Negotiating Citizenship: Mediatized Migration and the Canadian Data Border

by

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Abstract

This thesis reflects upon the anomalous rise of irregular migration into Canada near the town of Lacolle, Quebec and the response of the Canadian government in the context of prevalent networked communications. Conceiving of politics as performance, the research engages in a systematic content analysis of Canadian Press and Agence France Press coverage of arrivals through Lacolle to identify an official ‘institutional narrative’. Subsequently, I test this institutional narrative, which privileges the voices of Canadian political elites, establishing my own ‘narrative of encounter’ through analysis of a variety of legislation, policy, and internal documents obtained both publicly and through Canada’s Access to Information System. This produced novel insights regarding how the massive proliferation of networked communication has shaped possibilities for citizenship and authority at the Canadian border in many paradoxical and ironic ways.

Keywords: citizenship; irregular migration; media institutions; anticipatory governance; humanitarian securitization
Acknowledgments

This project represents part of my life that has now come to a close. Here I reflect upon the incredible confluence of people that have shaped me and this research.

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1.1 Introduction

Since January of 2017, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has intercepted over 38,000 migrants walking across Canada’s border with the United States (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017b, 2018; Scheel, 2018). The majority of these irregular crossings occurred along Roxham Road near the small town of Hemmingford, Quebec, just kilometers away from the busy official crossing with the state of New York at Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle, Quebec (Levitz, 2018). As these people walk across the border, they are arrested by waiting RCMP officers and brought to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to be ‘processed’ in Lacolle, which involves security interviews and background checks to determine eligibility to begin the asylum claims process.

Figure 1: Map of the Border Near Lacolle. From “Canadian army builds tented city to house Haitian arrivals” by Pavia, W., 2017, The Times.
In early 2017, irregular migration—crossing the border outside of official ports of entry—became a point of increased focus in the Canadian mass media and amongst elected officials (Banerjee, 2017a, 2017b; Braibant, 2017a, 2017b). Movements of people—a practice as old as recorded history—are typically accompanied by political and social uncertainties, which have been managed by the powerful in many different ways. Similar to European counterparts, the Canadian government has relied on discourses of humanitarian securitization to justify its practices of migration management in Lacolle. The concept of humanitarian securitization is useful in describing state policies that attempt to maintain “the balance of humanitarian needs with concerns over sovereignty” (European Council on Foreign Relations in Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017, p. 535). Herein, the term refers to both the performative ambivalence emergent of attempts to balance the mitigation of suffering with the preservation of control and the ways in which humanitarian discourses serve as a conduit for the securitization of the other (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017; Watson, 2011). Discourses of humanitarian securitization elicit the competing imperatives to uphold moral and international legal obligations to asylees while preserving sovereignty and the appearance of control at the border. The arrivals have presented many challenges to the methods Canadian governments have traditionally used to limit and compel the agency of migratory populations. To meet these challenges, the government has deployed novel tactics of governance in a series of entangled infrastructural, policy, and narrative interventions (Duncan & Caidi, 2018).

The situation in Lacolle resonates with a much broader and growing political divide in many regions of the world. Migration is a central motif in a shifting and increasingly polarized global political landscape (Sheller, 2018). The topic is of particular concern to increasingly powerful—and ironically transnational—nationalist movements (Davis & Deole, 2017; De Matas, 2017). The prevailing conflict narrative in popular media is one of nationalists versus globalists (Buruma, 2018; Hounshell, 2017). Political figures like Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Steve Bannon of the United States, and, in a Canadian context, Ontario’s Doug Ford and Quebec’s François Legault represent the resurgence of mainstream nationalist politics. Far from its origins as a term to describe those who embrace international cooperation, the term ‘globalist’ is now frequently used by proponents of nationalism as an anti-Semitic slur and an umbrella term for the political left (“How Did the Term ‘Globalist’ Become an anti-Semitic Slur?,” 2018; Rosenboim, 2017;
While in one sense, completely insufficient as a balanced portrayal of the political landscape, the dialectic is useful in that it also captures the ambivalence of humanitarian securitization as enacted by governments operating within the dominant internationalist liberal paradigm. The implication of the duality in popular discourse is that debates about migration are basically over the nature of citizenship. With this in mind, I ask: Are a citizen’s rights and responsibilities intractably tied to national identity and the state form? If not, from whom or what do we claim our rights as citizens? To whom do we have responsibilities?

Politics is always evolving. Scholarship has discussed at great length the arguments for and against as well as the causes and effects of globalization, which describes intensifying global flows of people, capital, and information (Ahmed, 2000; Appadurai, 2001; Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1998; Käkönen & Chaturvedi, 2005; Sassen, 1998). Less established in public discourse is the metaprocess of mediatization, which, according to Hjarvard, describes how evolving media technologies and patterns of media production and consumption constitute and are constituted by changes in social, political, and cultural institutions (Hjarvard, 2008). Couldry and Hepp argue that we have entered an age of “deep mediatization,” characterized by the “datafication” and algorithmic mediation of content consumption, which affords automated and highly effective targeting of increasingly segmented audiences (2018, p. 116). The concept of mediatization has been applied by scholars in various contexts to explore how techno-communicative affordances impact and interact with institutional social and political processes (Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017; Esser & Strömbäck, 2014; Hajer, 2009). In this sense, globalization and mediatization are two sides of the same coin; the globalization of mediation is concurrent with the mediatization of the globe.

Together, the competing trends of intensifying transnational migration and nativism (the notion that the interests of those born in a particular nation should hold privileged access to rights within that nation) share the broader reality that humans are more connected and mobile than any time in recorded history. The social media practices of migrants have been identified as a primary causal factor explaining the increase in irregular arrivals through Lacolle (Besset, 2017c; Lowrie, 2017a). Simultaneously, networked media are a key tool in the communicative strategies of globally networked nationalist-populist movements, which call for more tightly controlled migration in their public-facing policy positions (Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Trump,
2018). The so-called ‘alt-right,’ a community that takes shape through online forums like the messaging board 4chan has even taken credit for “meme-ing Trump into the White House” (although, the credibility of such a claim is dubious) (Marwick & Lewis, 2017, p. 2). With these trends in mind, the lens of global mediatization guides my inquiry into how authority and citizenship have been performed in relation to heightened irregular migration into Canada. These performances have taken place on social networks, in the mass media, and in encounters between asylees and Canadian enforcement officers.

In recounting the story of Lacolle, I work to uncover how the massive proliferation of networked technology has been accompanied by novel articulations and performances of authority and citizenship. This thesis explores how information and communications technologies (ICTs), specifically, networked communications technologies (NCTs) impact government-citizen interactions. I am particularly interested in understanding interactions between asylum seekers and Canadian border enforcement agents as encounters between migrants as political agents and Canadian law enforcement personnel as operators of state power. I draw upon Ahmed to understand encounters as “face-to face meetings” which involve some element of conflict or surprise (2000, p. 7). I set my focus upon the events which unfold between the interception of an asylee (an individual who has or is seeking asylum) at the border and a determination of admissibility, which is made by a Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officer. Using these encounters as a focal point, I unpack the socio-technical and juridico-political forces that shape the operations of power at the Canadian border as a regime of (im)mobility (Sheller, 2018).

In doing this work, I reveal how mobile, networked communities have disrupted pre-existing power relations between the Canadian state apparatus and those deemed non-citizens. I argue that the tens of thousands of asylum seekers arriving in Canada successfully negotiated with the Canadian state through novel acts of decentralized, networked citizenship, afforded by global mediatization. Acknowledging that networked technology offers new tools to facilitate acts of citizenship and challenge structures of global inequality, these same affordances create possibilities to expand state control and surveillance in defense of existing structures of inequity and injustice.
Through my discussion, I demonstrate how networked communicative practices and technologies shape the contours and performative affordances of the political. I parse acts of authority and sovereignty on behalf of Canadian state actors in both public-facing contexts and ‘backstage’—“a place...where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted” (Goffman, 1956, p. 69). These situated acts of authority exist in relation to the practices and performances of migrant communities entering Canada irregularly in large numbers than in the recent past. These relational encounters serve to define the contours of an official Canadian identity and yet the dominant narrative of these encounters is necessarily corrupted and altered by this interchange—and by the particularities that define each encounter (Ahmed, 2000). In the chapters that follow, I show how migratory micro-political communities are constituted by and comprised of citizens. I also demonstrate the capacity of these communities to leverage the performative affordances of NCTs to disrupt power dynamics at the border by acting as citizens. Nonetheless, it remains clear that the Canadian government also leverages networked technologies to expand its control over human mobility and preserve the regime of global inequality instantiated by borders.

My exploration of the case of Lacolle thus traces the entanglement of performative authority and citizenship. Public-facing performances of authority must be situated in the context of potential underlying meanings and motives. In Chapter 2, I present my methodological approach to these challenges. I begin by establishing an analytic framework, which guides the rest of the thesis. Expanding upon the notion of global mediatization, I tie in the work of Hajer, whose perspectives on performative authority and dramaturgical analysis shaped the trajectory of this work significantly (Hajer, 2003b, 2003a, 2009). Specifically, Hajer’s concepts of network governance and the institutional void complement the framework of global mediatization (2009). Network governance is defined as an “approach to public problem-solving in which we no longer simply rely on the state to impose solutions, but instead conceive of problem-solving as a collaborative effort in which a network of actors, including both state and non-state organizations, play a part” (2009, pp. 31-32). This “genre” of politics exists in what Hajer calls the institutional void, “where there are no clear and generally accepted rules and norms according to which politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon” (2009, pp. 33-34, emphasis in original).
While Hajer provides a rich toolkit for understanding performative authority, my analysis requires a more robust definition of citizenship. To articulate what I mean by citizenship, I trace the concept back to the post-World War II era, describing several relevant perspectives. The work of Engin Isin, alongside several collaborators, heavily informs my definition (Isin, 2008; Isin & Ruppert, 2015; Isin & Rygiel, 2007). Following this, I discuss how theories of performative and transversal citizenship, which exist next to, across, and through existing political structures and boundaries, have been applied to migration politics in the field of critical security studies (Isin, 2018; Yuval-Davis, 1999). After presenting how critical security studies has developed and mobilized radical theories of citizenship, I fold in work on the concept of humanitarian securitization in the context of the mediatized border (Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017). Chouliaraki and Georgiou (2017) argue that, in addition to studying the border through a bio-political lens, the symbolic and communicative flows immanent to bordering practices nuance oft-held perceptions of state power as a singularly dehumanizing force.

Chapter 3 works to identify and interrogate Canadian performances of authority as presented in and by the mass media. I ask: Who speaks in news coverage of Lacolle? Who is spoken of? To what effect? To answer these questions, I conducted a systematic content analysis of press wire coverage pertaining to Lacolle, which spans from February of 2017 to August of 2018, when, despite ongoing arrivals consistent coverage ceased. I first identified and categorized the voices featured in the coverage to quantify and qualify the “order of appearance,” an implicit hierarchy of authority in institutional media (Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou, 2018, p. 46). Confirming many other accounts of migration in Western mass media reporting, politicians and officials are given a privileged place in the news (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Duncan & Caidi, 2018; Schudson, 2002). To understand the effects of this consistent finding, I identified the discourses mobilized to construct an official account, which I term the ‘institutional narrative’ of Lacolle.

Institutional narratives are comprised of multiplicities of (often contradictory) voices. However, together these voices present a “field of perceptible reality within which we are allowed to think, feel and act” (Butler in Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 268). In this case, the official discourse operated to defend the (increasingly technologized) border and its related infrastructures as a security assemblage (Allen & Vollmer, 2018). Central to this institutional
narrative were discourses of humanitarian securitization, and consequent presentation of asylees as misinformed humanitarian subjects. I challenge this narrative as incomplete and reframe the interception of asylum seekers as government-citizen *encounters* (Ahmed, 2000). I highlight how the situated performances of politicians and the mass media operate to de-emphasize the political agency of migratory communities. Despite these efforts, I show how official responses to the arrivals tacitly acknowledge and react to asylees’ acts of citizenship and the political power of these mobile, networked communities.

Chapter 4 picks up on a lacuna in the institutional narrative, emergent of the Canadian government’s concerted virtue signaling. Official efforts to play up humanitarian discourses and de-emphasize the securitization of asylum seekers often involve dramatic gestures to Canadian virtuosity alongside only euphemistic references to securitization through discourses of law and order. The securitization of asylum seekers is down-played as a matter of routine with frequent references to ‘being processed.’ Rarely is this process described in the press wire coverage I consulted and never in any meaningful detail. This chapter peers into the backstage of Canadian performances of authority in the mass media. It answers the question: What actually happens when an asylum seeker is intercepted by the RCMP? Through this discussion, I make two cases: 1) I detail how Canadian intelligence and enforcement agencies are prone to error and insufficiently accountable for their decisions, and 2) I demonstrate how this already dangerous combination is amplified through the expanding use of NCTs and automated risk assessments.

In counter-scripting the institutional narrative, I put forth a narrative of encounter. Ahmed argues that identity is constituted through ‘strange encounters,’ wherein an ambivalent sense of nationhood emerges from proximal encounters with strangers—those who do not belong or are not yet known (2000). My narrative of encounter builds upon the news coverage collected for Chapter 3 by analyzing legislation and court cases; policy and procedural documents; and internal documents accessed through previously filed Access to Information (ATI) requests including briefing materials, reports, forms, interview guides, and various communications like emails and memos. Understanding encounters involves investigating the relationship between the particular and the general—and the ways in which the particular is partially determined by the general (Ahmed, 2000). To accomplish this, I begin by detailing key elements of the ‘process.’ The first interactions between an asylum seeker and the Canadian state apparatus are highly
consequential for a would-be newcomer. Being processed involves a decision on admissibility to Canada and eligibility to claim asylum; the process can result in being detained without charge indeterminately.

I limit my scope to the first encounters between asylees and agents of the Canadian state apparatus, after being intercepted and before a determination of (in)admissibility and thus eligibility to lodge an asylum claim. Being processed involves arrest, a health check, background checks, bio-metric data collection, and a security interview. I describe each step, in addition to the underlying legal and policy affordances. After this, I look to higher order structural trends, which condition these encounters. Specifically, I describe intensifying mass-surveillance through database integration, the rise of anticipatory governance, including the use of machine learning and predictive analytics, and civic stratification, which describes the political instantiation of differential regimes of rights.

In the concluding chapter, I tie these two components of my analysis together. The ambivalence and contradictions, inherent to government-citizen encounters at the Canadian data border brings to the fore the flows of power immanent to the global regime of borders. Communities of asylees have leveraged the affordances of NCTs to engage in novel forms of resistance to global inequality. The networked communicative practices of these communities have facilitated their mobility and consequent transgressions of Canadian sovereignty. Their acts of citizenship demonstrate how the process of global mediatization is shaping flows of people, capital, and information. Nonetheless, the Canadian state apparatus has also leveraged NCTs as a tool to monitor and control human mobility.

I highlight the deeply ironic quality of the official narrative of misinformed migrants by drawing together the various ways in which Canadian politicians and institutions perpetuate and act upon misinformation themselves. In the context of this self-interested ambivalence, I draw upon the works consulted for this study to put forth policy recommendations for the long- and short-term.

I first make a call to enact the spirit of international law by working to dismantle structures of civic stratification and global apartheid, which are upheld though the institution of borders. This might be done through the extension of meaningful transnational privacy rights,
ending immigration detention, and implementing common-sense reforms to migration policy that would increase capacity for reception. In the shorter term, I call for higher standards of algorithmic accountability, making reference to work in advocacy and research that have already put forth actionable policy recommendations (Broeders et al., 2017; Molnar & Gill, 2018; The Toronto Declaration, 2018).

Each of these discussions acknowledges that citizenship is intractable from social struggle. Processes of change like global mediatization create spaces for creative acts of resistance; however, state power also adapts to preserve its control. The case of Lacolle offers insights into the bleeding edge of evolving government-citizen encounters in a nascent political moment characterized by the fragmentation of audiences and polities, the rise of automation and algorithmic mediation, and the increasingly undeniable role of platformized and networked digital spaces as contested arenas for transversal politics (Gillespie, 2010; Hajer, 2009; Isin & Ruppert, 2015). Ultimately, my goal is to craft a clearer view of the operations of power at the Canadian border and how these operations are being disrupted and rearticulated.
Chapter 2
Literature Review and Methodology

2.1 The Institutional Narrative

The mass media as an institution has traditionally served as a political arena in which politicians and other ‘official’ voices are actively privileged (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou, 2018; Schudson, 2002). Media institutions prime publics and political actors to prioritize particular policy issues and shape political performances through modal logics of content production, distribution, and consumption, which are themselves shaped by technological affordances (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Hjarvard, 2008). A small number of news agencies like the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France Presse, and ITAR-TASS control the vast majority of global flows of information and consequently have significant control over the presentation of these official accounts (Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1998; Schudson, 2002). I refer to these accounts of events, co-constructed by political elites and the mass media as ‘institutional narratives.’

Narratives are accounts of events presented to an audience to achieve a purpose (McAlpine, 2016). They “shape our world and constrain behavior” in ways both emergent and reflective of the global order (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013, p. 1). In this context, political actors strategically leverage narratives as tools to defend and further their own interests (Miskimmon et al., 2013). Individual journalists contribute to the development of institutional narratives through their selective remediations of voice and the ways in which they frame their stories. The news agencies that employ them maintain professional and editorial norms and select stories that will generate income, shaping the institutional narrative in this way. News agency stories are remediated broadly across ‘retail’ news media (like broadsheet newspapers or cable news channels, which connect more directly with consumers than press wires) and are thus perceived as more objective than most sources; they do not tend to favour specific partisan or ideological causes in the same ways as online or televised sources (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Boyd-Barrett, 2013; Paterson, 2007). Nonetheless, news agencies are clearly conditioned by the ideologies and forces of neoliberalism as well as the political implications of their coverage (Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen, 1998; Goodman, 2016). They provide a platform for political elites
to promote official accounts of events; politicians communicate both to their publics and to each other through the mass media (Schudson, 2002). News agencies are, in this way, both a tool of political influence and a locus of power in their own right. The narratives they help to produce and disseminate typically support the interests of dominant institutions and ideologies.

Institutional narratives are produced by multiplicities of official voices, not just those of politicians. Georgiou describes how global institutions like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and bureaucracies like the Italian migration and civil rights department operate to de-politicize the voices of migrants, framing them through the lens of humanitarian securitization (Georgiou, 2018). Chouliaraki and Musarò surface how multivalent institutional formations “from official State narratives to local security interactions” operate to the effect of constructing ambivalent symbolic borders (2017, p. 538). In this way, the exclusionary power of the border is “[f]ar from a monolithic structure of biopolitical power” but rather constituted by complex networks of “techno-affective” practices and mediations that operate to cast symbolic boundaries between us on the inside and them outside (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017, p. 168; Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017, p. 536). Further to this, Ahmed describes how narratives of encounter with the outside are both constituted and “contaminated” by proximity to strangers; the ambivalence of the border is thus emergent of the ways in which the we is altered in relation to encounters with the outside (Ahmed, 2000, p. 12).

In these ways, narratives can be conceptualized within a Deleuzo-Guattarian framework. They are necessarily partial and relational interpretations and re-articulations of events that work to surface and convey meaning, knowledge, and the socio-cultural and institutional structures that shape the operations of power (Loots et al., 2013). Narratives are, moreover, implicated in processes of change—what Deleuze and Guattari referred to as de- and re-territorialization (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). However, unlike, ‘arborescent’ understandings of evolution, which trace linear paths of growth and dualistic divergences, Deleuze and Guattari conceive of change as through the lens of the rhizome, which embraces narrative multiplicity and rejects unity (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 10; Nail, 2017). There is no one clear chain of causality or start and end point to the story of Lacolle but multiplicities of voices, interactions, and divergent interpretations (Bhattacharya, 2016; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Loots et al., 2013).
Indeed, within this metaphysical formulation, difference is prior to identity—every story or artefact of investigation is immanently unique and may subsequently hold commonalities with or exist in relation to other phenomena. Neither classification nor truth are essential to an object or concept but rather exist as momentary configurations (Nail, 2017). “If one insists, the word ‘essence’ might be preserved, but only on condition of saying that the essence is precisely accident, the event” (Deleuze in Nail, 2017, p. 24). In this sense, narratives can be understood as constantly shifting assemblages of events, connected in complex and non-linear ways (Loots et al., 2013).

In line with Burchell (2015, 2017), I deploy the idea of assemblage in two senses. The first, which emerged prior to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) work, is in the context of situated performativity. Goffman referred to “assemblages of sign-equipment which…performers call their own for short periods of time” (1956, p. 14 in Burchell, 2015). The second articulation of assemblage refers to broader more socio-institutional understandings like Haggerty and Ericson’s ‘surveillant assemblage’ or the Foucauldian concept of dispositif (2000; Legg, 2011). Putting forth a clearer definition of this type of socially situated assemblage than others, Nail argues that “an assemblage is not just a mixture of heterogenous elements” but is rather an arrangement of abstract conditions, concrete elements, and ‘personae’—“mobile operators that connect the concrete elements together according to their abstract relations” (Nail, 2017, pp. 24, 27).

Narratives are thus emergent of both situated and purposeful individual performances, which exist in relation to a broader socio-cultural ‘setting,’ which is itself an accidental and temporary arrangement of conditions, elements, and agents. Specific events may be accidental, however institutional forces intervene in processes of de-and re-territorialization in efforts to preserve their authority. This resonates with Ahmed’s emphasis on the relation between the particular and the general as well as upon the shifting conditions in which encounters occur (Ahmed, 2000). In the section that follows, I describe how the meta-process of global mediatization has prompted shifts in performances of political authority and introduce a vocabulary to describe these shifts.

2.1.1 Network Governance

Hajer (2009) argues that politics (and policymaking) always involves performance. No matter how logical or well-founded a policy position is, it requires the trust of the public to be
impactful (Hajer, 2009). In this way, the enactment of meaning precedes policymaking; politicians must perform their authority to enact political change (Hajer, 2009). Hajer’s style of dramaturgical analysis is broadly compatible with Goffman’s work, emphasizing the many ways in which practicing politics resonates with the metaphor of theatre—though also acknowledging the countless, yet far more elusive ways in which the metaphor is lacking (Goffman, 1956; Hajer, 2009). Notwithstanding specific analogies to theatre, politics conceived as a series of situated performances encourages critical engagement with not just what is said but the how, why and where of stories crafted through multiplicities of performative voices.

Hajer (2009) deploys the notion of network governance to describe how shifts in practices of media production and consumption may be leveraged to the tactical advantage of many types of political actors in their performances. The internet has amplified the multiplicity of publics, politics, and the spaces in which politics is conducted (Hajer 2009). In doing so, it threatens the primacy of the state form in global politics by democratizing the stage upon which political agents may perform (Hajer, 2003b). The de-centering and transversal effects of contemporary, networked media practices are, in one sense, a threat to political elites and traditional notions of state sovereignty. Simultaneously, politicians engage in networked performances to connect with their publics and perform their authority (Hajer, 2009).

Traditionally, performances of authority existed in the context of what Hajer refers to as “classical modernist” political institutions (2009). Such performances are characterized by understandings of public space rooted in enlightenment values like territoriality, liberal democracy, bureaucracy, and understandings of truth rooted in the scientific method (Hajer, 2009). Indeed, traditional politics takes for granted, more or less discrete ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ spaces for politics, which afford a particular style of performance. Additionally, formerly separate ‘regions’, wherein performances are purposefully directed at, and hidden from specific audiences are now accessible to much broader publics through the affordances of networked media practices (Goffman, 1956; Hajer, 2009). Whereas, in decades past, a politician may have promised coal miners one thing and dock workers another, all while holding secret backroom meetings with titans of industry, this (admittedly imperfect) capacity to hide contradictions between a performance, its underlying conditions, and the ways in which it has been tailored for a specific audience has been fundamentally disrupted by the emergence of
networked media practices. This does not mean that politicians have suddenly become immune to corruption and precluded from dishonesty, rather it means that savvy performers must now take into account evermore fragmented audiences with broad access to performances not directed specifically to them (Hajer, 2009).

Hajer presents the concept of the institutional void to describe the loss of “taken-for-granted routines” that has accompanied the displacement of classical modernist politics in favour of network governance (2009, p.74). An institutional void is characterized not by a lack of institutions but rather a lack of consensus upon the rules and norms, which guide the practice of politics (Hajer, 2003). Such dissensus emerges in the context of change. Just as a truck on the freeway leaves a trail of low air-pressure behind it, global mediatization creates spaces for novel socio-political formations in its wake.

While traditional political institutions and international treaties are surely still relevant, it is simply unrealistic to ignore the “politics of the ‘in between’” that shapes policy making processes “next to or across established orders” (emphasis in original 2009, pp. 33, 34). Policy problems and solutions often transcend jurisdiction (Hajer, 2003). Cyberspace is a prototypical example of such transcendent spaces in between, defying the logics of traditional territorial governance (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). The online world works, at once, to expand possibilities for transversal encounters in liminal political spaces while simultaneously bringing people closer together—in very particular ways—through the affordances of instant communication. NCTs defy classical modernist structures through their increasingly holistic mediation of global informational flows.

Through the transcendent and de-centring affordances of mass connectivity, global mediatization expands the relevance of the spaces between formal political structures. ICTs have long been delegated the task of circumventing the limits of geography by collapsing the relationship between space and time (Harvey, 1992). More recently, “the modes [of data] production and consumption have been partially collapsed onto one another, with individuals assuming a role in the production of the service or product they are consuming” (Kitchin, 2014, p. 93). The novel social and political geographies of the institutional void result in “[t]he
weakening of the state” and go “hand in hand with the international growth of civil society [and] the emergence of new citizen-actors and new forms of mobilization” (Hajer, 2003, p. 175).

Increasingly frictionless flows of information have, at once, democratized and disrupted old practices of media production and simultaneously created conditions for the algorithmic mediation of content consumption to the end of maximizing profits (Gillespie, 2010). These redrafted norms work to the benefit of increasingly oligopolistic technology companies while bolstering the state’s capacity for surveillance (Kitchin, 2014). Effective networked performances of authority in this context are paradoxically both targeted to a niche audience and crafted with the assumption that they may be shared widely (Hajer, 2009). There are many stages upon which one must perform simultaneously. Similarly, effective performances of citizenship require an understanding of the competing emancipatory and oppressive affordances that accompany the use of networked technology. The ambiguity of the institutional void presents both threats and opportunities. While nationalists have proven quite adept at leveraging the performative affordances of the internet to benefit their causes, networked politics can work to the benefit of any savvy political actor (Hajer, 2009; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). In this sense, classical understandings of citizenship are also being displaced.

2.1.2 Defining Citizenship

The Citizenship Act (1985) outlines the bedrock of classical modernist citizenship in Canada. A citizen may be born on Canadian soil or naturalized at a later date, but social and political belonging is conferred through the laws of the sovereign. Such purely legal takes on citizenship have long been challenged. In the years following the Second World War, sociologist T.H. Marshall nuanced legalistic understandings of citizenship by re-casting the concept as a “kind of basic human equality, associated with full community membership” (1950, p. 8). While Marshall separated the notion of citizenship from the state, in his view, the bounds of such an equality were limited to “a population united in a single civilization” (1950, p. 76).

Notwithstanding well-founded critiques of Marshall’s formulation as Eurocentric and non-intersectional, the central precept of social citizenship—that citizens claim their rights and responsibilities from community rather than the state—has persisted (Yuval-Davis, 1997).
In this same postwar period, the United Nations was established and alongside it a global regime of universal human rights, constituting a (contested) “international community” (Fassbender, 1998). Despite frequent and flagrant disregard for these rights, upholding them is the primary concern of many modern international organizations. In light of glaringly inequitable access to these rights amongst members of this assembly of nations, Hannah Arendt famously described citizenship as “the right to have rights” (Arendt, 1973, p. 298). In doing so, she pointed out that rights are only meaningful if they can be upheld. Regardless of Marshall’s assertion that rights are derived from community, human rights regimes were then and are still today, realized through state power.

In practice, this has meant that only citizens of the most privileged nations (namely, former colonial powers and settler states) are conferred purportedly universal human rights. This in-built global inequity serves to stratify and sort global citizens today—as exemplified by the “Passport Index,” which serves as a proxy for this stratification based on the mobility rights of specific passport holders (“Global Passport Power Rank,” n.d.). The ‘international community’ has, for this reason, been accused of actually referring to the United States and its allies in upholding the global capitalist order (Chomsky, 2002). Citizens of nations with high levels of corruption, poverty, and unrest—conditions often attributable to past and present coloniality—do not have equal access to rights or opportunities, which are major drivers of migration (United Nations Publications, 2018).

Notwithstanding the many contradictions inherent to universal rights held by a stratified global citizenry, a substantive literature promoting, articulating, and refuting global citizenship has developed since Marshall and Arendt’s post-war works (Brecher, Childs, & Cutler, 1993; Dower & Williams, 2002; Parekh, 2003; Schattle, 2008). Michael Ignatieff, a prominent Canadian liberal scholar and politician argues the existence of human rights regimes, even if they are insufficient, is emergent of the feeling that “our species is one, and each of the individuals

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1 The Global Passport Power Rank is based on the availability of visas and ease of mobility for holders of particular passports. It is compiled by Arton Capital, a company which enables high net-worth investors to access citizenship and thus enhanced mobility through property investments. The company’s tagline is “Empowering Global Citizenship” (“Arton Capital” n.d.).
who compose it is entitled to equal moral consideration” (quoted in Ingram, 2008). Others point to global commons as sites of transnational responsibility like the ozone layer, the climate, and the sea, which impact everyone yet belong to no one state (Imber, 2002).

Nonetheless, these well-meaning universalist discourses of global citizenship have been criticized as re-articulations of colonial ontologies. Dominant liberal accounts of human rights and humanitarianism draw discursive borders by propagating narratives of us the givers and them the needy, connoting a sense of meritocratic hierarchy and relations of pity over partnership (Chouliaraki, 2013, 2017). The liberal impulse to universalize belonging—and thus alterity—has the effect of deemphasizing the structural conditions that render some less belonging than others (Ahmed, 2000). De Andreotti argues that the humanitarian tone of classical liberal global citizenship, often characterized by aspirations to “save the world,” re-produces colonial relations and the patterns of assimilation that are responsible for global inequality (de Andreotti, 2014, p. 1). Instead, de Andreotti advocates for a stance that emphasizes multiplicity, solidarity, and partnership in approaches to addressing global inequity (2014). Balibar points out that these same insider/outsider dualities are used to exclude people from citizenship rights in ways that are far less well-meaning. By defining strangers as enemies, Balibar, in line with Nevins, argues that powerful nations, even those that self-identify as defenders of human rights, perpetuate conditions of global apartheid via exclusionary immigration policies (Balibar, 2010; Nevins & Aizeki, 2008).

Yuval-Davis puts forth an understanding of citizenship that emphasizes the particular over the universal, painting it as a “multi-tier concept” separate “from an exclusive relation to the state” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 22). Locating citizenship above, below, and through the state form, she defines citizenship as an “overall concept encapsulating the relationship between the individual, state and society,” dismissing “assimilationist ‘universalistic’ politics” and divisive nationalist identity politics, which both appeal to insider/outsider dualisms (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 4; 1999, p. 94). While Yuval-Davis is not wrong, this emphasis on the particular, argues Ahmed, should also be placed in the context of how more general conditions shape the contours and possibilities of the particular (2000).
In relation to these dualities—in versus out and local versus universal—it is clear that citizenship is a paradoxical regime of inclusion rooted in exclusion instantiated by multi-valent and mutable borders both material and symbolic (Arendt, 1973; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Isin and Nielsen argue that legal structures and habitus—intra-subjective understandings of the social world—shape citizenship, but above all, performances constitute citizens (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). Acts of citizenship need not be rooted in legal recognition (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). Borrowing from Austin, Isin argues that the illocutionary force of making a claim to rights is constitutive of the citizen (Isin, 2008). Building on speech-acts as citizen-making performances and connecting communicative acts with embodied ones, Nyers points to migrant protests, labelling them “acts of non-citizenship,” to build on the argument that acts of citizenship and thus political force need not be rooted in legal duty or recognition (Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Nyers, 2010, p. 127).

These accounts of citizenship are subject to shifting conditions; the expansion of a networked global civil society through the performative affordances of NCTs has altered relations between individuals, states, and societies through connectivity. Isin and Ruppert (2015) argue that, in the networked age, ‘digital acts’ present a novel form of transversal speech act. Citizenship is constituted by claiming rights, yet these acts emanate from citizens’ everyday digital practices (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). Declarations of citizenship and the communities from which they emerge are increasingly virtual and decentralized; digital acts connect the physical world both through and with the digital realm (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). Citizens use “communication tools as objects and interfaces in their physical environment in order to maintain connection to mobile and online networks” (Burchell, 2015, p. 38). To use William Gibson’s under-rated term, digital acts start and end in ‘meat-space’ but their potential impact and geographical reach are amplified through the multiplicity and replicability inherent to cyberspace (Gibson, 1986; Isin & Ruppert, 2015). In addition to this immanently transversal quality, digital acts are often trans-mediated—transferred “from the symbolic realm on to the realm of physical action” (Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 268).

Digital citizenship thus exists as a relation between political and legal structures, performances both off- and on-line, and sociotechnical imaginaries—individual understandings of the self, situated amongst the social, political, and technical possibilities afforded by everything else (Isin & Ruppert, 2015; Ruppert, 2018). While imposed legal and political norms and
practices shape citizenship, citizens give life to complex, layered, and ambivalent imaginaries emergent of diverse experiences and social interactions much more nuanced than the law. It is through performances, which increasingly take place online, that citizens work to shape shared experiences of what is into accounts of what should be. Social and political imaginaries guide individual actions to claim rights and to uphold responsibilities to the communities, societies and states with which they interact. In this way, citizens negotiate with power to work towards an intra-subjectively imagined better world.

The implication of increasingly networked citizenship is the paradoxical potential for both increased efficacy and unpredictability of digitally mediated performances of citizenship (Hajer, 2009). Digital acts can reach more people than ever before; however, the performer cannot fully control to whom or how (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). While unpredictable in their effects, digital acts may also be easily tracked and monitored (Lyon, 2017). Online actors can impact communities and institutions far outside the jurisdiction of their origin, thus amplifying the fluidity and ambivalence of borders by transgressing them. Acts of citizenship online are acts in the institutional void. The performative affordances of the digital realm have displaced the rules and norms of government-citizen encounters, which characterize classical modernist territorial politics.

Citizenship is thus defined herein as a form of community-based political agency that is relational, mutable, and multi-valent. It exists not just within but across, through, and between existing political structures, including borders. Citizenship operates in relation to but not subordinate to the political and legal frameworks of the state. Rather than simply a legal status, citizenship is the enacted manifestation of intra-subjective imaginaries, community practices, and norms related to individual and collective rights, mutual responsibilities rooted in solidarity, and relations with social and political institutions. Creative resistance to state power is negotiated through world-making acts of citizenship, both in the physical world and in cyberspace. These actions are rooted in the everyday experiences and practices of networked citizens.

Networked media practices are increasingly entangled with those of transnational migration (Calais Writers, 2017; United Nations Publications, 2018). A study of people staying in refugee camps in Greece demonstrates the integral role of NCTs alongside a (heavily
gendered) digital divide amongst migrant and refugee populations there (Latonero, Poole, & Berens, 2018). Similarly, both the Canadian government and media blamed networked communicative practices for the geographically concentrated and protracted arrivals in Lacolle (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017f; Lowrie, 2017a). The following section discusses how these shifts in the production and consumption of media have shaped scholarship as it relates to migrant citizenships.

2.1.3 Networked Mobility

Global mediatization has facilitated transnational mobility by expanding peoples’ capacity to perform citizenship in the institutional void. Migration is increasingly facilitated by digital acts on social media, messaging apps, and other connected technology (Godin, 2017; United Nations Publications, 2018). However, these affordances have developed alongside the capacity of the state to monitor and control peoples’ movements and lives; irregular migrants are particularly vulnerable (Broeders, 2007; Topak, Bracken-Roche, Saulnier, & Lyon, 2015).

The topic of migratory citizenships and the political agency of migrants has often been approached by the field of critical security studies through the lens of Foucauldian biopolitics and Agambenian thanato-politics², which emphasize the capacity of a sovereign to strip migrants of their humanity and bodily agency to the effect of narrowing political possibilities (Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b). A substantial literature on migrant citizenships has outlined many ways that states take exceptional measures—next to or across from ‘normal’ law—to control the bodies of migrants, limiting possibilities for mobility and political agency in attempts to render them as ‘bare life’—alive, yet stripped of all political agency (Agamben, 2005; Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017; Isin & Rygiel, 2007; Johnson, 2012; Nyers & Rygiel, 2012). For example, Isin and Rygiel argue that embodied and extreme forms of protest like lip-sewing and hunger strikes employed by irregular migrants or political detainees constitute them as abject political subjects and “transient citizens” (Isin & Rygiel, 2007, p. 27). In these accounts, the

² Whereas Foucauldian bio-politics is concerned with the “administration and regulation” of life (Castree, Kitchin, & Rogers, 2013, p. 34), the concept has been extended by scholars like Agamben (1998, 2005) to focus on the state’s regulation of death (Vaughan-Williams, 2015a). As noted by Vaughn-Williams (2015), Agamben’s scholarship is at once highly influential and controversial.
state renders those deemed undeserving abject by forcing them into exceptional and temporary spaces like detention centres, camps, and border zones.

Scholars have documented extensively the ways in which some migrant-citizens work to reject abject subjectification through creative modes of resistance, solidarity, and exercises of collective power (McNevin, 2011; Nyers, 2010, 2015; Nyers & Rygiel, 2012). Still, others argue the embodied aspects of securitized migration have been well-studied, but that the politics of mobility can also be understood by investigating the communicative networks and symbolic stratifications, which underpin the operations of power at the border (Chouliaraki, 2017; Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017). Chouliaraki and Georgiou suggest that bio/thanato-political accounts of the border often over-state the state’s capacity for control and inadequately account for the ambivalence and complexity of power and resistance at the border, looking instead to the disposition of “hospitality,” which, describes the ability to “embrace and constrain a moving target’s likelihood to maneuver within a particular territory” (2017, p. 160). Hospitality, they argue, resonates with the discursive typology of humanitarian securitization, encompassing attempts to accommodate the “double requirement of security [for insiders] and care” for outsiders in liberal democratic states (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017, p. 159).

Chouliaraki and Georgiou’s work on the “communicative architecture of reception” implicitly points to migrant citizenships as constituted by countless, banal communicative transactions within and between communities of state and non-state actors to the effect of bolstering physical borders with symbolic ones (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017, p. 160). Networked technology is infused with the everyday of many migrant journeys and is used for way-finding, information sharing, and the maintenance of family or personal ties in addition to outright political activism (Godin, 2017; Latonero et al., 2018; United Nations Publications, 2018). Asserting a personal narrative, either within a limited community or for broader public consumption carries the illocutionary force of a claim to representation in global flows of information, capital, and people (Chouliaraki, 2013).

This “civil disposition of ‘I have a voice!’” creates space for claims to citizenship (Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 267). Within this frame, Chouliaraki explores convergent journalism—“the networking of citizen voices through major institutional news platforms”—as “citizen-driven acts
of deliberating and witnessing,” noting a consequent epistemological shift in the norms of journalistic production that undermines the long-held institutional authority of large press agencies (Deuze in Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 269; Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 278). In this way, the everyday media practices of migrant communities using WhatsApp groups and other social networks to share information about crossing the Canadian border irregularly contributes to the displacement of institutional authority within these communities and outside of them. Such banal digital acts need not all be explicit claims to citizenship, however, the stories, information, and solidarity that flows through these citizen-driven online communities are clearly tied to the embodied acts of transgression and resistance carried out by irregular migrants.

Quotidian performances of citizenship may culminate in more dramatic acts of power and resistance, like being arrested after crossing the border irregularly, occupying a government building to claim a right to the city and its services, or lip-sewing and hunger strikes in immigration detention (Isin & Rygiel, 2007; Johnson, 2012; Nyers, 2010). However, only focusing on these climactic embodied acts of citizenship neglects the underlying reality that any claim to rights or act of affective solidarity is a moment of becoming-citizen. Much as Ahmed (2000) warns against the fetishization of strangers, McNevin (2011) cautions against romanticizing migrant citizenships. The journeys and stories of the tens of thousands of asylum seekers converging upon Canada’s frontier consist of many small communicative moments that culminate in the transgression of Canadian territorial sovereignty, launching a whole series of events related to the asylum claims process. The journeys are themselves narratives of many moments of citizenship.

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3 WhatsApp is an encrypted messenger and I am not a part of any migrant WhatsApp groups. I base this point on the synthesis of a number of sources. WhatsApp is singled out by the Canadian government as a driver of ‘misinformation’ among asylum seekers (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017e). I take a high-level of understanding of the ways in which asylum seekers in Lacolle may be using NCTs from studies in European contexts (Godin, 2017; Latonero, Poole, & Berens, 2018; United Nations Publications, 2018). Further empirical research is required to establish a nuanced understanding of the information practices of asylees travelling through Lacolle.
2.2 Research Design and Methodology

The design of this research emerged out of a pilot study of English-language Canadian newspaper coverage on irregular migration into Lacolle, which looked at content from a spectrum of high-circulating textual media sources from the start of January to the end of December of 2017 (Duncan & Caidi, 2018). This pilot study revealed how the media operates as a tool of power for the Canadian government with respect to migration management in Lacolle as a consequence of their privileged access to the platform of the mass media. It highlighted many ways in which governmentality is enacted through situated truth claims (Duncan & Caidi, 2018; Mustapha, 2013). Bids for authority from the Canadian state regarding Lacolle involved various performative infrastructural, policy, and narrative interventions (Duncan & Caidi, 2018).

To accommodate our analysis of these interventions, we put forth the notion of ‘governmentalities of truth,’ which encourages analysis of what is said to be true and made to be true rather than searching for some a priori truth about Canadian migration politics (Duncan & Caidi, 2018). Based upon this preliminary study, it is clear that adopting a dramaturgical lens to identify and investigate the truth-claims, official strategic narratives, and related interventions of the Canadian government is a worthwhile endeavor for those seeking to understand the underlying motivations and hidden practices of Canadian political elites. The research herein takes up this challenge in a broader, more systematic fashion to test and build upon earlier findings.

To investigate how the affordances of networked technology have impacted interactions between asylees and the Canadian state apparatus, I conducted a qualitative study of the anomalous case of Lacolle, Quebec. Studying Lacolle and the informal crossing that emerged in nearby Hemmingford, Quebec is worthwhile for a broad range of reasons including the relatively high concentration of irregular arrivals and their persistence over time; the media attention generated by the arrivals and their impact on Canadian politics; and the novel articulations of authority and citizenship that emerged in these contexts. As an official border crossing, Lacolle is a zone of exception—the standard norms of government-citizen interaction do not apply (Agamben, 2005). Zones of legal exception like border crossings (referred to as Customs Controlled Areas in Canadian policy) have been studied by scholars for their capacity to lay bare
the relations of power that exist between states and their subjects (Salter, 2007; Topak et al., 2015).

As a frontier zone, Lacolle is a special case. Migrant communities discovered a loophole in the Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA). In their efforts to avoid the exceptional space of the Customs Controlled Area in Lacolle, which would preclude them from claiming asylum, they established an exceptional space of resistance just kilometres from the official crossing. In this sense, the case of Lacolle opens possibilities to study the negotiations and shifting power-relations immanent to the Canadian border assemblage through the novel performances of citizenship and authority that have emerged there. Lacolle is situated within a broader context of Canadian immigration policy. However, I have limited my analysis specifically to Lacolle as an anomalous narrative case. This case is not representative of typically banal immigration rhetoric in Canada but rather evocative of the polarized fringes of public discourse and the often-hidden and typically unspoken relations of power that exist at the border.

I approach the case study in two parts. In Chapter 3, I present press wire coverage, seeking to understand public-facing Canadian performances of authority, which I refer to as the ‘institutional narrative’. Inspired by Chouliaraki & Zaborowski (2017) and Georgiou (2018), I ask: Who speaks in the news and who is spoken of? To what effect? In Chapter 4, I investigate the underlying policies and practices behind the Canadian government’s public appeals for authority. I ask: What is left unclear or altogether out of the institutional narrative? What actually happens when an asylee is intercepted by the RCMP? I build upon my earlier findings through analysis of legislation, policy, and internal documents obtained both online and through access to information legislation. As Goffman (1956) and later Hajer (2009) point out, public performances are not the whole story. I thus looked to the ‘backstage’ of official Canadian performances of authority and situate Canadian governmentality at the border within a broader social, political, and legal context.

2.2.1 Analyzing Performances of Authority

In the first part of my study, French and English coverage from the Canadian Press (CP) and Agence France Presse (AFP) is used to parse institutional accounts of the arrivals near Lacolle, Quebec. Searching for news agency coverage of events in the Factiva database revealed that CP
and AFP offered the most comprehensive coverage of the arrivals. A search for the term ‘Lacolle’ limited to CP and AFP between January 1st, 2017 and October 10th, 2018, returned 116 relevant stories in French and English beginning on February 21st, 2017 with the last result from August 22nd, 2018. While arrivals in Lacolle are ongoing at the time of this writing, media coverage of irregular migration through Lacolle ceased in August of 2018. The reasons for this drop-off in the coverage are unclear as the arrivals are ongoing as of the time of this writing, albeit at lower rates than the height of arrivals in August of 2017 (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019).

With these 116 CP and AFP stories related to Lacolle, I used NVivo to code the coverage. I sought to document voice and representation to show who speaks and who is spoken of in news agency reporting of Lacolle. I also coded for major thematic discourses that emerged in the coverage. The coding process involved several passes through the textual data. I read through once without doing any coding, then I followed with an axial coding process, wherein I established the typologies of voice (e.g. politician, activist, expert) and the primary discursive categories. After establishing the categories, I proceeded with a reading for selective coding of individual voices and to break down the discursive nodes into more specific sub-nodes. For example, during the open coding process, I identified a pressure narrative. During the focused coding, the pressure narrative was divided into sub-nodes of counter-pressure, economic pressure, infrastructural pressure, institutional pressure, and water metaphors. In my discussion of these discourses, I relate insights from the body of press wire coverage to information retrieved from consumer-facing media and social media—this data was collected as evidence solely for its capacity to complement and contextualize the main body of coverage.

In my identification of the ‘order of appearance,’ I went a step past focussed coding. As a rough proxy for overall influence, I quantified voice by searching for the last names of those who speak and who are spoken of in NVivo. In the findings, those who speak are placed into six categories: politicians, officials, experts, institutional humanitarians, grassroots activists, and migrants themselves. In my analysis of the order of appearance, these numbers help to triangulate and confirm qualitative insights rather than serving as the basis for my argument. Please refer to Appendix A for more detail regarding the data collection and coding processes.
The findings of this study on voice and representation do not diverge greatly from trends that have been documented extensively in non-Canadian contexts. There is significant pre-existing work that indicates migrant voices are diminished and misappropriated to the effect of bolstering a pre-determined political agenda (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017; Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou, 2018). I test these ideas against the case of Lacolle to understand who speaks and who is represented in Canadian mass media coverage, contributing to a paucity of Canadian scholarship on this topic. My findings complicate those of Wallace (2018), who conducted an automated sentiment analysis of Canadian broadsheet newspaper framings of Syrian refugees. Wallace found a tendency towards more humanistic coverage and a trend of positivity in the tonal valence of Canadian media coverage following the release of the now-(in)famous, photograph of Alan Kurdi—a Syrian toddler who drowned crossing the Mediterranean sea like countless others (2018). Through the lens of humanitarian securitization, I show how the inclinations to both include and exclude migrants achieve the effect of constituting asylees as ‘strangers,’ thereby deemphasizing migrant-citizens’ capacity to be political regardless of tonal valence (Ahmed, 2000).

An important limitation of this study is that I have not coded for statistical validity. While “thin” rationalist methods can answer questions that are complementary to “thicker” reflexive, post-structuralist, and post-colonial analyses (for example, see Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017), this was not feasible given the scope of a master’s thesis (and lack of appropriate research funding to hire coders) (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 14). Another limitation is that politics is often scripted behind closed doors. Press wire coverage is inherently mediated by journalists and editors. Analysis of political performances does not reflect what is actually true. Rather, the performances analyzed herein are entirely institutionally mediated and thus reflect a desired reality, not a foundational one. For this reason, I built upon my analysis of public performances of authority by situating them within a broader context.

2.2.2 Situating Performative Governmentality

After describing and analyzing official accounts designed for mass consumption, I delved deeper into what is lacking in official accounts. What is left unclear or altogether out of the institutional narrative? What actually happens when an irregular migrant is intercepted?
Typically referred to vaguely as ‘being processed’, the first interactions between an asylum seeker and the Canadian state are highly consequential for a would-be newcomer. Being processed involves a decision on admissibility to Canada and thus eligibility to claim asylum. The process can result in being detained indeterminately without charge. Adding to official accounts of migrant reception with my own narrative of encounter, I synthesize a more complete understanding of the admissibility determinations process in Lacolle.

The narrative of encounter draws on legislation (like the Immigrant and Refugee Protection, Anti-Terrorism, Citizenship, National Defence, CBSA, RCMP, and Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) Acts), policy and procedural documents (such as the Beyond the Border Strategy and policy guides on biometric information sharing between the Border 5 nations, which consist of Canada, the UK, US, Australia, and New Zealand), and other publicly available information like web copy and departmental reports. These documents were recovered through an iterative online, databased research process directed at answering the research question (this involved both browsing and directed searches on the Government of Canada website, the CanLii database, and the University of Toronto Libraries database). Additionally, internal documents were obtained through previously filed Access to Information (ATI) requests including training materials, reports, memos and emails, as well as forms and paperwork related to enforcement activities.

I chose to undertake a close reading of the above discursive materials in efforts to articulate my narrative of encounter for several reasons. Unlike my analysis of the institutional narrative, the data used in the narrative of encounter is highly heterogeneous. It includes text from a multitude of sources, forms and paperwork, spreadsheets, slide decks, and more. While there are established methods of multimodal discourse analysis and it is possible to code this material in NVivo, I opted not to. This would have constituted an entire project in of itself and would have produced a set of findings only partly related to the institutional narrative. The research question these materials help to answer builds upon my systematic identification of an institutional narrative. Rather than engaging in a new content analysis of the documents, my interest lay in identifying information, which is either inconsistent with or missing from official accounts of events, thereby contextualizing public-facing institutional discourses. Another reason I opted to do a close read is that the documents used were both voluminous and not directly
comparable. Finding information that related to my question and the institutional narrative was like finding a needle in a haystack; most of the content across hundreds of slides, chains of emails, and multitudes of statutory clauses was simply not relevant to the scope of my project. Despite this, when I did find relevant information, my understanding of encounters at the border was greatly enriched. While Appendix B lists the ATI requests that I cited in this document, I read through dozens more, sorting through redundant and irrelevant information in my attempts to unearth novel insights. My use of the documents, in particular the ATIs, filled in gaps by contributing details regarding underlying processes, which condition encounters at the border.

As filing ATIs is often an expensive process that can take many months and even years, I worked with previously filed requests. Previously completed ATIs can be located on Canada’s open government website and may be re-requested, though still take up to 6 weeks to receive (Brownlee & Walby, 2015). Using the open government website, I searched through previously filed requests to the CBSA and (less commonly) CSIS using terms like “asylum,” “predictive analytics,” and “lacombe”. ATI research is an under-used method but, like media analysis, is not without its limitations (Walby & Luscombe, 2017). It is slow and can take months or even years to broker access to sensitive information, often through the courts (Larsen and Walby, 2012). As Luscombe and Walby (2015) note, ATI data is often heavily redacted, discontinuous, and lacking adequate context. The information practices of intelligence and enforcement agencies impede effective and efficient analysis through efforts to obfuscate, delay, and minimize disclosure (Larsen and Walby, 2012; Luscombe and Walby, 2015). Sensitive information will often be exchanged over the phone to avoid the creation of a written record; ATI requests may also be read hyper-literally by a bureaucrat to minimize disclosure, and over-zealous redactions serve to further obfuscate knowledge and slow down the process (Luscombe & Walby, 2015). There are even examples of conscious destruction of information in Canada (Luscombe & Walby, 2015).

Despite these limitations, ATI research is a valuable method for developing rigorous understandings of how secretive government institutions like intelligence and enforcement agencies operate to the end of empowering citizens and researchers (Brownlee & Walby, 2015; Luscombe, Walby, & Lippert, 2017; Walby & Luscombe, 2018). Information on government websites and in the media is often general and incomplete. While typically heavily redacted, ATI requests fill gaps and answer questions that would otherwise require conjecture or synthesis of
disparate evidence. This improves the capacity of those studying government institutions to craft fuller evidence-based arguments. In the context of this research, ATI data greatly enriches the publicly available sources.

2.2.3 Future Opportunities

Despite limitations, there are many ways in which the data used for this study could be used for complementary analyses. Moreover, there are many opportunities to build upon and test the findings through a variety of other methods. For example, within the press wire coverage collected, there are fascinating differences between the linguistic zones. While a comparative analysis along these lines is outside the scope of this project, such a study would enrich scholarly understandings of how the institutional media approaches Canadian Anglophone and Francophone audiences in distinct ways (at least on the topic of migration). Another fascinating site for future inquiry is the visual discourse that was produced by press agencies to accompany their textual reporting. While I focussed on textual content, many press wire images captured encounters between asylum seekers and the RCMP as well as between anti-fascist and far-right protestors and various other symbolically loaded images that present a compelling site for future study. Lastly, to look deeper into how social media was used by political actors and selectively remediated by the press wires would produce interesting results. Within the coverage collected, I noted that right wing politicians and activists were more likely to have their social media content referred to than were left wing activists and politicians.

Additionally, comparing CP and AFP’s coverage to the factors that condition the reporting environment of journalists within each organization could produce some compelling results. One might compare differences in the coverage in relation to the conditions each organization lays out for journalistic practice, for example through reporting guidelines, political economic factors, audience demographics, and access. Relatedly, interviews, participant observation, or other ethnographic methods with both journalists and agents of the Canadian security apparatus would most certainly produce interesting insights regarding the ‘abstract machine’ that conditions their interactions with other actors and the material world (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Nail, 2017). Admittedly, brokering access to journalists is far easier than convincing RCMP and CBSA officers to speak on the record. However, studies like Brayne’s
(2017) embedded work with the Los Angeles Police Department, Allen and Vollmer’s interviews with UK Border agents (2018), and Côté-Boucher’s (2016) work with Canadian customs officers indicate that access is possible.

Likewise, ethnographic methods would also shed more light on the voices, experiences, and practices of asylees and irregular migrants. Despite this, the decision not to engage human participants for this research was entirely conscious. The intent, timeline, and scope of a master’s thesis is not conducive to conducting emancipatory, participatory research. Rather, to have engaged such methods in the context of this project would almost certainly have resulted in short-term, extractionist relationships with an immanently precarious population (as a consequence of their transient legal status with the Canadian government). However, participatory research conducted mindfully on a longer-term basis in collaboration with migrant communities and the organizations that serve them (especially with particular attention to the protection of participant privacy) could be useful to communities of asylees. For example, insights into the information practices of networked migrant communities and their individual relationships to the political effects of these online communities could help to counter overly-simplistic institutional narratives about irregular migration into Canada. That said, research of this genre would be co-designed with participants and settlement organizations.

Through the process of conducting this research, I was also confronted with many new questions and discovered many gaps in existing research. There is much more room for analysis of the ATI materials accessed for this study. For example, the visual discourse on slides used to train federal employees on security threats related to irregular migration is full of overtly militaristic iconography and could contribute to a more complete understanding of internal attitudes and approaches to the securitization of migration. One might also analyze the conversational discourse of the vast body of internal communications related to policy development (bearing in mind sensitive conversations are reserved for the telephone) or attempt to map out internal bureaucratic processes related to migration management. Additionally, the process of exploring the knowledge already available through previously filed Access to Information requests highlighted gaps that exist in the public record. The longer, more patient process of submitting requests from scratch could be an important (though insufficient and
inefficient) component of research and advocacy strategies related to algorithmic accountability and government use of automated decision-making systems.

The internal documents consulted herein also brought to the fore the extent to which Canadian intelligence and enforcement agencies collaborate with international partners, in particular the Migration 5 partners. In this context, more work is needed to uncover the extent of this collaboration and to understand differences and similarities that exist along national lines. Notably, Australia, the UK, and New Zealand all have similar and far more user-friendly systems for proactive disclosure of previously filed Access to Information requests than Canada; the United States (in most contexts) allows non-citizens to make Freedom of Information requests despite less proactive disclosure (Luscombe, Walby, & Lippert, 2017; “Make and browse Freedom of Information (FOI) requests,” n.d.; “Make and browse Official Information requests,” n.d.; “Right To Know–Make and browse Freedom of Information (FOI) requests,” n.d.).

In the chapter that follows, I dig into CP and AFP’s coverage of Lacolle to surface an institutional narrative. Identifying the voices portrayed as authoritative and the role of these performances in the coverage of Lacolle sets the stage for an ATI-informed investigation into the omissions and inconsistencies which characterize official accounts.
3.1 Introduction

The increase in arrivals through Lacolle, which began at the start of 2017, coincided with Donald Trump’s presidential inauguration. The border crossings became a media spectacle, characterized by protracted coverage and positioning by high profile politicians. The peak of the coverage coincides with the height of arrivals in August of 2017. This was also the point at which the Canadian government began responding to the arrivals in earnest with infrastructural, policy, and narrative interventions. Events in August were pre-mediated by slow but consistent reporting of the arrivals, which began in February. While the coverage of Lacolle appears to start in February of 2017 and end in August of 2018, the case is situated within a much broader context. The arrivals, which are ongoing more than two years later, have had a lasting impact on Canadian political discourse in the sense that they both awakened and emboldened the far-right (Graves & Valpy, 2018). Conservative leader Andrew Scheer has been hesitant to condemn such groups, presumably due to hopes they will vote for him (Boutilier, 2019; Macdonald, 2019). In contrast, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has been highly vocal in his rejection of racism, presumably as a rhetorical wedge to woo voters who do not self-identify as ‘racist,’ notwithstanding the moral and factual basis for holding such a position (LeDrew, 2019; Macdonald, 2019). The trends toward intensifying nationalism and transnational migration find their roots prior to events in Lacolle and have extended well past the media’s focus on the case. Despite this, the case of Lacolle, and its prominent place in the media, provides a site for investigation into the ways in which Canadian politics and performances of political authority are being reshaped by these phenomena.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that elite voices—those of politicians, government officials, and organizational leaders—dominate the mass-media narrative of Lacolle to the effect of justifying selective empathy and exclusive policies towards asylum seekers. Importantly, these voices are not monolithic but multiplicitous and contradictory. Nonetheless, together they put forth a decidedly institutional perspective focused upon bureaucracy, economy, and service provision at the expense of highlighting the affective dimensions of migration—and the
individuality of migrants themselves. Despite the dominance of particular voices in the coverage, the proliferation of networked communicative practices has demonstrably altered interactions between individuals, society, and the state to the effect of weakening traditional liberal political institutions and methods of control (Hajer, 2009; Varnelis, 2012). This displacement of authority has allowed networked migrant communities to articulate novel and emboldened performances of citizenship, which are tacitly acknowledged by the Canadian state apparatus through its attempts at network governance.

I begin with a brief outline of how voice has been studied in European contexts alongside some of the major theoretical concepts this scholarship has deployed. Taking inspiration from European scholars like Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) and Georgiou (2018), my analysis begins by describing the voices featured in the Canadian coverage, outlining the ‘order of appearance,’ an implicit hierarchy established by the institutional media (Arendt in Georgiou, 2018). After contextualizing these voices, I describe the major discourses presented in the institutional narrative—a story that emerges from the voices, discourses, and situated performances privileged in the press wire coverage. I demonstrate that, despite the mass media’s privileging of elite voices and discourses, alongside simplistic re-articulations of the ‘figure of the refugee’, the coverage still reflects novel forms of government-citizen interaction (Arendt, 1943; Georgiou, 2018). To describe these interactions, I introduce the term ‘diplomacy in the void’ to describe political encounters which occur in a networked and global public domain.

3.2 Who Speaks in the News? Who is Spoken Of?

3.2.1 Understanding Voice and Representation

Gayatri Spivak’s seminal essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” inspired major shifts in postcolonial scholarship by outlining how forces of oppression work to silence voices at the margins (Spivak, 1994). Media scholars have applied this question to their studies of refugees in European media and found the voices of refugees are systemically silenced, homogenized, and stripped of historical narrative (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou, 2018). Symbolic and discursive borders are used to establish a hierarchical ‘order of appearance’ in institutional communications. In this way, “voice does not guarantee recognition” and, especially when institutionally mediated, can be used to reify symbolic borders and rearticulate the figure of the
vulnerable and helpless refugee for mass media consumption (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou, 2018; Smith & Waite, 2018).

In one sense, staking a claim to representation in global flows of information carries the force of a claim to citizenship. This is what Chouliaraki terms the disposition of “I have a voice!” (Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 267). While staking this claim may be emancipatory in many ways, the institutional media’s prerogative to selectively remediate migrant voices shapes possibilities for public intervention by, in effect, precluding the consideration of refugee and asylee voices as those that can ‘be political’, or which are imbued with the capacity to provide meaningful insights into the broader operations of society (Chouliaraki, 2013; Isin, 2002). Journalism is, in this sense, a performative act of selective representation. It is shaped by professional and organizational norms, often to the effect of bolstering institutional narratives and privileging the voices and perspectives of political elites (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou, 2018).

3.2.1.1 Politicians

Unsurprisingly, politicians speak and are spoken of the most. Liberal politicians, of the incumbent Canadian government, are afforded the most space. Their speaking points are presented comprehensively and are repeated often. The names of Liberal politicians, both Federal and provincial appear a total of 394 times. Conservatives, the official opposition, are next most common and work to counter-script the liberal narrative, attempting to frame the situation as a crisis. Federal and provincial-level Conservative actors are referenced a total of 144 times. Notably absent from the coverage is the New Democratic Party (NDP), Canada’s third official party, which maintains 41 of 338 seats in the House of Commons (“Current Party Standings,” 2019). Politicians from the NDP are mentioned just 7 times and the NDP itself is mentioned 21 times across the coverage. NDP MPs like Jenny Kwan (n=3), Matthew Dubé (n=1), and Alexandre Boulerice (n=2) are quoted only briefly and do not add anything new to the story. Party leader Jagmeet Singh, who did not have a seat in parliament at the time, is mentioned once but not quoted; a sharp contrast to Conservative leader Andrew Scheer who speaks and is

4 Based on a search for “NPD” or “NDP” or "new democrats" or "néo-démocrates"
spoken of consistently. It is unclear to what extent the NDP wanted to be left out of the conversation due to the volatility of the topic or whether their voices were deemed unimportant by journalists.

Table 1: Politicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Trudeau</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Hussen</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration Refugees and Citizenship</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Scheer</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Leader of the Opposition, MP</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Goodale</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Garneau</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Minister of Transportation</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-François Lisée</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Party Leader, MNA until October 2018</td>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillipe Couillard</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Premier of Quebec until October 2018</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathleen Weil</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusiveness until October 2017</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelle Rempel</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Official Opposition Critic for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, MP</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Legault</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Party Leader, MNA (became Premiere in October of 2018)</td>
<td>Coalition Avenir Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Heurtel</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusiveness after October 2017</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

5 Member of Parliament (MP); Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP); Member of the National Assembly of Quebec (MNA)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denis Coderre</td>
<td>Équipe Denis Coderre</td>
<td>Mayor of Montreal until November 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Paul-Hus</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>Federal Public Safety Critic, MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Dubourg</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Ford</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario</td>
<td>Became Premiere of Ontario in June of 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pablo Rodriguez</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP (Became Minister of Heritage in June 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucie Charlebois</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
<td>Minister for Rehabilitation, Youth Protection and Public Health until August 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gérard Deltell</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>Official Opposition Critic for the Treasury Board, MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa MacLeod</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario</td>
<td>Minister of Children, Community and Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Tory</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>Mayor of Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Miller</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brenda Shanahan</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP representing Châteauguay—Lacolle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenny Kwan</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP, NDP critic Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Rodrigue</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>Foreign Minister, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanie Auguste</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>Minister for Haitians living abroad, Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernadette Clement</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>Municipal Councillor, Cornwall (became Mayor in December 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre Boulerice</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP, NDP Quebec lieutenant and Ethics critic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Cormier</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Généreux</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Roy</td>
<td>MNP, Minister of Culture, Communication and the French Language since October 2018</td>
<td>Coalition Avenir Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Duteau</td>
<td>Mayor, Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Albanese</td>
<td>Ontario MPP, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration until June 2018</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Blais</td>
<td>Quebec MNA, Minister of Employment until August 2018</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Former President of the United States</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sébastien Proulx</td>
<td>Quebec MNA, Minister of Education until August 2018 now Official Opposition House Leader</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Fournier</td>
<td>Quebec MNA, quit PQ in March 2019</td>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monique Pauzé</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Plamondon</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luc Thériault</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier Barsalou-Duval</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrystia Freeland</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Blair</td>
<td>Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime Reduction</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carole Poirier</td>
<td>MNA until October 2018</td>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Dubé</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagmeet Singh</td>
<td>Party Leader, MP as of March 2019</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.1.2 Officials

Government officials or representatives are the next most common voices. Most of the time, official voices come in the form of unnamed spokespeople providing updates on statistics or developments. (“The flow continues at a steady pace, according to Canadian officials.”
(Agence France Presse, 2017)). However, some voices from implicated departments were recurrent, typically supporting the Liberals’ narrative. Exceptions to this included the alarmist tone of Jean-Pierre Fortin, president of the Customs and Immigration Union and the calmer, internationalist perspective of Jean-Nicolas Beuze of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Interestingly, several named RCMP officers gave personal and empathetic performances to the media in securitized encounters at the border, reflecting a similar ambivalence to the Greek military personnel described by Chouliaraki and Georgiou (2017). (“‘There's no doubt it’s touching, so we try to make their misery as short as possible,’ RCMP Staff Sgt. Brian Byrne told reporters in a briefing at the border this week” (Banerjee, 2017b)). This ambivalent affect presented a stark contrast to the CBSA, which was only represented by officials like Fortin and Patrick Lefort, the agency’s director, both with institutional interests to defend.

Table 2: Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization/Employer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Fortin</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Canadian Immigration and Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francine Dupuis</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Programme régional d'accueil et d'intégration des demandeurs d'asile (PRAIDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Nicolas Beuze</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Dumas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matieu Genest</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Press Secretary</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Bardsley</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Press Secretary</td>
<td>Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claude Castonguay</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Lefort</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. (Navy) Eliane Trahan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Canadian Forces (Navy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.1.3 Experts

Experts are not common in the coverage, contrasting the findings of a previous study of retail media coverage of Lacolle (Duncan & Caidi, 2018). This difference is likely attributable to the norm of so-called “churnalism” wherein a retail media journalist either directly re-prints or builds on a press wire story calling upon experts to fill in details left out of a news agency story (Johnston & Forde, 2011). All experts cited in the coverage are lawyers or professors of law. Their perspectives skewed critical; none worked to bolster conservative or nationalist accounts. Saron Gebresellassi was counted as both an activist and an expert due to her involvement with Black Lives Matter in providing legal commentary and advice to the media and asylees at the border.
### Table 3: Experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expert</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stéphan Handfield</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lawyer, Owner</td>
<td>Handfield and Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saron Gebresellassi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lawyer, Owner</td>
<td>Saron Legal PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Taillefer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Legal Aid Montreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherry Aiken</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Professor of Law</td>
<td>Queen's University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamie Liew</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Assistant Professor of Law</td>
<td>University of Ottawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Sébastien Boudreault</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lawyer, President</td>
<td>Association québécoise des avocats et avocates en droit de l'immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Meurrens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lawyer, Partner</td>
<td>Larlee Rosenberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifford McCarten</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lawyer, Name Partner</td>
<td>McCartney Wallace Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.1.4 Institutional Humanitarians

Institutional humanitarians are professionals working for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing services or doing advocacy work. With the exception of Carl Boisvert, these individuals are leaders in their organizations. Richard Goldman, Marjorie Villefranche, and Janet Dench all place emphasis on service provision as opposed to an affective approach to humanitarianism. Boisvert, of the Red Cross adopts a tropey humanitarian pride (“We make sure that they are safe and we are taking care of them,” (Wright, 2018d)). Guillaume André approaches humanitarianism as solidarity, stating that the Haitian community in Montreal is an “extended family” (Besset, 2017a). What differentiates these voices from those of grassroots activists is their entanglement with and/or dependence upon state institutions. The very necessary settlement and advocacy work that they do must be done and expressed in a way that is not overly subversive for fear of losing credibility and institutional support.

### Table 4: Institutional Humanitarians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carl Boisvert</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Canadian Red Cross</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.1.5 Activists

Grassroots activists offer perspectives from the fringes, challenging dominant accounts. Quotes from protests are often unattributed but activists fall into two main camps: pro- and anti-migrant. This divide instantiates the aforementioned nationalist versus globalist meta-narrative of contemporary global politics. Main nationalist groups La Meute and Storm Alliance are mentioned 31 times while the main pro-migrant groups were only named 15 times.\(^6\)

The pro-migrant groups are not presented as a cohesive whole but as generally bound by anti-fascist ideology. From Black Lives Matter (BLM), Saron Gebresellassi criticizes the government’s securitized approach to receiving migrants, suggesting the arrests are overkill and that detentions contravene the human rights of migrants. Pascale Diverlus (also BLM) blames the government’s ambivalent discourse for any confusion about the rules while Aaron Lakoff indicates that countering “racist” far-right groups is the main objective of Solidarity Across Borders (Giguère, 2018; Globenewswire, 2018). Solidarity Across Borders is presented in the context of a much broader anti-colonial ethos, blaming the policies of Western states for the inequality driving mobility (Saint-Arnaud, 2018b).

Anti-migrant voices are typically associated with the far-right. Nonetheless, they reject the label of racist, emphasizing law, order, and controlled migration. They blame the arrivals on the Trudeau government’s welcoming rhetoric, calling it “destructive” (The Canadian Press, 2017b). Anti-migrant activists are presented as more proactive and organized than the anti-fascist groups that engaged in counter-protests—a ‘welcome caravan’ is the only exception to this trend in the coverage (Saint-Arnaud, 2018b; The Canadian Press, 2017b). Storm Alliance activist Eric

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\(^6\) Based on searches for [“La Meute” or “Storm Alliance”] and [“Solidarité sans Frontières” or Solidarity across borders” or “Black lives Matter”]
Trudel describes protests at the border as a tactic to draw attention to the group’s cause (La Presse canadienne, 2017b). In contrast, Sylvain Brouillette of La Meute adopts a discourse of humanitarian securitization criticizing Storm Alliance’s protest at the border saying that “it is human to want the best for your family” and that the real problem is that Justin Trudeau is stopping the RCMP from “doing their job” (Giguère, 2018). Overall, these groups seem to adopt the documented nationalist-populist strategy of manipulating the media by strategically softening their rhetoric and situating it in contexts that attract “up the chain” media attention, typically on social media (Holiday in Marwick & Lewis, 2017, p. 38). However, as Perry and Scrivens note, “hate can only grow in an enabling environment” (2018, p. 178).

Table 5: Activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activist</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saron Gebresellassi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lawyer, Activist</td>
<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anas Bouslihane</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Pro-immigration activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Éric Trudel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Storm Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diane Blain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Storm Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascale Diverlus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Lakoff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Solidarity Beyond Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvain Brouillette</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>La Meute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaggi Singh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Solidarity Beyond Borders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.1.6 Migrants and Asylum Seekers

Unsurprisingly, migrants do not speak very much in the coverage and when they do, they are quoted in ways that bolster the official narrative of misinformed migrants desperately fleeing the policies of the Trump Administration. Recent, aforementioned observations from the European context are supported by the representation of migrants in the coverage (Allen, 2016; Allen & Vollmer, 2018; Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017; Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; Georgiou, 2018). Tired humanitarian tropes depicting desperate, vulnerable and ignorant migrants are blatantly rearticulated alongside a strong
emphasis on women, children, and families. The voices of individual migrants are appropriated to construct a homogenized figure of the refugee in the coverage and, even then, only as an afterthought to institutional and political concerns. Asylum seekers are silenced through heavily curated selective representation, homogenized through a narrative of pressure, and are de-contextualized through appropriations of their voices to bolster the institutional narrative rather than to recount their own.

Table 6: Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
<th>Profile</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marie-Junie Joseph</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30, young mother</td>
<td>&quot;I came because the door is open here, because I heard Canada is open to immigrants&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ahmed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Father of two</td>
<td>&quot;We came to the US to ask for asylum,&quot; he said. But with new President Donald Trump's anti-immigrant policy &quot;we are very much scared from deportation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asma and Ayman Elyas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pregnant young couple</td>
<td>&quot;A discarded plastic bag reveals the journey of a Sudanese couple.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Rigaud Liberal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>38, single</td>
<td>&quot;Learned about Roxham Road from Facebook &quot;; &quot;Canada will be better than America&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Iftikhar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42, father of four</td>
<td>&quot;There is nobody to help,&quot; he said as he watched his children play in a park near the shelter. &quot;I want to leave here but I don't know what to do.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran Carlos Reyes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40, Salvadorian facing deportation from US</td>
<td>&quot;There’s Canada, but I don’t know anything about Canada.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lid (not real name)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Young mother</td>
<td>“Lid is approaching the end of her stock of diapers and formula. After it's gone, the mother, who has applied for asylum in Canada, does not know how she will&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Dominant Discourses

In the sections that follow, I highlight how the norms of journalistic production at Canadian Press (CP) and Agence France Press (AFP), which privilege the voices of particular actors, had the effect of synthesizing the discourses put forth by these voices into an official account of events—an institutional narrative. To tell this story, I lay these discourses out in their order of appearance—from the most to least prevalent. Conveniently, they tell a rather compelling story:

(1) The most prevalent discourse in the coverage is of pressure, which is articulated through a focus on statistics as well as infrastructural, institutional, and economic strains associated with irregular migration. This pressure narrative primes audiences for a policy agenda centred on reducing migration. (2) The second most common discourse hinges upon policy discussions and debates. Xenophobic American policies are blamed for driving people away, while the loophole in the Canada-US Safe-Third-Country Agreement (STCA) is blamed for the influx of specifically irregular arrivals. These policy discussions are central to the political

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7 Translated from: Lid arrive au bout de sa réserve de couches et de lait maternisé. Après, la maman, qui a demandé l'asile au Canada, ne sait pas trop comment elle va se débrouiller avec son nouveau-né de 19 jours, dans son appartement infesté de coquerelles
positioning that accompanied the increase in irregular arrivals. (3) Relatedly, the third most prevalent discourse is that of humanitarian securitization, which shaped the contours of the political positioning that occurred. Ambivalent messages signaling both empathy and a need for control were tactically deployed by many actors, especially Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government. This was expressed by the government through an emphasis on virtues like openness alongside euphemistic references to law and order. (4) This justified the fourth discourse of the misinformed migrant, which suggested asylees were acting based upon misinformation about the Canadian immigration system disseminated through social media. By framing asylees as ignorant humanitarian subjects rather than malicious actors, the Trudeau government was able to enact interventions to deter migration and assert Canadian sovereignty without appearing authoritarian or exclusionary.

Table 7: Discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>References Coded</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>“Between Aug. 1 and Aug. 7 alone, 1,798 people showed up at an unofficial crossing from the U.S. into Quebec. In comparison, only 2,920 claims were filed in Quebec in all of 2015. So far the numbers show no sign of slowing” (Lowrie, 2017c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>“While Canadian authorities don’t directly link the flow to Trump administration policies, they acknowledge that the number of migrants from the United States has increased since January, especially through the Quebec border” (Triomphe, 2017).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Securitization</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>“Our government is committed to offering protection for those fleeing war, persecution and natural disasters without compromising the safety and security of Canadians,” he said at the news conference” (Lowrie, 2017a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misinformation and Social Media</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>“Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said Friday the government would use the intervening time to target American communities, including Miami and southern California, with an ongoing message that Canada may be compassionate and welcoming, but it still has a rules-based immigration system. ‘Just because you come to Canada irregularly does not give you a free pass to this country,’ he said” (Patel &amp; Blanchfield, 2018).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quantitatively speaking, the least prevalent discourse was the narrative of the misinformed migrant, however, as a rhetorical strategy it was central to the official response and a seemingly natural extension of the more common themes. The pressure narrative primed audiences to see migration as a threat, and alongside discussions of American policies and the STCA, set a policy agenda hinging on deterrence. Tactical discourses of humanitarian securitization meant this deterrent needed to be framed in virtuous terms—or at least in a way that contrasted the blossoming authoritarianism south of the border. The narrative of the misinformed migrant accommodates these criteria. The Liberals’ efforts to prevent migration were thus framed as an educational initiative targeting ignorant humanitarian subjects.

### 3.3.1 Priming for Pressure

**Table 8: Pressure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>References coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pressure (aggregate)</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure (direct/general)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-pressure</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water metaphors</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The focus on pressure in the coverage of Lacolle replicates previous insights regarding a strong emphasis on numbers and scale on immigration in British media discourse (Patel & Blanchfield, 2018). (“Between Aug. 1 and Aug. 7 alone, 1,798 people showed up at an unofficial crossing from the U.S. into Quebec. In comparison, only 2,920 claims were filed in Quebec in all of 2015. So far the numbers show no sign of slowing” (Lowrie, 2017c)). This focus does more
than just frame the arrivals in the context of their scale; it situates them within a broader narrative of pressure.

The implication is that higher numbers are a threat to domestic safety and prosperity. The well documented trend of using water metaphors including flood (flot) \((n=20)\) or wave (vague) \((n=34)\) to present migration as a homogenous and dangerous phenomena is consistently found throughout the coverage (“A wave of asylum seekers arriving on foot from the United States that threatened to overwhelm Canadian refugee services has slowed to a trickle as the harsh winter draws closer, officials said Friday.” (Agence France Presse, 2017c)).

The pressure narrative is linked to three main sites of concern: shortfalls in physical infrastructure like shelter \((109\) references coded\), stress on the bureaucracies of reception \((64\) references coded\), and the economic burden posed by asylum seekers \((45\) references coded\). The three sub-narratives are entangled and were frequently cross-coded.

**Institutional and Infrastructural Strain**

The most common concern relates to infrastructural deficits, mostly regarding shelter for the new arrivals. The challenge of shelter is discussed in relation to both temporary shelters and longer-term solutions during the claims process. A camp was assembled by the Canadian military near Lacolle and heated trailers were procured to shelter arrivals in the winter as they awaited their turn to make an asylum claim and undergo security screenings. Montreal’s disused Olympic Stadium was converted into a temporary shelter alongside university dormitories and an old hospital to meet the high demand on temporary housing after claimants had been transported into the city. After a newcomer is deemed admissible to Canada and lodges their asylum claim, they receive social assistance and a work permit and are expected to find their own accommodations. In big cities like Montreal and Toronto where most arrivals were staying, a lack of affordable and safe long-term housing presented a challenge for both the municipalities and the newcomers themselves.

Closely related to the pressure on physical infrastructure was the impact of the claims on the capacity of bureaucracies and services to process arrivals and provide government services efficiently. (“A rising number of migrants is crossing the Canadian-American border to claim
asylum in Canada, placing unprecedented pressure on police and border control, authorities announced on Thursday” (Agence France Presse, 2017a). Of preliminary concern was the backlog of people waiting to be screened for admissibility and their eligibility to make an asylum claim in Canada, which stressed the CBSA’s bureaucratic capacities, requiring human resource reallocations. After this first step in the process is completed, asylum claims must be heard by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), a quasi-judicial body responsible for making refugee protection determinations. At the peak of the arrivals in August of 2017, Conservative Immigration critic, Michelle Rempel, referencing an internal memo, stated that the arrivals “will further backlog a system in which some refugees are already waiting 11 years for hearings” (Ring, 2017). While the IRB memo was criticized as an alarmist “doomsday” scenario by Immigration lawyer Chantal Desloges, the pressure felt by Canadian structures of reception was real (Levitz, 2017a).

**Economic Stress**

While the construction of physical infrastructure and the expansion of bureaucratic capacities both implicitly involve additional costs, the coverage places far less explicit emphasis on the fiscal implications of the arrivals. One Lacolle restauranteur was quoted wondering “if we can afford to welcome” the asylum seekers but, for the most part, economic discourse had much more to do with who should pay as opposed to whether Canada as a whole could bear the costs of reception (Besset, 2017c). Discussions of economic stress were noticeably more concentrated in the CP’s French language coverage compared to CP’s English coverage and AFP’s overall coverage. While the federal government spent over 270 million dollars managing the situation, a large economic burden was placed on the provinces. Over 90 percent of arrivals since January 2017 came through Quebec with many moving on to Ontario, especially Toronto (Banerjee, 2017a; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017b, 2018). In April of 2018, the

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8 Translated from: “Un nombre croissant de migrants traverse la frontière canado-américaine pour demander l'asile au Canada, créant une pression inédite sur les services policiers et frontaliers, ont annoncé jeudi les autorités”

9 This article was written by the Canadian Press and subsequently printed in the Toronto Star. It alluded to Lacolle but did not mention Lacolle and, therefore, was not a part of the body of coverage coded. I have opted to include it here for its relevance.
government of Quebec announced that it had reached its limits not just in terms of costs, quoted at 146 million, but in terms of institutional capacity to receive newcomers (Saint-Arnaud, 2018a). Similarly, the following July, Toronto mayor John Tory stated that the city needed 64 million dollars to recoup the costs of the increased arrivals and that shelters in Toronto were filling rapidly (La Presse Canadienne, 2018).

Controversially, the Canadian government transferred just 50 million dollars across all affected communities with 36 million going to Quebec and 11 million to Ontario (La Presse canadienne, 2018). In August of 2018, resentments boiled over at an event where Justin Trudeau was speaking. Diane Blain, a member of far-right group Storm Alliance, asked Trudeau when he would be paying Quebec back its 146 million dollars and whether he was “tolerant of native Quebecois people” (Crête, 2018d)10. In response, Trudeau called her a racist, prompting several conservative politicians in and outside of Quebec to come to Mme. Blain’s defence (Crête, 2018c). The conversation became about racism rather than the economic stress, exemplifying how the economic implications of the heightened arrivals, while certainly important, often took a back seat to the social and practical pressures of the heightened arrivals.

Scripting Crisis and Control

The pressure narrative frames the arrivals as both a problem, and a threat to the system.政客们生产了危机和控制的脚本和反脚本，以证明自己的权威。自由党政治家和机构人道主义者承认抵达者给接收机构带来了压力；然而，他们也强调了他们的能力来管理这个情况。对于自由派魁北克政治家来说，这尤其明显，因为他们要求联邦政府给予更多的支持，但仍然与特鲁多政府政治上保持一致。（“我们被压垮了！”在此警报主义的语气在本地电台星期四，部长后来想在新闻发布会上安慰大家“政府将采取行动”）

10 Translation from: “tolérant envers les Québécois de souche”; “de souche” can also be translated as “old-stock”
the situation attentively and working in close collaboration with the federal government’ assured Ms. Weil.” (Braibant, 2017c)).

In contrast, critical voices framed the situation as a crisis that required drastic measures to enhance security and deter further arrivals. Their intent was to increase political pressure on the Canadian government—or in Fortin’s case, CBSA management—to their benefit. Crisis framing is a rhetorical tactic often used in politics to assert one actor’s authority at the expense of another (Hajer, 2009).

Jean-Pierre Fortin frames the arrivals as both a “major crisis” and an explicit security threat (Besset, 2017b; Wright, 2018a). He highlights “extremely tired” officers, who are spread too thin to effectively perform their duty to protect the integrity of the Canadian border and the security of Canadians (La Presse canadienne, 2017a). Fortin is repeatedly quoted criticizing the government and CBSA management but is never engaged in a discussion or spoken of by others, unlike the politicians. His strategy is rooted in defending the interests of the frontline agents and (purports to) reflect the ethos of his profession rather than of a partisan political position.

Unlike Fortin, Conservative party leader Andrew Scheer alongside Immigration critic Michelle Rempel and Public Safety critic Pierre Paul-Hus, counter-scripted the Liberal narrative of control by framing the arrivals as a crisis for political positioning. Scheer advocates for approaching “the issue with compassion, and also concern” while simultaneously arguing for a stronger stance on border security (Levitz, 2017b). His party attempts to frame Trudeau as weak and the arrivals as “dangerous” in their own bid for authority (Ring, 2017).

In Quebec, nationalist politician François Legault of the Coalition Avenir Quebec (CAQ)—who became the province’s premier in October of 2018—echoed statements previously made by both Rempel and Scheer, warning of an impending “backlash” against immigration, going a step

11 Translation from: “‘On est débordés’! Après cette petite phrase alarmiste sur les radios locales jeudi, la ministre s’est ensuite voulu rassurante en conférence de presse. ‘Le gouvernement du Québec suit l’évolution de cette situation de près et travaillons en étroite collaboration avec le gouvernement fédéral’, a assuré Mme Weil.”

12 Translated from: “extrêmement fatigues”
further by accusing the liberals of allowing the border to become like “a sieve” by “opening their arms wide as if Quebec could welcome all the misery in the world” (Angers, 2017; Bergeron, 2017).\(^{13}\) For his part, Jean-François Lisée of the nationalist-separatist Parti Quebecois referred to asylum seekers as “Trudeau’s guests” and advocated for the construction of a fence along the border, although it is unclear whether he was joking (Plante, 2017).\(^{14}\)

To counter this political positioning, liberal politicians framed these varying criticisms as malicious, illegal, intolerant, and uneducated. (‘‘While this has been explained many times, the Conservatives continue to perpetuate misinformation to pit communities against each other. If a briefing on the immigration system would be helpful for Mr. Scheer, we would be happy to organize one,’ Genest said” (Wright, 2018c)). In this way, the liberals sought to assert both moral and political authority, which they sought to contrast with populist-nationalist voices domestically and south of the border.

While there were debates over whether the events constituted a crisis and to what extent the Canadian government was in control, none of Canada’s political elite effectively challenged the framing of migration as a burden. Allowing for forced migration to be seen as simply a problem, as opposed to an opportunity for a stronger community or a situation commanding solidarity, set the stage for policy discussions and debates geared towards reducing migration rather than stoking discussions about how Canada might be more effective at receiving asylees. This applies both in the context of organizational efficiency, but also in terms of generating more compassionate approaches. Dominant narratives of pressure afforded a policy agenda of selective empathy, wherein actors express affective sentiment yet continue with their attempts to deter asylum claims.

\(^{13}\) Translated from: “ressac,” which literally translated means “surf”; “passoir,” which means colander or sieve; and the statement that, “Les libéraux lancent un très mauvais signal aux migrants illégaux en ouvrant grands les bras, comme si le Québec pouvait accueillir toute la misère du monde”

\(^{14}\) Translated from: “des ‘invités à Trudeau’”
3.3.2 Setting the Policy Agenda

Table 9: Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>References Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy (aggregate)</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Policy</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Third Country Agreement</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Policy</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Policies and Performances of the Trump Administration

The exodus from the United States was largely attributed to the Trump Administration’s xenophobic policies and rhetoric in the coverage by a multiplicity of voices. On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13769 (colloquially known as the Muslim ban) barring entry for citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entry into the United States on security grounds, subjecting Muslims in America and abroad to much unease (Trump, 2017).

Significant unrest was also caused as the American administration began revoking Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a humanitarian immigration status, which bars deportations to certain countries and allows TPS holders to work in the US. Between September 2017 and January of 2018, the Department of Homeland Security announced the termination of status for citizens of Sudan (with South Sudan remaining on the list), Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador; however, they were enjoined from enforcing this by court order on October 3rd, 2018 (Park, 2018; Ramos et al. V. Nielsen et al., 2018). Nonetheless, the uncertainty caused by this prompted many people to look north. In Canadian coverage, the Haitian population received the most coverage since Haiti was the most common country of origin for asylum seekers in 2017, which was attributed to Montreal’s large Haitian diaspora (Besset, 2017b).
Further stoking anxiety amongst immigrant populations in the United States was the ‘zero tolerance’ family separation policy that resulted in the detention and separation of parents from their young children (Crête, 2018b). This policy was widely condemned as a breach of human rights and strengthened the cases of those advocating for the Canadian government to take a stronger stance against the Trump administration (Crête, 2018b). It was one of the few times that the NDP was featured taking a strong stance in the coverage. Like the termination of TPS, the family separation policy was halted by the American legal system, although it has since become apparent the injunction against family separation has not been upheld (Chotiner, 2019; Jarrett, 2018; Ms. L. et al. v. U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) et al., 2018).

The Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement

While such performative and exclusionary American policies can easily be blamed for the exodus, the reason for the irregular quality of the arrivals is attributed to the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA). The STCA states that one must claim asylum in the first safe country of arrival, save for a handful of exceptions like family reunification (Proctor, 2017). If an individual is in the United States, they are expected to claim asylum there. If they arrive at an official Canadian port of entry, they will be sent back. However, a loophole in the policy, discovered by tens of thousands of asylum seekers, stipulates that the agreement only applies at official border crossings (Agence France Presse, 2017b). By crossing at Roxham Road, near Hemmingford, Quebec, just kilometres from the official crossing in Lacolle, people who would otherwise be ineligible to claim asylum in Canada are allowed to do so. The STCA thus became the primary subject of policy analysis and criticism amongst institutional voices in the coverage.

The agreement was attacked from all angles. Conservative voices like Andrew Scheer, Michelle Rempel, and Pierre Paul-Hus called for the agreement to be extended across the whole Canadian border or at least to the main points of irregular entry including Roxham Road (Levitz, 2017b; Wright, 2018b). It was also suggested that asylum seekers be declared “irregular arrivals”, a legal status (distinct from the use of terms like irregular migrant or irregular crossing), which mandates universal and indeterminate detentions, not dissimilar to the American zero tolerance policy (Levitz, 2017b; Smith, 2017). When used by the previous Harper
government, it had the effect of intimidating people into withdrawing their asylum claims (Smith, 2017).

Among the few experts quoted, Professor of Law, Sherry Aiken noted extending the STCA was impractical for several reasons (Smith, 2017). Firstly, the STCA functions at official points of entry because when someone is denied entry, there is an American counterpart right there to receive them without bringing the applicant into Canadian space. American authorities who are actively trying to drive immigrants away would need to be convinced to receive denied asylum seekers (Smith, 2017). In the words of American Border Patrol supervisor, Brad Brant “our mission isn't to prevent people from leaving” (Ring, 2017). Even if this worked, asylum seekers would likely—as has been the case along the United States-Mexico border—undertake more dangerous and less visible journeys, to achieve the same outcome, enriching smugglers in the process (Nevins, 2002). Tasking the RCMP with securing the whole border would simply force migrants to avoid Canadian enforcement officials rather than presenting themselves voluntarily as they are doing now, never mind the unfeasible cost of the operation and the time it would take to hire and train staff and procure necessary infrastructure. Extending the STCA across Canada’s entire frontier is simply not a realistic proposition, implicating Scheer and Rempel in performances of authority rooted in style over substance, which are effective in the context of network governance (Hajer, 2003a, 2009).

Contrasting conservative voices, Canada’s New Democratic Party (NDP), alongside activists and advocates demanded the STCA be suspended or cancelled on the grounds that it was promoting unsafe journeys and human smuggling. As noted, voices from the NDP are uncommon in the coverage; however, certain institutional humanitarian and grassroots activist voices amplified the message that the STCA ought to be suspended. Key to activist arguments is the position that “the United States is no longer a safe country” given deteriorating protections for the human rights of immigrants (Giguère, 2018).15 This argument is even stronger in the present context of semantic debates over whether the “mass incarceration of civilians without trial…where [detainees] are being brutalized in dehumanizing conditions and dying” can be

15 Translated from: “les États-Unis ne sont plus un pays sûr”
called a ‘concentration camp’ (Ocasio-Cortez in Gessen, 2019). While the NDP is seen to be generally in agreement with the notion that the United States is no longer a safe place to claim asylum, they also took a shrewder approach, arguing that rather than preventing arrivals, the STCA was encouraging irregular migration, thereby increasing stress on both the system and asylum seekers (Crête, 2018a; Wright, 2018b). Moreover, Jean Francois Lisée of the provincial Parti Québécois pointed out that the agreement was concentrating the arrivals in Quebec and that allowing asylum seekers to arrive at official entries would encourage broader distribution of arrivals and thus reduce pressure (Saint-Arnaud, 2018a).

Nonetheless, suspending the STCA poses its own problems including the potential for domestic political fallout from a policy that could easily be labelled as a move to open Canada’s borders and the simultaneous threat of American retaliation for being labelled unsafe—potentially explanations for why the NDP was much less vocal than the conservatives. Suspending the STCA would signal tolerance for subversion of Canadian sovereignty while decreasing the government’s control over who gets to live in Canada. This would stoke resurgent nationalist movements and empower the conservative voices framing the government as weak.

Adding to this is the threat of American reprisals. While it is clear that the Trump Administration’s positions are driving people away, the Canadian government denied this and refrained from commenting on Trump’s policies until the story on child separation broke, at which point condemnatory comments were released. If the Canadian government were to declare the United States an unsafe country, they would likely be subjected to harsh retaliations from the American administration, which has already exercised its hegemony to Canada’s detriment in the contexts of trade and security in addition to personally attacking Trudeau (The Canadian Press, 2018b). Suspending the STCA would not only risk exacerbating pressure by ostensibly increasing the number of arrivals, it would deepen the adversarial relationship with the US, which has significant economic, military, and political sway over conditions in Canada.

For these reasons, the acts of diplomacy covered were rarely oriented towards changing the STCA. When they were, it was emphasized that “discussions on modernizing the safe third country agreement are still in their early days” (Wright, 2018b). Most coverage of diplomatic efforts centred around changing the script about coming to Canada and was closely aligned with
a narrative of misinformation that developed. These efforts to deter arrivals included visits with Haitian dignitaries, addresses to American consular officials in Nigeria, and out-reach efforts on behalf of Canadian consulates in the United States. These efforts were embedded within a much larger outreach campaign against misinformation rooted in discourses of humanitarian securitization, which is described in the sections below.

The Ambivalent Canadian Brand

Compared to the millions of people that have taken refuge in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan since the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011 or that over 3 million Venezuelans have fled to neighbouring countries in recent years, to suggest that 40,000 arrivals in a wealthy nation like Canada constitutes a crisis ignores important context (Humanitarian Aid, 2018; UNHCR, 2018). At 68.5 million, there are more displaced people on earth than ever before (UNHCR, 2018). However, Canada’s relative success at receiving and integrating newcomers is historically rooted in a high level of control over who is allowed in—a benefit of geographical isolation (Bloemraad, 2012). The highly contingent Canadian immigration regime uses a points-based system—which has been celebrated by Donald Trump himself—and favours wealthy, educated newcomers who speak the official languages and are less likely to require social assistance (Paquet, 2018; Roberts, 2019).

While attitudes towards immigration are generally positive in Canada as a whole, according to a 2018 survey by the Environics Institute for Survey Research, attitudes in Quebec are the second least positive in Canada, after Alberta (Perreault, 2018). Quebec, which received the vast majority of arrivals, maintains an immigration regime that is separate from the rest of Canada, however, it engages in similarly curatorial practices (Immigration, Diversité et Inclusion Québec, 2018a; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2007). While the Quebecois provincial government provides services to asylees while they await a decision, all asylum determinations are made by the Federal Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2007a). Once an asylum seeker has been accepted, if they choose to stay in Quebec, they must apply for a Quebec Selection Certificate, which seeks to attract and retain specifically French-speaking newcomers (Immigration, Diversité et Inclusion Québec, 2018b). Regardless of these regional distinctions, the encounters, which are the focus of
this study are between asylees and officers of federal enforcement agencies (the RCMP and the CBSA)

As Ahmed argues, it is through proximal encounters with strangers, like those in Lacolle, that national identities take shape and are, moreover, negotiated and altered through policies of contingent multiculturalism (2000). In these ways the ‘we’ of a nation is defined in the context of what ‘we’ are not (Ahmed, 2000). Canada’s identity as a multicultural haven is predicated upon a willingness—even an eagerness—to welcome (certain) strangers, however, this obfuscates the ways in which the Canadian government asserts a claim to selective inclusion (Ahmed, 2000). Those deemed undesirable or undeserving might be expelled without sacrificing the claim to an identity rooted in inclusion.

This curatorial approach to immigration has precluded Canada from many of the social tensions that often accompany large movements of people. While Canadians are generally positive towards immigration, it is not because they are more generous or empathetic but rather because Canada is selectively empathetic and maintains an immigration regime designed to maximize incoming human capital (such as prior education, work experience, wealth, language skills, and various other factors that will contribute to the Canadian economy). Even though Canada does not take on its fair share of the costs associated with resettling forced migrants in a global context, Canada’s success at integrating newcomers has been touted by the Trudeau government as one of the nation’s great virtues (Trudeau, 2015). Canada’s brand as a welcoming and tolerant place is cherished yet became increasingly tensioned by the arrivals and the crisis-framing that accompanied them.

While the liberal government avoided directly criticizing Trump for peril of being subjected to a likely brash and aggressive retaliation, Trump’s nativist tack served as a convenient foil for the Canadian government in its communications. On January 28th, 2017, a day after Trump announced the Muslim ban, Trudeau published a tweet that became widely reprised in discussions of his government’s response to the arrivals. “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada” (Trudeau, 2017).
Scheer accused Trudeau of misleading asylum seekers and encouraging them to come to Canada based on an incomplete and romanticized portrayal of the immigration system (The Canadian Press, 2018a). As arrivals began attracting media attention in February, the Canadian government’s message quickly shifted to include emphases on law and order and the strict bureaucratic nature of Canada’s immigration system. Liberal voices, nonetheless, continued telegraphing moral and political authority by virtue signaling and deploying measured rhetoric to contrast nativist messaging across the border and domestically. (“‘We have an open compassionate country, but we have a strong system that we follow,’ [Trudeau] said. ‘Protecting Canadian confidence in the integrity of our system allows us to continue to be open, and that's exactly what we need to continue to do.’” (Ring, 2017)).

Despite efforts to find the proverbial middle ground, Trudeau’s liberals became caught in a centrist’s bind of sorts. Neither extending, nor suspending the STCA presented a politically tenable option, yet that is the policy agenda audiences were primed for in the news. Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship, Ahmed Hussen indicated a need to “refresh” the agreement but was “clear there are no formal negotiations with respect to the Safe Third Country agreement” (Banerjee, 2018). This bind created opportunities for opposing politicians to script events in Lacolle in relation to pressure on Canadian infrastructures of reception. By framing the situation as a crisis, overstating the effects of the arrivals, and suggesting the Trudeau government has lost control, opposition politicians sought to erode the Liberals’ claims to authority.

On the other hand, institutional advocates, activists, and left-wing politicians blamed the arrivals on exclusionary American policies over which the Canadian government has minimal influence. They also leveraged critiques from within the STCA-centred policy agenda. From a liberal political-strategic standpoint, extending, suspending, cancelling, or attempting to renegotiate the STCA poses significant risks to the social, political, and economic stability of Canada that are likely not worth the potential pay-off. Stuck between competing calls for enhanced law and order and a more compassionate humanitarian response, the Canadian government’s narrative approach to events in Lacolle was laced with ambivalence as it tried to play all sides.
3.3.3 Humanitarian Securitization

Table 10: Humanitarian Securitization

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<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Being Processed’</td>
<td>41</td>
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The rise of nationalist politics domestically and abroad meant that, for the liberals, Canada’s brand as a tolerant immigrant mecca had to be hedged with assurances to the public that the government was in control of the situation. European governments and enforcement agencies have described their own borders as a space of humanitarian securitization where they attempt to balance the “double requirement of security and care” by maintaining state sovereignty through securitization while upholding international humanitarian obligations to displaced populations (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017, p. 159; Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017).

Ambivalent national borders are, in this way, discursively and symbolically constituted through emphasis on balancing security for insiders and care for outsiders (Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017). Discursive regimes of humanitarian securitization work to impose contradictory dualist frames to the effect of reconstituting imbalanced power relationships (Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017). For example, states claim the power to declare migrants desirable or undesirable, legitimate or illegitimate, safe or risky, and deserving or undeserving through discourses of securitization. Furthermore, by differentiating between the purveyors and receivers of security and humanitarian relief, institutional humanitarian discourses bolster this power to sort bodies and limit mobility. Humanitarian securitization works to justify the migration-security nexus linking practices of mobility in search of human security to exclusionary state security practices in the name of domestic public safety (Huysmans & Squire, 2009).
Humanitarian securitization permeates the Canadian political discourse surrounding Lacolle. (“Our government is committed to offering protection for those fleeing war, persecution and natural disasters without compromising the safety and security of Canadians,” -Liberal MP Mark Miller (Lowrie, 2017a)). While often expressed in a single ambivalent statement as above, humanitarian securitization is also a tactic of narrative hedging in more abstract ways.

Distinct discourses of humanitarianism in the coverage emphasize women, children, and families, framing migrants as vulnerable, ignorant, blindly hopeful, and needy. (“Ahmed Iftikhar, 42, says he walked across the border from New York in late July with his wife and four children… ‘There is nobody to help,’ he said as he watched his children play in a park near the shelter. ‘I want to leave here but I don't know what to do.’” (Lowrie, 2017c)). Additionally, significant voice is afforded to purveyors of “institutional benevolence”, who prioritize their obligatory service over affective care in their performances (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017, p 162). Institutional humanitarians like Francine Dupuis, Marjorie Villefranche, and Janet Dench are quoted in ways that reflect a professionalized and pragmatic service mentality.

In contrast, securitizing moves and moments are typically implicit in the coverage (Wæver, 2011). Arrests and the potential for indeterminate detentions are mentioned but often downplayed and hedged with humanitarian discourses.

“In cases of detention, they are seen by an Immigration and Refugee Board commissioner within 48 hours, Handfield said. “But most are freed because most don't present a risk to Canadian society–as we've seen they are often young couples with children, and almost all have proper documentation confirming their identities” (Banerjee, 2017b).

More often, an emphasis on the rule of law and control of the government serves as a proxy for explicit securitizing language.

“We are ensuring that the capacity to deal with these refugees is in place and our immigration system remains strong and robust,” Trudeau said Friday. “We want migration to Canada to be done in an orderly fashion; there's border checkpoints and border controls that we need to make sure are respected.... The people coming now irregularly will still have to go through all the proper processes.” (The Canadian Press, 2017a).

Despite official efforts to de-emphasize the explicit securitization of migrants, grassroots activist voices draw attention to it, if only briefly. Saron Gebresellassi, a lawyer and activist with
Black Lives Matter described the environment at Roxham Road as “heavily militarized” (Globenewswire, 2018). Additionally, according to “Pascale Diverlus, an activist from Black Lives Matter, ‘Trudeau himself said refugees are welcome here but for Haitian children, parents and families their first moments in Canada are met with arrest instead of the welcoming environment they are hoping for,’” (Globenewswire, 2018). These inconsistencies in the official story come down to the competing imperatives of humanitarian securitization. Official accounts of reception reflect, in comparison to populist voices, genuine empathy for displaced people. However, this empathy is selective as they attempt to manage the political imperative of maintaining (perceptions of) law and order and the mass-subversion of Canadian sovereignty does not help to achieve this goal.

Discourses of humanitarian securitization are found throughout the coverage and come from many institutional voices. The dual discourses work to balance the political and narrative risks of the other; too much emphasis on law and order comes across as authoritarian and exacerbates pre-existing incongruities between state practices, domestic Charter rights, and universal human rights. Simultaneously, over-emphasizing humanitarianism and compassion attracts accusations and perceptions of weakness and a lack of control; the moral high ground is much less attractive to politicians if it threatens their capacity to govern.

3.3.4 Misinformed Migrants

Table 11: Misinformation

<table>
<thead>
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<td>Misinformed Migrants</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians and contested truth</td>
<td>15</td>
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</table>

Authority, in the context of humanitarian securitization, is derived from performances of compassion and control. Through these performances, dominant accounts of truth are constructed as a tactic of governmentality (Duncan & Caidi, 2018). At the peak of the arrivals, in August of 2017, the narrative of misinformed migrants emerges. Marjorie Villefranche of
Maison D’Haiti is the first to reference the use of social media for information-sharing amongst migrants. (“She said many came inspired by claims on social media about what was awaiting them in Canada: a welcoming place that is easy to enter. The pitches, in Creole, don’t explain the lengthy refugee process that awaits or the fact there are no guarantees they’ll be allowed to stay.” (Lowrie, 2017a)). While Villefranche specifies the information is in Creole, Scheer later blames Trudeau, suggesting his performances of moral authority came at the expense of legal authority over asylum seekers (Scheer, 2018). Likewise, politicians also accuse each other of lying and spreading misinformation at several points as well. (“While this has been explained many times, the Conservatives continue to perpetuate misinformation to pit communities against each other. If a briefing on the immigration system would be helpful for Mr. Scheer, we would be happy to organize one,” Genest said” (Wright, 2018c)). Despite this, the narrative of misinformed migrants prevailed.

Within a month of Villefranche’s statement, countering misinformation emerged as a key strategy in the government’s approach to managing the situation. The Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Taskforce on Irregular Migration was formed on August 17th, 2017 (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017c). Chaired by Transportation Minister Mark Garneau, the task force featured ministers from the provincial and federal governments. It began with the stated goal of information sharing between agencies managing the arrivals, however, the press release from its third meeting on September 1st, 2017, adds the goal to “engage with different communities to counter false information about Canada’s asylum system” (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017e).

On the topic of misinformation, Liberal politicians in the coverage recycled certain stock speaking points extensively. The most common among them is the reminder that crossing irregularly is “not a free ticket,” “free pass,” or a “laissez-passers” into Canada (Banerjee, 2018; Boutros, 2017; Patel & Blanchfield, 2018). The message that the Canadian system has strict rules to follow with an accompanying high burden of proof and complex bureaucratic process to obey is repeated over and over in statements by politicians and officials.

This discourse of the misinformed migrant was itself a product of a pressure narrative framing migration as a burden. This helped set a policy agenda centered on deterrence. In order
to preserve Canada’s welcoming brand and avoid condemnation, this deterrence strategy deployed discourses of humanitarian securitization, which at once identifies asylees as the vulnerable ‘figure of the refugee’ and as a threat to domestic security. This inclination to present migrants in humanitarian terms while working to monitor and control them informed Canadian responses to the arrivals, which centered around educating the purportedly ignorant migrants showing up on Canada’s doorstep. In the sections that follow, I first present the concept of ‘diplomacy in the void’ to articulate how, despite efforts to avoid it, the Canadian government tacitly acknowledged the capacity of irregular migrants to acts as citizens. They did this, I argue, by engaging in tactics of deliberative democracy to negotiate with these communities. This discussion links back to some specific ways in which the institutional narrative betrays itself. Despite persistently framing asylees as humanitarian subjects without the capacity to ‘be political,’ the institutional narrative is itself a response to the acts of transversal citizenship committed by the mobile communities crossing Canada’s border en masse.

3.4 Diplomacy in the Void

In late August, Liberal MP Emmanuel Dubourg, himself of Haitian descent, was sent to Miami to meet with local officials, media, and community leaders to

“dispel the myths on social media channels, such as WhatsApp, which had suggested that Canada gives asylum seekers a free pass into Canada. He also reinforced that while Canada is a welcoming and accepting country, entering Canada must be done according to the rules” (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017e).

Then, in September, Liberal MP Pablo Rodriguez, a Spanish-speaking Argentinian-Canadian and was sent to Los Angeles to inform would-be migrant latinx communities in the United States “that Canada has a robust immigration system, that there are rules that ha[ve] to be followed and that before thinking of quitting their job, selling their house or taking the kids out of school (in the US), they should be informed of that reality” (Agence France Presse, 2017c). According to Rodriguez’s Twitter account, he returned in January of 2018 and took a trip to Washington DC in March of 2018, where he appeared on Univision, a Spanish language television channel in addition to meeting with various community organizations and immigration advocates (Connect2Canada, 2018a, 2018b; L.A., 2018).
By May 2018, concern had shifted from people impacted by the termination of TPS in the United States to Nigerians entering the United States on tourist visas and subsequently walking into Canada at Roxham Road to claim asylum (Banerjee, 2018). The liberal government first sent immigration officials to American consulates in Nigeria before Immigration Minister Ahmed Hussen himself travelled to Nigeria to meet with Nigerian officials, civil society organizations, entrepreneurs, and Canadian consular officials to “bust ‘myths’ about illegal border crossings into Canada” (Banerjee, 2018; Hussen, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d).

Dubourg, Rodriguez, and Hussen leveraged tactics of deliberative democracy in their diplomatic missions. While they each conducted traditional diplomacy to varying extents by meeting with government officials, their primary motive was engaging communities and civil society leaders to help change the script about coming to Canada. The discussion took on many forms, from visiting religious communities, doing interviews for local media, engaging with NGOs and service providers, and tweeting to spread the message that Canada is not as welcoming as one may have thought (Deagle, 2017; Dubourg, 2017a, 2017b; Hussen, 2018a, 2018a).

The campaign against misinformation was not just limited to diplomatic missions. Much as social media was blamed for the proliferation of misinformation, it was an important tool in the fight to dispel it. Past politicians talking to the press and tweeting to their followers, and short videos explaining important aspects of claiming asylum in Canada were produced in Creole and Spanish in addition to shareable content like infographics explaining the process of submitting an asylum claim, which emphasize the many opportunities for ineligibility, the lengthy and complicated process, and the high burden of proof (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2017b, 2017a; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017a, 2017d). With this social media friendly content, the Canadian government undertook a targeted search engine marketing campaign to spread the message (Levitz, 2018).

The Canadian government has a history of targeting particular communities with information about the immigration system. For example, in 2013, a billboard campaign targeted Roma populations in Hungary warning them against attempting to claim asylum in Canada (Keung, 2013). What is new is the use of algorithmic targeting based upon search activity.
Together, all of the government’s efforts had the effect of instantiating a networked and global “public domain...a space in which people of various origins deliberate on their future as well as on their mutual interrelationships and their relationship to the government” (Hajer, 2003a, p. 88, emphasis in original; Ruggie, 2004). Through these performances of network governance, Canada acknowledged—yet ironically failed to recognize—the political agency of Haitians, Salvadorians, or Nigerians and their capacity to mobilize collective power and impact Canadian politics and political discourse as networked, rather than simply global or non-citizens.

The claims to truth and authority made by Canadian officials are reflective of network governance in an era of deep mediatization (Couldry & Hepp, 2018). As Hajer reminds us, tactics of network governance need not involve a wholesale rejection of classical modernist institutions but rather an acknowledgement of the mediatized politics of the in-between. Indeed, the Canadian government’s trans-mediated response to the arrivals constitutes diplomacy in the institutional void (Chouliaraki, 2013; Hajer, 2009). Traditional norms of government-citizen interaction became subverted by decentralized, networked communities of migrants claiming asylum in Canada. The Canadian government responded to these challenges with novel forms of transversal digital diplomacy, pairing community engagement with a targeted, algorithmically mediated marketing campaign in efforts to re-assert its authority in a context of shifting conditions. In doing so, Canadian political elites both validated irregular migrants as networked citizens by negotiating with them and, paradoxically, simultaneously defended and participated in the erosion of classical-modernist sovereignty in the context of global mediatization.

### 3.5 Negotiating Mobility

When a community or individuals within a community are dissatisfied by their conditions, they may resist existing legal, political, and social structures. Citizenship is always implicated in social struggle. In this way, political subjects stake a claim to rights and constitute themselves as citizens through the illocutionary force of declaring “I, we, they have a right to” (Isin & Ruppert, 2015). Acts of citizenship also take the form of mutual responsibilities and solidarity, as defined by one’s community (Isin & Ruppert, 2015).

Transnational solidarity and the extension of support from Canada-based community organizations and social movements reflect an ethos of affective responsibility (as opposed to
legal or professional obligations). For irregular migrants entering Canada, mutual responsibility also takes the form of information sharing through social networks and diaspora media. While this information is sometimes false or incomplete, Canadian politicians quoted in the official account demonstrated that the truth about Canada’s immigration system is itself highly contested by providing their own heavily spun accounts (Scheer, 2018; Wright, 2018c). It is clear that the figure of the misinformed migrant has far more to do with underlying social inequalities and their status as ‘strangers’ than with the actual truth (Ahmed, 2000). Nonetheless, it is also clear that through large-scale collective resistance to Canada’s territorial sovereignty, embodied and discursive negotiations with a government that does not recognize them as citizens, and practices of transnational community solidarity, multiplicitous, networked communities of asylees have performed citizenship in the face of Canadian power.

Crossing Canada’s southern border between ports of entry to claim asylum is a claim to rights and an act of resistance and thus of citizenship. Claiming rights and resisting unjust legal and political structures places asylees at peril of being subjected to the exceptional, embodied conditions of immigration detention or deportation to a place they deem unsafe or otherwise undesirable (Beder, Cohen, Hui, & Jimenez, 2018; Molnar & Silverman, 2018; Muscati, 2018). NCTs play an important role in prompting, facilitating, and documenting journeys through Lacolle and the acts of citizenship that occur in relation to these journeys. These digital acts point to a view of citizenship performed through many small, often banal communicative acts, which culminate in embodied acts of power and resistance. In this way “migrants do not simply figure as passive ‘bare life’ but also as active and creative agents who seek to take their fates in their hands” (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017, p. 168). While this is demonstrably true, the individuals in these communities need not either be figured explicitly as activists, either, but rather everyday citizens in pursuit of a better life, in their own interests and those of their families and communities.

Despite the significant embodied risks, networked migrant communities negotiated with the Canadian government. The arrivals had the effect of calling the Trudeau government’s humanitarian bluff and resulted in the reallocation of significant infrastructural, institutional, and economic resources, several community-oriented diplomatic missions, and major shifts in Canadian political discourse. The tens of thousands of newcomers to Canada may not be
recognized as citizens by the Canadian government and the majority of their asylum claims rejected. However, through both embodied resistance as well as mediated solidarity and information sharing, these communities performed their citizenship forcing the Canadian government to acknowledge the collective political force effectuated by these communities in its bids to maintain authority and control of the situation.

3.6 Conclusion

The case of Lacolle offers significant insight into the forces that shape Canadian politics and the types of authoritative performances required of politicians in the contemporary networked context. This section has confirmed that the voices of Canada’s political elite do indeed dominate the mass-media narrative of Lacolle. Elite discourses of humanitarian securitization operate to justify the extension of selective empathy towards vulnerable populations and the implementation of policies that work to control and monitor the movements of asylum seekers to exclusionary ends. Notwithstanding an ongoing imbalance of power, the impact of social media and NCTs has reconfigured interactions between individuals, society, and the state, displacing classical modernist institutions and tactics of governance. In the case of Lacolle, this erosion of authority afforded novel performances of citizenship amongst networked migrant communities to the effect of disrupting Canadian infrastructures of reception, thereby negotiating with power. Simultaneously, the massive proliferation of networked technology has afforded novel tactics of control. Together these performances surface novel forms of government citizen encounters occurring at the Canadian border.

Analysis of the institutional narrative reveals the extent to which governmentality of truth played into official responses to the influx of new arrivals. The Canadian government relied upon both digitally and institutionally mediated narrative interventions in its attempts to maintain both perceived and actual control of the southern border. In their response to the increase in arrivals, the government worked to emphasize the situation was under control through various infrastructural, institutional, and economic interventions. The deployment of the military to construct a camp, and the conversion of the Montreal Olympic stadium into an emergency shelter are both examples of the performative official response. Simultaneously, these reactionary interventions played into a broader story of the threat of the ‘misinformed migrant,’
which was the focus of various, equally performative, preventative measures. The educational campaign against misinformation, which I have referred to as diplomacy in the void, took the form of both digitally mediated and embodied efforts to change the script on coming to Canada.

While these interventions worked to construct a story of the Canadian border, the government simultaneously worked to divert attention from many less convenient aspects of the events, which unfolded—and are still unfolding—in and near Lacolle. References to ‘being processed’ are recurrent throughout the coverage. The following chapter unpacks these euphemistic gestures to the routinized securitization of asylum seekers. By peering into the backstage of Canadian performances of authority, I further complicate the institutional narrative that has been outlined above by examining the specific legal, political, and bureaucratic processes that underlie border enforcement practices.
Chapter 4
Being Processed: Encounters at the Data Border

4.1 Introduction

The institutional narrative implicitly acknowledges that practices of mediated migration have allowed for novel articulations of citizenship. However, what is far less obvious in official accounts are the ways in which this connectivity simultaneously empowers the state to engage in evermore sophisticated practices of mass surveillance and anticipatory governance to the effect of re-inscribing global inequality. Specifically, the press wire coverage often failed to unpack what actually happens when a prospective asylum seeker is apprehended at the border in sufficient detail, often referring to an abstract “process” (Laframboise, 2017). Likewise, some ‘retail media’ coverage details the steps in this process but leaves many questions surrounding the underlying legal, political, and technical conditions (Harris, 2017a; Warnica, 2017). This narrative lacuna indicates a need to delve deeper into what happens when an irregular arrival is intercepted by the RCMP.

Of particular concern is how networked technologies have impacted how decisions are made at the Canadian border. Encounters always involve an approach and thus anticipation (Ahmed, 2000). With respect to increasingly mediated forms of anticipation, there is a growing body of scholarship dedicated to understanding the risks and benefits of technologies that pre-mediate encounters between governments and citizen-subjects at the border (Allen & Vollmer, 2018; Amoore, 2011; Grusin, 2004; Hall, 2017). In a Canadian context, Côté-Boucher has demonstrated that intensifying use of predictive risk assessments is altering the role of human discretion at the Canadian border and the professional identities of CBSA agents (Côté-Boucher 2018; 2016). With the above developments in mind, I ask: How are practices and encounters at the border informed by underlying political, technical, and legal (infra)structures?

Government-citizen encounters in Lacolle are both intensely ambivalent and insufficiently accountable, which I argue is a dangerous combination and creates substantial risk for unchecked bias, error, and abuse. This risk is amplified through the use of networked communications technologies, which serve to obfuscate discrimination through the guise of computational objectivity. In this chapter, I establish a narrative of encounter by detailing some
of the legal and policy conditions that shape arrests, background checks, biometric scans, and interviews, the steps which inform determinations on the admissibility of asylum seekers, and thus their ability to lodge an asylum claim. To fill in the story, I deploy Hajer’s (2003; 2009) concepts of network governance and the institutional void, once more to discuss the entangled phenomena of mass-surveillance (“mass monitoring in search of … ‘actionable intelligence’” (Gandy, 2012, p. 125 in Lyon, 2014, p. 2)), anticipatory governance (the use of predictive technology “to assess likely future behaviours or events and to direct appropriate action” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014)), and civic stratification (“ways in which the structuring of life chances and social identities is the direct or indirect result of the institutionalization of citizenship under conditions of social and economic inequality in relation to migration governance” (Lockwood, 1996)). I conclude that present institutional political, legal, and technical frameworks serve to perpetuate global inequalities through the iterative articulation of differentiated access to rights (2003). I begin below by first detailing the euphemistic ‘process’ of securitization.

4.2 The Process

‘The process’, as it is called in the news agency coverage, refers to what happens when an irregular migrant is intercepted, arrested, questioned, and has their identification verified by the RCMP; they are then forwarded to the CBSA where they are further subjected to a databased background check, fingerprint scans, a facial photo, a summary health check, and another security interview (Harris, 2017a; Warnica, 2017). These tools and practices inform decisions on admissibility to Canada and, by extension, an individual’s eligibility to make an asylum claim. This chapter delves deeper into this process, breaking it down by arrests, health screenings, background checks, biometric data collection, and interviews. The steps addressed herein are just the first stage of much longer asylum claims, or in some cases, immigration detention processes. Each government-citizen encounter is a unique event yet all share many common conditions. The extent to which the particular is shaped by the general should not be underestimated, especially with reference to broad structures of social, political, and economic power (Ahmed, 2000). The process described herein culminates in a determination of admissibility and, typically, an asylum claim. Through a focus on these encounters, I work to surface the ambivalence of Canadian approaches to migrant reception and begin to explore the broader reality of politically, legally, and technologically instantiated civic stratification.
4.2.1 Arrest

Although the CBSA and the RCMP work together closely to process arrivals, the division of labour at Lacolle tends to fall in line with their respective mandates. The CBSA is mandated with guarding the border at official points of entry including all land, sea, and air ports, while the RCMP is tasked with guarding the rest of Canada’s frontier with the United States (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017; A-2017-06905). However, ‘guard’ is a slight misuse of language as much of the 8900-kilometre boundary is unmonitored and even unmarked; it is compared by Immigration and Customs Union President, Jean-Pierre Fortin to “Swiss cheese” (Quan, 2017).\(^{16}\) Despite the alleged ease of entering Canada without detection, this has not been of much concern to tens of thousands of asylum seekers entering Quebec. While it is true that the RCMP cannot feasibly monitor the whole physical border, the vast majority of irregular migrants making asylum claims have not sought to evade arrest. Counter to the narrative of misinformation, asylum seekers are crossing with full knowledge of their imminent arrest—the RCMP even warns people as they cross (Triomphe, 2017). Irregular crossings are, in this sense, a deliberate and public transgression.

While the RCMP arrests intercepted asylum seekers upon entry, in most cases this is just a ceremonial performance of law and order. Despite the illegal nature of the arrivals under Canadian domestic law, there is a clear legal explanation for the irregular arrivals. Afforded by the loophole in the STCA, once an individual has entered Canadian space, they have a right under international law to have their asylum claim heard. The vast majority of intercepted migrants are released shortly after their arrest to continue their asylum claims with the charge of illegally crossing the border stayed (“Evidence - CIMM (42-1) - No. 119 - House of Commons of Canada,” 2018). Despite the fact that most arrivals are released, arresting migrants upon their arrival casts a securitized tone for the rest of the process. Migrants are outsiders and must therefore be vetted and deemed worthy of freedom to proceed with an asylum claim.

\(^{16}\) Published in the National Post and is not part of the body of coded coverage.
4.2.2 Health Screening

Despite casting irregular migrants as inherently threatening, Canada has a duty of care to uphold, which is enshrined in both the welcoming self-identity held by many Canadians not to mention international law. All arrivals are subject to a summary health screening, conducted on-site to identify signs of illness and to provide immediate basic care (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017a). The Red Cross was called into Lacolle to help with humanitarian logistics, provide emergency supplies like blankets and hygiene products, and offer basic health care services (“Receiving asylum seekers - Quebec - Canadian Red Cross,” n.d.). Unlike most arrivals, under section 38 (2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, an asylum seeker cannot be declared inadmissible on health grounds. The check serves to identify risks to public health and to extend services to those in need. Very little information about the policies and outcomes of health screenings conducted upon irregular migrants at the border in Canada is made public, nor is there significant research specific to Canada (Hwang, 2017). However, unlike other aspects of the process detailed herein, these screenings are not used to exclusionary ends. They, nonetheless, exemplify the ambivalence of migrant reception within the modern liberal order through their dual purpose of mitigating risks to the inside while extending compassion to outsiders.

4.2.3 Background Check

In contrast to the health checks, every asylum seeker is subjected to a background check of powerful, integrated multi-modal databases after their arrest and before an admissibility determination is made. These checks are exclusionary in focus, seeking to sort out dangerous or otherwise undesirable individuals. In recent years, the checks have become more powerful through intelligence sharing, the integration of previously disparate search functions, and advanced data analytics informed by machine learning (Canada Border Services Agency, 2016; A-2016-07582; A2016-421).

In Lacolle, RCMP officers intercepting new arrivals will first verify claimants’ identity documents and perform preliminary security interviews. The CBSA is then responsible for implementing a more comprehensive check before making an admissibility and eligibility determination (Irregular Crossings at the Border: Challenging Myths and Preconceptions, 2018;
“La GRC cesse d’utiliser un questionnaire «inapproprié» qui cible les musulmans,” 2017; Refugees and Citizenship Canada Immigration, 2018b). CBSA officers access data banks and intelligence from domestic and global sources in attempts to pre-empt threats to Canada’s national security using “a variety of threat and risk assessment methodologies” to determine admissibility and thus whether an asylum claim may be made (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018c). If deemed admissible, a claimant is allowed to enter the country to await their hearing. Alternatively, a claimant deemed “high-risk” for reasons of criminality, ambiguity over their identity, or intelligence linking them to undesirable political, religious, or community groups may be detained pending a deportation hearing (Canada Border Services Agency, 2017b).

Background checks relate to a complex network of policy and legislation at the domestic and international levels. In the context of admissibility determinations, I discuss structures of information-sharing at the international, regional, and domestic levels that empower intelligence and enforcement agencies to access broader sources of information and otherwise collaborate in monitoring and sorting irregular migrants.

4.2.3.1 Interpol and Five Eyes

The standard platform for sharing international intelligence between enforcement agencies is through Interpol, which offers various services to member nations, including frontline access to databases on flagged travel documents and travellers (“Databases,” n.d.; Hamaid, 2017). However, Canada exchanges more sensitive information through the longstanding Five Eyes signals intelligence sharing partnership in ways that are not entirely clear. Canada’s cryptographic agency, the Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSEC), serves as the primary link to the Five Eyes for signals intelligence exchange (Cox, 2012). A product of the World War Two-era UKUSA agreement, the term “Five Eyes” was initially used as an intelligence community shorthand that indicated information could be shared amongst Canada, the US, UK, Australia, and New Zealand (Cox, 2012). Cox—a retired Brigadier General in the Canadian Forces—describes routine trust-based exchanges of signals intelligence between the partners, which includes intercepted messages or social media data collected by or shared with Canadian intelligence agencies, which may be subsequently filtered down to formats accessible to enforcement agencies (2012). As the agreement relates to migration governance, the CBSA
and RCMP exchange intelligence with these partners through various means. For matters regarding the maintenance of territorial sovereignty, Canada partners with these allies, called the “Border Five” in informal contexts to increase standardization, improve data analytics, and exchange targeting intelligence twice daily to the end of interdicting flagged travellers and enhancing risk assessments (A-2014-14403). The Heads of Intelligence from each member nation speak regularly and the members routinely exchange intelligence on an ad-hoc basis (A-2014-14403). The Five Country Conference, a more official forum also maintains biometric data sharing agreements, outlined further below.\textsuperscript{17}

\subsection*{4.2.3.2 Beyond the Border Action Plan}

In 2011, the Beyond the Border Action Plan was announced as a partnership between Canada and the United States with the purpose of enhancing security to reduce risks while increasing the flow of people and goods deemed safe and desirable (Public Safety Canada, 2016). The Beyond the Border strategy encompasses a broad range of activities related to governing the border; however, the use of technology to pre-empt threats is a primary goal of the initiative in addition to regularized channels of communication (Public Safety Canada, 2016). The plan’s mission is “pushing out the border” from physical to virtual space through predictive risk assessment, information sharing, and a strong focus on the development of cyber-infrastructure (Public Safety Canada, 2016, 2018). The plan is a central driver of increased cross-border enforcement integration and exemplifies the trend of rolling out anticipatory solutions for examining, sorting, and normalizing flows of people and goods (Amoore, 2011; Hall, 2017; Topak et al., 2015). However, the collaborative relationship is not absolute. Canadian officials have been working with American Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to stem the arrivals in Lacolle, but ICE has not prioritized the interdiction of people leaving the United States (A-2017-13945).

Topak, Bracken-Roche, Saulnier, and Lyon (2015) argue the plan is symptomatic of American hegemony, that it expands the state of legal exception at the border to American

\textsuperscript{17} The terms “Migration Five” or “M5” are also used in different contexts (Gionet, 2011; Refugees and Citizenship Canada Immigration, 2011; Treasury Board of Canada, 2009).
benefit, and that security-by-surveillance “measures subtly undermine the rights of travellers in systematic ways”–I suggest this is especially so for irregular border-crossers in a “low rights environment” such as the border (Eubanks, 2018, p. 12; Topak, Bracken-Roche, Saulnier, & Lyon, 2015, p. 881). ‘Customs Controlled Areas’ (CCAs) are the official term for spaces of exception at legal points of entry, which allow for practices like invasive questioning, searches, and other forms of examination that contradict the legal rights of Canadian citizens in most contexts (Canada Border Services Agency, 2015; Salter, 2007). CCAs are designed to increase the visibility and knowability of those passing through for the purposes of sorting desirable and undesirable travellers (Salter, 2007). The Beyond the Border Action Plan amplifies the exceptional state of the border by expanding the use of powerful surveillance technologies and bilateral information sharing in both scope and scale, contradicting standard norms of Canadian governance (Topak et al., 2015). The invasive surveillance and exceptional standard of transparency required of travelers exacerbates tensions between national security and liberal-democratic ideals like liberty and justice, which are sold to Canadians through the performances of political elites. Authoritarian governmentality at the border is justified to the end of maintaining the freedom and security of those deemed desirable and worthy of the protection of Canadian institutions.

4.2.3.3 The Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (SCISA)

The Security of Canada Information Sharing Act (SCISA), passed as a part of the Anti-terrorism Act (2015), empowers national security agencies to respond to opportunities and threats afforded by digital technologies through information-sharing. Before SCISA, security agencies were limited in their capacity to share information by the Privacy Act (1984), which states that information must only be collected and retained as it relates to a specific administrative purpose. After SCISA came into effect, through exceptions to the Privacy Act, information related to national security became much less restricted and could be shared amongst intelligence and enforcement agencies. This policy shift preceded the establishment of more comprehensive frameworks for exchange and collaboration between implicated agencies. Indeed, since SCISA was enacted, the CBSA has expanded its pre-existing (since 2014) use of big data, predictive analytics, and machine-learning assisted actuarial assessments, which leverage historical data and topical intelligence to identify and flag high-risk travellers (Canada Border
Services Agency, 2017a, p. 8; A-2016-18416; A-2014-14403). Additionally, as a result of changes to the CSIS Act in 2016, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has expanded its use of “data analytics” and “automated analysis” and seeks professionals with experience “performing complex data exploitation on large volumes of data” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2017, 2018).

Just six months after SCISA came into effect, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner expressed concern over the legislation’s broad wording around “national security” and consequent potential for inconsistent application (A-2016-421). Moreover, it was noted that algorithmic and predictive technologies have significant privacy implications and must be used carefully in order to uphold Canadians’ rights to privacy (A-2016-421). Despite this, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), responsible for overseeing CSIS activities makes no reference to methodological accountability in its 2017-2018 report. Worse still, no such committee even exists for the CBSA despite their collection, analysis, and use of national security intelligence (“Create new watchdog to review border agency, RCMP, federal report recommends,” 2018). Despite being passed over three years before the time of this writing, the increased capacities for the collection and analysis of huge quantities of citizen-data that accompanied SCISA have not been accompanied by improvements or updates to privacy protection legislation or policy.

While the escalation of government surveillance through database integration has raised alarms from those protecting the privacy of Canadian citizens, asylum seekers are especially vulnerable. In international law, irregular migrants hold rights to privacy under “article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” yet these rights are frequently disregarded and migrants are subjected to invasive mass surveillance (Summary of the Human Rights Council panel discussion on the right

18 A watch dog agency was recently proposed (Tunney, 2019).
19 Bill C-59 which proposes moderate improvements to accountability for CSIS and the CSE is currently in the Canadian Senate and would create the new position of Intelligence Commissioner and roll back some of CSIS’ powers to act upon intelligence without a warrant.
Western nations typically uphold privacy regimes that differentiate between insiders and outsiders, including the United States and Canada (Lubin, 2018). This means that irregular migrants hold minimal, if any, rights to privacy as they approach Canadian space near Lacolle. The CSIS Act and National Defence Act delineate this stratified access to privacy. The CSE must respect the privacy of all Canadian citizens, regardless of location, in addition to any person physically present in Canada (National Defence Act 273.64(2)), while CSIS may not collect and retain information on Canadians or permanent residents, notably excluding asylum seekers (CSIS Act s. 16(1)(b)(i) – 16(1)(b)(ii)). SCISA introduced legislative affordances that allow intelligence and enforcement agencies to expand their information exchange and analysis capacities, leaving already vulnerable asylum seekers with even weaker privacy rights. As is detailed in the section below, the integration of databases and sharing of information is supported through the systematic collection and exchange of fingerprints.

4.2.4 Biometric Data Collection

The biometric information of all asylum seekers is collected before entering the country in the form of fingerprints and facial photos. This information is used to enhance the reliability of future surveillance and enforcement actions by ensuring consistency in identity throughout the claims process, preventing double claims, documents fraud, and efforts to evade deportation in cases where a claim is rejected (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018b; United Kingdom Home Office, 2016). Fingerprint information is accessible to the CBSA through several databases such as the Document Integrity Program, Interpol databases, and through the aforementioned Five Country Conference Data-Sharing Protocol (Canada Border Services Agency, 2017b; United Kingdom Home Office, 2016). The Protocol, mandated (as of 2016) that each country may request up to 3000 fingerprint records from each of the other four members annually (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018b; United Kingdom Home Office, 2016).

While it is illegal to collect Canadian citizens’ biometric data—as it is considered an intrusive mechanism of control that threatens democratic freedoms—the collection and sharing of biometric data is a standard practice in migration management across a range of global contexts (United Nations Publications, 2018). In May of 2018, Ahmed Hussien indicated the expansion of
cross-border collection and exchange of biometrics as part of Canada’s collaborations with the United States to better control the movements of migrants between the two countries (Wright, 2018b). The following July, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada announced their expansion of bio-metric border control, including the systematic collection and verification of biometric data of travellers from “Europe, Africa and the Middle East” and “[i]increased biometric-based information-sharing between Canada and the U.S. and automated biometric-based information-sharing with the other Migration 5 partners: Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand” (Refugees and Citizenship Canada Immigration, 2018a). Internal documents revealed that beginning in 2018 systematic, automated sharing increased “from approximately 5000 cases per year/partner to [REDACTED] per year/partner, representing a much greater proportion of overall immigration applications,” indicating a significant escalation in information exchange since 2016 (A-2018-05241).

Amoore argues that biometrics are a key tool of risk management at the border as “identity is assumed to be anchored [to the body] as a source of prediction and prevention” (2006, p. 336). This anchoring grounds efforts to extend the border far beyond its physical space by marking arrivals with their “data doubles”—simulacric data assemblages meant to represent a specific person (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 606). The use of biometrics is thus entangled with the build-up of data-driven anticipatory methods of governing mobilities, serving as a lever through which governments and enforcement agencies can target and sort legitimate and illegitimate bodies as they traverse state and non-state spaces (Amoore, 2006). One central concern with the use of biometrics is the risk of having to dispute one’s own identity within a system that features inadequate or non-existent measures for appeal and is perceived as objective and reliable. For example, Canadian citizen, Olajide Ogunye spent 8 months in Canadian immigration detention as a consequence of inadequate oversight and accountability for the use of biometric technology by the CBSA. After Ogunye’s citizenship documents were questioned outside of his Toronto home, his fingerprints allegedly matched a failed Nigerian asylum claimant, which the CBSA maintained as fact for months despite “numerous sworn affidavits by friends and neighbours who had known Ogunye for years” (Cecco, 2018). Biometric data like fingerprints serve as connective tissue linking virtual representations of a human to their body,
allowing for digital surveillance to produce (sometimes erroneous) embodied and transversal effects that are difficult to contest.

4.2.5 Interview

Digitally accessible intelligence and actuarial outputs linked to bodies through biometric data all come together to inform face-to-face security interviews conducted by CBSA and RCMP agents to determine admissibility and eligibility to claim asylum in Canada. CBSA agents are responsible for verifying a claimant against the information collected about them but are supported by RCMP officers for both convenience and specialized expertise—the RCMP assists the CBSA in “high-risk” contexts, in cases where electronic surveillance is required, or in remote locations (A-2017-06905). While the RCMP helps to gather and synthesize intelligence and may inform decisions, CBSA agents are the final arbiters of admissibility and the right to enter and stay in Canada. Section 55 of the *Immigrant and Refugee Protection Act* (2001) (IRPA) states that CBSA officers have the sole discretion to determine whether a potential entrant to Canada is who they say they are, and whether they pose a security or flight risk. In order to make such a determination, the CBSA and RCMP use form-based risk assessments and interview guides. Interviews and other face-to-face encounters may be scattered throughout ‘the process’ but the completion of the form constitutes the locus of determinations and guides the process.

The Preliminary Risk Assessment form that (since being issued in July of 2017) must be filled upon each encounter between an asylum claimant and agents of the Canadian government verifies that domestic and international criminal and biometric databases have been searched and includes 12 dichotomous “Security Questions” on topics like past political and military affiliations in addition to physical and mental health status (A-2017-18416). Such analog-algorithmic procedures have been criticized as both unreliable and outright discriminatory (Kennedy, 2017; “La GRC cesse d’utiliser un questionnaire «inapproprié» qui cible les musulmans,” 2017; Peritz & LeBlanc, 2017). In the words of one CBSA officer filling in a (different) National Risk Assessment for Detention form, “I have not received any training on the completion of the form. This assessment is cursory in nature and should not be construed as an accurate representation of the subject’s risk or mental health status” (Kennedy, 2017). The Canadian state’s attempts at “governing through risk” have long been criticized for their role in
escalating illiberalism at Canada’s borders (Muller, 2009, p. 68; 2010). The rise of automation informed by historical enforcement serves to obfuscate and amplify pre-existing systemic biases and inadequate standards of accuracy and accountability at the Canadian data border (Hall, 2017).

4.2.5.1 Freedom or Detention

Over 99 percent of asylum claimants are admitted into Canada to continue the claims process (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018a). However, when it is determined that someone is too risky, or that their identity is ambiguous, the arrest becomes more than just a ritual performance. Like the frontier, Canadian immigration detention exists in a context of legal exception. During the 2016-2017 fiscal year 162 children were held in Canadian immigration centres and 439 people were detained for more than 90 days without charge (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018a). Ebrahim Toure, a high-profile detainee was released in 2018 after more than 5 years in immigration detention; he was identified as high-risk due to a conviction for selling pirated CDs in the United States (Kennedy, 2018). As outlined in the IRPA, Canada’s practices of immigration detention exist outside of standard practices of judicial review and the accompanying evidentiary standards. The Immigration and Refugee Board is responsible for reviewing these determinations and does so through the use of analog risk assessments like those detailed above alongside a “quasi de novo” evidentiary standard that systematically upholds previous decisions regardless of their merits, thereby perpetuating indeterminate detentions and discouraging scrutiny of a CBSA officer’s initial judgement (Muscati, 2018, p. 6). Toure’s case highlights how risk assessment methodologies implemented in Canada’s border security strategy and immigration detention framework prolong unnecessary and indeterminate immigration detention (Muscati, 2018).

Despite the implementation of system reforms by the Liberal government making detention a “last resort,” Canada’s Immigration Detention Framework continues to attract negative attention for its demonstrable lack of adequate accountability for detention decisions, a record of abuse and deaths in detention, the detention of children, and ongoing discriminatory practices that punish mental illness (Harris, 2017b; Magder, 2019; Molnar & Silverman, 2018; Muscati, 2018). Immigration detentions have an immensely traumatic effect on the mental health
of both children and adults placed in the system; those coping with mental illness are more likely to be detained in the first place (Beder et al., 2018; Muscati, 2018). Non-criminals are often housed in maximum security conditions alongside criminal populations (Beder et al., 2018; Muscati, 2018). This has prompted detainees to go on hunger strikes and engage in various other forms of ‘abject activism’ to call attention to infringements of their human rights (Harris, 2017b; Isin & Rygiel, 2007). Detentions, which impact the lives, health, and happiness of migrants, impose a regime of differential access to rights, which are directly traceable to human decisions made within the techno-bureaucratic and legal-political frameworks that shape encounters between border agents and would-be entrants to Canada. At a higher level of abstraction, the Canadian federal government is responsible for establishing and maintaining these legal and technical frameworks and does so largely in relation to classical-modernist perceptions of national sovereignty and political will.

4.3 Network Governance and the Institutional Void

Having discussed the process of intercepting and examining asylum seekers for deviance from institutional norms, this section analyzes these phenomena in relation to the concepts of network governance and the institutional void. Politicians communicate their positions to the public with the goal of solidifying authority. Such performances are inseparable from the context of global mediatization and the institutional void. Effective performances of authority necessitate targeted messaging that one can also expect to be shared and viewed widely. This imperative is amplified in the context of deep mediatization; the algorithmic mediation of content consumption promotes audience fragmentation and the datafication of consumers’ online activity (Couldry & Hepp, 2018). The Canadian government’s targeted campaign against misinformation is an example of how network governance operates in this context.

Global mediatization and the consequent institutional void highlight the growing strategic imperative to conceive of politics as a space of multiplicities wherein diverse and decentralized micropolitical communities have the capacity to mobilize political power and influence policy outcomes from within and without the state’s jurisdiction (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Hajer, 2009). The inputs that shape policy outputs frequently and necessarily transgress the limits of classical modernist notions of sovereignty and jurisdiction bleeding into performances of
network governance, which acknowledge and strategically leverage the institutional void and the politics of multiplicities in the construction of narratives (Hajer, 2009, pp. 57-8). As it relates to the uptick in irregular migration near Lacolle, the institutional void affords nascent strategies of governmentality that exist “next to or across” structures of state sovereignty and jurisdiction (Hajer, 2003, p.175). Moreover, one might intuit that international laws and norms exist above state institutions yet, in practice, they are expressed through structures of the sovereign state—the Canadian lawmakers and courts that are tasked with interpreting and ratifying international agreements cannot be effectively held to account at a supranational level (Barnett, 2012; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

The state may instantiate human rights in the context of the global institutional void, but it is increasingly forced to do so in ways that acknowledge how flows of information, people, and capital are amplified by networked technology. Many of the grand narratives inherent to classical modernist governance reach their limits in contexts where tactically prudent performances of authority transcend traditional conceptions of the citizen as a geographically-bounded subject of power and politics (Hajer, 2009). In this subversion of classical modernist citizenship, global mediatization has also amplified the capacity of micro-political communities to interact with states outside the bounds of Westphalian sovereignty. Surely, it is not a novel observation that the rules and norms of global governance are frequently disregarded but network governance—and citizenship—add a framework to account for novel articulations of network-mediated government-citizen interactions (Hajer, 2009; Isin & Ruppert, 2015). In the case of Lacolle, just over 40,000 asylum-seekers have prompted a heated domestic policy debate, significant public expenditure, the construction of expanded infrastructure at an unofficial crossing, and an outreach campaign against “misinformation” led by Liberal MPs targeting Caribbean and Latin diaspora communities in the United States in addition to would-be asylees in Nigeria (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2017b, 2018; Levitz, 2017b; Lowrie, 2017b; Marin, 2017; Ocampo, 2017; Wright, 2018d).

Online migrant communities connected through social media produced a geographically manifested network effect in Lacolle by channeling anomalous levels of traffic through a single point at the Canada-US border (DiMaggio & Garip, 2012). The diffusion of information through networked communicative channels has produced homophilic patterns of mobility through
processes of collective social learning (DiMaggio & Garip, 2012). While not necessarily explicit in the intent of individual actors, the cumulative outcome of these movements of asylees has been the subversion of Canadian sovereignty and jurisdiction. The government responded to this challenge with a targeted online campaign directed at communities with high numbers of potential irregular migrants. It engaged in diplomatic missions and used deliberative democratic tactics to engage with non-American and non-Canadian communities in the United States to inform them of Canada’s policies. In this sense, networked performances of authority and citizenship at once erode and re-constitute traditional liberal political institutions. The rules of engagement are unclear—there is no one polity to describe the relation of government to citizen but rather there are many overlapping communities of networked political stakeholders interacting according to no stable set of rules and norms. Nonetheless, the networked and global public domain afforded by global mediatization operates as a nexus for novel government-citizen interactions, which transcend and displace classical conceptions of territoriality and related performances of politics.

With reference to this framework for understanding mediatized politics, I discuss three tools and practices of Canadian governmentality relevant to the case of Lacolle: mass-surveillance, anticipatory governance, and civic stratification. These processes are both constituted and conditioned by a lack of meaningful accountability and are therefore susceptible to undue bias, error, and abuse. Simultaneously, they signal efforts to counter emergent challenges to the sovereignty of the state presented by global mediatization.

### 4.3.1 Mass Surveillance

In 2000, Haggerty and Ericson described the emergence of an institutional surveillant assemblage characterized by the generation and analysis of huge quantities of information about citizen-consumers based upon their interactions with the online world. Within the past decade or so the proliferation of NCTs has amplified the capacity of governments and corporations to collect, organize, and monitor information on people’s online activities by an almost unfathomable magnitude (Kitchin, 2014). For example, in 2012 IBM asserted that over 90 percent of the data in existence had been created since 2010; this process has only intensified in the years since (Kitchin, 2014). Through the advent of the Internet of Things, the immense (and
growing) popularity of social networking sites, and the now-banal online consumption of physical and virtual goods and services, more data has been generated about citizen-consumers’ preferences, behaviours, vices, and insecurities than could have been imagined (Doidge, 2018; Kitchin, 2014). Through legislation like SCISA, the Canadian state is further developing its capacity to analyze this information through database integration. These trends apply no less to irregular migrants for whom networked technologies have become, if not necessary, central and routine aspects of a typical journey (United Nations Publications, 2018). While in no way is this observation meant to discount the existence of digital divides, messaging apps like WhatsApp, social media platforms like Facebook, and even apps developed specifically to facilitate safer migration like the UN’s MigApp, have become naturalized as tools of mediated migration (Godin, 2017; United Nations Publications, 2018). While such technologies have found their way into the lives of billions of people globally for the pleasure, efficiency, and safety afforded by connectivity, they have also presented a variety of new risks (GSMA, 2018; Lyon, 2017). Irregular migrants and Canadian passport-holders alike are subjected to invasive surveillance of their internet activity in the United States as the privacy rights of foreigners are unprotected (Aggarwal, 2018; Clement, 2018; Lubin, 2018). Likewise, as discussed above, asylum seekers are subject to legal surveillance by CSIS and the CSE and are not extended equal privacy rights.

### 4.3.2 Anticipatory Governance

The mass collection and organization of information is fundamentally entangled with the development of ever-more powerful methods of analysis (Fleer, 2018). These advances have produced the rise of anticipatory governance—a form of decision-making, which exists in a mode of pre-mediation, wherein “the future itself is…already mediated” by ICTs (Grusin, 2004, p. 19; Kitchin, 2014). Anticipating and mitigating threats at the border is a longstanding practice, however, since 9/11, pre-emptive efforts have become heavily reliant upon data-driven technology (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018b; Stenum, 2017). In April 2018, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) released a Request for Information (RFI) in collaboration with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) to leverage machine learning and predictive analytics to inform immigration determinations among several other objectives (Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2018). The precise applications and methods used by various agencies are unclear but the use of
algorithmically enhanced actuarial border strategies is both ongoing and increasingly sophisticated (Canada Border Services Agency, 2017a; Molnar & Gill, 2018; A-2014-14403; A-2016-421; A-2016-07582; A-2018-05241).²⁰

Despite the efficiencies that these technologies afford, there are also significant challenges linked to the reliability of outcomes, the ability to explain or appeal a decision and, especially in the case of national security, to scrutinize the use of algorithmic technologies, which are typically shrouded in Top Secret status (Broeders et al., 2017). Despite a lack of specificity, it is neither conspiracy nor conjecture to conclude that in relation to huge quantities of data collected by the Canadian government, security agencies are increasingly reliant on data-driven technology to premeditate security decisions (Canada Border Services Agency, 2017a, 2017b; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2017; A-2014-14403; A-2016-421; A-2016-07582; A-2018-05241). The Security Intelligence Review Committee, described in its 2017-18 report that “CSIS had exceeded its lawful authority under section 12 of the [CSIS] Act in retaining in its Operational Data Analysis Centre (ODAC) holdings bulk metadata that had been collected under warrant” (p. 25). The report problematically fails to mention any mechanisms that exist to hold the organization accountable for its use of any particular method of analysis, namely algorithmic and automated methods, though CSIS is explicitly engaged in activities that merit such scrutiny (Broeders et al., 2017; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2017; Security Intelligence Review Committee, 2018).

Many scholars have shown how the expanding use of predictive technologies can amplify pre-existing inequalities, delegate discriminatory practices to automated processes, and erroneously impact the lives of those implicated across diverse applications including justice, finance, social services, and employment (Beatson, 2018; Brayne, 2017; Broeders et al., 2017; Eubanks, 2018; O’Neil, 2016). We should not expect migration management to buck the trend, especially given the CBSA’s heavy reliance on historical data to inform predictions (Molnar &

²⁰ While there are specific risk assessments designed by the Canadian government, there are no direct references to any specific applications of predictive analytics to asylum seeking populations. However, based upon descriptions of the Scenario Based Risk Assessments, and the fact that ‘refugees’ are repeatedly labelled ‘high risk,’ it is highly likely these technologies are being applied in these contexts (REFs).
Gill, 2018; A-2014-14403; A-2016-07582). Big data, predictive analytics, and machine learning can certainly be useful and even more reliable than humans at many tasks but blindly optimistic discourses of innovation and efficiency shielded by rhetorical (and often fetishistic) appeals to science and security have overshadowed significant concerns regarding the ethical and regulatory imperatives that accompany their use, notwithstanding their scientific validity—or lack thereof (Kitchin, 2014; Mattern, 2013; van Dijck, 2014). While concerns of fairness and accountability are important generally, the national security context, again, poses unique challenges as algorithmic methods are especially far-removed from public or third-party scrutiny (Broeders et al., 2017). Through biometric anchoring, asylum seekers are ‘marked’ and forced to embody unaccountable risk assessments and mass surveillance to which they have been subjected, practices which those born in Canada are legally protected from (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018b; Stenum, 2017). In this sense, applications of mass surveillance and anticipatory migration governance have created an algorithmic state of exception, which serves to perpetuate and enforce global inequalities by delegating discriminatory practices to technology (McQuillan, 2015). It is important, nonetheless, to recognize that not all issues associated with automation are necessarily purposeful or instrumental for those deploying such technologies.

4.3.2.1 Automation Bias and Actuarial Governance

Scholarship in human factors engineering has demonstrated how automation can lead to a deskilling of the operators that are responsible for monitoring automated systems, ultimately rendering them less effective in intervening when necessary and potentially less confident in deciding to intervene at all (Bainbridge, 1983; Strauch, 2018). Côté-Boucher outlines how this deskilling operates at the Canadian border by displacing the discretion of CBSA agents attached to automated customs enforcement (2016). Further to this point, human-factors studies have also described how system monitors are subject to automation bias—the inclination to trust automated systems (Skitka, Mosier, & Burdick, 2000). Skitka, Mosier, and Burdick outline two types of error that result from this: omission errors, missing a system error and commission errors, noticing a discrepancy between an automated recommendation and another indicator yet still erroneously deferring to the automated system. Their study of professionally trained flight crews using a flight simulator demonstrated an omission error rate of 41% of possible errors (compared
to 0 errors using an analog method) and a commission error rate of 65% of possible errors with only 1% of participants making no commission errors at all (Skitka et al., 2000). A follow-up study (this time with student participants) demonstrated that perceived accountability lowers but does not resolve automation bias (Skitka et al., 2000).

As has been outlined, the policy and legislative environment that conditions background checks and threat assessments at the Canadian Border is highly complex and informed by many sources of domestic and global intelligence. Paired with the black box of national security, this creates an environment ripe for automation bias to prevail. When a risk is identified, it is distilled into a ‘lookout’, described by the CBSA as “reliable, accurate and actionable intelligence on actual or suspected infractions or criminal activities that may result in the interception of inadmissible people” (Canada Border Services Agency, 2017b). Lookouts prompt a mandatory secondary screening interview. Even though secondary screening is meant to be a neutral information gathering process, the lookout establishes a presumption of danger or guilt that necessarily taints the follow up. Additionally, the complexity and automated quality of the lookout system and broader intelligence gathering and sharing processes could mean that a contextualized explanation is unavailable to the frontline officer making an admissibility decision. Although the officer that creates a lookout must include background and contact information, some facts may remain classified or unknown, especially if they come from an international partner (A-2017-06905). Any ambiguity over the provenance of information is problematic as an erroneous determination could prevent a well-founded asylum claim and result in an unjust detention or deportation.

An asylum seeker may, like the officer, be unable to understand or effectively appeal a system error, prohibiting them from claiming asylum in contravention to their human rights (Molnar & Gill, 2018). Worse still, Canadian enforcement agencies tend to rhetorically conflate automated intelligence-led policing with accountability itself (Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015). The above description of a ‘lookout’ is a good example of this. These concerns are compounded upon by a broad scale lack of accountability for human decision-making at the CBSA as it relates to detention practices (“Border services must be more transparent and accountable,” 2017; “Create new watchdog to review border agency, RCMP, federal report recommends,” 2018; Mochama, 2018; Molnar & Silverman, 2018). Despite this, foreign entrants to Canada are
systematically tied to incomplete digital representations of who they are and computerized conjecture about who they may be.

4.3.3 Civic Stratification

In this way, the governance of mobility is inseparable from the context of civic stratification, “a system of inequality based on the relationship between different categories of individuals and the state, and the rights thereby granted or denied” (Morris in Ataç, 2014, p. 125; Rygiel, 2014). This stratified regime of rights between Canadians and non-Canadians is clearly articulated in the case of Charkaoui v. Canada. In 2003, Adil Charkaoui was arrested without charge on the basis of a security certificate—a legal tool which allows for the removal of non-Canadians (including asylees) without disclosing any evidence to justify the detention or to meet the charge. While only 27 certificates have ever been issued, the existence of the framework clearly establishes a set of differentiated rights extended to non-Canadian citizens (Public Safety Canada, 2015). The framework was challenged over more than 5 years in a series of court cases concerning Mr. Charkaoui and in the separate security certificate case of Harkat v. Canada. Controversy over such non-transparency prompted shifts in the security certificate framework including the creation of a new class of lawyer, called a Special Advocate who may see evidence on behalf of their client (Department of Justice, 2013). However, courts have generally upheld the legality of security certificates (Department of Justice, 2013).

These exceptional cases serve to highlight the far more prevalent practice of extrajudicial detainment of non-Canadians. Despite having ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all subsequent and related human rights agreements, when it comes to enacting universal rights domestically, Canada’s detention framework extends differentiated access to basic Charter rights like habeus corpus. A precedent precluding access to habeus corpus for most immigration detentions was established by Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1989. This precedent has been challenged recently in the cases of Chaudhary v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 and Chhina v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017. In the former the Ontario Court of Appeals concluded that the IRPA does not offer a robust enough system of review to justify the denial of habeus corpus, as was outlined by the Peiroo exception. Nonetheless, the Chhina case
demonstrates the ongoing challenge of accessing habeus corpus rights for immigration detainees. Despite having made a claim to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (ABQB) to have his detention reviewed by a court after 26 months in detention, Mr. Chhina’s claim was denied and subsequently appealed by the Alberta Court of Appeals (ABCA), which determined the ABQB should have entertained the claim. The Minster of Public Safety filed a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which is irrelevant to Mr. Chhina, who was deported to Pakistan in 2017 despite the open case (Keung, 2018). However, if the government wins its appeal, this will allow for the ongoing stratification of rights and lack of robust judicial review of detentions, notwithstanding the Chaudhary case. The Canadian government’s defence of exceptional practices of immigration detention, detached from the norms, rules, and values that govern its interactions with Canadian citizens, are the enacted and codified culmination of global regimes of stratification and exclusion.

Discourses of humanitarian securitization and acts of “institutional benevolence” serve as mechanisms of civic stratification by drawing conceptual borders to justify the securitization of outsiders (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017, p. 162). In its communications to the public, the Canadian government emphasizes its compassion and commitment to upholding international obligations while simultaneously fighting in court to maintain differentiated access to rights and subjecting outsiders to intense scrutiny and surveillance. Welcoming some strangers publicly while working to violently exclude others is exemplary of the fundamental ambivalence immanent to the regime of borders and modern nationhood (Ahmed, 2000). Humanitarian aid is used to intensify surveillance and examination while imposing behavioural norms upon the receiver of assistance as a basic condition of access, re-inscribing the control of the humanitarian purveyor and justifying exceptional security measures to the detriment of vulnerable others (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017). For example, in a global context, biometric checks and identification wristbands are often used to mediate access to food aid (Chouliaraki & Musarò, 2017; Jacobsen, 2017). For asylees entering through Quebec, the conditions of exercising their right to make a claim involve arrest, invasive background checks, biometric data collection, and intimidating security interviews, none of which would be tolerated in the context of typical government-citizen encounters in Canada. In defending these processes, and de-emphasizing the uglier aspects of them, the Canadian government’s discourse of humanitarian securitization
attempts to justify its practices of civic stratification and contingent empathy through rhetorical sleight of hand. In the words of Minister of Immigration Refugees and Citizenship, Ahmed Hussen, himself formerly a refugee: “We’re making the necessary investments to the [Canada Border Services Agency] to expedite and conduct more removals of failed claimants …Those who do not deserve Canada’s protection get to be removed” (emphasis added, Scotti, 2018).

4.4 Conclusion

In response to their arguably eroding power in the face of increasingly uncontrollable pan-jurisdictional flows of people, goods, and information, the Canadian government performs its sovereignty while leveraging the affordances of an ambiguous yet stratified global order aided by increasingly powerful technologies of governmentality (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). Exceptional legal regimes subject irregular migrants to targeted surveillance and the collection of biometric data; the application of insufficiently accountable technologies of anticipatory and actuarial governance; and the prospect of indeterminate detention without adequate mechanisms for appeal, fair and reliable evidentiary standards, or accountability for detention decisions. Canadian lawmakers, enforcement, and intelligence agencies enact law and order as if their jurisdiction were absolute (as is their mandate) but ironically do so in ways that rely upon globalized and transversal political, legal, and technical realities that exist “next to or across” from Canadian sovereignty, thereby simultaneously subverting and re-asserting their authority. This ambivalence highlights the challenges to the Canadian state presented by the intensifying transnational flows characteristic of global mediatization as well as the simultaneous opportunities for control that the proliferation of connectivity affords.

This chapter has discussed what happens when an irregular migrant is intercepted by the RCMP by unpacking the implications of key juridico-political structures which condition arrests, background checks, biometric data collection, and security interviews. These encounters were interpreted using Hajer’s (2009; 2003b) concepts of network governance and the institutional void and then contextualized within the broader processes of mass-surveillance, anticipatory governance, and civic stratification. Through this discussion, I demonstrate that the technical, legal, and political environment that structures these encounters between governments and citizens is highly ambivalent and insufficiently accountable, creating opportunities for bias, error,
and abuse to taint Canada’s already exclusionary immigration enforcement regime. In the chapter that follows, I first highlight the latent irony in the discourse of the misinformed migrant by situating it in the performances and practices of Canadian political elites. I conclude my argument with two normative claims: 1) the Canadian government must enact the spirit of international law as the current Canadian border regime perpetuates civic stratification and 2) there is an urgent need for the development and mobilization of strong standards of algorithmic accountability, especially in the context of expanding tactics of anticipatory governance at the border.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

5.1 Globally Oriented Public Policy for Future Prosperity

Postmodern thinkers are often criticized for presenting problems without solutions (Mustapha, 2013). As this work has relied heavily on this genre of thought, I conclude by dedicating some space to rebuffing such critiques, which I will do in two ways. First, by simply pointing to the ways in which citizens have themselves articulated novel forms of resistance through acts of networked citizenship. The real power of positive change is held by multiplicities of micropolitical communities negotiating with power. Asylum seekers in Lacolle enacted embodied and performative resistance to a regime of global inequality with rhetorical and material consequences for Canadian political elites. These bonafide citizens contributed to the erosion of Canadian sovereignty and the state-form as the primary locus of power in global politics, challenging, in small and varied ways, the reality of global civic stratification and global apartheid.

The official strategic narrative of the misinformed migrant is deeply ironic on several levels. The first is that Canadian performances of humanitarian securitization operated to deemphasize the political agency of mobile communities, yet in practice, subtly acknowledged the political power immanent to these micro-political communities by engaging in tactics of deliberative democracy and participating in novel government-citizen encounters. Tactics of diplomacy in the void, like using algorithmically targeted advertising and deploying community-facing diplomatic envoys to address outsiders constitutes a novel networked approach to migration management in the Canadian context. Asylee acts of citizenship thus disrupted and nuanced the relations of power between the Canadian government and those it deems ‘non-citizens’. The narrative of the misinformed migrant is doubly ironic when one considers the quality of information emanating from Canadian institutions. Politicians were actively engaged in disseminating partial, self-interested accounts of Lacolle, whether that meant emphasizing Canada’s virtuousness or framing the arrivals as an absolute crisis. How these truths were contested and refuted amongst political elites highlighted the power of the media as a platform and tool for governmentality. Migrants were not afforded the space to ‘be political’; they were
not quoted in ways that highlight their historicity, individuality, and power as political agents. They are instead framed as ignorant victims acting on bad information. This leads to the third layer of irony, which is the flawed and unaccountable methods of intelligence gathering and analysis which are deployed by Canadian enforcement agencies. The CBSA relies upon questionable risk assessments, flawed data analysis, and obfuscated intelligence to inform its decisions on admissibility. The legal exceptionalism of the border allows Canadian institutions to evade scrutiny and accountability, yet they are not seen as misinformed. In these ways, the narrative of the misinformed migrant is just that. A narrative. A story told to achieve particular strategic outcomes and accommodate various assumptions. In this case, the story worked to perpetuate the global regime of borders and uphold the reality of civic stratification.

To address the inconsistencies emergent of Canadian institutional ambivalence, I point to some policy recommendations made by scholars and practitioners who have informed this research. Rather than fully fleshing out these arguments, my goal is to reference possibilities for a better world. For the longer term, I point to public policy recommendations that acknowledge a globally networked public domain yet seem unlikely in the short-term. I also put forward some specific and practical interventions for algorithmic accountability in the shorter term, despite Canada’s complicity in perpetuating global inequality. Many of these suggestions are radical yet are formulated with the de-/re-territorialization of the dominant liberal ideology in mind.

5.1.1 Enact the Spirit of International Law

Enacting the spirit of international law means dismantling regimes of civic stratification; this involves taking action to ensure all people have ‘the right to have rights’ (Ingram, 2008). In relation to the case at hand, this means recognizing universal digital rights by evenly applying privacy protection to all people rather than just legally-recognized citizens and ending limitations to informational access through secretive legal regimes like Security Certificates. Past this, developing global accountability mechanisms for the effects of data-driven and networked technologies is necessary (The Toronto Declaration, 2018). Migration policy itself, like the STCA and IRPA, also instantiates stratified access to rights. While declaring the United States an unsafe country would tension relations between the two countries, regularizing and expediting all processes of mass immigration would attract further human and fiscal capital flight from the
United States to Canada’s benefit. Migration as a global phenomenon is at unprecedented levels and shows no sign of slowing down (UNHCR, 2018; United Nations Publications, 2018). As climate change—a fundamentally global threat—intensifies, patterns of human mobility will only follow suit (Sheller, 2018).

Whereas mass media and political elites frame migration as a threat, I posit that it is an opportunity. Acknowledging cosmopolitan government-citizen encounters as productive rather than problematic opens space for the Canadian government to build a forward-looking framework to receive and welcome newcomers, transcending the ambivalence of curatorial immigration regimes. Preparing for and welcoming future mobility by eliminating dysfunctional policies like tied development aid, bureaucratized and securitized migration policy, and frameworks of irrational exclusion like refusing to recognize newcomers’ knowledge and qualifications would put Canada at an economic and social advantage while tackling the actual threats of extreme poverty, climate degradation, and institutionalized civic stratification.

5.1.2 Algorithmic Accountability

In May of 2018, advocacy organizations Amnesty International and Access Now launched the Toronto Declaration, which seeks to outline a strategy to protect human rights and combat inequality related to threats posed by machine learning technology (2018). The declaration makes reference to an expanding body of scholarship on ‘data harms’ associated with machine learning and, within the framework of international law, proposes certain obligations of states and corporations. Three primary issues were highlighted: 1) ensuring the application of artificial intelligence technologies does not infringe upon or erode existing human rights, 2) embracing responsibilities like developing new frameworks of accountability for systems design, and 3) ensuring access to effective remedies in cases where rights are not upheld. As I have shown, all three are relevant to the Canadian immigration system.

With reference to this declaration, Molnar and Gill put forth a comprehensive list of actionable policy recommendations for automated decision-making systems in immigration contexts in their 2018 report, Bots at the Gate. These recommendations involve radical transparency on the development, implementation, and outcomes of the technologies and methodologies deployed by states—with minimal exceptions for national security; the
development of strict standards surrounding the use of automated decision-making systems (including predictive analytics) by government agencies; the creation of multi-level mechanisms of accountability including an arm’s length watchdog agency, a framework for algorithmic accountability with periodical formal reviews, independent academic peer-review and scientific verification of all systems, and a stakeholder taskforce; the establishment of back-up analog determinations systems, the right to have one’s case reviewed by an impartial human-based system, and a mechanism to appeal and redress erroneous determinations (Molnar and Gill, 2018). Finally, Molnar and Gill call upon the Canadian government to draw an explicit red-line surrounding applications of automated decision-making that are absolutely out of bounds, for example highly discretionary applications like humanitarian and compassionate care applications (2018).

In cases where national security does justify secrecy, a team of European academics, led by Broeders, developed a framework for the protection of fundamental rights by proposing several regulatory interventions to expand the emphasis of accountability safeguards from the collection of data to the analysis and use of government-held information (Broeders et al., 2017). As noted above, Canada’s Security Intelligence Review Committee does not make any reference to methodological accountability in its most recent annual report but rather focuses on CSIS data collection and holdings (Security Intelligence Review Committee, 2018). Worse still, the CBSA has no such watchdog agency and makes little meaningful reference to methodological accountability in its annual report (Canada Border Services Agency, 2018c). Broeders et al. argue that methodological accountability for Big Data (and by extension machine learning) in national security requires that technologists, rather than just policymakers or administrators, be given access to all stages of the process from input to output (2017). They also argue for multi-level algorithmic accountability through the creation of mandatory internal audit and reporting frameworks and arms-length watchdog agencies that report to parliamentary committees that are open to the public as opposed to those that convene behind closed doors (Broeders et al., 2017). Finally, Broeders et al. argue that all data-driven government technology be subject to a sunset clause of 3-5 years, whereupon the efficacy of a project may be evaluated before causing irreparable systemic damage (2017).
5.2 Conclusion

In the time since Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sent his #welcometoCanada tweet in January of 2017, he has been forced to harden his stance and alter his performances. While still regularly expounding upon the benefits of immigration, he has also made significant investments in border security as well as to Canada’s immigration bureaucracy. In a pre-election budget released in March of 2019, Trudeau’s liberals promised to increase funding for border security and the processing of asylum claims from 173.2 million to 1.05 billion Canadian dollars (Mackrael, 2019). The pressure on Trudeau to appear tough has only intensified since the election of several conservative provincial premiers. Doug Ford took office as Premier of Ontario near the end of the coverage in June of 2018 and has made several moves to limit support for asylum seekers since, including denying access to legal aid (The Canadian Press, 2019). François Legault became the Premier of Quebec in October 2018 after the coverage ended, although many of his xenophobic statements in the run-up to the election were featured in the press wire coverage. In April of 2019, Alberta elected Jason Kenney Premier. Kenney served as federal Immigration Minister under the previous conservative government and was responsible for a number of policies that eroded the rights of refugees and sought to deter asylum applications, including the previously mentioned “irregular arrivals” designation (Nerenberg, 2019).

These political tensions between progressive and conservative liberal ideologies in Canada are not new. However, networked technology has impacted interactions between asylum seekers and the Canadian government near Lacolle in multifarious and contradictory ways that are far more politically novel. The massive proliferation of connected technology has opened possibilities for decentralized communities of migrants to travel in ways that are safer, more comfortable, and more connected yet also implicated them in more intensely securitized encounters with the Canadian data-border assemblage, which works to restrict mobility and limit access to rights. Mobile media technology has presented a platform upon which to negotiate with power, yet simultaneously, the increasing ubiquity of handheld devices and social networks have afforded the development of what Ruppert, Isin, and Bigo call “data’s empire” (Ruppert and Isin in Ruppert, Isin, & Bigo, 2017, p. 5). Indeed, novel practices of mediatized migration have
unfolded concurrently with intensifying algorithmic governmentality which hinge upon the mass datafication of citizen-subjects.

The Canadian government, concurrent with its closest international allies, has invested heavily in the development of cyber-infrastructure to monitor and anticipate the movements of people to the effect of limiting mobilities and instantiating a regime of hospitality and civic stratification through a disposition of selective empathy (Chouliaraki & Georgiou, 2017). Close analysis of the case of Lacolle reveals a nascent genre of politics conditioned by global mediatization. Ambivalent acts of networked citizenship and authority next to or across from traditional politics are both explicitly and implicitly present in the discourses, practices, and performances of the state in both public-facing and ‘backstage’ contexts, albeit in distinct fashions. Migrant voices are only selectively remediated in the institutional narrative, yet the state was forced, if only tacitly, to acknowledge the political agency and influence of these communities and their acts of citizenship through its negotiations with them.

In Chapter 2, I set the stage by developing a theoretic framework within which to define institutional narratives and government-citizen encounters in the context of global mediatization. I presented the concepts of network governance and the institutional void; performative authority and citizenship; and connected this with existing literatures on the securitization of migration. I then presented the design of the study describing my dramaturgical approach to analyzing and constructing narratives of institutional authority and government-citizen encounters.

In Chapter 3, I explored the public performances of the Canadian government through press wires, which are marketed as an objective source of information but often serve as a platform for politicians to perpetuate dominant discourses and speak to each other alongside the public. I surfaced the ‘order of appearance’ in Canadian press-wire coverage and the dominant discourses of reception. The construction of this institutional narrative served to uncover the basis of my claim that Lacolle has been the site of novel performances of politics. I proceeded to reframe encounters between the CBSA and asylees as government citizen-encounters, showing how official responses worked to inadvertently reveal the underlying reality that irregular migrants may act as citizens and engage in social struggle. The identification of these
inconsistencies raised the question of what actually happens when an asylee is intercepted by the RCMP and ‘processed’.

Chapter 4 answers this question. Using a diverse range of sources, I find that despite facing novel acts of migratory citizenship, the Canadian security apparatus leverages its technical, legal, and political (infra)structures against asylum seekers. I begin by outlining ‘the process’ of securitization, which is referred to only euphemistically in Canadian institutional media. After using various types of documents to parse the ‘backstage’ of Canadian governmentality in Lacolle, I describe three more general trends which increasingly shape the contours of government-citizen encounters at the Canadian border. First, I describe intensifying mass surveillance through the integration of databases. I then describe the enthusiastic turn to modes of anticipatory governance. Lastly, I situate these processes in the context of civic stratification. Ultimately, I conclude that the efforts of the Canadian state to control narratives of migration operate to the effect of perpetuating the institution of borders and, as a consequence, a system of global apartheid, characterized by inequitable access to rights, mobility, and opportunity.

Global mediatization is forcing states to reckon with the growing irrelevance of their physical territoriality. As borderless technologies like social networks and predictive analytics intensify global informational flows between and amongst citizens and states, new approaches to governing and acting politically are required. While this research has worked to highlight, label, and understand nascent tactics of networked politics, there is much more to be done. This includes generating better understandings of how states are working together in this networked context to maintain the institution of borders; developing a sensible approach to migration policy that upholds human rights and acknowledges that practices of detention, encampment, and illegalization are not just immoral but ineffective at addressing the causes of inequality and forced mobility; redrafting and negotiating defencible standards for universal human rights protection in the digital age; and studying, advocating, and implementing meaningful frameworks of algorithmic and intelligence accountability domestically and internationally.
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Appendix A: Press Wire Methodology

Data Collection

The arrivals through Lacolle first caught the attention of the Canadian media in early 2017. While the arrivals are ongoing, the high number of asylum seekers in Lacolle fell out of the news by August 2018. To collect the coverage for my analysis, I used the Factiva database and the term “Lacolle” to search for stories from major press wires including Reuters, Associated Press (AP), the Canadian Press (CP), and Agence France Press (AFP). These searches were limited between the January 1st 2017 and October 10th 2018, the day I began pulling the coverage. Such an arbitrary end date is unproblematic as the last relevant result in the coverage is August 22nd, 2018. These searches served as preliminary tests to determine which press wires I would use in my collection and analysis. Reuters and AP’s results were limited to omit their respective image services as there were no images in AFP or CP’s results, duplicates were set to “similar,” and French and English were selected as language delimiters.

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<td>“The Associated Press–Newswires”</td>
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Within these results, I looked for articles relevant to asylum seekers and found 22 relevant articles for AFP, and 94 relevant articles for CP in both French and English omitting both duplicates (both those caught by Factiva and ones that are obviously redundant) and results related to Lacolle but not to asylum seekers. In contrast I found 6 relevant articles by Reuters and 5 from AP (including 2 already in CP’s coverage) all in English. It was clear that Canadian Press and Agence France Presse would be the best sources to use as they both featured bi-lingual coverage in French and English in addition to having the most comprehensive coverage of events in Lacolle.
Subsequently, I conducted four searches to collect data from the Factiva database, one for each press wire in French and English. I combed through the results selecting the relevant articles and downloading them as four .pdf files—CP-English (32 stories), CP-French (62 Stories), AFP-English (11 stories), and AFP-French (11 stories). As I did this, I compiled a spreadsheet of the coverage including some basic metadata including the date and time of publication, the location in the by-line and the location of the development being covered in the story, the headline, the wordcount, whether there are duplicates (according to the database) and the word counts of any duplicates, the source, and the language.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
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<td>AFP-English</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFP-French</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>116</td>
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</table>

**Data Analysis**

After importing the .pdf files from Factiva into NVivo, I began the coding process. It should be noted that I entered the coding process with a fairly high level of prior knowledge based upon a previous study of consumer-facing textual news related to Lacolle (Duncan and Caidi, 2018). Despite having a general understanding of what to expect, I left room to be surprised. Starting from scratch with a process of axial and focussed coding served this purpose. Before I began coding, I also read all the way through the coverage without adding any nodes in NVivo. During the axial stage of coding, I outlined core themes in the data within the two broad categories of voice and discourse. In the focussed coding that followed, I broke the high-level codes down further using sub-nodes in NVivo.
Voice

I identified a typology of voice and representation within the coverage by coding for people that speak and are spoken of in the coverage. The primary categories included: community organizations, activists, experts, locals from impacted communities, migrants, and officials. Within these categories, I broke officials down into politicians and bureaucrats, I broke community organizations and activists into institutional humanitarians (professionals), far-right activists and voices of ‘grassroots solidarity’, experts were broken down as lawyers and academics, although this is less important of a distinction as the academics consulted were professors of law.

After this, I went a step further by coding for individual voices of key groups (politicians, officials, institutional humanitarians, activists, experts, and migrants) by searching for last names in the coverage and noting how many times a name was mentioned. There were no cases of the same last name. When named, individuals are referred to by their full names on first mention and by their last names in each subsequent mention (within an article) making this the most reliable systemic way to quantify the implicit hierarchy of authority in the press wire coverage. Factiva generates a table of contents, so being mentioned in a headline adds two to the total number of times a name is mentioned. Headlines are important, they are meant to capture attention and convince a reader to look at the contents of a story. For this reason, I did not correct this imbalance.
Figure 2: Hierarchy chart automatically generated in NVivo

Discourse

Similar to voice, I engaged in a process of axial and focussed coding to generate both high level and more specific understandings of the types of discourses present in the coverage. During the axial stage, I identified a pressure narrative, discussions about policies of deterrence, discourses of humanitarian securitization, and a narrative of misinformation closely tied to migrants use of social media, although some politicians were also implicated in discussions of misinformation as well. Unlike with voice I did not pay attention to the quantification of discourses, however, I did engage in more comprehensive selective coding by both reading through the coverage start to finish an additional time, and also reading through and sub-categorizing all previously coded references.
In the selective phase, discourses of pressure became broken up into the more refined categories of water metaphors, counter-pressure (attempts to deny that the pressure is too much), as well as institutional, infrastructural, and economic pressures. Discourses of policy were coded as Canadian policy (for example, discussions of internal policies of deportation and the asylum system), American policies (like the Muslim ban, or the revocation of Temporary Protected Status), the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA), and Diplomacy outside of the STCA (like community outreach visits to the United States and Nigeria). Humanitarian securitization was broken both into its constitutive parts—humanitarian discourses and those of law and order—in addition to references to ‘the process’ asylum seekers are subjected to upon their interception. Lastly, discourses of misinformation were categorized as either regarding the narrative of the misinformed migrant or describing political squabbles and contested truths. Within each of the sub-categories the possibility existed to remain only coded within the top-level node, however, this only happened regularly in the context of pressure. Any general or categorically ambiguous references to the burden of migration, including citing updated statistics were not sub-categorized.
Figure 3: Hierarchy chart automatically generated by NVivo
### Tabular Results of the Coding Process

Below are the tabular results from the body of the text for reference.

#### Politicians mentioned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Prevalence</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Trudeau</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Hussen</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration Refugees and Citizenship</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Scheer</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Leader of the Opposition, MP</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Goodale</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Garneau</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Minister of Transportation</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-François Lisée</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Party Leader, MNA until October 2018</td>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillipe Couillard</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Premie of Quebec until October 2018</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathleen Weil</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusiveness until October 2017</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelle Rempel</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Official Opposition Critic for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, MP</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Legault</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Party Leader, MNA (became Premiere in October of 2018)</td>
<td>Coalition Avenir Quebec</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Heurtel</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusiveness after October 2017</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Coderre</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mayor of Montreal until November 2017</td>
<td>Équipe Denis Coderre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 Member of Parliament (MP); Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP); Member of the National Assembly of Quebec (MNA)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Paul-Hus</td>
<td>Federal Public Safety Critic, MP</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Dubourg</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pablo Rodriguez</td>
<td>MP (Became Minister of Heritage in June 2018)</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucie Charlebois</td>
<td>Minister for Rehabilitation, Youth Protection and Public Health until August 2018</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gérard Deltell</td>
<td>Official Opposition Critic for the Treasury Board, MP</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa MacLeod</td>
<td>Minister of Children, Community and Social Services</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Tory</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Miller</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brenda Shanahan</td>
<td>MP representing Châteauguay—Lacolle</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenny Kwan</td>
<td>MP, NDP critic Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Rodrigue</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanie Auguste</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernadette Clement</td>
<td>Municipal Councillor, Cornwall (became Mayor in December 2018)</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre Boulerice</td>
<td>MP, NDP Quebec lieutenant and Ethics critic</td>
<td>New Democratic Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Cormier</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bernard Généreux</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Roy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MNP, Minister of Culture, Communication and the French Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>since October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Duteau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mayor, Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Albanese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ontario MPP, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration until June 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Blais</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Quebec MNA, Minister of Employment until August 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Former President of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sébastien Proulx</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Quebec MNA, Minister of Education until August 2018 now Official</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition House Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine Fournier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Quebec MNA, quit PQ in March 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monique Pauzé</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Plamondon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luc Thériault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier Barsalou-Duval</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrystia Freeland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Blair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carole Poirier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MNA until October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew Dubé</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagmeet Singh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Party Leader, MP as of March 2019</td>
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## Officials mentioned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
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<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Fortin</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Canadian Immigration and Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francine Dupuis</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Programme régional d'accueil et d'intégration des demandeurs d'asile (PRAIDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Nicolas Beuze</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Dumas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathieu Genest</td>
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<td>Press Secretary</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Bardsley</td>
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<td>Press Secretary</td>
<td>Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness</td>
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<td>Claude Castonguay</td>
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<td>Officer</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrick Lefort</td>
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<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. (Navy) Eliane Trahan</td>
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<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Canadian Forces (Navy)</td>
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<td>Mike MacDonald</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senior official'</td>
<td>Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada</td>
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<td>Jacques Leroux</td>
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<td>Deputy Minister</td>
<td>Ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and Inclusion Quebec</td>
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<td>Staff Sgt. Brian Byrne</td>
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<td>Const. Erique Gasse</td>
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<td>Luc Portelance</td>
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<td>Former Head</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hursh Jawal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Immigration Minister Ahmed Hussen</td>
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<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camille Habel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brad Brant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Special Operations Supervisor</td>
<td>US Border Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karine Martel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cedric Essiminy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Parc Olympique, Région de Montréal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Le Bouthillier</td>
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<td>Head, Media Relations</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Jefferies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Ontario Premiere Doug Ford</td>
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**Experts mentioned**

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<tr>
<td>Stéphan Handfield</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lawyer, Owner</td>
<td>Handfield and Associates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saron Gebresellassi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lawyer, Owner</td>
<td>Saron Legal PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Taillefer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Legal Aid Montreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherry Aiken</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Professor of Law</td>
<td>Queen's University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamie Liew</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Assistant Professor of Law</td>
<td>University of Ottawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Sébastien Boudreault</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lawyer, President</td>
<td>Association québécoise des avocats et avocates en droit de l'immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Meurrens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lawyer, Partner</td>
<td>Larlee Rosenberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifford McCarten</td>
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<td>Lawyer, Name Partner</td>
<td>McCarten Wallace Law</td>
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**Institutional humanitarians mentioned**

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<tr>
<td>Carl Boisvert</td>
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<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Canadian Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Goldman</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Committee to Aid Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillaume Andre</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Multi-Ethnic Community Centre, Montreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjorie Villefranche</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>Maison D'Haiti</td>
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### Activists mentioned

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saron Gebresellassi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lawyer, Activist</td>
<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anas Bouslikhane</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Pro-immigration activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Éric Trudel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Storm Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diane Blain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Storm Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascale Diverlus</td>
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<td>Activist</td>
<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Lakoff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Solidarity Beyond Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvain Brouillette</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>La Meute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaggi Singh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Solidarity Beyond Borders</td>
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### Migrants mentioned

<table>
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<th>Migrant</th>
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<th>Profile</th>
<th>Quote</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marie-Junie Joseph</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30, young mother</td>
<td>&quot;I came because the door is open here, because I heard Canada is open to immigrants&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ahmed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Father of two</td>
<td>&quot;We came to the US to ask for asylum,&quot; he said. But with new President Donald Trump's anti-immigrant policy &quot;we are very much scared from deportation.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asma and Ayman Elyas</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pregnant young couple</td>
<td>&quot;A discarded plastic bag reveals the journey of a Sudanese couple.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Rigaud Liberal</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>&quot;Learned about Roxham Road from Facebook &quot;; &quot;Canada will be better than America&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Iftikhar</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Father of four</td>
<td>&quot;There is nobody to help,&quot; he said as he watched his children play in a park near the shelter. &quot;I want to leave here but I don't know what to do.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran Carlos Reyes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Salvadorian facing deportation from US</td>
<td>&quot;There's Canada, but I don't know anything about Canada.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lid (not real name)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Young mother</td>
<td>&quot;Lid is approaching the end of her stock of diapers and formula. After it's gone, the mother, who has applied for asylum in Canada, does not know how she will manage with her 19-day old newborn, in her cockroach infested apartment&quot;22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lena Gunja</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;10-year old from the Congo&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;In Trump's country, they want to put us back to our country&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medyne Milord</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>&quot;needs work to support her family&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;If I return to Haiti, the problem will double,&quot; she said. &quot;What I hope is to have a better life in Canada.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inancieu Merilien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moved to the United States in 2000</td>
<td>&quot;They're going to give us housing in apartments. I hope everything goes well.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando Lopez</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Honduran living in Miami facing deportation from US</td>
<td>&quot;We work hard and do not have criminal records. I own a home and business with my family and every year I pay my taxes, &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discourses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>References Coded</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

22 Translated from: Lid arrive au bout de sa réserve de couches et de lait maternisé. Après, la maman, qui a demandé l'asile au Canada, ne sait pas trop comment elle va se débrouiller avec son nouveau-né de 19 jours, dans son appartement infesté de coquerelles
“Between Aug. 1 and Aug. 7 alone, 1,798 people showed up at an unofficial crossing from the U.S. into Quebec. In comparison, only 2,920 claims were filed in Quebec in all of 2015. So far the numbers show no sign of slowing” (Lowrie, 2017c).

“While Canadian authorities don’t directly link the flow to Trump administration policies, they acknowledge that the number of migrants from the United States has increased since January, especially through the Quebec border” (Triomphe, 2017).

“Our government is committed to offering protection for those fleeing war, persecution and natural disasters without compromising the safety and security of Canadians,” he said at the news conference” (Lowrie, 2017a).

“Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said Friday the government would use the intervening time to target American communities, including Miami and southern California, with an ongoing message that Canada may be compassionate and welcoming, but it still has a rules-based immigration system. ‘Just because you come to Canada irregularly does not give you a free pass to this country,’ he said” (Patel & Blanchfield, 2018).

### Pressure discourses

<table>
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<th>References coded</th>
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<td>Pressure (aggregate)</td>
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<td>Pressure (direct/general)</td>
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<td>Infrastructural</td>
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<td>Counter-pressure</td>
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<td>Water metaphors</td>
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### Policy discourses

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<td>Policy (aggregate)</td>
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<td>US Policy</td>
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<td>Safe Third Country Agreement</td>
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<td>Canadian Policy</td>
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<td>Diplomacy</td>
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### Discourses of humanitarian securitization

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<td>Humanitarian Securitization (aggregate)</td>
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### Discourses of misinformation

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<td>Misinformation and Social Media (aggregate)</td>
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<td>Politicians and contested truth</td>
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</table>
## Appendix B: Access to Information Requests

While dozens of ATI requests were consulted in the course of this research the table below is a list of the requests cited in this document, their official description, length, and the disclosing agency. For requests made since 2017, there is a spreadsheet of all requests available at https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/0797e893-751e-4695-8229-a5066e4fe43c

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<th>Agency</th>
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<td>A-2014-14403</td>
<td>Records from June 1, 2014 to November 30, 2014 from the National Border Operations Centre’s Targeting Operations – Intelligence section regarding: scenario based training, exchange programme with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, high risk travellers, Syrian and other foreign fighters, confronting terrorist travel, and a Ministerial briefing on traveling sex offenders.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-2016-421</td>
<td>Complete copy of all letters sent and received by Michel Coulombe.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>A-2017-06905</td>
<td>Instructions issued from June 30, 2015 to May 2, 2017 pertaining to the search of electronic devices or media, the Officer Reference Booklet, and Appendix B to the Customs Enforcement Manual entitled “Offences against a Border Services Officer”. Additionally, data sharing agreements between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) including documents on how the RCMP or local police can request a passenger receive extra screening by the CBSA.</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-2017-13945</td>
<td>The final version or most recent draft from January 1 to September 20, 2017 of reports, studies, analysis, memos, briefing notes, risk and threat assessments by the</td>
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<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<tr>
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<td>A-2017-18416</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency's liaison officers stationed in New York discussing implications for illegal migration to Canada arising from changes to the policy of the United States.</td>
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