use of such techniques is driven largely by external factors: perceptions of orders from above, or some combination of logistical factors that make
killings a more compelling choice at a given time. For purposes of theory building I focus more on extrinsic factors: information, collaborator networks, and logistics. Building theory off intrinsic preferences of individuals offers little in terms of generalizeability.

8.2 Information

Selecting which detainees to execute has the same problem of selecting members of a broader population to detain: security forces must screen intended victims from a larger pool based on a non-physical characteristics. If security forces do not have access to such private information they are more likely to use lethal violence towards inmates indiscriminately in an attempt to eliminate the intended subgroup (see Valentino 2004; Kalyvas 2006; Kocher and Kalyvas 2007). This is most likely to occur in areas of low security entrenchment, as security forces in these conditions frequently lack adequate intelligence collection capability. Security forces are also likely to favour mass executions rather than mass releases in such low information environments. This is because opting for release has the potential to free targets perceived as high value, and who are more likely to lead future challenges to security forces (Downes 2008:35-36; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006:56; Wallace 2012:961). Those wrongly accused or killed due to lack of information become collateral damage in the effort to wipe out security forces’ intended targets.

This problem is especially acute when there is a sudden increase in the prison population system, as security forces scramble to properly screen the mass influx of detainees.

A lack of intelligence collection capacity with which to screen detainees can also encourage security forces to rely on torture as a means of collecting private information. Torture, in turn, is likely to lead to high numbers of false confessions, as victims are willing to confess to any role within a group in order to spare themselves further torture. The use of torture often has a snowball effect on rates of execution: as victims are encouraged to name more individuals meeting a certain selection criteria, security forces come to not only use torture against this new list of victims, but also to believe that they are uncovering an increasingly secret and vast conspirator network (Dubois 1990; Roosa 2008). This encourages further torture, leading to increasing rates of killing whenever torture is used as a practice.
8.3 Collaborator Networks

Civilian elites can also drive rates of killing higher still than providing excessive amounts of false information. This occurs through the direct use of force such as that wielded by autonomous or semi-autonomous militia groups, or through the threat thereof to encourage security forces to engage in higher rates of killing. Militia groups acting outside the official security apparatus are likely to themselves raise rates of killing relative to other forms of violence: as these militia do not have access to mass detention facilities that are normally operated by security forces, their options for eliminating their local opponents are more limited than those that can utilize mass detention. In a cross-national study of PGM, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler demonstrate that state reliance on PGM outside the control of professional security forces increases the risk of repression in those states (2014; see also Alvarez 2006; Bates 2008).

Specifically, reliance on PGM outside the official security umbrella increases the number of physical human rights violations, and decreases respect for freedoms from torture, killing, and disappearance. Moreover, this study suggests that PGM with recognized links to government increase the degree of political incarceration, while PGM without these links do not. The reason for this is that incarceration requires close collaboration with the state - informal or unrecognized PGM are incapable of such transparent collaboration (2014:826). The lack of access to security force institutions such as prison systems incentivizes informal, unrecognized militia to utilize more direct forms of violence such as killing.

The ability of civilian elites to influence rates of killing is not limited solely to deploying militia groups to utilize lethal violence outside the purview of security forces. This collaborator network can also pressure local security forces to use higher levels of lethal violence against their local opponents – including political prisoners. An example of this occurred in Bone, Sulawesi, during the Indonesian politicide. There, local civilians forced their way into a makeshift detention centre and slaughtered 200 detainees. Following this, they armed themselves and made further demands at the local military headquarters (Ahmad 2012:168). Local security forces can have a strong incentive to acquiesce to these demands: civilian elites with access to militia groups and the ability to mobilize large number of followers can make local control far more difficult for security forces (see also Aliyev 2016). Similar dynamics have frequently occurred during lynchings in the United States, in which groups of townspeople gather at a local police station to demand the release of one or more detained African Americans accused of crimes. Following
pressure and threats to release these individuals, the mob would then brutally murder them (see Rushdy 2012:20-59).

The ability for the collaborator network to drive killings still higher is tied to security entrenchment. As discussed above, security forces are likely to empower civilian militia as a low-cost force multiplier. The low ratio of soldier to civilians that characterizes low entrenchment is thus likely to encourage this type of violence delegation. The need for troops with local knowledge also makes this delegation of violence more attractive than simply redeploying troops from elsewhere (see also Eck 2015). Moreover, the collaborator network is only able to successfully pressure security forces or wield violence unilaterally if security entrenchment is low. If it is instead high, security forces are likely to have sufficient troops to resist these demands, and the collaborator network is unlikely to be able to mount a successful armed challenge at the local level.

### 8.4 Logistics

Here I introduce a third extrinsic factor that can incentivize local commanders increasing rates of killing: what I term the logistics problem. I argue here that the logistical problem of feeding and housing detainees causes such a burden on security forces that they have an incentive to use mass executions as a means of reducing the prison population. A consistent finding in the literature on mass killing – including politicide – is that these events virtually always occur during acute political crisis (Harff 2003; Valentino 2005). Moreover, these types of crises themselves are strongly correlated with substantial economic downturns and other situations of mass privation (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In these circumstances critical resources such as food are often in short supply. Moreover, providing the physical space to keep detainees and leave them under guard further stretches the resources of security forces, who are often involved in wider range of internal or external security activities such as searching for intended targets or directly combatting international or domestic challenges. At times, the cost of caring for detainees can be enormous. During the First World War, for example, Austria-Hungary devoted approximately 2.5 percent of its total war expenditure in the 1916-17 fiscal year to feed and house the 1.8 million prisoners of war it had captured: more than the expenditure for motor cars, explosives, or aircraft (Davis 1977:629).
In such times of crisis, security forces must allocate scarce resources such as food and manpower while maintaining their own operational capacity. Broadly speaking, this allocation is between three potential groups: security forces themselves, the local civilian population, and detainees. Of these three, only the first two are essential to the operational goals of politicide. Like any other organization, security forces prioritize resources for themselves. During periods of crisis this is especially important for armed actors who wish to avoid internal fragmentation. Moreover, security forces have an incentive to limit the degree of privation faced by the civilian population – especially that which could be blamed on security forces. Should security forces be seen as providing additional hardship, civilians will generally be less willing to provide support in the form of providing such crucial resources as intelligence, and in the most severe situations, may have an incentive to join or form insurgent groups to better provide them with the necessitates of life (see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). The full withholding of the necessities of life constitutes the type of indiscriminate violence that makes cooperation with security forces less likely (Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011). As such, security forces have a strong incentive to ensure adequate resources find their way into the hands of civilians, either by providing it themselves, or preventing or limiting the degree to which local resources are seized. On the other hand, security forces have less incentive to reallocate scarce resources to care for detainees, especially during times of hardship.

In situations in which security forces are unable or unwilling to provide for the detainee population, they have an incentive to rely upon executions or intentional privation as a means of “solving” their resource allocation problem. Examples of this phenomena abound. In the First World War, one soldier recalled his commanding officers words of “Remember, boys … every prisoner means a day’s rations gone” (Brown 1999:28, cited in Ferguson 2004:159). Similarly, when confronted by his commander over the execution of prisoners under his charge, one Soviet political officer during the Second World War replied “Do you want us to feed the prisoners with our bread […] when at the same time the Germans kill our prisoners?” (Edele 2016:369). Indeed, in many cases during the First World War, mass starvations were avoided not because of allocations of food by captor powers, but rather by the allocation of food parcels by the nations of those imprisoned. By 1916 “British, French and Belgian prisoners in Germany were living off the food they received through the parcel system; prisoner nationalities who did not receive regular parcels, such as the Italians or the Romanians, died of malnutrition in Central Power camps” (Jones 2008:36). Reflecting the high cost of caring for prisoners on the part of the

The same cost of care problem and its brutal logistical solution is true during politicide as well as war: as security forces are confronted with the challenge of feeding and housing massive numbers of detainees for indefinite periods of time, mass executions become a feasible tool for overcoming this problem. Because politicide involves the screening of a population group, security forces can have huge numbers of detainees under their charge. Indeed, execution may be even more attractive as a means of avoiding the cost of caring for detainees during periods of mass repression when compared to larger civil or international wars: unlike these latter types of conflicts, there is no fear of the other side engaging in reciprocal mistreatment of prisoners to act as a deterrent (see MacKenzie 1994). In these cases, the killings of those that do not fit within the scope of those who would otherwise avoid execution become collateral damage as security forces attempt to keep costs of care under control.

It should be emphasized that this pressure to eliminate prisoners described here occurs in the context of pre-existing mass violence: a situation in which security forces are already utilizing high levels of lethal violence. As such, local commanders have already been tasked with killing, albeit on a lesser scale than if they were to empty the prisons. In cases of politicide, when security forces seek to kill an identifiable portion of a particular group, these killings are also often directed towards unarmed parts of the civilian population. These orders to eliminate, often coming from national-level leadership, ensure that local commanders and their subordinate troops will have already been forced to overcome any internal limitations on using lethal violence on unarmed detainees, regardless as to whether they are directly executing detainees themselves or turning them over to vigilante groups or death squads. Once lethal violence has already entered the repertoire of group action, its repetition and expansion often has less of an internal psychological cost than its first uses – a process some have referred to as “brutalization” (Weiner 2006:107-116). Because of this, under the conditions of politicide it is psychologically easier for local commanders and their subordinates to utilize high rates of executions, far more so than would be the case in a context under which large number of executions were not an existing repertoire of action. It should also be emphasized that the implementation of these orders to execute prisoners, be they from national or sub-national levels, is typically undertaken by professional security personnel – a group that has already been trained and socialized to use such
lethal violence, making them more able to deploy it in conditions such as these (see Manekin 2013; Hoover-Green 2018:25-45).

9 A theory of Politicide Dynamics:

Politicide is doubly selective violence: the targeting of specific members of a target group with lethal violence. Because of the selectiveness of the violence, organizers of politicide require detailed information to successfully screen potential victims from the population. In instances in which the organization intent on implementing politicide – most often state security forces – lacks the ability to unilaterally collect this local intelligence on their own, they are forced to outsource this intelligence collection to civilian actors. The drive to empower civilians in areas in which security forces are weak is not limited solely to the provision of intelligence: in areas of low security entrenchment, security forces are also likely to form or empower civilian militia to act as a source of auxiliary manpower. As I established above, this delegation of intelligence and manpower is likely to raise levels of repressive violence in politicide as civilians use their newfound abilities to use violence to eliminate local rivals (see Kalyvas 2006; Eck 2015; Balcells 2017).

In their search for potential civilian allies, security forces are most likely to turn to local civilian elites known to harbor some level of antipathy towards the politicide victim group. The reasons for this are twofold. First, security forces seek to eliminate a specific subsection of the population without allowing them to escape violence. When seeking informants, security forces thus have an incentive to select those informants who are unlikely to provide safe haven for politicides intended targets. More than ordinary members of the population, it is easier to determine the attitudes of local elites: they are often instrumental players in local society, and in many cases are closely linked to local political parties and organizations. In some cases – especially when local elites are members of religious organizations or political parties, their very status in these organizations will serve as a strong signal of political attitudes towards outgroups.

Second, political elites have access to greater resources with which to gather private information and encourage participation in militia. Elites can often draw on networks of supporters, through which they can gather far more private information than ordinary civilians. They can then aggregate this information and send it to security forces en-masse. Elites are also capable of mobilizing, or at least facilitating the mobilization of, wider sections of the community by
providing incentives to those who participate in violence or through lifting moral restrictions on the use of violence (see Hardin 1995; Straus 2006:65-66). Elites can provide both material and social incentives for participating in violence – providing not only money and material goods, but also conferring status through recognizing participants, arranging better marriage prospects, and generally raising in a positive way the profile of those willing to engage in violence against potential opponents (eg: Petersen 2001:9-14; Hinton 2005). Elites can also lift social restrictions on violence. Religious elites, for example, can frame using violence against the victim group – either directly or through denunciation – as either a religious duty or one that breach standard taboos on violence (see Fealy and McGregor 2012). For these reasons, security forces seeking information and manpower can do so more efficiently by approaching civilian elites known to harbor antipathy towards politicides intended victims.

Approaching elites to help provide information and potentially manpower is likely to raise both levels of repressive violence and rates of killing. As discussed above, the ability to identify potential victims, be it through denunciation or direct identification “in the field” by militia, allows civilian actors to move against local rivals – either those of individuals or those of elites and their interests. This drastically raises the number of individuals initially detained – or at times directly killed – in politicide. As shown in the introduction, the relationship between security entrenchment and repressive violence is an inverse linear one.

In addition, these civilian elites – what I term the collaborator network – is capable of raising levels of killing still further when it is strong vis-à-vis security forces at the local level. Should this collaborator network be both well coordinated and have access to its own armed wing, it has the capability to engage in violence unilaterally. Such unilateral violence is likely to result in killings rather than incarcerations, as these militia units are unlikely to have access to the detention facilities under the control of professional security forces (see also Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014:826). Moreover, such strong collaborator networks are also capable of pressuring local commanders to engage in additional levels of lethal violence than would otherwise be their preference. However, the strength of the collaborator network only matters when security entrenchment is weak. When it is strong, security forces can foreclose these opportunities for the collaborator network.
The control security forces have over all territory in which politicide occurs ensures that politicidal violence is never wholly indiscriminate. In conventional rationalist accounts of violence against civilians, armed actors resort to indiscriminate violence when they are unable to exercise control over territory (eg: Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Kalyvas 2006:171-172). Absent civil war and its corresponding zones of control and contested sovereignty, however, there is no incentive for security forces to engage in totally indiscriminate violence such as large scale bombing campaigns or enforced famines. As discussed previously, security forces generally have an incentive to refrain from the use of indiscriminate violence when possible: it often lowers support for those responsible for violence by creating potent local grievances and undermining the legitimacy of the armed actor (see Balcells 2017:31). Given the omnipresence of at least some security forces, be they police, military, or other organs of state violence, all violence in politicide is selective to some extent, even if the selection criteria does not necessarily meet that which was intended by its architects.

That violence occurs at varying levels across territory, despite security forces being the dominant armed actor in each, suggests that it is not control per se that dictates levels of violence, but rather the ability to collect intelligence in of itself. For this reason, it is not simply the presence of local troops, but the number of them, length of deployment, whether they are locally recruited, and whether they engage in civic-action programs – those factors that I refer to collectively as security entrenchment, that drives repressive violence. Sudden deployments of troops often do not meet these requirements of entrenchment – contra Kalyvas, only increasing the number of troops, but not providing the time and means for them to adequately build networks of trust with the civilian populace, is unlikely to lead to high levels of intelligence gathering capacity by security forces (see also Eck 2015). High levels of incoming troops are thus likely to face an acute information problem, one which, as discussed above, leads to higher levels of repressive violence and increased rates of killing.

An additional consequence of the one-sided nature of violence and ubiquity of security force control over territory is that, unlike civil wars, there is no opposing side to whom to defect (see Kalyvas 2006:194-209). Normally, the threat of counter-denunciations is believed to deter individuals from using denunciations to solve local rivalries. However, in the context of politicide this deterrent is unlikely to ever exist. This suggests that the levels of denunciation that could occur in politicide are enormous, as there is virtually no external constraint on
denunciations. Indeed, this suggests that denunciations may in fact be higher in politicide than in conventional civil wars.\textsuperscript{13}

Like repressive violence writ large, rates of killing are likely to increase in areas in which a lack of security entrenchment incentivizes security forces to empower civilian actors to provide intelligence. Problems of allocating sufficient resources to detainees rise along with the number of detainees whom security forces must provide for. This logistical problem means security forces have a greater incentive to use mass executions as a strategy when the total number of detainees increases by a significant amount, especially in short periods of time. Given that the number of detainees is likely to increase more when security forces delegate intelligence collection to civilians, these situations should also have a higher rate of killing relative to detention than areas in which security forces can collect intelligence unilaterally. Screening these detainees is also difficult in such information-poor environments, and making mass executions attractive to both alleviate the resource allocation problem and to ensure that none of their intended victims are released back into society writ large. Rates of killing are likely to be higher still when the perpetrator network harbours significant grievances against the victim group and perceive themselves as relatively strong vis-à-vis local security forces. In these conditions, they are more likely to mobilize followers to engage in lethal violence unilaterally, and/or use the threat of doing so as leverage to encourage local commanders to escalate killings in the areas under their jurisdiction.

Taken together, the relationship between security entrenchment, collaborator networks, repressive violence, and rates of killing can be divided into an ideal type 2x2 (see figure 1.2).

\textsuperscript{13} Internal repression in Nazi Germany is illustrative here. There, the Gestapo often relied upon civilian denunciations to uncover individuals suspected of having sexual relations with Jews, socialization with Poles, or of listening to foreign radio. For sexual crimes, out of 175 investigated cases, 57\% began by denunciation; the Gestapo only uncovered one such case on their own (Gellately 1997:189). Combined with socialization with Poles and listening to foreign media, the total number of cases investigated by the Gestapo without relying on denunciation was only 8\% of the total (Ibid:196). Most of these denunciations were more about solving personal disputes than outing individuals for crimes: 80\% of investigations were dropped instead of being referred to trial, and the majority were motivated by marital issues or disputes over housing allocations. The number of false denunciations was so extreme in some areas that “only direct threats to send both parties to a concentration camp could put a stop to it” (204).
Taken together, this theoretical model has four observable implications:

1. Repressive Violence will be higher in areas in which security entrenchment is low.
2. Rates of killing will be higher in areas in which security entrenchment is low.
3. Rates of killing will be highest in areas in which security entrenchment is low and in which collaborator networks are strong.
4. Both repressive violence and rates of killing will be lower when security entrenchment is high, regardless of the strength of collaborator networks.

### 9.1 Scope Conditions and Further Discussion

Five important scope conditions are worthy of further discussion as it pertains to this theory. First, this theory applies only to politicide – a category of violence that is doubly selective. In these types of campaigns, the organizing body makes some attempt to control the spread of violence, limiting it to the intended group subset. It is only when there is some intent of limiting the scale of violence that it can be captured from below by civilian actors. In cases of genocide, in which a group is targeted in its entirety, security forces need make no effort to further screen individuals of a group. The less information security forces require, the less they potentially must
rely upon civilians. When violence directed towards a population is meant to be unlimited, it cannot spiral further. Furthermore, this theory does not apply to indiscriminate mass killing, such as the state-induced famines following collectivization efforts in the Soviet Union and PRC. Given that there is no identification process in these types of killing, there is no need for its organizers to seek private information at all.

Second, I assume elite compliance with security forces for the purpose of denunciations and participation in violence. While not always true, I believe this assumption to be a reasonable one. Security forces are likely to approach civilian elites who are known to harbor some level of antipathy towards the potential victim population. Such elites often have an individual interest in seeing local opponents removed, and as such have an incentive to cooperate with security forces and facilitate the mobilization of networks within which they are embedded to cooperate as well. This is underscored by the fact that politicide almost always occurs during periods of extreme political crisis and tension (Harff 2003:66). In these situations, national level political cleavages that are often crucial for delineating which groups will be targeted for politicide will often be reflected to some degree in local politics (see also Balcells 2017:28). Moreover, I do consider levels of antagonism between local elites and the group that is to be the target of politicide in terms of anxiety over future status and survival. Because of this, these civilian elites are not as much of a black box as the individual civilians modelled in other theories (eg: Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).

Third, I assume that local elites are capable of mobilizing members of their respective communities for engaging in denunciations and direct violence, and that some of this membership will be willing to use these opportunities. However, it is worth acknowledging that not all individuals respond homogenously to such opportunities. Some individuals or communities are may actively resist security forces: hiding potential victims or forming resistance groups (Petersen 2001). Others simply refuse to cooperate with authorities or local elites. At the individual level, people often carry out varieties of roles: perpetrator, bystander, and rescuer, over the course of a conflict as circumstances change (Clark 2009:435-437; Fujii 2009:8-12; Staub 2003:67). Still, I believe this assumption to be a reasonable one. Civilian elites have potent mechanisms with which to incentivize behaviour – including violent behaviour. They can help to lift moral sanctions against using violence, or distribute material and/or social
incentives to those participating in violence.\textsuperscript{14} Once violence is locally sanctioned, few actual “hard-core” participants are needed to inflict and sustain violence. If these violent specialists can receive reward for using their skills, and are not constrained by broader physical or moral sanctions, it seems reasonable to assume they would be willing to do so (see also Tilly 2003:24; Ron 2002:297; Toal and Dahlman 2011:117-119). Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the civilian actors responsible for using direct violence in this theory are civilian militia groups. Militia are created for the explicit purpose of utilizing violence. Members often undergo at least some basic training, the intent of which is to socialize militia members into overcoming normal restraints on using violence against others (see Manekin 2013; Hoover-Green 2018:25-45).

While it is reasonable to assume that a given individual may be unwilling to engage in violence, it also seems reasonable to assume that in an armed body, formed and trained to some extent specifically to use violence, some members will be willing to do so. For this reason, I focus on militia for using direct violence, rather than individual civilians. It is also worth noting that this assumption that civilians are willing to use violence and/or denunciations is a common in order to build theory (eg: Kalyvas 2006; Eck 2015 Balcells 2017).\textsuperscript{15}

It is also worth re-emphasizing that the decision to utilize mass executions against an existing detainee population ultimately rests with security force personnel, including prison wardens, subnational commanders, and at times the leadership of the entire security apparatus itself. At any point in this chain of command individual commanders are capable of acting on their own initiative, either deciding to execute prisoners or resisting outside pressure to do so. Some commanders inevitably will either resist pressures to execute detainees under their direct control or escalate killings themselves based on their own intrinsic preferences to do so. Such intrinsic preferences, however, are difficult starting points with which to build theory. Even if responses to pressures to execute are not uniform, it is reasonable to assume that large numbers of officers can be influenced by the pressures discussed here in a context in which significant executions are


\textsuperscript{15} This assumption also dovetails the majority of studies of perpetrator identity during genocides or mass killings, insofar as most participants are ordinary men (see Browning 1993; Owens, Su, and Snow 2013:76; for a dissenting view see Mann 2000).
already occurring: lack of information on detainees, pressures from civilians, and the cost of housing an ever expanding prison population.

Fourth, I place the majority of focus on security forces and militia groups when it comes to perpetrating violence. In doing so, I tend to minimize largely spontaneous, bottom-up mobilization that leads to loss of life, such as murderous riots or pogroms (see Horowitz 2000; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2018). While these events are no doubt important subjects of inquiry, I believe I am justified in leaving them outside the scope of this analysis. Violence on the scale of politicide, conducted across broad swathes of territory, requires substantial organizational resources, especially when this violence is sustained over time. Localized violent episodes generally lack the organizational resources to sustain themselves on the scale of violence that I am studying here, save for those that are already organized armed actors (security forces or militia). These local events no doubt do lead to losses of life, but they themselves are unlikely to substantially alter rates or repressive violence or killing in a territory as large as a province.

Finally, I do not include the potential agency of the victims themselves, or the potential for broad community resistance, as part of my explanation. Recent work has shown, for example, that the structure of communal relations – either communal solidarity or integration with the broader political community – can have important effects on violence at the local level (Kaplan 2017; Finkel 2017; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2018). My reasons for omitting this form of local agency are threefold. First, the inclusion of a third major variable would likely make my theoretical framework too unwieldy to be easily generalizeable. While inclusion of victim agency may lead to more accurate descriptions of particular events, it would also create nine possible configurations of major variables, which leads to problems of finding representative cases to compare, and for mapping cases onto my framework outside of this particular study. Second, unlike the work of Kaplan, whose focus is on civilian resistance in civil war, I am interested in explaining one-sided violence against civilians. In these cases, it is not control over the civilian population that security forces seek, but the physical destruction of at least a part of it. In these instances, non-violent resistance is likely to be less effective at limiting violence (see also Finkel 2017). Third, in the case of Indonesia there was no meaningful civilian resistance to the killings within local communities as they were occurring that lasted for longer than a day (see chapter 5). Because of this, it is virtually impossible to ascertain how much an impact resistance may have had in the context of this study.
Chapters five through seven will test this theory in three Javanese provinces during the Indonesian Mass Killings of 1965-66. Before doing so, the next chapter will introduce the methodology, data sources, and case selection used in this project.
Chapter 3
Methodology, Data, and Case Selection

In this chapter I overview my research methods, sources of data, and case selection. In the first section I outline my method used: process tracing. I show how this project follows Bennett and Checkel’s ten best practices for process tracing. I follow this with outlining what we would expect to see in the causal process should the theory I outlined in the previous chapter apply. In the next section I overview the sources of data used in this project. This section includes a discussion of the interviewing process, as well as how I identified potential interviewees and cross-checked information. I conclude by discussing case selection and summarizing how each case fits within the broader theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter.

10 Methodology

I use process tracing to assess the linkages between security force entrenchment, repressive violence, and rates of killing. Process tracing is the examination of “diagnostic pieces of evidence within a case” which focuses on “intervening steps in a hypothesized causal process” (Bennett 2010:208; see also Mahoney 2015). To understand why some military commanders suffered from a lack of security entrenchment and the corresponding inability to gather intelligence, I examine the development of security force entrenchment in each of the three case studies, noting where in the processual chain of violence the cases differ, producing divergent outcomes in the 1965-66 Indonesian politicide.

To the best extent possible, I follow Bennett and Checkel’s ten best practices for process tracing throughout this dissertation (2014:21). I consider a range of alternative explanations, rooted

16 These best practices are: (1) Cast the net widely for alternative explanations; (2) Be equally tough on the alternative explanations; (3) Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources; (4) Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations; (5) Make a justifiable decision on when to start; (6) Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable decision on when to stop; (7) Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal and feasible; (8) Be open to inductive insights; (9) Use deduction to as “if my explanation were true, what will be the specific process leading to the outcome?”; (10) Remember that
in studies of mass killing, genocide, and repression more broadly, as well as historical explanations of the Indonesian killings specifically (see chapter one and conclusion). I also rigorously debunk these theories based on available data, especially new information that came to light over the course of my fieldwork. Indeed, debunking existing theories provided many of the inductive insights necessary to developing the theory of politicide that I advance here – insights which I could then apply to the other case studies in this dissertation for further testing.

Throughout the course of collecting and analyzing empirical evidence I made a point of thinking through the potential biases of my sources. Indonesian military publications, for example, rarely directly discuss executions, instead focusing on broader patterns of troop movements, demonstrations, and occasional acts of support for the Indonesian Communist Party. I found it essential to cross reference these materials with a combination of interviews, diplomatic archives, and existing secondary literature. US diplomatic cables, for example, do not shy away from discussing reports of mass executions, or the justification provided to their embassy and consular staff for their occurrence. Even though much of the US diplomatic community was in favour of the Army crushing the PKI, they do not fail to note instances of civilian abuse, and the likely innocence of many of those caught up in the Army’s campaign. I was also rigorous in cross-checking interview material. As I elaborate below, I attempted to establish facts on the ground by both checking information across multiple respondents, and across both former victims and anticommunists whenever possible. I also interviewed many respondents several times, both to assess consistency with responses over time, as well as to probe new information that had come to light from other sources. I also considered the identity of my respondents as they formulated their answers.

I gathered as much evidence as was feasible over the course of my fieldwork and archival analysis. By the time I had come to the end of my fieldwork, it was becoming nearly impossible to find any higher level contacts that could discuss the organization of the killings in either the Army or Indonesia’s anticommmunist civilian organizations from that time. Most of these organizers have since passed, and those that remained were often reluctant to meet with me.

conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is conclusive (Bennet and Checkel 2014:21).
While I accessed some, requests to others for interviews through these contacts were generally denied by the time fieldwork had concluded. By that time I had also reached a saturation point with interviews amongst the survivor community, with very little new information emerging from interviews. I ended my archival analysis once I had processed every declassified document in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) archives for three years prior to and following the killings. As many documents remained classified, this provided a natural end point for archival research. Still, a number of documents were declassified throughout researching this dissertation, meaning many of the documents here are only now being analyzed by scholars.

In comparing three cases, I am also better able to probe for alternative explanations and test inductive insights gleaned from other cases. As discussed below, West Java, Central Java, and East Java form a series of most similar cases, often differing substantially only on the proposed independent variables: security entrenchment and the strength of the collaborator network. In all three security forces are under the leadership of the Army high command, reacting to similar orders, and in an identical international context. The identity of the victim group is also constant, as were many of the cleavages within society (landowners threatened by potential communist rule). The religious makeup is also extremely similar. As I elaborate below, this case comparison also allows me to test inductively derived insights from one case to others, ensuring the project does not become an inductive/deductive feedback loop within a single case. This also helps to assess the generalizability of the findings (see also conclusion). I also elaborate on the specific hypothesized processes to be observed below.

One concern with process tracing is establishing temporally where to start. In the case of the Indonesian Killings, I chose to start my analysis with the development of the Indonesian Army during the independence struggle and early years of independence. As I am primarily concerned with testing the effect of security entrenchment, it made sense to begin my analysis with the genesis and expansion of the Indonesian security forces. I do discuss the impact of previous security structures based on Dutch and Japanese occupation; however, the main development of Indonesia’s Army emerged during independence. Indeed, as I establish in chapter three, the divergences of the territorial divisions in Java largely occurred during this time. It is also during this time that the communist party emerged as a serious player in Indonesian politics and began to challenge the entrenched interests of both Indonesia’s largest sociopolitical organizations
and the Army. Prior to independence the communist party was a marginal player in Indonesia (see chapter three; Mortimer 1974). The period between independence and the politicide is also only 20 years, ensuring that process tracing over this period is a feasible endeavor.

10.1 Process Tracing and Politicide

Recall that I have advanced two principal theoretical arguments. First, a lack of security entrenchment leads to shortages in available information and manpower with which to implement politicide. To overcome these shortages, security forces turn to collaborator networks, leading to increased levels of repressive violence, as civilians expand targeting to include those who would otherwise have fallen outside the scope of the politicide campaign. Second, a combination of information scarcity, logistical problems, and strong collaborator networks are all likely to result in higher rates of killing. The first two are closely tied to security entrenchment, while collaborator networks are strictly independent of this. However, collaborator networks can only drive rates of killing higher when security entrenchment is low.

In process tracing these arguments, there are a number of pieces of evidence that one would expect to observe. First, in areas in which security entrenchment is low, we should expect to see security forces actively seeking information from local civilian organizations as to who they ought to be targeting. We should also expect this information to lead to large numbers of arrests, and that many of those arrested would have likely fallen outside the scope of politicide operations had security forces been operating with perfect information. Within prisons, we should also expect to see significant overcrowding, difficulty and identifying specific prisoners, and shortages of foodstuffs and other care items. Under these conditions we should also expect to see large numbers of executions, including those that fall outside presumed targeting criteria. Ideally we should also be able to observe some statements or similar evidence that these executions were done specifically to alleviate the burden of prisoner care.

Under these conditions of low entrenchment we should also expect to see the formation or empowerment of civilian militia, who may attempt to act unilaterally against perceived local opponents. In areas where collaborator networks are weaker, we should see security forces be able to bring these militia back under the official security umbrella. In areas where collaborator networks are strong, we should see significant numbers of lethal attacks by civilian militia unaccompanied by security forces. We should also see some evidence that security forces are
unwilling or unable to directly confront these militia groups. We may also see evidence of civilian elites advocating for greater violence directly to security force personnel, and that this pressure corresponds with higher levels of lethal violence.

In contrast, in areas where security entrenchment is high, we should see few attempts to solicit information from the civilian population or to form civilian militia. We should also expect that arrests rarely target those outside the intended scope of politicide operations. Prisons should have less crowding, and there should be fewer mass executions with the stated aim of easing the burden of detainee care. We should also observe fewer incidences of mob violence.

I observe all of these phenomena in chapters five through seven.

11 Sources of Data

I rely upon a variety of information sources in this dissertation. To assess the number of victims of repressive violence in each province, I rely upon estimates of arrests and killings compiled by Kammen and Zakaria (2012). These estimates are based upon reports in military-sponsored newspapers within Indonesia, estimates by observers in consulates and embassies, and discussions with former Indonesian military and political officials during and after the politicide. As a source of data, this compilation is hardly systematic, and likely has a high margin of error. Military publications, for example, may not list accurate numbers of victims, and may have had an incentive to inflate or deflate these numbers. It is also probable that foreign observers stationed in Indonesia at the time – including those sympathetic to the military, would have had access to detailed intelligence on the number of arrests and killings. While the Army kept at least limited records of arrests and killings (see Melvin 2018 for Aceh), it is impossible to ascertain from this dataset if they accurately shared this information with either foreign correspondents, the press, or the researchers themselves. At the same time, and despite these issues, there is some evidence that this dataset may be more reliable than it first appears. In a study of estimated population changes due to the Indonesian Killings in East Java, based on population growth curves and census data prior to and following the killings, Siddharth Chandra estimates approximately 175,000 people were killed in the province (2017:1066). This is quite
close to the 180,000 estimate provided by Kammen and Zakaria (2012:452). Chandra also estimates that a total death toll of 500,000 (the figure most frequently cited by scholars) appears plausible in light of East Java (2017:1077). The figures cited in Kammen and Zakaria total approximately 415,000, including the most affected provinces of Central Java, East Java, and Bali, yet omitting South and Central Sumatara, and Sulawesi – all places that experienced some killing, but in which the PKI had little support (see Feith 1957). Based on the low number of potential victims in these omitted provinces, it likely that this dataset would have approximated this same 500,000 number with their inclusion.

To assess the degree of communist party support in each province, I rely upon electoral data from the 1955 national, and 1957 regional, elections. These are the last two free elections held in Indonesia before the politicide. Given the extremely high voter turnout coupled with a lack of membership lists of the communist party (PKI) and its affiliated organizations, these numbers allow for a proxy as to the number of potential communist party supporters in each province – a rough estimate of the total size of the group from which some were targeted in politicide. These elections were free and fair, and as such capture well support for Indonesia’s political parties (see Feith 1957; Lev 1966). The combination of data on repressive violence, discussed above, combined with these electoral results, allows for comparative estimates as to the magnitude of suspected communist party supporters repressed relative to the total number of communist party supporters in each province. Relying on these relative numbers is a more useful gauge than the raw numbers of arrests and killings as it helps to control for disparities in both total population and victim group size.

To observe how repressive violence and politicide unfolded in each province I rely upon three primary sources: Indonesian military (TNI) publications, foreign diplomatic and intelligence archives, and field interviews. Over the course of fieldwork, I was granted access to a range of

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17 These statistics are not available for other provinces at this date, either due to computations not being finished, or shocks such as volcanic eruptions making such estimates impossible in some provinces.

18 If anything, these numbers likely underestimate the level of communist party support in each province. The PKI made significant gains between 1955 and 1957, and continued to gain national prominence throughout the authoritarian period known as Guided Democracy (1959-1966). Still, these electoral results are useful in that they are measured at the same time, and have more accuracy than qualitative estimates of the level of communist party support.
TNI publications pertaining to the communist party, military operations to crush the PKI, and the continued danger of communist revival in Indonesia. The publication dates of these documents range from 1966, immediately following the politicide, to 1986, when the crushing of the PKI and the danger of communism were key ideological pillars justifying the New Order (see Roosa 2012). The early works shed light on the perceptions of TNI leadership on the reliability of local troops and commanders and the process through which they implemented politicide prior to the development of a nation-building narrative surrounding these events. These publications include the names of local commanders and deployments believed to be sympathetic to the PKI in Java, in turn allowing for a better picture of the entrenchment of troops loyal to the high command in each province.

In addition to TNI publications, I rely upon a series of recently declassified US intelligence and diplomatic cables in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) archives. Throughout the years leading up to and during the politicide itself, US embassy staff were in regular contact with the top Indonesian army leadership. Given their shared interest in eliminating communism in Southeast Asia, the army leadership engaged in candid discussions regarding the progress of the anti-communist campaign, and their logistical needs in doing so. These reports also include US assessments of the situation on the ground from its embassy in Jakarta and consulate in Surabaya, giving fair coverage of events across Java. Archives in the process of being released this year also include Indonesian intelligence reports outlining the perceived infiltration of their own intelligence service in East Java.19

The final source of information is a series of semi-structured interviews conducted over a six-month period from November 2015 – May 2016. Interviewees came from a diverse background. Many were former political prisoners who were arrested based on real or perceived membership with the PKI or its many affiliated mass organizations. In addition, I interviewed members of anti-communist organizations from that time that participated in the politicide in a variety of roles. I interviewed members of religious mass organizations such as the NU-affiliated Ansor and Banser, HMI, and Muhammadiyah. I also interviewed members of the youth wing of the

Nationalist Party (PNI). Among these respondents were those who participated in the process of identifying and detaining suspected communists. Others served directly, and at times led, civilian militias and local branches of the student action front KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*). I also interviewed local and national elites from the aforementioned organizations, as well as several former high-ranking PKI cadres. Finally, I interviewed several members of both the air force (AURI) and army who were involved in the politicide, both as prison guards and as executioners.

### 11.1 The Interview Process

In total I interviewed 48 respondents for this project, with several respondents being interviewed multiple times. The average time for an interview was approximately an hour, though some were significantly longer or shorter depending on circumstances. All interviews were conducted in Bahasa-Indonesia, the national language of Indonesia. Interviews in Central Java and Yogyakarta were done with the help of a research assistant, while the majority of interviews in Jakarta and East Java were done independently. Underscoring the sensitivity of this topic, my second research assistant only felt safe assisting with interviews involving former political prisoners due to his own past activism during the transition to democracy. Because of this, only my first research assistant was present for any interviews involving former perpetrators, and even then, only in the case of one individual.

Most respondents were interviewed at their homes or at the offices of local NGOs. A select few others were interviewed at their place of work: either an office or at a local *pesantren* (religious boarding school). In general, most respondents were willing to meet at home, with only two wishing to meet elsewhere for security reasons. The potential respondents most reluctant to speak on the record were those who witnessed the killings yet were not involved, such as those who happened to live near an execution site at that time. These individuals often feared military reprisal, and were unwilling to consent to formal interviews for this project.

Respondents varied greatly in age, but in general fell between the ages of 70 and 85, with a few high ranking communist party members being as old as 93. Despite the advanced age of respondents, the vast majority were still in adequate health, and clearly recalled intimate details of their experiences in the 1960s and beyond. Some events were remembered with far greater detail than others. Virtually all respondents who were imprisoned vividly recall the conditions of
the prisons and their treatment therein: chronic lack of food and starvation conditions; mistreatment, torture, and degradation at the hands of their jailors; and nighttime disappearances. Most also clearly recalled local life before their arrests, including local tensions and conflicts (if any), and the sudden change in atmosphere following the news of the September 30th Movement in Jakarta. All of them clearly remembered their initial arrest: a period almost always characterized by fear and shock. Most respondents spoke at length of the horrors they experienced in prisons without prompt: first at police stations, military bases, and both official and improvised prison camps; and then later at the Plantugan women’s prison in Central Java and the prison camps on Buru Island.

For many respondents the act of remembering their experiences was a profoundly political act. The crushing of the communist party and forming a bastion against its revival was a crucial pillar of legitimacy for the New Order regime of Suharto, with the communist party vilified and the military glorified on the anniversary of the killing of the generals in Jakarta. Many respondents actively sought to challenge this narrative privately, and in some cases, publicly. Many would recite in interviews the names of those they were imprisoned with at various stages, or those who were taken at night, presumably for execution. Others would recall the names of those killed in the early stages of the detention and execution process that were killed at their homes. A few more had prepared copies of their own past identity cards, forms of release, letter signifying that they were not involved in G30S, and newspaper clippings, further underscoring the importance of altering the historical record. One respondent, Ibu Sri, whose story introduced this chapter, even refused to consent to an interview unless I used her real name: an act of forcibly reclaiming her own share of history from the imposed silence and anonymity of the New Order.

Interviews with former perpetrators, or those involved in some activity against the Left during that period, were far more mixed in how respondents remembered this period. Some would only speak in generalities, keeping their descriptions of the conflict at the level of the group (such as the PKI, SOBSI, NU, etc.). A few spoke openly, even brazenly and boastfully, of their involvement – going as far as to take me to various sites in which they killed and disposed of alleged communists. In general, such confessions are extremely rare, a violation of the taboo of speaking about this period in Indonesia, yet they underscore the impunity of the killers and that the crushing of the PKI is still widely celebrated in Indonesia.
Given potential issues of memory and likely gaps and biases in archival materials, I extensively cross-checked interview information. When possible, this would include archival sources, though this was rarely possible for events outside of Jakarta and broad timelines of troop movements, large demonstrations, and the burning of PKI buildings. Usually, this involved carefully cross-checking timelines of events across as many respondents as possible, and if feasible, using both former political prisoners and anti-communists. The primary reason for checking across such groups is that memory is strongly influenced by the context in which remembering takes place (see also Malkki 1995). Those within the survivor community have a common set of narratives on which to draw upon, often centering their narrative in a larger Cold War context. The vast majority of former political prisoners saw themselves as victims of a larger struggle between the East and West, and would often insist on American complicity in their arrests and detention. Those in the anti-communist community often referenced periods of terror or terrorism both prior to, and especially after, they received news of the September 30th Movement. Given these different memory frameworks, I found it essential to compare across these two different mental worlds to establish facts on the ground with confidence, especially in the absence of local newspaper or military records. I also interviewed many respondents multiple times in order to probe consistency and open new lines of inquiry as additional information came to light (see also Fujii 2009; Wood 2009).

To locate potential interviewees, I relied on a snowball sampling technique (Tansey 2007). This technique is particularly well suited to working with hidden populations, or in situations where there may be an initial lack of trust. Snowballing relies on seeking referrals to new respondents once an initial respondent or series of respondents has been identified, building a larger network until a saturation point of information is reached. For the most part, I operated within two broad networks: former political prisoners, and anti-communists. My initial contact into networks of former political prisoners was through NGO activist networks that formed after the fall of Suharto to campaign for recognition of victims of the anti-communist campaign. They could approach former prisoners on my behalf and inquire whether they would be willing to meet with a foreign researcher. This initial round of interviewees was then asked if they knew of anybody else with whom I should speak regarding the subject of the “1965 events”, and would approach these people on my behalf. After receiving permission to meet, I would be either given phone numbers, addresses, or most often, taken to meet the person in question. At times the respondent
providing the referral would stay for the duration of the subsequent interview. In others they would leave us to speak privately after an initial introduction. Many former political prisoners were eager to put me in contact with others, as there is a strong interest amongst many former prisoners to provide evidence and testimony to what they endured at the hands of the military and their allies.

I accessed anti-communist networks through two initial points of contact. There are still active anti-communist groups in Indonesia that regularly protest, disrupt, and threaten to attack events that they perceive to be affiliated with communism. I was able to contact a current high-ranking member of one such group operating in Yogyakarta, who was then able to introduce me to other current and former anti-communist activists. Through them I was also invited to several prominent anti-communist seminars and events at major universities, where I was introduced to a wider variety of said anti-communists. These seminars were well attended by a mix of different generations of Indonesians, and often included current and former religious figures and members of the armed forces.

A second means of accessing former anti-communists was through current members of the Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Through my own networks of friends and colleagues, I was introduced to members of NU that would be willing to assist with my project. They were in turn able to connect me to older members of the organization who either witnessed or participated in the anti-communist campaign. These contacts were able, in turn, to introduce me to other members of their own organization, as well as to individuals in former positions of leadership in other Muslim religious organizations such as the student association HMI and Muhammadiyah. Like the network of former political prisoners, I relied upon my initial contacts to approach and introduce me to others.

It was particularly important to have intermediaries approach potential interviewees on my behalf for three reasons. First, the killings are still a very sensitive topic in Indonesia today. Former political prisoners and anyone believed to be associated with the Indonesian left faced decades of state-sanctioned discrimination, including limits of employment, with former political prisoners having an “ET” designation stamped on their identity cards. Despite some opening of the political space following the fall of Suharto, those who wish to speak about the “1965 event” face risk of harassment from both anti-communist groups and members of the military and
police. Given my identity as a white foreigner, my presence in areas in which foreigners do not often venture can attract local attention and curiosity. While all candidates were granted anonymity, my presence at their home, if only to find it, could attract attention that I wished to give my respondents the opportunity to avoid. For this reason I always made available a neutral location, such as a university or NGO office, should the respondent wish. Given that it would have been impossible for me to fully understand the extent of potential local stigmas in each neighbourhood in which I interviewed respondents, I ultimately left questions of the appropriateness of my coming to their homes to the respondents themselves. Having lived with the prospect of stigma for decades, they are far more attuned to this problem than any researcher or hired assistant has the potential to be.

A second reason to rely on others for introductions is trust. Groups of people who face discrimination often will not meet with a researcher unless there is some indication that the researcher may be trusted (Tansey 2007). A referral from a fellow prisoner or advocacy network provided such trust in many cases. Indeed, several respondents mentioned that they never would have consented to be interviewed had they not received a phone call from one of my initial contacts explaining who I was and endorsing my research. This mechanism also operated within anti-communist networks. Even though anti-communists, including those who participated in the killings, face no legal risk and can openly speak of their involvement without fear of reprisal, a personal introduction was still necessary in order to arrange meetings.

Third, given the advanced age and the potential scope of involvement in the killings, it would be virtually impossible for me to independently identify who should be approached for this project. When initially planning this project, I had identified anyone around the age of 65 to be a potential informant. However, I quickly learned upon arriving that despite some increased public discussions of the killings, the topic remained off limits for the majority who lived through this time. Without referrals from others, it would be extremely difficult and time consuming to establish trust with the necessary number of informants, particularly considering this project bridges several regencies. This subject is simply not commonly spoken about in Indonesia, despite increased media coverage.
12 Case Selection:

In this dissertation I compare three regencies during the 1965-66 Indonesian politicide: West Java, Central Java (including Yogyakarta), and East Java.\(^{20}\) The Indonesian Killings are a crucial case for understanding politicide for three reasons. First, the Indonesian Killings are the largest episode of politicide to occur since the end of the Second World War by a state or its security forces (see Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017; Su 2011).\(^{21}\) Given the sheer scale of the Indonesian Killings, any theory of politicide ought to take this case into account. Second, the Indonesian Killings occurred outside the context of a larger civil war. Most studies of killing on this scale, including politicide, have occurred under this context, as state security forces seek to eliminate potential civilian support bases for rebel groups (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Even though the killings occurred simultaneously with a low-level confrontation in Borneo regarding the formation of Malaysia, there had been no significant armed combat on Indonesian territory (Tuck 2017:90-91). Because of this there were no areas of contested sovereignty: a key factor in many other theories of violence against civilians (eg: Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2017). The entirety of Indonesian territory was under the control of its security forces. This also helps to prevent measurement issues of differentiating combatants and non-combatants. Third, the Indonesian Killings had substantial variation in the magnitude of repressive violence and rates of killing relative to the level of communist party support across provinces, despite the army leading the killings in each province (see Roosa 2016; Robinson 2017; Melvin 2017). This allows for a more controlled comparison of repressive violence than by comparing entire episodes of politicides: the principle architects, victims, international context, and timing can all be held relatively constant.

The cases of West Java, Central Java (and Yogyakarta), and East Java were chosen for four reasons. First, the regencies show significant variation in terms of the magnitude of repressive

\(^{20}\) Formally Yogyakarta is an independent regency located entirely within Central Java. However, given that it is under the same military command as Central Java and is located entirely within the territory of this larger regency, I consider them together as part of the same case.

\(^{21}\) This does not include the millions more imprisoned without trial (see Robinson 2018). Data on the number of prolonged incarcerations in other instances of politicide is not readily available, ergo I rely on the death tolls provided by the Political Instability taskforce here.
violence, relative to the degree of communist party support. In West Java, the magnitude of repressive violence was four to six times lower than Central and East Java, respectively. Moreover, despite Central and East Java having relatively similar degrees of repressive violence, the two regencies differ substantively in the rates of killing. This occurred even though violence was perpetrated by similar constellations of actors against similar targets. Second, despite differences in politicide outcome, the three cases are similar in many important respects. The three regencies contain the majority of communist party supporters in Indonesia (Lev 1966; Alfian 1971). In addition, all three are located in Java, the most politically important and populated of Indonesia’s islands, and each has its own dedicated regional military command (Kodam). Crucially, the different territorial commands varied substantively in their capacity to implement politicide unilaterally following what is often described as a coup attempt that served as a catalyst for the politicide (see Table 3.1; see also Roosa 2006). This in turn allows for a better comparison of security force entrenchment at the local level. Third, in each province politicide commenced at virtually the same time. This not only underscores that in each province the politicide was the result of central military directives, but also ensures that methods of identification, detention, and execution were not immediately imported from the adjacent province. Moreover, the similarity in timing makes it possible to hold constant national and international level politics. Finally, in each province there was an attempt by security forces to limit the violence – with varying levels of success – to communist party and affiliated organization activists. This ensures that all three provinces accurately represent instances of politicidal violence. The magnitude of target selection and varying rates of killing is represented in Table 3.2.

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22 Yogyakarta is under the same Kodam as Central Java (Kodam IV/Diponegoro).

23 In Aceh, for example, the number of killings is extremely close to the total number of votes that the communist party received in the province. Moreover, there were virtually no prolonged detentions – all suspected communist party members were killed. This suggests that in Aceh the violence can be better captured under the framework of genocide, and as such, is outside the scope of this project. Similar observations can be made for Bali (see appendix 1).
Table 3.1 – Security Entrenchment in Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Java</th>
<th>Central Java</th>
<th>East Java</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village Deployments</td>
<td>1957-62</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops recruited from</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic-action programs</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers:Civilians(^{24})</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop redeployments</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Entrenchment</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{24}\) In this case, loyal troops:civilians at the time that politicide began (October 1965). There are no hard numbers for this ratio in either West Java or East Java; however, West Java had few redeployments for the Malaysia campaign and very little infiltration by the PKI, meaning that the number of soldiers relative to civilians was far higher in this province than the other two.
Table 3.2 – Politicide Dynamics in Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Java</th>
<th>Central Java</th>
<th>East Java</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Entrenchment</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaborator Network</strong></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of PKI voters in 1957</td>
<td>1,087,269</td>
<td>2,706,893</td>
<td>2,704,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI Vote Share 1957</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool in detention</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number detained</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Killed</td>
<td>&gt;10,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>180,000-200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number repressed (killed + detained)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>205,000-225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool killed</td>
<td>&gt;.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.579-8.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PKI pool subject to Repressive Violence</td>
<td>1.839</td>
<td>7.758</td>
<td>8.504-9.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing:Detention</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>8:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Lev 1966:93-97; Kammen and Zakaria 2012:452

Before tracing my argument in these three cases, I provide an overview of Indonesian politics prior to the politicide, as well as a closer look at the catalyst for politicide, and how politicide played out at the national level. I focus especially on the emergence of a loose anti-communist alliance that linked hard-core members of Army leadership with prominent anti-communists across Indonesia’s largest non-communist sociopolitical organizations. This will be the focus of the next chapter. Following this, chapters four through six use process tracing to test my theoretical argument. A summary of these cases, and where they fall within my theoretical framework, can be seen in Table 3.3, below:
Table 3.3: Security Entrenchment, Collaborator Networks, and Politicide Dynamics – with cases

Security Entrenchment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborator Network</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak</strong></td>
<td>High Repressive Violence</td>
<td>Low Repressive Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium rates of killing</td>
<td>Low rates of killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Case: Central Java</em></td>
<td><em>Case: West Java</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong</strong></td>
<td>High Repressive Violence</td>
<td>Low Repressive Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High rates of killing</td>
<td>Low rates of killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Case: East Java</em></td>
<td><em>Case: n/a</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4
Background and Overview of the 1965-66 Indonesian Politicide

13 Introduction

In this chapter I provide a background of the main actors and events leading up to the 1965-66 Indonesian politicide, as well as a general overview of the politicide itself. In 1965 the Indonesian Army lacked access to a centralized state apparatus capable of unilaterally implementing politicide across the territory it controlled (van Langenberg 1990:58; Gerlach 2010:30-31; Kammen and McGregor 2012:8). Not only did the killings occur against the wishes of President Sukarno, who called for restraint, but the Army itself often had divided loyalties that hindered a coordinated response to the communist party (PKI) and disrupted the security entrenchment of the high command prior to and during politicide. This in turn encouraged Army leadership to cultivate ties with anti-communist civilian organizations in order to combat and eventually purge the Indonesian Communist Party from sociopolitical life. This process was facilitated by a rise in communist fortunes and a shift in PKI domestic strategy in the years immediately prior to the politicide that helped bridge divides between anti-communist civilian leaders. This led to a situation in which anti-communist members of both the Indonesian army and Indonesia’s largest non-communist sociopolitical actively sought each other out to form a loose anti-communist alliance intent on eliminating the communist party and its supporters.

Following an incident in which members of the Army sympathetic to the PKI kidnapped and killed six top generals, the emerging coalition of Army leadership and anti-communist civilian hard-liners accused the PKI and its affiliated organizations of launching a coup. This coalition, under the leadership umbrella of the Army high command, then implemented a campaign of repressive violence that would result in an estimated half million deaths, as well as the torture and prolonged incarceration of hundreds of thousands of other suspected communists (see Cribb 1990:12). Arrests and killings were not implemented solely by the Army, but also by members of the civilian population, especially those organized under Indonesia’s religious organizations and some sections of the nationalist party that formed the civilian nodes of the anti-communist network.
The loose anti-communist network that took shape in Jakarta would become instrumental in the campaign to crush the PKI for two related reasons. First, this network provided Army leadership with a means of collecting information about PKI supporters at the local level. As will be discussed at length in the following chapters, the Army high command believed that the PKI had significantly infiltrated local deployments in both the Central Javanese Diponegoro and East Javaese Brawijaya divisions (Sundhaussen 1982:175-176). In turn, this prevented the Army high command from having access to the type of centralized and effective state (or military) bureaucracy that extended throughout society. Anticommunist civilian leaders and the organizations they controlled, on the other hand, were able to successfully infiltrate communist organizations and developed ties to sympathetic members of the armed forces who would ostensibly avoid tipping off the PKI. Moreover, these – especially religious - anti-communist civilian organizations were deeply integrated into many rural communities, some of which had scarce army presence. This provided Army leadership with local allies that could be relied upon to provide intelligence on the communist party and its supporters even when they could not trust their own deployments.

Second, the organizational leadership meeting in Jakarta would be able to mobilize large numbers of their membership for any actions to be taken against the communist party. Not only were religious organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) able to mobilize an organized and battle-tested paramilitary force, but taken together, the organizations that would later form a civilian action front to crush the PKI would be able to arrange massive protests against them. This would not only help to mask the leading role of the army in the majority of the killings, but it would also provide a source of reliable auxiliary manpower upon which the army could draw to implement killings at the provincial level (see chapters five through seven). As I will argue in the following chapters, the extent to which Army leadership was forced to rely upon this anti-communist alliance for varying combinations of intelligence and manpower strongly conditioned the magnitude of individuals targeted in politicide, rates of killing, and their regional differences.

Over the course of this chapter I develop these points in detail. First, I provide a background of the key Indonesian political actors leading up to the politicide: the Indonesian Army, PKI, and the major non-communist sociopolitical organizations – some of which controlled dedicated
militia groups.\textsuperscript{25} I show how past divisions in the Army meant that Indonesian security forces were not universally entrenched throughout Java, leading to varying capacities to act against the PKI across divisions. I also highlight how during the period of Guided Democracy (1959-1965) in particular, PKI gains relative to the non-communist political forces and a shift in PKI strategy towards more direct confrontation dramatically increased tension in many areas of the country and encouraged competing anti-communist social forces to form informal alliances with one another. In the second section, I briefly outline the events of September 30\textsuperscript{th}, 1965, in which six top army generals were kidnapped and murdered by a group calling themselves the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement. In the third section, I provide an overview of the 1965 politicide itself, highlighting the consolidation of power in the hands of Suharto, the coordination and loose formalization of an anti-communist alliance in the capital, and the subsequent drive to purge the communist party. This chapter concludes by briefly overviewing existing explanations for the differing politicide dynamics that will be the principle focus of later chapters.

14 Major Actors and Background in the Indonesian Politicide

14.1 The Indonesian Army

Three salient points are important for understanding the position of the Indonesian Army and its varying capacity to act against the communist party by October 1965. First, the Indonesian Army was internally divided and far from a unified and cohesive military force. Even though it was able to purge some of its most radical membership, important cleavages ensured that the high command could not treat varying regional troops as interchangeable in a similar manner to a fully professionalized military force. Second, the Indonesian Army was a territorially entrenched military force aimed primarily at combating internal threats to the Indonesian state. This entailed having troops available within the borders, and also a military culture that emphasized popular mobilization in order to overcome the logistical challenges of combatting internal threats in a massive archipelago state. Crucially, however, the capacity of different divisions to implement

\textsuperscript{25} These organizations include the major Muslim organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Masyumi, and Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (HMI). It also includes the nationalist party (PNI), and to a lesser extent the Catholic Party. It also includes affiliated organizations and youth wings.
this vision of what became known as territorial warfare differed dramatically. Third, over the course of the post-independence years, the Indonesian Army became increasingly involved in politics and the economy, and grew skeptical of civilian leadership – both political parties, and in some cases, President Sukarno. Taken together this meant that the Army had a large interest in preserving its position in the local economy, but also that the ability of the high command to unilaterally wage a coordinated campaign of violence across Java was limited.

The Indonesian Army emerged from the independence struggle as a massive, internally divided force. The combination of a chaotic popular struggle against Dutch rule and an archipelago spanning thousands of populated islands made the creation of any unified armed forces extremely difficult. During the independence movement, not only was the nascent republican army often organized along patrimonial relations between commanders and subordinates, but these troops often worked alongside and occasionally competed with a huge variety of militia (laskar) with varying levels of organization and ties to various political actors (see Crouch 1978:25-28; Kahin 1952:184-185; Anderson 1976; Swift 1989:67-73). Rather than a unified independence struggle, the independence movement was in large part a large number of semi-coordinated local independence struggles that often expressed competing aspirations for a future Indonesian state, including various communist, Islamic, and nationalist orientations. At times these differences led to open conflict between various pro-independence forces, especially on the outskirts of Yogyakarta and Solo in Central Java, and during a failed communist uprising in Madiun. In the case of the latter, troops from the West Java Siliwangi division under the command of Abdul Haris Nasution were tasked with crushing the communist uprising. Following independence, this massive number of armed actors had to be both consolidated into a single army, and reduced for peacetime. Given the combination of prestige and economic opportunity that being a soldier or officer entailed, the decision as to who would be demobilized, incorporated, or promoted created significant rifts following independence (see Crouch 1978:25-30).

Adding to the problems of demobilizing, modernizing, and centralizing Army command was significant differences amongst the officer corps in terms of military training and their vision for the political role of the armed forces. Prior to the Japanese invasion of Indonesia during the Second World War, the Dutch colonial administration trained a small number of indigenous officers at the military academy at Bandung to serve as junior officers in the colonial army.
(KNIL). Receiving greater education, literacy, and a more westernized military training, these KNIL officers would later form the professional core of the armed forces - especially within the Siliwangi division that would later gain the reputation as the most disciplined and professional troops in the Indonesian Army TNI (Crouch 1978:25-28; Kahin 1952:184-185). KNIL officers included figures such as Nasution, the commander of the Siliwangi division during the independence struggle and future chief of staff of the army. These ex-KNIL officers initially favoured a depoliticized armed forces following independence (Crouch 1978:25-28; see also Utrecht 1978:14-33).

Most officers in the republican army were those that had received some military training under the Japanese and tasked to lead civilian self-defense units in the case of an Allied invasion. The most common of these units were those collectively organized as PETA (Pembela Tanah Air – Defenders of the Fatherland). Armed primarily with bamboo spears, these PETA units introduced some degree of military organization and coordination to many residents of Java (Cribb 1991:41-42; Kahin 1952:109). These PETA recruits vastly outnumbered the small number of Indonesian ex-KNIL officers. Unlike their KNIL counterparts, PETA training emphasized the political character of an armed forces. PETA officers formed a large part of the Central Javanese Diponegoro and East Javanese Brawijaya brigades (Utecht 1980:48; Penders and Sundhaussen 1982:88-89). Competition between the less professionalized PETA troops and militia groups with the more professional corps under command of Dutch trained KNIL officers would be a continual source of tension throughout both the revolutionary period and the first decades of Indonesian independence (see also Sundhaussen 1982).

Tension between former KNIL and PETA officers continued throughout the early periods of independence as officers such as Nasution sought to modernize the armed forces. Only a limited number of officers could be selected for more professional military training, and the many uneducated PETA and self-made officers feared losing their positions of authority that they had gained over the course of the independence struggle (Crouch 1978:29-30). The connection between these officers and the political parties in cabinet incentivized the latter to interfere in Nasution’s modernization programme, attempting to blunt demobilization efforts and ensure that “their” officers would receive positions of seniority in the new Army chain of command. This created a tense standoff in 1952 known as the October 17th affair, in which troops loyal to Nasution surrounded the parliament to demand non-interference. In this Nasution was
outmaneuvered and temporarily removed from his position as Army Chief of Staff, a position to which he would return in 1955. Conflict over promotions was especially fierce when one considers the patrimonial nature of the Indonesian Army during the independence struggle and the lucrative prospects of Army officers for serving as key brokers in the local economy (see Crouch 1978).

On the outer islands, the prospect of losing privileged economic position encouraged regional commanders to defy central Army leadership. When Nasution tried to transfer regional commanders and rival senior officers in 1956, regional and local commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi took control of local governments and rallied public support in their opposition to the central government (Crouch 1978:33). By 1957, this defiance turned into open rebellion in Sulawesi, with parts of Sumatra following in 1958 when several politicians from the Masyumi party established the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in West Sumatra. Nasution dispatched his first deputy, Colonel Achmad Yani, to crush the rebellion over the course of several months first in Sumatra and then Sulawesi. Guerilla activity continued in Sulawesi until 1961 (Ibid). Collectively the rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi were known as the PRRI/Permesta rebellion (see Harvey 1977).

The need for Army leadership to quell rebellion was not limited to the PRRI/Permesta or the outer islands. The province of West Java was gripped by an Islamic insurgency under the leadership of Kartosuwiryo that began during the independence struggle (discussed in greater detail in chapter 6). Known as Darul Islam, this insurgency was especially active in the rural mountainous areas in the Southeastern West Java. The Darul Islam rebellion also spread to Aceh. Both Darul Islam insurgencies ended in 1962, and in both cases, troops of the Siliwangi division were largely responsible for crushing the insurgents (see Kilcullen 2006; Elson and Formichi 2011).

The combination of the Madiun Affair and Darul Islam rebellions allowed the Army leadership to better centralize command structures and purge itself of both communist sympathizers and supporters of an Islamic Indonesian state; however, deep divisions remained. To ward off potential challenges by Nasution, President Sukarno politically outmaneuvered him in 1962 by promoting him to Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The promotion ensured that Nasution was no longer in command of any actual troops and regulated him to a desk job. Nasution was
replaced by his deputy, Achmed Yani, creating a fierce rivalry between the two. Upon his promotion to Army Commander, Yani began replacing officers loyal to Nasution with those loyal to himself. By 1965 the Army High Command was factionalized into those supporting Yani and those supporting Nasution, and attempts to reconcile the two factions were unsuccessful through 1965 (Crouch 1978:83-86). The principal divide between these two officer factions was their attitude towards President Sukarno vis-à-vis the position of the PKI: while both were ardently anti-communist, Nasution advocated greater confrontation with Sukarno, while Yani was seen as less willing to openly contradict or confront Sukarno. Of probably less importance was the willingness of each to tolerate corruption within the Army, with Nasution being far more likely than Yani to police corruption among the officer corps.

By 1965 divisions were not limited to the high command. Due to the need to incorporate so many locally based troops dating back to the independence struggle, as well as the involvement of many troops in the local economy, many troop deployments had loyalties outside the chain of command. In the Central Javanese Diponeogro division, a large number of troops were suspected of being sympathetic to the communist party, especially in areas of communist strength such as Solo. In addition, many officers and soldiers were viewed as closer to President Sukarno than the high command – making it more difficult for the high command to publicly challenge the president. In general, the territorially-entrenched nature of the Army, combined with local recruiting, meant that local troop deployments could reflect local political affiliations unless carefully screened for (Lev 1963:350). Finally, many junior officers, especially the younger corps, began to resent the Army high command, perceiving them as blocking potential promotions and becoming corrupted by life in the capital (see Anderson and McVey 1971:2-6). Taken together, these factors limited the ability of the Army to respond to Sukarno or the PKI in any unified manner. Indeed, doing so ran a real risk of splintering the armed forces.

The second salient point about the Army was that it was primarily organized to defend the Indonesian state from internal challenges. The inception of the Indonesian Army was as an insurgent force. Because of this, the Indonesian Army quickly learned to attach itself to the civilian administrative apparatus, especially during the later stages of the revolutionary struggle when the revolutionary capital Yogyakarta fell to the Dutch. At this point, the Army divided itself into territorial commands, and set up an administrative structure parallel to civilian rule – attaching military officers and cadre to provincial and sub-provincial leadership, all the way to
the village level (Sundhaussen 1982:9-24). Unlike conventional military forces, the territorial units could operate with relative autonomy, and often enmeshed themselves in local politics and economics to maintain a steady supply of recruits, intelligence, food, and other logistical necessities – all crucial elements for waging guerilla warfare. This program fell into disuse immediately following independence, only to be returned to later under a doctrine that became known as territorial warfare. This doctrine was the chief strategy advocated by Nasution: embedding the Army at all points of civilian governance and enacting a people’s war against internal challenges. This also entailed mobilizing the civilian population to assist the military in combatting threats to the regime when necessary (see Nasution 1953, 1964). Indonesian military doctrine was thus primarily inward looking, concerned about local political balances, ensuring the unity of the Indonesian state, and by doing so, maintaining a military presence throughout society with which to potentially act against dissident elements of the civilian populace. This outlook was reinforced by the fact that most of the earliest threats facing Indonesia was not external aggression, but regional rebellions in the form of Darul Islam and PRRI/Permesta. Crucially, this also meant that the strategy most likely to be used in internal security operations would be to mobilize elements of the civilian populace as auxiliary troops.26

Starting in the 1950s, the doctrine of territorial warfare led to a return to revolutionary-style Army involvement in civilian life. The Army re-emphasized the need for a territorially entrenched Army as a means of both waging guerilla warfare in the case of an armed attack on Indonesia and for widespread use in counterinsurgency operations. To combat regional rebellions in West Java, Aceh, Sumatara, and Sulawesi, General Nasution helped to re-introduce a program known as the Village Security Organization (OKD). The OKD attached junior Army officers or NCOs to groups of villages, extending the Army chain of command to the local level. In addition, the OKD were responsible for providing local intelligence and manpower in the form of village guard units known as Hanra or Hansip (Kilcullen 2006:49-50). In 1962 this program was further expanded by creating Bintara Pembina (also known as Babinsa) – Army cadre attached to individual village heads throughout the country, thus giving the Army a parallel

26 This strategy of using civilians as both militia and at times as a living fence are discussed in greater detail in chapter three. For further discussion on the Indonesian Army’s reliance on civilian actors when local professional troops were in short supply, see also Kilcullen (2006); Robinson (2009).
structure to the civilian government. In addition, Army leadership intended for these local deployments to engage in public works programs at the local level, fostering trust between soldiers and civilians – a factor that Nasution regularly emphasized as a necessary component of successfully implementing territorial warfare for reasons of intelligence provision (Nasution [1953] 1965:33-34). Finally, the Army began to adopt more local deployments of combat troops for collections of villages known as Koramil in 1962.

The Army’s implementation of territorial warfare was uneven across the country, and heavily conditioned by the extent to which the Army had to overcome regional rebellions. In West Java, where the Army had to contend with a local religious rebellion known as Darul Islam, the Army was quick to extend the OKD, and later Babinsa and Koramil, programs throughout the province. The program was successful insofar as it both facilitated the defeat of Darul Islam and provided a means of screening local village guards for communist influence (Sundhaussen 1982:175). Outside of West Java, however, the Javanese Divisions were less enthusiastic about the organizational changes of territorial warfare. In both Central Java and East Java, a combination of lack of funds, hostility to modernization, and divisional rivalries made each division slow to implement Nasution’s vision of territorial warfare (Penders and Sundhaussen 1982:88-89). Koramil programs were only established in 1964, and even then, the associated OKD programs in each division were unable to fully screen village guards for communist influence (Sundhaussen 1982:175-176). In Central Java the implementation of the Koramil program was further hampered by the perception that few of its junior officers were reliable. Indeed, the situation was so bad that the Diponegoro headquarters feared that at times the village guard programs inadvertently provided some military training to local communist party members (Sejarah Militer Kodam VII/Diponegoro 1971: 184, cited in Hammer 2013:44). Not only this, but the ability of the East Java Brawijaya Division and the Central Java Diponegoro Division to engage in public works programs was severely limited in 1963 due to budgetary constraints brought on by the confrontation with Britain over Malaysia (Sundhaussen 1982:173).

The final salient point about the Army is that throughout the period from the revolution to politicide, the Army became an increasingly important political stakeholder, with growing influence and interest in being a major political force. Following independence, the Army was initially too divided, and its officer corps too political inexperienced, to be a major political force in the country (Crouch 1978:27). However, the combination of numerous failed parliaments,
political interference in the internal affairs of the Army, and the failure of civilian politicians to solve problems of internal unity encouraged the Army to take a more active role in politics. This role was facilitated by the declaration of martial law in 1957, which gave the Army sweeping powers with which to detain its domestic opponents. Initially implemented to help quell regional rebellions, martial law also encouraged some local commanders to act against political rivals such as the PKI. This led to the arrest of several prominent PKI leaders, who were only freed after interventions by Sukarno (Crouch 1978:49). In addition to powers of detainment, martial law gave increased powers to local commanders for purposes such as tax collection and the issuing of licenses, giving them a greater material stake in local economies (Lev 1963:351-352; Crouch 1978:38). The growing disillusionment with party politics led Army leadership to support the transition to Guided Democracy in 1959, effectively centralizing power in the hands of Sukarno, and granting an increased role to the military in national administration. In terms of political representation, under Guided Democracy military representation in cabinet increased to one third – prior to 1957 the army had no such representation (Hearman 2012:88). This integration into both politics and the economy was representative of Nasution’s “Middle Way” or dwi fungsi (dual-purpose) as it became known in the New Order, in which the army would have a role in all civilian areas but would not seek sole domination over any of them (Hefner 2000:45).

The economic interests of the Army continued to grow during the Guided Democracy era as Sukarno’s policies of confronting western powers over former colonial enterprises first in West Irian (Papua) and then Malaysia intensified. Responding to the takeover of Dutch enterprises by nationalist groups in response to the issue of West Irian, the army used their powers of martial law to “place all Dutch enterprises under military supervision” (Crouch 1978:39). Following the nationalization of these enterprises, military officers were permitted to manage these new state corporations, some of which were in the key economic industries such as plantations, mining, and banking (Ibid). The role of the army in the economy would increase in the years leading up to the September 30th Movement with the nationalization of some British enterprises in 1964, along with select American ones in 1965, providing additional enterprises to fall under the jurisdiction of Army officers. This in turn allowed for the redirection of funds away from the formal economy and into the pockets of military commanders, giving individual commanders
significant incentives for corruption. The integration of the officer corps into the economy ensured any challenge to the economic status quo could lead to direct personal consequences for military stakeholders. In addition, the Army’s stake in the local economy – especially in nationalized industries reliant on unionized labour – put the Army in direct competition with the communist party over labour and labour relations. The combination of economic management, law provision, and security made the army an indispensable pillar for Guided Democracy.

14.2 The PKI

In the near twenty years following a disastrous uprising at Madiun, the PKI became the largest communist party in the world outside China and the Soviet Union. By 1965 Chairman Aidit claimed the party had a membership of 3.5 million, with perhaps 23 million more in its affiliated organizations such as its trade union (SOBSI), youth organization Pemuda Rakyat, the cultural association Lekra, the women’s organization Gerwani, and its peasant association BTI, (Harian Rakyat August 20, 1965, cited in Mortimer 1974:366). By this point the PKI was the chief pillar of civilian support for Sukarno’s Guided Democracy: no other political party could match the PKI in terms of organizational membership, its ability to mobilize the masses in support of various political positions, and its presence in village life. Indeed, by 1963 PKI organizations extended to 62% of all Indonesian villages (Gerlach 2010:53). Three salient points are important in regards to the PKI. First, the Madiun Affair during the Indonesian Revolution, in which militia affiliated with the communist party seized the town of Madiun, ensured that the PKI would always be viewed with suspicion and hostility by Indonesian Army leadership. Second, following independence the PKI was able to gain a massive following, especially in Java, and was the only major political party to consistently increase its influence from 1955 to 1965. This led to Sukarno depending on the PKI for civilian support, and over time the position of Sukarno became increasingly aligned with the PKI. Third, and partly as a result of this, in 1963 the PKI changed strategies from elite cooperation with other political forces to a more aggressive unilateralism, especially in the countryside and in its dealings with the Army. As will be

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27 The immersion of officers in the local economy greatly alarmed Nasution, to the extent that he suspended or transferred several of the most egregious offenders. One such offender was the Central Javanese commander, Colonel Suharto. Nasution’s attempts at eliminating army activity in the informal economy ended in 1964 following the opposition of several other high ranking officers (Crouch 1978:40).
discussed in greater detail in the following section, these factors pushed the PKI into a fierce struggle with the remaining sociopolitical forces, encouraging alliances between them that would be instrumental for their drive to crush the communist party in 1965-66.

As discussed above, the Indonesian struggle for independence (1945-49) was frequently chaotic involving both semi-professional troops and huge numbers of civilian militia (*laskar*) with varying political orientations. Conflict between competing *laskar* and the Indonesian pro-nationalist republican army in Central Java came to a head on September 18, 1948 when militia affiliated with the communist party seized the town of Madiun from republican forces, capturing a number of high-profile military and political prisoners. Sukarno quickly denounced the seizing of Madiun over public radio, inviting the people of Indonesia to choose between the revolutionary Hatta government and that of the communists under the leadership of then-chairman Musso. For their part, the communists prepared to defend the town and mount a subsequent guerilla resistance in the countryside (Swift 1989:77-81). Part of this resistance included targeting potential local opponents. Reports abounded of mass killings of conservative Muslims during the withdrawal of communist forces, as well as the razing of their property (Anderson 1976:45-6; Swift 1989:80). To retake the town the army was forced to redeploy forces away from existing maneuvers in order to deal with the situation in the rear.

Colonel Nasution was tasked by the Hatta cabinet to crush the communist uprising in Madiun. By the end of October Nasution had successfully retaken Madiun, and arrested an estimated 36,000 communists and suspected sympathizers. The army also shot 11 leaders of the uprising (Hindley 1966:21). A few high ranking cadres, such as D.N. Aidit and Njoto, successfully escaped and fled the country. Responding to the apparent split in the nationalist movement, the Dutch launched a second offensive in December of 1948, prompting the release of those arrested at Madiun, many of whom apparently joined in actions against the Dutch. This action reduced PKI membership to approximately 4000 or 5000 members (Ibid:69). Following the withdrawal of the communists, members of the religious community responded with reprisal killings against suspected communist sympathizers. Greg Fealy provides an estimate of 8000 civilians killed, but
notes that the majority of those killed were suspected communists (Fealy 1998:313). Following independence no further action was taken against those involved at Madiun on either side.

The Madiun Affair drove a permanent wedge between the top leadership of the armed forces and any group claiming an affinity with communism. Army leadership saw the taking of Madiun as nothing less than a betrayal at a crucial time in their fight against the Dutch, forcing them to divert troops from where they were badly needed elsewhere (Kahin 1952:260-262, 295). This in turn ensured that there would be no cooperation between the PKI and top army leadership in the years following independence. The Madiun Affair also shattered the capacity of the PKI to engage in armed struggle for the remainder of the Indonesian revolution and post-revolutionary period. In the retaking of Madiun, the army arrested an estimated 36,000 suspected communists and shot eleven leaders of the affair (Hindley 1966:21). Following the re-legalization of the party in 1951, PKI leadership turned away from armed resistance and instead sought power through parliamentary channels.

Reduced to a mere 4000 cadre following the Madiun Affair, the PKI began a substantive drive into the countryside following their re-legalization as a political party in 1951. In an effort to develop a revolutionary consciousness amongst the peasantry, PKI cadres and select members of the affiliated peasant front BTI were dispatched to numerous villages throughout Java in particular to report on the material conditions facing the Indonesian peasantry. As time progressed, the scale of these activities increased, including helping to establish credit unions, providing occasional legal services for peasants, and to providing education both in the villages and larger cities (White 2016:3; Hearman 2012:74-75). In addition, the PKI and its affiliated cultural organization Lekra would stage festivals and entertainment such as wayang kulit (shadow puppet performances) and ladruck (plays) in the villages, further increasing the attractiveness of party membership. By 1956 the PKI claimed to have over one million members, with more still having some ties with one of the mass organizations affiliated with the party (Hindley 1964:80). The PKI was well positioned to locate and articulate rural grievances during

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28 Kahin estimates several hundred santri were killed by communist-backed forces during this period (1952:300). However, given that these figures are provided by Masyumi contacts, there is reason to doubt the reliability of these figures (see also Fealy and McGregor 2012:109)
their electoral campaign, and promised major rural concessions such as land redistribution (Feith 1957:13). While the overall number of cadre remained low, these activities helped the PKI to establish a rural presence that was unmatched by any other non-religious political party.

The PKI strategy of rural penetration paid off in both the 1955 national and 1957 regional elections. In the 1955 national elections the PKI received 16.4% of the popular vote, good for fourth place behind the nationalist party (PNI), the Muslim party Masyumi, and the more traditionalist Muslim NU (Feith 1957:58). PKI strength continued to grow rapidly: by the 1957 regional elections their aggregate vote share was the largest of all political parties at 30.9% (Lev 1966:97). Crucially, the PKI was the only one of the four major political parties to increase its vote share between 1955 and 1957. The PKI vote was largely concentrated in Java, the most politically important island in Indonesia, making it a crucial player in Indonesian politics, even if the party was often underrepresented in cabinet. The PKI wielded additional influence through its affiliated mass organizations: its affiliated labour union SOBSI controlled approximately 60% of Indonesian labour by 1957, and the farmers’ association BTI was the largest organization of its kind in Indonesia (McVey 1963:164).

Like the Army, the PKI supported the transition to Guided Democracy in 1959. Over the course of Guided Democracy, the PKI’s fortunes would continue to rise at the expense of the other major political parties. In 1960 Sukarno banned both Masyumi and the socialist PSI for their support of regional rebellions and their opposition to Guided Democracy – a move that was strongly supported by the PKI as it removed two of their principle political rivals. The political role of both NU and the PNI was also reduced throughout the Guided Democracy period. The position of NU in national-level politics was largely confined to the religious ministry, while the PNI proved to be ineffective at mobilizing support outside the bureaucracy. As Ruth McVey noted, the political position of both parties had been reduced to “little more than self-perpetuating patronage machines” (1963:167), at least in the capital. The sidelining of the major non-communist parties ensured that Guided Democracy would exist as a tenuous balance

\[29\] It is worth noting that, especially Masyumi and NU, were socio-religious organizations in additional to being political parties. Outside the specific context of elections, it is more appropriate to think of them as the former.
between the PKI, Army, and President Sukarno, with the latter balancing the two against the other to maintain his own authority and autonomy. The Army maintained a virtual monopoly on violence, while the PKI was unrivalled in its ability to mobilize the populace in favour of Sukarno’s policies. Sukarno, for his part, was also able to protect the PKI from the Army, such as securing the release of PKI leaders who had been arrested under martial law.

Over the course of Guided Democracy, Sukarno’s policies and those of the PKI began to converge. In international politics, this convergence took the form of an anti-imperial struggle, first with the Netherlands in regards to the province of West Irian, and then with the British – and to a lesser extent the United States – over the formation of the state of Malaysia following British decolonization. West Irian was the last remaining Dutch holding on the archipelago that Indonesia had always claimed would be part of its territory following independence. By 1960, Sukarno adopted a more aggressive confrontation policy with the Dutch over West Irian – including a build-up of arms from the Soviet Union and limited military action in West Irian. Domestically, the PKI was active in organizing demonstrations in favour of confrontation and in forming closer ties with the communist bloc (see Mortimer 1974:175:202). Fearing this, the US Kennedy administration brokered a deal between the two parties in 1962, with the Netherlands transferring sovereignty first to the United Nations, and then to Indonesia following an independence vote. Sukarno continued to pursue an aggressive anti-imperial struggle following his success in West Irian. By 1963 Indonesia had entered into a low-intensity campaign of military action and provocation known as Konfrontasi towards Britain over the creation of an independent Malay state. To maintain their close connections with Sukarno, who framed Konfrontasi as a public struggle, both the army and PKI became enthusiastic public supporters of the campaign. In the case of the PKI this meant mobilizing its supporters in massive rallies in favour of the campaign, as well as large protests outside American and British embassies. Like the West Irian dispute, Konfrontasi encouraged closer relations between Indonesia and the communist bloc – especially China – with whom both Sukarno and the PKI would pursue warmer relations following the Sino-Soviet split (see Zhou 2014, 2015). Rhetorically, Sukarno also tried to position Indonesia as a leader of the non-aligned movement, a group of states that he referred to as the “New Emerging Forces”.

Sukarno’s pursuit of policies like those advocated by the PKI was not limited to foreign policy. For years land shortages had been one of the central grievances in rural Indonesia, particularly in
Bali, Central Java, and East Java. Unsurprisingly, land reform had long been one of the key promises made by the PKI towards the peasantry, dating back to at least the 1955 national elections. This promise was also one in which the PKI could claim sole ownership: no other major political party had fought and continued to fight for land redistribution (Mortimer 1974:277). Moreover, the PKI had since independence sought to integrate itself into the countryside in an attempt to transform the party into an agrarian one more in the vein of Mao than the Soviet Union (Ibid 299). Until later in the Guided Democracy period, the PKI was unable to make meaningful strides in implementing land reforms.

Land reform continued to stall in the first few years of Guided Democracy. To attempt to address the issue of land reform the government passed Act No.1/1958, forcing large landowners to sell land either privately or to the Indonesian government for redistribution to break up and redistribute large estates that had been acquired by wealthy families under colonialism (Soemardjan 1962). This law was further amended in 1960. Absentee landholding, with the exception of government officials or undefined special circumstances was made illegal. The promise of the reform was to provide two hectares of land per family. While regional figures are unavailable, 60% of Indonesian farmers, concentrated in Java and Bali, are estimated to have been landless at that time (Soemardjan 1962:26-7). Given that the average existing plot size in Java was a mere 0.65 hectares, it was an “arithmetical impossibility” to provide two hectares per family in Java (Mortimer 1974:287).

It is virtually impossible to determine with any accuracy the amount of land either owned or controlled by large landowners. This is due in large part to complex village arrangements regarding land use, as well as a lack of statistics in landholding in Indonesia at this time more generally (Mortimer 1974:286). In practice, village arrangements often had individuals controlling more than 10 hectares of land, even if they themselves did not own them. This frequently arose when poor peasants did not have the means to work the land themselves, and out of necessity would then rent it to wealthier local inhabitants who could employ sharecroppers or work the land themselves (Utrecht 1962:75). Utrecht estimates that there only 5,400 landowners across Java, Madura, South Sulawesi, Bali, and Lombok that actually owned more than 10 hectares of irrigated land, and 11,000 who owned 10 or more hectares of dry fields (Ibid). He also claims that “a much larger number of people” had more than 10 hectares available
due to local rental practices; however, there is no way to determine what this number is, nor their regional concentration in various areas of Indonesia.

In addition to the mathematical impossibility of finding land in of itself, the PKI and BTI accused large numbers of landlords of finding loopholes in the law: transferring land to family members, or donating it to the lands owned by religious institutions – a loophole in the law that prevented land transfer to the peasantry (Lyon 1970:43). By mid-1963 it was obvious to all stakeholders that implementation of the land reform law had stalled or outright failed. Official figures placed the amount of redistributed land in Java at 35,978 hectares. BTI officials interviewed by Rex Mortimer in 1964 claimed that only 57% of land scheduled for redistribution had been partitioned, and that if one included fraud such as redistribution to friends or relatives, this number dropped to an estimated nine or ten percent (1974:290).

On November 1, 1963 Aidit made a speech to peasant cadre praising the role of the peasantry in the Indonesian revolution and linked this peasant mobilization explicitly to the anti-imperial campaign being made in Malaysia (Mortimer 1974:296). In December Aidit doubled down on this premise in a Central Committee meeting, “in which he placed radical land reform in the center of the ‘revolutionary offensive’” (Ibid 297). By April of the following year peasants, with the support and organization of the PKI and BTI, began to unilaterally seize landholdings in Central Java, with land seizures following in East Java and some areas of West Java.

In a typical unilateral action (aksi sepihak), PKI affiliated organizations, along with the peasants to whom land was being redistributed, would seize and occupy lands owned by large landowners who were believed to be circumnavigating the land reform laws. The number of people involved in these actions could grow quite large, with numerous aksi involving thousands of individuals. While sanctioned at the national level, the decision to implement these campaigns were made by local PKI and BTI branches. Aksi were especially prominent in rural areas with a strong PKI presence, such as Klaten and the outskirts of Solo in Central Java, and the Jombang-Kediri area of East Java (Mortimer 1974:317). Often these aksi would target the landholdings of entrenched rural elites, such as the vast tracts of land owned by pesantren or nationalized foreign plantations.

30 Interview 037, former PKI cadre, Semarang
(Fealy and McGregor 2012:112). These actions in turn placed the PKI and its affiliated organizations in often violent conflict with these same entrenched local interests. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, violence was especially severe in East Java.

By September or October of 1964 it was becoming readily apparent that the PKI was losing the campaign over land reform. It was often unable to physically overcome the landholders and their allies in NU and the PNI, and by December PKI Chairman Aidit publicly admitted the success of the opponents of the aksi (Mortimer 1974:321). A meeting called by Sukarno at Bogor Palace on December 12 including the major political and religious parties concluded with a joint statement on land reform stating “officials and peasants are obliged to consult without insinuations, intimidation, and arms” (Harian Rakyat Dec 14, 1964 cited in Mortimer 1974:322). However, aksi were still carried out in (especially East) Java and Solo through February and March of 1965 despite calls for moderation emanating from the center. By mid-1965 aksi appear to have stopped in all regencies. The land reform campaign was the first to involve substantial organized violence between PKI and non-PKI supporters in Java since the Madiun Affair.

In addition to a more radical land reform campaign, the PKI also intensified its activities vis-à-vis the Armed Forces. Seizing upon Sukarno’s framing of Konfrontasi as a popular struggle, the PKI advocated for the formation of armed civilian columns with which to defend Indonesian territory and to send to Malaysia for Konfrontasi in early 1965. On June 1 Sukarno urged territorial commanders to give serious thought to the proposal, as well as appointing civilian commissars throughout the Army to represent the religious and communist elements of the Nasakom triangle. For their part, the Army high command was opposed to both proposals: they advocated strongly that any civilians would be under strict Army command, and arguing that the Army already represented Nasakom in spirit, were able to pay lip service to the Nasakom principle without the appointment of commissars. When it came to train civilians for the Malaysia campaign, it was the air force that took the lead: Halim Air Force Base outside Jakarta was a major training area, and more local training exercises took place across Java. Approximately 400-600 civilians were trained each month at Halim Air Force Base alone before training was halted on September 21 by Commodore Ignatius Dewanto, who alleged that the civilians being trained were overwhelmingly drawn from communist supporters (Crouch 1978:74). For the Army leadership, the creation of a fifth column demonstrated that the PKI was seeking to challenge the monopoly of force currently enjoyed by the army, as it was widely
understood that such a civilian force was likely to come under PKI influence (Crouch 1978:87; see also Mortimer 1974:382-384). Moreover, the last time the PKI had access to an armed wing was during the Madiun Affair, an event that remained a continual point of reference in army discussions surrounding PKI militancy. Finally, the PKI, operating through their special bureau, sought to gain additional covert support from amongst junior officers in the Army.

According to Sjam, the head of the special bureau who was put on trial following the September 30th Movement, the special bureau had contacted 500 officers believed to be sympathetic to the PKI.

Taken together, the combination of the Madiun Affair, a rise in PKI fortunes from 1951-1965, and a radicalization of its domestic strategy placed the PKI in a direct and often zero-sum competition with the remainder of Indonesia’s sociopolitical groups. For the Army, Madiun showed that the PKI could not be trusted, and the increased role of the Army in domestic politics and the economy only increased the fields in which it was forced to compete with the PKI. As will be discussed below, the rising success and radicalization of the PKI also alarmed the other sociopolitical organizations – especially the religious parties – in Indonesia, driving them to form a nascent anti-communist network that would eventually work with the Army to annihilate the PKI.

31 For example, Nasution brought up Madiun as an event that would “pale in comparison” to what would happen should the PKI attempt to use Indonesia’s struggles in an attempt to seize power to members of US embassy and military staff. Moreover, Nasution himself was tasked with crushing the communist uprising in Madiun during the revolution. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 19 March, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, RG59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDON-MALAYSIA.

32 It is unclear if these officers were actual PKI sympathizers or simply army dissidents seeking to leverage the support of the PKI for their own grievances. It is also difficult to ascertain exactly when the PKI intensified its efforts to infiltrate the Army. A contact of Sjam interviewed by John Roosa claims Sjam was involved in covert operations in 1956, though this information is impossible to triangulate (2006:125). Harold Crouch estimates such efforts occurred by “at least” 1957 (1978:83). There is little doubt, however, that there were substantive efforts to infiltrate and make contacts in the armed forces by the late 1950s and early 1960s.
14.3 Non-Communist Civilian Organizations

The rise of the PKI and subsequent radicalization of its domestic strategy deeply alarmed the leadership of other sociopolitical organizations in Indonesia, especially the major Muslim organizations (Masyumi, HMI, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama) and the right-wing of the nationalist party (PNI). This would in turn have two important consequences for the politicide that would occur in 1965-66. First, non-communist organizations increasingly saw the political struggle with the PKI in zero-sum terms, making it a material imperative to oppose the communist party. Local grievances and conflict also increasingly took on a political dimension that mirrored national-level political cleavages. Second, opposition to the PKI led its opponents to seek out like-minded leaders in both other political organizations and the Army at both the national and local level. Taken together, these factors led to the formation of a loose anti-communist alliance that spanned the Army and anti-communist civilian groups that sought to infiltrate, confront, and destroy the communist party if given the opportunity to do so.

For most non-communist parties, conflict with the PKI shifted from electoral and political competition to defending the material well-being or legal status of the organization itself. The land reform campaign, for example, was a substantive threat to the material interests of the elite of both the PNI and NU. For the former, land reform was an attack on the property of the parties more aristocratic membership – those former members of the Javanese nobility that later became prominent bureaucrats in the Dutch and post-colonial regime (see Geertz 1964). For NU, the land reform campaign was an attack on the very social structure within which NU was situated. The strength of NU was, and continues to be, in its vast network of religious schools (pesantren) in rural Java – especially East Java, that served as spiritual, educational, and economic hubs for the more orthodox Muslim (santri) community. In exchange for education and board, santri (which also refers to students in the context of pesantren) would often work the lands of the school headmaster (kiai). Within this system, kiai became important spiritual, economic, and cultural leaders of their respective communities, and amongst their followers their “word was writ” (Fealy and McGregor 2012:107). The links between santri and their students would often continue long past formal schooling, and kiai were sought for business or moral advice throughout the lifetime of the pupil. Following their time at the pesantren, some santri would study further, with the eventual aim of starting or taking over their own pesantren, all the while retaining close connection with their own kiai. The basis of the pesantren system and the wealth
of individual kiai depended heavily on income generated through landholdings and the labour of students.\footnote{In practice it was often difficult to separate the private landholdings of kiai with those of their respective pesantren.} In addition, the santri community whom NU represented politically tended to be wealthier than their more spiritually idiosyncratic (abangan) neighbours (Hefner 2000:52-53). Taken together, this meant that the PKI’s aksi were a direct attack on both the material wealth of the community NU represented, as well as the personal wealth and prestige of the pesantren and kiai: the two institutions through which NU was able to exercise influence in the Javanese countryside. The PKI was also a threat for organizations such as the Muslim Student Organization (Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia – HMI). Following the banning of Masyumi, the PKI lobbied extensively for HMI to be banned, claiming (not unreasonably) that it was a bastion of former Masyumi activists. Demonstrations for banning HMI drew massive crowds as late as September 28, 1965.\footnote{Interview 040, HMI leader, Jakarta.}

This material dimension of political competition tended to reproduce national-level political divides at the local level. The land reform campaign led to sharp divides between predominantly santri NU and abangan supporters of the PKI. Political identity became the basis on which land could be parceled out and grievances over land articulated, meaning these political groups increasingly defined their interests and identities in opposition to one another (see Lyon 1970:57-65). This problem was exacerbated by the general shortage of land in rural Java. Santri accused their abangan neighbors of theft and unjust claims to land, while poor abangan workers accused santri of corruption and violating promises to redistribute land. On university campuses, the PKI-affiliated student group CGMI held rallies denouncing HMI, calling on Sukarno to ban the party, while competing political party youth groups held rallies denouncing one another in the streets of major cities. In Surabaya, PKI and NU presses regularly published leaflets denouncing one another, and anniversary rallies were staged by mass organizations as public shows of force (Ibid 66). Grievances over issues of land and the legal-status of political organizations diffused down to the local level, and tensions between sociopolitical groups was often extremely high (eg: Lyon 1970: 57-65).
A second consequence of PKI gains, and a product of the increasingly zero-sum political struggle, was that it drove anti-communist leaders across different sociopolitical organizations to form a loose anti-communist alliance between themselves and with sympathetic members of Army leadership. Within NU, for example, there were two principal factions: a pragmatic camp under the leadership of NU leader Kiai Chasbullah and a hardliner camp that was dominated by Kiai Achmad Siddiq, Mohammad Dachlan, Machrus Ali, and Bisri Syansuri (Fealy 1996:19). By 1963, in the face of growing PKI strength and activities, the pragmatist wing began to lose ground to a younger generation of strong anti-communists. By 1965 younger leaders such as Subchan ZE and Chalid Mawardi gaining increased prominence (Ibid 38). While the pragmatists had close ties with Sukarno, the younger militant faction often enjoyed close ties with other anti-communist organizations, especially anti-communists within the army (Fealy and McGregor 2012:112). Included also in this network were former Masyumi activists, who following the banning of the party, either went underground or joined HMI (Hefner 2000:47). From within HMI these activists worked diligently whenever possible to check the growth of the PKI, forming secret alliances with anti-communist members of other organizations as well as sympathetic members of the armed forces. In some cases, young Muslims would infiltrate communist fronts in order to seize membership lists that could then be passed to other nodes of the alliance, such as local military commanders with anti-communist inclinations (Ibid 48).

By 1965 anti-communist leaders from HMI, Muhammadiyah, NU, and the Catholic party were in regular contact with both each other and anti-communist army officers at the strategic reserve command (Kostrad) headquarters in Jakarta.35 At the time Kostrad was under the command of General Suharto. Among those civilian leaders involved in these discussions was Harry Tjan of the Catholic party and Subchan of NU, who would together form the leadership of the civilian action front to crush the PKI. Also in attendance was Sulastomo, the chairman of HMI, along with representatives of Muhammadiyah.

35 Interview 040, former HMI leader, Jakarta.
15 The September 30th Movement and its Aftermath

The pretext to crush the PKI would eventually arrive in the form of the September 30th Movement, in which a small group of junior army officers, acting with the support of a small segment of the PKI, kidnapped and killed six high ranking army generals. Suharto rapidly consolidated control over the remaining loyal troops, and acting with the support of civilian and international anti-communist partners, launched a campaign of mass arrests and executions against suspected communist sympathizers.

G30S

The events that took place the night of September 30 and early morning of October 1 remain the subject of scholarly debate, and have long prompted intense speculation as to who the mastermind of the events. The principle debates center whether the movement was an internal army affair (Anderson and McVey 1971), a communist-backed coup (the official New Order version, first published by Notosusanto and Saleh 1967), or some combination thereof (Crouch 1978; Roosa 2006). There are also debates on the relative involvement of the United States (Simpson 2008), Suharto (Wertheim 1970), or Sukarno (Dake 1973). The purpose of this section is not to offer an alternative explanation to those already produced. Rather, the intent is to familiarize the reader with the events that served as the catalyst for politicide, and how Indonesia’s sociopolitical forces responded to the September 30th Movement to this end. This account is largely based on the work of John Roosa (2006), who has produced the most recent detailed monograph of the subject. His accounts are supported by fractions of information that have since emerged from temporary openings in the Chinese archives (Zhou 2014, 2015). The broad series of events presented here are not disputed in the existing literature.

In the evening of September 30th, 1965, army troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, calling themselves the September 30th Movement, departed from Halim Air Force base outside Jakarta. Their mission was to kidnap seven high ranking army leaders, presumably those who were thought to make-up the so called council of generals allegedly planning a coup on
armed forces day.  These troops were to be supported by the deployment of two troop battalions in front of the palace, who would in turn receive logistical support and foodstuffs from Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani (Roosa 2006:101-103). Coordination between PKI affiliated civilians and the Army was to be done by Sjam, the head of the PKI’s special bureau, which was responsible for infiltrating the armed forces (Ibid).

From the outset the September 30th Movement was characterized by catastrophically poor planning. The troops tasked with carrying out the kidnapping received no prior training in these types of missions, and the decision to proceed with the plan was only made on September 29. Given that the movement was intended to be a “fuse” that would ignite revolt elsewhere, the rapidity of decision to action ensured it was impossible to coordinate activities across even small distances, much less courier orders that required train or bus (Roosa 2006:96). The kidnapping of Yani and Nasution, the two most difficult targets, were not assigned the best troops. In the case of Nasution, the operation was commanded by a private, while every other kidnapping was led by a corporal, sergeant, or lieutenant (Ibid:99). Yani, Harjono, and Pandjaitan were killed in the process of capture and transport back to Halim Air Force Base, while Nasution was able to escape over the back wall of his property into that of Iraqi ambassador. Nasution’s five year old daughter was also fatally wounded during the arrest process, and a Lieutenant was mistakenly taken instead of Nasution.

It appears that the original plan was to present the kidnapped generals to Sukarno in order to have him deal with the plotters directly; however, those in charge of the movement at Halim changed their plans at the last minute when some of those slated for arrest had been killed. Rather than present those remaining to Sukarno, they were executed at Halim and their bodies thrown in a well. Underscoring the lack of planning, the movement was unable to find Sukarno in the immediate aftermath of their action, despite Untung being the leader of Sukarno’s Palace Guard. In addition, the food and water that was intended to be delivered by Pemuda Rakyat members for the battalions outside the palace never materialized, and additional weapons and

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36 Those who were targeted were: Lieutenant General Yani, Major General Suprapto, Major General Harjono M.T., Major General S. Parman, Brigadier General D.I. Pandjaitan, and Brigadier General Sutojo Siswomihardjo.
support for other civilian auxiliary groups failed to arrive by the morning of October 1 (Roosa 2006:100).

That same morning, Untung made a radio announcement revealing the existence of the September 30th Movement and that it had eliminated a right-wing coup attempt against President Sukarno. Untung announced the dissolution of cabinet and the formation of a revolutionary council in Jakarta that included representatives from each branch of the armed forces. This was followed by calls to establish revolutionary councils elsewhere: presumably an invitation for other left-leaning military units to seize control of their respective areas. Direct PKI influence on the council was kept at a minimum, with only three out of 45 listed members of the council coming from the party. Sukarno was not listed as a member of the revolutionary council, sowing further confusion as to the aims of the movement (Crouch 1978:98). A coherent vision of the movement was never announced to the Indonesian population despite control over national radio, and confusion surrounding the movement was widespread. The lack of contingency planning and consideration of potential failures led to widespread confusion amongst the movement at Halim Air Force Base.

Due to a lack of planning, the September 30th Movement in Jakarta collapsed within 24 hours. General Suharto, the second-highest ranking combat officer and head of Kostrad, was able to rapidly assemble the remaining loyal troops in Jakarta, including the special forces (RPKAD) based south of the city. By 6pm on October 1 Suharto had dispersed or co-opted the battalion deployed in the central square outside the presidential palace by the September 30th Movement. This was followed by a radio broadcast from Suharto, who denounced the movement – known also by the acronym G30S - as counter-revolutionary. The remaining battalion loyal to the movement was dispersed the following morning from its position south of Halim Air Force Base. By the end of October 2 the main political and military players associated with the movement had fled Halim, including Aidit and Omar Dhani (Roosa 2006:218-222).

37 Confidence that this would occur is another blunder listed in a document written by Supardjo that is documented extensively by John Roosa. The leadership of the movement, particularly Sjam, was convinced that there were far more troops loyal to the September 30th movement than actually existed.

38 September 30th Movement is Gerakan 30 September in Bahasa Indonesia.
16 Unleashing Violence

One side effect of the elimination of Yani and the majority of his inner circle was that it eliminated the faction of the Jakarta high command most likely to accommodate President Sukarno. Following the killing of General Yani and incapacitation of Nasution, Sukarno tasked Suharto with restoring order and security on October 2. In a meeting at Bogor with the remaining top-ranking generals, Sukarno attempted to appoint a commander that would be compliant with his own programs. This move was met with stiff resistance by the remaining anti-communist leadership. In what appeared to be a compromise, General Pranoto was appointed caretaker of the army providing that the task of restoring order and stability was left in the hands of Suharto (Crouch 1978:102). In practice, this enabled Suharto to become the highest ranking general concerning domestic deployments in the wake of G30S.

Anti-communist civilian organizations quickly met to coordinate their activities both with each other and with trusted elements of the army leadership immediately following the announcement by the September 30th Movement. On the morning of October 1, hours after Untung’s radio announcement, NU’s Subchan, and Sulastomo and Syarifudin Harahap of HMI were already describing the events as a coup attempt (Sulastomo 2006:44). The following day, representatives of NU, HMI, Muhammadiyah, and the Catholic Party met in Jakarta. They agreed that G30S was the work of the PKI, and in response formed the Action Command to Crush the Thirtieth September Movement (KAP) under the leadership of Subchan and Harry Tjan (Crouch 1978:141; Sulastomo 2006:78). KAP leadership travelled to Kostrad within 24 hours of forming to coordinate their activities with anti-communist army forces. Two days later, the same day that the generals’ bodies would be discovered, KAP was also dubbed “Front Pancasila” in order to frame the movement as one in greater accordance with state principles, on the recommendation of Suharto (Sulastomo 2006:79). This underscores the close connection between civilian anti-communist hardliners and Suharto that would be necessary for coordinating activities between the Army and civilian organizations.

39 Interview 040, HMI leader, Jakarta.
On October 4 the bodies of the slain generals were exhumed from a well at Halim Air Force Base following the arrival of camera crews to widely broadcast the exhumation (Crouch 1978:138). After submersion in water for three days the bodies were in a grisly state. Following the exhumation Suharto made a brief speech denouncing the PKI while simultaneously distancing himself from Sukarno. At the same time as the exhumation the first anti-PKI rallies were held in the capital, attracting around 1000 individuals (Hearman 2012:96).

The exhumation and condition of the generals’ bodies was the focal point of a prolonged propaganda campaign waged by the army against the communist party. One of the most repeated propaganda stories was of the torture and mutilation of the generals by the PKI-affiliated women’s group Gerwani. This mutilation was followed by an orgy between the blood-soaked Gerwani members and PKI cadre who were also in attendance (Wierenga 2011). Autopsy reports uncovered by Benedict Anderson refute these claims of torture (1987). Along with tales of Gerwani, army propaganda focused on PKI plans to exterminate large portions of the population, faked caches of discovered weapons and instruments of torture such as eye gougers, and tales of PKI barbarism.

KAP organized a massive rally the day following the exhumation of the generals as part of a massive funeral that had taken the place of armed forces day. There, Suharto made further denunciations against the PKI. On October 9th an even larger KAP-organized rally was held, attended by tens of thousands of members of KAP’s constituent organizations. The rally culminated in the destruction of PKI headquarters in Jakarta (Crouch 1978:144-145). Rallies in Jakarta continued throughout the month of October, often resulting in the destruction of PKI property. However, at this time there had yet to be any instances of mass killing, and large demonstrations were supervised by local army elements.

The killing of the generals prevented Sukarno from being able to publicly defend the September 30th Movement. In the days that would follow, Sukarno would attempt to shift blame away from the PKI for the killing of the generals, repeatedly describing G30S as “a ripple in the ocean of the revolution” (Sukarno 1965, cited in Crouch 1978:162). Still, the propaganda campaign put forth by the army, combined with mass protests against the PKI and lack of communist counter-mobilization, limited the spread of Sukarno’s appeals for calm. Sukarno was also conspicuously absent from some of the more high profile events in the capital immediately following G30S,
such as the funeral and subsequent rally for the generals on Oct 5. This further enabled Suharto and other anti-communists to seize the initiative.

On October 10 Suharto tightened his hold on the security apparatus and gave the first orders to purge elements of the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement from the military. Suharto announced the formation of Kopkamtib, an alternative chain of command within the existing security apparatus. Suharto’s first order, issued that same day, was to purge the army of all elements believed to be sympathetic to G30S. Instructions were left vague as to what was considered sympathetic (Kammen and Zakaria 2012: 443-444). These instructions were also transmitted to regional army commanders, leaving them with a high degree of discretion as to what constituted involvement in G30S. At the same time, army units swept through Jakarta to arrest suspected communists. Suharto was named as the new army commander on October 14, further consolidating his hold on the major security organs. Following this, the anti-communist network moved in force against the PKI and its supporters.

In the case of the Army, Suharto deployed the elite RPKAD regiment to Central Java. There, troops from outside the province were required, as several local troop deployments had sided with the PKI and the province was a bastion of PKI strength (Crouch 1978:143). Politicide began in Central Java with the arrival of the RPKAD and commenced around the same time in West Java and East Java. In Aceh, Brigadier-General Ishak Djuarsa started the process of killings slightly earlier, in the first week of October (Melvin 2017:497). In other areas of the country the killings started later. In Bali, for example, the local commander was unwilling to move against the PKI, and mass detentions and arrests only began with the arrival of the RPKAD in December 1965. This clearly demonstrates that the Army was essential for unleashing politicide, and for explaining when politicide began in each province (see also Roosa 2016; Robinson 2018).

The Indonesian Army appears to have intended to direct violence towards particular subsections of the communist party. On November 8 Kopkamtib issued order KEP-069/10/1965, forming a Central prosecuting Team and Regional Prosecutor’s Teams. These teams were tasked with the classification of political prisoners into Categories A, B, and C (Kammen and Zakaria 2012:447). The Army was responsible for selecting team leaders, with the remaining members being selected by the Minister of Defence and the Attorney General. Formally, Category A prisoners were seen as leaders and slated for execution, whereas B and C prisoners were to be subjected to
incarceration, indoctrination, have their employment terminated, or freed. In practice, local commanders had substantial leeway in interpreting these orders. Still, the practice of screening and sorting detainees suggests the Army intended to limit violence towards specific types of individuals. Moreover, and as will be developed further in subsequent chapters, Army units would occasionally clash with civilian militia over who was being targeted for violence, with the former trying to curtail the activities of the latter.

Still, the Army had severe limitations when it came to properly identifying and screening members of the PKI and its affiliated organizations. US Ambassador Marshall Green noted that the Army “seemed to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership.”\(^{40}\) This statement appears to be borne out by the fact that after half a year of moving against the PKI, the Army had only managed to kill or arrest four of ten politburo members, and by 1967, less than half of the PKI’s Central Committee had been arrested or killed (see Gerlach 2010:31). Indeed, when the Army interrogated Carmel Budiarjo in early 1970, she noted that an organizational chart of the PKI hanging on the wall had the names of leaders and functionaries in PKI “committees, commissions and departments […] still empty (Budiarjo 1996:129, cited in Gerlach 2010:31). Even five years later, the Army still lacked basic information about the leadership structure of what had been Indonesia’s largest political party! As will be discussed at length later, this meant that the Army would often have to reach outside its command structure to identify and screen potential communist party supporters.\(^{41}\)

The civilian nodes of the anti-communist network were also active in encouraging and participating in politicide alongside the Army. Within NU, the militant anti-communist wing of Munasir, Yusuf Hasyim, Subchan, and Ahmad Syaichu began to issue circulars from Jakarta headquarters (Fealy and McGregor 2012:115). On October 5 this NU branch, with the blessing of Suharto, made the first public radio broadcast expressly linking the September 30th Movement to


\(^{41}\) It is also telling that, despite actively working to collect intelligence on the PKI, the head of military intelligence, General Parman, was amongst those kidnapped by the September 30th Movement, evidently with no guards posted outside his home (Gerlach 2010:30). The ease of his kidnapping by the organization that would have been the focus of much military intelligence collection, in a time of high political tension, underscores how the Army was not terribly effective at obtaining intelligence on the PKI and its activities.
the PKI. From October 9 onwards instructions were issued from Jakarta to NU branches in the provinces to move against the communist party, though the instructions came short of directly calling for physical violence. Still, central NU board instructions to the regions following G30S were laced with terms such as eradicate (menumpas), finish off (menghabiskan) and crush (mengganyang). Members were also told that anyone that fell in battle to the communists would “die a martyr” (Ibid:117). In the case of HMI, chairman Sulastomo departed Jakarta for a tour of Central Java at the same time the RPKAD was dispatched to the province (Sulastomo 2006:123). His tour corresponded with RPKAD movements through Yogyakarta, Klaten, and Solo. While on the tour, Sulastomo spoke to crowds of HMI supporters, encouraging them to be brave in the face of the communist party.  

42 It is almost certain that other organizations that came together under the KAP umbrella made similar overtures to their membership. Together, this anti-communist alliance would implement one of the largest episodes of mass killing since the Second World War.

17 Conclusion

By 1965 the success of the PKI, radicalization of its domestic strategies, and seeming influence with Sukarno posed a direct material threat to both the Army and non-communist sociopolitical organizations. In the case of the Army, the PKI was its main political challenger for leadership of a post-Sukarno Indonesian state. For religious and nationalist groups, the combination of attempted land seizures and the banning of their political opponents made the prospect of a PKI dominant post-Sukarno state a daunting one. In this sense the success of the PKI drove its opponents together to form an anti-communist alliance that together had the capacity to annihilate the communist party once given the opportunity to do so. It was only together that the anti-communist alliance would have the capacity to implement politicide. Internally the Army was still divided, and numerous units were believed to be sympathetic to the communist party – especially in Central Java, East Java, and Bali.  

42 Interview 040, HMI leader, Jakarta.

43 I provide more detailed information on specific unit disloyalties in the following chapters.
In those provinces in which local troops were believed to be sympathetic to the PKI, the high command believed that it did not have ample intelligence with which to move against the PKI, nor did it necessarily have the reliable manpower with which to do so. As a result, in these areas the Army high command lacked the capacity to unilaterally detain, screen, and execute communist party leaders and activists. To fill these gaps, the Army utilized its previously developed doctrine of territorial warfare, emboldening parts of the civilian population, who in this case, were willing allies in the drive to crush the PKI. These organizations could provide the local intelligence and manpower – in the form of militia – that the Army would need to unleash politicide. As I demonstrate in the following chapters, in the regions in which these collaborator networks were empowered, they raised levels of repressive violence through denunciations, and in the process also elevated rates of killing. As I show in the case of East Java, the strength of this collaborator network drove killings still further than occurred in Central Java, despite similarly low security entrenchment. In contrast, areas in which the Army did not have to rely upon civilians for intelligence or manpower tended to produce much lower levels of violence.

The Indonesian Politicide would eventually claim the lives of an estimated half million people, whose deaths were justified by their alleged involvement in the September 30th Movement and membership in the PKI or its affiliated organizations – all of which were legal prior to March 1966. Under the leadership umbrella of the Army high command, Army troops and their civilian allies detained, screened, and often executed huge swathes of their civilian opponents, often in brutal fashion (see chapters 4-6; Kammen and Zakaria 2012; Roosa 2016; Robinson 2018). Those that escaped execution were often tortured during their detention, and at times remained imprisoned in labour camps without charge until a mass release of prisoners in 1979. The Politicide also reoriented Indonesian politics, paving the way for Suharto to replace Sukarno and build the military regime known as the New Order that would rule Indonesia until 1998. Along with the replacement of Sukarno, Indonesia re-oriented its foreign policy towards the West, opening itself for increased international aid, ties with the US, and to abandon its policies of regional confrontation (see also Simpson 2008).
Chapter 5  
Politicide in Central Java

18 Introduction

In this chapter I examine the dynamics of politicide in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Here, the army high command was only weakly entrenched in these provinces, yet the collaborator network was weak vis-à-vis the Army. In terms of entrenchment, the Diponegoro division failed to develop village-level deployments systemically across the provinces, and did not have the budget for large public works projects. Crucially, in October 1965 the three brigades composing the Diponegoro were either absent in whole or in part due to the Malaysia campaign, or had significant numbers of troops declare in favour of the September 30th Movement (Crouch 1978:141-144; Jenkins and Kammen 2012:78). This had two consequences. First, the army high command was forced to deploy the highly mobile elite para-commando regiment (RPKAD) from West Java to Central Java to implement and coordinate a campaign of politicide. Second, this weak entrenchment meant the RPKAD was forced to rely upon civilians for both local intelligence and auxiliary manpower. At the same time, the relative weakness of the collaborator network meant that they were incapable of unilaterally acting against suspected communists outside the scope of official operations, and did not engage in violence prior to the arrival of the RPKAD and the subsequent lifting of legal and moral sanctions on the use of violence.

I argue in this chapter that the RPKAD’s forced reliance upon civilians for information and manpower significantly increased the level of repressive violence in Central Java and Yogyakarta. In Central Java, this collaborator network consisted of local elites tied especially to the right wing of the nationalist party and the religious organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), whose lands the communist party (PKI) had advocated seizing, and whose organizations were the target of communist-led demonstrations calling for their abolition. This network used their organizational resources to eliminate their main political competition by providing large lists of communist party supporters. Civilian elites were also instrumental in encouraging participation in violent militia groups, who themselves increased rates of repressive violence by serving as an information rich vanguard for the RPKAD.
Lack of security entrenchment also increased rates of killing in Central Java. Due to a massive increase in the number of detainees brought about by the Army’s reliance on civilian actors, the Army created a situation in which they were both unable to unilaterally screen the identities of, or provide the basic necessities of life to, a rapidly expanding prison population. By November 1965, this created an incentive for the Army to rely upon a system of mass executions to help alleviate the burden on the prison system. The use of torture to screen detainees also led to increased numbers of executions by raising the number of false confessions.

At the same time, the collaborator network in Central Java was relatively weak vis-à-vis the army. Anti-communist civilian organizations did not have access to a large and coordinated militia with which to use violence unilaterally, and anticommunist organizations were not united prior to politicide. This meant the Army was largely able to prevent civilian militia from engaging in widescale killings outside the scope of the more official politicide operations, and were able to resist any pressure to raise rates of killing by the collaborator network. This combination of low entrenchment and a weak collaborator network led to high levels of repressive violence and a mid-level of killings relative to detentions, when compared to West Java and East Java (see Table 5.1, below).

Table 5.1: Politicide in Central Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Entrenchment</th>
<th>Low</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>High Repressive Violence (7.76% of PKI pool)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium rates of killing:detention (2:1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case: Central Java</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strong</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>High Repressive Violence (8.50-9.24% of PKI pool)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High rates of killing (8:1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case: East Java</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Repressive Violence (1.84% of PKI pool)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low rates of killing:detention (1:1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case: West Java</td>
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<tr>
<td>Case: n/a</td>
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Sources: Lev 1966:93-97; Kammen and Zakaria 2012:452

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I overview of the political situation in Central Java and Yogyakarta prior to the September 30th Movement. This includes the
entrenchment of the armed forces into local society, and the extent of conflict between the PKI and other mass political and religious organizations. Second, I trace the first phase of the politicide campaign in Central Java and Yogyakarta as the RPKAD moved eastwards across the provinces, noting how they removed disloyal troops and encouraged anticommunist civilians to move against the PKI. In the third section I examine the second phase of politicide, when the army empowered civilians to provide information and manpower, and what effect this had on the magnitude of repressive violence. In the fourth section I examine rates of killing, noting how the massive influx of detainees incentivized mass executions as a strategy, as well as reflecting on the ability of the Army to reign in civilians when they attempted to kill local opponents unilaterally. I conclude with a summary of politicide dynamics in Yogyakarta and Central Java.

19 Central Java and Yogyakarta prior to and immediately after the September 30th Movement

Prior to the September 30th Movement both Central Java and Yogyakarta were prominent bases of PKI support. In the 1955 elections the PKI secured 25.8% of the vote in Central Java – second to the nationalist PNI, and placed first in Yogyakarta with 21.8% of the vote (Alfian 1971:80-83). Moreover, the PKI continued to make impressive electoral gains by the 1957 regional elections, securing 36.4% of the popular vote in Central Java and 44.1% of the popular vote in Yogyakarta, making the PKI the largest political party in both provinces (Lev 1966:93-97). Like elsewhere in Indonesia, the PKI campaign focused on issues of peasant and worker grievances, including wages, land reform, and corruption (see Lev 1966). The PKI’s influence went beyond electoral totals: given Yogyakarta’s prominence as a center of education and culture, the communist-affiliated student group CGMI and artist collective Lekra were especially active in the special region. In urban centers such as Surakarta, the youth group Pemuda Rakyat and the trade union SOBSI had a substantial following, while the peasant front BTI was active in many rural areas of Central Java and Yogyakarta. These inroads continued throughout the Guided Democracy period. By 1965 the Deputy Governor of Central Java, Sujono Atmo, was allied with the party, as were six of thirty-five district heads (bupatis and mayors) including the mayors of Solo, Magelang, and Saltiga (Crouch 1978:143).

The PKI and its opponents in Central Java shared many similar characteristics, insofar as the vast majority of all were ethnically Javanese and at least nominally Muslim. While a communist
party, the PKI never formally renounced religion, and was careful to refrain from attacking religion as an institution (see Mortimer 1974). The PKI drew support from a number of sectors, but was most focused on attracting the rural peasantry and urban workers (Mortimer 1972:4-8). As a generalization the PKI likely attracted a higher percentage of poorer workers, but each of the major sociopolitical organizations had large poorer peasant and worker constituencies. The greatest difference lay at the top levels of the organizations, as the PKI was the party with the least ties to entrenched wealthy interests, religious and otherwise, and was generally seen as the least corrupt of Indonesia’s major political parties (Robinson 2018:44).

The success of the PKI in the period of Guided Democracy led it to temporarily change its strategy: attempting to both infiltrate the armed forces and unilaterally implement land reforms. The latter especially sharpened the grievances of non-communist sociopolitical organizations and elites towards the communist party. One of the most important of these grievances was land distribution. Central Java was the site of numerous unilateral actions (aksi sepihak) by the PKI and its peasant organization BTI in 1964 and early 1965. These typically involved occupying the estates of wealthy landowners or industries believed to be violating the tenets of the land reform act by holding excessive amounts of private land. Aksi occurred most frequently in rural areas with a strong PKI or BTI presence: rural areas of Surakarta and Klaten regency had numerous large aksi extending into early 1965 (Mortimer 1974:317-322). In both Solo and Klaten these aksi often resulted in armed clashes between at times hundreds of peasants and youth armed with crude farming implements and clubs representing both communist-affiliated mass organizations and supporters of the landlords. These supporters were most often affiliated with either the PNI, Muhammadiyah, or NU. At times these clashes led to small numbers of fatalities. Unlike Central Java, aksi were largely absent in Yogyakarta; however, rumours of potential land seizures and the aksi in neighbouring regencies such as Klaten contributed to rising tensions between communist party supporters and their opponents.44

44 Confidential Interview 006 with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016. Confidential Interview 009 with NU member by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016
The main civilian opponents of the PKI in Central Java and Yogyakarta were religious organizations and the right wing of the nationalist party.\textsuperscript{45} The strongest of these were the Muslim organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU), as well as the Muslim student association HMI. The Catholic Party was also strongly opposed to communism, but represented only a small percentage of political life in Central Java and Yogyakarta. The main grievances of these parties were threefold. First, as described above, there was significant conflict over land. Even though religious institutions were formally exempt from land reform laws, this did not stop the PKI and its allies from implementing \textit{aksi} on religious property (Mortimer 1974:317-328). The PKI also attempted \textit{aksi} against the landholdings of the Javanese upper class, many of whom were affiliated with the PNI (Mortimer 1974:312-314). Second, the PKI were seen by religious conservatives as anti-religious.\textsuperscript{46} The PKI had been one of the main advocates for banning the largest Muslim party, Masyumi, from politics, and by 1965 was attempting to do the same to the Muslim Student Association HMI (Hefner 2000:47). The third grievance was social: the PKI sought to transform some elements of the social order, such as by modestly empowering women and breaking the feudal hold landowners were able to exercise over sharecroppers (see Mortimer 1972:8-9; Mortimer 1974:141-175). These further threatened the material interests of wealthy landowners and large religious organizations. All of these grievances were magnified by the prospect of a future Indonesian state dominated by the PKI – a real possibility considering the growth of the party and its closeness to President Sukarno.

Compared to East Java, the collaborator network in Central Java was relatively weak. This is for two reasons. First, the collaborator network in Central Java was spread across numerous sociopolitical organizations that frequently competed against one another for political support, followers, and access to patronage structures (see Lev 1966). Muhammadiyah and NU promoted differing interpretations of Islam, while NU and the PNI competed for political influence at both the local and national levels. This competition precluded the emergence of a united

\textsuperscript{45} By 1965 the nationalist party (PNI) had begun to split into two factions, each aligning with the left and right of Indonesian politics. The principle divide was the inclusion of communists as a key pillar in guided democracy.

\textsuperscript{46} Confidential Interview 006 with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016. Confidential Interview 009 with NU member by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016; Confidential interview 012 with Muhammadiyah member by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016
anticommunist front (Kammen and Zakaria 2012). Second, unlike NU in East Java, in Central Java the collaborator network lacked access to a large, seasoned, and well-coordinated militia. While NU maintained some militia, the relative weakness of the organization in Central Java meant that NU elites could not easily mobilize thousands of youth to engage in violence over large sections of territory. The competition between groups also ensured that no such coordinated civilian armed actor existed prior to the Army training one during its campaign to implement politicide.

By 1965 anti-communism began to serve as a bridge between members of rival Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, but only at the local level. An example of this was GEMUIS (Generasi Muda Islam – Young Islamic Generation): an Islamic student and youth organization consisting of both NU and Muhammadiyah members dedicated to opposing the influence of communism in Yogyakarta. While initially small, GEMUIS provided a means of connecting the most ardent civilian anti-communists, fostering links between those that would later form part of the hard-core of the anti-communist civilian auxiliary units in Yogyakarta. However, even these more dedicated explicitly anti-communist organizations did not engage in open violence against communist party members, instead usually limiting their activities to surveilling suspected communists and forging links with like-minded members of local army deployments (Hefner 2000:47-48).

19.1 The Armed Forces in Central Java and Yogyakarta

The Diponegoro division command had a difficult time entrenching itself in village life in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Three factors drove this. First, the budget for army public work programs intended to win army support at the local level decreased significantly in 1963 due to the need to allocate resources towards the confrontation with Malaysia (Sundhaussen 1982:173). Second, Diponegoro officers were reluctant to follow the lead of the West Java Siliwangi division, who were most associated with the territorial warfare doctrine, due to inter-divisional rivalries stemming from competition over funding, training, and promotion dating back to armed service reforms in the 1950s (see Crouch 1978:29-36). Third, a number of junior officers were

47 Confidential Interview 006b with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016
seen as potentially sympathetic to the PKI. This made Diponegoro high command reluctant to attempt to establish sub-regional commands known as Koramil, as well as their networks of OKD (known as Bintara Pembina or Babinsa) that attached army cadre directly to village heads. (Sundhaussen 1982:175-176). Koramil were only established in Central Java in 1964, and even then, there was a concern amongst the Diponegoro staff that the civilian guards that had been trained also contained communist figures (Sejarah Militer Kodam VII/Diponegoro 1971: 184, cited in Hammer 2013:44).

Security entrenchment in Central Java and Yogyakarta was made worse by the number of armed forces units sympathetic to the communist party. Not only was the air force (AURI) seen as potentially sympathetic to the PKI, but numerous battalions of the Diponegoro division also had strong communist sympathies. As discussed in chapter three, a large part of this is due to how the Indonesian army developed, having to integrate a large number of disparate armed groups with varying political persuasions. The army, in Central Java and elsewhere, was also often deeply enmeshed in local politics, and few soldiers and officers saw their role as entirely apolitical (Crouch 1978:24-42; see also Utrecht 1978; Sundhaussen 1982). Given that troops were recruited locally, the armed forces could acquire a political character different from the high command. This problem was especially acute amongst the more junior officers in the division, some of whom felt their road to promotion was blocked by a coterie of generals in Jakarta (see Anderson and McVey 1971:1-2). The lack of security entrenchment in Central Java curtailed the ability of the Diponegoro command to unilaterally collect reliable intelligence on the communist party and its supporters.

19.2 The Security Situation in Central Java and Yogyakarta following G30S

Troops in Central Java and Yogyakarta were quick to support the September 30th Movement (G30S), leading to a situation in which the Army high command was critically undermanned in these provinces. At the time of the September 30th Movements call for support on October 1,

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48 Recall from the previous chapter that Air Force Chief Omar Dhani was widely viewed as sympathetic to the PKI, and was the only head of an armed service branch to support the PKI’s proposals for political commissars and an armed civilian column.
Diponegoro commander Brigadier General Surjosumpeno was away from the provincial military headquarters in Semarang. In his absence, his Assistant, Colonel Sahirman, declared himself leader of the September 30th Movement in Central Java and Yogyakarta (Jenkins and Kammen 2012:77-78). By the end of the day, five of seven infantry battalions in Central Java were under rebel command.\footnote{It remains unclear as to why so many Central Javanese battalions declared in favour of the September 30th Movement compared to other provinces, save for the extent of PKI support in the province.}

Adding to the problems of the army high command in Central Java and Yogyakarta was that a large number of reliable, combat-ready troops had been deployed outside the province for the Malaysia campaign. The entirety of the Fourth Infantry Brigade had been deployed to North Sumatra, while two battalions from the Fifth Infantry Brigade were in Kalimantan (Crouch 1978:143-144). This left the Sixth Infantry, which had declared in favour of the September 30th Movement, as the most numerous Brigade in Central Java and Yogyakarta. By October 2nd, the total number of combat ready troops considered reliable to the army high command in Central Java and Yogyakarta numbered only 1,200-1,500 (Hammer 2013:43).

The military situation in Central Java and Yogyakarta was temporarily stabilized within the first week of October; however, it was clear that most of the troops in these provinces would be unsuitable for any attempt to move in force against the PKI. Brigadier-General Surjosumpeno, the Diponegoro commander, returned to Semarang on October 2 and was able to secure the loyalty of the troops there. By this time, the September 30th Movement had already collapsed in Jakarta. By October 7 he was able to do the same with troops stationed in Yogyakarta and Solo (Crouch 1978:144). However, these troops were now compromised. In order to move against the PKI in Central Java the army high command would have to find troops from outside the province. Making this more difficult was that the army high command was reluctant to deploy Siliwangi troops to Central Java, fearing that animosity between Siliwangi and Diponegoro troops could further complicate the security situation (Jenkins and Kammen 2012:80). From early October to mid-October, the Army high command would transfer those troops perceived to be infiltrated by the PKI. This would further limit the entrenchment of security forces loyal to the Army high command just prior to politicide starting in mid-October.
19.3 Civilian Reactions to the September 30th Movement

For their part, the PKI in Central Java and Yogyakarta appeared to have been unaware of the events taking place in Jakarta. According to an unnamed Australian journalist considered reliable by the US embassy who travelled to Yogyakarta and Central Java on October 10, the PKI in Yogyakarta were “thoroughly confused and claiming lack of any foreknowledge of Sept. 30 Movement”. He was informed by a “PKI source who said he was on fringes of top 50 PKI in Jogjakarta who are ‘in know’ […] that Jogjakarta PKI had no advance word on September 30 Movement and that there was great confusion in Party ranks on what they were supposed to do.”

The religious community in Central Java and Yogyakarta reacted with alarm to the news of the September 30th Movement. Rumours about PKI death lists spread, leading to many Muhammadiyah members to sleep in their mosques for protection. Fearing attacks by members of the PKI, prominent religious scholars and teachers (kiai) instructed those at the mosques in self-defense and mental training. By the middle of October, this led to small militia groups being formed. In Yogyakarta, hard-liner elements such as GEMUIS formed KOGALAM (Komando Siaga Islam- Standby Commandos of Islam), a militia self-tasked with defending the religious community against the PKI. KOGALAM allowed for better coordination amongst hard-liners, who would roam between different religious sites to defend property and persons from potential attack in Yogyakarta. There were also occasional night patrols by both Muhammadiyah and PKI youth, despite curfews. Still, local elites did not sanction outright attacks on the PKI, and violence by anti-communists civilians appears to have been minimal. The

50 Telegram 1516 from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 6 pol 23-9 September 30th Mvt, November 20-30, 1965
51 Confidential Interview 008b with former KAMI leader, Surakarta, April 2016; Confidential Interview 012 with Muhammadiyah member by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016.
52 Confidential Interview 011 with Muhammadiyah leader by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016
53 Confidential Interview 006 with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016
54 Confidential Interview 011 with Muhammadiyah leader by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016; Confidential Interview 012 with Muhammadiyah member by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016; Confidential Interview 020, witness and former PNI member, Surakarta, February 2016.
Catholic community also had similar practices of coordinating members to defend religious sites (Wardaya 2013:95-99).

This dense concentration of anti-communist youth would provide an easily accessible well of potential militia recruits for the military. It also encouraged anti-communist hard-liners to organize patrols and other proto-violent sub-organizations such as KOGALAM. This relatively small group of hard-liners would later form the leadership core of militias trained by the Army. At this point the main factors precluding civilian attacks on communists was their relative weakness vis-à-vis the Army: militia leaders feared that any violence would be met by harsh crackdowns by local police or military units. In part because of this, local elites had also yet to encourage violence. Both these would be lifted with the arrival of the RPKAD.

20 Politicide in Central Java – the first phase

Politicide in Central Java and Yogyakarta would proceed in two phases. First, a campaign of shock and awe to discourage armed resistance by troops who declared in favour of the September 30th Movement. This phase would last from around October 19 to the start of November. Once these disloyal troops were moved out of province, this would be followed by a longer phase from November 1965-March 1966 when militia operating under the supervision of the army would round up communist party supporters. Even in the first phase, the army made extensive use of civilians for information and manpower. Throughout both phases the collaborator network remained weak, in the sense that they lacked the capacity and coordination to engage in sustained violence outside the scope of official army operations or to intimidate local commanders into raising levels of killing. Attempts to do so were met with army repression.

The first phase of politicide began in Central Java on October 17, when the West Java-based RPKAD under the command of Colonel Sarwo Edhie was dispatched to Central Java and Yogyakarta. He had a force of approximately 1,000 elite, mobile combat ready troops, with an additional 1,500 reliably loyal troops stationed throughout Central Java (Hammer 2013:43). This

55 Confidential Interview 006 with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016; Confidential Interview 008b with former KAMI leader, Surakarta, April 2016.
first phase of politicide followed a distinct pattern. The RPKAD would arrive in an urban center and perform a show of force with armored vehicles, while also holding a mass rally with anticommunist civilian organizations. The RPKAD was accompanied by leaders and representatives from Indonesia’s largest religious organizations. One such leader was HMI Chairman Sulastomo.\(^{56}\) Speaking to those assembled in the largest and most prominent mosques, Sulastomo extolled the local Muslim communities to be brave in the face of the PKI. To the more militant anti-communists in the mosques – such as the leadership of groups like KOGALAM – these words were seen as a signal of communal support for attacks against communist supporters.\(^{57}\) Local civilian leaders were also clearly briefed in advance prior to the RPKAD’s arrival: members of religious and nationalist organizations attended the rallies in large numbers, with prepared speakers and headbands with which to identify each other. PNI supporters wore red and white headbands, Muhammadiyah white, and NU green.\(^{58}\) Rallies staged by the RPKAD and anticommmunist civilian organization typically involved a series of speeches by military and religious leaders outlining the crimes of the PKI and a list of communist-affiliated organizations to be banned. Following this the attendees would then parade to the local headquarters of the PKI or one of its affiliated organizations, ransacking it and usually burning it to the ground (Jenkins and Kammen 2012:83). While these attacks were nominally by “the people,” they occurred only under the supervision of RPKAD troops. While religious and nationalist civilians destroyed buildings they also had the ability to identify suspected communists to the RPKAD, who would arrest these individuals en-masse. By the end of rallies, most prisons in the city in which the rallies were staged were already becoming overcrowded. These waves of ostensibly civilian-led arrests done under the protection of the RPKAD would foreshadow a larger and more sustained campaign of arrests and killings from November 1965-March 1966. They are also the first instance in which civilians, organized under the auspices of Indonesia’s largest sociopolitical organizations and with the support of their leadership, could freely identify “communists” from amongst the population writ large. In doing

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\(^{56}\) Confidential interview 040 with former member of HMI leadership by author, Jakarta, April 2016

\(^{57}\) Confidential Interview 006b with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016; Confidential Interview 020, witness and former PNI member, Surakarta, February 2016.

\(^{58}\) Confidential Interview 008b with former KAMI leader, Surakarta, April 2016.
so, they initially captured large numbers of people with no ties to the communist cadres and their leadership core.

The last potential physical hurdle to a sustained campaign of repressive violence in Central Java were those troops who had declared in favour of the September 30th Movement. These troops were removed around October 23 or 24. Following meetings with Surjosumpeno, Battalions L and K agreed to depart Central Java under the auspices of reinforcing the Konfrontasi campaign, with Battalion M following two days later (Crouch 1979:151). At around the same time, the RPKAD, supported by religious and nationalist youth, arrested significant numbers of the local air force (AURI) units stationed in Solo. At this point, there was little risk of organized resistance that could meaningfully oppose politicide in Central Java. Most troops who declared in favour of the September 30th Movement had been redeployed and their leaders arrested or killed. Moreover, the PKI and its mass organizations offered very little initial resistance, were disorganized, and lacked firearms. Still, the disruption of the Diponegoro ensured that Edhie still had fewer than three thousand troops to arrest and process suspected communists. Moreover, the infiltration and subsequent redeployments of Diponegoro troops, and purges of the air force severely disrupted the ability of the RPKAD to gather intelligence on PKI membership and muster the subsequent manpower to arrest PKI suspects. Indeed, Edhie had only 2,500 combat-ready soldiers to implement a campaign of politicide in two provinces with a combined population of over twenty million (Widjojo 1970:174; Hammer 2013:43). This forced him to turn to civilian elites for intelligence and manpower.

21 Politicide in Central Java – the second phase

The second phase of politicide in Central Java and Yogyakarta lasted from November 1965-March 1966. While mobile units such as the RPKAD could cover large amounts of territory, they lacked reliable local intelligence and the physical numbers to conduct sustained arrest operations, detentions, and potential executions across all of Central Java and Yogyakarta simultaneously. To overcome these weaknesses, the RPKAD and the few remaining loyal Diponegoro troops would have to delegate the provision of intelligence and manpower to the

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59 Confidential Interview 025 with former AURI staff and political prisoner, Surakarta, March 2016.
civilian community. This second phase was categorized by civilian militia arresting huge numbers of suspected communists under the supervision of the RPKAD and remaining loyal Diponegoro division troops.

The lack of security entrenchment during this second phase allowed the collaborator network, centered especially on the leadership of religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah, NU, and the Catholic Party, to drastically raise levels of repressive violence. They did this through providing false information by denouncing, compiling lists, or serving as an information-rich vanguard during anti-communist sweeps. At the same time, this collaborator network was relatively weak in the physical sense vis-à-vis the RPKAD. Larger militia groups in Central Java were only formed under the supervision of the Army, and the equipment and mobility of the RPKAD generally prevented militia from being able to act unilaterally. In this section I limit the discussion primarily to arrests, and take up the issue of killings specifically in the following section. Still, it is worth noting that almost all executions were preceded by some length of detention, making the process I describe here illustrative of why repressive violence (arrests and killings) reached high levels in Central Java.

**The Collaborator Network and Intelligence**

Due to limited intelligence on PKI rank-and-file, the RPKAD was forced to rely upon civilians to identify potential communist sympathizers from amongst the populace. The ability of civilians to provide intelligence occurred in three primary ways. First, RPKAD soldiers could often be observed in the streets following their initial arrival in shock and awe operations. These soldiers would solicit information from people in the streets and be available should anyone wish to provide information directly. 60 These troops would then either proceed directly to the home of the accused to make an arrest, or place their name on a list to be picked up later in a larger arrest action. In areas further from the city, these accusations would be made at the local police station, Koramil, or to the village head, who could contact the military as a proxy. 61 Second, RPKAD units would attempt to gain information directly from the leaders of religious and nationalist organizations. These organizations were instructed to provide lists of suspected communist

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60 Confidential interview 012 with Muhammadiyah member by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016
61 Confidential Interview 013 with former political prisoner by author, Surakarta, February 2016.
sympathizers and submit them directly to the RPKAD or local army units.\textsuperscript{62} Finally, organizations which were considered to have a large leftist constituency – such as universities – were instructed to provide lists of all PKI sympathizers. Recently declassified archival materials demonstrate that schools such as UGM were given a quota of leftist students that had to be submitted (Wahid 2018).

The ability to provide information directly through denunciation opened opportunities for individuals to increase the number of individuals targeted for repressive violence by security forces. Often, personal denunciations were used as a means of resolving personal rivalries and eliminating rivals. One respondent, a soldier, was accused of supporting the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement by a fellow officer who sought a relationship with his wife. It was only the intervention of one of his superior officers that prevented a long incarceration.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, some capitalized on the fear of denunciations for extortion. Tan Soe Yie, head of the Yogyakarta branch of the Chinese party BAPERKI, was repeatedly subject to this type of blackmail.\textsuperscript{64} Neither of these individuals had any links to the communist party.

Denunciations were higher still when channeled through elites and their respective organizations, whom the RPKAD approached for lists of suspected. The lists provided by nationalist and religious organizations led to the arrest of many whose ties to the PKI were tenuous at best. One way in which Muhammadiyah leaders in Yogyakarta added to its lists was by denouncing the attendees at cultural events, such as \textit{wayang} performances, by the PKI-affiliated cultural organization LEKRA. Members of Muhammadiyah would observe and record the attendees, and report them en-masse to the army.\textsuperscript{65} In Solo city, a group of approximately 30 civilian religious and nationalist leaders were responsible for coordinating lists of individuals to be arrested with the RPKAD and other remaining troops within their respective mass organizations.\textsuperscript{66} This

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\textsuperscript{62} Confidential Interview 011 with Muhammadiyah leader by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016

\textsuperscript{63} Confidential Interview 001 with former soldier by author, Yogyakarta, December 2015. This practice of arrested the husband of a desired woman in order to coerce her into entering a relationship was widespread during the anti-communist campaign (Pohlman 2015).

\textsuperscript{64} Confidential Interview 102 with former political prisoner by anonymous research assistant, Yogyakarta, May 2016.

\textsuperscript{65} Confidential Interview 011 with Muhammadiyah leader by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016

\textsuperscript{66} Confidential Interview 008b with former KAMI leader, Surakarta, April 2016
underscores the critical nature of elites in organizing denunciations on a massive scale. Unlike individual denunciations, nationalist and religious elites were capable of organizing massive denunciation lists drawn from their membership and coordinating their members to gather intelligence on anyone with real or perceived ties to the PKI.

A third way civilians were able to increase the number of individuals targeted was through lists provided by educational institutions. These institutions were also tasked with purging their faculty and student body of links to communism. The RPKAD ordered University administrations to fill a quota of communists from within their ranks (Wahid 2018). The fulfilment of these quotas appears to have been done arbitrarily, and compilers of such lists had substantial leeway in pursuing their own personal agendas. While the task of compiling lists was officially in the hands of school administrators, in practice it was often delegated to individual professors or students. The University Gadjah Mata (UGM), for instance, lacking membership information on student groups such as CGMI, gave tremendous power to anti-communist students to purge school faculties (Wahid 2018). Approximately 3000 students and faculty were initially dismissed, expelled, arrested, or killed based on these lists from UGM alone (Ibid:169-171). Like direct denunciations and the lists provided by religious organizations, these lists led far more arrests than would have been the case had the Army been capable of collecting accurate intelligence unilaterally.

21.1 The Role of Civilian Militia

Civilian militia contributed to repressive violence in Central Java and Yogyakarta in two ways: by providing auxiliary manpower in direct arrests, and by conducting and providing information for sweeps and patrols. The former provided the physical ability to make arrests on the scale that occurred, while the latter drastically expanded the scope of those targeted. Due to the aforementioned lack of manpower, Sarwo Edhie asked for permission to train and empower local civilians to assist in his efforts to crush the PKI and its affiliated organizations in the third or fourth week of October, which was granted after a short delay (Crouch 1978:151).

The RPKAD approached the leadership of local religious and nationalist organizations to encourage participation in training programs. Doing so allowed the RPKAD to overcome one of their major weaknesses in Central Java: the infiltration of local security forces by communist sympathizers. There was a concern amongst the Diponegoro staff that village guards trained by
sub-district commands contained communist figures (Sejarah Militer Kodam VII/Diponegoro 1971: 184, cited in Hammer 2013:44). According to a journalist embedded with the RPKAD at that time, it was common practice to select a small handful of known Muslim anti-communists and task them with militia recruiting so as to ensure the PKI would be unable to infiltrate the anti-communist militia (see Jenkins and Kammen 2012:91).

Thousands of youth signed up for the initial round of training. As training progressed army trainers selected smaller numbers of volunteers for increasingly strenuous training. From this smaller group a select few were eventually given firearms and permission to lead civilian units against the PKI. The RPKAD and military police provided guarantees of legal immunity to these few, in what one such leader described as a “license to kill”. In Yogyakarta ten civilians were entrusted with firearms and the leadership of anti-communist civilian columns, while in Surakarta fifteen were entrusted with the same. In Yogyakarta, several hard-core perpetrators were drawn from the ranks of KOGALAM, underscoring the importance of pre-existing dedicated anti-communists in the violence that was in the process of being unleashed. In addition to the mass training provided to civilian auxiliaries, the RPKAD, working along with Muhammadiyah, formed the militia KOKAM (Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah) in late October to help crush the PKI. The number of civilians trained by the RPKAD appears to have been enormous. By mid-November, a report from US Ambassador Green claimed that the Indonesian Army had trained 24,000 youth in the Surakarta area alone. Prior to this training, no militia of this size existed in Central Java. The majority of these civilian militia worked directly under the supervision of the Army.

Civilian militia both provided auxiliary manpower in direct arrests and served as an information-rich vanguard for the army. For direct arrests, the role of civilian auxiliaries was often surround individual homes or at times villages to cow suspects into submission and to prevent their escape. The number of auxiliaries ranged from dozens to hundreds. When a suspect attempted to

67 Confidential Interview 006 with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016
68 Ibid; Confidential interview 008 with former KAMI leader by author, Surakarta, January 2016
69 Confidential interview 012 with Muhammadiyah member by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016
70 Telegram 1438, US Embassy Jakarta to State Department, 13 Nov. 1965, POL 23-9, Indonesia, NARA.
flee, youth militia, who were often armed with crude bamboo spears or knives, would savagely beat them - at times to death. In most instances local army units sought to restrain this type of violence, though several respondents recall incidents in which authorities stood back and allowed such beatings and killing to occur. Still, this kind of public violence in official operations was uncommon. By far the most common practice was for the military to arrest people directly, without the direct use of violence – including lethal violence – by civilian militia.

Civilian militia also provided an information-rich vanguard. During sweeps, civilian militiamen were tasked with identifying the houses of suspected communists as troops swept through villages or neighbourhoods. R.E. Stannord Jr, the Jakarta Bureau Chief for United Press International, noted that “The army simply picks out four or five young men it trusts from the local nationalist youth party organisation or Moslem party group and authorizes them to mobilize their comrades. [...] This] spares the army the problems of screening and selection that could damage its own popularity at the grass roots”. Once identified, soldiers would move to arrest one or more of its inhabitants. In other instances, troops and militiamen would assemble the inhabitants of a village or neighbourhood, and have militiamen identify those suspected of communist sympathies following an inspection.

In some instances, militia were tasked with conducting sweeps themselves (Crouch 1978:151; see also Hasworo 2004). This was more common in rural areas. Like those operations conducted under the auspices of formally trained soldiers, militia identified potential communist supporters from amongst the populace. In the same way as soliciting denunciations, enabling civilian militiamen to identify and/or detain individuals allowed them to use this opportunity to eliminate rivals, thus increasing the number of detainees in the prison system (see also Tri Hasworo 2004).

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71 Confidential Interview 028 with former political prisoner by author, Yogyakarta, March 2016.
72 Interview 028, former political prisoner, Yogyakarta.
73 R.E. Stannard Jr, dispatch from Yogyakarta, 24 Nov. 1965, in Series A1838/280, item 3034/2/1/8, part 6, pg. 111, NAA. See also Record of conversation with Mr Tiwari” cited in Jenkins and Kammen 2012:91
74 Confidential Interview 008b with former KAMI leader, Surakarta, April 2016.; Interview 022, wife of former political prisoner, Surakarta.
While the number of militia utilized in Central Java and Yogyakarta was enormous, there is little
doubt that they largely operated under the direct supervision of the army and were usually
incapable of acting unilaterally. US Ambassador Green noted that Deputy Chief of Mission
Francis Galbraith had been informed that the “Army (RPKAD) is training Moslem Youth and
supplying them with weapons and will keep them in front against PKI.”75 Indeed, it was common
practice for the RPKAD to remain extremely mobile to ensure that arrests continued apace. They
would also dispatch additional troops to troubleshoot potential resistance – such as an incident in
Tulung in which the army deployed a jeep equipped with machine guns to disperse a gathering of
pro-PKI civilians attempting to resist arrest from Muslim militiamen (Hammer 2013:46).
Moreover, these civilian militia were almost always directed by small number of troops, and
victims were rarely killed on site. Instead, these civilian militia would arrest suspected
communist sympathizers and transport them to military or police installations for detention and
interrogation. Leaders of civilian militia – including those claiming to possess a license to kill -
claimed that their operations were always intended to be supervised by the military, and that to
engage in violence unilaterally, carried a great degree of difficulty.76 As I elaborate in the next
section, this meant that civilian militia could drastically raise the number of arrests through the
provision of information, but their lack of strength vis-à-vis the Army precluded them from
raising killings to the rates seen in East Java.

Civilians were also involved in the direct execution of detainees. Like most other documented
killings during this period, prison guards removed detainees from the prisons at night, after
which they would be trucked to a remote location. Local army units and occasionally small
number of civilians would already have gathered at this pre-arranged spot, where they would
then execute the detainees and dispose of the bodies. The most common execution method used
by soldiers was to shoot detainees, while civilians were usually forced to use blunt or bladed
weapons. At some locations, such as Wonosari, detainees were simply pushed, bound, into

75 Telegram 1438, US Embassy Jakarta to State Department, 13 Nov. 1965, POL 23-9, Indonesia, NARA.
76 Confidential Interview 001 with former soldier by author, Yogyakarta, December 2015; Confidential
Interviews 006b, 006c with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January and February 2016;
Confidential interview 008 with former KAMI leader by author, Surakarta, January 2016.
coastal caves to be swept out to sea.⁷⁷ There is yet to be any evidence of killings of this scale outside those directly under military control. The logistics involved in transporting prisoners en-masse to a pre-determined execution site would likely have been beyond the capacity of any of the civilian militias operating in Central Java or Yogyakarta during this time. It is unlikely that the participation of civilians in mass executions themselves substantively changed the number of individuals killed: victims almost always arrived by truck from the many prison facilities, and compared to the arrest process, few civilians were actively engaged in this process. The primary means through which civilians could affect the magnitude of those targeted, and by extension killed, was through providing false information by denouncing, compiling lists, or serving as an information-rich vanguard during anti-communist sweeps. In the absence of a means for security forces to screen this information, however, civilians could still drastically increase violence through these channels even while the Army attempted to restrain direct violence by civilians.

22 Rates of Killing

The ability for civilians to capture parts of the campaign against the PKI from below not only increased the number of individuals targeted for repressive violence in a general sense – it also increased the rates of killing relative to detention. By providing civilians the opportunity to denounce personal or perceived organizational rivals the scope of target selection came to include thousands with no or only tenuous links to the communist party and its affiliated organizations. This process of mis-identification and denouncement quickly put the prison system at severe over-capacity, and hundreds of makeshift prisons were erected in schools, public buildings, and military bases across Central Java and Yogyakarta. Most prisoners faced severe food shortages and near-starvation. A lack of information about political prisoners incentivized torture as a means of screening detainees, leading to increased rates of killing. In addition, the sheer number of detainees exceeded the capacity of the Army to provide basic life necessities. This led to the use of mass executions to solve the logistical problem of feeding so many prisoners. For their part, elements of the collaborator network attempted to use the opportunity provided by the anti-communist campaign to attack their own political opponents;

⁷⁷ Confidential Interview 001 with former soldier by author, Yogyakarta, December 2015; Confidential Interview 006 with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016.
however, the relative weakness of this network meant that security forces were generally able to prevent civilian elites and the militia under their influence from directly attacking their opponents, thus preventing these attacks from having a substantive impact on rates of killing (see also Jenkins and Kammen 2012).\textsuperscript{78} The following subsections develop these points in greater detail.

\textbf{22.1 Information and Torture}

The same information problem that led to outsourcing intelligence to civilians continued in the prison system itself. Torture was frequently a means of securing confessions from detainees. Prison guards, usually military police, frequently removed detainees from their cramped cells for interrogation in which they would be subject to prolonged beatings and other physical abuse. Interrogators often sexually abused female detainees, stripping them naked to search for a hammer and sickle tattoo allegedly given to Gerwani members.\textsuperscript{79} Under these conditions many detainees confessed to being PKI cadres or to have had knowledge of the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement – an unlikely possibility since some had only learned the day of their arrest that groups such as CGMI were affiliated with the PKI.\textsuperscript{80}

Once torture began to be used as a means of screening detainees, it often had a snowball effect, leading to increasing instances of torture or execution. Believing themselves to be facing a potential communist uprising, interrogators frequently used torture to extract confessions on all sorts of outlandish fantasies, such as PKI members hiding tanks in the rice fields of Klaten (Roosa 2008:43). Detainees were forced under torture to implicate others, leading to both more rounds of arrests and additional potential mis-categorizations of others already in the prison system. Depending on the pre-conceptions of interrogators – their belief as to a detainee's position within the PKI hierarchy – individuals could be forced to confess to being a participating member of the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement, a fate almost always resulting in execution.

\textsuperscript{78} Confidential Interview 006; Confidential Interview 008.

\textsuperscript{79} Confidential Interview 003 with former political prisoner by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016. See also Pohlman (2015).

\textsuperscript{80} Confidential interview 016 with former political prisoner by author, Yogyakarta, February 2016
22.2 The Logistical Problem

Even prior to the September 30th Movement, Central Java was in the midst of a severe food shortage. Reuters reported that one million people were facing starvation, with thousands being treated for malnutrition (Gerlach 2010:49). Despite a record level of rice production in 1965, starvation conditions often continued into 1966 due to massive inflation: in 1965 prices rose by 500 percent, while the price of rice specifically rose by 900 percent. From August to September alone, the price of rice quadrupled (Ibid:50).

Political prisoners faced starvation conditions from their first days in detention following the outbreak of the anti-communist campaign in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Many detainees were only able to survive due to parcels sent from family and friends outside the prison. These would frequently be shared throughout the detainee population to maximize their survival. Even with such sharing a number of detainees starved to death in custody, and many former prisoners vividly recall severe weight loss.81

By the end of November, the sheer volume of detainees was stretching the capacity of the Army to care for them to the breaking point. In a report on the situation in Indonesia, the US Embassy in Jakarta reported that a principle obstacle in the repression of the PKI in the provinces was housing and feeding detainees. For their part, the Army was “successfully meeting this problem by executing their PKI prisoners.”82 This same embassy airgram claims that in the case of Central Java, this order to execute came directly from Suharto. Jenkins and Kammen also cite second-hand reports claiming the Army was sending large numbers of detainees to civilian death squads for execution to reduce the number of political prisoners (2012:93-94).

Increased rates of killing due to a lack of foodstuffs are directly tied to the entrenchment of security forces in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Lack of security entrenchment led the RPKAD

81 Virtually all political prisoners whom I interviewed or spoke to over the course of this project brought up food shortages of the prison without prompt. This reinforces not only the degree of privation in each prison, but highlights how widespread these conditions were across the Central Javanese and Yogyakatan prison network during this time.

to rely upon civilians and civilian organizations for the necessary intelligence to round up PKI supporters. This, in turn, led to a far greater number of initial detainees than would otherwise have been the case. The sheer number of detainees pushed the capacity of the Army to rely upon long-term detention as a breaking point, encouraging them to rely upon mass executions as a means of alleviating the logistical burden of caring for huge numbers of prisoners. This led to an increased ratio of killings relative to long term detentions than otherwise would have been the case.

22.3 Collaborator Networks

The RPKAD and remaining loyal security forces were generally able to prevent unilateral militia killings in Central Java. Even though the number of elite troops such as the RPKAD was low, their access to vehicles and strategy keeping two-thirds of their strength on the road at all times – a strategy known as “rolling-rolling” - allowed them to cover huge swaths of territory at a rapid pace and bring unruly civilian elements back into line (Hammer 2013:45). This ensured that killings done before any form of screening were kept at a minimum. This helped to prevent the type of widescale public killings that would characterize the early weeks of politicide in East Java (discussed in the next chapter), and ensured that the rates of killings relative to detention were intermediate rather than high. The specific motivation for limiting unilateral attacks by militia is unclear, but it may have something to do with governance following the politicide. Many of the militia in Central Java were affiliated with religious organizations, some of whom the Army saw as “fanatics and troublemakers” (Crouch 1978:146). Preventing these elements from seizing too much power, or organizing too independently, would likely have been in the best interests of any future military rule in Central Java.

Civilian militia did at times attempt to carry out acts of violence unilaterally in Central Java, though they were rarely successful. Militia such as KOGALAM, for instance, attempted to use violence unilaterally by conducting raids into PKI neighbourhoods. Part of the reason for doing this appears to have been a desire to wield violence directly. During more official operations, militiamen were often restrained from using violence in a direct sense by the Army, with their activities usually being to form human cordons to prevent suspects from escaping. Still, these operations were rare, and groups like KOGALAM were frequently lost clashes with the army.
when they attempted to use violence unilaterally. Had these operations been allowed to run rampant, they would have further raised rates of killing in Central Java and Yogyakarta. The vast majority of political prisoners that I interviewed in this project from Central Java were arrested with at least some military personnel, underscoring that this was the norm for arrests and violence in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Still, the situation in Central Java and Yogyakarta was destabilizing enough that on November 24 Brigadier General Surjosempeno was forced to issue a pronouncement banning civilian arrests, and that this sort of disobedience could lead to arrest (Crouch 1978:154).

The public re-imposition of legal constraints on civilian arrests at the end of November further limited unilateral arrests or acts of violence, and most unsupervised civilian action appears to have stopped then. Moreover, the return of the Fourth Infantry Brigade from Sumatra allowed the army to keep closer tabs on the actions of their civilian allies. This ensured physical acts of arrests and killing stayed firmly under Army control and further precluded the ability of collaborator networks to pressure local commanders to raise rates of killing. The relative weakness of the collaborator network compared to the army thus ensured that killings remained at an intermediate, rather than a high level. Altogether, the dynamics of politicide in Central Java can be seen in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Magnitude of Politicide in Central Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number detained</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Killed</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total victims of repressive violence</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Total Adult Population (aged 15+)</td>
<td>10,894,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of PKI voters in 1957</td>
<td>2,706,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI Vote Share</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

83 Confidential Interview 006b with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016.

84 The 1961 census does not provide an internal breakdown of the aged 15-24 category (see Widjojo 1970). This estimate is derived from the total population of Central Java, minus the percentage of this number that is under 15 (this percentage is for Java as a whole, and thus may not be exact for Central Java specifically).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of PKI pool in detention</th>
<th>2.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool killed</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop in detention</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop killed</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop targeted</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PKI pool targeted (1957 figure)</td>
<td>7.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing:Detention Ratio</td>
<td>2:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


23 Politicide Dynamics in Central Java

The army high command sought to implement a campaign of repressive violence in Central Java and Yogyakarta, with the broad intent to limit targeting to the leaders and activists of the PKI and its affiliated organizations. However, army leadership was limited in its ability to act unilaterally. The support of local troops for the September 30th Movement, especially battalions K, L, and M, left the Diponegoro command severely understaffed at the local level. The lack of reliable troops in turn disrupted the ability of the army to collect reliable intelligence on communist sympathizers, and to deploy sufficient troops to arrest, detain, process, and potentially execute suspected communist leaders and activists.

Lack of security entrenchment led to high levels of repressive violence in Central Java. Due to the lack of reliable troops entrenched at the local level, the army high command, operating through the RPKAD, was forced to delegate the collection of intelligence and provision of auxiliary manpower to civilians. To do so, they sought the assistance of local elites known to be hostile to the PKI – giving them the opportunity to denounce local opponents and organizations en-masse. For their part, these elites seized this opportunity to purge their socio-political rivals to a greater degree than intended by politicide organizers. The resources and organizational ties of these elite actors ensured that denunciations was even more widespread than had they been delegated to the civilian populace writ large. Moreover, it was only after receiving assurances from these religious leaders that religious anti-communist groups began to engage in violence. Finally, it was these elites that were instrumental in promoting participation in more formal
militia – the most notable example of this being the Muhammadiyah paramilitary KOKAM – that provided the RPKAD with the necessary manpower to implement politicide in Central Java and Yogyakarta. The ability of these militia to identify “PKI” on the ground allowed them to further expand the scale of repressive. Still, it is important to emphasize the key role of entrenchment in enabling this violence. It was only the arrival of the RPKAD and national-level anticommmunist civilian leaders that sparked violence. They did this by lifting legal and moral restraints on violence, and by removing the threat posed by elements of the army sympathetic to the PKI. They only did this due to a lack of security entrenchment, which prevented them from having the necessary intelligence and manpower to implement politicide unilaterally. The grievances of civilian elites and their followers were not sufficient for this type of violence to occur.

The rapid increase in the number of detainees, combined with inadequate screening procedures, also led to increased rates of killing as the Army sought to rid itself of the logistical problem of feeding and housing so many prisoners. At the same time, the Army was largely able to prevent civilian militia from engaging in widescale killings outside the scope of the more official politicide operations, and were able to resist any pressure to raise rates of killing by the collaborator network. This led to a mid-level of killings relative to detentions, when compared to West Java and East Java.

Major operations involving the RPKAD ended at the end of December 1965. The final operation was a weeklong convoy through Central Java and Yogyakarta, departing from Kartosuro, which had served as Sarwo Edhie’s forward headquarters for most of the politicide campaign (Jenkins and Kammen 2012:96-97). The route of this convoy appears to have been constructed so as revisit the principal areas in which the RPKAD was active in organizing politicide: the Surakarta region (including Klaten and Banyolali); the Banyumas region; Semarang; Pati; and Purwodadi (Ibid). Despite the departure of the RPKAD, arrests continued in Central Java and Yogyakarta until March 1966, when power was officially transferred from Sukarno to Suharto. At this point,
civilian militia were disbanded, and civilian militia leaders were rewarded for their services in public ceremonies or through patronage appointments in the newly purged bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{85} Confidential Interview 006 with former perpetrator by author, Yogyakarta, January 2016; Confidential interview 008 with former KAMI leader by author, Surakarta, January 2016
Chapter 6
Politicide in East Java

24 Introduction

In this chapter I examine the dynamics of politicide in East Java, a province with both low security entrenchment and a strong collaborator network. As was the case in Central Java, in East Java the provincial Brawijaya division lacked adequate security entrenchment with which to implement doubly selective unilaterally. The Brawijaya division was late to create village level deployments, and those village deployments lacked the intelligence capacity to even screen village guards for communist party (PKI) sympathizers (Sundhaussen 1982:173). There were also concerns that sections of the Brawijaya were communist sympathizers (“Report from East Java” 1986). The Brawijaya also had a number of units deployed outside the province at the time politicide began, and the Brawijaya commander was initially reluctant to coordinate the entirety of the division to move against the PKI (Crouch 1978:143). Both of these factors meant that the army high command lacked a reliable source of coordinated manpower within the Brawijaya division itself. Like Central Java, this incentivized first sub-national Brawijaya officers, and eventually the entire division, to turn to civilian elites and their respective networks for intelligence and manpower. Also like Central Java, empowering this collaborator network – especially the Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) led to high levels of repressive violence in East Java. For reasons of prison overcrowding and torture, this lack of entrenchment also raised rates of killing in East Java.

Unlike Central Java, in East Java the collaborator network was strong vis-à-vis the Brawijaya division. This is for two reasons. First, the collaborator network was dominated by a single sociopolitical organization: Nahdlatul Ulama. This ensured that the collaborator network was capable of coordinating its actions rather than competing across various organizational nodes.

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Second, NU had developed a well-coordinated and well-trained militia known as Banser. Banser was formed specifically to combat the communist party as it grew in strength in East Java. Because the collaborator network was united and had access to a well-trained and battle tested militia, it could occasionally challenge the primacy of the army at the local level, and engage in violence unilaterally.

The strength of the collaborator network in East Java raised rates of killing compared to Central Java, even though the overall levels of repressive violence (killings + long term detentions) were similar. The strength of the collaborator network allowed it to be aggressive in moving against communist party supporters, and in some areas was able to mount its own lethal campaigns of violence outside the auspices of the army. At times, this occurred despite attempts by the army to reign civilian militia in. These actions led to the deaths of individuals who in Central Java would have instead been incarcerated. NU leaders were also active in pressuring local commanders to execute more detainees. Both these activities raised levels of killings in East Java relative to Central Java.

This combination of security entrenchment, collaborator networks, and politicide dynamics can be seen in Table 6.1, below.

**Table 6.1: Politicide in East Java**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Entrenchment</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Repressive Violence (7.76% of PKI pool)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low Repressive Violence (1.84% of PKI pool)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium rates of killing:detention (2:1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low rates of killing:detention (1:1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case: Central Java</td>
<td></td>
<td>Case: West Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Repressive Violence (8.50-9.24% of PKI pool)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low Repressive Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High rates of killing (8:1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low rates of killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case: East Java</td>
<td></td>
<td>Case: n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Lev 1966:93-97; Kammen and Zakaria 2012:452
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I overview the politics in East Java prior to the September 30th Movement. I draw attention to the lack of entrenchment of the armed forces, the strength of the collaborator network, and the tension between this network and the PKI that resulted in NU forming a large and well trained militia. In the next two sections, I trace how politicide unfolded across East Java: an initial wave of militia violence, followed by a more coordinated campaign of arrests, detention, and often execution. In these sections I show how a lack of security entrenchment led to higher levels of repressive violence, as it encouraged them to delegate intelligence collection and the use of force to the collaborator network. In the fourth section I examine rates of killing in East Java, arguing that a combination of the inability to provide food and shelter for the burgeoning detainee population combined with unilateral militia attacks and pressure from the collaborator network to raise executions led to high rates of killing in East Java. I conclude with a summary of politicide dynamics in the province.

25 East Java Prior to Politicide

Like Central Java, East Java was a major bastion of PKI support prior to the 1965-66 politicide. In the 1955 elections the PKI was able to secure approximately 2.3 million votes (23.2 percent of total), enough for second place. The PKI trailed only Nahdlatul Ulama, the dominant political party in the province, with 34.1 percent of the vote (Feith 1957:66). By the 1957 regional elections the gap between the PKI and NU had closed considerably: the PKI secured 35.6% of the popular vote compared to NU’s 39.4%. In both proportionate and absolute terms, PKI support was near identical in both Central Java and East Java. Not only was the PKI able to attract votes, like Central Java, its trade union (SOBSI) was a major player in East Java industry, and all of the peasant front BTI, women’s organization Gerwani, and artist association LEKRA had substantial followings. Like Central Java, in East Java PKI support was drawn from a mix of farmers, workers, artisans, and intellectuals. PKI supporters also tended to be less religiously devout than supporters of the Muslim political parties such as NU, and in the aggregate, likely of lower socioeconomic status (Hefner 2000:52-53). The PKI was also one of the only political

87 In Central Java the PKI received just over 2.3 million votes in the 1955 elections (25.8% of total), while in the 1957 elections the PKI received approximately 2.7 million votes (35.6% of total). In absolute terms, the PKI received just over 2.7 million votes in East Java. The population of the two provinces is also extremely similar (Feith 1957:66; Lev 1966:93-94).
parties to build significant party infrastructure at the village level – signing up workers and farmers in its major associations, advocating for peasant issues such as land redistribution, corrupt landlords, and sharecropper rights (see also Mortimer 1974). In doing so, the PKI challenged long-standing social structures, as well as the authority of East Javanese landowners and religious elites (a category that frequently overlapped).

25.1 Potential Collaborator Networks in East Java

The collaborator network in East Java was especially strong. This was due to a combination of the collaborator network being concentrated within a single organization, and that organization having access to a large and well trained militia. Together, this meant that the collaborator network had the ability to coordinate violent actions across large swathes of East Java. By the time politicide occurred, this meant the collaborator network would have the ability to engage in violence unilaterally and to pressure commanders to increase killing. The ability of this collaborator network to coordinate such violent activity was due to both the organizational structure of its principle organization – Nahdlatul Ulama – and the fierce competition between NU and the PKI in the years leading to politicide. This incentivized the creation of a dedicated militia, and also an incentive to deploy it once their appeared to be an opportunity to do so.

Unlike Central Java, the collaborator network in East Java was dominated by a single organization: Nahdlatul Ulama. NU was the largest religious organization in East Java and its largest political party. Organizationally, a major advantage held by NU was its dense network of pesantren (religious boarding schools), as well as the local political and spiritual authority of the kiai (heads of pesantren), who themselves were linked in dense institutional and kinship networks (Fealy 1998; Dhofier 1999). The authority of the kiai amongst their students during this period was enormous: Fealy and McGregor describe the relationship as one in which a “kiai’s word was writ among his students and supporters” (2012:107). In addition, kiai and their networks of followers were also often dominant economic players in the countryside – pesantren often owned large tracts of land, and the religiously conservative Muslims from which NU is primarily drawn tended to be wealthier than their less religiously devout neighbors (Hefner 2000:52-53). East Java was both the province with the greatest NU presence and the site of some of its largest and most important pesantren such as Lirboyo (in Kediri) and Tebuireng (Jombang). Not only could NU’s electoral party compete with the PKI, but as a sociopolitical
organization, NU also had youth and student groups to attract mass support and membership much in the same way as the PKI.

As the PKI continued to grow in strength, they increasingly challenged the material status quo in East Java. One such challenge was a propaganda campaign directed at the “Tujuh Setan Desa” (Seven Village Devils). The seven devils targeted by the PKI were landlords, usurers, advance purchasers of crops (penebas), middlemen, capitalist bureaucrats, rural bandits, and evil traders. PKI activists singled out these categories at rallies and performances as a means of denouncing local opponents. In East Java, kiai at times became targets of the campaign due to their large landholdings, and the label of setan applied to a kiai was particularly offensive. The seven village devil campaign also included a strong cultural component provided by Lekra, such as public performances of wayang kulit (shadow puppet) or ludruk (plays) with such provocative titles as “the death of God”. Many within the religious community saw this performance as a direct attack on Islam, even though they rarely witnessed it (Sulistyo 1997:314).

The PKI’s attempts to implement land redistribution also had significant repercussions in East Java. At the national level the PKI was successful in advocating for changes to sharecropping laws and land redistribution laws in 1960 and 1961. If fully implemented, these changes could have re-distributed lands belonging to NU supporters to members of the poorer peasantry. While religious institutions were technically exempt from land reform, this did not prevent the PKI and its affiliated organizations from agitating against NU and its pesantren as violators of the land reform act (see Mortimer 1974). If the PKI were successful in these agitations, NU would suffer significant material losses.

In response to the growing strength of the PKI and its challenges to the status quo, NU formed a militia known as Banser in 1962. Drawn from their youth group Ansor. Banser functioned as a paramilitary body that would defend pesantren interests from the PKI (Fealy and McGregor 2012:113). Kiai had a wellspring of able recruits: in the pesantren physical tests of strength were a major component of spiritual training, and many kiai themselves were believed to possess supernatural strengths or immunities to knives and bullets.88 Students regularly engaged in martial arts and games of soccer with a flaming ball made of coconut husk. This emphasis on

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88 Gus Maksum of Lirboyo, for instance, was said to be immune to knives and bullets, and to possess powers of clairvoyance (Sulistyo 1997:121).
physical prowess stemmed from the idea that one could “[measure] the degree of someone's total submission to Allah by his ability to resist or repel physical threats, such as stabbings” (Sulistyo 1997:121). Emphasizing physical prowess and the ability to physically confront opponents of Islam provided NU leaders with an enormous reserve of physically fit youth with at least some degree of self-defense training.

In addition to being able to draw on a wealth of potential militia recruits, kiai also ensured close lines of communication across pesantren to coordinate activities in the face of potential PKI aggression. Pesantren in Jombang and Kediri, for example, had a dedicated courier service between boarding schools, with pre-written notes prepared to call for assistance from other schools. Kiai ensured that there was always vehicles on standby to request help if required.89 These networks often extended substantial distance. The networks in Jombang, for example, extended to the neighbouring regencies of Kediri, Blitar, and Mojokerto.90 Given that larger pesantren had thousands of students, kiai in East Java had the means to rapidly coordinate huge numbers of youth militia at short notice, giving them a substantive force advantage over the PKI, and, at times, local army commanders.

These militia groups also gained experience in using violence prior to politicide. By 1963, the PKI sought to unilaterally implement the land reform acts by leading land seizures and occupations. In these unilateral actions (aksi sepihak) farmers associated with the BTI, alongside members of the PKI and the communist youth wing Pemuda Rakyat occupied the lands of large landholders whom they believed to be violating the terms of the 1960 sharecropping law. In East Java many of these landholding belonged to NU members or pesantren. By 1964, violence during aksi between NU and PKI supporters became frequent, as NU deployed Ansor youth and the Banser militia to disperse the occupations. The worst of this violence occurred in Kediri, Banyuwangi, Jember, and Jombang: all areas in which both the PKI and NU had high levels of support (Fealy and McGregor 2012:112). Due to their force and coordination advantages, NU was generally able to repel aksi. These physical clashes resulted in substantive injury, and at times loss of life.

89 Confidential interview 034 with witness and kiai by author, Jombang, April 2016.

90 Ibid.
An example of such a lethal *aksi* occurred in the village of Njati Pandak, in Northern Jombang. There, an *aksi* was led by a PKI member named Matari. After he and a collection of PKI and BTI members seized fields owned by a local NU member, Ansor and Banser members arrived in force to drive off the communist supporters. NU youth drove the occupiers off the fields, after which they followed Matari to his home, surrounded it and set it ablaze. As Matari ran from the fire he was beaten to death. Despite the spectacular nature of the attack – arson and a public execution, police did not investigate the murder.91 Even though the PKI officially ended its program of *aksi* in 1964, low level violence continued in some areas of East Java.

25.2 The Armed Forces in East Java

The Brawijaya Division was not well entrenched in East Java. Due to intra-service rivalries – and a lack of funds - the Brawijaya was slow to implement sub-district command structures (Koramil) and village level troop deployments (OKD - Sundhaussen 1982:173; Sudjatmiko 1992:121). For these reasons, and also due to perceived communist sympathizers within the Brawijaya division, the Brawijaya OKD also lacked the necessary intelligence gathering capacity to screen its village guard units prior to 1965 (Sundhaussen 1982:173). At least three-quarters of the Brawijaya battalions had been deployed outside of the province for the Malaysia campaign and to repress revolts in Sulawesi, leaving the division “seriously under-manned until well into November [1965]” (Jenkins and Kammen 2012:97; see also Sudjatmiko 1992:113). This further disrupted the entrenchment of the Brawijaya, and left them crucially undermanned in the months leading up to politicide. The Malaysia campaign also precluded the development of civic action programs by the military in East Java (Sundhaussen 1982:173).

The main role of the armed forces in East Java amidst rising tensions between the PKI and NU was to try to prevent violence from escalating – a task in which they were only partially successful. As discussed above, low level violence was not uncommon in some areas, and during *aksi*, it could be explosive. At the same time, the Army generally attempted to contain these outbreaks. In Jombang, for instance, following the murder of Mathari, the Brawijaya deployed in

91 Confidential interview 027 with former political prisoner by author, Yogyakarta, March 2016; Confidential interview 034 with witness and *kiai* by author, Jombang, April 2016.
force at the funeral to dissuade violence from either side.\textsuperscript{92} Part of the reason for the Army’s success in containing violence after *aksi* is likely due to NU not engaging in a coordinated effort to wield sustained violence against the PKI. At this point, coordinated NU actions appear to have been largely limited to defending *aksi*, and there is no evidence that NU actively coordinated an offensive drive to kill communist party supporters.

25.3 The Security Situation Following the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement

Unlike Central Java, there was no widespread support for the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement among Brawijaya officers. Neither the Brawijaya headquarters nor any of the sub-provincial commands declared in favour of the movement (Crouch 1978:143). However, the Brawijaya still lacked entrenchment in East Java. This lack of entrenchment would force the Brawijaya to turn outside their organizational structure to obtain the necessary intelligence and manpower if they chose to move against the PKI in East Java. This lack of entrenchment continued for three reasons and is crucial for understanding how the collaborator network would influence politicide in East Java. First, as in Central Java, a large number of East Java troops were deployed outside of province. At least three-quarters of the Divisional battalions had been deployed outside of the province for the Malaysia campaign and to repress revolts in Sulawesi (Sudjatmiko 1992:113). This left the Brawijaya severely understaffed as it came to implement politicide in a province of approximately 22 million (Widjojo 1970:174). Not only would this reduce the amount of troops to physically arrest communist party supporters, it also disrupted local intelligence ties, as large numbers of locally recruited troops were no longer available to provide information on the areas from which they were drawn. Moreover, it also weakened the army vis-à-vis the collaborator network, especially in the first phase of politicide (discussed in the following section).

Second, loyal members of Brawijaya intelligence and the Army high command saw some sections of the Brawijaya Division as compromised. This led to both further intelligence-disrupting redeployments and suspicion that the intelligence branch and various battalions were not moving fully against the PKI. A report compiled by an intelligence officer in East Java in

\textsuperscript{92} Confidential interview 034 with witness and *kiai* by author, Jombang, April 2016.
November 1965 claims that “up to 30 percent [of the army East Java] were ‘involved’ in the coup” (‘Report from East Java’ 1986:146). The report claimed that village-level commands tended to be infiltrated with the PKI, causing intelligence leaks that would obstruct the arrest process. In addition, Battalions 511, 512, and 513 were suspected to have been strongly infiltrated with communist sympathizers. All of these battalions were subsequently deployed out of province (Ibid 147). In addition, the intelligence section of the Brawijaya command had large numbers of suspected communist supporters. These sympathizers were subsequently dismissed, leaving the intelligence staff severely undermanned. These factors further hindered the ability of the Brawijaya to collect reliable intelligence on the PKI, incentivizing the remaining loyal troops to turn outside their organizational infrastructure for information on the PKI.

Third, Brawijaya leadership was initially unwilling to take actions against the wishes of President Sukarno, precluding coordinated action by the Brawijaya as a whole (Crouch 1978:143). While nominally anti-communist, Basuki Rachmat was also a supporter of President Sukarno, and was reluctant to openly challenge the president. Sukarno frequently called for calm and decried the persecution of the communist party, leading to a situation in which the Brawijaya headquarters initially ignored requests from the Army high command to purge the PKI (Kammen and Zakaria 2012:446). In practice, this meant that the decision to move against the communist party fell to local officers. This downstreaming of authority to move against the communist party hindered the initial ability of anti-communist Brawijaya troops to coordinate their activities over large areas. Not only did this encourage relying on the collaborator network for manpower, but it also weakened the position of the Army vis-à-vis the collaborator network – a factor that would facilitate the latter’s ability to raise rates of killing in East Java. Even once Brigadier General Sunariyadi replaced Basuki Rachmat as Brawijaya commander in November 1965 and was willing to coordinate the entirety of the division to crush the PKI, disruptions to the intelligence gathering capacity of the Brawijaya Division due to dismissals in the intelligence branch and troop redeployments ensured that the Army would have to continue to rely upon civilian actors.

93 Note that some of these redeployments occurred prior to October 1965.
94 Telegram 187 from American Consulate Surabaya to American Embassy Jakarta, ‘Joint sitrep 19’
for intelligence and auxiliary troops. As I will demonstrate below, this led to increases in both repressive violence and rates of killing.

**25.4 Civilian Reactions to the September 30th Movement**

Unlike Central Java, in East Java the collaborator network was able to initially mobilize itself for violence prior to direct training and supervision by military forces – and at times against the wishes of local security forces. In the first week of October the NU national leadership in Jakarta began to mobilize its branches in East Java to violently crush the communist party. On October 5 the NU national radio broadcast denounced the September 30th Movement, and called for the PKI to be banned (Fealy and McGregor 2012:117). This announcement was approved by Suharto (see Sulastomo 2006). NU quickly escalated its rhetoric against the PKI, and in doing so, instructed its membership to engage in protests and attacks against the PKI. Following the October 5th broadcast from NU headquarters in Jakarta, East Java Central Board instructions framed the September 30th Movement as a continuation of the 1948 Madiun Affair, in which communist militia massacred members of the Islamic community. By October 9th the NU Central Branch in East Java issued instructions to its membership – including its militia – to move, using “terms such as *menumpas* (eradicate), *menghabiskan* (finish off), *mengganyang* (crush), gobble up) and *mengikis habis* (eliminate) in describing what should be done to the PKI.”95 In addition, anyone who fell in battle against the PKI would be declared a martyr.

Just after these instructions were issued from the East Java Central Board, Ansor members attacked several suspected PKI members in Kertosono district, bordering Kediri and Jombang. Ansor members beat accused communists and tore down their homes.96 Protests by NU branches began at the same time. Around October 9 students of Tebuireng in Jombang gathered outside the *pesantren* to protest against the PKI. Armed with industrial chains, the students proceeded to the local SOBSI headquarters, and after setting the building alight, used the chains to topple the building. On October 16th an NU-led protest in Surabaya damaged the PKI office, leading security forces to arrest 200 NU members (Fealy and McGregor 2012:117). Protests, and

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96 Confidential interview 027 with former political prisoner by author, Yogyakarta, March 2016
sometimes local campaigns of violence spread across NU branches in East Java. As I discuss in the following sections, this raised both levels of repressive violence and rates of killing.

26 Politicide in East Java – the first phase

Politicide in East Java did not have an initially coordinated anti-communist campaign or clear start date in the same manner as Central Java or West Java. Whereas in Central Java politicide commenced with the arrival of the RPKAD, the Brawijaya commander, Basuki Rachmat, was initially reluctant to act against the PKI. This meant that for the first phase of politicide in East Java, lasting for at least the first three weeks of October, the decision to act against the PKI was left in the hands of more junior commanders. This led to varying situations in which any combination of nothing, arrests by the military, anti-communist violence by civilian groups, or joint civilian-military operations could occur. In instances in which civilians were involved, they tended to raise levels of repressive violence, and at times, killing.

In areas in which local commanders were unwilling to move against the communist party and in which the collaborator network was strong, collaborator networks sometimes moved against the PKI unilaterally, leading to increased rates of killing. During the first few weeks of politicide in some rural areas of Mojokerto, for example, local NU branches identified, arrested, screened, and executed suspected communists without the army. Large groups of Ansor members would arrive at villages, and arrest those believed to be members of organizations such as PKI, BTI, and Pemuda Rakyat. Those arrested would be taken to a makeshift detention center, such as the home of a prominent NU member. There, they would be held for a short time before being taken to a secluded area for execution by a handful of Ansor members. One Pemuda Rakyat member who miraculously survived having his throat slashed by an Ansor execution squad recalled that there were no soldiers present during the arrest or brief detainment, and that Ansor groups arrived on foot rather than truck.\footnote{As will be discussed below, the deployment of Ansor and Banser units via truck was generally a hallmark of NU-army coordination.} Militia-led violence in Mojokerto was evidently so severe that both security forces and other civilian groups were afraid of removing the headless corpses that were strewn by riverbanks or the sides of the road (“Report from East Java” 1986:141).

Something that would have facilitated this violence was the degree of collaboration within the...
collaborator network: Mojokerto was a regency connected to the courier system discussed earlier, ensuring local NU branches could deploy huge numbers of militia. Moreover, the regencies connected in this system – Kediri, Jombang, and Mojokerto, all experienced some of the highest levels of violence in East Java (see Chandra 2017:1066-1072). In addition, lack of access to a dedicated prison system meant that there was no option for prolonged incarceration, making killing a more likely outcome.

In other areas, local Army commanders coordinated anti-communist sweeps alongside civilian organizations, especially NU, leading to high levels of repressive violence. The first of these occurred around October 10. At that time, NU branches in Kediri planned, with the assistance and permission of local military forces, a mass rally to be held in Kediri city on October 13. Much like the rallies that occurred in Central Java with the arrival of the RPKAD, the Kediri rally culminated with an attack on the local PKI headquarters in which the building was burned to the ground and eleven PKI members were killed (Sulistyo 1997:182 Young 1990:80). Arrests in the Kediri area involving coordinated actions between religious youth and army personnel began not long after. Similar rallies occurred across numerous towns in East Java when local commanders decided to move against the communist party. These kinds of unilateral militia attacks or joint-operations led to the targeting of those who would have fallen far outside the desired targets of communist leaders and activists. Those targeted in Mojokerto, for example, included ordinary members of Pemuda Rakyat – a youth group with an enormous membership.

For militia such as Banser, the prime factors determining if and when they became active in moving against the communist party was the initiative of local religious leaders such as kiai. As discussed earlier, at the time of politicide, a kiai’s authority over their pupils was absolute. Actions only occurred after first receiving the blessing of the most important local kiai and Ulama (eg: Kuniawan et al. 2015:11). In areas characterized by joint army-civilian action, such religious figures would receive assurances from local security forces – either asking or being asked to act – in order to ensure that their actions would not be repressed by the military (see Sulistyo 1997:180-187; Kuniawan et al. 2015:14, 18). In many locations close contact between local kiai, who would have had the authority to mobilize and direct Ansor and Banser groups, and local commanders appears to have happened almost immediately following Untung’s
broadcast (see Sulistyo 1997:181-184). Anti-communist local commanders and hard-liners within local nationalist and religious organizations had often already developed close ties in the face of perceived communist strength. However, religious elites were still sometimes willing to sanction this kind of violence even if there was a threat of repression from security forces. The dense network structure of the pesantren of which the kiai stood at the center allowed each to mobilize huge numbers of students, making such mobilizations capable of resisting or dissuading attempts to repress by local commanders who wished to remain inactive during the first weeks of politicide in East Java.

In early November Brawijaya headquarters began to coordinate politicide across all of East Java and attempt to bring civilian militia under the security umbrella of the Army following weeks of pressure from Jakarta. On October 22 Basuki Rachmat issued a temporary ban on the PKI and its ten mass organizations in East Java (Hearman 2012:101). Not long before this, the Army attempted to coordinate existing civilian militia by helping to establish a civilian action command to crush the PKI (KAP-Gestapo) in East Java. This command was intended to coordinate between civilian groups, and to ensure that they themselves were coordinating with the Army in order to prevent violence from occurring outside the army chain of command (see “Report from East Java” 1986:136). The anti-communist campaign in East Java became further coordinated when Brigadier General Sunariyadi replaced Basuki Rachmat as commander of the Brawijaya. Unlike Rachmat, Sunariyadi and willing to act against the wishes of Sukarno. Around the same time Brawijaya Battalions 517 and 518 arrived in East Java from Kalimantan, providing further troops for Sunariyadi to coordinate joint operations between civilians and the army. This marked the start of the second phase of politicide, in which the dominant form of politicide across East Java was of joint operations. I discuss this phase below.

27 Politicide in East Java – the second phase

Once General Sunariyadi replaced Basuki Rachmat as Brawijaya commander and Battalions 517 and 518 returned to East Java, politicide in East Java was largely characterized by joint civil-military operations. Like Central Java, the East Java Brawijaya Division lacked both the

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98 Confidential interview 034 with witness and kiai by author, Jombang, April 2016.
capability to collect the required intelligence or deploy sufficient manpower to implement politicide unilaterally. These shortcomings meant that the Brawijaya division would continue to outsource parts of both intelligence collection and the use of force to the collaborator network. For their part, the collaborator network provided auxiliary manpower via their existing militia; and provided information in the form of denunciations and identifying suspected communists during sweeps. The army’s reliance on the collaborator network for intelligence and manpower led to similar levels of repressive violence in East Java as in Central Java – though as I argue in the next section, the increased strength of the collaborator network further raised rates of killing compared to Central Java. This is because the collaborator network was able to continue to use violence outside the scope of military operations – and the wishes of its commanders - and occasionally pressure local commanders to increase executions.

Like Central Java, the Army approached civilian organizations known to be antagonistic to the communist party for information and manpower. As discussed above, NU the most potent source of civilian support to whom the Army could turn. Civilians were able to identify suspected communists in two primary ways. First, individuals or religious organizations could denounce suspected communists directly to local military commands (Korem, Kodim, or Koramil). Second, civilian militia could identify victims themselves during patrols or other operations. These means of intelligence provision drastically increased the magnitude of repressive violence in East Java and suggests that while the Army was ultimately responsible unleashing much of the repressive violence, they were only partially able to control its scale. In this section I focus primarily on repressive violence in the aggregate (both detentions and killings), and address rates of killings specifically in the following section. Before doing so, I briefly summarize the second phase of politicide in East Java.

27.1 Dynamics of the Second Politicide Phase in East Java

The most common pattern of the second phase of politicide in East Java was joint operations between Army forces and those of NU’s youth groups Ansor and Banser. Oftentimes, this would involve a combination of army troops and militia going house to house in neighborhoods and villages, armed with lists of potential PKI supporters. As I will establish below, frequently the names on these lists would be generated by civilian organizations themselves. Once the combination of soldiers and militia arrived at a location, they would arrest those whose names
were on the list, and occasionally others who were residing at the same location (Kurniawan et al. 2015:10-45). Like Central Java, detainees would often be taken to one of the many official or makeshift detention centers across the province for screening and interrogation. In some instances, suspected communists were killed in deserted areas without processing at detention facilities (See Tempo, Oct 7, 2012:31). However, many victims appear to have first been detained for some period of time before execution (Sunyoto et al. 1996:156; Sulistyo 1997:186; Kurniawan et al. 2015:10-48; see also Roosa 2016:19).

Even in instances in which anti-communist operations visibly included only civilian elements, they often did so with the consent and support of local army units. It was common practice in East Java for local military commands (Kodim) to distribute lists of suspected communists to religious organizations and their respective youth wings for capture or execution (Robinson 2018:155). Civilians were instrumental in helping to place names on these lists (Hefner 2000:47). In some cases, lists themselves carried instructions as to who on the list was to be killed, in others, the decision whether to kill or not was left in the hands of anti-communist organizations or militias themselves (Tempo, Oct 7, 2012:31-35). At times these killings were immediate: in or just outside the home. In others, victims were taken to a secluded location such as a river before being killed and their bodies dumped. Ansor units would often arrive by trucks, some of which were provided by the military.

### 27.2 Denunciation

The opportunity for the collaborator network to denounce suspected communists made it possible for them to use politicide to eliminate their local political competition and potential threats to status quo, and by doing so expanding the circle of those targeted from party leaders and activists to those with only peripheral ties to the party. Like Central Java, civilian organizations would provide lists of communist party supporters to the army. In Jombang, civilian fronts in the area had teams actively dedicated to drafting these lists. NU elites were especially important in coordinating denunciations on a large scale: *kiai* would gather village youth together, using them to identify suspected communists in their respective villages (Tempo

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99 Confidential interview 042 with witness and former Lekra member by author, Jombang, May 2016.
2012:33). The practice of using mass organizations to identify communist supporters appears to have been widespread. An intelligence report from East Java claims that in Bondowoso: “The community, especially the Religious groups, were very active in reporting PKI elements to those in authority, who would then take action” (“Report from East Java” 1986:138). The report lists that similar actions by what it refers to as “the people” occurred in numerous other regencies, including Jember, Jombang, Mojokerto, Kediri, Malang, and Madiun (Ibid: 138-142).

Relying on civilian organizations for intelligence could lead to high rates of denunciation, especially in areas in which organizations such as NU had intense local rivalries with the PKI. One example of this can be seen in the case of Darul Ulum Pesantren in Jombang. Prior to the anti-communist purge, there were several low-level clashes and provocation between Darul Ulum staff, students, and broader religious community on one hand, and supporters of the communist party and BTI on the other. The situation was so polarized prior to the September 30th Movement that Darul Ulum students were forbidden to travel to “red” areas unless they were in a group of no less than five, and unless they had some form of weapon.100 Once the anti-communist campaign spread to Jombang, a large number of low-level communist supporters and their families took refuge in the pesantren in fear of becoming targets of the politicide. When soldiers at the school asked their identity, they were turned over en-masse to the army.101

Vanessa Hearman also notes that in Karang Duren, Bangil, PNI and Ansor members created their own screening teams before handing in suspected communists to the army (2012:119). Both factors suggest that the military was not necessarily able to limit politicide to its intended victims.102

100 Confidential interview 034 with witness and kiai by author, Jombang, April 2016.
101 Ibid
102 It was also possible, though rare, for some kiai to resist politicide. Kiai Ichsan of Mojowarno advocated a less-brutal crackdown, and actively sheltered a number of workers accused of being PKI members at his pesantren (Sulistyo 1997:190). Another kiai who helped to restrain militia groups was Mohammad Cholil Bisri, head of Ansor in Rembang, who “forbade his branch members from persecuting communists” (Fealy and McGregor 2012:125). The actions of Kiai Ichsan and Mohammad Cholil Bisri appear to be an exception to broad patterns of violence involving NU.
27.3 Militia Actions

A second means through which civilians could provide information was for civilian militias to solicit it directly over the course of anti-communist operations. An interview with a former Ansor member by Vanessa Hearman recounts:

> Ansor began to move by asking for information from friends who knew precisely if [someone] was PKI. There were [PKI] in each village. [We would ask] “(Are they?) PKI or not? No. Ok.” We received information directly from each area. That was the way it was, so that we wouldn’t make a mistake. Because every area would know precisely the make up of its community and organisations.\textsuperscript{103}

This type of autonomy gave Banser commanders the ability to significantly increase the scope of politicide in the areas in which they were active and possessed this delegated authority. Moreover, it provided an additional avenue through which civilians could eliminate local political competition.

Civilian militia were also heavily involved in the execution of detainees in East Java. Most accounts of the killings in East Java follow a similar pattern. A truck would either pick up a group of civilian militia members – usually Ansor or Banser, or these militia would walk to a pre-determined location. A group of “communists” would either be waiting, bound and guarded by the military, or would arrive soon after by truck. An executioner from Rengen district recalled they “were called up whenever there was an execution scheduled. Usually it was at night after the [evening] prayer. There was a schedule, along with the name of the victims, which was transferred from the District Office to the District Military Command (Kurniawan et al. 2015:37). These executions typically occurred in locations away from public view and in which disposing many bodies could be done relatively easily. In the area around Kediri this was most often the Brantas River, especially for the first several weeks of mass executions. The river became so overwhelmed with corpses that people became afraid to bathe or eat fish from the river for fear of finding human remains (Sulistyo 1997:206).

\textsuperscript{103} “Muhammad” interview by Vanessa Hearman, Feb 2009, Bangil. Cited in Hearman 2012:119
Lack of entrenchment by the Brawijaya division increased levels of repressive violence by incentivizing the army to turn to the collaborator network for intelligence on PKI leaders and activists. This provided the collaborator network with the opportunity to eliminate its local political opponents, and in doing so, expand the scope of those targeted to include many people with few, if any, ties to communist leadership. Reflecting on some of the detainees that were later executed in Srebet village in Sumbersuko district, a local resident recalled: “Many residents who were not actually in the PKI were killed […] Many of them even thought that PKI was an abbreviation for ‘Indonesian Kiai Party’” (Kurniawan et al. 2015:32). By December, this practice or targeting non-communists had extended to include not just individuals with peripheral ties to the PKI, but also supporters of the nationalist party (Fealy and McGregor 2012:126). Together, these factors led to similar levels of repressive violence – the combination of arrests and killings – in East Java as occurred in Central Java.

28 Rates of Killing

While rates of repressive violence in East Java are extremely similar to that of Central Java, East Java had significantly higher rates of killing relative to detentions. Like Central Java, a lack of security entrenchment led to an inability to screen detainees, encouraging greater levels of lethal violence through torture and misidentification. Also like Central Java, the logistical problem of caring for such a large numbers of prisoners incentivized security forces to use mass executions as a strategy to reduce the prison population. However, in East Java the strength of the collaborator network was such that civilian elites at times used the opportunity to use the anti-communist campaign to move against their own local opponents. In some areas of East Java in which there were pre-existing and effective militia, these militia performed waves of killing outside the control of the Army, leading to the killing of those that may otherwise have been imprisoned or released. In addition, civilian elites occasionally pressured local army commanders to escalate rates of killing in the areas under their control. Taken together, these factors led to higher rates of killing in East Java than Central Java or West Java.

28.1 Information and Screening

Like Central Java, the massive influx of detainees that resulted from outsourcing intelligence collection to civilian organizations quickly stretched the local prison system beyond its capacity, leading to a proliferation of temporary prisons throughout East Java. At Kaliosok prison in
Surabaya, for example, rooms intended to house 25 prisoners were now occupied by some 50-60 detainees (Hearman 2012:104). As it was across Java, the Army was tasked with categorizing these prisoners into three categories, with only one category being slated for execution. The sheer number of detainees, combined with low intelligence gathering capacity, made this an impossible task for the Braijaya to do unilaterally. This intelligence shortcoming led to a combination of outsourcing intelligence further to civilians and torture to assess the role of detainees in the September 30th Movement.

The East Javanese screening system had to rely on civilians to a similar extent as Central Java. Given the lack of reliable information on detainees, it was often necessary to recruit local civilian actors to assess guilt. In Surabaya, for instance, the local screening team was led by a university dean from the faculty of shipping (Hearman 2012:102). In Kediri inmates were screened by a combination of NU and military personnel (Ibid:121). At times, this screening process could occur directly in the field, with organizational or militia leaders having final say as to who on a list was sufficiently communist to warrant execution. The Army would frequently choose the most ardent anti-communist civilians for this task: ensuring the screening team would classify many as being strongly communist even if they had few ties to the party. A large number of inmates were also tortured during interrogation sessions in East Java (see Roosa 2008). This not only led to false confessions leading to execution in a direct sense, but also for detainees to implicate others, further raising rates of execution.

28.2 Caring for Detainees

Like Central Java, food shortages were a ubiquitous problem in the East Java prison system, and prisoners often faced starvation conditions. Like the rest of Indonesia, East Java was in the midst of a severe food crisis prior to the September 30th Movement, and skyrocketing inflation incentivized rice hoarding and prevented the easy access of foodstuffs. Meals in prisons such as Kaliosok consisted of two teak-leaves of rice and a bowl of cabbage soup per day. Detainees were sometimes able to supplement their rations with parcels provided by friends or family members, provided they were not stolen by prison guards. In a remarkable show of solidarity, political prisoners often divided outside rations, sharing with those who had no outside sources to rely on. Still, under these conditions many died of starvation or disease in Kaliosok and other prisons across the province (Hearman 2012:105).
The sheer number of political prisoners incentivized first local commands, and then the Brawijaya command as a whole, to rely on mass executions to solve the problem of feeding the detainee population. On October 17, for example, the commander of the Kodim 0809 at Kediri, Lieutenant-Colonel Mukadji, convened a meeting in which to discuss the detainee problem. At the time, the Kodim had no money with which to feed the detainee population, nor could this money come easily from the Army’s local civilian allies in NU. According to Syafii Soleiman, the NU Chairman for Kediri at that time, NU had no money and could barely feed its own poor members. At the meeting the decision was made that the most practical means of overcoming the issue of feeding detainees was to execute large numbers of them en-masse. Like the process described in the previous section, the Army removed large numbers of political prisoners from detention centers during the night, brought them by truck to an isolated location, and either killed them themselves or turned them over to Ansor and Banser groups to be slaughtered. The problems faced by the Army in feeding detainees was also noted by the American Embassy in Jakarta. One air gram states that “[m]any provinces appear to be successfully meeting this problem by executing their PKI prisoners, or by killing them before they are captured, a task in which Moslem youth groups are providing assistance.”

The need to rely on mass executions is directly tied to the Army’s decision to outsource intelligence collection to civilian organizations. As I have shown above, the Army’s reliance on denunciations led to huge increases in the number of individuals arrested by the Army. It was this large number of detainees that originally incentivized the use of mass executions by the Army. Had the initial detainee population been smaller, there would have been less difficulty in feeding the new prison population, and as such, less of an incentive to rely upon executions.

28.3 Collaborator Networks

In East Java, the collaborator network was able to further increase rates of killing. It did this by directing militia to kill opponents unilaterally, and by pressuring local commanders to use mass executions. These increased rates of killing appear to be most prominent in areas in which NU

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was both strong and had intense competition with the communist party in the years prior to politicide.

Civilian elites occasionally directed militia to move unilaterally against their local opponents, leading to higher rates of killing in areas in which these unilateral attacks occurred. Lacking connections to the official security apparatus and their network of detention centers, these unilateral attacks were more likely to take lethal forms than the repressive violence campaign orchestrated by the Army writ large. Unilateral militia attacks were more likely to occur when civilian militia were capable of challenging Army dominance in a locale and when local civilian elites had intense anxiety about future power balances.

Militia commanders were able to exercise high degrees of autonomy in civilian-led operations, being able to decide in the field who was to be targeted, and who amongst those targets was sufficiently communist so as to warrant execution. An example of this in-field decision making is provided by Sulistyo, in describing the actions of an Ansor unit in Kediri: “They stopped the buses and asked the passengers to declare themselves Muslims or not. If the answer was yes, then the gang asked them to recite the syahadat. Rarely could someone not recite this sentence; if this happened, he was dragged out of the bus and finished right there” (Sulistyo 1997:200). Similar direct, lethal attacks occurred in areas such as Mojojerto and Madura – both areas in which NU was physically strong and had been in intense competition with the PKI (“Report from East Java” 1986:141).

At times, the relative strength of civilian elites allowed them to pressure local commanders to raise rates of execution. In the aforementioned case of Kediri, there were few reliable troops available with which to conduct operations against the PKI, leading Colonel Willy Soedjono to rely upon the local NU branch for intelligence and manpower (see also Sudjatmiko 1992:205-206). There, the influence of kiai such as Mahrus Aly of Lirboyo was evidently important enough that military and civilian planners of a mass rally in Kediri felt compelled to seek his blessing before orchestrating violence (Sulistyo 1997:180). Following the rally, it was not the local military command, but instead Syafii Soleiman the local NU chairman, that advocated for

106 Confidential interview 041 with former Pemuda Rakyat member by author, Mojokerto, May 2016
the mass execution of detainees. Soleiman was well positioned to make this demand: Lirboyo Pesantren was embedded in a dense network of pesantren, each with dedicated Banser units, which had developed a courier system to rapidly coordinate the deployment of Banser units from within Kediri regency and neighbouring ones such as Jombang.\textsuperscript{107} had the highest levels of violence in East Java at this time, and the many reports of mass executions there suggest that it likely had the highest rates of killing in the province (see Sulistyo 1997:186-214; Rochijat 1985; Chandra 2017:1067).

Regional variations in levels of violence support the argument that it was the collaborator network that further increased rates of killing in East Java compared to Central Java. In a study of population change due to politicide at the regency level, Siddharth Chandra has found that the regencies with the greatest population losses were most frequently those in which NU was strong (2017:1069-1072). Crucially, this appears to be the case regardless of PKI strength. This suggests that levels of repressive violence were in large part driven by the actions of civilian organizations, rather than number of potential communist party leaders and activists in a given location. Moreover, most of the regencies in which there are reports of unilateral militia attacks are also those with some of the highest levels of population loss. Actions in which civilian militia clashed with local security forces over their use of violence are reported in Kediri, Madura, Jombang, and the regencies neighbouring Surabaya – including the aforementioned Mojokerto (see “Report from East Java” 1986; Sulistyo 1997:188-200; Hearman 2012:111-112). Kediri city, for example, had the highest levels of population loss of any city of regency in the province, while all Madurese regencies, Mojokerto, and Jombang also had significant population declines (Chandra 2017:1067). Given that militia in these regencies were not initially able to access detention centers, and is likely that a significant portion of this population loss was due to lethal violence. Also, in many of these regencies there were reported clashes between militia and professional security forces, making it likely that this increased violence happened against the preferences of local commanders. All together, the scale of politicide in East Java can be found in Table 6.2:

\textsuperscript{107} Confidential interview 034 with witness and kiai by author, Jombang, April 2016.
Table 6.2: Magnitude of Politicide in East Java

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number detained</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Killed</td>
<td>180,000-200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number targeted (killed + detained)</td>
<td>205,000-225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Total Adult Population (aged 15+)</td>
<td>12,875,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of PKI voters in 1957</td>
<td>2,704,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI Vote Share</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool in detention</td>
<td>.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool killed</td>
<td>7.579-8.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop in detention</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop killed</td>
<td>1.59-1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop targeted</td>
<td>1.784-1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PKI pool targeted</td>
<td>8.504-9.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing:Detention Ratio</td>
<td>8:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Politicide in East Java largely concluded by February or March 1966. By the end of December 1965, Sunarjadi issued instructions forbidding civilians to assist in the annihilation of G30S elements, and by the end of January proclaimed that civilians who do not obey the authorities

108 The 1961 census does not provide an internal breakdown of the aged 15-24 category (see Widjojo 1970). This estimate is derived from the total population of East Java, minus the percentage of this number that is under 15 (this percentage is for Java as a whole, and thus may not be exact for East Java specifically).
would be summarily shot by the Army (Crouch 1978:154). The extent to which these orders
were carried out is unknown, but by this time it was believed that the vast majority of hard-core
communists in the province had already been executed (Fealy and McGregor 2012:125). Like
Central Java, most arrests and execution without detention appear to have stopped by March
1966 following the ascension of Suharto. However, tensions between Ansor, the PNI, and the
Army continued to lead to occasional violent clashes in East Java. These types of clashes only
ended in June 1966 when Major General Soemitro became the new regional commander for East
Java (Fealy and McGregor 2012:126-128). With close links to both NU and the PNI, Soemitro
could sufficiently bridge the differences between the remaining political forces to stabilize the
situation.

29 Politicide in East Java

Politicide in East Java followed a more complex pattern than Central and West Java, with two
distinct phases of politicide. During the first phase, lasting until approximately mid-November,
the initiative to commit politicide was passed down to local commanders. In areas in which the
local commander moved against the PKI, they had an incentive to turn to the collaborator
network to provide the necessary intelligence and manpower to implement politicide at the local
level. In areas in which the collaborator network was strong, and in which local commanders
were unwilling to move against the PKI they occasionally took initiative themselves. In the
second phase, the Brawijaya command began to coordinate politicide in the province. However,
the Brawijaya still had to rely upon civilians for intelligence and manpower like during the first
phase of politicide, only now the anti-communist campaign spread wider across the province,
and civilian militia were brought more fully – albeit incompletely - under the umbrella of the
Brawijaya Division.

Relying upon civilians and civilian organizations for intelligence allowed them to use
denunciations as a means of eliminating personal and organizational rivals, and in doing do,
expand the magnitude of repressive violence in East Java. In doing so, they expanded the scope
of politicide to include not only communist leaders and activists, but also those with no or only
tenuous links to the party. Indeed, by December, this practice or targeting non-communists had
extended to include not just individuals with peripheral ties to the PKI, but also supporters of the
nationalist party (Fealy and McGregor 2012:126). Regional variations in population change
support this argument: the best predictor of population decline was not the size of the communist party (measured by electoral support) – the group ostensibly targeted for repressive violence – but the size of NU – the Army’s chief civilian ally in implementing repressive violence in East Java (Chandra 2017:1066-1072).

Civilian actions also greatly increased rates of killing relative to detention in East Java. This occurred through three pathways. First, like Central Java, the huge influx of detainees caused by outsourcing intelligence provision to civilians exceeded the ability of the Brawijaya Division to house and feed them. This created an incentive to utilize mass executions as a means of easing the burden of caring for prisoners. Second, a lack of information on detainees incentivized further outsourcing of intelligence to civilians to classify detainees. Relying on known anti-communists, this tended to lead to more civilians being classified as strongly communist. Moreover, the lack of information incentivized torture, leading to false confessions and, subsequently, increased executions. Third, in areas in which civilian elites had experienced past conflict with the PKI and access to organized militia, they occasionally used lethal violence unilaterally against their local political opponents. Lacking access to state detention facilities, these militia attacks were more likely to lead to killing than imprisonment. These unilateral killings were most common in October and early November 1965, before the Brawijaya Division began to coordinate the campaign of repressive violence throughout East Java. These killings were also most common in areas in which NU was strong and in which there had been clashes between NU and the PKI. At times, local NU leaders were also able to encourage mass executions, further raising rates of killing. For these reasons, East Java had extremely high rates of killing, even if the relative magnitude of repressive violence was virtually the same as Central Java.
Chapter 7
Politicide in West Java.

30 Introduction

In this chapter I examine the dynamics of politicide in West Java. West Java is a case in which security entrenchment was high. Due to an insurgency known as Darul Islam (1949-1962), the local Siliwangi Division was forced to entrench itself at the local level years before politicide began. Both during and following the Darul Islam insurgency, the Siliwangi Division created extensive village-level deployment structures in many areas of the province, and had numerous public works programs. Moreover, unlike the Central Javanese Diponegoro and East Javanese Brawijaya Divisions, the Siliwangi Division had few troop redeployments outside of the province in the years prior to politicide. It also had far fewer troops suspected of communist infiltration. This meant that the entrenchment of the Siliwangi Division was not disrupted or compromised in the same way as the other Javanese Divisions prior to moving against the communist party and its supporters. This entrenchment meant that the Siliwangi Division generally had the necessary intelligence and manpower to implement doubly selective violence unilaterally, without relying on civilian collaborators.

I argue in this chapter that the entrenchment of the Siliwangi Division had a number of important consequences for politicide in West Java. First, the capacity of the Siliwangi Division to collect intelligence on the communist party (PKI) unilaterally ensured the collaborator network was not given the opportunity to denounce local rivals. Second, the availability of troops at the local level ensured that the Siliwangi Division rarely had to approach this collaborator network to serve as auxiliary agents of violence. Because of this, the relative number of individuals targeted for repressive violence by the army in West Java was smaller than any other province in Indonesia during this time. This high entrenchment also led to lower rates of killing than elsewhere in Indonesia (see Table 7.1).
Table 7.1: Politicide in West Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Entrenchment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Repressive Violence (7.76% of PKI pool)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium rates of killing: detention (2:1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Case: Central Java</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Repressive Violence (8.50-9.24% of PKI pool)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High rates of killing (8:1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Case: West Java</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Lev 1966:93-97; Kammen and Zakaria 2012:452

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I overview the situation in West Java prior to the September 30th Movement. I focus on the Siliwangi Division’s efforts to combat the Darul Islam insurgency in the years following Indonesian independence, and its subsequent impact on the entrenchment of Siliwangi troops into local life down to the village level. I also overview the position of the army, PKI, and other religious and political organizations prior to politicide. Following this, I examine the security situation following the September 30th Movement, especially the availability of Siliwangi troops deemed to be sufficiently free of communist influence. Second, I trace the general pattern of politicide in West Java. Third, I demonstrate how the strength of the Siliwangi Division generally precluded civilian capture of operations by contrasting areas of the province in which Darul Islam was especially prevalent with those that were not. In the case of the latter, occasional reliance on civilian auxiliaries led to brief flashes of repressive violence. I conclude with a summary of politicide dynamics in West Java.

31 West Java Prior to the September 30th Movement

Prior to the September 30th Movement West Java was a province with a strong PKI presence. In the 1955 general elections, the PKI placed third with just over 755,000 votes (15.7% of total) behind the Muslim party Masyumi and the nationalist PNI (Feith 1957:67). These numbers belie
the gathering popularity of the PKI in the province: by the 1957 regional elections, the PKI was able to increase its total vote to 1,087,269 (23.7% of total) – placing second behind Masyumi (Lev 1966:94). Like elsewhere in Java, the PKI was the only political party to increase its vote total between 1955 and 1957, and most of its gains appear to have been from former supporters of the other major non-religious party, the PNI. The sharp drop in support for the PNI, which lost approximately half a million votes, and the substantive gains made by the PKI, suggest that the communist party likely would have enjoyed even higher degrees of support than their 1957 electoral totals indicate. By 1965 the Deputy Governor of West Java was a close sympathizer of the PKI, as was the mayor of Cirebon (Feith 1967:339; Cribb 1990:26).

Like Central Java and East Java, the PKI were also active in pursuing land reforms in some areas of West Java. Following the radicalization of PKI strategy in 1963, the PKI and its peasant association BTI led aksi in Bandung, Cirebon, Indramayu, Krawang, Losari, and Tasikmalaya (Mortimer 1974:306; Sundhaussen 1982:185). As would occur elsewhere, these aksi often involved the occupation of fields belonging to local religious, nationalist, or commercial elites with the aim of redistributing land to peasants. In response to these occupations, local elites would mobilize their own supporters, at times leading to explosive confrontation. In Losari, for instance, the local NU youth group Ansor publicly declared its willingness to wage jihad after the PKI “terror” (Ibid). In general, the army sought to curtail these types of actions, and in West Java in general the Siliwangi Division was active in opposing advances made by the PKI. Apart from these limited number of clashes over land reforms, violence between the major sociopolitical groups in West Java appears to be minimal following the conclusion of the Darul Islam rebellion.

Politically, the PKI’s main rival in West Java was the Masyumi party, and tensions often ran high between the PKI and the more conservative Muslim community. Leading into the 1955 elections, the chairman of West Java’s Masyumi, Kiai Hadji Isa Ashary, campaigned on a platform of a state based on Islam, denouncing the leaders of the non-Muslim parties as hypocrites (munafik) and unbelievers (kafir) (Feith 1957:11). The Ashary section of Masyumi was especially ferocious in its attitudes towards the PKI, forming an anti-communist front in West Java and claiming the PKI was subservient to Moscow. Some Masyumi leaders in West Java went so far as to “urge refusal to them of Moslem burial rites” (Ibid 13). For their part, PKI leadership lobbied extensively to tie together Masyumi and the Darul Islam rebels, advocating
action both against the party, and increased action to be taken against the rebel group (Ibid). Masyumi was ultimately banned by President Sukarno in 1961. The banning of Masyumi, combined with the decline in fortunes of the PNI during the 1957 elections and in national politics, and the relative weakness of the other major Muslim political party, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in West Java, meant that the PKI was the strongest political party in West Java by the 1960s.

Still, there is good reason to believe there was a substantial collaborator network in West Java that would have been willing to use denunciations and direct violence against the PKI. Like elsewhere in Java, in West Java the PKI had come into violent conflict with religious elites over land distribution, with some West Java NU branches publicly willing to declare *jihad* against the communist party (Sundhaussen 1982:185). These religious elites would have been as threatened as those of NU in East Java at the prospect of a communist Indonesia, as they would have suffered from the same potential loss of land and privilege as they enjoyed under the Sukarno regime. The PKI also pushed strongly for increased military powers to be deployed against Darul Islam, and were major proponents of outlawing the political party Masyumi – then (by far) the largest political party in West Java, and one that was attached to a significant portion of the province’s religious elites (Hefner 2000:44-50; see also Jackson 1980). This suggests that in West Java there was a collaborator network more than willing to escalate violence against the communist party. They likely would also have had the means to do so if empowered: in a survey of attitudes in West Java, Karl D. Jackson found that a significant number of West Javanese Muslims would be willing to kill in the name of religion in certain circumstances (1980:113-114). Moreover, the province still had large numbers of former Darul Islam fighters with experience in using violence in 1965. As I will elaborate below, however, this collaborator network would rarely be able to influence politicide in West Java due to the entrenchment of the army at the local level.

31.1 The Armed Forces in West Java

The army was more entrenched in West Java than any other province in Java. This is for two reasons. First, unlike the other two major Javanese territorial divisions, the Siliwangi Division had to confront an armed insurgency in West Java from 1949-1962. These counterinsurgency efforts meant that the Siliwangi was the tactical innovator of the territorial warfare doctrine that
would later be adopted by the Indonesian army as a whole. This counterinsurgency effort also ensured that the Siliwangi division had the necessary funds for public works projects, and that the army high command was reluctant to move troops outside the province to confront later security threats. Second, the Siliwangi Division was notably anti-communist, due in large part to the better training of its officers and the role of the division in combatting communist militia during the independence struggle. This in turn helped to prevent the sort of internal fractures that occurred in Central Java, and that were suspected of happening in East Java.

The movement that became Darul Islam first formed in West Java during the independence struggle. Towards the end of the independence struggle, the republican government signed a temporary ceasefire known as the Renville Agreement, which was ratified on January 17, 1948. The Renville Agreement forced the republic to redeploy its troops, including the Siliwangi Division, outside of West Java. The agreement also called for the removal of all armed bands; however, many militia decided to remain in West Java. Many of the former Masyumi affiliated Hizbullah and Sabilah militia came to be united under the leadership of Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, who broke from republican leadership and claimed the region as an independent Islamic state under the name of Darul Islam, with himself as Imam. Darul Islam would fight both Dutch and Indonesian republican forces throughout the revolution, at times driving republican and Dutch forces into informal alliances to combat Darul Islam dominance in the countryside (Elson and Formichi 2011:280).

Following formal independence Darul Islam continued to oppose republican forces in an attempt to carve out an Islamic state in West Java. The rebellion also spread to South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. The army’s initial attempts to combat Darul Islam failed dismally – while the army was able to control major urban centers such as Bandung, much of the countryside was in the control of Darul Islam, who could operate with virtual impunity in the more mountainous areas, especially at night. Darul Islam was especially strong in the Southeast Priangan region, particularly Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Ciamis (Jackson 1980:13).

By the late 1950s two changes facilitated the end of Darul Islam and drastically increased the army’s entrenchment in West Java. First, in response to the growing pressure from Darul Islam and emerging Permesta/PRRI rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the parliament declared martial law in 1957, giving the army sweeping new powers to detain civilians. Second, in 1959
Nasution, along with several RPKAD officers developed a plan known as P4K (Pokok Perencanaan Pemulihan Perdamaian Keamanan – Planning Guidance for Perfecting Peace and Security) for dealing with Darul Islam (Kilcullen 2006:48-9). The goal was to prevent movement of enemy troops and contain them in areas, which could then be systematically cleared zone by zone. Under P4K the Siliwangi Division established local militias controlled by army cadres, the largest of which was the Village Security Organization (OKD), “which provided local guard forces, security patrols and vital asset protection” (Kilcullen 2006:49-50). These strategies drastically increased the power of the Army at the local level and eventually facilitated the capture of Kartosuwiryo in June 1962.

In 1962, the Siliwangi Division began to reorganize itself more completely around the doctrine of territorial warfare. First, the Siliwangi Division introduced sub-district command structures known as Koramil throughout the province. Second, the Siliwangi instituted village deployments known as Bintara Pembina (or Babinsa). The Bintara Pembina attached Army cadre, and at times a small number of soldiers, to village heads, further ensuring a flow of local information from the village, to the Koramil, and up the chain of command to the Kodam itself. The Bintara Pembina were also used to screen Hanra/Hansip units for communist supporters following the defeat of Darul Islam (Sundhaussen 1982:175). Taken together with the OKD, the Bintara Pembina created and maintained a system in which loyal Siliwangi troops were dispersed throughout the West Java village system, creating a network of information and local manpower able to suppress internal challenges to the state. The Siliwangi Division was the first to implement territorial commands of this kind in Indonesia. These commands would spread over Indonesia in the following years, though as discussed in previous chapters, they were often deployed later and had problems of low funds and perceived communist infiltration.

In addition to civil-military integration intended to provide information and wield force directly, the Siliwangi Division was also heavily involved in building public works. During the Darul Islam rebellion, the use of civilians freed up troops to perform public works in the villages of West Java, fostering collaboration between Siliwangi troops and local civilians. Over the course of the counterinsurgency campaign, Siliwangi commander Brigadier General Adjie divided the province into zones “according to the urgency of the need for military action” (Pauker 1963:37). Areas with a heavy Darul Islam presence often had significant damage done to public infrastructure such as roads, schools, and public offices, thus requiring significant repairs. These
areas were classified as “C” zones, and received significant Army assistance to both repair infrastructure and to resettle local residents who had fled violence. Areas in need of some Army assistance, yet could cope primarily using local efforts were labelled “B” zones, while those largely unaffected by violence were labeled “A” zones (Ibid:37-38). The varying intensity of Army presence based on Darul Islam ensured that those former rebel strongholds were now the sites of the strongest Army presence at the local level.

The Siliwangi Division also saw its civic action efforts as a crucial military strategy after Darul Islam had been defeated. Following the defeat of Darul Islam, Adjie feared that the PKI could take advantage of the political vacuum to develop a strong local presence in areas that had previously been Darul Islam strongholds (Pauker 1963:39). By providing public works and other local incentives for the local population, the Siliwangi Division engaged in a strategy of outbidding the social promises made by the PKI at the local level in order to curb the growth of the party in West Java. Because of this, and to ensure that the Army could maintain as many soldiers under arms as possible, civic action programs actually intensified in West Java in 1962 following the defeat of Darul Islam (Ibid: 39-40).

The Darul Islam rebellion and the tactical innovations it necessitated provided the Siliwangi Division unprecedented entrenchment into West Javanese society when compared to the rest of Java. The creation of OKD and Bintara Pembina provided the army with reliable sources of local intelligence that could later be used to monitor the political activities of other organizations in the province – notably organizations such as the PKI. Moreover, their ability to screen local village guards also ensured a reliable source of local manpower with direct ties to the armed forces. In addition, the destruction of Darul Islam in 1962 removed organizations that could compete with the army when it came to the deployment of violence in West Java (Kilcullen 2006:50; Sundhaussen 1982:141). Finally, civic action programs, during and after Darul Islam, further encouraged troop deployments at the local level and the kind of regular contact between civilians and soldiers that is crucial for building local intelligence. Unlike Central and East Java, however, the Siliwangi Division also ensured that screening teams were in place so as to prevent this contact from facilitating communist infiltration of the Army or civilian auxiliary units.

In general, the Siliwangi division itself was also notably anti-communist when compared to the other divisions in Java. Unlike the Diponegoro or Brawijaya Divisions, the Siliwangi Division
was formed around a core of a comparatively better trained and professionalized officer corps who had studied at the Dutch military academy in Bandung prior to the Japanese takeover of Indonesia. Initially commanded by Nasution, the Siliwangi Division had a strong anti-communist reputation: the Siliwangi was responsible for crushing a failed communist uprising in the town of Madiun in 1948, and in the period before and after often engaged in hostilities with communist-affiliated *laskar* around Yogyakarta and Surakarta (see Crouch 1978:25-28; Kahin 1952:184-185; Anderson 1976; Swift 1989:67-73). In part because of this, the Siliwangi Division was comparatively resistant to infiltration by, or having sympathies with, the PKI.\(^\text{109}\) The lack of PKI influence is reflected in the number of sympathizers who “were not anti-communist” identified by Sjam at his trial.\(^\text{110}\) The PKI’s Special Bureau had only made successful regular contact with 80-100 officers in West Java (ranks unknown), compared to 250 in Central Java and 200 in East Java (Crouch 1978:83).\(^\text{111}\) Indeed, the combination of a generally anti-communist junior officer corps, Bintara Pembina, and significant local troop deployments through civic action programs ensured that the Siliwangi Division was the only one seen as able to screen its own village guard (Hansip/Hanra) units to keep them free of potential communist influence (Sundhaussen 1982:192-193).

Once Siliwangi troops became attached to the local civilian administration, they tended to remain there, ensuring a deep military penetration of West Javanese society even after martial law had ended (Feith 1967:333). Subsequent histories of the Siliwangi Division written by its own historians credit the Bintara Pembina in particular for constraining the actions of the PKI at the village level (Sejarah Militer KODAM VI Siliwangi 1968:609-610). By June 1965, Siliwangi commander Brigadier-General Adjie claimed that he could mobilize “three million people, arm

\(^{109}\) At his trial, the head of the PKI’s special bureau, Sjam, claimed that he had made contact with only 80-100 officers in West Java. This is compared to 250 in Central Java and 200 in East Java. Note also that contact says little as to the degree of sympathy to the communist party, only that they were willing to make semi-regular contact (Crouch 1978:83).

\(^{110}\) Recall that Sjam was the chief of the PKI’s special bureau tasked with infiltrating the armed forces. He also served as the civilian leader of the September 30th Movement, responsible for coordinating its military and civilian elements (see Roosa 2006).

\(^{111}\) It is worth emphasizing that these were only officers seem as sympathetic to the PKI’s program, and thus should not be considered to be actual PKI members. I include this only as a relative measure to which the PKI was able to cultivate relationships within the Siliwangi Division.
part of them, organize a military exercise involving one million, and ‘could crush the PKI organization in West Java’ within 72 hours” (Gerlach 2010:54). Combined with the ability of the Siliwangi Division to first purge itself of the radical left following its suppression of Madiun in 1948, and then of pro-Islamic state members during the Darul Islam rebellion, this meant that the Siliwangi Division was by far the most cohesive military division in Java.

31.2 The Security Situation Following the September 30th Movement

Only a very limited number of Siliwangi troops supported the September 30th Movement. According to an Army history of events in West Java, in Cimahi, member of the RPKAD close to Untung destroyed their armory and took to the streets, allegedly chanting “long live Sukarno and long live the Revolutionary Council” from October 1-2. This was followed by members of other units such as the Artillery Armory Center (Pusat Kesenjataan Arteleri - Pussen Art) and the 14th Field Artillery Battalion (Yon Armed) 14, who were currently at the Army School of Command (Sekolah Para Kommando AD -SPKAD). Civilian supporters of the PKI also joined these demonstrations (Djanwar 1985:135-136). These demonstrations ended on October 2 after Siliwangi units took command of the area under martial law and arrested the demonstrators. In response to these initial protests, Siliwangi command issued orders consigning troops to barracks unless acting on orders, and broadcast the official line that the PKI was ultimately responsible for this “coup” attempt.

There was also little support for the September 30th Movement in the civilian administration. At the time of Untung’s broadcast, Governor Haji Bashudi – a Brigadier-General himself - was in Beijing to attend the October 1 celebration in Tiananmen Square. He received news of Untung’s broadcast on October 2, and was able to return to Indonesia on October 4. Consistent with the lack of civilian support for the movement, none of his deputies issued statements in favour of the movement, despite the fact that the deputy-governor was seen as a PKI sympathizer. The only instance in which there are reports of an attempt to establish a revolutionary council was in Kuningan, though this attempt quickly failed (Herlina 2012:68). Following this, Bashudi worked with Adjie and his subordinate Siliwangi troops to quickly arrest PKI leaders in West Java, allegedly for their own protection from anti-communist civilians (Mashudi 1998:207, cited in Herlina 2012:70).
The lack of support by Siliwangi troops meant that West Java did not experience the same kind of security entrenchment disrupting redeployments that occurred in Central Java and East Java. There are no reports of any Siliwangi officers declaring in favour of the September 30th Movement, nor of any attempts to redeploy potentially disloyal troops out of the province. Moreover, most of the Siliwangi troops remained in West Java. The only major deployment on record are the troops from Cirebon, three battalions of whom had been deployed outside the province prior to the September 30th Movement for Konfrontasi (Sudjatmiko 1992:196).

### 31.3 Civilian Responses to the September 30th Movement

Like the Armed Forces, public support for the September 30th Movement in West Java appears to have been muted. With the exception of the aforementioned Cimahi demonstration, there are no military reports of demonstrations in favour of the September 30th Movement by civilians. In both Central and East Java, even the appearance of posters or graffiti supporting the September 30th Movement and/or PKI are listed as provocations triggering a military or civilian response (eg: Staf Pertahanan Keamanan 1966; Djanwar 1985). The lack of any reports of overt support for the PKI strongly suggest that civilians in West Java – including PKI supporters – were extremely hesitant to publicly express any support for the September 30th Movement in the days following Untung’s radio broadcast.

Like both Central Java and East Java, there was a significant portion of the civilian populace that was at least willing to use violence against the communist party. In religiously conservative areas in which Darul Islam was initially strong, some former Darul Islam militia allegedly volunteered their services to assist in the crushing of the PKI and September 30th Movement. In Tasikmalaya and Garut, 300,000 members of fronts known as Brigade Siaga (Standby Brigade) and Komando Aksi Islam (Islamic Action Commandos) “volunteered” their services to crush the PKI in the surrounding areas (Staf Pertahanan Keamanan 1966:115). Their future actions are described as being done in conjunction with local ABRI (army) forces. There are no reports of protests being led by anti-communist civilian groups in the first days following Untung’s radio broadcast, nor are there reports of attacks against communist party members by religious or nationalist groups. Indeed, with the exception of the demonstration in Cimahi, the September 30th Movement did not appear to trigger significant action in West Java with the exception to those initiated and directed by Siliwangi troops. I discuss this further below.
32 Politicide Patterns in West Java

Far less is known about the general dynamics of politicide in West Java than Central and East Java. Compared to other provinces, politicide in West Java was on a far lesser scale, had fewer killings relative to detentions, and involved civilians to a far lesser degree (Crouch 1978:142; Kammen and Zakaria 2012:455, 464). Despite this, there are a few broad patterns of action that can be discerned from existing scholarly and internal military sources. As will be discussed further below, there are two main patterns of politicide in West Java. In areas in which Darul Islam was initially strong, there were very few arrests of communist party supporters, and even fewer reports of public violence or killing. In these instances, arrests seem to be limited only to party leaders and activists unless militia were recruited to act alongside security forces. In contrast, areas in which Darul Islam was weaker – particular the Northeast coast, there were occasional mob attacks on PKI members and proliferations of arrests. The majority of deaths are also likely to have occurred in these regencies. This was especially the case in the area around Cirebon – notably the only area of West Java in which local troops had been deployed out of province prior to politicide.

Arrests of suspected communist leaders began not long after the September 30th Movement collapsed in Jakarta. The most common pattern was for the Siliwangi Division to arrest the leadership core and known cadre in an area. Following this, remaining party members, or members of the PKI’s affiliated mass organizations would assemble in the town square and “voluntarily” dissolve their local organizational branches (Crouch 1978:142). The first recorded instance of this was on October 1 in Singaparna, in which members of the PKI and its affiliated organizations, the peasant association BTI, artist collective Lekra, trade union SOBSI, and youth organization Pemuda Rakyat dissolved their branches and declared the September 30th Movement to be a violation of Pancasila ideology (Staf Pertahanan Keamanan 1966:115). After initially waiting for orders from Adjie, the Korem commander for Cirebon, Colonel Witono, “asked” the local PKI and affiliated organizational branches to dissolve themselves. The leaders were arrested, and from October 13-16 over two hundred thousand leftists allegedly renounced their membership in their respective mass organizations (Sundhaussen 1982:209, 217). This pattern repeated itself on October 15 in Sukabumi, and then with approximately 200 communist supporters in Segalherang on October 17. The PKI branches in Rengasdengklok disbanded on October 18, while approximately 500 communist party supporters disbanded their local
organizations in Cilegon on November 9 (Ibid:115-116). There are no reports of civilian involvement or violence in any of these instances of arrest and dissolution.

In some areas, especially on the Northeast Coast where the PKI was strong, Darul Islam weak, and in which aksi had occurred, the arrest process was characterized by demonstrations and mob violence. In Bandung, a captain from the army-affiliated labour union SOKSI led a demonstration of 6000 civilians denouncing the PKI and September 30th Movement. Much like the rallies of Central and East Java, the Bandung demonstrators attacked buildings and offices believed to be affiliated with the PKI. Here, these included the PKI, BTI, Lekra, and university student organization CGMI offices (Staf Pertahanan Keamanan 1966:115). It is highly unlikely that this violent procession occurred without the blessing of local Siliwangi troops. Bandung is both the site of Siliwangi command and the main military training academy. In addition, the leader of the riot was an army captain who was also a member of an army-affiliated labour union. As such, the Siliwangi Division would easily have had the ability to either physically repress the riot, or to dissuade its leader from taking action.

In instances in which civilians were empowered to assist the armed forces by forming formal or informal militia, the arrest process was also often marked by mob violence. In Subang, for instance, the local Kodim commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Otje Djundjunan only had 23 men available with which to arrest the local leaders of the PKI in a regency in which the PKI was especially strong (Sundhaussen 1982:217). To overcome this lack of manpower, Djundjunan empowered civilians to assist in the dissolution of the PKI. The violence in Subang quickly spiraled, with numerous civilian-led attacks on PKI members. Sundhaussen claims that approximately half of the suspected communists killed in all of West Java occurred during this operation (1982:217). In addition to Subang, civilians were also involved in physical attacks on suspected communists in Cirebon, Garut, and Tasikmalaya (Staf Pertahanan Keamanan 1966:115; Gerlach 2010:56). That Cirebon had civilian involvement in politicide is hardly surprising; it is one of the few regencies that had troops redeployed outside the province for the Malaysia campaign, with three battalions deployed outside the province (Sudjatmiko 1992:196). According to the US Embassy, the army also empowered civilian militia to assist in the arrest of
suspected communists in Tanggerang, and alongside Siliwangi troops, arrested 346 suspected communists.\footnote{\cite{112}}

33 Civil-Military Relations and Targeting in West Java

The presence of many loyal troops, combined with territorial commands that extended down to the village level and a lack of entrenchment disrupting redeployments, provided the Siliwangi Division with the necessary entrenchment to implement politicide unilaterally, without having to rely upon civilians for information and/or manpower.\footnote{\cite{113}} In turn, this limited the ability for civilians to capture politicide in West Java from below, as the intelligence collection capacity of the OKD and Bintara Pembina precluded the need to solicit denunciations. Due to this lack of capture, mass arrests in West Java appear to have been limited to a far greater extent to only PKI leaders and cadres, and the leadership core of the PKI’s affiliated mass organizations. By the time politicide ended in November or December, it was estimated that approximately 10,000 such leaders and activists remained in detention in West Java, with an additional 10,000 having been killed or executed at some point prior to the end of 1965 (Kammen and Zakaria 2012:452). This combined total of 20,000 represents just under two percent of the total number of communist party supporters in the province, based on the 1957 elections – a figure that seems to plausibly represent leaders and cadre from the PKI and its respective mass organizations (see also Table 7.1).\footnote{\cite{114}}

A number of factors, taken together, suggest that it was the high entrenchment of the Siliwangi division that best explains the lower magnitude of repressive violence in West Java. First, in terms of the magnitude of repressive violence, far fewer individuals were imprisoned or killed in West Java relative to the size of the PKI voter base when compared to Central and East Java – both provinces in which intelligence collection was delegated to civilian actors. Moreover,

\footnote{\textsuperscript{112} Telegram 1425 from American Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 5 pol 23-9 Sept 30th Mvt Nov 10-19 1965

\textsuperscript{113} Nina Herlina comes to a similar conclusion in her analysis of the post-coup events in West Java, noting that the ability of the Siliwangi Division to remain unitedly anti-communist prevented the turmoil seen elsewhere in Java, and thus facilitated a less chaotic – and lethal – anti-communist purge (2012:74-75)

\textsuperscript{114} Note also that the PKI gained considerable support at the expense of the PNI in particular, a party that by 1963 had deteriorated to little more than a “self-perpetuating patronage machine” (McVey 1963:167).}
repressive violence relative to the total population size of West Java (0.2%) is less still than Central and East Java, which each had approximately 1.9% of the adult population targeted (see chapters four and five). The Siliwangi Division was able to be far more selective in its use of both detention and execution as a means of removing communists from the social fabric of West Java.

Most scholars of the 1965-66 politicide have identified West Java as a province in which violence was less based on the number of killings in the province, arguing that this is largely a product of the strategy pursued by Siliwangi leader Brigadier General Ibrahim Adjie. Geoffrey Robinson, for example, compares West Java to Aceh, noting that while both were provinces in which the respective military commands had sufficient loyal troops available, Adjie chose a strategy of arrest as opposed to extermination, leading to proportionately far fewer deaths in the province (2018: 150,227). Numerous others make similar claims, emphasizing Adjie’s closeness or reverence for Sukarno, his reluctance to engage in mass slaughter, a reluctance to arm civilians after recently having to defeat an insurgent movement, and the existing territorial system that had helped to hinder PKI gains in the province (Gerlach 2010:25; Kammen and McGregor 2012:18; Kammen and Zakaria 2012:454). As Adjie himself explained to a British military attaché:

Adjie commented that it was not always necessary for blood to show. His tactics has been to put the leaders of the PKI in concentration camps, work on the masses to prove how the leaders had deceived them, and then let the leaders out … Adjie was critical of the different tactics employed in East Java. The kind of internecine war that had gone on had been wrong and left many wounds open.115

However, in understanding politicide in West Java, it is crucial to note that the number of people initially arrested at all is far less than any other province for which data is available (see Kammen and Zakaria 2012). This suggests that it is not simply a reluctance to kill suspected communist party members and leaders, rather, that the Siliwangi Division had better information to initially detain and screen members of the PKI and its affiliated organizations. Indeed, accounts of politicide in West Java are consistent in noting how low-ranking members of the

115 British Embassy Jakarta (Murray) to South East Asia Department, Foreign Office (Cable) February 10, 1966, DH 1015, FO 371/186028, National Archives of the United Kingdom, cited in Robinson 2018:150-151.
party were only briefly detained, screened, and released – rather than placed in prolonged detention awaiting further screening, or killed, as frequently occurred in Central and East Java (eg: Jackson 1978:8; see also Kammen and Zakaria 2012). Moreover, the lower ratio of individuals killed in detention in West Java suggests that the Siliwangi Division was able to better differentiate affiliation with communist party and better place those initially detained into categories A, B, and C (see chapter 2; Kammen and Zakaria 2012).

Second, the regional patterns of arrests and violence often inversely correspond to areas in which Darul Islam was active and in which the Siliwangi Division was forced to engage in earlier prolonged counterinsurgency warfare. These “C” zones had higher levels of security entrenchment than “A” or “B” zones, with a greater troop presence at the local level even after the defeat of Darul Islam as the Army sought to use its civic action programs to stall potential communist advances following the displacement of Darul Islam from village life. That Siliwangi Division intelligence believed that several former Darul Islam strongholds had switched their primary affiliation to the PKI, further suggests that it is entrenchment, not a low level of communist support, that drove lower levels of repressive violence (see Jackson 1980:119). Had levels of repressive violence been tied to the number of potential targets, we would expect many of these former “C” zones to have the highest levels of violence, yet this was not the case.

Underscoring the importance of entrenchment, the areas in which there are reports of mob violence and high numbers of killings – Cirebon, Subang, and Indramayu – were also those in which entrenchment was weakest in West Java. In these areas Darul Islam was generally weak and the communist party relatively strong (see also Crouch 1978:142). Because Darul Islam was weak, the Siliwangi Division did not initially entrench itself as firmly, or devote additional resources, to these areas, being more concerned with waging an anti-Darul Islam counterinsurgency (see also Pauker 1962:37-38). Because of this, in these areas the Siliwangi Division often had less troops available, and consequently was forced to empower some civilians to use violence in politicide. In areas like Subang, this led to an initial wave of anti-communist violence that had a far greater intensity than other areas of West Java. Moreover, in Cirebon the Army was also severely understaffed due to the deployment of three battalions outside the province for Konfrontasi. As redeploying troops disrupts entrenchment, it is not surprising that repressive violence was higher in this area. This lends further support that strong security forces entrenchment generally ensured targeting was limited towards those to which it was intended.
Conversely, only one Darul Islam stronghold had reported mass killing: Garut. There, the military reportedly used 300,000 former Darul Islam militia to assist in anti-communist operations (Staf Pertahanan Keamanan 1966:115). The specific reason for empowering these militia to assist is unclear; however, the delegation of violence to civilians in the only former Darul Islam stronghold to experience mass violence underscores how civilian actors are likely to increase the magnitude of politicidal violence in areas in which they are empowered.

34 Rates of Killing

Because of the high entrenchment of the Siliwangi Division, West Java had far lower rates of killing relative to detentions than Central Java or East Java. In West Java, better access to intelligence meant that there were fewer numbers of detainees that were likely to be subject to torture in order to find their role-identity within the communist party. There was also little incentive in utilizing mass executions to cope with an issue of prison overcrowding, as the absolute number of arrests was comparatively low. Moreover, in most areas the availability of local Siliwangi troops precluded unilateral civilian elites from pressuring security forces to increase killings or attacks by militia, further limiting the number of killings. The only instances in which killings took on a mass scale were those in which civilians were especially active.

West Java had far fewer detainees that had the potential to be placed in long term detention than other provinces. In terms of total numbers of victims of repressive violence – an indicator of the total number of individuals considered worthy of removal from society by security forces – West Java had “only” 20,000 (Kammen and Zakaria 2012:42). This is compared to over 200,000 in both Central Java and East Java. This number is not simply due to West Java’s smaller population. Relative to the total population, less than half of one percent of West Java’s population was targeted for repressive violence, compared to approximately 8-9% of the population in Central Java and East Java (see Table 7.2). Indeed, this is the lowest amount of repressive violence relative to the size of population of all Indonesian provinces during this time for which data is available. As I have demonstrated in the previous two chapters, one of the major incentives for relying on mass executions was to deal with the logistical problems of feeding and housing so many detainees. In most areas of West Java, this problem simply did not exist in a comparatively meaningful way.
Table 7.2 – Politicide Dynamics in Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Java</th>
<th>Central Java</th>
<th>East Java</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Entrenchment</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborator Network</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (aged 15+)</td>
<td>9,952,475</td>
<td>10,894,733</td>
<td>12,853,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of PKI voters in 1957</td>
<td>1,087,269</td>
<td>2,706,893</td>
<td>2,704,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI Vote Share 1957</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number detained</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Killed</td>
<td>&gt;10,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>180,000-200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number repressed (killed + detained)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>205,000-225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population subject to Repressive Violence</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.59-1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population killed</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4-1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool killed</td>
<td>&gt;.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.579-8.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PKI pool subject to Repressive Violence</td>
<td>1.839</td>
<td>7.758</td>
<td>8.504-9.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing:Detention</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>8:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There are very few reports of mass killing in West Java during the 1965-66 politicide. The only areas in which reports of such killings exist are in the aforementioned cases of Cirebon, Garut, Indramayu, and Subang (Sundhaussen 1982:217; Cribb 1990:26; Gerlach 2010:25-26). Tellingly, these are all areas in which civilians were active in assisting the Army in rounding up potential communists: a scenario that leads to huge increases in the total number of individuals arrested. One of the more spectacular sites of killing was in Cirebon, where “according to residents, the anti-Communists set up a guillotine that worked steadily throughout the day, day after day (Hughes 1967:157). As mentioned earlier, Cirebon is also one of the few areas in which there was a lack of local Army personnel, three battalions having been redeployed outside the province for the Malaysia campaign (Sudjatmiko 1992:196).

Civilian elites also had few opportunities to use militia or the threat of violence to increase rates of killing. The only recorded instance in which there is a possibility of this occurring was in Subang, where local Siliwangi forces only had 23 soldiers at their disposal with which to move against the PKI (Sundhaussen 1982:217). There, as discussed above, the anti-communist purge quickly took on a communal character, and public violence and killing spiraled out of control –
leading to a significant amount of the total number of deaths in all of West Java during this period. Elsewhere, it appears that the Siliwangi Division was able to keep civilian militia closely integrated into the chain of command in the rare instances in which they were used.

Outside of the above instances, there is a virtual consensus in both primary and secondary materials that actions against the PKI were limited to the arrest and occasional subsequent killing of top PKI leaders and cadre in the province, while low ranking supporters turned themselves in, denounced the leadership, and after a brief detention were released back into society (eg: Jackson 1978:8; Robinson 2018:150-151). There is good reason to take the lack of mass executions in West Java at face value. West Java contains the capital region of Jakarta, making it the easiest region to access for foreign journalists and intelligence agents. This would make such mass executions more likely to be noticed when compared to Central or East Java. Given the number of reports that came from more remote areas of East Java, the lack of similar stories from West Java is striking. The magnitude of politicide in West Java can be seen in Table 7.3.

116 It is unlikely that this heightened media attention would be a potential explanation for the lower levels of violence in West Java. Bali, for example, had among the highest levels of violence and rates of killing of any area in Indonesia, despite being the most popular tourist destination in the country (Kammen and Zakaria 2012:452).
Table 7.3: Politicide in West Java

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number detained</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Killed</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number targeted for repressive violence</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Total Adult Population (aged 15+)</td>
<td>9,952,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of PKI voters in 1957</td>
<td>1,087,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI vote share</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool in detention</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of PKI pool killed</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop in detention</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop killed</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total adult pop targeted for violence</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PKI pool targeted for repressive violence</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing:Detention Ratio</td>
<td>1:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


35 Politicide in West Java

In West Java, the Siliwangi Division sought to implement a campaign of repressive violence targeting the leadership of the PKI in the province. Compared to all other provinces in which data is available, West Java had by far the least amount of repressive violence relative to the number of communist party supporters, and had lower rates of killing than all other areas on the archipelago save Jakarta (see Appendix 1). There are very few reports of the prolonged arrest or

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117 The 1961 census does not provide an internal breakdown of the aged 15-24 category (see Widjojo 1970). This estimate is derived from the total population of Central Java, minus the percentage of this number that is under 15 (this percentage is for Java as a whole, and thus may not be exact for Central Java specifically).
killing of fringe PKI members. Limiting repressive violence to the leadership of the PKI was a deliberate strategy of commander Brigadier Adjie, who did not wish for “blood to show” and sought to avoid the bloodbath that characterized the killings in provinces such as East Java.\footnote{118 British Embassy Jakarta (Murray) to South East Asia Department, Foreign Office (Cable) February 10, 1966, DH 1015, FO 371/186028, National Archives of the United Kingdom, cited in Robinson 2018:150-151}

Adjie was only able to limit politicide to those towards those it was intended due to the entrenchment of the Siliwangi Division into sociopolitical life throughout West Java. The need to suppress the Darul Islam insurgency led to the creation of OKD, Koramil, and Bintara Pembina in West Java, placing military officers and cadre all the way to the village level. In doing so, the Siliwangi Division was able to collect detailed local intelligence throughout the province, and ensure that local civil defense units were free from PKI infiltration. This process was further facilitated by extensive public works projects that gave additional local civilian contacts to the Bintara, OKD, and other Siliwangi officers. Moreover, the lack of entrenchment-disrupting redeployments ensured that the Siliwangi Division was able to remain entrenched in the months leading up to and following the September 30\textsuperscript{th} Movement. Having these extensive local deployments and contacts ensured that the Siliwangi Division would generally not have to outsource intelligence collection haphazardly to civilian organizations following Untung’s radio broadcast in order to move against the PKI. This foreclosed the opportunity for civilian elites to capture the politicide process from below by providing false or overly expansive intelligence on the identity of suspected communists. The process of screening detainees in Central Java and East Java also suggests the army in these provinces sought to limit politicide; however, the lack of entrenchment compared to the Siliwangi Division in West Java foreclosed their ability to do so on a similar level.

In addition to the ability to collect accurate local intelligence unilaterally, the lack of communist infiltration and troop redeployments meant that local Siliwangi commanders rarely had to outsource the provision of manpower to civilian actors. This in turn precluded the ability for civilian militia to engage in forms of violence outside the security umbrella of the Siliwangi Division. Indeed, the politicide process in West Java is noteworthy to the extent in which civilians were not used as auxiliary units. Part of this, oft cited by scholars of the killings, is that
the Darul Islam rebellion made commanders less willing to re-arm former combatants (eg: Gerlach 2010:25; Robinson 2018:150). However, it is worth noting that there was little material incentive for doing so: the Siliwangi Division was well entrenched at the local level and its troop base was not depleted from either perceived disloyalty or redeployments for the Malaysia campaign.

The information available on regional variation within West Java strongly suggests that the reason politicide was of lesser magnitude in West Java as a whole is the entrenchment rather than potential levels of antagonism held by anticommunist civilian groups. Given that Muslim leaders had previously clashed with the communist party over land, had long labelled the PKI as kafir in the province, and had access to a battle-trained militia dating back to the Darul Islam movement, one would expect that had religious antagonisms or fears of a future communist state been primary drivers of violence, it would actually have been worse in Darul Islam strongholds. However, the Siliwangi Division invested greater resources following the defeat of Darul Islam in areas in which rebels were formerly active – areas deemed “C” zones for civic action programs. These former Darul Islam strongholds, in turn, are widely reported to have had fewer killings compared to those “A” zone: the Northeast coast such as Cirebon, Indramayu and Subang. Moreover, evidence from Subang and Garut both strongly suggest that it was the empowerment of civilians that led to increased violence in both provinces. It is also highly unlikely that the areas with the worst violence had larger numbers of civilians willing to act against the PKI: these areas did not have the same well of former militia fighters as those in which Darul Islam had been active. This underscores the crucial role that entrenchment has in limiting doubly selective violence towards those to which it is intended by the organizers of politicide.\(^\text{119}\)

The ability to largely limit repressive violence towards its intended targets also led to lower rates of killing in West Java. The ability to unilaterally collect intelligence on PKI leaders and activists allowed the Siliwangi Division to prevent the explosive increase in detainee population that occurred in Central Java and East Java. This limited the attractiveness of mass executions as a

\(^{119}\) On a related note, the only attempt to establish a revolutionary council was in Kuningan. Though it failed, it is interesting to note that this would have been an “A” zone in which the Siliwangi Division was less invested with developing local works and fighting a previous insurgency.
means of coping with the expanding detainee population. In addition, civilian elites were generally weak compared to local security forces, ensuring that even if civilian militia did seek to resolve grievances unilaterally through lethal forces, there was no opportunity to do so. These factors combined to reduce the number of killings relative to long-term detentions in West Java.

Major operations in West Java ceased by around the end of November 1965. On November 17, Adjie officially banned the PKI and its affiliated mass organizations in West Java, making him the first commander to do so (Sundhaussen 1982:217). By this point, most of the sub-regional offices had already “voluntarily” dissolved themselves and their leadership had been arrested. There are no reports of additional mass arrests in the province until 1968, when a second anti-communist sweep targeted Indramayu (Kammen and McGregor 2012:21). This was part of a larger operation to round up remaining PKI elements, some of whom had formed a base in Blitar, East Java.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{120} For an account of Operation Trisula, see Hearman 2018
Chapter 8
Conclusion

36 Introduction

In this dissertation I have provided a theoretical explanation for variations in levels of repressive violence and rates of killing during politicide. I argue that levels of repressive violence in politicide are conditioned by both levels of security entrenchment and the strength of collaborator networks. Repressive violence is likely to be higher in areas in which security forces are only weakly entrenched at the local level. In these instances, security forces lack the means to collect sufficient information to implement doubly selective violence unilaterally, incentivizing them to turn to civilian collaborators. In turn, these collaborators use denunciations to eliminate their rivals at the local level, increasing levels of violence. I also argue that this lack of entrenchment leads to increased rates of killing, as the same information problem that existed at the arrest stage persists in the prison, leading to the use of torture and misidentification of detainees. I also introduce what I term the logistical problem: as the absolute number of detainees rises, security forces face an increasing burden to feed and house a growing prison population. In these circumstances, mass executions can become an attractive option to reduce the size of the detainee population. Finally, collaborator networks can also raise rates of killing. This happens when there is a strong collaborator network capable of using violence unilaterally and/or pressuring local commanders to raise rates of killing. However, this only occurs in areas of low security entrenchment – when security entrenchment is high, security forces are capable of repressing this network when it attempts to move outside their control. In building this theoretical argument, I rely upon process tracing in three Indonesian provinces: Central Java, East Java, and West Java, each of which corresponds to a different combination of security entrenchment and collaborator network strength.

In my conclusion, I first consider alternative explanations to the empirical observations on which I build my theoretical framework. Following this, I reflect on the generalizability of my argument, and demonstrate that some of its observable implications can be seen across many episodes of politicide at the national level. In doing so, I argue that my theory is likely to travel
well beyond the case of Indonesia I then overview the contributions of my dissertation both to studies of violence, repression, and mass killing generally, as well as the Indonesian politicide in particular. I conclude by discussing policy implications, and suggesting avenues for further study.

37 Alternative Explanations for Empirical Observations

In accordance with best practices of process tracing (see Bennett and Checkel 2014), in this section I consider alternative explanations to my main empirical findings: that in the case of Indonesia, provinces with low security entrenchment (Central Java, East Java) had higher levels of repressive violence than those that did not (West Java); and that rates of killing were higher still in the province with both low security entrenchment and a strong collaborator network (East Java). From theories of violent conflict more generally, I consider three alternative explanations for my observations: security dilemmas; local political balances; and the discipline of armed actors. I also consider three related explanations based on historical accounts of the Indonesian killings: a mass outbreak of civilian-violence when constraints on doing so were removed, the decisions of provincial commanders, and the number of relevant non-communist political parties at the provincial level. Finally, I consider whether security entrenchment and the strength of the collaborator network are interconnected – especially in the case of West Java.

At face value, a security dilemma appears to capture many of my empirical observations. According to security dilemma-type arguments, in the absence of state authority, groups in mixed territories have an incentive to compete with each other for security, a good seen in mutually exclusive terms (see Posen 1993; Kaufmann 1996). At some point, one group moves against the other to gain a first-mover advantage. In a sense, this explains why violence is likely to be higher in areas of low security entrenchment: in these areas civilian groups are more likely to perceive a need to rely on themselves for security, thus creating a security dilemma situation. However, this explanation does not hold up well to closer scrutiny. First, in most areas killings only started once militias are empowered to act by security forces. In Central Java in particular, violence and killing only began with the arrival of the RPKAD, despite the local Diponegoro being significantly depleted throughout the province. It was only after potential problems of anarchy had been effectively solved that killings began in the majority of locales. Second, the majority of killings only occurred after varying lengths of incarceration (see also Kammen and
Zakaria 2012). This type of mass incarceration requires access to the security organs of the state, something which is simply not possible under conditions of (domestic) anarchy. Third, arrests and killings were usually supervised by security forces. Even if feelings of security may have prompted collaboration against local opponents, such collaboration was clearly not done in conditions of anarchy. Finally, when civilian groups did attempt to attack targets unilaterally, they occasionally did so even when security forces were present, prompting clashes between the Army and militia units. That militia would attempt to act despite having a local security guarantor strongly undermines the security dilemma argument.

Similarly, rates of repressive violence and/or killing in areas of low entrenchment could be a result of local political configurations. Civilian elites could foster collaboration with those security forces or militia present when there is an approximate parity between political actors in order to ensure future political dominance (Balcells 2017). Alternatively, members of the local community could unilaterally attack or form armed groups to rid themselves of political opposition when provided an opportunity to do so (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2010). In the case of the former, it does not explain why violence was the most severe in areas in which civilian militia were especially active. If militia with close ties to elites operated under the logic of foreclosing future challenges, there would be no need to continue to escalate violence once it had secured local power balances in favour of the group utilizing violence (Balcells 2017:32-37). In the case of the latter, it ignores the fact that in most areas, violence was conducted under the leadership of security forces, even if they were not well entrenched at the local level. Indeed, even the areas with the highest level of unilateral militia violence, such as Madura in East Java, violence continued under the leadership of the Army by the end of November 1965 at the latest. While, as I argue, this likely had an influence on the frequency of killing specifically, it cannot adequately explain variations in repressive violence writ large.

Finally, relationships between security entrenchment and force balances on one hand, and rates of repressive violence and killing on the other, could be explained by variations in the security ties or discipline of armed actors. In the case of ties to security forces, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler have shown that militia without ties to security forces make killing a more likely repressive strategy as they lack access to the detention facilities of the state, even if overall levels of repression remain similar (2014:826). To a large extent this finding can help to explain why rates of killing was highest in East Java, given the increased unsanctioned militia activity.
However, this explanation cannot account for variations in repressive violence writ large, nor why rates of killing differed across provinces in which militia generally acted alongside professional security forces – such as West Java and Central Java. In a similar vein, it could be argued that some militia or Army commanders simply lacked the ability or willingness to discipline those under their control, leading to increased rates of killing or repressive violence when such troops were used (see Wood 2003; Weinstein 2007). However, given that most victims were first detained and then moved from prisons to the hands of civilian death squads, killings do not appear to be the product of lack of disciplinary control. Also, discipline says little as to why levels of arrest would be so different across provinces.

37.1 Historical Explanations of the Indonesian Killings

In historical accounts of the Indonesian killings, levels of violence were either thought to be a product of especially strong grievances that were unleashed by the September 30th Movement, the strategic choices of provincial commanders, or focused on the number of major political parties at the provincial level, with higher levels of killings relative to detentions more common in areas with two dominant parties (Kammen and Zakaria 2012). It is possible that repressive violence or rates of killing could be higher in areas of low state entrenchment due to especially strong local tensions that were later unleashed. This is the official version of history put forth for some of the 1965-66 killings by the Indonesian Army – in the chaos following the September 30th Movement, civilian groups across the country seized the opportunity to settle the score with the communist party (see Oei Tjoe Tat 1995:348–366; Roosa 2008, 2016). Some early commentaries also repeated this line of civilians “running amok” in the months following the September 30th Movement. These types of explanations have been most common for explaining violence in East Java, Aceh, and Bali (eg: Hughes 1967 [2002]:162-197). Similarly, based on readings of single case studies or statements from military leaders, it can also be inferred that killings were worse in some areas – notably Aceh, Bali, and East Java – due to high levels of civilian mobilization and initiative (eg: Crouch 1978:143-147; Sulistyo 1997; Rochijat 1985).
The most common evidence cited for this position are claims that in all three provinces the military had to step in and ultimately restrain public enthusiasm for violence.¹²¹

Under this logic, the removal of security restraints freed civilians to lethally act upon long held grievances or hatreds, increasing killings on the ground – one of the indicators of repressive violence and one that would obviously lead to increased rates of killing. However, this explanation fails to account explain why in the majority of cases, victims were first detained before being killed. Moreover, the majority of killings were supervised by security forces, and violence in civilian-led areas continued even after the Army regained control of the local situation. As I argued in chapter six in particular, the ability to pursue violence unilaterally did increase rates of killing, but it says little as to the overall magnitude of repressive violence. Indeed, Central Java and East Java experienced similar levels of repressive violence, despite the latter having four times the rate of killings. Moreover, in Central Java civilians only began to use violence, even unilaterally, after receiving at least some assurance from security forces that they would be able to do so. Grievance may explain the motivations to collaborate or use violence, but fails to account for the varying forms that repressive violence took, or when it began.

Second, some historians have recently argued that provincial commanders had a substantial impact on levels of killing in their respective provinces. Geoffrey Robinson, for example, has argued that commanders such as Ibrahim Adjie in West Java were unwilling to implement mass killings, instead deciding to pursue a policy of mass arrests (2018:150). However, as I show in chapter seven, the decision to use arrests rather than killings does not explain why West Java also had such fewer arrests, relative to the size of the communist party (PKI), than either Central Java or East Java. If this was only a decision on the fate of suspected communist activists and leaders, we would expect West Java to have similar relative victims of repressive violence, only lower rates of killings. That this is not the case strongly suggests that in West Java, the army was able to limit all violence largely to communist leaders and activists. Moreover, the areas in West

¹²¹ It should be noted that this explanation has been entirely debunked for Aceh and Bali. In the case of the former, Jess Melvin demonstrates that the campaign to eliminate the PKI was orchestrated by the Armed Forces, and killings often began only after military incitement. In the case of the latter, killings only began after the arrival of the RPKAD, once again demonstrating the central role played by the Army in orchestrating violence in a broad sense (Roosa 2016; Robinson 2018:151; Melvin 2018).
Java that did experience high levels of violence were those in which the Siliwangi was comparatively less entrenched at the local level. This underscores that entrenchment had a strong conditioning effect on levels of violence.

In terms of political polarization, Kammen and Zakaria have argued higher rates of killing relative to detentions occurred due to higher political polarization after the September 30th Movement that could be exploited by the Army. In areas with more than two major political parties, polarization was tempered by competing non-communist political actors, who were competing both with themselves and the communist party, thus reducing rates of killings relative to detention (Kammen and Zakaria 2012:455-456). In areas with more than two parties, this previous competition hindered cooperation with the army against the communist party. My finding lend some support to this position, in terms of the rates of killing between Central Java and East Java. However, I establish here that it was not polarization, but rather the relative cohesiveness of anticommmunist organizations, that led to differences in rates of killing. In the case of Central Java, the collaborator network was split across numerous organizations, hindering provincial-level coordination, while in East Java, the collaborator network was united, making it much stronger vis-à-vis the Army.

I found that in Central Java, the collaborator network was only loosely coordinated prior to politicide, and typically more at the local than the provincial level. This, in turn, hindered the creation of an effective armed wing apart from very small local organizations such as those discussed in chapter three. However, these small groups still felt compelled to attempt to use lethal violence. Indeed, my interviews with former militia leaders in Central Java and Yogyakarta demonstrate that polarization was sufficient for militia in Central Java to attempt to move unilaterally against suspected communists and other political opponents (see also Winward 2018). Rather than polarization, I show here that it is their relative weakness, in terms of coordination and possession of an armed, vis-à-vis the army that drove variations in rates of killing between Central Java and East Java. In East Java, the collaborator network was centered in a single organization - the Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) - and had access to an extremely well-coordinated militia in the form of Banser that was able to rapidly move against the communist party, even when local commanders preached calm. In contrast, the small militia that had formed in Central Java prior to politicide were not capable of moving outside army control in a similar fashion, and found themselves quickly repressed by the army.
37.2 Security Entrenchment and Collaborator Networks

Finally, it might be argued that security entrenchment and the strength of the collaborator network are inherently intertwined, especially in the case of West Java. It could be argued that because Islamists were seen as potential enemies there, West Java Division leadership was unwilling to provide arms or the opportunity to use violence – thus limiting the strength of the collaborator network (for a similar argument, see Robinson 2018:150). When looking at the province as a whole, this argument is plausible; however, intra-provincial dynamics suggest that this explanation is inherently limited. West Java Division officers were willing to empower former Darul Islam fighters in some areas, notably Subang, Cirebon, Garut, and Tasikmalaya, despite previous conflict with these militia groups. Indeed, in some cases the army reports it empowered as many as 300,000 former Darul Islam combatants (Staf Pertahanan Keamanan 1966:115). Moreover, post-insurgency efforts at entrenchment were done with the aim of combatting the PKI more so than Darul Islam – something that is underscored by the fact that civil action programs actually increased after the insurgency was finished (Pauker 1963:39-40). This underscores that the army was both more concerned with the PKI by 1965, and that it was perfectly willing to bring its former enemies into the fold in situations in which they lacked the internal capacity to move unilaterally. The extent to which security entrenchment and the strength of the collaborator are intertwined here is effectively the same as any other hypothetical case: high security entrenchment typically coincides with a strong security presence at the local level. As collaborator network strength is always relative to that of security forces, it is extremely unlikely that a strong collaborator network can exist alongside high security entrenchment, regardless of the prior relationships between this potential collaborator network and security forces themselves.

38 Generalizeability

Thus far I have developed and tested a theory of politicide dynamics in the case of the 1965-66 Indonesian Killings, with the aim of producing a more general theory of politicide dynamics. Here I consider whether these findings are likely to hold across episodes of politicide at the national level. A full statistical test of this theory are beyond the scope of this dissertation, given the number of variables currently being used as a proxy for security entrenchment, how these vary across cases, and problems of missing data for (especially) arrests, troop deployments, civic
work programs, and the size of the potential victim group. Still, there are some available data points that suggest this theory is likely to hold across national-level cases of politicide more broadly, and at minimum that this theory warrants further testing as a series of future projects. We have, for example, estimates for the sizes of various armed forces on a per year basis, as well as estimates of population sizes and the number of individuals killed in any particular episode of politicide. Using these data points, it is possible to construct a preliminary statistical test of my theory of politicide dynamics.

Recall that one of the indicators of security entrenchment introduced in chapter one is the ratio of soldiers to civilians. Using a combination of armed forces size estimates and total population size, as compiled in the National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremar, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987), it is possible to provide an estimate for the ratio of soldiers to civilians in every country that has experienced politicide on a per year basis. I use this as an indicator of security entrenchment as conceived throughout this dissertation. In the statistical correlations I present below, I invert this relationship to be one of civilians:soldiers. I do this solely for presentation purposes: if low security entrenchment leads to higher levels of violence, it will lead to an ascending trend line should security entrenchment be represented this way.

To determine both cases of politicide and their relative intensity, I rely on the dataset of genocides and politicides compiled by the political instability taskforce (Marshall, Harth, and Gurr 2017). To determine whether a particular episode of mass violence qualifies as doubly selective violence – my definition of politicide – I rely on event descriptions by the political instability taskforce. In doing so, I eliminate cases such as Cambodia, in which the majority of victims were of indiscriminate violence such as starvation. Each event in this dataset has a separate per year entry for each year in which genocide or politicide occurred. I maintain this per year disaggregation below. To assess the number of victims in each instance, I rely upon the median number of deaths within the range estimate provided by the taskforce. In the original dataset, events are categorized by intensity levels ranging from 0.5-5, with each half-point indicating a range of deaths. Given the difficulty in developing per year estimates of fatalities in any conflict on a per year basis, I rely on the median number of total numbers of civilians killed
within each intensity level.\textsuperscript{122} While this is imperfect, it is preferable to relying upon data collected from a wide variety of estimates using different methods, and rarely disaggregated on a yearly basis. I then divide this number of fatalities by the total population of the country for that year. Doing so provides the closest available proxy for relative rates of repressive violence that I use throughout this dissertation.

To avoid problems of security entrenchment when it comes to foreign soldiers, I also omit any cases that are concurrent with international war. I also omit any cases in which large-scale violence at civilians is committed by multiple sides in a civil war (e.g., the civil war in Angola). My reason for doing so is that casualty estimates are not disaggregated by who committed the violence. Also, the size of rebel groups is rarely available, and even when such estimates exist, it makes little sense to aggregate their numbers with those of state security forces to reach some sort of combined “entrenchment” variable. Due to difficulties in assessing the size of rebel groups, I also omit cases of politeicide committed by non-state actors. Finally, I omit two cases: Burundi (1972) and Equatorial New Guinea (1969-79). In the case of the former, this is purely an issue of data presentation. Violence in Burundi in 1972, during what is frequently labelled the Burundian Genocide, was more than triple the intensity of the next most intense politeicide on a per capita basis. Because of this, its inclusion triples the length of the Y-axis, making for a less clear presentation. Omitting this case has no major impact on the trend line (see Appendix 2). In the case of Equatorial New Guinea, this case was omitted due to the extent to which it drives data trends. Equatorial New Guinea has by far the smallest population of any case included in this dataset, and low-level violence persists for a decade. Even though absolute levels of violence in Equatorial New Guinea are extremely low, the tiny population size means virtually all of these incidents are of high intensity relative to the size of the population. The same is true of the ratio of soldiers to civilians – even though the number of soldiers never surpasses five thousand (see Singer 1987). Because of this clustering of high intensity and high entrenchment, Equatorial New Guinea alone is capable of shifting the trend line in the opposite direction (see Appendix 3). While this effect would likely be mitigated with more accurate data across cases on the levels of

\textsuperscript{122} The median deaths per intensity level are as follows: 0.5=650 deaths; 1.0=1,500 deaths; 1.5=3,000 deaths; 2.0=6,000 deaths; 2.5=12,000 deaths; 3=24,000 deaths; 3.5=48,000 deaths; 4=96,000 deaths; 4.5=192,000 deaths, 5= 256,000 deaths (Marshall, Harff, and Gurr 2017)
fatalities (note footnote below and the extreme variation within categories), this data is currently unavailable. Given the extent to which this case is an extreme outlier, I omit it from my main statistical analysis. Together, this dataset that I have compiled on entrenchment and politicide has 93 data points, spread across 20 politicides. A full list of these data points can be found in Appendix 4. The correlation between security entrenchment and politicide intensity can be seen in Figure 8.1, below:

![Figure 8.1: Security Entrenchment and Magnitude of Violence](image)

From this analysis, we can see that there is a positive trend between low security entrenchment and high levels of violence. This analysis is obviously far from conclusive – it lacks control variables, information on arrests, and numerous indicators of security entrenchment. The data itself also likely has a large margin of error (see also Roth, Guberek, and Hoover Green 2011). Still, this correlation does suggest that there is a relationship between security entrenchment and levels of violence that could hold across a large number of cases at the national level, as well as the subnational comparison of Indonesia that was the focus of this dissertation. At minimum, this data suggests that the relationship between entrenchment and violence is worthy of further study.
39 General Significance:

In this dissertation I make a number of contributions to our understanding of what I term repressive violence, politicide, and mass killing more generally. First, I demonstrate that studies of mass killing, be they termed mass killing, democide, genocide, or many of the other existing categories, would benefit from disaggregating cases based on the selectivity of violence and/or killing. Beyond the most commonly cited cases of the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust, and Rwanda, the majority of events normally aggregated together as genocide and politicide represent cases of what I term doubly selective killings, in which victims are chosen not just on group-traits, but also based on their role-identity within the group (eg: Harff 2003; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017). Rather than develop theories based around the types of mass violence directed against civilians that occurs the least – outright genocide – more scholarly attention needs to be paid to the more common forms of such violence – eliminating more active members of an identity group, often with the aim of repressing the group in its entirety. Indeed, even when these forms of mass killing are the focus of study, there is a tendency to prove that they are episodes comparable to the Holocaust or Armenia, and thus worthy of inclusion as amongst the worst crimes against humanity, without taking into account how the violence was significantly different (Shaw 2014:19-21).

Disaggregating episodes of mass killing based on selectivity offers a better framework for understanding processes through which violence is likely to flow from state policy to killing at the subnational level. In short, the more selective the violence, the more information is required by security forces to limit violence towards its intended victims. This ability to access information, as I have demonstrated in this dissertation, is contingent on the degree to which security forces have entrenched themselves at the local level. Instances of indiscriminate mass killing, such as those caused by sustained periods of indiscriminate bombing or famine, require very little in terms of information. Indeed, security forces are perfectly capable of implementing large-scale indiscriminate killing outside the borders of their own territory, providing they have the technical means of carrying out high casualty attacks on civilians – such as occurred in Hiroshima and Nagaski. On the other end of the spectrum, what I term politicide, especially when limited only to its intended targets, requires significantly more information on the identity of potential victims, and security forces must screen those they intend to target from a larger population. Understanding the processes through which security forces identify potential victims
within a larger population is crucial to understanding how politicide is implemented on the ground, as well as the scale of repressive violence more generally.

Second, I provide an explanation for why or under what conditions mass repressive violence is more likely to be lethal. Rather than mass killing necessarily being the product of deliberate elite strategy (eg: Valentino 2005), it may instead be contingent on the inability of security forces to employ other forms of violence on a mass scale. Rather than mass killings flowing directly from a centralized policy, this study suggests that reaching the high threshold of killings required for inclusion as an incidence of mass killing may instead be a product of state weakness – a lack of security entrenchment. States with a weak security apparatus that cannot properly entrench itself at the local level cannot unilaterally collect sufficient private information with which to use violence – including killing – as selectively as it otherwise could. This finding is diametrically opposed to earlier studies of regime type that emphasized how genocide is largely a product of totalitarian regimes (eg: Arendt 1958; Kuper 1981; Rummel 1994; Mamdani 2001). Instead, this finding provides a compelling explanation as to why the majority of what the Political Instability Taskforce compilation of genocides and politicides occur during periods of acute political crisis such as civil or international wars, or military coups. These shocks disrupt existing security force entrenchment at the local level through troop redeployments and potential purges, precluding the use of more selective forms of violence (see also Eck 2015). This, in turn, leads to increased rates of killing as the remaining security forces lack the resources to utilize mass incarceration as a strategy (see Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017; see also Harff 2003, Shaw 2003; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Eck 2015). Restraint, in this case, may be less a product of elite strategy or local constraints, and instead simply a byproduct of the ability of security forces to run a more selective campaign of mass repression.

By situating mass killing within a larger campaign of mass incarceration I also help to build bridges between studies of genocide and mass killing, repression, civil war, and political violence: all subfields that are currently studied in isolation from one another (see also Verdeja 2012; Finkel and Straus 2012; Owens, Su, and Snow 2013). Specifically, this dissertation suggests that the extent to which security forces target civilians for repressive violence during civil war, peacetime repression, and politicide are governed by similar mechanisms. When security forces have access to large amounts of private information, they can utilize this to limit violence only to those for who it is initially intended. In situations when this does not occur, be it
through contestation over territory during civil war (Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2017), security force fragmentation (Greitens 2016), or military purges (Eck 2015), security forces are less able to deploy violence selectively and must often rely upon extra-organizational actors to fill gaps in their operational capability to collect private information or deploy sufficient local manpower. This reliance upon civilian actors leads to additional violence as civilians, civilian elites, and militia utilize denunciations as a means of eliminating local rivals. Situating mass killings within a context of repressive violence suggests that we gain little analytic utility from studying repressive violence in different security contexts separately. Regardless of the form violence orchestrated by security forces, increasing selectiveness in its application is only possible to the extent to which security forces are capable of collecting ever-increasing amounts of private information. This is true whether security forces opt to use violence in or outside of a larger civil or international war. Moreover, this escalation through lack of information can be the case even when mass killings are a deliberate strategy chosen by security forces, provided this killing is intended to be selective – which it most frequently is.123

Third, I introduce a key explanatory factor in the treatment of political prisoners during periods of mass repression: what I term the logistical problem. To date, political scientists have neglected the inherent costs of feeding and housing large prison populations, especially in conditions of conflict in which resources for security forces often have other priorities. I have shown here that this cost can invite a gruesome logic, in which states or their security forces resort to mass executions as a means of alleviating the cost of caring for prisoners. This logistical problem is also likely to extend to other forms of conflict, as security forces, rebels, and militaries must frequently make these types of decisions in the context of civil wars, counterinsurgency operations, and international wars more generally.

Fourth, this project expands explanations on variations in violence when sovereignty is not contested. In doing so, I also expand on how we perceive the information at the local level through what I term security entrenchment. Existing studies on the information problem inherent

123 Indeed, within the context of genocide studies, there have only been three cases in the past approximately 100 years that are selective on the level of the group as a whole: The Armenian Genocide, Holocaust, and Rwandan Genocide (see Midlarsky 2005).
in targeted violence typically do so in the context of a two-sided, conventional civil war in which sovereignty can be contested by both states and insurgents (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Balcells 2017). I show here that this same information problem exists even when security forces do not face contestation at the local level. Even when they lack an armed challenger, security forces must still identify potential victims from within a wider community. Obtaining the information to do so requires not territorial control in a brute sense, but rather reliable intelligence networks and the ability to unilaterally screen the civilian population. This study also suggests a potential reason by which weak states come to imprison or target so many perceived opponents in peacetime. Denunciations, should they be solicited by security forces, may actually be higher outside of civil wars: in these cases, there is no potential opposition with which to counter-denounce one's opponents.

Fifth, this dissertation helps to fill the gap between the decision to use repressive violence on a massive scale and the means through which it is implemented on the ground. As was discussed in Chapter One, studies of mass killing in particular have a tendency to show either the conditions under which the decision to implement mass killings is more likely, why and under what conditions individuals participate, or how killings are orchestrated at the local level. Rarely, however, have studies showed how these levels of analysis operate together to produce variations in the degree of local violence (for an exception, see Su 2011). Here, I suggest that the ability for grievances or fears held by the civilian population to condition the extent of repressive violence is contingent upon security force entrenchment. In areas in which security forces are capable of identifying and initially arresting their intended targets, there is very little ability for these types of factors to influence the scale of violence. In contrast, in areas of weak security force entrenchment, civilian motivations, recruitment, and participation are all crucial factors for explaining the degree of violence at the local level.

This finding is especially important for clarifying the relative roles of factors such as rivalries, grievance, hatreds, and ideological commitments for understanding mass killing and/or repressive violence, at least in terms of how they play out at the local level. Should security forces delegate intelligence collection or the use of violence to civilians, the aforementioned factors are all likely to motivate increasing rates of denunciation and violence against the sources of grievance – be it competition over land, fear of future power balances, or some other factors. However, should security forces have the ability to implement repressive violence unilaterally,
these attitudes are likely to be of little relevance to the magnitude of repressive violence at the local level. Well-equipped and well-entrenched security forces are likely able to implement huge amounts of doubly selective violence, should they wish, at the local level regardless of any incentives that civilians may have to escalate violence against perceived local opponents – no matter the extent of said grievances.

In examining variations in repressive violence and killing, I also introduce a useful measure with which to compare repressive violence within or across states: relative rates of repressive violence and rates of killing. For selective violence, the intended targets are usually members of some identifiable group, be it a rebel group, protestors, activists, an ethnic identity group, or some other category. Because of this, the potential victim group is often much smaller than the population writ large. As such, when comparing the scale of repressive violence or killing, it makes little sense to examine absolute numbers, even in territories with relatively similar populations. When such data is available, it provides a useful indicator as to the intensity of repressive violence directed at a population group. Failure to control for victim population size, as is common in datasets used in large-N analysis of genocide and politicide, tends to mean that the most severe cases of mass killing are simply those that have the largest population and/or victim groups to begin with, regardless if there was an attempt to physically exterminate these groups in their entirety (eg: Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017; Harff 2003).124 Relative measures of repressive violence and killing enable better comparisons of violence directed at smaller population groups that may be targeted for particularly intense violence.

Finally, the theory I present here provides an explanation for varying magnitudes of repressive violence and rates of killing that should hold across varying levels of analysis. In this dissertation I test my theory via process tracing in three Indonesian Provinces during the 1965-66 politicide. However, as I demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, this model can help to explain variations at the sub-provincial level as well. In West Java, for instance, repressive violence appears to have been higher in areas in which security forces were not as entrenched due to a lack of previous

124 Controlling for population in the Political Instability Taskforce database, for instance, would shift Indonesia in 1965-66 from being an instance of the highest magnitude of violence (5.0 on a 5 point scale) to a relative rate of killing similar to that of the Argentine Dirty War (rated at 1.5).
counterinsurgency operations in these areas. In contrast, the highest levels of violence were those in which security force entrenchment was low due to both troop redeployments and a lack of previous counterinsurgency efforts. Based on accounts of the Indonesian killings, these intra-provincial variations also appear to hold for rates of killings, insofar as strong collaborator networks are capable of raising rates of killing further still than weak security entrenchment alone. In East Java, for example, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was the most important organization in the collaborator network across the province. The highest levels of population loss in that province were not regencies which had the highest levels of communist support, but rather those in which NU was especially strong (Chandra 2017:1069-1072). As I will demonstrate further below, there is no reason to suspect this theory could not be scaled up to explain differences rates of repressive violence and killing across states, providing there is sufficient data on the size of the victim group, the number of individuals targeted for repressive violence and killing, and some proximate measures of security entrenchment (for the latter, see also Greitens 2016:23-41).

40 Significance for Understanding the Indonesian Politicide

In this dissertation I also make two important contributions to understanding the 1965-66 Indonesian Politicide. First, I provide the first in-depth explanation of regional differences in repressive violence and killing across different provinces during this period. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, the entrenchment of security forces at the local level and the relative strength of the collaborator network is crucial for explaining variations in repressive violence and rates of killing during episodes of doubly selective violence. Arrests and Killings during the anti-communist campaign at times occurred on the scale that they did due to the relative weakness of the Indonesian Army. In both Central Java and East Java, the two provinces with the largest absolute levels of repressive violence and killing, the relative weakness of the Army forced them to rely upon civilian actors for intelligence and manpower. This in turn increased the number of individuals swept up in the politicide campaign. This outsourcing of intelligence to civilian actors largely explains why so many individuals with few or no ties to the communist party became targets of violence in these provinces. While the Army was ultimately in control of the arrests and killings in a direct physical sense, its reliance on civilian actors for information precluded the ability to limit violence towards those to which it was initially intended. Once civilians were empowered to identify communist party supporters, the sudden spike of detainees
this created incentivized security forces to rely on mass executions to alleviate the burden of feeding and housing such huge numbers of political prisoners.

Second, and in making the above argument, I help to clarify the relative role of the Army and civilian actors in perpetrating the violence during the 1965-66 politicide. There is now a virtual consensus that the Indonesian Army is ultimately responsible for Indonesian Killings. My findings do not challenge this interpretation. However, following Mathias Hammer (2013), I find that while the Army is responsible for unleashing killings, they were not always able to fully control said violence. Civilian groups, especially the religious and nationalist groups that came to be organized under the civilian action front (KAP) umbrella, were not only willing participants in politicide, they also had a key role in magnifying the violence. Rather than operating solely at the behest of the Army, as recent studies of the killings have often implied, these civilian groups at times moved ahead, expanding lists of PKI members to those with no or only peripheral ties to the party, and occasionally using the opportunity provided by the central anti-communist campaign to use lethal violence unilaterally against their own political opponents. Rather than exonerating the Indonesian Army in one of the largest atrocities of the 20th Century, my findings suggest that the leadership and membership of some of Indonesia’s largest mass organizations played a crucial role in the massacre of their fellow countrymen.

41 Policy Implications

This project has two main policy implications for policy makers seeking to prevent or stop mass violence. First, this project highlights the role that civilian elites frequently play in enabling or escalating violence at the local level. This insight is essential for ending events such as politicide once they begin. While it may be possible to incentivize or pressure state security forces to halt violence, these efforts are unlikely to fully stop violence unless there are efforts to forcibly restrain civilian militia once they have been empowered. This could either be through the state security forces who initially empowered them to then restrain them, or for the international community to exert pressure on these civilian actors in addition to state ones. Absent some sort of re-imposed constraints, it is plausible that civilian elites and the militia over which they exert influence will continue to use violence at the local level with impunity.

Second, the ability to somewhat predict which instances of doubly-selective violence are likely to be more severe can guide where to deploy scarce resources intended for conflict prevention or
intervention. Here, there is an encouraging confluence of opportunity and impact: the states likely to have the greatest relative rates of repression and killing are the same ones that are likely to be less equipped to resist third-party intervention – especially by the more powerful states of the international system. This means that some of the greatest possibilities to save lives are also those that require the fewest resources by the international community. This is an encouraging argument in favour of the responsibility to protect (R2P), and how even with minimal resource commitments such an initiative is likely to have a major impact in lowering the effects of lethal repression around the world.

42 Future Research

This project has several implications that are worthy of further research. A key finding in this project is that variations in repressive violence are heavily conditioned by the ability to deploy violence selectively. More research needs to be done to understand the conditions under which state leaders or security forces are likely to opt for broader or more specific targeting criteria. Why do some states opt for more targeted forms of mass killing, such as the doubly selective violence that I label politicide, rather than genocides such as those of Rwanda or Armenia? Is this initial decision connected to the ability to implement violence selectively at all? And if so, under what conditions? While there has been work done to understand when deciding on mass killings in general is a likely strategy (eg: Valentino 2005), much more work needs to be done to understand the selection process through which killings are conducted. Doing so will not only help to explain the decision to implement the more common forms of mass killing - indiscriminate mass killings and politicides - but will also help to explain and differentiate the decision-making process between these and outright genocide.

A second major finding is that the extent of repressive violence, even absent contested local control or broader civil war, is often heavily conditioned by the collaboration of local civilian actors. In Central Java, for example, even though the arrest process, interrogations, and subsequent killings were initiated and supervised by the Army, civilian actors ensured that the overall level of violence was far higher than could otherwise have been the case. In this dissertation, collaboration with security forces by Indonesia’s other major sociopolitical organizations appears to have been largely ubiquitous across the three case studies, at least once security forces determined to implement politicide were present at the local level. Future
research would be well served to consider more the conditions under which individuals, civilian communities, and organizations are more likely to resist opportunities to collaborate with security forces intent on committing campaigns of mass violence. Better identifying these factors would both further our understanding of repression dynamics and potentially assist interventions seeking to stop or limit violence once it has been unleashed.

This dissertation also suggests that comparative studies of mass killing or repression ought to disaggregate “the state” or “security forces”. To date, many studies of mass killing or repression view these phenomena as being primarily driven from the top-down (eg: Valentino 2005; Midlarsky 2005). As I demonstrate here, even if this is the case, the ability of different states to implement such top-down policies, or the same state doing so evenly across the territory it controls, can vary enormously. To better understand these dynamics, it is necessary to take a more nuanced view of the security forces ultimately responsible for unleashing violence. Following Greitens (2016) work on varying levels of repression in authoritarian settings, future research should further explore how the differing capacity of the state to repress, through factors such as security force fragmentation or exclusivity, leads to differing patterns of violence on the ground. This type of work cannot only be done within states, as I have done here, but also across them. Moreover, there is no reason that studies of repression, focusing on these problems of private information, could not also fruitfully compare authoritarian states with democracies.

Another potentially fruitful avenue of future research would be to consider the impact of security force fragmentation on the onset and/or severity of mass killing.

43 Concluding Remarks:

Over the course of this dissertation I have developed a theory with which to explain magnitudes of repressive violence and rates of killing during politicide. The findings presented here suggest that we cannot conceive of atrocities such as what I label politicide as being the sole work of states or their security forces. While state leaders and their security forces often bear the most responsibility in terms of deciding to pursue strategies of mass repression or killing, they rarely have the capability to do so themselves with at least some compliance by the local populace. Especially when security forces are not well-entrenched at the local level, the actions of local civilians are a crucial intervening factor enabling the use of mass, doubly selective violence. Policies aimed at reducing the likelihood of mass atrocity, or stopping them once they have
begun, would do well to consider the crucial role of civilian actors: seeing them as a source of conflict or resilience, rather than a passive body that is acted on by the state. For states that have experienced mass killings, these findings suggest that reconciliation efforts must go far beyond holding past leaders or soldiers accountable for violence. In many cases, civilians are also responsible for increasing levels of violence, and any reckoning of the past needs to confront the actions of ordinary people for facilitating politicide. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, this is a difficult and controversial task. Still, understanding how violence unfolded is crucial to not only move past it, but also to ensure that it does not happen again. Ordinary civilians occasionally have the literal power of life or death in campaigns of mass killing orchestrated by the state. Understanding how these choices were made, and how they could have been and be different in the future is a moral imperative for any post-conflict society.

Speaking of the Indonesian killings in particular, it is worth re-emphasizing that these killings were the direct result of a campaign orchestrated by the Indonesian Army under the command of Major General Suharto. Even though civilians were a crucial factor in determining the relative levels of repressive violence in different provinces, they would have been able to do so to a meaningful extent without the direct incitement, encouragement, and assistance of the Army. In this sense, I do not challenge the emerging consensus that the Army leadership centered on Suharto bears the responsibility for the killings writ large. However, I do argue that civilian elites, especially in Indonesia’s major sociopolitical organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, HMI, the Catholic Party, the PNI, and their other affiliated organizations are also responsible for the scale of violence that was unleashed across Indonesia in 1965-66.

Attempts to discuss the killings, persecute its perpetrators, or find closure for survivors and the relatives of those killed remains elusive. Despite a non-binding International People’s Tribunal in the Netherlands finding the Indonesian Army under Suharto to be guilty of crimes against humanity, there have been no serious attempts by the Indonesian state to reckon with this part of its past, despite pledges to do so by in 2014 by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo prior to his election (see Santoso and van Klinken 2017). Reports by Indonesia’s main human rights body, Komnas HAM, have been internally silenced, effectively remaining in limbo and unlikely to ever be published. Despite the first forum sponsored by the government to discuss the killings in April 2016, the Army, police, and hard-liner anti-communist civilian groups continue to disrupt, ban, and disperse events talking about the 1965-66 killings, such as viewings of two documentaries.
by Joshua Oppenheimer: *The Act of Killing* and *The Look of Silence*. Moreover, in June 2016, a group of retired generals and Islamic hard-liners organized a counter-symposium denouncing IPT, the April symposium, and warning people of a potential communist revival. That same July, Jokowi appointed General Wiranto to oversee the recommendations of the national symposium from April. Given Wiranto’s was indicted as a war criminal by the United Nations Serious Crime Unit in Dili for his actions during the East Timor occupation, it is unlikely that any progress will be made for the victims of 1965 under his leadership (see also Santoso and van Klinken 2017).

Still, some Indonesians have been able to find some degree of closure, even in the face of great personal risk. Sri Muhayati, whose story opened this dissertation, was eventually able to discover the fate of her father, over four decades after his initial arrest and disappearance. Working alongside other survivors of the anti-communist purge in 2000, Sri helped to exhume a mass grave in Wonosobo, Central Java. There, she found what she believes to be the remains of her father. Still, even this small bit of closure was bittersweet: attempts to rebury, with funeral rites, those who were found at Wonosobo were violently dispersed by Islamic hard-liners (see McGregor 2010). Most other survivors have not even had this small modicum of success, and many winder over the fate of relatives, friends, and loved ones from this time. It is my hope that this dissertation has helped, in some small way, to shed further light on the events of 1965-66, the relative complicity of varying sections of Indonesian society, and how this violence can help us understand patterns of repression and violence in a wider context.
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Appendices

44 Appendix 1: Magnitudes of Violence in Indonesia across all Provinces (for which data is available)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aceh</th>
<th>North Sumatra</th>
<th>Jakarta</th>
<th>West Java</th>
<th>Central Java</th>
<th>East Java</th>
<th>Bali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of PKI voters</td>
<td>7,887</td>
<td>250,988</td>
<td>137,305</td>
<td>1,087,269</td>
<td>2,706,893</td>
<td>2,704,523</td>
<td>59,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI Vote Share &lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in Detention</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>11,000-15,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>400 &lt;sup&gt;126&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Killed</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>&gt;10,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>180,000-200,000</td>
<td>36,000-45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Repressive</td>
<td>6,120</td>
<td>26,000-30,000</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>205,000-225,000</td>
<td>36,400-45,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PKI Detained</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.4%-6%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.924</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% PKI Killed</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>&gt;0.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.579-8.319</td>
<td>60.9%-76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Repressive Violence</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>10.4%-12%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1.839</td>
<td>7.758</td>
<td>8.504-9.244</td>
<td>61.6%-76.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing:Detention</td>
<td>50:1</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>1:17</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>8:1</td>
<td>100:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Feith 1957; Lev 1970; Alfian 1971; Kammen and Zakaria 2012

<sup>125</sup> North Sumatra, Aceh, and Bali were not part of the 1957 regional elections. As such, I use the data from the 1955 national elections.

<sup>126</sup> As of 1968
Appendix 2: Security Entrenchment and Politicidal Killings with Burundi (1972)
Appendix 3: Security Entrenchment and Politicidal Killings with Equatorial New Guinea
### Appendix 4: List of Cases in Figure 8.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years (note: each year is an individual data point)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1976-1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1973-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1959; 1966-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1976-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1978-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1965-1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1981-1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1971-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>1964; 1977-1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>