“Abandoned in every sense”: Dispossession, Depletion, and the Reproduction of Colonial Relations through Transnational Mining in the Peruvian Andes

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Department of Geography and Planning
University of Toronto

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Abstract

In 2016, the ten indigenous campesino communities of the district of Chamaca, Peru temporarily seized a copper mine owned and operated by a transnational mining company, HudBay Minerals. To understand such mining conflicts in Chamaca, this thesis examines how colonial logics and power relations underpin contemporary development policies of the Peruvian state. In particular, I analyze how the historical entanglements of race, indigenous land tenure and labor, and mining inform contemporary extractivist policies. Drawing on three months of ethnographic research, I argue that the HudBay mining enclosure, justified by such policies, reproduces the colonial power structure in three ways: through 1) disposessions that deplete indigenous social reproduction; 2) the entrenchment of the colonial gender system; 3) state and corporate legal abandonment that recreates hacienda-indigenous relations.
“Abandonadas en todo sentido”: Desposesión, Agotamiento, y la Reproducción de las Relaciones Coloniales por la Minería Transnacional en los Andes del Perú

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Resumen

En 2016, las diez comunidades campesinas originarias del distrito de Chamaca, Perú tomaron las instalaciones de la minera transnacional—HudBay Minerals—por cuatro días. Para entender los conflictos mineros en Chamaca, esta tesis examina cómo las lógicas y relaciones de poder coloniales respaldan la política de desarrollo contemporánea del Estado peruano. En particular, analizo cómo las conexiones históricas entre las estructuras raciales, la tenencia de la tierra y la labor de las poblaciones indígenas, y la minería informan la política extractivista del presente.

Luego de tres meses de investigación etnográfica, sostengo que el cercamiento minero de HudBay, establecido por tal política, reproduce la estructura colonial en tres maneras: por 1) las desposesiones que agotan la reproducción social de los pueblos originarios; 2) el afianzamiento del sistema de género colonial; 3) el abandonamiento legal por parte del Estado y la empresa, que recrea las relaciones y economía de hacienda.
Acknowledgements / Agradecimientos

“Finding beauty in a broken world is creating beauty in the world we find. We do it alone. We do it together. We create our best work in community.”

– Terry Tempest Williams

“The journey takes four thousand eight hundred and thirty miles, more than the length of this country. The monarchs that fly south will not make it back north. Each departure, then, is final. Only their children return; only the future revisits the past.”

– Ocean Vuong

This thesis was made possible because of the support and kindness of so many people across time and space.

Estoy sumamente agradecido por todas las personas del Perú que me han apoyado con esta investigación. Agradezco ante todo a los/as compañeros/as de Chamaca y Velille que confiaron en mí para compartir sus historias. Hernán, gracias por acompañarme en este proyecto y por tu paciencia y amistad. Timoteo, gracias por ayudarme tanto y por ser tan acogedor durante mi estancia en Chamaca. Esta investigación no habría sido posible sin la ayuda de los colegas de Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras, especialmente Jaime y José Antonio. Ustedes me apoyaron tanto—estoy realmente agradecido, mucho más de lo que puedo expresar.

I would also like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Sharlene Mollett, for her guidance and for constantly pushing me throughout the program. Sharlene, because you cared enough to be critical, I grew so much more than I had imagined—both intellectually and personally. I am also grateful for Dr. Sue Bunce and Dr. Christian Abizaid for taking the time to be on my thesis committee and for their insightful suggestions and observations.

This thesis is also a product of my family’s sacrifice—physical, emotional, financial—over generations. In a country ravaged by colonial and imperial violence, my great-grandmother, grandmother, and great aunt gave their all to their children, often forgoing their own needs, so that their descendants might flourish in a world structured by the colonial difference. My mother and father have similarly sacrificed so much—and without their selfless support and unwavering interest in my education since my childhood, I would not have been able to pursue a master’s degree in a country where I was not born. I recognize your sacrifices too, Min Woo, and your childhood on the move because of me.

And to my chosen family: thank you, Connie, for your compassion and your helpful feedback on many draft chapters of this thesis; Laura, for being a steadfast companion on this journey and your constant reassurance; Roxana and Fernando, for your friendship and mentorship, and your help preparing me for fieldwork; Jason, for always believing in me. And to many others who have been with me through this process, thank you for holding me through the ups and downs. You know who you are.
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List of Acronyms

ANA National Water Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Agua)
CENSOPAS National Center for Occupational Health and Environmental Protection for Health (Centro Nacional de Salud Ocupacional y Protección del Medio Ambiente del Instituto Nacional de Salud)
CSR Corporate social responsibility
DHSF Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras
FDI Foreign direct investment
FTA Free trade agreement
FUDICHA Frente Único de Defensa de los Intereses de Chamaca
ILO International Labour Organization
MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economy and Finance)
MINAM Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente)
MINEM Ministry of Energy and Mines (Ministerio de Energía y Minas)
OEFA Body for Assessment and Audit (Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental)
UNDRIP UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Chapter 1
Introduction

Lights lit up the winding mountain roads of Chamaca, an Andean district that gets its name from the Aymara word for darkness, in the early hours of November 7, 2016; the indigenous people from the district’s all ten campesino communities (comunidades campesinas) were making their way to Uchucarcco, a community on whose lands the Constancia copper mine operates. “By 4:30 [in the morning], we were breaking down fences… the mine did not know how to react, it was not prepared for that,” recalled David,¹ a leader who helped organize this protest against the Canadian mining company, HudBay Minerals (interview 25). Once inside, the protesters occupied the open pit for four days, halting the mine’s operations, despite the near-freezing night temperatures and a lack of food and water provisions.

The toma de mina (seizing of the mine) was an eruption of the tension that had been building since HudBay entered the zone in early 2011, when the firm acquired the pre-construction Constancia project from Norsemont Mining, another Canadian corporation. Since the firm’s entry, the district government of Chamaca, along with representatives from the district’s ten communities, has participated in annual negotiations for corporate social responsibility (CSR) agreements—with much difficulty. In 2016, although the parties had established that the firm would provide projects in health and education, on the day of signing, HudBay turned on the agreement. The toma de mina took place just a week after, with the communities demanding these promised projects—including the construction of a new health centre (puesto de salud) and support for malnutrition in children—and several amendments to the Environmental and Impact Assessment (EIA), such as the formulation of a contingency plan for contamination (La República, 2016a; Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras, 2016a). Community members also demanded that the central government set up a mesa de diálogo, a dialogue roundtable, where they could address these concerns (Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras, 2016a).

A mesa took place a few weeks later according to the communities’ wishes. And it was partly a success: “Lots of projects have come out, because of that [protest] this school was executed…the sanitation, too, was done…there is a project, they are doing irrigation in Uchucarcco... all that has been thanks to the mesa that was set up,” said David (interview 25). Today, however, communities still feel to have been deceived by the mining firm because the

¹ All names are pseudonyms.
projects were carried out by the government. As David put it, “the state practically came to save the mine, the mine left free and the state carried all the weight…but the mine should keep assuming commitments, yes or no?” The tension between the communities and the mining firm is thus latent, ready to erupt, despite the lack of press coverage and that the Ombudsman’s office (Defensoría del Pueblo) only lists two “active” conflicts relating to HudBay at the time of writing (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2018).

The 2016 protest reveals several key issues that will be discussed in this thesis. The conflict is an example of the many socio-environmental conflicts that occur in Peru every year, a pattern noted by scholars (Bebbington, 2012a; Bebbington et al., 2008). Indeed, in October 2018, socio-environmental conflicts accounted for 64.1% of all social conflicts according to the Peruvian Ombudsman’s office; of those, 65% related to mining activities (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2018). Such conflicts, as in the case of HudBay, happen frequently on Indigenous lands. Although Peru is a signatory of the UN’s International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), as many other countries in Latin America, the state maintains the rights to subsoil minerals and pursues extractivist policies. The concessions it grants to foreign corporations overlap with indigenous peoples’ territories and existing livelihoods (Bebbington, 2012a). Further, as people’s demands for CSR commitments in the 2016 protest further demonstrate, these extractive conflicts are also unfolding in the context of neoliberal resource governance, in which the state and the mining company both provide social services and their jurisdictional limits are ambiguous.

To understand such conflicts, this thesis examines how colonial logics underpin contemporary development policies of the central Peruvian state that dispossess indigenous campesinos through mining. I trace the historical co-constitution of race, indigenous land tenure and labor, and mining to show how the multicultural state promotes contradictory extractivist policies by resorting to racial ideologies. Looking specifically at the case of HudBay Minerals in the district of Chamaca, I argue that the mining enclosure, justified by such policies, reproduces the colonial power structure in three ways: through 1) disposessions that deplete indigenous social reproduction; 2) the entrenchment of the colonial gender system; 3) state and corporate legal abandonment that recreates hacienda-indigenous relations.
1.1 Historical context of indigenous land struggles in Peru

Before the Spanish Conquest, in the Andes was the Inca empire, a loose confederation of ethnically-differentiated polities that spanned from modern-day Colombia to Chile (Wilson, 2000). The polities, or ayllus, owed allegiance to the Inca king, and were primary social units that functioned at once as an “economic collectivity for landholding and production, an institution for regulating marriages and social reproduction, a religious or ritual entity focussed [sic] on a titular sacred mountain and territory, and a hierarchical political unit controlled by hereditary leaders known as kurakas” (Poole, 1994: 14).

This system would be altered, however, when the conquistador Francisco Pizarro captured emperor Atahualpa in 1532, seizing the imperial city of Cusco, and subsequently founded the Spanish capital of Lima in 1535 (Mörner, 1985). In the new viceroyalty of Peru, the “Republic of Indians” was put under the patronage of the “Republic of Spaniards,” which began to transform indigenous land tenure and labour to fulfill Spaniards’ economic and religious objectives. Initially, the encomienda was the primary institution instituted for this purpose. Under the encomienda, the Spanish crown gave grant holders (encomenderos) the right to indigenous labour within their jurisdiction (Rice, 2011). The forced labour ranging from farming to domestic service that indigenous people had to provide was seen to be an exchange for the religious education that the encomenderos had to provide (Covey and Quave, 2017).
The viceroyalty under the government of Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581) instituted more systemic reforms to transform indigenous land tenure and labour. For example, under the *reducción*, indigenous people were resettled from their ancestral territories to nucleated villages, where they could be more easily taxed, drafted for labour, and converted to Christianity (Covey and Quave, 2017). Toledo also instituted the *mita*, forcing the native population to work for minimal wages for various Spanish enterprises, but in particular, the mines (Scott, 2012). During this time, haciendas—large estates owned by Spaniards—also began to grow through land encroachments and other legalized means. For example, royal officials auctioned off “excess” indigenous community lands deemed unnecessary on the basis of population counts (Covey, 2017). Landless indigenous people, as well as those in need of more fertile lands, became *colonos* (tenants) on haciendas, paying access fees for pasture and providing free labour in *hacendados’* fields and homes (Handelman, 1975).

After Peru proclaimed independence from Spain in 1821, the new republic removed the inalienable status of indigenous lands, reasoning that indigenous people’s communal forms of property maintained their relationship with *kurakas*, undermining their integration into the new national citizenry (Himley, 2016; Thurner, 1997). The central state simultaneously withdrew its presence from the highlands, leaving the local *mestizo* elite in charge of governing the local population (Thurner, 1997). These changes left indigenous people vulnerable to hacienda encroachment and began the “feudalisation of rural society in Andean Peru,” resulting in indigenous insurgencies toward the end of the century (Himley, 2016: 213).

In the new century, the Peruvian government reversed its earlier policies to reinstate the protected status of indigenous lands, establishing the base for the system of protection in place today. Through the 1920 Constitution, the Leguía regime enabled *ayllus* to seek legal recognition as *comunidades indígenas* (indigenous communities), a status granted by the newly-created Office of Indigenous Affairs after the submission of an application (Handelman, 1975). Once community boundaries and titles were officialized, the lands became inalienable, meaning that they could not be sold or seized to an outsider (Handelman, 1975). Unfortunately, because many communities lacked the resources to prepare sufficient documentation and *hacendados’* often challenged communities’ claims, only a small proportion of communities were recognized; for example, in 1958, only 1,472 communities had received recognition out of the estimated 5,986 communities (Handelman, 1975). As a result, haciendas continued to grow, gaining control of
around 52% of Andean lands by 1961 (Kay, 1982). The continued encroachment of haciendas on community lands led a series of violent indigenous revolts for land reclamation throughout the 1960s (Kay, 1982).

The military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) began the agrarian reform in this context. Velasco expropriated costal and Andean hacienda lands by setting the maximum area of land ownership (Kay, 1982). Importantly, the reforms nominally changed comunidades indígenas in the Andes to comunidades campesinas (“peasant communities”), while calling the Amazonian indigenous communities comunidades nativas (“native communities”) (Greene, 2006).

Today, indigenous communities continue to be protected under Velasco’s naming convention. In the Andes, indigenous governing autonomy is enshrined in the General Law of Campesino Communities of 1987. As communities continue to serve as a political and social unit as did ayllus, people often use the term comunero/comunera to describe members of communities.

1.2 History of resource extraction in Peru

Resource extraction has played an important role in nation-building throughout Peru’s history. Soon after independence, liberalism became the guiding philosophy for the new republic’s development, helping establish an export-oriented economic model based on free trade (Grompone Velásquez, 2016). Liberalists believed that extraction supported by foreign capital would be an essential part of this development model, insisting that Peru was essentially a “mining country” (Grompone Velásquez, 2016). Such ideology led to the country’s first mining code in 1901, which finally repealed colonial mining laws (i.e. Mining Ordinances of New Spain) and allowed mineral rights to take the character of a private property (Dore, 1988; Vildósola Fuenzalida, 1999). Under this law, the ownership of a mining property became perpetual and irrevocable with the payment of low annual taxes, offering stability to companies (Dore, 1988; Vildósola Fuenzalida, 1999). Such policies, combined with the interest of the U.S. capital in Peru’s mineral wealth, helped establish foreign mining firms such as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, which came to own five-sixth of all mines in central Peru, in the first half of the 20th century (Brown, 2012). During this time, mineral exports (primarily copper and oil) overtook agricultural exports, which had previously dominated Peru’s portfolio (Drinot and Contreras, 2014; Thorp and Bertram, 1978).
The role of resource extraction and foreign capital went largely unaltered throughout the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The Velasco regime (1968-1975) did attempt to regulate foreign capital by bringing it under state control, nationalizing key transnational oil and mining firms including the abovementioned Cerro de Pasco Corporation. However, the military junta was not opposed to foreign capital in principle, and in fact tried to attract foreign investment in the construction of mining and petroleum infrastructure (Dore, 1988). Further, Velasco continued to support an economic growth model led by resource extraction, creating the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINAM), state hydrocarbons and mining enterprises Mineroperu and Minpeco. In other words, though the state became more of an active participant in resource extraction, the fundamental role of mining to the national economy did not change (Thorpe and Bertram, 1978). Once the regime toppled in 1975, however, the government reverted to older policies that encouraged privatization, quickly bringing up foreign ownership of the mining industry to 62 percent in 1984 from 54.7 percent in 1976 (Dore, 1988).

The export-oriented, foreign investment-led economic growth model reliant on resource extraction expanded drastically after the neoliberal reforms of the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). Following the tenants of neoliberalism—deregulation, free markets, and free trade—Fujimori implemented sweeping measures to promote foreign direct investment (FDI), offering various tax incentives and denationalizing 200 mining operations (Bury, 2005; Eaton, 2015). He instated laws that facilitated mining; for example, the 1995 Land Law (Ley de Tierras) stimulated investment in rural areas by developing a land market, while the National Mining Cadastre Law centralized and simplified the mining concession system (Himley, 2016; Bury, 2005). As a result of these changes, Peru’s mining sector grew 2000 percent just between 1990 and 1997, outperforming the average growth rate of 400 percent for Latin America (Lust, 2016).

Fujimori’s predecessors have reaffirmed their commitment to neoliberal development, pursuing free trade agreements with various countries such as the U.S and Canada. Even President Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) depended on contributions from the mining industry to fund his social policies even though he had campaigned against the extractive industry (Lust, 2016). Just in 2018, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) announced its intention to increase investment in the mining sector by 50 percent in the next two years (El Comercio, 2018).
The rapid growth of mining in the last few decades attests to how neoliberal policies have benefited the industry. Between 1994 and 2009, mining accounted for 60 percent of its exports and 21 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country (Gordon and Webber, 2016). In 2007, it accounted for close to 25 percent of its internal tax revenue (Gordon and Webber, 2016). Similarly, the contribution of mining to the GDP grew from 4.1 percent to 10.6 percent between 1990 and 2010 (Lust, 2016). Peru’s production in metals such as copper, for instance, grew from 318,000 metric tons in 1990 to 2.45 million metric tons in 2017, marking a 770 percent increase. Peru is now a leading producer of various minerals both regionally and globally, as demonstrated by Table 1.1.

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<tr>
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<th>Global Ranking</th>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molybdenum</td>
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Table 1: Peru’s ranking in Latin America and the world in mineral production in 2017 (MEM, 2017)

1.3 About the district of Chamaca

My research takes place in the Andean district of Chamaca, which is composed of ten indigenous *campesino* communities: Uchuccarcco, Cconchaccollo, Ingata, Ccacho Limamayo, Sihuincha,
Añahuichi, Tintaya, Q’ellomarca, Cangalle, and Tinkurka. Chamaca, where altitudes range from 3,700 m to over 4,800 m above sea level, is located in the province of Chumbivilcas, one of the Provincias Altas (high provinces) of the Department of Cusco (Municipalidad Distrital de Chamaca, 2013).

The Provincias Altas, which stretch across the Departments of Cusco and Apurímac, are characterized by isolation (Gade, 1994). Poole, writing in 1994, describes that traveling to Santo Tomás, the capital of Chumbivilcas, takes at least twenty-four hours from Cusco. While roads and transportation methods have improved significantly since then, a trip to Chamaca is still not an easy one. Despite the fact that the distance between the two locales is only 250 km, the trip takes about six hours by car on winding, unpaved roads (trochas). By bus operated by local businesses—the most popular method of travel for local people—the drive can take over seven hours. Traveling within and between communities of Chamaca, too, can be difficult as most people do not own private vehicles; just around 10% of the population have a motorcycle, and less than 1% own a car (INEI, 2017). Private buses that travel to larger urban centers such as Cusco, Espinar, and Arequipa pass by certain communities, allowing people to get on and off when they need to. However, these do not run daily and mostly only once a day; they also do not reach the inner areas within the communities. Hitchhiking in occasional passing vehicles, such as the municipal government’s pick-up trucks, is an option, but of course, unpredictable. Many people combine these above methods of travel with walking.

The Provincias Altas have a long history of socioeconomic marginalization. In the 16th century, the corregimiento (provincial governorship) of Chumbivilcas was composed of nine encomiendas and was later subject to the resettlement scheme of Toledo (Municipalidad Distrital de Chamaca, 2013; Gade, 1994). The village of Chamaca itself was created through the reducción and was considered an important center of religious indoctrination within the province of Chumbivilcas (Gade, 1994; Municipalidad Distrital de Chamaca, 2013). These systems enabled the systemic exploitation of local indigenous people’s land and labour; for example, people from Chumbivilcas were sent to the mercury mines of Huancavelica and the silver mine of Cailloma under the Toledan mita (Gade, 1994). Chamaca was as a result “in ruins” due to depopulation by 1698; in the neighbouring district of Velille, the heavy demands of forced labour similarly destroyed three of the four ayllus (Gade, 1994). Indigenous people of the region were also exploited by haciendas, since many Cusco families owned estates in the high provinces for income and status (Gade, 1994). Unfortunately, because most of the revenues generated from
haciendas were directed to Cusco, where the *hacendados* lived, indigenous people gained little material benefits from the “parasitic relationship” (Gade, 1994: 53).

Socioeconomic vulnerability continues into the present in Chamaca as a result. It is estimated that 61.6% of the district are living under poverty, and 31.2%, extreme poverty, mirroring the levels of the province (INEI, 2010). Because of iron deficiency, 36.4% of pregnant women suffer from anemia, which not only bears negative consequences for the mother, but also for the development of children (Municipalidad Distrital de Chamaca, 2013). Access to electricity and public water supply, too, remains uneven throughout the district. Of the 2,024 houses surveyed for the 2017 census, 42.9 % did not have electricity, and about half had access to the public water supply, whereas others relied on groundwater or springs (INEI, 2017). As there is no landline telephone service, about 55% of the population uses cellphones to communicate (INEI, 2017). However, cellular coverage is generally weak and patchy throughout the district.

In Chamaca, 7,698 people live in a relatively large area of 674.2 km² and depend heavily on crop and livestock farming as a livelihood strategy (INEI, 2007). Due to its high altitudes, Chamaca is mostly comprised of *puna* grasslands best suited for extensive livestock farming (Gade, 1994). Therefore, for many *Chamaqueños*, milk products such as cheese and yogurt, items popular at the weekly market, are an important source of income. Crop farming, too, is an important livelihood practice. Most families grow potatoes, and some grow additional crops such starchy corn (*maíz amiláceo*), barley, and broad beans in their *chacras*, usufruct parcels given out to *comuneros* (Municipalidad Distrital de Chamaca, 2013). Non-community members similarly practice farming. For example, one interview participant who relinquished her community membership after moving to the district capital told me that her family farms on non-community lands: “[The land] is outside of the community, but we have the same activities whether we are *comuneros* or not. The same” (interview 14). However, crop farming typically only meets families’ subsistence needs; therefore, in order to supplement income from livestock, local people—especially men—often seek contract wage labor, however limited.

The cultural practices of the district show a marked convergence of indigenous and non-indigenous worlds. While it can be argued that the region’s history of socioeconomic marginalization has helped the survival of indigenous traditions (Gade, 1994), people’s engagement with colonial legacies is also evident. For example, while 93.6% of the population speak Quechua as their first language in Chamaca, many also speak Spanish as their second language (INEI, 2007). Most women wear a heavy traditional skirt of the region with floral
patterns (*pollera chumbivilcana*) and a round hat with matching designs, whereas men typically wear jeans, Western shirts, and jackets. Houses are typically built out of the traditional material of adobe, but often with corrugated iron (*calamina*) forming a roof. The *qorilazo* culture is another example. As Poole (1994) explains, *qorilazos* are the inhabitants of the mythologized *tierras bravas* (wild lands) of Chumbivilcas, in large part a product of racial ideologies and *mestizo* culture. The word “*qorilazo*” itself, coming from “gold” in Quechua (*qori*) and “lasso” in Spanish (*lazo*), “speak for the cultural contours of a province where the boundaries between ‘Indian’ and ‘*mestizo’ have been thoroughly redrawn” (Poole, 1994: 94). Indigenous *campesinos* of Chamaca and Chumbivilcas celebrate this culture, putting on a bullfight (*corrida de toros*) on special occasions such as community or district festivals.

![Figure 3: Farming is an essential livelihood practice in Chamaca. (Photo by the author)](image)

**1.4 Theoretical framework**

**1.4.1 Political ecology**

To understand how transnational mining unfolds on indigenous lands, I situate my research in Chamaca in the field of political ecology. Political ecology provides a useful framework for analyzing natural resource extraction because of its emphasis on social and political origins of environmental problems. For Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield, among the pioneering scholars of this subfield, “The phrase ‘political ecology’ combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic...
between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself” (Blaikie and Brookfield cited in Watts and Peet, 2004: 7) Therefore, political ecology rejects the notion that environmental problems can be solved purely through science and technology; instead, it analyzes the underlying power relations across scale that shape resource production, consumption, use, and access (Watts and Peet, 2004; Neumann, 2005; Bridge, 2009). Political ecology also emphasizes analyzing history to understand the present, “the way that the world is reproduced through environmental conflict” (Wainwright, 2005: 1042; Neumann, 1992). Thus, political ecologists frequently analyze the role of colonialism in shaping the contemporary situation. As Wainwright (2005) puts it: “doing political ecology in postcolonial spaces carries the responsibility of engaging with colonialism, because we cannot understand these spaces outside of, prior to, or apart from the fact of colonial experience” (1034).

As political ecology developed to analyze peasant and agrarian societies being integrated—often violently—into capitalism (Watts and Peet, 2004), the framework often analyzes the processes of accumulation. According to David Harvey (2003), for Marx, primitive accumulation involves a variety of processes, including:

- The commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons; the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources)… (145)

Marx argues that these processes alienated peasants from their lands and forced them to find wage labor, achieving conditions for industrial production capitalist accumulation.

The particular significance of accumulation for political ecology is that land enclosures happen through territorialization, a political process of resource control influenced by the undergirding power relations. In articulating this notion, Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) underscore the need to analyze how the state enacts territorial strategies for its power and sovereignty. For the scholars, territorialization is a resource control strategy concerned with “excluding or including people within particular geographic boundaries, and about controlling what people do and their access to natural resources within those boundaries” (388). This process requires forming abstract space through measuring and classifying through means such as mapping, contradicting “peoples' lived social relationships and the histories of their interactions with the land” (389). However, because people resist their relationships with the land being
overwritten, territorialization involves not only governance, but also “the disciplining of practice associated with governmentality” (Peluso and Lund, 2011: 673).

Increasingly, scholars have turned to the role of non-state actors in influencing state territorialization. Under neoliberalism, there is a “the networked interaction” between the state and non-state actors, meaning that non-state actors, including transnational NGOs and private commercial interests, pursue their desire for control and authority over the peasant commons by intervening in states’ territorializing processes (Himley, 2008: 435; Corson, 2011). This process is enabled by the “historically-constituted, power-laden and transnational alliances among state and non-state entities” through which non-state actors have increased their participation in states’ decision-making spaces (Corson, 2011: 721). As a result, even though the ultimate act of “mapping boundaries, establishing and enforcing new rights, and determining acceptable resource uses” might be done by the state, private and non-profit entities play a crucial role and gain both claims to and power over natural resources (Corson, 2011: 721).

Scholars have shown how territorialization disproportionately affects peasants and indigenous people who have traditional ties to their lands. Committed to understanding the role of history in shaping the present, some scholars directly engage with the legacies of colonialism. For example, Neumann (1992) highlights how conservation programs that limit customary land access are informed by colonial/imperial policies. Other scholars emphasize states’ racial thinking in limiting indigenous people’s land rights by confining them to a narrow set of practices and promoting policies based on the nature/civilization binary (Ybarra, 2011; Mollett, 2006; Mollett, 2016).

1.4.2 Political ecology of the subsoil

In recent years, political ecologists have turned their attention to subsoil extraction—namely, mineral and hydrocarbon extraction—partly as a response to the commodity boom in the sector since the 1990s (Bebbington, 2012a). Particularly relevant to my study is this subfield’s use of accumulation by dispossession. This concept expands on the above-described notion of accumulation. For Harvey (2003), predatory practices thought to be characteristic of primitive accumulation are ever present in the contemporary neoliberal economy, well beyond that initial stage of capitalist development. This concept is appropriate in analyzing subsoil extraction because subsurface resources are physically bound in land (Bebbington, 2012a; Peluso, 2018), meaning their extraction often results in enclaves, heavily-guarded private properties that are separated from local communities (Himley, 2008; Nixon, 2011). Extensive physical
infrastructures required for extraction, from pipelines to roads and refineries, further heighten extractive projects’ territorial nature (Bridge, 2009).

Extractive enclosures result in a series of dispossessions of local—often indigenous—livelihoods. Livelihoods are understood as “making a living and making it meaningful” that involve natural, produced, social, cultural, and human capitals (Bebbington, 2000: 498; 1999). Consequently, livelihood dispossession entails “both the colonization of life-worlds and the material threats to livelihood” (Bebbington et al., 2008: 2890, emphasis in the original).

In the Andes, impacts on campesinos’ material livelihoods include impacts on water and land. Scholars have observed that mining results in reduced water and quantity because mining projects are water-intensive, require use of toxic chemicals, and are often located in the headwaters of a river (Brain, 2017; Bebbington, 2012b). As a result, campesinos’ agriculture, a source of subsistence and income, is negatively impacted as crop yields drop and livestock sicken (Li, 2009; Himley, 2011, Bury, 2004; Perreault, 2013). Campesinos’ land tenure, too, can be dramatically altered as mining companies coerce indigenous residents to sell their lands at a low price (Bebbington, 2012a), and the harmful effects of contamination have the same effect as installing a fence as lands become unproductive (Perreault, 2013). Meanwhile, campesinos’ ability to make meaningful lives decreases as social conflicts and cultural relations are threatened, resulting in the dispossession “of everyday peace and quiet, and of culturally significant landscapes as mountains are ground down and new holes appear” (Bebbington, 2012a: 1157).

Because territorialization is inherently political, scholars of extraction often turn to the role of government and institutions, articulating the concept of extractivism to state promotion of extraction throughout Latin America (Gudynas, 2009; Bebbington, 2009). They note the importance of extraction to economic and social policies in both neoliberal (e.g. Peru) and “post”-neoliberal (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador) states, using terms such as “convergence” (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011), “commodity consensus” (Svampa, 2013), and “extractive imperative” (Arsel et al., 2016) to describe the pattern.

Some scholars emphasize the role of race in justifying the era of “commodity consensus.” They argue that indigenous rights are systemically violated through violent disciplining from physical violence to criminalization (Andreucci and Kallis, 2017; Guzmán Solano, 2016)—an act that must be understood as an instance of neoliberal multiculturalism. For Hale (2002), neoliberal multiculturalism—the states’ selective appropriation of indigenous rights under the
banner of multiculturalism “as a means to resolve their own problems and advance their own political agendas” (487)—reveals the ongoing racial project informed built on colonial ideologies.

1.4.3 Feminist and decolonial geographies

Given political ecology’s concern for power relations structured by race, class, and gender, a feminist approach to understanding natural resource conflicts is essential. From its inception, feminist geography has been critical and multidisciplinary as it arose in response to positivistic geography in the 1970s (Nelson and Seager, 2004). In the 1990s, feminist geography, drawing from developments in critical race theory, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism, started paying increased attention to intersectionality—the mutual constitution of race, gender, and space (Nelson and Seager, 2004; Mollett an Faria, 2018). With its foundation in intersectionality and emphasis on the body, feminist geography “disrupts naturalized dichotomies and embraces a multiplicity of material and symbolic sites, ones located at the interstices of power exercised under various guises” (Nelson and Seager, 2004: 2).

The subfield of feminist political ecology (FPE) draws on these insights to ground our understanding of macro processes (Sundberg, 2017). FPE, as articulated by Dianne Rocheleau and colleagues’ 1996 key edited volume, Feminist Political Ecology, advances three areas of research: “(i) gendered environmental knowledge and practices; (ii) gendered rights to natural resources and unequal vulnerability to environmental change; and (iii) gendered environmental activism and organizations” (Sundberg, 2017: 3). In conducting these analyses, FPE pays attention to the scale of the body and the everyday, much like the broader field of feminist geography (Sundberg, 2017).

Increasingly, feminist political ecologists engaging with post/decolonialism have been pushing the subfield to directly engage with the concept of intersectionality and thus, race. For Mollett and Faria (2013), FPE must adopt a view of postcolonial intersectionality that “acknowledges the way patriarchy and racialized processes are consistently bound in a postcolonial genealogy that embeds race and gender ideologies within nation-building and international development processes” (120). In a similar vein, Rocheleau and Nirmal (2015) articulate the framework of decolonial FPE, which “brings together feminist ethics, rigor, and critique to political ecology analysis while also centering, rather than adding, coloniality as a factor mediating people’s relations to place and its associated politics” (Nirmal, 2017: 32).
Studies such as Mollett (2017), Merino (2015), and Stetson (2012) show that such an intersectional, decolonial approach may be employed for examining resource conflicts by turning to *coloniality of power* and *coloniality of gender*. These two concepts stem from the Modernity/Coloniality (MC) research program that has emerged from the work of Latin American decolonial scholars. Coloniality refers to the persisting colonial logics and “a model of power that continues” in postcolonial spaces (Walsh cited in Naylor et al., in press: 1). If colonization was an event, coloniality is a condition: the “long-standing patterns of power…that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations” (Maldonado-Torres cited in Sundberg, 2014: 39-40). The MC framework views modernity as a product of coloniality, and therefore, pays attention to colonialism and locates the origins of modernity to the conquest of the Americas in 1492 (Escobar, 2007). It also examines the ways capitalism is constitutive of modernity. In Mignolo’s (2006) words, “the rhetoric of modernity is that of salvation, whereas the logic of coloniality is a logic of imperial oppression. They go hand in hand, and you cannot have modernity without coloniality…” (312). Within the MC research program, Anibal Quijano’s (2000) concept of “coloniality of power” particularly highlights the mutual constitution of race, space, and capitalism. As Escobar (2007) summarizes succinctly, coloniality of power refers to the “global hegemonic model of power in place since the Conquest that articulates race and labor, space and peoples, according to the needs of capital and to the benefit of white European peoples” (185). This model of power, founded in racial ideologies, also assumes modernity and rationality to be exclusively European (Quijano, 2000).

Maria Lugones’s (2007) concept of *coloniality of gender* adds to the understanding of coloniality of power by historicizing gender formation. If “heterosexuality, capitalism, and racial classification are impossible to understand apart from each other” (187), it is crucial to analyze how the colonial/modern gender system and coloniality of power were mutually constituted:

Understanding the place of gender in precolonial societies is pivotal to understanding the nature and scope of changes in the social structure that the processes constituting colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism imposed. Those changes were introduced through slow, discontinuous, and heterogeneous processes that violently inferiorized colonized women. The gender system introduced was one thoroughly informed through the coloniality of power. Understanding the place of gender in precolonial societies is also essential to understanding the extent and importance of the gender system in disintegrating communal relations, egalitarian relations, ritual thinking, collective decision making and authority, and economies. (Lugones, 2007: 201-202)
This type of analysis thus reveals how coloniality of power has imposed gender ideologies, which have in turn further supported the reproduction of coloniality by breaking down collective decision-making.

The epistemic dimension of coloniality of power/gender has ontological implications. Eurocentric thought has tried to impose a One-World World—a world composed of a single Western world (Escobar, 2016). Decolonial scholars argue that such conceptualization of the world—in which differences are framed as cultural, a result of different cultures within a single reality—undermines the multiple realities do exist (Blaser, 2013, 2014; Escobar, 2016; de la Cadena, 2010). Indigenous ways of being, including indigenous people’s relations with the non-human, testify to such other worlds that survive despite having been relegated to a status of a myth through coloniality of power (de la Cadena, 2010; Escobar, 2016). At the same time, scholars have emphasized that indigeneity does not stand in isolation to the Western world; rather, it is an articulation of “more than one, but less than two socionatural worlds” (de la Cadena, 2010: 347), and indigenous participation in capitalist development may in fact enable the reproduction of indigenous ontologies (Anthias, 2017, 2018).

Insights from decolonial FPE can thus add to the political ecology of the subsoil literature by adding a more detailed account of everyday gendered and racialized experiences of violent accumulation. Indeed, a growing number of studies, pointing out that political ecology of extraction literature has focused little on the people who are embedded in the macro-level and institutional processes of resource conflicts (Jenkins, 2015), have given gendered and embodied accounts of mining. For example, feminist studies of mining have revealed how extraction has disproportionate livelihood impact on women (Li, 2009; Lahiri-Dutt, 2015; Himley, 2011), increases women’s workload (Deonandan et al., 2017; Cuadros Falla, 2010), and results in the gendering of activism (Jenkins, 2015; 2017). Bridging these works with “postcolonial intersectionality” that has been mostly used to understand other development projects, I show how coloniality is essential to understanding the subsoil extraction as well.

1.4 Research objective, methodology, and methods

This thesis analyzes the history of race, indigenous land tenure and labour, and mining to show how similar colonial logics and power relations are reproduced through contemporary mining. I seek to answer the following questions:
1) How do historical intersections of race, indigenous land tenure and labour, and mining inform contemporary development policies?

2) What are the (gendered) experiences and implications of transnational mining in the indigenous campesino communities of Chamaca?

3) How do contemporary state-mining company-indigenous relations in Chamaca reflect the colonial power structures of Peru?

My methodology to answer these questions has been informed by feminist and decolonial reflections on research approaches. As debates on feminist methodologies have revealed, feminist geography research practices are constantly changing, and there is no single data collection method that is inherently more feminist than others (McDowell, 1992); it may be that what makes a study feminist is “the epistemological stance taken towards the methods” (Johnson and Madge, 2016: 78). At the same time, feminist geographical studies are often linked by their justice-oriented nature, from validating the subjective experience to exposing gender power relations and giving voice to the silenced (Johnson and Madge, 2016). Indeed, feminist political ecologists have tried to make the field a “feminist and justice oriented project” (Harris cited in Mollett, 2017: 4).

Feminist approaches have informed postcolonial and decolonial methodologies that are “intended to contribute to the self-determination and welfare of ‘others’…[and] break down the cross-cultural discourses, asymmetrical power relationships, representations, and political, economic, and social structures through which colonialism and neo-colonialism are constructed and maintained” (Howitt and Stevens, 2016: 47). One way of doing so is by breaking down Walter Mignolo’s notion of “colonial difference”—which he does not specifically define, but can be thought of as “knowledge and cultural dimensions of the subalternization processes effected by the coloniality of power” (Escobar, 2007: 185). Countering the colonial difference requires highlighting non-Western ontologies by “telling stories that open up a space for, and enact, the pluriverse” (Blaser, 2013: 553). Engaging in “pluriversal politics,” as de la Cadena (2010) puts it, would entail allowing ontological conflicts to take place in the realm of politics. For instance, in pluriversal politics, indigenous relations with the non-human would be taken seriously and would constitute a valid political argument instead of being relegated the status of myth (de la Cadena, 2010).
Attending to such justice-oriented goals of feminist and decolonial work, this thesis uses an ethnographic approach, whose strengths have been noted by both scholars in political ecology, feminist geography, and decolonial/postcolonial studies. By building on political ecology literature focused more on the organizational and institutional dimensions of neoliberalization, ethnographic accounts can enhance our understanding of the “complex and place-based sets of practices through which particular actors have produced, reproduced, and challenged these novel modes of governance – or, alternatively, have failed to do so” (Himley, 2008: 445). Katz (2001) similarly calls on geographers to use ethnography to produce “topographies” and “countertopographies,” which can help counter the both material and abstract processes of global economic systems. Topographies, built on “thick descriptions of particular places…can get at the ways in which a process associated with—for example—the globalization of capitalist production…affects a particular places” (Katz, 2001: 720). Topographies produced can be juxtaposed to one another, creating countertopographies that can offer the sorts of abstractions needed to reimagine and rework globalization and its effects. Interwoven with thick descriptions of local specificities, an analysis that follows abstract connections among disparate places, and a spark of insurgence, countertopographies can inform a new geographically invigorated praxis. (Katz, 2001: 726)

The emphasis on place also has decolonial potentials. For Escobar (1995, 2001), ethnography provides clues to alternatives to Western development by highlighting the stories of other worlds (Escobar, 1995; 2001). Ethnographies have not only “documented active and creative resistance to capitalism,” but are also “how people actively continue to create and reconstruct their lifeworld and places” (2001:155). They show that non-Western cultures “might have their own story to tell” (Massey cited in Escobar, 2001). Ethnography’s emphasis on place and the everyday, thus, makes the methodology well-suited for decolonial feminist political ecology.

My thesis draws on three months of ethnographic data collection in the district of Chamaca in the department of Cusco, Peru in 2018. I lived in two locales within the department of Cusco during this time: the city of Cusco, and the district of Chamaca, where many of the communities affected by HudBay Minerals’s are located. I collaborated with an NGO located in the city of Cusco, Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras (DHSF), which works in the Provincias Altas of Espinar, Chumbivilcas, and Paruro. The NGO works to promote indigenous rights in the campesino communities and the capitals of these provinces by engaging in capacity-building and
providing legal support. The organization works in particular with mining and women’s rights issues, and is a member of national and international networks such as the Red Muqui and the Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina (OCMAL).

DHSF’s support helped me solve the many logistical challenges that I faced. To begin, Chamaca is a remote district, as previously described. While I had originally planned on living in one “directly affected” community, Uchucarcco, the NGO pointed out the potential difficulties of entering a community that is receiving direct corporate social responsibility (CSR) benefits from the mining company. They noted that the other community considered to be in the “area of direct influence” of HudBay—Chiloroya—was completely closed to outsiders. My initial trip to the field site, which took place with several NGO workers, confirmed that living in Uchucarcco would indeed be difficult.

Because of these factors, I lived in the district of Chamaca’s capital of the same name. The district government of Chamaca has its own corporate social responsibility (CSR) agreement with HudBay Minerals; it was the big protest organized by the ten campesino communities of Chamaca that had spurred my interest in this project. The district capital itself is located on the territory of the Sihuincha campesino community. Living in the district capital—which, despite the denomination, is very small—allowed me to interact with people from the ten communities. Most people who work in the municipal government are from the surrounding communities, and on Fridays, when the weekly market takes place, people from all ten communities come to the municipality to sell their goods and buy necessary products for the week. I also made trips out to several communities, such as Añahuichi, Uchucarcco, and Urazana.

While most of my data comes from participant observation and interviews within the district of Chamaca, I included one community located in the Velille district—Urazana—in my research. Urazana is one of the three communities considered to be located in the “area of indirect influence” of mining operations according to the environmental impact assessment (EIA), even though it is actually closer to the Constanica mine on the main road than Uchucarcco’s town center. However, its status as an “indirectly influenced” has excluded the community from substantial CSR benefits. This interesting context added much insight to my research.

2 The district of Chamaca’s capital is also called Chamaca. The district’s government, located in the town of Chamaca, is called Municipalidad Distrital (District Municipality). To avoid confusion, in this thesis, I will use “Chamaca” to refer to the district, my study area. I will specify when referring to the town and the government.
To collect data, I engaged in ethnographic participant observation. Participation observation is key to geographers seeking to understand the scale of the everyday and the meanings of place, for everyday life happens beyond the formalized spaces of interviews (Kearns, 2016). My daily conversations with the NGO workers and the people of Cusco and Chamaca added to my understanding of Peru. For example, my daily conversations with my field assistant from a campesino community in a neighboring mining-affected province further added to my understanding of race, indigeneity, and state-indigenous relations. I attended various public events and workshops hosted by DHSF in Cusco, Santo Tomás (capital of the province of Chumbivilcas), and Chamaca, including capacity-building workshops for community leaders, panels on mining issues, and book launches. As campesino leaders, government officials, and workers from various NGOs participated in these spaces, I gained a better insight of the socio-environmental problems of the region and the country. I was also able to observe few special events within Chamaca. For example, I attended Uchuccarcco’s annual festival, where I got a firsthand look at the qorilazo culture (see Poole, 1994) expressed through music, dance, and the bullfights. I took field notes at the end of every day.

Semi-structured interviews were another key method of data collection. I chose semi-structured interviews to highlight participants’ perceptions and experiences and to allow for unexpected answers to my research questions emerge, while maintain some control over the process by having a general framework (Dunn, 2016). In total, I conducted 31 semi-structured interviews with people from the seven of the ten communities in Chamaca (Añahuichi, Sihuincha, Ccacho Limamayo, Uchuccarcco, Ingata, Cconchacollo, and Tintaya) and one community from the district Velille (Urazana). All of these interview participants, except one, held (or had previously held) leadership positions in the community, local social organizations, or the municipal/regional government. Their active involvement in local politics helped me get a better understanding of mining company-community relations that are structured through CSR negotiations, as most of the participants had participated in HudBay’s CSR negotiations with the district government of Chamaca as representatives of their communities. Some interviewees from Uchuccarcco and Urazana, two communities that have their own CSR agreements with HudBay (the other six do not, and only get benefits through the district government), had also attended the CSR negotiations in their respective communities. In addition, I conducted one interview with an officer at DHSF who has studied mining conflicts in different regions of the country. A little
over a third of my interview participants (11 out of 31; 35%) were women. While I tried to recruit more women participants, doing so was challenging due to women’s relative exclusion from politics and public life; this meant that my participants, including women participants, were likely to connect me to women leaders. The interviews were around 45 minutes on average and included questions on livelihoods, community politics, perceptions of mining and the CSR regime, understandings of indigeneity, and visions of development.

I used snowball sampling to select participants to help overcome the difficulty of gaining trust (Valentine, 2015); doing so was key in my research context due to the high levels of distrust of outsiders caused by mining. To conduct interviews in Urazana, I presented myself in a small community meeting, as suggested by a former leader and the current president. All interviews but one were conducted in Spanish. My field assistant was always present and sometimes clarified my questions. One interview was conducted partly in Quechua with the help of the field assistant. Two interviews were not recorded to respect the wishes of the participants. In Appendix A, I have included a list of participants in order to show their community membership and their leadership roles. However, I have decided not to reveal people’s official titles within the community directive or social organizations in order to protect confidentiality.

All interviews conducted in Spanish were transcribed verbatim by myself and a local assistant. The one interview that was partly conducted in Quechua was translated into Spanish verbally by the field assistant, which I wrote down sentence by sentence. I used NVivo for the coding process. I first started by developing descriptive codes and subsequently, analytic codes, once the themes became clearer through my continued engagement with the material.

State laws, corporate documents, and news articles have also been important sources of empirical data. On the field, I was able to secure important legal documents, including HudBay’s land use agreement with Uchucarcacco and CSR agreements with various jurisdictions (i.e. Uchucarcacco, Urazana, District Municipality of Chamaca) over multiple years. Corporate documents found online—such as the mining company’s detailed technical reports, annual reports, and CSR reports—enabled me to confirm and delve deeper into the land enclosure process noted in the interviews, the nature of CSR programs, and the discourses of development. News articles from national newspapers such as La República and El Comercio were helpful in understanding state policies and national mining conflicts; often, the news reporting from DHSF and Pulso Regional,
a Cusco-based news media focused on human rights, proved more helpful in understanding smaller mining conflicts in the region that fail to be covered by the aforementioned newspapers. Finally, I have engaged with reports published by NGOs such as the Lima-based Cooperación and international agencies such as the Inter-American Human Commission Human Rights (IACHR) and the World Bank.

My positionality as a Korean/Canadian master’s student created data-gathering and ethical challenges. There was a certain degree of distrust in the region, as many feel disenchanted by the mining firm, which is trying to further expand its operations in the region. Some explicitly asked whether I was working for the mining company. Interestingly, it was my Korean background that diffused the distrust that it first generated. On the one hand, my visible status as a foreigner and a resident of Canada bought suspicion. However, upon finding out about my Korean background and citizenship, people became more trusting. Some asked me to speak phrases in Korean, while others asked to see my Korean passport. I found myself relating to Miraftab’s (2004) experiences, who notes that transnational researchers who are themselves racialized face unexpected positioning, since participants assess their positions in relation to their perceptions of the researchers’ social situated-ness. My affiliation with DHSF, who had a good reputation among community leaders, and my field assistant also engendered trust. Of course, the ethical challenges still remained (and remain). My conversations with the NGO and interview participants suggested that the best way for me to reciprocate would be to provide a report, which I will write after the completion of the thesis.

1.5 Thesis outline

This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. In Chapter 2, I trace the colonial history of Peru to show how race, indigenous land tenure and labour, and mining were mutually constituted through the conquest. I show how land tenure reforms throughout the 19th and 20th centuries happened in connection to the dominant racial ideologies and the export-oriented growth model. I thus argue that the post-independence Peruvian state continued to draw on the colonial habitus to reproduce the colonial articulation of race, space, and labour through mining, setting up the stage for extractivist growth after the 1990 neoliberalization.

In Chapter 3, I delve into the history of neoliberalism and extractivism in Latin America and Peru. I analyze Peruvian state policies on mining and indigenous rights from 1990, when
neoliberalization commenced. I argue that the state’s supposed commitment to improving its relations with indigenous people is contradicted by its extractivist policies that actively marginalize indigenous rights. I argue that such contradictions are representative of “neoliberal multiculturalism,” as the state relies on colonial logics to justify extractivism.

In Chapter 4, I turn to the daily lives of people of Chamaca to detail the impacts of state promotion of mining. I merge the livelihoods and social reproduction frameworks to better show how contemporary mining implicates indigenous labour, like in the colonial era. I show that HudBay’s operations have led to a series of dispossessions, including that of territory, material livelihood practices, and social cohesion. I argue that such dispossession are leading to a depletion of social reproduction, a kind of “slow violence” that threatens the ability of indigenous people to reproduce their ways of being, in place.

In Chapter 5, I turn to how the depletion of social reproduction detailed in the previous chapter disproportionately affect women. I show that the disproportionate social reproductive burdens that women take on due to mining are caused by the existing gender system. I argue that the gender relations, which must be understood in relation to coloniality, is reproduced through mining through physical violence and the continued exclusion of women from decision-making spaces on mining issues.

In Chapter 6, I turn to the legal geographies of extraction established by the extractivist policies detailed in Chapter 2. I draw on Correia (2018)’s work on abandonment and liminality to show how the dispossession noted in Chapter 4 and 5 are not an accident, but rather, actively produced by both the state and the mining company. On the one hand, the state at times engages in abandonment through assertion of power, by manipulating indigenous rights laws through recourse to racial logics. At other times, the state cedes governing authority to the mining firm, which in turn similarly moves back and forth between force and neglect. I argue that such tactics of abandonment reliant on state-corporate jurisdictional ambiguities reproduces hacienda-indigenous relations that began in the colonial times and formally lasted until the agrarian reforms of the 1960s.
In Chapter 7, I summarize the findings of this thesis and offer my final thoughts by showing how the indigenous people of Chamaca, more than passive observers to colonial injustices, are mobilizing.
Chapter 2
Co-constitution of Race, Indigenous Land Tenure and Labour Rules, and Mining

Decolonial scholars emphasize the importance of analyzing the conquest and paying “persistent attention to colonialism and the making of the capitalist world system as constitutive of modernity” (Escobar, 2007: 184). They do so because unraveling the enduring coloniality of power requires analyzing how race and labor were articulated in relation to capital through the Conquest. Similarly, scholars of modern extraction argue that a historical perspective is necessary to untangle how colonial history and early political choices have shaped the current political economy focused on extraction (Orihuela and Thorp, 2012; Bebbington, 2012b).

Therefore, in this chapter, I turn to the colonial history of Peru as well as the post-independence period leading up to the country’s neoliberalization in 1990. I untangle how religious and racial ideologies justified indigenous land dispossession and labour exploitation in the colonial era primarily to facilitate mining. By tracing the interconnected histories of 19th and 20th century land reforms, racial ideologies, and political economy, I argue that the post-independence Peruvian state, in its quest for modernity, has continued to articulate indigenous people’s place in the nation according to the needs of (mining) capital through colonial logics.

2.1 Race, territory, indigenous people, and mining in the colonial era

2.1.1 Racial ideologies, land dispossession, and labour exploitation

The European arrival in the Americas, as Kamen (2014) puts it, may have been a “fortunate accident” (15). At the time, seafaring had been mostly dominated by the Portuguese and the Basques, and King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella were at first reluctant to support Christopher Columbus, a man of dubious credentials. Nonetheless, once Columbus successfully returned to Spain after landing in the Caribbean in October 1492, the Catholic monarchs quickly took steps to secure ownership of the new lands, lodging a claim with the pope and entering into a treat with Portugal (Kamen, 2014).

Despite what the word suggests, the Conquest was “a step-by-step process, eagerly watched and supervised by the Crown” (Mörner, 1985: 31). On the one hand, the Spanish crown was certainly interested in gaining access to the great mineral wealth of the continent that Columbus had written about (Elliot, 1989); the Spanish Crown needed new sources of revenue because its costly imperial wars had put it under tremendous, rising debt, which the Castilian taxpayer was
unable to support (Kamen, 2014; Elliott, 1989). On the other hand, the Conquest was made possible by the so-called *conquistadores*, the poorer Spaniards drawn in by the myth of *El Dorado* who were willing to take a significant risk of traveling to and gaining control over the new territories in exchange for access to indigenous wealth and labour (Kamen, 2014; Mörner, 1985).

At the same time, Spanish colonization of the Americas had religious rationalities in addition to economic and territorial. In this period when Castilian national consciousness was rising, Spaniards believed that their arrival in the Americas was part of God’s plan in which Spain and its Catholic monarchs were favored as the victory in the *Reconquista* seemed to also suggest (Elliott, 2009). Gold and religious conversion were seen as the interrelated components of this divine design. Columbus himself believed that the Americas were “the new heaven and earth foretold by Our Lord” and mused that the profits could be used to liberate Jerusalem from the Turks (Kamen, 2014: 51).

The colonial conquest of Peru began in this context, when Francisco Pizarro, an illiterate laborer drawn by the rumors of the gold-rich lands of Biru, first arrived in the region in the mid-1520s and returned in 1530 to battle the Inca empire (Kamen, 2014; Mörner, 1985). He rationalized that the contract (*capitulación*) with the Crown to capture the region would serve not only to amass wealth, but also to “conquer the mysterious realm for Spain and Christianity” (Mörner, 1985: 32). Pizarro captured Emperor Atahualpa in 1532, seizing the city of Cusco shortly after. By 1535, he had founded the Spanish capital of Lima (Mörner, 1985).

The subsequently established colonial society was racially hierarchized through religious justifications. On a macro level, colonial Peru was divided into two: the Republic of Spaniards and the Republic of Indians (Wilson, 2000). This division was possible because as Silverblatt (1994) observes, colonials believed that they were “moral human beings, acting in the interest of those they colonized and certainly in accord with their God’s will” (283). This supposed indigenous inferiority was not only about indigenous people’s pagan faith, but also their un-Christian way of being. As Elliott (1989: 53) convincingly demonstrates, for Spaniards, being a Christian was at once about the doctrine and behavior, and “to live like a man meant, ideally, to live like a Spaniard.” Indeed, after the conquest of the empire of Granada in Southern Iberia, the first archbishop of the region told the Moors to conform to “Christian” practices, “in your dress and your shoes and your adornment, in eating…in cooking meat…in your manner of
walking…and more than anything, in your speech, in forgetting in so far as you can the Arabic tongue” (53). Colonials therefore reasoned that indigenous people, un-Christian on many counts and thus uncivilized and less-than-human, should not only be indoctrinated in the Christian faith, but also in the Spanish way of life. The division of the society therefore made sense; the Republic of Spaniards would be apt for governing and the Republic of Indians, for service (Wilson, 2000). Spaniards reasoned that the indigenous population would be elevated through service and patronage.

Such racial ideologies transformed indigenous land access and labour rules. Traditionally, ayllus had served as a basic form of political and territorial governance in the Andes. Like Matryoshka dolls, ayllus were layered, as basic territorial and kinship units (ayllus menores) were also part of a larger ethnic unit (ayllum mayor) (Rivera Cusicanqui, 1990). Kurakas, or chiefs, had authority over larger ayllus, best conceived as ethnically-differentiated polities. After colonization, the Spanish came to justify territorial control and labor exploitation, certain about their superiority and the need to make the indigenous people “Christian” in every sense.

The encomienda was the first institution to be instituted for this purpose. Often described as a territorial grant, the encomienda could be better conceived as an economic institution, as does Mignolo (2007), since it granted Spanish settlers the power to control labour of native populations within their jurisdiction (Rice, 2011; Mörner, 1985). Through the system, encomenderos (encomienda holders) came to oversee the given lands and were empowered to collect tribute in-kind ranging from harvests to cotton cloths and receive forced labor for activities including farming, domestic service, and artisanry from indigenous people in their jurisdiction (Mörner, 1985; Covey and Quave, 2017). Kurakas and their subjects had to report to their assigned encomendero.

This system of labour exploitation was justified by religious rationalities. The encomienda had been in fact first implemented during the Reconquista, when Spaniards expropriated lands from the “Moors” and gave them to military chiefs, who then provided religious education while demanding labour and tribute (Rice, 2011). The encomienda in Peru functioned similarly; as “trustees” of indigenous people, encomenderos were to provide religious education in return for labour and tribute (Covey and Quave, 2017). Following the 1512 Law of Burgos, encomenderos’ accepted a wide range of religious responsibilities, including “building a church with an image of the Virgin Mary and a bell; attending religious services with the tributaries; examining their
religious knowledge every 2 weeks; teaching them the Ten Commandments, Seven Deadly Sins, and Articles of the Faith…” (Rice, 2011: 485).

Indigenous land tenure and labour were transformed even more significantly to meet the objectives of the Spanish Empire once Francisco de Toledo became the viceroy of Peru in 1569. At this time, “the concept of the New world as a territory based on its economic utility to the Crown became concrete policy. It identified the usefulness to Castile with what was fair for the indigenous people” (Gil Montero, 2011: 305). Two institutions, the **reducción** and the **mita**, became of particular significance. Through the **reducción**, Toledo resettled indigenous people to villages (**reducciones**) to facilitate their labour and tribute for the state. Toledo was able to imposed explicit tributary requirements (**tasa**) that would go to the Crown, not **encomenderos**, through this system (Covey and Quave, 2017; Laite, 1981; Mörner, 1985). While **kurakas** continued to act as intermediaries between **ayllu** members and the Republic of Spaniards, **ayllu** configurations were altered, since several **ayllus** came together to form a village, which then became a new **ayllu** (Covey and Quave, 2017). Further, the resettlement did not correspond to an **ayllus’** historical territories, because Toledo demanded an equal distribution of the lands based on up-to-date population counts that were conducted every three years (Covey and Quave, 2017).

Just as one of the purposes of the **encomienda** had been to provide religious education, the **reducción** had religious objectives and had a connotation of “reassembl[ing] a wayward and scattered flock”—reflecting the use of other biblical herding metaphors for resettlement in different places, such as **congregaciones** in Guatemala (Covey and Quave, 2017: 280). For example, Toledo claimed that indigenous people could not be “catechized, indoctrinated, and taught, nor could they live in civil or Christian order so long as they should be living where they were, in the **punas** [high grasslands], gullies and canyons, and on the hills and mountains…” (Toledo cited in Covey and Quave, 2017: 280). However, the **reducción**’s religious objective went hand in hand with other conceptions of modernity, because as explained before, to be a good Christian meant to live a Spanish way of life. Following such logics, Toledo argued that resettlement would allow the indigenous population to be “instructed and occupied in good civil order, natural law, and evangelical doctrine” (Covey and Quave, 2017: 280).

Toledo’s reforms also brought changes to indigenous labour. If tribute had been initially collected in-kind through harvests, textile, and other (forced labour service) by **encomenderos**, increasingly, it was collected as money, making indigenous people “embark upon commercial
activity in their attempts to obtain the means to pay tribute” (Gil Montero, 2011: 316). As well, the viceroy, driven by his objective to more effectively control the native population, infamously implemented the *mita*, an institution that would allow the Crown to exploit indigenous labour more systematically. Under the Toledan *mita*, *ayllus* had to provide a proportion of their population for forced rotational labour in the mines, coca plantations, textile workshops (*obrajes*) and other Spanish enterprises for minimal wage (Covey, 2017; Gil Montero, 2011).

To be sure, the Toledan *mita* was not purely a Spanish invention, but rather, derived from the Incan *mita*, under which Andean villagers had provided rotational labour on public projects—such as road-building and mineral exploitation—as a tribute to the state (Brown, 2012). Such projects enabled the Incas to achieve economic intensification throughout the empire (Garrido and Salazar, 2017). At the same time, the Incan arrangement was less exploitative and onerous, and had a public function, enabling some local people to pursue new opportunities without state intervention or control (Brown, 2012; Garrido and Salazar, 2017). In contrast, the Toledan *mita* was expansive, systemically forcing indigenous people to work in toxic environments for little personal or collective benefits (Gil Montero, 2011; Scott, 2012; Brown, 2012). The Spanish did not have limits to their demands (Gil Montero, 2011).

Toledo’s reforms set the stage for the later growth of private estates—*haciendas*—owned by Spaniards. As Mörner (1984) observes, from the beginning, land redistribution was an inherent feature of the colonial legal system. For example, *encomenderos* and *vecinos*, the “worthy persons who have served His Majesty” (Faron, 1960: 154), received lands for farming and grazing by royal favour. However, with the *reducción*, lands of the Republic of Indians were transferred to the Republic of Spaniards with greater intensity as relocated indigenous people could not fight off encroachment by claiming ancestral ties to the lands (Covey, 2017). By the end of the 16th century, Philip II had ordered royal officials to inspect titles for indigenous and private lands (Covey, 2017). This process encouraged hacienda growth by, first, enabling Spaniards to legalize their land claims through payment of a fee *composición de tierra* (Mörner, 1984; Faron, 1960). The *composición* validated Spaniards’ lands that had been gained through encroachments on indigenous lands because it ignored indigenous land claims that challenged those of the Spaniards (Mörner, 1984; Faron, 1960). Further, following Toledo’s logic of redistributing lands based on contemporary population counts, “excess” community lands above the amount deemed necessary were auctioned off after the title inspections (Covey, 2017). The
mita also aided in the growth of haciendas, as many indigenous people fled their ayllus of origin to escape the exploitative labour system, freeing up more lands that could be bought by Spaniards (Mörner, 1984). Further, many of such migrants ended up on haciendas as free labourers and worked alongside other indigenous people who had been conscripted to provide hacienda labour through the mita (Covey, 2017). Colonials thus set the stage for land dispossession and labour exploitation that would continue, albeit in new ways, following independence.

2.1.2 Mining in the colonial era

The significant changes to indigenous land tenure and labour described above were driven by the imperative for subsoil extraction. Mining was crucial during this time because the Spanish Crown desperately needed new sources of revenue to fund its imperial ventures. Revealingly, Spain’s annual fleets to the Americas mostly brought back precious metals; for instance, metals, principally silver, composed 90-99 percent of the cargo between 1531 and 1700 (Reinhard, 2015). Between 1503 and 1600, 7.4 million kilograms of silver was brought to Spain from the Americas (Kamen, 2014). The viceroyalty of Peru held an especially important role in mineral production among the colonies because of the great silver deposits of Potosí (in modern-day Bolivia) and the Huancavelica deposits, which provided the mercury necessary for amalgamation3 (Kamen, 2014).

Such extraction of precious metals would not have been possible without the above-described systems of indigenous labour exploitation. In his famous book The Open Veins of Latin America, Eduardo Galeano viscerally describes how mineral exploitation was made possible through indigenous forced labour in the mines: “The rape of accumulated treasure was followed by the systematic exploitation of the forced labor of Indians and abducted Africans in the mines” (1973: 29). Indeed, mineral production had initially lagged because ayllus were self-sufficient and most indigenous people did not want to take on dangerous labour (Dore, 1988). This quandary was resolved through the encomienda, as encomenderos, empowered with the mandate from the Crown to oversee indigenous labour, sent the indigenous people in their jurisdiction to the mines without offering compensation. Bakewell (1984), for example, observes that by 1549, indigenous people under the encomienda (encomendados) from all parts of Peru were sent to the silver mines of Potosí for forced rotational labour of six or twelve months.

3 In the latter half of the 16th century, a new silver refining process called amalgamation was discovered. Through the use of mercury, amalgamation allowed for the use of lower-quality ores to recover silver (Scott; 2012).
Later, the Toledan *mita* enabled the Crown to exploit indigenous labour for the mines more systematically. This previously described system obliged one-seventh of males from the age of eighteen to fifty from sixteen surrounding provinces to work at the Potosí mines for a period of a year; initially, this amounted to 13,500 men (Robins, 2011). Similarly, in Huancavelica, around 3,300 men—one-seventh of the tributary male population—were sent to the mines for draft labour (Robins, 2011). Many people—possibly tens of thousands—moved to avoid the service, meaning that those who remained in their native communities were further exploited and were required to serve every two or three years instead of every seven (Robins, 2011).

The Spanish also secured mining labour through indirect coercion. For example, the tribute levied on adult males drove *mitayos’* (people working under the *mita*) family members to also work in the mines, as *mitayos* were not released from their tribute obligations (Gil Montero, 2011). Other “free” laborers, too, were often working in the mines to meet their tribute requirements (Gil Montero, 2011). Local governments also used *reparto de mercancías*—commercial distribution—to sell goods at inflated prices, forcing indigenous people into debt and practically forcing them to work in the mines (Brown, 2011).

Just as land tenure transformations had been supported by racial ideologies, mining labour in lethal environments too “became an act of charity, an argument for the faith” (Galeano, 1973: 41). Despite the fact that indigenous people suffered grave consequences from working in places like the Huancavelica mercury mine, known as the *mina de la muerte* (the mine of death) (Brown, 2001; Robins, 2011), Toledo claimed that particular places and environments could shape “Indian” bodies and minds differently (Scott, 2012). Through recourse to ideas of indigenous inferiority, he held that natives could not be left “idle” because of their nature of laziness, “drunkenness and sensuality”(Scott, 2012: 14). He therefore argued that mining work was in the best interest of the natives, as moving to a different environment would “be appropriate for their good spiritual and temporal government” (Scott, 2012: 14). While Toledo’s policies were not without controversy, even those who showed more concern for mineworkers’ health and safety reasoned that indigenous people were the “feet” of the republic, and that the mining wealth was necessary to defend the colonies and the Christian faith (Scott, 2012). Thus exploited indigenous labor helped Potosí “become the symbol of Spain’s whole power…[that] served above all to sustain the fight against the heretics and other enemies of true Christianity” (Galeano, 1973: 58). In this way, the Spanish Crown was able to receive from the Viceroyalty of Peru two-thirds of all silver remittances (Elliott, 1989).
2.2 Post-independence articulation of race, indigenous people, and mining

19th century liberal reforms

After independence, indigenous people continued to be exploited in relation to new emerging racial ideologies and a vision of modernity linked to mineral exports. In the early years of the Republic, the criollo elite of Spanish heritage saw race as both a hindrance and a means to achieve development. Criollos of the new republic continued to deem indigenous population inferior, “blam[ing] the Spanish for having ‘frozen’ the Indians in a kind of primordial stupor which, they now rationalized, in effect rendered them incapable of assuming the responsibilities and privileges of full citizenship in the Peruvian Republic” (Thurner, 1997: 11). Peruvian elites believed that the way to improve the inferior population, then, would be by dismantling the “Andean-colonial inheritance” whereby “universal progress through the expansion of private property, capital accumulation, and free trade” could be achieved (Pratt cited in Thurner, 1997: 17).

The nascent Peruvian state’s vision of capitalist expansion was a thus racial project involving two interrelated processes. On the one hand, liberals believed that an export-led economy, in which mining would play a central role, had to be established. Liberals argued that the country should continue to cultivate its colonial export-based economy supported by agriculture and mining. For example, President Echenique (1851-1855) called Peru “essentially an agricultural and mining country,” while José Manuel Tirado, who would become Echenique’s Minster of Government and External Relations, asserted that

our destiny lies in extracting our natural resources from the ground, things that can be exported and changed ... Our industry cannot be other than those that obtain natural products by working the land and mines with care; producing for export. (Tirado cited in Grompone Velásquez, 2016: 238)

As Grompone Velásquez (2016) notes, liberals argued that an extractive model of economic development would bring modernity and serve as an antidote to the backwardness of the colonial period. Eventually, as the science of Political Economy also embraced free trade, liberalism came to enjoy “general and undisputed techno-scientific support, so that any position that oppose[d] it falls into the realm of the anachronistic, absurd and unscientific” (242).
The other side of the coin of the racial economic project, then, was to bring indigenous people under the capitalist system. For the early political elites, disassembling the “Andean-colonial inheritance” would include removing the protected status of indigenous lands and the indigenous tribute, which were consequently eliminated in 1828 and 1854, respectively. These changes encouraged indigenous land dispossession through hacienda growth, not only because the repeal of the former law make indigenous lands alienable, but also because the central state, in no longer collecting tribute, retreated from the Andes, making encroachments and the enclosure of the commons much easier (Thurner, 1997).

Such growth in private accumulation led to further exploitation of indigenous labour. On haciendas, landless indigenous people, as well as landed indigenous peasants who needed access to sufficient or fertile lands (Handelman, 1975), found themselves in a social structure that mirrored that of the larger society. In addition to paying access fees for lands, male tenants had to pay provide free labour on hacendados’ lands during sowing and harvesting seasons, and indigenous women, in hacendados’ homes (Handelman, 1975). As Poole (1994) notes, haciendas and their mestizo owners would not have existed without the labour pool of neighboring indigenous communities.

**1920s land reforms**

The 20th century land reforms must be similarly understood in relation to the nation’s prevailing racial ideologies—mestizaje (racial mixing) and indigenismo—as well as the export-oriented economy. At the time, Lima elites supported mestizaje, a thought born of the interconnected ideologies of scientific racism and eugenics. If the former used “scientific” principles to argue that certain human groups were naturally inferior to others, the latter, informed by theories on heredity and evolution, sought to racially improve these “inferior” groups (Stepan, 1982; 1991). Building on these ideas, mestizaje advocated for racial mixing—“constructive miscegenation”—as a means of national regeneration and elevating inferior races (Stepan, 1991). Among the popular theories on mestizaje was José Vasconcelos’s idea of the cosmic race. Writing from Mexico, Vasconcelos argued that Latin America would become the stage for a new cosmic race through mestizaje, as white and yellow races would mix and form a final stage of race formation (Stepan, 1991). Lima elites espoused this ideology, arguing that Lima’s economic success, especially in the latter half of the 19th century, was due to its hybrid racial composition (de la Cadena, 2000).
On the other hand, in Cusco, *indigenismo* became the racial project supported by intellectuals. In contrast to *mestizaje*’s roots in scientific racism and eugenics, this thought emerged from Lamarckism, the theory that acquired traits can be passed on to subsequent generations (Stepan, 1991). Marisol de la Cadena (2000), in her rich account of racial ideologies in the country, shows that Lamarckism led to an increased emphasis on racial elevation through education and preserving the “soul of the people” at the turn of the 20th century (19). Cusco *indigenistas* intellectuals believed that the way to preserve this “soul” was through racial purity, as “race implied moral and cultural inheritance, also susceptible of being molded by the environment” (85). They therefore argued that contemporary “Indians” had degenerated despite the excellence of the Incas because they had moved to cities and had abandoned their racially proper places. The way to regenerate the “soul” of the Inca race, then, was not through urbanizing education, but through education given by Indian educators in rural *ayllus*.

Following such logics, *indigenistas* such as Luis E. Valcárcel and José Carlos Mariátegui strongly advocated for the protection of indigenous lands. Mariátegui argued that “to remove the Indian from the land is to vary profoundly and possibly dangerously the race’s ancestral tendencies” (Mariátegui, cited in de la Cadena, 2000: 313). In other words, racial betterment would not only entail keeping indigenous people in their traditional environments, but also in agriculture, as Incas had been a “race of agriculturalists” (de la Cadena, 2000: 66). The *indigenistas* succeeded in getting the authoritarian Leguía government (1919-1930) to follow their ideology through the 1920 Constitution (de la Cadena, 2000). Under these reforms, indigenous lands were once again legally recognized, and indigenous communities became eligible to apply for the *comunidad indígena* (indigenous community) designation from the newly-created Office of Indigenous Affairs within the Ministry of Labour and Indigenous Affairs (Handelman, 1975).

Leguía’s 1920s reforms, in addition to fulfilling the racial objective of confining indigenous people to particular geography and labour, were also intended to boost the export-dominated economy. At the time, the Peruvian economy had become more dependent on mining due to the liberal reforms; exports in copper and oil—and to a lesser extent, lead and zinc—had overtaken agricultural exports (Drinot and Contreras, 2014). Leguía actively supported such export and foreign investment-led model of capitalism. During his regime, borrowing from international financial markets, especially from the U.S, increased so dramatically that “U.S. loans were used
to pay U.S. debts” (Drake, cited in Drinot and Contreras, 2014). For Leguía, returning communal lands was not only supported by *indigenista* thought, but also a way to incorporate indigenous people of the highlands into the capitalist economy. He reasoned that “the *gamonal* is retarded in his business sense for his failure to realize that the toil he forcibly exacts from the Indians would multiply a hundred-fold if he worked to keep them well-paid, well-fed and content, instead of squeezing out their very last energies” (Mörner, 1985: 198). Land reforms thus made sense for the mining economy.

That Leguía’s paternalistic concern for indigenous welfare was merely a veil for racial capitalism is revealed by the regime’s labor draft for road construction. The *Ley de Conscripción Vial* (Law of Road-Building Conscription) legally obliged men between ages 18 to 60, often indigenous, to provide labor for road-building, echoing the *mita* (Drinot and Contreras, 2014; Mörner, 1985). Further, despite the renewed protection of indigenous lands, hacienda growth continued, as indigenous land claims were challenged by *hacendados*, who had access to better lawyers and connections in the legal courts (Handelman, 1975).

*Agrarian Reform, 1969*

Juan Velasco Alvarado’s (1968-1975) sweeping agrarian reforms in the 1960s that have shaped contemporary indigenous land tenure were similarly motivated by *indigenismo* and a comparable model of capitalist growth. To be sure, Velasco’s land tenure reforms were the most extensive. Velasco expropriated hacienda lands in both the coast and the highlands by setting a series of conditions, such as the maximum area of land ownership by individuals (Kay, 1982). While there were exemptions and the limits could be adjusted by meeting certain efficiency criteria, the reforms more or less targeted all large landowners, marking a leap from previous weaker reforms (Kay, 1982; Thorp and Bertram, 1978).

At the same time, these reforms must be understood within the context of the rise of *indigenismo* as the official state policy between 1930s and the late 1960s. During this period, *indigenistas* such as Luis E. Varcárcel held senior positions in the government, implementing policies such as Quechua-only education for indigenous children (de la Cadena, 2000).

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4 *Gamonal*, meaning “boss,” was a term used for both *hacendados* and local strongmen, who acted as intermediaries between *hacendados* and indigenous people to perpetuate indigenous subjugation (Handeman, 1975; Poole, 1994)

5 While all Peruvian men in the said age group were affected, it was possible to substitute labor for a payment. Therefore, in effect, the law was a tax for urban/mestizo workers, but a labor tribute for indigenous people, who lacked funds for the payment to replace their labor (Drinot and Contreras, 2014).
Culturalist understandings of race, cemented as a result of such state support of *indigenismo*, are evident in the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law. Under these reforms, indigenous communities (*comunidades indígenas*) in the Andes were formally reclassified as peasant communities (*comunidades campesinas*) (Ley N. 17716), whereas communities in the Amazon were subsequently classified as native communities (*comunidades nativas*) (Ley N. 20653), establishing categories that are still in use today. Velasco argued that the nominal change from “*indígena*” and “*indio*” to a class-based label of “*campesino*” would remove the pejorative racial associations with the earlier terms and promote national unity (Gustfasson, 2018; de la Cadena, 2000; Greene, 2006). The association of Andean indigenous people to agriculture, however, echoes Mariátegui’s logic of defining Indians as “peasants”—a culturalist fundamentalism (de la Cadena, 2000). Therefore, the class rhetoric of the Velasco regime in fact reflects “the instrumentalization of racial discourse as a founding narrative of Peru’s deeply racialized society” (Puente, 2019: 94).

Velasco’s land reforms must also be thought of as an effort to articulate indigenous people’s place in relation to an extraction-led economy. While the military regime did nationalize some of the largest extractive firms in the country—such as the International Petroleum Company and the two copper giants, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Southern Peru Copper Corporation—Velasco did so in order to establish a state-based model of capitalism (Stephens, 1987; Puente, 2019; Thorp and Bertram, 1978). In fact, Velasco pushed for foreign investment in mining infrastructure, and created state enterprises to oversee mining, envisioning “turning…massive low grade mineral deposits into productive mines” (Dore, 1988: 184). Therefore, as Thorp and Bertram (1978: 304) argue, “For all its assertive nationalism…the 1971 [5-year economic] Plan offered little in the way of a new economic structure for Peru…None of these economic goals distinguished the Military Government from any of its predecessors since the 1940s.”

The land reforms were a key component of this extraction-based (albeit state-controlled) economy, as Velasco believed that the reforms would result in a demand stimulus from income redistribution, which would provide a wider market for industrialization, and consequently, lead to an expansion of export sectors (Thorp and Bertram, 1978). In other words, the reforms were not so much about land redistribution to indigenous people as they were about increasing state control over the agrarian economy. Tellingly, most expropriated lands were not returned to indigenous communities but turned into cooperatives—namely, *Cooperativas Agrarias de*
Producción (CAPs) and Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social (SAISs), which ironically increased land concentration (Kay, 1982; Albó, 2008). Velasco believed that such measures would help farms achieve economies of scale (Kay, 1982). As a result, between 1969 and 1980, 57.1% of expropriated land became cooperatives, whereas only 14.7% were given to campesino communities (Mejía, 1990). Cooperatives, combining both landless campesinos of expropriated estates and neighboring landed communities, remained in strict state supervision and failed to meet indigenous demands for autonomous control of land (Puente, 2019). Indigenous people thus became state laborers in a “capitalist agrarian production [that] became a pivotal component of the expanding project of state capitalism” (Puente, 2019: 94).

The expansion of mining throughout the 19th and 20th centuries not only led to indigenous land dispossession but also labour exploitation, as in the colonial period. Of particular note is the system called the “enganche” (“hook”). If in the colonial times, indigenous people had to work in the mines to pay off their tributes, the enganchados now had to work in the mines to pay off the loan that they had received from enganchadores, the agents contracted by a mining company to provide workers (Laite, 1981). This system was partly aided by the growth of haciendas linked to the liberal reforms, as some landless indigenous people went to the mines under this system of debt peonage (Dore, 1988; Brown, 2012). The debt relation was difficult to escape, and like the hacendado-indigenous relations, it depended on patron-client dynamics, in which bonds of dependency and loyalty were developed within highly asymmetrical power relations (Gustafsson, 2018). For example, workers had to spend their salary at the company store, where goods were overpriced just as they had been under the colonial reparto de mercancías; they also borrowed money for expenses such as marriages and burials (Deustua, 1994; Laite, 1981). Unpaid debts were passed on through generations, driving many people to resort to selling family lands, one of the ways of canceling debt (Laite, 1981). As a result, indigenous land holdings were further diminished while many enganchadores became large landowners (Laite, 1981). Further, some mining companies, such as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, directly fenced off grazing lands of neighboring communities in order to discourage transitory mineworkers from going back to their communities (Dore, 1988). The system of mining labor exploitation, partly facilitated by indigenous territorial dispossession, thus reproduced it.
The privileging of foreign capital and mining throughout the post-independence period meant that by the end of the Velasco regime, Peru was in an apt position for increased foreign investments in the mining sector. Due to the Velasco regime’s nationalization of mining companies and the succeeding governments’ promotion of privatization and implementation of tax benefits, foreign firms were liberated from the “antiquated mines and machinery that proved burdensome in competitive struggles within the industry” and hence empowered to invest in more profitable ventures (Dore, 1988: 178). Such strength of foreign capital in the mining industry as well as the state’s commitment to extractive growth set the stage for neoliberal development after 1990, as will be explained in the following chapter.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have shown how religious and racial ideologies shaped indigenous land access and labour rules in the colonial times and after independence. During the colonial period, the Spanish Crown and settlers, drawn by the riches of the New World, shifted and exploited indigenous land tenure and labour through racial logics. Spaniards equated indigenous people’s un-Christianness to inferiority and justified that resettlement and forced labour—key to colonial mineral production—would save the native population from savagery.

After independence, the new republic continued to rely on modernist/colonial logics, believing that the inferior native population could be evolved through their integration into the capitalist economy focused on primary exports. As a result, indigenous lands and labour continued to be articulated by evolving racial ideologies and the needs of capital. The land reforms thus failed to guarantee indigenous territorial autonomy, while foreign capital-dominated mining industry continued to expand. Such development policies predicated on indigenous dispossession and modernist extraction prepared ground for the contemporary neoliberal era, as will become clear in the next chapter.
Chapter 3  
Indigenous Development, Neoliberal Multiculturalism, and Extractivism

Neoliberalism became a predominant political and economic theory globally in the 1980s. This philosophy that emphasizes deregulation, free markets, and free trade quickly took hold throughout Latin American states, most of which were struggling after a collapse in oil prices in 1982. In Peru, as in other Andean-Amazonian states, neoliberalism put a heightened emphasis on resource extraction, which had already played an important role in the development model as described in the previous chapter. Ironically, the neoliberal project has unfolded alongside increased global attention to indigenous rights. In Peru, indigenous issues have become prominent in politics and the state has shown willingness—however superficial—to attend to indigenous needs. On the other hand, the flurry of policy changes on land, mining, and the environment that have followed neoliberal reorientation casts doubt on the Peruvian state’s commitment to improving its relationship with indigenous people. The resulting contradictions signal a case of “neoliberal multiculturalism”—“the simultaneous cultural affirmation and economic marginalization” of indigenous people (Hale, 2002: 493)—which is maintained through racial ideologies.

3.1 Neoliberalism in Latin America

3.1.1 The rise of neoliberalism

Neoliberalism, according to David Harvey, can be summarized as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (2005: 2). Formulated first as an economic theory in the U.S. in the 1960s and the 1970s, neoliberalism became integral to political and economic policies in the 1980s during the Reagan and Thatcher eras (Perreault and Martin, 2005). During this period, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.S. Department of Treasury developed a set of policy recommendations—now commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus—for the Global South based on neoliberal philosophy (Hurt, 2019). This neoliberal practice typically unfolded through the World Bank and the IMF, which gave loans to debt-ridden countries that were then obliged to follow the banks’ prescriptions, or “structural adjustment programs” (SAPs) (Goodale and Postero, 2013). SAPs
involved instating the following reforms: privatization of state-owned enterprises, reduction of social spending, deregulation of industry, promotion of export and foreign investment, and elimination of subsidies and trade barriers (Goodale and Postero, 2013).

In Latin America, neoliberalization followed the failed import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) strategy and the debt crisis following commodity price bust in the 1980s. ISI emerged as a key economic philosophy throughout Latin American states as a reaction to the Great Depression of 1929-33, which revealed the dependency of Latin American economies on the global economy (Perreault and Martin, 2015). Therefore, ISI policies focused on economic growth sustained by internal industrialization, limited foreign trade and investment through protectionist policies (Perreault and Martin, 2015). While ISI brought economic growth throughout Latin America—in particular Brazil and Mexico—through its emphasis on industrialization, it also fostered economic instabilities such as inflation and inequality (Perreault and Martin, 2015). These instabilities were hidden because of the easily-available foreign loans following the oil price boom of 1973 (Orihuela and Thorp, 2012; Perreault and Martin, 2015); however, once the commodity prices dropped, U.S. interest rates soared, leading Mexico to default on its debt payments in 1982. Consequently, investor confidence in Latin America dropped, and “all of Latin America was red-lined by the banks, capital flows were abruptly reversed, and debt burdens became impossible” (Orihuela and Thorp, 2012: 36). In this context of debt crisis, Latin American countries turned to the World Bank and the IMF for loans, which necessitated neoliberal reforms as a condition for the loans. The resulting SAPs and other reforms brought an era of deregulation and increased foreign direct investment (FDI), which rose dramatically from $10 million to $18 billion between 1990 and 2013 (Dougherty, 2016).

3.1.2 Neoliberal multiculturalism

Interestingly, the spread of neoliberal principles came alongside the rising recognition of indigenous rights. International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169, a convention concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, was adopted in 1989, and in 1993 the UN pronounced the first International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People (1995-2004). Charles Hale’s (2002) concept of “neoliberal multiculturalism” has been particularly helpful in illuminating the paradox of states’ simultaneous support of indigenous rights and neoliberal policies. For Hale, “proponents of the neoliberal doctrine pro-actively endorse a substantive, if limited, version of indigenous cultural rights, as a means to resolve their own problems and advance their own political agendas” (487). He contends that multiculturalism builds on existing racial ideologies
and is “a mestizaje discourse for new millennium” (491). By deciding which rights to recognize based on compatibility with the neoliberal agenda, neoliberal multiculturalists at once affirm indigenous people culturally while marginalizing them economically.

Andolina, Laurie, and Radcliffe (2009) expand on Hale’s concept to articulate “social multiculturalism.” In their view, social multiculturalism works through the neoliberalization of social development, whereby “cultural difference, environmental protection, gender equality, and popular participation” come to be conceptualized “as necessary ingredients in development and accordant with capitalist markets” (9). Andolina et al. point out that the notion of social development predates neoliberalization; since the 1960s, this concept has been used to measure national progress in international development areas such as health, education, and poverty reduction. The more recent neoliberalization of social development happened through the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), both of which began to support the idea that markets alone were unable to achieve development and thus needed the help of social services, social capital, and institutional reform. Social neoliberalism, it was further argued, would eliminate social exclusion through social integration. Indigenous people and issues thus fit squarely into the social neoliberalist agenda. As two economists behind the World Bank indigenous development policy put it, “The vision of development with identity…builds on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies, including a sense of ethnic identity, close attachments to ancestral land, and the capacity to mobilize labor, capital and other resources to promote local employment and growth” (Van Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, cited in Andolina et al., 2009: 42). Like Hale (2002), Andolina et al. understand multiculturalism to be supported by racial ideologies: “Official multiculturalism as a racial project rooted in regional histories, as well as a cultural project tied to the recent neoliberal order” (8).

### 3.1.3 Extractivism

Neoliberal development, fuelled by social multiculturalism, has heightened the importance of resource extraction as a macroeconomic policy throughout Latin America. On the one hand, neoliberalization capitalized on the boom in mineral prices in the 1990s, ushering in an era of “the new extraction”—the contemporary period of unprecedented multinational mineral investment in Latin America (Bebbington, 2009; Dougherty, 2016). With policies and conditions amenable to foreign investment, the FDI into the region dramatically increased from $10 million to $18 billion between 1990 and 2013, much of which was directed to the extractive industry (Dougherty, 2016). For example, between 1990 and 1997, investment in mining exploration and
exploitation grew by 400 percent in the region (Lust, 2016). By 2012, Latin America became the principal mining exploration target in the world, capturing 25 percent of the global share of mining investment (Dougherty, 2016). Neoliberal extraction has been particularly pronounced in the Andean-Amazonian region of Latin America, as the region’s political economy had already been co-constituted with resource extraction (Bebbington, 2012b; Orihuela and Thorp, 2012). Therefore, after neoliberalization, the region’s rich mineral deposits and its historical political economy have shaped the “region the source of extractives in Latin America” (Orihuela and Thorp, 2012: 29).

At the same time, extraction came to take on an important role in social policies, both ideologically and materially. Scholars have observed that the above-described “new extraction” is sustained through “new extractivism,” in which revenues from FDI in extraction is used for the social development of the population (Gudynas, 2009; Dougherty, 2016). Arsel, Hogenbloom, and Pellegrini (2016) note that the intertwining of extraction and social development has led to the “extractive imperative.” In this model, extractivism is more than an economic policy, having “taken over the logic of other state activities, reorienting policy objectives to further justify and advance the policy of extractivism” (881). The extractive imperative is sustained by a linear, Rostowan view of development in which a traditional society needs to build the preconditions for “take-off” before maturing and ending at a stage of high mass consumption. Following this logic, extraction is viewed as a “necessary and unavoidable step towards higher levels of development,” an economic activity that will also result in poverty reduction in the process (884). Through such ideological and material construction of extraction as more than an economic policy, both neoliberal and “post-neoliberal” Latin American states have kept extraction central to their development policies, forming a “convergence” (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington, 2012a) and a “commodity consensus” (Svampa, 2013). For example, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, despite being elected on the leftist platform to turn away from neoliberalism, argued that “The great opportunity of Latin American countries to develop…is with the use of natural resources. This generates the resources to invest in human talent, science, technology, and innovation, which help overcome extractive economy” (Correa, cited in Arsel et al. 2016: 884). Similarly, Bolivia’s Evo Morales of Movement to Socialism (MAS) made a commitment to extraction, justifying that the activity would allow the government to secure surplus for redistribution through social programs (Bebbington and
The convergence shows how extractivism is justified through a neoliberal multicultural logic, as extraction becomes a means to social inclusion.

The “new extraction” and extractivism have produced new tensions in state-indigenous relations in Andean-Amazonian countries. Scholars have observed that, first and foremost, the “extractive imperative” has led to the dispossession of indigenous territories and livelihoods. Despite the increasing codification of indigenous rights in the constitutions of the Andean-Amazonian countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru, the concessions granted by the state overlap with indigenous territories, livelihoods, and water resources (Bebbington, 2012b). As people come to bear the burdens of extraction, they have been increasingly mobilizing against the state, leading to a sharp increase in state-indigenous conflicts (Perreault and Valdivia, 2010; Bebbington et al., 2008; Savino, 2016; McDonell, 2015). Unfortunately, indigenous protests have been met with violent state repression and criminalization (Savino, 2016; Andreucci and Kallis, 2017; Bebbington, 2012b).

3.2. Neoliberal development in Peru

3.2.1 The rise of neoliberalism and extractivism

Peru underwent a series of dramatic neoliberal reforms in the 1990s that recentered the importance of foreign investment-led resource extraction in the nation’s development model. The neoliberalization of Peru began with the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). In the 1980s, the country suffered through a civil war with the Maoist guerrilla group, Sendero Luminoso, and an economic collapse linked to rising debts and hyperinflation. The surprising win of Fujimori against Mario Vargas Llosa, a member of the traditional elite, symbolized a convergence of multiple social interests that desired an effective solution to the economic crisis (Guzman Solano, 2016). Upon assuming office, Fujimori quickly unveiled a series of neoliberal policies geared in particular for the promotion of foreign investment. First, in 1991, Fujimori crafted a new law opening all sectors of the economy to FDI and guaranteeing “foreign investors non-discriminatory treatment, free exchange convertibility and unrestricted rights to repatriate capital and profits” (Korinek and Ramdoo, 2017; Bury, 2005). The Legislative Decree No. 668 further identified domestic and foreign trade as a fundamental condition for Peru’s development, and required the state to promote the free flow of goods and services (Korinek and Ramdoo, 2017). In addition, the government ratified bilateral and multilateral investment treaties to offer stronger guarantees to investors (Bury, 2005).
This foreign investment-friendly framework had particular significance for the extractive sector. The Fujimori administration’s denationalizing spree privatized 200 mining operations, resulting in 95 percent production of minerals by foreign firms by the end of the regime (Eaton, 2015; Lust, 2016). More controversially, the government also established tax incentives through the form of tax stability agreements, which protect mining companies from changes to tax treatments for a period of ten to fifteen years (Eaton, 2015; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016).

In addition to introducing various financial incentives, Fujimori’s neoliberal reforms also made changes to land tenure that facilitate mining operations. Most importantly, the concession system was simplified. As Bury (2005) notes, prior to the National Mining Cadastre Law (Law 26615) of 1996, mining concessions often overlapped due to a variety of contradicting government decrees. The new law centralized and unified the concessions, eliminating previous mining-claim procedures. These changes guaranteed mining firms exclusive control of land resources necessary for their operations. In essence, the changes to mining-related laws marked a return to the liberal Mining Code of 1950 that was designed to attract private investment in mining (Eaton, 2015; Korinek and Ramdoo, 2017). The policy changes led to a dramatic increase in investment in mining exploration and exploitation—2000 percent just between 1990 and 1997 (Lust, 2016)—and, in so doing, set the stage for extractivism (Andreucci and Kallis, 2017).

In the new millennium, Peru’s presidents followed in the footsteps of Fujimori and reaffirmed the country’s commitment to promoting foreign investment-led extraction as a development strategy. Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) appointed liberal technocrats as key members of his cabinet: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski,6 a U.S. investment banker, became his finance minister and Roberto Dañino, a corporate lawyer from Washington and another privatization supporter, his prime minister (Barr, 2003; The Economist, 2001). With liberal economists by his side, Toledo pursued free trade agreements with other countries and “proposed what the IMF referred to as ‘an ambitious privatisation and concessions program’” (Barr, 2003: 1166). The 2006 Trade Promotion Agreement with the United States stands out as an outcome of these efforts. Toledo further promoted the mineral industry by establishing the Peruvian Agency to Promote Private Investments (Proinversión) and introducing new tax incentives related to the mining exploration and exploitation (Lust, 2016). For instance, his regime eliminated the 18 percent sales tax on capital goods and services for mineral exploration (Lust, 2016).

6 Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, also known by his initials as PPK, later became president in 2016 but resigned in 2018 following a massive corruption scandal related to Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction firm.
Alan García (2006-2011), the succeeding president under whose first regime (1985-1990) Peru had suffered economic collapse, pushed for neoliberalization and supported transnational mining even more aggressively. He believed that Peru’s Rowstowan “take-off” would be achieved through transnational capital investment in resources; accordingly, García issued 99 legislative decrees within a 180 day-period to meet the terms of the 2006 Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. Many of these laws were aimed at promoting transnational resource extraction (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). Despite his campaign promise to introduce a tax on windfall profits, García instead proposed the “Voluntary Contributions” (Aportes Voluntarios) framework once in office. Under this scheme, mining companies were asked to voluntarily contribute revenues to finance projects in their regions of operations (Eaton, 2015). This five-year program gave significant leeway to companies on how much to contribute and how to spend their funds (Eaton, 2015).

While center-left Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) had spoken out against neoliberalism and had promised “a great transformation” during campaign (Collyns, 2011), he further entrenched Peru’s extractivism once in office. From the start, Humala’s promise of social development depended on mining; social expenditures would increase by taxing the extractive industry more heavily (Lust, 2016; Collyns, 2011). The president’s commitment to neoliberalism quickly revealed itself when he reappointed high-level figures from the García administration, including Economy and Finance Minister Miguel Castilla and the Central Bank president Julio Velarde (Eaton, 2015). Accordingly, Humala spared the mining industry from the heavy taxes that had formed a key component of his electoral platform; the promised mining taxes on windfall profits of up to 40 percent was reduced drastically to 2.4 percent to 8.4 percent (Collyns, 2012). The new taxes’ net positive effect on state revenue was further limited as the payments could be calculated as operational costs for income tax purposes (Eaton, 2015). In addition to lowering to the promised taxes, Humala in fact implemented a tax program akin to García’s Voluntary Contributions. Obras por impuestos, or Works for Taxes, enables companies to finance and execute infrastructural projects prioritized by local governments; up to half of corporate income tax can be paid in this manner (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, n.d.), and companies can deduct maintenance and operational costs in addition to construction costs (Eaton, 2015).

However, Humala’s commitment to extractivism was made most conspicuous by his 2014 Paquete Reactivador (Law 30230)—an economic reactivation packet designed to promote investment. This law changed various regulations, environmental in particular, to “restore
investors’ confidence” decreased by the fall in commodity prices and boost the “meager” 4.5 percent GDP growth for the first quarter of 2013 (Rénique, 2013).

At the time of writing, the current regime has once again reaffirmed the country’s commitment to extractive development. In 2018, President Martín Vizcarra said, “It’s not possible that the country has wealth in the subsoil and poverty on the surface” (El Comercio, 2018b). As the newspaper *El Comercio* observed, his comments signaled his belief that “the big mining potential of the country must be put to use and generate progress and development for all Peruvians” (El Comercio, 2018b). The Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) accordingly announced its intention to increase investment in the mining sector by 50 percent in the next two years (El Comercio, 2018b).

### 3.2.2 Contradictions of neoliberal multiculturalism

*Rise of Multicultural Politics*

Consistent with the pattern elsewhere in Latin America, Peru’s neoliberal and extractivist development happened alongside and through the support of multiculturalism. This process involved framing certain aspects of indigenous cultures and histories as pro-development through racial ideologies. This selective support of indigeneity for the purpose of neoliberal development can be observed in presidential campaigns since the 1990s, most notably that of Fujimori, Toledo, and Humala.

Fujimori’s election campaign hinged on promises of economic improvement, which was in turn supported by a social multiculturalist argument. Lee (2010) observes that Fujimori’s campaign tactic relied on depicting himself—sometimes literally—both as a Japanese samurai and an Andean peasant. Fujimori’s campaign motto “*honestidad, trabajo, tecnologia*” (“honesty, work, technology”) drew upon an idealized notion of Japanese and Andean cultures. Fujimori repeatedly cited his work ethic and commitment to efficiency, often mobilizing the metaphor of a “reliable, efficient Toyota truck” (49). This supposed Asian trait echoed the Incan moral code of “Never steal, never lie, never be lazy,” something that all Peruvian children are taught in school (49). Such imagery relied on racial thought in two ways. First, the strategy uses Incanism promoted by *indigenismo*. Secondly, it appeals to the idea of race as moral and cultural inheritance, another legacy of *indigenismo*, by emphasizing the honesty and work ethic that are purportedly inherent to Andean and Japanese cultures. In so doing, Fujimori highlighted the benefits of multiculturalism and employed campaign slogans such as “A President Like You”
and “Chinitos y cholitos, contra los blanquitos” (“Chinese and cholos against the whites”) (de la Cadena 1998; Lee, 2010). In other words, his electoral platform argued that economic survival, the top priority of Peruvians as indicated in the polls at the time (Lee, 2010), would be achieved by a new era of politics that harnessed the positive aspects of different cultures.

In a similar fashion, Toledo owed his electoral success to his ability to incorporate indigeneity into neoliberalism through racial ideologies. Toledo’s cholo identity was critical to his campaign: he was a successful cholo because he completed a Ph.D. in economics at Stanford University and worked at institutions such as Harvard University, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank despite coming from a poor indigenous family. Toledo highlighted this identity in several ways, such as by calling his Andean-folk-music-playing campaign van cholomovil (Lee, 2010) and by drawing explicit comparisons to the celebrated 15th-century Inca ruler Pachacútec. He used chakana, an Inca sign symbolizing a new era, to represent his political party (García and Lucero, 2008; de la Cadena, 2001), and also opened his political gatherings with a ritual salute to Andean deities in Cusco, the heart of the Inca Empire (de la Cadena, 2008). Like that of his predecessor, Toledo’s campaign drew from indigenismo, though his extensive use of Inca imagery and emphasis on his own mestizaje through education made his Incanism and culturalist racialism even more overt. As de la Cadena (2001: 21) observes, indigenist incorporation of indigeneity is compatible with neoliberalism because of neoliberalism’s “embrace of the excluded as consumers, regardless of their self-identity.” Following this logic, Toledo’s cholo image was “highly compatible with the persona that neoliberalism requires: a solitary achiever, able to succeed without the intervention of the state” (21). Embodying the neoliberal ideal, Toledo showed that his promise of “market economy with a human face” (The Economist, 2001) could “also come with a cholo face” (de la Cadena, 2001: 21). Therefore, by incorporating multiculturalism through indigenismo into his campaign, Toledo was able to highlight the connection between multiculturalism and development, and succeed in the “economy dominated” campaign in which he promised an “all-out war on poverty” (CNN, 2001; The Economist, 2001).

Multiculturalism was yet again promised alongside development in the subsequent presidential campaigns of 2006 and 2011, when Humala embraced the concept to frame his electoral platform. Though Humala relied less on indigenismo than had his predecessors, the logo of his party was a traditional Incan clay pot and his campaign rallies and literature made use of the rainbow-coloured indigenous flag (Madrid, 2011). He also called for various measures to
support multiculturalism, such as multicultural education, the use of indigenous languages in the military and the government, and the recognition of Peru as a multicultural country (Madrid, 2011). Humala argued that multiculturalism would promote and be promoted by a growing economy; his plan for economic growth echoed Toledo’s “market economy with a human face.” “My macroeconomic policy is to strengthen and ensure economic growth, but with social inclusion,” he said in an interview, revealing the enmeshment of social development to economic growth (Weymouth, 2011). Humala’s social expenditures thus depended on extractivist policies, as explained earlier.

Contradictions of Neoliberal Multiculturalism
Having assumed office by supporting aspects of indigeneity in their campaigns, the three presidents made certain improvements—however contradictory and limited—to indigenous rights. For instance, after Fujimori’s self-coup (autogolpe) that shut down the government, the Political Constitution of 1993 established that “The state recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural plurality of the nation” (Constitución Política del Perú, Article 2.19). The constitution also specifically recognizes indigenous cultures, requiring that the state “respect the cultural identity of Comunidades Campesinas and Nativas” (Constitución Política del Perú, Article 89). The government also ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1994. Toledo’s administration made efforts to undertake multicultural initiatives as well. Most significantly, First Lady Eliane Karp founded the Comisión Nacional de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afro-Peruanos (CONAPA) for the indigenous people in the Andes and the Amazon as well as Afro-descendants (Greene, 2006). When the commission was dissolved after a series of scandals, Toledo created the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afro-Peruanos (INDEPA), bringing Andean and Amazonian peoples under an explicitly “indigenous” banner for the first time (Greene, 2006). Under García and Humala, the Law of Prior Consultation, which legalized the principles of ILO Convention 169, were developed and passed (Ley de Consulta Previa, Law 29785).

Unfortunately, extractivist policies contradict such advances to indigenous rights, revealing how neoliberal multiculturalism cherry-picks the rights to support. This paradox is revealed by extractivism’s role in increasing indigenous territorial dispossession, which happens both directly and indirectly through changes to land tenure and the weakening of environmental regulations that concern indigenous territories. Many of the laws passed to facilitate foreign-led
extraction have directly weakened indigenous land rights. Although Fujimori’s 1993 constitution recognizes the multiculturality of Andean and Amazonian communities, it simultaneously eliminated the inalienable and unseizable status (*inalienabilidad y inembargabilidad*) of campesino community lands (del Castillo Pinto, 2004; Hogue and Rau, 2008). The General Mining Law of 1992 had also enabled the forced relocation or displacement of communities for mining purposes (Lust, 2016). García’s 99 decrees—now notoriously known as Law of the Jungle (Ley de la Selva)—were designed to open up what the state deemed “uncultivated lands” (*tierras eriazadas*) owned mainly by indigenous communities (Stetson, 2012; Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). The laws undermined collective property rights, facilitating the entry of foreign capital as desired by the state (Stetson, 2012; Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). Similarly, Humala’s *Paquete Reactivador* established a procedure for land tenure regularization near large investment projects and for extrajudicial procedures for recuperating state property (Servindi, 2014). As a group of Peruvian NGOs indicated, such procedures facilitating state access to strategic lands could potentially violate indigenous people’s land rights (Servindi, 2014). More seriously, Humala denied prior consultation for major development and investment projects to Andean campesino communities, arguing that “there are no native communities…in the [Andean] highlands; the majority are agrarian” (Rénique, 2013).

Indigenous territorial autonomy has also been affected by a lack of regulations that mitigate the negative ecological consequences of extraction. As Eaton (2015) argues, Peru’s neoliberal mining has been characterized by the reluctance to implement adequate environmental protections. According to a World Bank report, environmental concerns have been a “low priority” in Peru, with total public spending for the environmental sector decreasing by 24 percent between 1999 and 2003 (Póveda and Sánchez-Triana, 2007: 461). Indeed, the Ministry of Environment (MINAM) was only created in 2009 after critics of the Peru-USA FTA voiced concerns about the potential environmental damages from increased FDI (Eaton, 2015). However, the MINAM continues to lack power compared to the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), which had both strongly opposed its creation (Eaton, 2015). Until 2012, the Ministry of Energy and Mines—the entity responsible for promoting mining—was in charge of approving Environmental Impact Assessments (Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer, 2015; Bebbington, 2012b; Merino, 2018). MINAM was stripped of its powers once again in 2014 with the aforementioned *Paquete Reactivador* that designed to attract
foreign investment. The packet of reforms reduced the audit capacity of OEFA (Body for Assessment and Audit) within MINAM as well as the organization’s ability to sanction those who fail to meet environmental standards (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2014). Such changes directly helped the extractive industry, which accounted for the majority of the sanctions issued in 2013: out of the total 198 sanctions, 148 were for mining and 18 for hydrocarbons. The law also cut environmental fines by half and reduced EIA evaluation time by government agencies to just 45 days (Servindi, 2014), in essence stripping MINAM “of jurisdiction over air, soil and water quality standards, as well as its ability to set limits for harmful substances” (Fernández, 2014).

In order to resolve contradictions of neoliberal multiculturalism, the state uses race to justify contradictory development policies that marginalize indigenous people, just as it had done so to incorporate indigenous rights into the development agenda. Several incidents surrounding the Peru-U.S. FTA are particularly relevant in illustrating how changes to land tenure that facilitate neoliberal extraction continue to be supported by colonial logics that hierarchize people along the nature/culture spectrum. For one, calls for a referendum on the FTA were denied in part through the animalization of indigenous people. For example, a congressman equated indigenous campesinos to camelids to argue that the referendum was unnecessary, saying: “are you going to consult the llamas and vicuñas about the free trade agreement? ...You can’t ask them about such a technical question…That would be barbarous (una barbaridad)… Those who can’t read or write can’t be asked about that” (Garcia and Lucero, 2008: 255). This statement reveals how cultural racism informs the state’s position, as lack of education amounts to the animality of indigenous people within such logics.

Similarly, President García has called indigenous people and their land use backward and irrational, revealing the use of racial ideologies to defuse threats to neoliberal development. In a series of editorials in 2007, he argued that the country suffered from a “dog-in-a-manger syndrome,” 7 in that indigenous peoples were hindering national development by guarding “millions of hectares” of idle lands (Stetson, 2012: 82). This logic informed the Law of the Jungle that was designed to facilitate the expropriation of indigenous lands. When indigenous protests and violent state response resulted in Baguazo, Garcia defended the government’s

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7 Aesop’s fable of the perro del hortelano, or the dog in a manger, is about a dog that prevents other animals from getting food for which it has no use.
response, saying: “They [the natives] are not first class citizens…400 natives cannot say to 28 millions of Peruvians that we have no right to come here…[They] want to lead us to irrationality and primitivism” (Merino, 2015: 85).

3.3 Conclusion

In Latin America, neoliberal expansion has happened alongside and through the rise of multiculturalism’s recognition of indigenous rights. Extractivism and multiculturalism can both reinforce and contradict each other; as a result, neoliberal multiculturalism necessitates the state to choose a limited set of indigenous rights to support based on their compatibility with principles of neoliberal development. In Peru, such tensions are evident. Since the country’s neoliberalization in 1990, the country has hardened its commitment to extractivism and has enacted various mining-related laws that facilitate foreign investment in the sector. At the same time, the discourse of multiculturalism has also taken hold in the country; politicians increasingly frame multiculturalism as integral to development by using racial logics. However, extractivist policies directly contradict the state’s commitment to multicultural recognition by marginalizing indigenous land tenure rights. The state tries to resolve the resulting conflicts from these contradictions by resorting to racial ideologies, revealing how neoliberal multiculturalism is a racial project rooted in coloniality.
Chapter 4

Conviviendo with Transnational Mining: Daily Lives, Dispossession, and Depletion of Social Reproduction

Having shown how the state promotes the mining industry as a development model, in this chapter, I illuminate how indigenous campesinos experience extraction in the district of Chamaca. Chamaqueños have been conviviendo (co-living; living together) with the Canadian transnational company, HudBay Minerals, since 2011. I show that the mining operations are leading to a series of dispossession, including that of territory, livelihood practices, and social cohesion. Livelihood dispossession in turn puts an increased burden on social reproduction, depleting indigenous people’s ability to reproduce intergenerationally. I argue that mining operations thus constitutes a type of “slow violence” (Nixon, 2012) that once again exploits indigenous (re)productive labour and threatens indigenous people’s ability to reproduce their ways of being, in place.
4.1 Livelihoods and social reproduction frameworks

To analyze the daily and intergenerational consequences of mining on indigenous ways of being, I draw from both livelihoods and social reproduction literature. As explained in the introduction, dispossession is useful for highlighting the violent processes of contemporary accumulation. However, as Fernandez (2018) argues, using “a feminist lens to illuminate theories of dispossession requires bringing to the foreground the inter-relationship between production and social reproduction” (145). Indeed, broadly defined as “the activities necessary to maintain and reproduce life daily and intergenerationally at both the individual and social scale” (Winders and Smith, 2019: 872), social reproduction reveals multiple, oft-ignored forms of labour that underpin accumulation—such as mental, emotional, and other forms of unpaid work (Laslett and Brenner, 1989; Henry, 2017). In other words, it can help uncover the embodied, emotional, and everyday consequences of dispossession.

The social reproduction framework can also allow for a more intersectional reading of dispossession. Some feminist Marxists have pointed out both the racialized and gendered foundations of accumulation: “the accumulation of capital requires women as well as men, and the colonies of the global South as well as the metropoles of the global North” (Hartsock, 2006: 185). Indeed, Cindi Katz (2001) argues that social reproduction can add to a political ecology framework because:

environmental racism and environmental forms of imperialism—whereby there is a geographical fix to political-ecological problems, such as the siting of toxic waste repositories or the location of noxious industries (often regulated out of wealthier or more privileged locales)—have implications in common with the social relations that encourage production in one place tapping a migrant workforce reproduced elsewhere. In both cases, there is a rejigging of the geography of social reproduction so that the costs of social reproduction…are borne away from where most of the benefits accrue. (Katz, 2001: 714-715)

Given political ecology’s interest in “distributive justice, from the distribution of products and benefits derived from land….to the creation and unequal distribution of waste, toxins, ecological damage, and other environmental threats to health and wellbeing” (Rocheleau and Nirmal, 2015), a social reproduction framework can reveal the uneven environmental costs that different groups of people bear due to patriarchy and racism.

Further, attending to social reproduction can facilitate a decolonial reading of dispossession. Hall (2016), extending her analysis of social reproduction in Indigenous communities of Canada, observes that there is an “on-going—and often violent—gendered, racialised and colonial
disciplining required to orient social reproduction toward capitalism” (103) that threatens Indigenous subsistence and reproductive labour. Subsistence/reproductive labour, Hall argues, is connected to “well-being, meaning and hope” (106) and is based on a social need, meaning that it is more than
hand-to-mouth living; that is, a socio-economy can be rich and abundant without being based on the accumulation of value, and need is not simply a physiological state but a social one, and can include various comforts, entertainment, art and culture. (Hall, 2016: 102)

While an echo of Bebbington’s livelihoods approach—“making a life and making it meaningful” (2000: 498)—Hall goes one step further by asking us to analyze the capitalism’s racialized and gendered implications for social reproduction that threaten the (re)production of indigenous ontologies.

I therefore draw insight from Fernandez (2018), who looks at the gendered consequences of dispossession for social reproduction in the case of prawn farmers of India. She uses Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas’s (2014) concept of depletion of social reproduction, which highlights how those engaged in social reproduction can experience depletion “when there is a critical gap between the outflows – domestic, affective and reproductive – and the inflows that sustain their health and well-being. This affects not only individuals but also the households and communities in which SR takes place” (86). Building on this concept, Fernandez (2018) shows how dispossession from non-capitalist modes of production leads to the depletion of social reproduction over time.

This chapter thus builds on these discussions to illuminate the connections between the dispossession of indigenous livelihoods in Chamaca through the mining enclosure and the increased burden on social reproduction on indigenous people. I conceptualize depletion from occurring not only due to the excessive outflows in social reproduction, but also from the impacts to social reproduction, following Katz’s (2001) reminder that political-ecological fixes entail an uneven distribution of social reproductive costs.

I analyze three components of social reproduction: biological reproduction, unpaid production and care labour, and reproduction of culture and ideology (Rai et al., 2014; Fernandez, 2018). Given the both racialized and gendered elements of accumulation, in this chapter, I first focus on how indigenous people of Chamaca as a whole bear the social reproductive costs of the mining industry before shifting to examine the specific effects on indigenous women in the next chapter.
4.2 Political ecologies of livelihoods

4.2.1 Land enclosure

Scholars of extraction highlight dispossession that occurs as a result of mining. In particular, they stress livelihood dispossession that occurs through the dispossession of land and water (Bebbington, 2012a; Perreault, 2013; Bury, 2004). At the same time, since livelihood practices also entail meaning-making, dispossession not only refers to the material threats to livelihood, but also the “colonization of the lifeworlds” (Bebbington et al., 2008: 2891). Similarly, HudBay’s mining operations are dispossessing people of their territory, sources of subsistence and income, and lifeworlds.

Background

The Constancia mine is a relatively new project that entered initial production in 2014 and achieved commercial production in 2015 (HudBay Minerals, 2018). Primarily focused on the production of copper and molybdenum and in smaller amounts, silver, the project spans across three districts of Chumbivilcas: Chamaca, Velille, and Livitaca.

Constancia is owned by HudBay Minerals, a Canadian mining company headquartered in Toronto. Founded in 1927, HudBay first started operations in Flin Flon, Manitoba, to produce zinc and copper. The company’s operations overseas began much more recently in 2008 through the acquisition of Skye Resources, a Vancouver-based firm, which owned a nickel mine in Guatemala (HudBay Minerals, n.d.). HudBay further expanded its international presence in 2011 when it acquired Norsemont Mining operating in Peru. Norsemont, a junior Canadian corporation, had finished the feasibility studies for the Constancia project and had the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) approved by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) in late 2010. As a result of this acquisition, the Constancia mine, comprised of 36 concession blocks, is owned by HudBay Peru S.A.C., HudBay’s wholly-owned subsidiary (HudBay Minerals, 2018: 16).

Constancia is located three kilometers away from a previous large-scale mine named Katanga that once operated near the community of Uchucarcco in Chamaca. The U.S. firm Cerro de Pasco Corporation8 owned this mine prior to the government expropriation of the firm in 1970, after which a Japanese firm named Mitsui Mining and Smelting and Minera Katanga led the

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8 As explained previously, Cerro de Pasco Corporation, owned five-sixth of all mines in Central Peru in the first half of the 20th century (see introduction).
exploitation (Flores Unzaga, 2016; Norsemont Technical Report Dec 2007; Gade, 1994). The Katanga copper mine was abandoned in the early 1990s due to the presence of the guerrilla group *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) (Flores Unzaga, 2016; SRK Consulting, 2007). The period of inactivity was broken in 2003 when a firm named Rio Tinto entered into an agreement with the owners of the former mine—Mitsui Mining and Smelting and Minera Katanga—to begin exploration (SRK Consulting, 2007). Rio Tinto brought in a Canadian firm, Norsemont Mining, as a joint-venture partner in 2005 (SRK Consulting, 2007). By the end of 2009, Norsemont had acquired 100 percent of mineral rights for the Constancia project from Rio Tinto and Mitsui.

The Constancia pit and its facilities largely rest on former hacienda lands owned by the Velasco siblings. In 2007, Norsemont purchased the Fortunia hacienda, a 974.91-hectare property that “covers most of the main resource area” (GRD Minproc, 2008: 14). By 2009, Norsemont had purchased additional lands from three other Velasco siblings totalling 3,123.18 hectares. However, Norsemont also approached two *campesino* communities directly to gain consent mineral exploration and categorized them as communities in the “area of direct influence” in its EIA in 2010 (Flores Unzaga, 2016). In 2012, HudBay rented and bought lands from these two communities—Uchuccarcco of the Chamaca district and Chilloroya of the Livitaca district—for S/. 80 million (CA$31.5 million) and S/. 50 million (CA$19.7 million), respectively, in exchange for CSR commitments. In Uchuccarcco, some of the S/. 80 million from the agreement were distributed among qualifying *comuneros*, who each received S/.102,000 (CA$40,200) (interview 26; interview 27).

Constancia is an open-pit mine that extends about 1.8 km east to west and 1.6 km north to south, with a maximum depth of 660 m (HudBay Minerals, 2018a). In open-pit mining—a type of surface mining, which accounts for over 60% of global mineral production (Glidden, 2003)—surface material (overburden) is removed to extract low-grade ores underneath (Dore, 1988). The extraction is done through the use of heavy-duty equipment, including bulldozers, giant power shovels, and bucket-wheel excavators (Glidden, 2003). Open-pit mining thus radically differs from underground mining, in which higher-grade ores are extracted by following mineral veins through shafts and tunnels (Dore, 1988). The extracted ores and the overburden are then taken by trucks to a nearby processing facility; in the case of Constancia, a processing facility is located 1 km west of the pit, and tailings management facility, 3.5 km southwest of the pit (HudBay Minerals, 2018a).
HudBay has plans for expansion in Chamaca and the neighboring districts and beginning production in a satellite deposit named Pampacancha in the near future (HudBay Minerals, n.d.; Fernandez, 2019). In addition, HudBay acquired three new large mining properties that add up to 9,932 hectares in early 2018, further enlarging its concession possessions in the district of Chamaca (HudBay Minerals, 2018b). The company is now trying to obtain permission for exploration from key communities of Chamaca, such as Añahuichi. Aside from the Constancia project in Peru, the firm now also has other international pre-production projects in Arizona and Chile.

Figure 5 The HudBay mining infrastructure (HudBay Minerals, 2018a)
HudBay’s mining operations dispossess indigenous people of their lands and territorial autonomy in two ways: direct encroachment and indirect enclosure through contamination. As explained above, HudBay was able to gain the majority of the lands needed for its operations through direct negotiations with the Velasco haciendas, perpetuating a colonial form of land dispossession. Daniel, a leader of Uchuccarcco, expressed that over 1,000 ha of the community’s territory had been inside the Velasco haciendas. He recalled that when the community tried to claim the lands in 2012, the company discouraged the comuneros, saying that it would return the lands after the closure of the mine (Son interviews, 2018). The community was instead offered a small part of the hacienda of around 300ha for their livestock grazing, which Daniel described as “deceit.”

In addition to the former hacienda lands, the mining enclosure currently spans across the lands of Uchuccarcco and Chilloroya. While only a total of thirty-six families (all from Chilloroya) were relocated for the Constancia project (HudBay Minerals, 2017), HudBay’s encroachment on indigenous lands is likely to grow given that it has recently acquired three mining concessions adding up to 9,932 hectares (HudBay Minerals, 2018b). Indeed, leaders from Añahuichi have indicated that the firm is showing a concerted effort to obtain permission from the community to begin mineral exploration (Son interviews, 2018).

In addition to directly encroaching on indigenous lands (e.g. Bury, 2004; Brain, 2017), mining activities can also indirectly enclose communal lands through contamination. As Brown (2012) notes, indigenous people’s proletarianization in the 1940s was due less to the direct
encroachment of mines on their lands as to the effects of contamination. As mineral production only began recently, communities in Chamaca may see more adverse effects on their lands and livelihoods in the future. As Isaac said, “[HudBay] has been in the exploitation phase for four years… right now, there are a small number of deaths of animals… This is why I say that in 20, 25 years, it’s going to be like in Espinar⁹, no?” (interview 18). People in Urazana who are suffering from more severe contamination are already contemplating moving. “Future, I think… I will go to the city, here we are already totally contaminated, the people, we will also die, so, I think about moving to Cusco, and if I don’t have money [to move], then I will just die here,” said Constanza (interview 29). Joaquin of Uchuccarcco, too, expressed similar desires:

In any case, if the mining company HudBay has this policy of expanding, better to move from this area, to relocate… there is a clear example… just here in Espinar, there are people who live close to the mine, who have lead, heavy metals in the blood. So we are already sick… And so… maybe we would really think about resettlement, a change of place… I don’t want to stay here [if the mine expands]… because in the future, we will be sick. Not just human beings but also our animals. (interview 26)

Figure 7: Fence separates HudBay’s property (left) from Urazana, an “indirectly affected” community. The sign reads: “Private property.” (Photo by the author)

⁹ Espinar is another region of Cusco, where the Tintaya mine has caused contamination since commencing operations in 1985 (CooperAcción, 2016).
4.2.2 Dispossession of livelihoods

Farming and Fishing

The mining enclosure is disrupting indigenous people’s hybrid livelihood strategies in Chamaca. Crop and livestock farming are especially important in the region, as key crops such as potatoes provide subsistence and milk products, which can be sold for cash, provide an important source of income. Fishing, too, can provide additional food for families. Unfortunately, mining operations have had a negative impact on these important livelihood practices through contamination.

Scholars studying the economic implications of mining in Andean contexts have noted how contamination has negatively impacted local people’s agriculture (Li, 2009; Perreault, 2013; Bury, 2004; Brain, 2017). Although the Constancia mine only recently begun production, people in the vicinity of the mine have already started reporting a decline in food production due to contamination. According to interview participants, crop and milk production have dropped dramatically, especially in communities closer to the mine such as Urazana. Here, community members report the dramatic change in production in the last few years with much frustration.

Air (dust) pollution, in particular, was a concern for many. Miguel described the dust generated by the increased traffic of heavy vehicles on unpaved roads as “hell…dust, dust, dust comes out from all our pasture…when you walk it sticks to you like talc, no?” (Interview 28). The increased dust affects cows and, consequently, milk production:

The pasture is covered with dust and the cows eat that. Some cows don’t eat…they are getting thinner and if they do eat, it also gives them diarrhea. Some cows don’t eat, so that’s why they have become thin and the milk production has declined. (Interview 10)

Simón described the current production as “a tremendous failure”: “We have had deaths of animals…we are only taking care of our livestock, we don’t make money anymore, there is no income. We only make them survive” (interview 31). Constanza indicated that her cows, which used to produce fifteen to eighteen litres of milk daily, now only produce between five and seven litres (interview 29). At the end of our conversation, she pointed to the hide of a cow that had recently died. Lucas similarly explained that he has sold two of his nine cows because the “cows are thin, some are having miscarriages, some are dying” (interview 10). In addition to the decrease in milk production, community members’ sales of agricultural products have declined because of outsiders’ perceptions of contamination. Simón said:
We, the community of Urazana, practically, unfortunately, don’t have employment with the company but are viewed badly. We no longer have a market…in the districts anymore. Because simply they say that cheese from Urazana or meat from Urazana is contaminated. All of our products have dropped in price. All have dropped. Simply because we are close to HudBay… How much do they pay you? You have to sell cheese for 5 soles, 6 soles, [but] they pay you 2 soles or 3 soles. How much we lose because of this. (Interview 31)

Hydrological changes are another dimension of contamination that is negatively impacting crop and livestock production. In the Andes, where rain is scarce in the dry season, changes to water can have particularly significant consequences. Unfortunately, mining has brought changes to water quantity and quality according to interview participants. People assert that bofedales and springs have dried up since the start of the mine’s operations; as a result, the production of essential crops such as potatoes and oats has declined (Son interviews, 2018).

Water has also been contaminated because of the location of HudBay’s operations. Constancia, along with its tailings dam containing toxic residues, is located in the head basin of the Chilloroya-Makaray River. This river is an important source of sustenance for local communities and flows through both the districts of Velille and Chamaca. Local people insist that mining operations have changed the water quality drastically. For example, the Community of Uchucarcco has sent formal complaints to the MINEM regarding contamination since 2011, maintaining that people had even seen residual waters being dumped at night (OEFA, 2016; Comunidad Campesina de Uchucarcco, 2014). Some interview participants spoke of getting rashes after bathing in the water after the start of mining operations, even calling the river “dead” (Son interviews, 2018).

Indeed, state water monitoring conducted by OEFA has found high levels of lead, copper and zinc in surface water, arsenic, cadmium, mercury, zinc, and copper in the sediments, and cyanide, chromium, lead, and cadmium in agricultural lands at certain testing stations in Chamaca and Velille (OEFA, 2015; 2016). However, the reports mostly do not offer an explanation for the cause of contamination, though they briefly suggest that the elevation of certain metals is due to natural mineralization and/or previous mining activity (Katanga mine). Such superficial observations not only absolve HudBay from allegations of contamination but also reflect the state’s general reluctance to link contamination to existing mining activities. For example, Chumbivilcas’s neighboring province of Espinar, where the Tintaya mine has operated

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10 Bofedales are wet meadows or peatlands found in the Andes. Hartman et al. (2016) note that bofedales provide important dry season grazing, but are sensitive to drought and slow to recover from degradation.
since 1985, is suffering from serious water contamination. Although the state confirmed in 2013 the presence of various heavy metals such as mercury in water, it has refused to specify the cause of contamination (Amnesty International, 2017). Perhaps even more tellingly, the state took three years to publish the results of the blood tests conducted on indigenous people in Espinar, doing so only after persistent demands by the people (Amnesty International, 2017).

One of the impacts of water contamination on local livelihoods has been on fish, which had been an important source of food and income for the people in Chamaca. According to participants, people no longer eat trout because trout now have sores and other deformities. Esperanza observed that “We are all in extreme poverty, at the level of Chumbivilcas, so some compañeros who are poor fed trout to their kids, no? … But now trout have diseases, they have wounds like this, so you cannot eat it anymore…” (interview 16). Trout had also been a source of income. Maria told me that

There are many compañeros comuneros who solved their family’s needs with fishing…they got trout from the river and now, it’s not like this anymore, no? Now there is distrust even to buy [trout], so, they don’t have this income as they should… because one season, we found trout like this, with round heads, without eyes, with scab in the head, without fins, practically deformed, no? (Interview 6)

David similarly remarked that “Fishing was important. People went to fish everyday…Since the mine began to enter, you are not going to find trout from Chamaca in a restaurant…so no one eats the fish from these rivers anymore…before, every day, afternoon, morning, they [people] entered [the river] to fish” (interview 25).

People’s observations of land and water and the consequent declines in agricultural production are consistent with the experiences of other locales throughout the Andes. For example, the Yanacocha mine of the Central Andes has caused a substantial decrease in water quality and quantity, affecting local people’s dairy production, fish catches, and agricultural yields (Bury 2004; Li, 2009). In the Huanuni River valley of Bolivia, too, indigenous campesinos are suffering from a dramatic decline in agricultural production due to the accumulation of toxic sediments released by mining (Perreault, 2013).
Exploitation of Labour

In addition to the disruption to farming and fishing practices, mining also causes dispossession of indigenous livelihoods in the form of labour exploitation related to the CSR regime. Even though open-pit mining relies less on unskilled labour than underground mining due to its technical nature, it exploits indigenous labour in different ways. Perreault (2013), writing from Bolivia, argues that indigenous campesinos form a “cheap and readily available labor force” (1066) for the mining sector as they produce their own food and own housing, even as these capabilities are weakened by environmental burdens. Himley (2013) similarly observes how the CSR program of another Canadian mining firm in Peru recruits a “flexible and cheap labor force for unskilled work” (405) from the local campesino communities through its rotational work program. While indigenous communities may “consent” to such unstable work opportunities (Himley, 2013; Son Interviews, 2018), the highly uneven power relations increase the potential for exploitation.

HudBay’s sudden drastic cuts to employment during the construction and post-construction phases of Constancia reveal how indigenous campesinos served as a disposable work force in Chamaca. During the construction of the mine, around 1000 people—the majority of the
population of Uchuccarcco and Chilloroya—received an employment offer (HudBay Minerals, 2014). However, once the construction ended, HudBay cut employment by half, using only 400 to 600 people from Uchuccarcco and Chilloroya in rotational positions since 2015 (HudBay Minerals, 2015; 2016). The sudden change in employment status had disastrous consequences for some. Many people had been unprepared for steady income since formal employment was not readily available in the region. According to David of Frente Único de Defensa de los Intereses de Chamaca (FUDICHA)\textsuperscript{11}, some people did not know that the jobs would disappear after the construction phase and sold their livestock: “They don’t have neither sheep nor cows anymore, they have nothing and there is no work now” (Interview 25). Miguel of Urazana similarly voiced that people...started a life that really should not be...With the movement of money, people started to make changes [to their lifestyles]. So, people became accustomed, there was this movement [of money] for almost two years. Then, it started to fire people, no? HudBay… Just imagine, what it would be like, let’s say, I am the employer, you are my worker and I fire you, without rights, without anything? How are you left? Isn’t that right? These things happened, no? (Interview 28)

The CSR regime further extracts the labour of campesinos indirectly as community leaders have to participate in corporate-led negotiations without pay. Although officials from the mining company are compensated for attending the roundtables, community leaders participate voluntarily. As David described, “[community] presidents come [to the mesas] for the love of their community but don’t earn even a cent for being in so many meetings” (interview 25). As previous participants noted, CSR negotiations can take up to almost forty meetings that each last an entire day, taking people’s time away from other life-sustaining activities (Son interviews, 2018). The mining firm’s exploitation of labour thus further dispossesses the livelihoods of the people of Chamaca, who are already suffering from the falling productions due to contamination.

Social Conflicts

In addition to impacting material livelihood, HudBay’s operations have brought social disruption, decreasing the social capital needed to make people’s lives meaningful. The social breakdown is primarily a result of the uneven distribution of CSR contributions. In its EIA, HudBay has only classified two communities—Uchuccarcco of the Chamaca district and

\textsuperscript{11} FUDICHA, or the Defense Front, is an important social organization in the district that represents the interests of all ten communities. Its scope of work is broad, from dealing with mining-related issues to overseeing municipal governance. It attends community assemblies, organizes regular multi-sectorial assemblies—in which leaders across communities participate—and popular assemblies, which members from all communities attend.
Chilloroya of the Livitaca district—-to be in the area of direct influence. Three communities, all in the Velille district, are considered to be in the area of indirect influence; none of the communities in Chamaca except Uchuccarcco are even considered influenced.

Communities receive benefits based on the category of influence. The two “directly affected” communities have their own CSR agreements worth S/. 80 million (CA$31.5 million) and S/. 50 million (CA$19.7 million) and receive HudBay’s few rotational employment opportunities (HudBay Minerals, 2015; 2016; Son interviews, 2018). Other communities receive substantially less benefits. For instance, the community of Urazana, considered “indirectly influenced” even though it is closer to the mine than Uchuccarcco’s town center on the main road, has a cooperation agreement that was signed in 2016 when the mine was already in full production. The agreement only promises one project a year without specifying a budget, leaving the community subject to the firm’s whims (Convenio de Cooperación, 2016; interview 31). Other communities that have not even been considered in the EIA (i.e. all communities of Chamaca except Uchuccarcco) only receive benefits through the agreements between the company and the District Municipal government, which have so far amounted to only S/. 3.5 million (CA$1.38 million) for each of the last five years.

The uneven distribution of mining rents and CSR contributions based on the influence category determined by the mining firm has resulted in inter-community territorial conflicts. The conflicts stem primarily from the fact that two communities of “direct influence” are trying to encroach on other communities’ lands in order to receive further benefits. For example, since mining began, Uchuccarcco has started territorial conflicts with all of its neighboring communities, including Añahuichi, Urazana, and Quehuincha. Several leaders of Añahuichi (Chamaca district) noted that the “invasion of territory” by Uchuccarcco is happening on lands that are concessioned; they believe that Uchuccarcco is driven by the motivation to sell or rent out these lands, or because of the population increase related to mining (interview 1; interview 13). Isaac, another leader from Añahuichi, similarly noted that territorial disputes are not normal, since “they [Uchuccarcco] as a community, know well from where to where is their territory…However, today, the ambition at times takes us to some problems that should not happen in this life” (interview 18). Additionally, comuneros of Urazana (district of Velille) are suffering from a water conflict due to territorial demarcation disagreements with Uchuccarcco. Previously, a sector of Urazana had been sustained by a water channel that peacefully flowed from Uchuccarcco. However, in 2016, Uchuccarcco cut off this water source, claiming that it
owned the water because it originates from within its territory. Interview participants believe that Uchuccarcco’s actions stem from its desire to negotiate solely with the mining company, as the territory in question will be affected by HudBay’s planned expansion—similar to the case of Añahuichi (Son interviews, 2018). A sector of Urazana has dried up as a result; while the community has appealed to government authorities, the conflict remained resolved at the time of my fieldwork. Meanwhile, in November 2018, a deadly conflict between Uchuccarcco and Quehuincha left more than thirty injured and at least one dead (DHSF, 2018). This event, in which comuneros of Quehuincha (Livitaca district) attacked comuneros of Uchuccarcco working in the borderlands, was a product of yet another ongoing territorial conflict that intensified due to mining operations (DHSF, 2018c).

The two communities of “direct influence” are attempting to become districts separate from their current ones, further fomenting tensions with other communities. People from other communities vehemently oppose these efforts because distritalización would enable Uchuccarcco and Chilloroya to receive the canon minero12 instead of the districts of Chamaca and Livitaca, respectively. As many communities currently only receive mining-related benefits through the district governments, distritalización would exclude them from crucial benefits. In July 2018, this issue even led to a district-wide protest organized by the communities of the Livitaca district, which led to the involvement of central government including the Prime Minister’s Office (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros; PCM) (Son fieldnotes, 2018).

Mining operations have created intra-community divisions in addition to inter-community conflicts. As Ramona from Sihuincha said, “Before, my town, my community was pretty calm. But since the moment [the mining company] entered, the people have separated, like this. In two. There [are people] in favour of mining, there [are people] against mining. There is a clash” (interview 19). Ramona’s sentiments echo those of others throughout the district. In Añahuichi, intra-community tension has heightened as HudBay is trying to gain permission to begin exploration. While the community has so far denied this request following a vote in an assembly, leaders noted the “division that is already entering” (interview 23)—not just among community members, but also among the leaders themselves (interview 1). Uchuccarcco, too, is suffering

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12 Canon minero is the devolution of mining revenues collected by the central government to local governments (Arellano Yanguas, 2011). Currently, 50% of income tax paid by mining companies are returned to regional and local governments (Garvan, 2019)
from internal disputes. Joaquin claimed that the mining firm’s community relations process has “divided us in many groups...even in the same church...there have been up to four, five groups between comuneros” (interview 26).

Intra-communal conflicts are further intensified due to the CSR regime, because even the little CSR contributions that communities receive are not distributed evenly, further dispossessing community members. According to participants, HudBay has used its decision-making power over CSR projects (further discussed in Chapter 6) to exclude certain community members from receiving benefits. This was the case with the mini-stable project in Urazana, in which people with fewer than five cows were rendered ineligible from receiving the project. Although the community had objected to these conditions, the firm did not concede (interview 10; interview 31). Daniel described the disastrous consequences of the firm’s decision in detail:

…those who had more than five animals were beneficiaries [of the mini-stable]. The most poor do not have five...So, if I have, maybe I am economically elevated and I have 8, 10, 20 [animals], sure, there will be [a mini-stable] for me. But there are also compañeros...who do not have this number of animals...And the support has been strong, no? Because we had to...[provide] labour, no? And what happens to a poor person? We have earned more or less 6,000 to 7,000 [soles], this is the payment for our labour for these stab...les. So, a humble family will never get to earn this. (interview 31)

The most vulnerable members of the community—including single mothers and widows—were thus doubly marginalized: they neither qualified to receive a stable or to be employed to build the stables. Unfortunately, some people will be similarly excluded from receiving the next CSR project for kitchen improvements [cocinas mejoradas]. “Only 44 [qualify]. But we are more than 70 comuneros,” said Simón (interview 31). Lucas indicated that such uneven distributions of projects have caused “a lot of conflict, between compañeros” in Urazana (interview 10). In short, Chamaca is experiencing the dispossession of social cohesion that is breaking down reciprocity, the fulcrum of Andean life (Wilhoit, 2017).

4.3 Depletion of social reproduction

4.3.1 Biological reproduction

Returning now to Rai et al.’s (2014) conceptualization of depletion through social reproduction, I show how dispossession is increasing the outflows of each category of social reproduction (i.e. biological reproduction, unpaid/emotional labour, and cultural/ideology reproduction), jeopardizing indigenous people’s health and well-being in Chamaca daily and over time.
First, biological reproduction is threatened by contamination, the main culprit behind the dispossession of material livelihoods. As noted previously, air pollution in Chamaca is visible even to the naked eye, as vehicular movement on the unpaved roads used by the mining firm creates significant dust clouds. “Surely, we are eating dust, since sometimes from the plant comes this smoke. So, since wind comes here it brings [dust], so we must be with an illness,” said Constanza (interview 29). Indeed, elevated levels of particulate matter (PM) in communities close to the Constancia mine have been formally observed. A participatory environmental monitoring conducted by OEFA found that at certain observatory stations, PM 2.5 and PM 10 levels at times reached 49.39 μg/m³ and 208.53μg/m³ respectively, far exceeding the recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO)’s air quality guidelines for 25 μg/m³ and 50 μg/m³ (OEFA, 2016; WHO, 2018). Elevated levels of PM are a significant health concern. According to the WHO, high concentrations of PM have been linked to “increased mortality or morbidity, both daily and over time” as a result of increased likelihood of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases (WHO, 2018).

Water pollution can also have a similar effect on mortality and morbidity. Pedro voiced his concerns about the contamination caused by tailings ponds containing toxic residues located in the head basin of the Chilloroya-Makaray river: “Very probably the children that live in Uchuccarcco and Añahuichi already have heavy metals in their blood, and in a number of years the consequence is going to be much worse” (interview 2). Although immediate physical changes have not yet been observed, the latent nature of contamination and bioaccumulation means that the harmful effects may be observed later. In the neighboring province of Espinar, where the Tintaya mine has operated since 1985, people are now suffering from the health consequences of heavy metals. In 2010, CENSOPAS (National Center for Occupational Health and Environmental Protection for Health) tested over 500 people from seven campesino communities in Espinar for heavy metals. Shockingly, 97.3 percent of participants were found to have lead in their blood (Amnesty International, 2017). The Ministry of Health finally promised to address the concerns of those affected by heavy metals in Espinar in July 2019 (Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras, 2019). Pedro’s concerns about the future health consequences of contamination are therefore reasonable. As toxic effects of heavy metals can be passed on to future generations (Carvan et al., 2017), contamination may have lasting consequences for indigenous reproduction.
4.3.2 Unpaid/affective labour

Among the indicators of depletion of social reproduction are physical effects such as tiredness and exhaustion, as well as mental effects such as “feelings of guilt and apprehension or insufficient time for oneself, the family, and community life” (Rai et al., 2014: 90). Local people are experiencing such effects due to their increased unpaid and affective labour burdens that are linked to mining operations.

Community leaders commonly reported feelings of fatigue due to their unpaid labour in mining-related discussions. As explained above, leaders spend voluntary time in CSR negotiations throughout the year. David expressed that the mining company “makes [community] presidents, leaders tired” through many fruitless meetings (interview 25). When I asked Esperanza, who had participated in previous negotiations, whether she still participates in mesas as a member of the Organization of Retail Shopkeepers (Organización de comerciantes minoristas), she said:

We don’t participate anymore because we have become tired, it’s the fatigue, a leader sometimes worked while eating, sometimes without eating, without a salary, without anything. We are simply a campesino, so, day after day…we were tired, there were never any achievements … what do leaders gain? What is there now? There are no achievements, so we worked for nothing. (Interview 6)

Regular community members also feel exhaustion from being in many meetings. In Urazana, the community spent more than a year negotiating with HudBay for its Convenio de Cooperación (Cooperation Agreement). Lucas said that the community had to sign an imperfect agreement because people became tired from the meetings: “We were debating, we were in conversation two times, three times a month like that, the community became tired…” (Interview 10)

In addition to the physical effects of fatigue, local people now experience increased anxiety due to the emotional labour associated with dispossession of lands and livelihoods. Miguel, a former leader of Urazana, described the pain caused by contamination in this way:

Practically our river, our water, we have already lost it. We can no longer drink it even if you wanted to, even if you were dying of thirst. I remember still when we would come from our fields, take this water in a bucket…and drink it. But today, we suffer, we can only look… (Interview 28)

Miguel continued that the community’s marginalization “really…causes us pain, it causes us sadness” (interview 28). Constanza similarly echoed such sentiments: “now, we are totally,
totally sad, we don’t even have work, we don’t even have a job… I don’t know how we are going to be in the future” (Interview 29).

Pain and anxiety result not only from the present effects of mining, but also the future uncertainty of their livelihoods. One cause of such uncertainty is the ongoing land enclosure. Paulo expressed his “concern about the future” that “this land is already concessioned [and that] mining is going to be a permanent threat” (interview 17). Similarly, Ramona said, “I believe our province of Chumbivilcas…our district of Chamaca, all that, almost 100% is concessioned, so it’s a tremendous concern, no? … Mining for us is a tremendous concern. Later on, what will happen to us in our Chumbivilcas, no?” (interview 19).

Potential contamination is another form of uncertainty that causes anxiety. An official from the Municipality of Chamaca’s Office of the Environment expressed his “big worry” about the tailings dam being located dangerously close to the headwaters of the Chilloroya-Makaray river. “We can’t foresee nature. At any time the rain could come…seismic activity, what happens? The tailings, where do they go? The Makaray watershed is there… [there are] impacts that can’t be foreseen. At any time this could happen…” (interview 11). Juan similarly expressed his fear about the tailings dam that “in the long run, the watershed that we have in Chamaca is a dead watershed…So it is a tremendous concern for Chamaca…we compare with other mining sites…we think that Chamaca will have serious problems in the long run” (interview 3). As the physical and mental effects of social reproductive burdens deplete the ability to engage in social reproduction, Chamaqueños’ state of fatigue and worry can harm their social reproduction over time.

4.3.2 Reproduction of indigenous campesino communities

Dispossession not only causes the depletion of social reproduction on the level of the individual and the household, but also on the level of the community; it weakens indigenous campesino communities’ ability to reproduce their way of life in place. This depletion is happening through the weakening of relationships, both human and more-than-human.

Human relationships primarily have been strained due to the rise of aforementioned social conflicts, which have weakened community governance, key to campesino autonomy. As explained previously, campesino communities descend from ayllus and have governing autonomy. They all have communal statutes (estatuto de la comunidad), and decisions over community matters are decided democratically in monthly general assemblies (asamblea general). Communities also occasionally host special assemblies (asamblea extraordinaria) to
discuss urgent issues, such as those related to mining. While the general assembly is the most important decision-making body within communities, leaders are also elected during assemblies for two-year terms.

Unfortunately, the community governance structure, which relies heavily on mutual understanding and cooperation, is being undermined due to distrust and differences of opinions caused by mining. For example, Daniel of Uchuccarcco noted that there was a general distrust of the leaders because they are seen as being “already captured” by bribes as soon as they assume their roles (interview 27). He claimed that “some leaders or also community members [non-leaders] themselves in the assembly…have the cellphone turned on and the engineers of community relations are listening in their office” (interview 27). As a result, he believes that there is “little credibility of the assembly for the people” (interview 27). Indeed, David, who regularly attends assemblies of all communities of Chamaca, described that Uchuccarcco’s assembly is “complete hell”:

There is no sense in doing an assembly there, they are arguing, they are fighting…there are groups, a small group that has become comfortable with the mine and defends tooth and nail, manipulates the community, and there is a group of people who are tired and who are fed up with the mine and there is a neutral group…there is no understanding in that community anymore. (interview 25)

The inter-community conflicts are also undermining the reciprocal relations that communities had previously. Reciprocity has been an integral part of campesino communities since before the Inca empire, a backbone of campesino social life and economies (Wilhoit, 2017). Reflecting on the current relationship between Urazana and Uchuccarcco, Simón expressed that in the past, the two communities had lived together “just like families, just like siblings” (interview 31). The two had engaged in reciprocal exchange; for example, Urazana supported Uchuccarcco in the building a school, the creation of a medical post, and the strikes against the mining company (interview 31). Emilio, reflecting on the differences between the past and the present, provided an insight into the breakdown of community:

Before the company operated…life was very different than the one we are living. It was tranquility, peace, where one lived without anyone saying anything to them…there was good understanding, a climate where people lived together…So, what was before was tranquility, where there was peace between leaders and the comuneros, and there weren’t arguments like now, there weren’t these disagreements. (interview 4)

Emilio’s statement not only reveals how communities are threatened due to disagreements, but also how such tensions are creating an additional emotional burden for local people. In other
words, depletion in one area of social reproduction can lead to depletion in another sphere of social reproduction, forming a dangerous feedback loop.

The ability to reproduce in place not only requires healthy human relationships, but also relationships with the more-than-human. As Glen Coulthard explains, land and place “ought to be understood as a ‘field of relationships of things to each other.’ Place as a way of knowing, experiencing and relating with the world…” (cited in Hall, 2016). Environmental changes brought by mining can fundamentally alter indigenous people’s relationship with the land and place. David recounted how during the 2016 protest, people started crying when they entered the mine:

Because never in their life a Chamaquino had seen how the mine was, never had seen veins, what were the crude veins that there were…the people of Uchucarcco arrive at the pit and say ‘But this wasn’t like this, this was a huge mountain, what happened with this mountain, what happened, here I grazed my sheep, my cows, these were bofedales, here there were springs, there were streams.’ And when we entered, there was not even a drop of water inside, not even a drop of water, what were bofedales were dry grass, what was brook, dry, papá, what were springs, nothing. And so they cried, damn it, what form of exploiting, in only two years they [HudBay] had brought down an entire mountain. It was no longer being called Sayhualoma, it was being called Sayhuatojo…in other words, a mountain was now a depth, cavity…that’s why people cried there. (Interview 25)

People’s emotional response can be understood as grieving, showing how mining has fundamentally altered people’s relationship to the land.

My conversation with Joaquin also revealed the effects of contamination and land transformation on intergenerational reproduction. As Joaquin explained, “Leveled mountains…absolutely do not produce anything, even though [the companies] promise [otherwise]…An open wound leaves a scar. It’s not the same. The same for the mother earth, or Pachamama. She is left wounded” (interview 26). Joaquin’s heavy statement reveals how contamination may cause irreparable damages to indigenous subsistence and relationship with the land, harkening back Hall’s (2016) argument that indigenous subsistence production has a social dimension. Contamination endangers not only indigenous people’s economic security but also their way of life, by breaking their relationships with human and more-than-human beings.

4.4 Conclusion

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13 Sayhualoma, a word mixing Quechua and Spanish, roughly translates to landmark (Sayhua) hill (loma). The land use agreement between Uchucarcco and HudBay confirms that it was indeed the Sayhualoma sector that was rented out to the mining firm in 2012 (Contrato, 2012)
Though only five years into production, HudBay’s Constancia mine has brought multiple forms of dispossession to the people of Chamaca through land enclosure, contamination, exploitation of labour, and social conflicts. This dispossession creates difficulties for indigenous communities to both make a living and to make life meaningful. Materially, contamination and land enclosure have decreased crop and milk production and fish catches, causing in economic precarity that is exacerbated by labour exploitation. Meanwhile, social conflicts dispossess people of the social capital needed for making meaning.

The negative impacts of mining not only have consequences for today, but also for the future. Using the concept of depletion, I have shown how dispossession negatively impacts each category of social reproduction. These social reproductive costs are at once individual and communal, meaning that mining not only affects indigenous individuals’ ability to reproduce, but also the indigenous communities’ capacity to reproduce their way of life. These intergenerational consequences of mining suggest that mining constitutes a type of slow violence, “violence that occurs gradually and out of sight…incremental and accretive…playing out across a range of temporal scales” (Nixon, 2011: 2). HudBay’s transnational mining operations can thus be seen as a political-ecological fix that shifts spatial and temporal costs of development to indigenous people and, as I will show in the next chapter, indigenous women in particular.
Chapter 5
Feminist Political Ecologies of Extraction

Feminist Marxist scholars argue that contemporary accumulation is “built on the backs of women” (Hartsock, 2006: 183). In particular, they draw attention to how women bear the burdens of social reproduction, observing that due to the gender division of labour, women often take on much of the reproductive work (Katz, 2001; Hartsock, 2006; Winders and Smith, 2019). In Chamaca—as in other parts of the Andes—there exists a gender hierarchy that has been established in part through the conquest and dictate a clear division of labour and space between men and women. In this chapter, I show how the existing gender ideologies and relations make women particularly vulnerable to the depletion of social reproduction. I argue that assertions of masculinity intensified by mining not only magnifies the negative impacts of mining on women, but are also reproduced through mining by physical violence and the exclusion of women from decision-making spaces on mining issues.

5.1 Gender relations in the Andes

In the Andes, gender division of labour and space is characteristic of domestic and community life. Men typically dedicate themselves to agriculture and often seek seasonal wage labour outside their communities—working, for example, on industrial farms during sowing and harvesting seasons (Cuadros Falla, 2010). Women, on the other hand, are responsible for taking care of livestock such as cows and sheep (Himley, 2011; Li, 2009). They are also responsible for all domestic work, from cooking to caring for children and other family members (Wilhoit, 2017; Son interviews, 2018). Men and women are also expected to embody different values. An ideal man should be strong, autonomous, virile, and engaged in the public life of the community. He is expected to be an effective head of the household, whereas an ideal woman should be hardworking, quick-witted, tender, and attractive (Harvey, 1994).

Although such relations are sometimes understood to be a component of Andean complementarity, as Penelope Harvey (1994) argues, Andean complementarity is “essentially a hierarchical notion. The bringing together of distinctive elements to from the complementary whole is confrontational…because the hierarchy is…not the prescribed…hierarchy of kinship but the achieved hierarchy of conquest” (76). Further, gender relations in Andean communities also must be understood in relation to colonialism, which fundamentally altered the principles of
complementary. As discussed in the introduction, the modern gender system has been mutually constituted with coloniality of power (Lugones, 2007). Irene Silverblatt (1987), in her detailed account of the conquest on gender relations, shows how colonialism “destroyed the ayni—the mutual obligations and complementarity—that characterized much of the interaction of women and men before the Conquest” in multiple ways (147).

First, indigenous women’s access to and ownership of land was altered as Spanish laws on patrilineal and patrilocal ties eroded principles of parallel descent. Women were legally defined as minors, meaning that their inherited lands were under the protection of their spouses. Further, laws stipulated that men, as heads of household, received usufruct lands for both women and children.

Silverblatt also notes how the Spanish delegitimized women’s power in ayllu governance. While kurakas remained,

colonial administrators did not recognize the pre-Columbian hierarchies of authority which delegated important governing and political functions to women. Nor were they sensitive to other matrilineal phrased patterns of succession to positions of local leadership. As a consequence, the opportunities women once had to exercise authority in the ayllu were undermined, as the traditional mechanisms determining their selection gave way to Spanish customs. (150-151)

In addition to suffering from the changing gender relations between men and women, native women also shouldered the burdens of colonial abuses. Silverblatt notes that some colonial administrators forced women to weave to “make quick money” (135). Some colonial administrators made women to weave at a low wage, while others even had a jail cell in their houses for imprisoning women to force them to weave. Many women were also sexually abused encomenderos and priests, who raped and used them as laborers, mistresses, and prostitutes (Silverblatt, 1987). As men also fled their villages to avoid the mita, women who stayed became burdened with completing the unjust obligations.

Today, such unequal gender dynamics are present in Chamaca, where many women interview participants recounted their daily experiences of subordination and machismo. Ramona indicated that “There is still this difficulty in the house, where there is a saying that the man has to be the head of the household [jefe del hogar]…what the man says, everything has to be listened to…” (interview 19). For some, persistent gender inequality was an example of machismo, which can be understood as a “term used to characterize prevailing gender relations by a powerful domination of women by men” (Gutmann, 2003: 37). Originally used to describe the masculinity
of Mexican men, *machismo* is now widely used to refer to Latin American masculinity in general, which include characteristics such as an exaggeration of sexuality, competition among peers, and willingness of domination of women (Fuller, 2012). Among those who spoke about Almira, who said emphatically, “I am going to say pretty clearly, machismo continues…There is still gender inequality” (interview 22). Claudio, an NGO worker, also agreed:

…the people in Chumbivilcas, in general, come from a very *machista* culture, where the man is the center, it is he who has the most power and the woman. while the man rides a horse, the woman walks, it is said, no? So the *machista* culture of Chumbivilcas is much talked about, no? It’s the man who is the protagonist in different scenarios of daily life of the population, the women are always in a situation much more relegated, marginal, no? (Interview 21)

While the term *machismo* may obscure the multiple contradicting facets of masculinity (Fuller, 2012; Gutmann, 2003), my participants’ use of the term nonetheless highlights the ongoing severe marginalization of women prevalent in Chamaca. As will be shown in the next section, this existing gender inequality makes women more vulnerable to the negative impacts of mining.

### 5.2. Depletion through increased precarity and workload

Mining’s negative impacts on natural capital and social reproduction described in the previous chapter take a heavier toll on women due to the gender division of labour. Throughout the Andes, finding salaried work can be difficult for *campesinas*, who are generally excluded from spaces considered masculine (Himley, 2011). Specifically in regard to mining, women’s participation in large-scale mining is limited and stigmatized, as women are associated with danger and contamination (Ulloa, 2016; Silva Santisteban, 2017). The gender labour expectations have different implications for single mothers/widows and married women suffering from the livelihood impacts of mining. For single mothers and widows, decreased agricultural production and their exclusion from salaried labour lead to a disproportionate increase in precarity due to their dependence on livestock farming for sustenance. As Karen of Añahuichí explains:

Women always say that they are opposed [to the expansion of HudBay]…because… single mothers and widows always work with their livestock. With their livestock they educate their children. They think that if the mining company enters, the water will disappear, ranching will disappear, with what are they going to sustain themselves, from what are they going to live? This is what they think. (Interview 23)

The precarity experienced by single mothers and widows may further rise as a result of their exclusion from CSR benefits. As previously discussed, in Urazana, HudBay set certain eligibility
criteria that rendered some community members ineligible from receiving CSR benefits. Simón indicated that single mothers and widows were among those who did not meet the minimum threshold of five cows for the mini-stable, as they are already economically marginalized and therefore do not have many cows (interview 31).

For married women, gender relations and division of labour increase their burden of productive and reproductive labour as men secure rotational employment in the mines or look for additional salaried work to compensate for declining agricultural production. In two campesino communities of the Provincias Altas, Cuadros Falla (2010) found that women typically work about three hours more than men every day, waking up earlier and staying up later than their husbands to fulfill their tasks. Cuadros Falla notes that the inequalities become more pronounced when men find seasonal wage labour, as women become responsible for men’s tasks such as farming; even children—especially girls—may be called upon to help their mothers in such instances. However, men typically do not assume women’s domestic responsibilities if the situation is reversed. Indeed, Claudio explained that:

One thing that happens in all of Peru and also surely in Chamaca, is that there are roles that are differentiated…when a campesino family has to make more fundamental economic resources…it’s generally the man who ends up migrating, no? To look for work close by, outside, in the coast, wherever it may be, to be able to generate some income and to cover basic needs of the people. So, this migration, this absence overloads the work of women, no? … the harvesting season ends, for example, in June, July, and sometimes [men] leave to look for work… so the women before only had to look after small animals, I have to take care of big and small animals or also distribute tasks to my kids, for example…cleaning, the gathering of water…all the work, generally, women take on themselves, no? (Interview 21)

Just as men’s seasonal wage labour increases women’s workload, other activities that are also a result of mining operations, such as CSR negotiations, have a similar effect. As previously explained, the annual CSR negotiations can be drawn out, often taking up full days over many months. As most leaders who participate in the negotiations are men—an important point which I will return to later in the chapter—it is probable that their wives have to perform additional work to meet their families’ needs.

For the few women leaders who do participate in mesas de diálogo, the consequences may be even worse. Maria, a community leader who has participated in many negotiations, explained the exhausting effects of the negotiations:

For me, mesas de diálogo…are a waste of time. I think that they [HudBay] only want to make us worn out. Each time we do a mesa de diálogo it’s the same, no? It’s on the same issue, it’s the same problem and in each dialogue different mining company officials
Therefore, we can’t reach a conclusion easily… We even reached up to 35, 36 mesas de diálogo the previous year. So, imagine, the people, we don’t have to do anything? We have to work, we have to move even a stone in our houses. If not, how are we going to sustain our children… (Interview 6)

Maria’s experience of being “worn out” is related to the work that she still needs to perform as a mother to “sustain [her] children,” which is rendered more taxing because of the time she has spent in mesas.

It should be noted that not only are women burdened with additional responsibilities, but their regular responsibilities are also made more difficult by the presence of mining. As a World Bank report notes, contamination brought by extraction means that basic tasks such as washing clothes and cooking food become more arduous and, even worse, children and family members may be sickened by dirty water, meaning that mothers must then devote more time to seeking and giving family health care, taking time away from income generation, farming, or other tasks that might benefit the family or community. (World Bank, 2009: 17)

This observation highlights how women, even without taking on husbands’ responsibilities or participating in CSR negotiations, must spend more time performing their “normal” tasks due to the compound effects of contamination.

In a mining context, women’s emotional burdens are also increased because “emotions come to matter in everyday struggles” involving resource access and use (Sultana, 2011: 163). When natural capital decreases, women in particular bear the weight of emotional labour due their roles as agriculturalists and caregivers. For example, Constanza from Urazana lamented that “my animals are dying…there’s no more milk, we are drinking it totally contaminated, cheese also must be contaminated, meat also must be contaminated, even the water is contaminated. We are living here totally contaminated. This is the most worrisome for us, isn’t it?” (Interview 29). Esperanza similarly told me how her role as a homemaker has made her acutely aware of food insecurity caused by mining operations and thus worried about her children:

I am a homemaker… For the situation that we are near the mine, that we are living together with the mine, everything is influenced, cost of life, cost of [goods] of primary necessity have risen considerably. The mining company has even made the [cost of] food go up. So, women, more than anyone, are very affected… how are we going to feed our children, this is the concern, more concern, I worry about my compañeros, what will become of those who have 5, 4 children today, how will they be able to feed [their children], how much will they spend daily, no? (Interview 16)
When I asked Esperanza why women worry more about the rising cost of living, she elaborated:

Moms are more worried because we give food to our husbands, we plan, we know how much is spent, we spend how much we are going to spend today for lunch, for dinner, we really...economize our money, we women always have more concern... Personally speaking, I am more worried because [the cost of] meat has risen, no? (Interview 16)

Acacia similarly explained how women’s domestic labour leads to increased emotional labour:

Women, we give food to our children, women, always, each hour, in the morning, day, in the afternoon, always cooking. So, sometimes we don’t have a lot of production, our fields don’t produce well, so, sometimes there are very small potatoes like this, so we worry, we don’t have enough to give to our kids. (Interview 9)

Constanza, Esperanza, and Acacia’s comments all reveal how women—as agriculturalists who observe the effects of contamination daily and as caregivers who are in charge of feeding their families—are especially aware of the impacts of mining on their livelihoods and thus experience heightened stress and anxiety.

Over time, the gender division of labour can cause ill health, depleting indigenous women’s ability to sustain social reproduction. Due to women’s roles as agriculturalists and responsibilities for day-to-day reproduction, women are more exposed to contaminated lands and waters (Jenkins, 2014). For single mothers who are economically marginalized, the health effects of contamination on livelihood precarity may be more pronounced. Pregnant women are more susceptible to anemia due to the increased need for iron and vitamins to make hemoglobin, as the amount of blood in a mother’s body increases by 20 to 30 percent (American Society of Hematology, n.d.). Severe anemia not only puts babies at risk of pre-term delivery, but it also puts mothers at risk of infection and blood loss during labour. In 2010, 41.4 % of pregnant women of Chamaca were found to suffer from anemia (Municipalidad Distrital de Chamaca, 2013); this figure may rise due to food insecurity exacerbated by contamination.

Women’s increased labour demands also result in gradual depletion. When women take on the responsibilities of men who are absent due to wage labour, there is a “tremendous strain on household functioning” that can actually cause illness (Oths cited in Wilhoit, 2017: 444). Similarly, stress from women’s heavier share of emotional labour can result in poor physical and mental health over time, putting individual health and well-being below the level of normal wear and tear (Rai et al., 2014). Indigenous women thus disproportionately take on the costs of social reproduction due to mining that I have detailed in the previous chapter.

5.3 Reproduction of gender relations
5.3.1 Physical violence

Not only do prevailing gender ideologies burden women in terms of social reproduction, but they also become entrenched due to violent assertions of masculinity. Ethnographies of Andean communities show that the region has long had a high incidence of domestic violence, with jealousy (*celos*) being cited as the primary cause (Harvey, 1994; Cuadros Falla, 2010). Men often respond violently to their jealousy of real or imagined female sexual infidelity in order to assert their masculinity and thus maintain hierarchical gender relations (Harvey, 1994: 84). The incidence of domestic violence further rises in the presence of alcohol (Harvey, 1994; Cuadros Falla, 2010).

As studies of different mining locales have observed, domestic violence rises in a mining context (Grieco, 2016; Jenkins, 2014; IACHR, 2016). Indeed, Daniel, who works in the office of the *Juez de Paz*¹⁴ in Uchuccarcco, explained the rise in domestic violence in his community:

> Before, infidelity, separation of homes were not really known, but now every day we have to call…the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations […] many cases that come [to the *Juzgado*] are cases of domestic violence, infidelity, abandonment…in case of domestic violence…we call [the Ministry] and a doctor, lawyer, social worker or psychologist answers us in Lima…then these doctors come in their red jackets, assistant lawyer, straighten out the perpetrator, no? They give psychological therapy [to the victims], all that. There are quite a few of these cases, of domestic violence.” (Interview 27)

The increase in family violence in mining towns is linked to a surge in the availability of alcohol (Cuadros Falla, 2010; IACHR, 2015) and, more importantly, to men’s rising insecurities over the control over their wives. A song that was mobilized in an anti-mining protest in Cajamarca, another Andean city of Peru, reveals how men associate mining with infidelity: “If you say that Conga [the mining project] works/ I want you to first know/ that on Sunday your wife/ slept with a mining worker” (Silva Santisteban, 2017: 82). My conversation with Paulo similarly revealed men’s profound insecurities over their masculinity that have followed mining in Chamaca:

> It is said that in Uchuccarcco…there is no solid family, everyone is separating, cheating on each other. Why? Because the woman makes money, the man makes money, everyone makes money…the value [of money] is being lost. You, as a man, you can no longer call, yell at your partner. Why? Because she makes money, she has the right to drink just like the man, she has the right to travel, I don’t know. You understand? (Interview 17)

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¹⁴ *Juez de Paz*, or judge of peace, is a citizen of a community that is elected to resolve conflicts. In other words, they act as a conciliator (Poder Judicial del Perú, n.d.)
Paulo’s insecurities that women should have the same rights as men arise from the possible breakdown of gender roles (i.e. women’s participation in wage labour) and space (“the right to travel”) due to mining.

Mining is also associated with the increase of other types of sexual violence that further subordinate women, such as the exploitation of minors. Many of my interview participants shared the observation that teenage pregnancy has risen in the communities closer to the mine, such as Uchuccarcco and Chilloroya, where there have been a greater number of itinerant mineworkers. For example, Pedro, a former member of FUDICHA said:

> The pregnancies of students…have increased… For this reason, one sees that… girls do not finish [school], and those who do, do so with their kids… 16, 17 years old. This has also happened in Velille. The mining company is in Velille and from there workers came for construction, and… students appeared pregnant. Even marriages have broken.” (Interview 2)

Worse yet, teenage mothers are often abandoned by the fathers of their children. Daniel explained that: “The [mine] workers seduce them [women], buy them a cellphone or give them money and after they have a child and the child is now in the air. In the Juzgado [Juez de Paz’s office], we attend to their demands…irresponsible parenthood, all that” (interview 27). This trend is consistent with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’s (IACHR) report that “many women from indigenous communities that have children with men from this ‘floating population’ who are unwilling to acknowledge them and take responsibility for their children” (IACHR, 2015: 169). Sexually exploited and then abandoned, teenage mothers are relegated to a precarious position in which they are socially and economically marginalized (IACHR, 2015).

Even more seriously, mining has been linked to sex trafficking throughout Peru. For example, it has been reported that in the Peruvian Amazon, thousands of girls—some as young as twelve—are being auctioned off to gold miners (Hill, 2016). In La Rinconada, a gold mining town of the Peruvian Andes, nightclubs are “dens of prostitution, human trafficking, robbery, and murder…and many of the prostitutes [are] minors” (Finnegan, 2015). While I did not encounter accounts of trafficking in my interviews, such violence is a risk in Chamaca given its prevalence in other contexts and the reports of teenage pregnancies.
5.3.2 Exclusion of women from decision-making spaces

Unequal gender relations are further reproduced through women’s exclusion from decision-making spaces on mining matters. Despite the fact that women shoulder disproportionate burdens of mining, they are excluded from two important decision-making processes on mining matters: general community assemblies and CSR negotiations. Due to the patriarchal governance structures established by the conquest, *campesinas* have traditionally been excluded from participating in community politics in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, in most *campesino* communities, only men are considered “qualified community members” (*comuneros calificados*) with a full set of rights (Cuadros Falla, 2010). Single mothers and widows are an exception, though even in their cases, sons or in-laws may take the *comunero calificado* title after the death of the titleholder. Maria, who has lived in the community of Sihuincha her whole life, explained how she had to petition the community to let her and her husband, who is from a faraway community, stay in the community:

M: I am a daughter of a *comunero* because my parents always have been *comuneros*… but according to an internal statute that they [the community] approved, the daughter cannot be a *comunera* [*calificada*], only the son. So I couldn’t be a *comunera*, no? … Where my husband belongs, I have to be a *comunera* there, this is what the internal statutes that they have approved say, no? … However, I have registered myself as a resident along with my husband, no?

P: Because your husband is from…

M: No, my husband is from Puno, he is not from here. So he doesn’t have land close by in any community, his is very far away and I have decided to live here, no? Because my dad passed away and my mom is alone. So, I can’t abandon my mom, so fortunately, none of the community members rejected me when I presented my request to be part of the community…but to many [other] people, they observe, no? It’s not possible. First, they evaluate us, no?, the conduct that we have, how we live, no? Each partner. If our comportment is not favorable, they will not accept us… (Interview 6)

As only qualified community members are legally allowed to be a member of the community directive (*directiva communal*), few women hold leadership positions in their communities (Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas, 1987; Son interviews, 2018).

In addition to their exclusion from community leadership, women are generally discouraged from attending general assemblies (*asambleas generales*), the most important governing mechanism of *campesino* communities (Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas, 1987). Esperanza explained that:
They [Men] don’t want women to attend because they always say, “Why women? Here we should discuss among men”… So it’s not permitted, for example, I am speaking to you about the community of Sihuinchá, they don’t allow women [to participate], only widows […] in this community they have marginalized us, no? That we should not attend because our husband is the head of household, so he should attend… (Interview 16)

Men discourage women from attending by stoking fear, by “marginalizing us, discriminate against us, laugh at us,” as Maria put it (interview 6). Gloria, a leader in Ingata, similarly observed how fear has hindered women from taking leadership positions in community organizations:

Sometimes women don’t want to, sometimes they are afraid, the women. I tell them, ‘Why can’t we accept [leadership positions], how difficult would it be. Only by walking and participating will we learn…if not, we will stay like this. Our husbands will even continue to hit us. You have to learn to walk, to be leaders.’ This is what I say. And yes, some accept with fear. But before, they didn’t accept and said that ‘My husband would be jealous of me.’ (Interview 24)

The existing gender ideologies thus exclude women from decision-making processes over mining on the level of community. Women’s exclusion from community politics similarly leads to their exclusion from CSR negotiations, where participation for local actors is limited to two to five elected leaders from each of the ten communities and leaders from certain local social organizations. In other words, because there are only a few women who are community leaders, there is little female participation in the negotiations as well (Son interviews, 2018).

Female leaders who do try to break down the gender division of space by voicing their opinions on mining issues may be attacked by violent expressions of masculinity that try to maintain the existing gender relations. Maria, a leader active in many local and regional social organizations, expressed that “there are always machistas, so, these [people] look at me like poison” (interview 6). Later in the interview, she mentioned that she had even thought about leaving her roles because of attacks on her integrity. In the 2016 protest, some people claimed that she was “with the mining company, we are doing the strike just to pretend [we are not], all that…[this] totally shocked me…and has quite affected me, emotionally” (interview 6). Gloria, another leader, provided a deeper insight into what had transpired at the protest. On the first day of the strike,

Compañera Maria did not go because she was sick. In the strike they talked badly about her. Juan’s [another community leader’s] supporters hate her. They even hate me. They say that ‘They are bought. Why doesn’t she talk now [at the protest] if she also talks on the radio?’ … They had designated her to speak on behalf of all women. This is where some people say that she is bought. ‘Why doesn’t she die? We should bury her in the
ground.’ They spoke like this next to her brothers. It’s very sad… [Maria] doesn’t talk anymore because maybe they would think that she is bought… (Interview 24)

Maria’s experience shows how men’s contempt for women active in mining politics (“machistas… look at me like poison”) can at times turn into violent accusations and threats (“We should bury her in the ground”). The verbal violence, in turn, can silence women in leadership roles (“Maria doesn’t talk anymore”), reinforcing the gender hierarchy and division of space.

Maria’s encounter with gender ideologies in activism is not isolated. Indeed, Grieco (2016) argues that women’s mining activism can even lead to increased domestic violence. The scholar tells the story of Juana, who was verbally and physically abused by her brother on the grounds that “she was a ‘bad mother, who leaves her child to go yell in demonstrations’” (143). When Juana reported a particularly aggressive incident to the Rondas Campesinas\(^\text{15}\), the Ronda committee “decided to close the case, agreeing with the brother that, in fact, Juana was not a good mother” (143). Women who try to break into the traditionally male public sphere are thus confronted with violence that is condoned by male-led community governing institutions that uphold prevailing gender relations.

**5.4 Conclusion**

In the Andes, gender ideologies, with roots in the Conquest, exacerbate the negative impacts of mining for women. First, in the presence of extraction, women take on more productive and reproductive labour. As men gain mining employment or seek additional wage labour to compensate for the effects of contamination, women take on the productive tasks of their husbands while still being expected to perform their reproductive tasks as well. This further increases the rising emotional burdens connected to the loss of resources. The disproportionate workload that women take on suggests that the depletion of social reproduction, discussed in the previous chapter, impacts women more heavily than men.

Gender relations that marginalize women are entrenched because violent expressions of masculinity escalate with mining. If jealousy has historically been a primary cause of male aggression in the Andes, male insecurities around female infidelity rises with mining, leading to

\(^{15}\) *Rondas Campesinas* are community-led disciplining institutions of *campesino* communities (See Starn, 1995 for more information).
an increase in domestic violence. Other forms of male sexual aggression, such as the exploitation of minors and trafficking, also increase.

Gender inequalities are further reproduced as women are excluded from decision-making spaces for mining matters. The historical exclusion of women from community politics continues in a mining context, and I have shown the ways in which women who do try to engage in mining politics are ultimately discouraged through verbal and physical violence. By being excluded from community assemblies and CSR negotiations, women are further subordinated because they are unable to voice their opinions on issues that significantly affect them.

In short, the prevailing gender relations both exacerbate mining’s negative impacts on women and are reproduced through increased assertions of masculinity brought on by mining. Differently put, the process is cyclical; mining depends on indigenous women’s absorption of social reproductive costs and further reproduces their subordination.
Chapter 6

Legal Abandonment and the Reproduction of Hacienda-Indigenous Relations

The multiple dispossessions and the social reproductive impacts that indigenous people face in Chamaca are not an accident. Rather, as this chapter will demonstrate, they are a result of the state’s active neglect of indigenous rights. I draw from Joel Correia (2018)’s work on abandonment and liminality to show how indigenous marginalization is politically willed. Correia builds on Geraldine Pratt’s work to contend that abandonment is “not an accident, but an actively produced condition” in which indigenous people’s rights are only selectively recognized (2018: 76). For the scholar, this space is liminal, as indigenous people are at once inside and outside the law.

The people of Chamaca are put in a state of liminality both by the state and the mining company. The state first abandons the indigenous population by selectively enforcing indigenous rights laws to facilitate mining. Similarly, the mining firm, as a state-like governing authority, at times recognizes indigenous rights and in others, ignores them by alternating between asserting authority and denying responsibility, using the ambiguous state-corporate jurisdictional limits. I argue that such conditions and tactics of abandonment reproduce hacienda-indigenous relations that began in the colonial times and formally lasted until the agrarian reforms of the 1960s.

6.1 Legal geographies of extraction

Before analyzing state and corporate acts of abandonment, I first explain laws that shape state-indigenous and state-mining firm relations. On the one hand, the state has laws that build on international principles to protect indigenous rights. On the other hand, laws that put the promotion and execution of mining firmly in the hands of the central government show little regard for indigenous territorial autonomy. I highlight the tension inherent in this legal arrangement in order to better show in the next chapter how the state resorts to partial recognition of indigenous rights to resolve the contradiction.

In Peru, the state recognizes and protects two types of indigenous communities: campesino communities of the Andes (comunidades campesinas) and nativo communities (comunidades nativas) of the Amazon. As explained previously, these differing denominations came after the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law (Ley N. 17716), whereby indigenous communities (comunidades indígenas) in the Andes received the campesino title and the communities in the Amazon, nativo,
through the Law of Comunidades Nativas and Agricultural Production in the Amazon (Ley N. 20653). General Law of Campesino Communities of 1987 (Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas) is a key piece of legislation that recognizes the Andean communities “as fundamental democratic institutions, autonomous in their organization, communal work and land use” (Ley N. 24656, Article 1). In it, the state promises to:

- Guarantee the integrity of the right of property of the territory of Comunidades Campesinas;
- Respect and protect communal work as a mode of participation of comuneros, directed to establish and preserve the goods and services of communal interest, regulated by customary indigenous right; […] Respect and protect indigenous customary law [usos y costumbres] and traditions of the community. Make a favourable environment for the development of their cultural identity. (Ley N. 24656, Article 1)

The Political Constitution of 1993 similarly affirms that campesino (and nativo) communities are “autonomous in their organization, in communal work and in the open use and the open disposition of their lands,” echoing the General Law of Campesino Communities (Constitución Política, Article 89). The Constitution also upholds communities’ jurisdictional power, stating, “The authorities of the comunidades campesinas and nativas… can exercise their jurisdictional function within their territorial scope (ámbito territorial) in conformity with customary right…” (Constitución Política, Article 149).

In regards to extraction, the Peruvian state supports, in theory, the concept of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) as a signatory of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). As a landmark international convention for indigenous rights, the ILO 169 establishes indigenous peoples’ right to be consulted on development projects that will affect their autonomy:

- The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect them directly. (ILO 169, Article 7.1)

The UNDRIP expands on ILO 169’s notion of consultation to establish the principle of “free, prior, and informed consent.” Specifically regarding extraction, the Declaration states that

- States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources. (UNDRIP, Article 32.2)
Based on these international agreements, Peru passed its own Law of Prior Consultation (*Ley de la Consulta Previa*) in 2011. Allegedly built in “conformity with the obligations established” by ILO 169, the law recognizes that “it is the right of *pueblos indígenas* or *originarios* to be consulted prior over legislative or administrative measures that directly affect their collective rights, physical existence, cultural identity, quality of life or development” (*Ley N. 29785*, Article 2).

The state is the entity responsible for carrying out the consultations and to do so, it must first identify *pueblos indígenas* and *originarios*. However, *campesino* and *nativo* communities are not automatically considered indigenous (*indígena*) or native (*originario*) under this law, even though the constitution explicitly recognizes the communities’ right to customary law and traditions as explained above. Instead, it is up to the Ministry of Culture to determine *pueblos indígenas* and *originarios* based on “objective” and “subjective” criteria. The objective criteria include: 1) descendency from original populations, 2) lifestyles and spiritual and historical connections to the traditionally used and occupied territory; 3) own social institutions and customs; and 4) cultural patterns and a mode of life different from the national population (*Ley N° 29785*, Article 7). The subjective criterion only includes “the awareness of the collective group of possessing an *indígena* or *originario* identity” (*Ley N° 29785*, Article 7). Based on this list, the state engages in an “intercultural dialogue” to “reach an agreement or consent between the State and indigenous or *originario* people” for relevant development projects (Ministerio de Cultura, n.d.; *Ley N. 29785*, Article 3).

Although the central government thus recognizes indigenous autonomy, it also maintains significant control over territorial planning in order to promote mining. The General Law of Mining of 1992, the primary law that regulates the mining industry in Peru, insists that the state play an active role in promoting extraction: “The state…promotes large mining” (*DS N. 014-92-EM*, Article 3) since “The mining industry is of public utility and the promotion of investment in its activity is of national interest” (*DS N. 014-92-EM*, Article 4). The promotion of mining is done through a tight control over territorial decisions that implicate extraction. For example, the subsoil belongs to the nation, meaning that INGEMMET (Geological, Mining and Metallurgical Institute) within the Ministry of Energy and Mines grants mining concessions to companies without the consultation of indigenous communities or regional governments (Bebbington, 2012b; PWC, 2016). Land use planning, too, is highly centralized for the same reason.
Technically, regional governments are responsible for elaborating and enforcing territorial planning under the Law of Decentralization (*Ley de Bases de Descentralización*, Ley Nº 27783) and the Law of Regional Governments of 2002 (*Ley Orgánica de Gobiernos Regionales*, Ley Nº 27867) (Gustafsson, 2017). This planning process involves the participation of local actors because it includes both technical and political procedures: *Zonificación Ecológica y Económica* (ecological and economic zoning – ZEE) entails classifying different zones for different economic activities and conservation, while *Ordenamiento Territorial* (territorial planning - OT) involves the participation of different social actors (Gustafsson, 2017).

Despite the regional governments’ mandate to carry out the ZEE-OT, the central government has limited their authority over land use planning to protect mining interests. For example, when the regional government of Cajamarca classified the area around a proposed mine—the Conga project—as “mining with restriction” in 2010 based on the area’s sensitive hydrology and intense public opposition, the central government immediately challenged the decision (Preciado Jeronimo et al., 2015). The central government argued that under the Mining Law, the power to promote and make decisions in mining areas falls under the national jurisdiction, meaning that the regional government could not define land use for these areas in question (Preciado Jeronimo et al., 2015). The continued conflict ultimately led to the regional government to issue an ordinance stating that the headwater catchment areas were untouchable and the Conga project, invalid (Preciado Jeronimo et al., 2015). This ordinance, however, was quickly overturned by the Constitutional Tribunal, which argued that only the National Water Authority (ANA) has the power to declare headwaters as intangible; it further indicated that as the EIA had already been approved by the central government through the Mining Law, the regional government did not have the authority to declare it invalid (Preciado Jeronimo et al., 2015). Since this conflict around the Conga project, the central government has passed Law 30230, which affirms that the central government has no obligation to follow regional governments’ territorial plans (Gustafsson, 2017).

### 6.2 Abandonment
#### 6.2.1 State abandonment
The state, prioritizing its relationship with the mining company, erodes indigenous territorial autonomy by only partially upholding the principles set out by the indigenous rights laws
discussed above. In line with Correia’s (2018) argument that political will is undergirded by prevailing power relations, state abandonment in Chamaca is supported by colonial logics and modernist rhetoric, as demonstrated by the state manipulation of the Law of Prior Consultation and the criminalization of protest.

First, although the state claims to conform to the ILO 169 in the Law of Prior Consultation, in reality, it limits indigenous rights to FPIC through a narrow definition of indígena and originario. Unlike the ILO 169 that establishes self-identification as the “fundamental criterion” for determining indigeneity (ILO 169, Article 1.2), as discussed previously, the state details the “objective criteria” while mentioning the “subjective” criterion of “awareness of… indígena or originario identity” in passing. Dropping the so-called criterio subjetivo after the detailed “objective criteria” without any mention of the fundamental identification criterion outlined by the ILO Convention 169, the Prior Consultation Law all but diminishes the significance of self-identification.

The state has used the “objective” criteria to privilege its own definition of indigeneity based on racial ideologies, denying many indigenous peoples from protection. Campesino communities in particular have been affected by such use of racial thought. A little after the Peruvian congress unanimously passed the Law of Prior Consultation in 2011, the then-president Ollanta Humala stated that campesino communities would not be protected under the law, because “there are no native communities … in the [Andean] highlands; the majority are agrarian communities. For the most part […] native communities are [only] found in the [Amazonian] jungle, those indigenous groups that years ago were out of contact, but which we are now trying to articulate to the national community with infrastructure and modernity” (Humala, cited by Rénine, 2013).

Humala’s statement reveals the colonial logics underneath the state definition of indigeneity in two ways. First, the claim that only agrarian communities exist in the Andes is an echo of Velasco’s agrarian reform based on indigenismo and culturalist notions of race. As discussed in Chapter 2, indigeneity was first exclusively associated with agriculture through indigenismo, and then subsequently hidden under culturalist notions of race that emphasized class (de la Cadena, 2000). Secondly, the former president’s association of indigeneity with isolation reveals how indigeneity is conceived to be fundamentally opposed to modernity, requiring isolation and cultural purity.

When the government finally conceded in 2015 that campesino communities could also be indígena/originario, it did so to maintain its relationship with the mining industry. According to
Vice-Minister of Interculturality Patricia Balbuena, the denial of could not persist because it is “a threat to legal security because you can give out projects that you will later have to cancel…I cannot be said any longer that there are no indigenous people [indigenas] in the Andes” (Taj, 2015). This cynical reasoning that does not refer to indigenous rights, but rather, emphasizes the importance of the state’s stable legal relationship with the mining industry shows yet again the colonial/modernist logics that undergird the implementation of indigenous rights laws.

In Chamaca, the state has denied the majority of communities from receiving the indigena/originario status by using similar definitions of indigeneity rooted in coloniality that refuse to recognize contemporary indigeneity. At the time of fieldwork, only two out of ten communities had been classified as originario, as Quechus: Uchuccarcco, one of two communities in the “area of directly influence” of the Constancia mine, and Añahuichichi, a community from which HudBay is trying to obtain permission for exploration for a new project. Two more communities—Ingata and Tintaya—were granted the status in early 2019 (BDPI, 2019). While several communities in Chamaca are now in the process of formally requesting their originario status, several leaders indicated that they have encountered difficulties due to the state’s insistence on equating indigeneity to nature. David of FUDICHA explained that:

> The state bureaucratizes [the process] and says, ‘if you want to be a indigenous/originaria community, you have to return to antiquity, you can’t use gas…cellphones, radios, these things, this is modernity, if you want to be a native community you [have to] leave these behind and return to old forms of communication…’ (Interview, July 2017)

Paulo is a member of Ccacho Limamayo, a community that has been seeking the originario denomination. Similarly to David, he explained that the state has so far denied them of the status through logics that limit indigeneity to the past, divorced from modernity:

> It’s almost been four years fighting for the approval [of our indigenous status,] it’s not possible… to be a comunidad originaria, we shouldn’t even have a television, right? We have to walk with our ojota [traditional open sandals], our bayeta [traditional woollen cloth], everything made from bayeta, this is native…[if government officials] see you with these pants, you’re not [native]…right now, we only have this, these pants. Ojota, who wears them anymore? … No one wears them anymore. (Interview, July 2017)

Ccacho Limamayo’s case is not an exception. Bruno, who had previously carried out prior consultation in the Amazon while working for the central government’s Ministry of Transportation, explained that there, too, people had to act in a way that would match the state’s conception of indigeneity. People wore traditional clothing and held traditional religious
ceremonies to convince the state of their indigenous identity (personal communication, June 2018).

Such conceptions of indigeneity fail to acknowledge hybridity of indigenous worlds and, in insisting on ontological purity, bind indigeneity to the past. A community member of Uchuccarcco, Daniel, described what it means to live in a campesino community:

Tradition, customs, ayni, minka, are still practiced...although it’s true that because of the meeting of two worlds, after the Conquest there has been a lot of biological, cultural mestizaje, of everything. But [the communities] are considered campesino communities that have their indigenous customary law [usos y costumbres]. The offerings to pachamama in the sowing time, ccapachi, all that, no? Sure... since the presence of Pizarro [there has been] religious syncretism too, no? Here, Christianity coexists with Andean paganism. A festival in, be it Velille [a neighboring district], Chamaca, Santo Tomás [capital of the province], before you go worship Virgin Mary... you offer bread to Choque Velille, who is an apu, a guardian deity...So, the fact that we also speak Spanish doesn’t mean that HudBay should lump [Andean peasant communities] with coastal communities. They are interpreting [the fact that we also speak Spanish] to avoid paying, [respecting] the rights and the obligations that must be kept when dealing with a comunidad campesina originaria, and they have violated the ILO Convention 169.

Daniel’s observation is strikingly similar to de la Cadena’s (2010) argument that indigenous worlds are alive as a kind of gestalt, a product of “more than one, but less than two socionatural worlds... Andean indigeneity did not disappear into Christianity first, or citizenship (through mestizaje) later; but...it was not impervious to them either, for doing so would have meant to be impervious to history” (347-8). In Daniel’s account, Andean religious beliefs and rituals exist alongside Christianity in Chamaca, and the communities of Chamaca are undoubtedly originario.

In addition to making the indígena/originario status hard to achieve, the state also excludes indigenous people from protection under the Prior Consultation Law by maintaining the power to make the final decision over consultations. Bruno, recounting his experience carrying out prior consultation in the Amazon for the central government, emphasized that the consultation is not legally binding [“no es vinculante”] (personal communication, June 2018). He further explained.

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16 Ayni is a form of reciprocal labor between members of a community.
17 Minka is a form of communal labor in which community members work together on a project (e.g. irrigation) for the community.
18 Ccapachi is the burning of offerings in a sack containing coca leaves, animal fodder, etc, done in August before sowing to ask for a successful harvest the following year. It is practiced throughout the Provincias Altas (personal communication, October 2018).
19 Francisco Pizarro, a Spanish conquistador, led an expedition that conquered the Inca Empire by capturing and killing the last Incan emperor, Atahualpa.
that the Ministry of Transportation went into the process with a fixed time frame. Indeed, the Prior Consultation Law caps the maximum number of days in consultation—from the day the affected communities are first notified about a project to the end of the state-community dialogue—to just 120 days (Ministerio de Cultura, 2015). The “intercultural dialogue” itself is limited to just 30 days in dialogue, after which the consultation must proceed to the next phase—decision-making. The state has the final say in this step, which is why Bruno repeatedly said, “it’s not binding.” According to the Law,

the final decision on the approval of the legislative or administrative measure concerns the competent state authority...In case in which an agreement is not reached, state entities are to take all necessary measures to guarantee the collective rights of indigenous or native peoples... (Ley Nº 29785, Article 15)

Indeed, even a corporate report by PricewaterhouseCoopers about the Peruvian mining industry notes that prior consultation “consists in obtaining an opinion of the indigenous communities as such by the Mincul [Ministry of Culture]...This opinion is not an obligatory requirement to obtain the authorization since it can be issued at the discretion of the Minem” (51). The shocking description of consultation as “obtaining an opinion,” not consent, and the MINEM’s power that makes the consultation “not an obligatory requirement” reveals the Peruvian system’s divergence from the principles of FPI and its systemic neglect of indigenous rights.

After successfully installing mining projects through the intentional manipulation of laws in ways described so far, the state further curtails indigenous rights to ensure smooth mining operations by criminalizing protests—namely, by declaring a state of emergency. According to the Constitution, the President can declare a “state of emergency, in case of perturbation of peace or internal order, catastrophe or serious circumstances that affect the life of the nation” (Constitución Política, Article 137). A state of emergency suspends four constitutional rights: 1) inviolability of residence (i.e. state forces can enter homes without a warrant); 2) freedom of transit; 3) right to peaceful meeting; and 4) personal liberty and security, specifically related to the right not to be detained without a written warrant (Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras, 2018a; Nº 006-2018-PCM). The police and the army are also mobilized to “maintain internal order” (DHSF, 2018a).

The state has used this mechanism frequently in the province of Chumbivilcas in recent years. From January to June of 2018, the central government declared a state of emergency on 500km of the road (including 500m of either side of the road) used by HudBay and MMG Las Bambas,
another mining company, as a “preventative measure” to deter protests (El Comercio, 2018; DHSF, 2018a). Then, in August 2018, the government again declared a state of emergency for a smaller portion of the road due to protests by several communities in Velille over modifications to the EIA of Las Bambas (DHSF, 2018b). Hence, between January 2018 and March 2019, areas surrounding HudBay and MMG Las Bambas were under a state of emergency for 11 out of 15 months. The state has thus purposely restricted indigenous people’s constitutional rights to promote mining; its act of abandonment is a political will based on modernity/coloniality that overrides indigenous campesinos’ constitutional rights and territorial autonomy to facilitate modernist projects.

6.2.2 Corporate abandonment

The state, while occasionally asserting authority to ensure seamless mining operations, gives the mining firm significant governing powers. The Peruvian government has legalized such state-like roles of corporations through supreme decree N° 042-2003-EM of 2003 and supreme decree N° 052-2010-EM of 2010, which require companies to establish a prior commitment (compromiso previo) “to contribute to the sustainable development of the population located in the area of influence of the mining activity…that lead to the economic diversification and local sustainability that lasts longer than the service life of the mining operations” (DS N° 052-2010-EM, Article 1). HudBay, in turn, has acknowledged such responsibilities by adopting the performance standards of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which states that the firm must “ensure that the development process fosters full respect for the human rights, dignity, aspirations, culture, and natural resource-based livelihood of Indigenous Peoples” (International Finance Corporation, 2012: 1). HudBay legally announced its commitment to such standards and responsibilities in the CSR framework agreement with the District Municipality of Chamaca:

HUDBAY, in the frame of its activities and of the commitments and obligations assumed through the EIA of the Constancia project—as part of the monitoring programs and environmental and social commitments of the EIA—has the objective of taking actions that contribute to improve the quality of life of the people and communities located in its vicinity […] All the aforementioned actions are taken by HUDBAY following the highest standards of social and environmental responsibility of… the Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability” regulated by the International Finance Group… (Convenio Marco, 2013: 2.2)

The framework agreement even states that norms such as the ILO 169, UNDRIP, Law of Campesino Communities, and Law of Prior Consultation were considered in its development, showing HudBay apparent willingness to protect indigenous rights (Convenio Marco, 2013).
However, HudBay’s intentional attempt at excluding affected indigenous communities from compensation and socio-environmental protections contradicts its written acknowledgement of indigenous rights. As discussed in Chapter 4, HudBay has mostly distributed its CSR benefits to the two communities in the “area of direct influence.” While this arrangement may seem logical at a first glance, mining firms themselves determine these classifications in their environmental impact assessments that are crafted with little public participation. Recounting the EIA approval phase for Constanica, Simón from Urazana noted that the baseline data of the EIA was simply “explained” to the community at an assembly; while community members “should have been consulted, should have been participants,” they were not given such opportunity (interview 31). The single public meeting (*audiencia pública*) that was held in June 2010 in the last stages of the EIA approval process was similarly perfunctory. Without much consideration for local people’s convenience and capacities, the meeting included people from multiple districts including Chamaca, Velille, Livitaca, and Coporaque, and was fraught with confusion: “most people did not know what an *audiencia pública* was…because really, they thought it was just a [regular] meeting. But in reality, it wasn’t” (interview 28). An NGO report further notes the mining firm (Norsemont Mining) brushed off repeated questions about the impacts on water, saying, “The impact is detailed in the EIA” (Flores Unzaga, 2016). The firm insisted that the environmental impacts would be only observed in the areas of influence indicated in the document and did not reference indigenous rights, such as prior consultation and water lights (Flores Unzaga, 2016).

HudBay has attempted to exclude all but the two “directly influenced” communities from receiving compensation. In an early presentation to stockholders, the company even claimed that “There are two local communities in the area: Uchuccarcco and Chilloroya,” effectively erasing from its imaginary tens of communities that are in the vicinity of the mine and share the waterways with Constancia (HudBay Minerals, 2011: 23). The firm only began CSR negotiations with the District Municipality of Chamaca and the “indirectly influenced” communities after protests, months after the agreements with the two “directly influenced” communities were finalized (Flores Unzaga, 2016). To this date, all communities except the two “directly influenced” communities receive substantially less benefits, as explained in Chapter 4.

HudBay’s use of the CSR regime as an “instrument of power” (Himley, 2013: 396) further reveals how the firm actively puts indigenous people in liminal space. One such space of manipulation of power and marginalization is the *mesa de diálogo*, the dialogue roundtable
where framework agreements and annual specific agreements are negotiated. Here, the mining firm has shown its willingness to limit the participation of certain actors such as NGOs that could help address the power asymmetry between the local people and the company. Lucas of Urazana, who had played an active role in the negotiations for a cooperative agreement with HudBay, explained that the firm did not let us bring outsiders, not even advisors. They [HudBay] did not want them, and we brought lawyers in secret...When a lawyer came like this, they would say... ‘for other reasons, we won’t be able to participate’...They didn’t let us have advisor or other professionals that could help, they didn’t want them. (Interview 10)

Similarly, a leader from Añahuichi, where HudBay is trying to begin exploration, indicated that while the community has asked the firm to explain its proposal in front of public entities and NGOs, the company does not accept this condition. Instead, the firm’s “convincing of communities, leaders, comuneros always happens in secret. This is a big advantage for them [HudBay]” (interview 18). Claudio, from Derechos Humanos Sin Fronteras (DHSF), one of the only NGOs that work in the region, also described the barriers for NGO participation in these negotiations. HudBay is especially against organizations such as DHSF, which it classifies as an “anti-mining organization” (interview 21). Recently, DHSF had supported the Agrarian League (Liga Agraria) during the negotiations between HudBay and the Province of Chumbivilcas but with “many complications.” According to Claudio, the firm always makes a “power play” to frame the NGO as “anti-mining” and foster the discourse that “the only thing the [NGO] seeks is to destabilize,” making the NGO’s participation “very difficult” (interview 21).

In addition to restricting outsider participation, the mining firm tilts the negotiations in their favour by exerting authority over the projects to finance. For instance, the company’s CSR framework agreement with the District Municipality of Chamaca establishes that the District is in charge of coming up with CSR projects and “propos[ing]” them to HudBay for financing (Convenio marco, 2013: Article 5.3). Leaders who have participated in negotiations explained that the firm uses this decision-making power to “impose,” and that consequently, “the communit[ies] just have to accept” the unjust conditions (interview 25). Lucas of Urazana similarly described that “once the community proposes projects, they [HudBay] don’t accept them. Only some things that are not favorable for us but are favorable for them are possible, they just accept those” (interview 10).

Mining firms can use the CSR regime as an instrument of power even outside the dialogue space by converting it into a disciplining mechanism. In Urazana, HudBay has used CSR
agreements to effectively silence local protests. According to several leaders, the initial drafts of the community’s cooperation agreement (Convenio de Cooperación), eventually signed in 2016, were “just in their [HudBay’s] favour” (interview 10) and had stipulated that a protest and a strike against the mine could nullify the agreement (Son interviews, 2018). While the final agreement no longer explicitly specifies protests and strikes, it does state that “Both parties promise not to obstruct, disrupt, or interfere with the activities that each carries out in its properties (in the case of HudBay, be they mining activities or not)”; another clause states that a violation of obligations may result in the dissolution of the contract (Convenio de Cooperación, 2016). Leaders of Urazana feel that this is a part of the reason they cannot mobilize despite their discontent stemming from the negative impacts detailed in Chapter 3. Indeed, an employee of DHSF who had assisted in the negotiations for this particular cooperation agreement interpreted the stipulations similarly and told me that a protest could invalidate the contract (personal communication, May 2016).

While I have so far focused on how the mining firm creates abandonment by exerting force, at other times, HudBay does so by negating responsibility. This is made possible due to the overlapping state-corporate jurisdictions. As Shiri Pasternak (2014; 2017) argues, jurisdictions are never separate, but rather, always overlapping and engaged in a power struggle. In the context of neoliberal extraction, state and corporate jurisdictions overlap (even more) clearly, as demonstrated by the fact that the mining company provides state-like services. However, while the mining firm uses its state-like authority to its advantage, it sometimes engages in a power struggle not to gain jurisdictional power, but rather, to defer jurisdiction to the state; for, as Bebbington (2010) observes, mining companies ironically argue that they do not want to be a quasi-state because of visibility even as they clearly exert control over their environments. Therefore, taking advantage of the overlapping—and thus ambiguous—jurisdictional limits, HudBay deploys jurisdictional maneuvers to cede responsibilities to the state, neglecting indigenous people’s needs that it claims to attend to.

A key jurisdictional maneuver of HudBay involves defining CSR commitments as “voluntary investment of funds in the broader community” (HudBay Minerals, 2017: 136, emphasis added). By framing CSR projects as “voluntary support,” the firm is able to deflect responsibilities during negotiations. When a senior official of the municipal government expressed discontent with the agreements with HudBay, I asked if it was possible for the communities to demand
more benefits. He replied: “The people always want to demand, they always do…the problem is that they [HudBay] don’t understand, don’t understand…what they say is simply, ‘it’s aporte voluntario [voluntary support]’” (interview 4). Similarly, my conversation with Simón of Urazana, who had been a part of the Comité Multisectorial de Desarrollo—a committee consisting of HudBay and community representatives to implement projects—revealed how HudBay’s insistence on the “voluntary” nature of CSR projects results in insufficient contributions:

Right now, the implementation aspect [of projects] is really difficult for us…because the company already doesn’t want to invest in the community. It wants to invest what it has in its pocket; if it’s one sol, one sol, no? Because they say that it’s a cooperation agreement for which the company, what it has it will make available…which isn’t convenient for us because the company also has to fulfill its social and environmental responsibilities, no? …but unfortunately, they [HudBay] push them [the responsibilities] aside, no? (Interview 31)

HudBay’s failed negotiations of 2016 with the District Municipality of Chamaca—which ultimately led to the biggest protest against the company to date—further show how the firm shifted jurisdictional limits to deny increased contributions. This maneuver first involved taking on the role of the state through state-sanctioned mechanisms to emphasize the supposed generosity of its contributions. Specifically, HudBay agreed to provide state services through the obras por impuestos (projects for taxes) legislation, which enables companies to pay up to half of their income tax by financing and executing infrastructural projects prioritized by local governments (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, n.d.). The company, reasoning that it was going to give obras por impuestos on top of the S/. 3.5 million it had given in previous years, first diffused community demand for increased contributions. David explained that:

The company is astute. It makes you believe that it’s giving you a lot when in reality, it’s giving you almost nothing. That time [in 2016], [it said] ‘I am going to give you 3 million, do you want it or not? and on top of that, I will give you obras por impuestos, a project on education that is 20 million. Another project on chronic malnutrition that is 10 million and the highway project…three obras por impuestos on top of the 3 million…’ (Interview 25)

In this case, then, the company was able to “make[] you believe that it’s giving you a lot” (interview 25) because taking on what is normally assumed to be within the state’s jurisdiction further emphasized the “voluntary” nature of its commitments.

Although the promise of obras por impuestos kept the negotiations moving, the company ultimately decided not to fund the projects, this time deferring jurisdiction to the state. According
to Paulo, a former official in the Department of Interior of the Region of Cusco, the firm decided last minute “on the day of the historic signing” that it would not approve the projects the parties had previously agreed on, saying that the projects on “education is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education [compete al Ministerio de Educación], health, the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, highway, the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation” (interview 17).

In short, HudBay ultimately used the jurisdictional overlaps to at first emphasize the voluntary nature of the contributions and then to deny responsibilities for the projects, leading to the dissolution of the negotiations.

The firm uses similar jurisdictional tactics in project planning and execution phases. Its annual CSR agreements with Chamaca emphasize that the Municipality has the absolute and exclusive responsibility for the contracting of providers in charge of the execution of the projects and will be the only one responsible for executing whatever actions, paperwork, and procedures that may be necessary for the execution and the conclusion of the projects, leaving explicitly established that in virtue of this document HUDBAY does not assume any type of obligation or responsibility in respect to the execution, conclusion, commencement, use or operation of the projects… (Convenio específico, 2016: 3.11)

Interestingly, while handing off all responsibility to the local government besides the financing in quite certain terms, the company still emphasizes its authority over the CSR arrangement, stating that it has the right (but not the obligation) to verify that the execution of the projects meet all the legal requirements of the legal system, such as soliciting whatever information that is deemed appropriate for the execution of the projects…Likewise, HUDBAY has the right (but not the obligation) to carry out, whenever and without prior notice, supervisions… (Convenio específico, 2016: 3.11)

Its curious use of the phrase “right (but not the obligation)” highlights how the company asserts authority through CSR regime while at the same time ridding itself of responsibilities through jurisdictional maneuvers, echoing Bebbington’s observations about the contradictory moves of neoliberal mining firms.

David, who has participated in various CSR negotiations, painfully explained how HudBay’s use of jurisdictional maneuvers, facilitated by systemic state approval of corporate authority through neglect, result in abandonment:

The mine is closed to giving its support, they [HudBay] want to give the least it can. On the other hand, the population asks that it improve [its contributions] and the mine doesn’t…we can’t even increase [them] by 10 cents…The mine tells you, ‘we don’t want ideas, we want you to give us projects already done [planned out], ready to be executed.’
You present the projects and the mine starts to observe, ‘this doesn’t go, this goes, this no’... the time passes... so, this is where the tension between the community and the company forms, the mine is closed [to giving more support], on top of that it gives itself the luxury to observe all that [projects]... mesas de diálogo break down...there is no one that protects you, only Chamaca and the mine fight each other, but the provincial government, regional government, the Ombudsman’s office...don’t even participate...so you have to appeal to a higher authority, let’s say, [a central] ministry, you go to Lima, but you learn that the state doesn’t defend the communities, it defends the big mining company...How do the communities feel? The communities feel abandoned, in every sense, in every sense... (Interview 25)

David’s statement reveals that the mining company exercises authority over and through the CSR regime because the state has empowered the firm to take on a state-like role with little oversight; HudBay is able to decide on the total value and the type of projects it will fund. This authority partly derives power from jurisdictional ambiguities, as the firm denies certain projects by deferring responsibility to the state. Once conflicts arise, the state, which had been a passive observer through negotiations to support the firm’s authority, now actively defends the corporation, just as it had done so to first install the mining operations. This constant shifting of laws and jurisdictions, as David shows, results in the communities’ abandonment “in every sense,” putting indigenous people in a space of liminality where their rights are only partially recognized by the two governing entities that move between the exertion and the denial of power according to the needs of capital.

6.3 Reproduction of hacienda-indigenous relations

The state abandonment of indigenous communities and the muddled state-corporate boundaries it allows reproduces hacienda-indigenous relations that began in the colonial times and lasted until the agrarian reforms in the second-half of the twentieth century. As Bebbington (2010) argues, mining firms assume

a packet of interventions...that combines control of large territories, regional economic power, social responsibility and very close relationships with political and military police authorities. This is a packet of interventions that combines market transactions and patronage relationships, and that in the process builds a wide-ranging web of relationships centred on the company. This is an assemblage that begins to look very much like the hacienda model that dominated the Andean (and South American) countryside up until the land reforms of the 1960s. (Bebbington, 2010: 109)

Indeed, haciendas not only an economic institution, but a form of government. Hacendados “served as a vortex for the peasant’s [indigenous campesinos ] social relationships,” mediating
campesinos’ relationship with the local and national governments (Handelman, 1975: 43). They also provided social services that are now (in many cases) provided by the state or civil society (Neira and Ruiz Bravo, 2001). For example, because the state did not provide schools on large estates, hacendados were in charge of providing education, which they were reluctant to provide as their power depended partially on indigenous illiteracy and ignorance (Handelman, 1975). The authority that HudBay has gained through its CSR regime echoes such hacienda-indigenous relations, as indigenous people under state neglect must now turn to the mining firm for social services. With a state-like mandate, the mining firm exercises authority, creating room for exploitation and denial of indigenous rights.

The key significance of the hacienda’s provision of state services is that such patronage relations were structured by race, which similarly shapes contemporary mining company-indigenous relations. As explained in Chapter 2, Spaniards and later, mestizos, formed haciendas largely through the expropriation of indigenous lands. Haciendas then exploited indigenous labour, making indigenous tenants pay for pasture and provide free labour for their own homes and fields. In other words, “the hacienda combined forms of patronage and social security provision with deeply retrograde attitudes toward (and regulation of) indigenous labour” (Bebbington, 2010: 109).

Such “retrograde attitudes” toward indigenous people is also characteristic of HudBay’s actions, as shown by the firm’s use of both colonial and modernist logics to manipulate indigenous rights in ways described previously. Tellingly, a common sentiment among people of Chama ca is feeling devalued and cheated; the company, they say, is “interested in making the most profit and people don’t matter to them” (interview 3). Joaquin of Uchuccarcco recounted in detail the challenges he has faced in negotiations due to the colonial logics of HudBay representatives from Lima:

The difficulties that I have seen were not seeing eye to eye with the officials from Lima. Because the Limeño officials are…pretty intolerant… and…defend the patrón tooth and nail [defiende a capa y espada al patrón]…a Limeño doesn’t look beyond his nose, doesn’t look to see if another reality exists. Because to live in this country, to be a person from the province or to not be a Limeño is something…a person from the province is despised, [thought of in a manner that is] derogatory. And we have not permitted this [discrimination] because HudBay’s community relations manager… we removed him, we called for his head. He was a bit tyrannical. Despotic. He didn’t understand things, he only learned to impose. And there was another lady Vinatea, the same. She had the same behavior, the same tact to undervalue us. This conduct even carried racial tones. Because
our wives or women in this land where I was born wear a pollera\textsuperscript{20} and braid [their hair], all this for them [HudBay workers] was [a reason] to reject, to undervalue [us]... The difficulties are despots, limeños, very limeño... Yes. So these are some difficulties and impasses that we have had, that we were two cultures: Limeñismo and the Andean. (Interview 26)

Here, Joaquin observes how two interrelated forms of coloniality support HudBay’s assertion of power through the CSR regime. The first is epistemological and ontological, whereby HudBay representatives devalue Andean worldviews, forcing the values and practices of the One-World World upon indigenous campesinos; the second is cultural racism, whereby Limeño superiority is justified by campesinas’ supposed backwardness shown by their traditional costume. Joaquin’s use of the word “patrón” further illuminates how the hacienda relations are reproduced between the campesinos and the mining firm. Although patrón can simply mean boss or employer, it was also a word used to call hacendados. As Neira and Ruiz Bravo (2001) argue, patrón is therefore a “dense word” (palabra densa) that carries multiple meanings and reveals people’s identities and social structure: “The figure of the patrón not only alludes to an economic process, but also to the process of modification of social relations and of recreation of imaginaries, of symbolic structures of power” (212). Neira and Ruiz Bravo also observe that in the Andes, patrón is remembered as an abusive, powerful figure that governed without external control. Joaquin’s use of “patrón” thus reveals how HudBay has taken on a hacendado-like role by using governing powers abusively through racist logics. If we consider the gendered element of Joaquin’s story, the analogy becomes even stronger, as the patrón was a male figure that constructed a model of masculinity for indigenous tenants in the hacienda (Neira y Ruiz Bravo, 2001).

The other side of HudBay’s colonial logics revealing its “retrograde attitudes” is the ever-elusive promise of modernity. During our interview, Daniel of Uchucarcco repeatedly told me to take a photo of the trucks parked in an empty field behind us. These trucks had been bought for S/. 10 million (CA$4 million) of the S/. 80 million (CA$32 million) that HudBay has promised to Uchucarcco in the CSR and land use agreement (Flores Unzaga, 2016). HudBay’s own report celebrates this purchase, saying that the firm “collaborated” with the community “to buy trucks they could rent to local contractors to transport Constancia concentrate to the port of Matarani” (HudBay Minerals, 2016: 55). However, the trucks have not been contracted out after

\textsuperscript{20} Literally “skirt,” but here, Joaquin is specifically referring to the traditional skirt of the region explained in the introduction.
just one year, and for Daniel, this is “the proof of deceit” (interview 27). “Makes one angry or no?” he asked.

What is this…it’s like Francisco Pizarro came and tricked and seized Atahualpa... it has happened again similarly, [although] now, no longer with weapons or the Bible, but rather with a little bit of money and…deceit. (Interview 27)

Daniel’s statement reveals how the mining firm’s manipulation of indigenous communities reflects the enduring logics of and power structures of modernity/coloniality. If encomenderos had promised modernity through religion and hacendados, through land modernization, the mining company now does so through CSR programs. As before, however, the promise of modernity remains a “deceit” based on indigenous exploitation.

Figure 9: Tractors that were bought as part of the CSR agreement, but are no longer used. (Photo by the author)

21 This participant previously brought up Pizarro when talking about religion (see page 89) without mentioning Atahualpa. Atahualpa was the last Incan emperor that was captured by the conquistador Francisco Pizarro. While Atahualpa was supposed to be released when he offered Pizarro a lot of gold, he was still executed.
The parallel between the role of the state in creating haciendas and facilitating mining cannot be overlooked. As discussed in Chapter 2, haciendas first developed in the colonial times through state legal mechanisms, such as the *composición de tierra*. In this scheme, Spanish landholders were granted property rights on their lands—often expropriated—after a payment of a fee (*composición*) to the Crown (Mörner, 1984). Today’s concession system, in which the MINEM arbitrarily grants subsoil rights to corporations without indigenous participation, echoes this colonial system. Further, the rapid expansion of haciendas after independence was linked to liberal policies that eliminated the protection of indigenous lands to at once encourage capitalist production centered on primary exports and to “elevate” the inferior population (Gabbert, 2012; Thurner, 1997). Today, the state asserts its commitment to extractivist growth, promoting “socially responsible capitalism based on a very significant concentration of ownership in land and natural resources—the modernized hacienda” (Bebbington, 2010: 110). This economic model, as an offspring of neoliberal multiculturalism, too rests on racial logics, as detailed in Chapter 3.

If one considers the fact that HudBay bought hacienda lands to facilitate its operations (Chapter 4), the parallel between the hacienda and the mining firm even becomes literal. HudBay is thus a new form of enclosure and government that derives power from enduring colonial state-indigenous relations and reproduces a power structure shaped by modernity/coloniality.

**6.4 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have focused on the legal geographies of extraction that shape state-mining company-indigenous relations. Building on Correia’s notions of abandonment and liminality, I have shown how the state resolves the tension in its mandate to recognize indigenous rights and promote extraction by choosing to partially violate the laws of the former category. This abandonment has two dimensions: it involves marginalizing indigenous rights through active manipulation as well as giving the mining company to act as a governing authority with little state control. The mining firm, in turn, takes advantage of its state-like authority to similarly recognize and ignore indigenous rights. Just as the state at times asserts authority and in other, recedes, the mining company too aggressively uses the CSR regime as an “instrument of power” while also deferring responsibilities to the state by pointing to ambiguous jurisdictions. I have argued that such state and corporate abandonment as well as the overlaps in state and corporate
functions reproduce hacienda-indigenous relations. This relationship, as before, is a racial one whereby indigenous needs and capacities are devalued to support the logics of capital. Indigenous people in mining zones thus find themselves in multiple spaces of liminality: in between recognition and neglect by the state and the mining company that shift their jurisdictions and recognition of indigenous rights for the benefit of the modern/colonial project.
Chapter 7
Conclusion

7.1 Summary of key findings

This thesis has sought to uncover the inner workings of a nascent transnational mining operation in an indigenous campesino district of the Peruvian Andes by analyzing how the extractive project is facilitated and impacts the local people. In particular, I have shown that contemporary extraction in Peru must be understood within the country’s colonial history, arguing that transnational mining depends on colonial logics and reproduces colonial power relations.

To do so, I first analyzed how Peru’s post-independence vision of achieving modernity through mining is connected to colonial legacies. In the colonial era, race, indigenous land tenure and labour rules, and mining were mutually constituted. The Spanish, convinced in their morality and superiority over the non-Christian others, established institutions that enabled indigenous land dispossession and labour exploitation in a cyclical manner; if Toledo’s resettlement scheme facilitated indigenous conscription for the mita, it also helped free up lands for private accumulation for Spaniards. Such measures were motivated by the Spanish monarchs’ and colonials’ quest for mineral wealth, eventually enabling the viceroyalty of Peru to become the key source of silver remittances. After independence, the new republic continued to articulate indigenous land tenure according to evolving racial ideologies and an export-led economic model, in which resource extraction was central.

Understood within such historical context, the current neoliberal era of rapid mining expansion happening alongside the partial recognition (and neglect) of indigenous rights seems not an exception, but rather, takes on a colonial character. Peru’s (partial) embrace of indigenous rights—as in other parts of Latin America—are made possible through racial ideologies that essentialize indigeneity to be central while framing multiculturality to be central to the nation’s development. As indigenous rights are only recognized in relation to economic growth, which takes precedence, the state’s commitment to extractivism betrays its promise for indigenous affirmation and instead demonstrates how neoliberal multiculturalism, following Hale’s (2002) observations, is a contemporary form of mestizaje.

I showed how HudBay Minerals’ Constancia project, materialized under such conditions, impacts indigenous people’s livelihoods and depletes their ability to reproduce in place. The mining enclosure has led to territorial dispossession not only through physical fencing, but also
through contamination. Indigenous people of Chamaca’s ability to make a living is similarly dispossessed due to the decline in agricultural productivity related to contamination and also due to the exploitation of labour. Meanwhile, their capacity to make lives meaningful is decreased due to the dispossession of social cohesion, as intra and inter-community conflicts rise due to disagreements about mining and its benefits. I have argued that these multiple dispossessions burden indigenous people’s social reproduction, as people’s biological reproductive capacities are harmed, the needs for unpaid labour rise, and the ability to reproduce indigenous campesino communities deteriorates due to social conflicts and the disruption of human and more-than-human relationships. Such depletion of social reproduction constitutes a type of slow violence that once again threatens indigenous people’s ability to reproduce their ways of being, showing how modern mining reflects colonial state-indigenous relations whereby indigenous social reproductive labour is exploited for the functioning of the mining industry.

I have demonstrated that such impacts on social reproduction disproportionately harms indigenous women due to the existing patriarchy that has been in part established through the colonial encounter. It was through the conquest that the principles of complementarity were fundamentally altered and women became subordinate to men economically and politically. Due to the existing gender hierarchy and gender division of labour, in a mining context, women shoulder additional (re)productive tasks in and out of the home and experience further depletion of social reproduction. Unfortunately, the existing gender hierarchy becomes reproduced through mining, as women remain subordinated due to the increase in male violence. The continued exclusion of women from political spaces also contribute this reproduction of colonial gender structure, as women are unable to vote on mining issues, matters that have direct consequences on their well-being.

By focusing on the legal geographies and mechanisms of extraction, I have analyzed how the central Peruvian state actively causes dispossession experienced by indigenous people through legal abandonment. The state does so by simultaneously manipulating indigenous rights laws through racial logics and giving governing authority to the mining company, leaving the communities vulnerable to exploitation. Similarly, the mining company, while promising development through CSR contributions, instead uses the governance regime as an instrument of power and uses the state-corporate jurisdictional ambiguities to deny responsibilities. Indigenous people are thus in liminal space, put in limbo between recognition and neglect from both the state and the mining company. I have argued that such abandonment reproduces hacienda-
indigenous relations, in which the mining company exercises a state-like authority through a racial power structure. What can be thus observed in Chamaca are the state-indigenous, state-mining company, and mining company-indigenous relations that are strikingly similar to older structures of racialized and gendered indigenous dispossession for the benefit of capital.

### 7.2 Moving forward: indigenous resistance and pluriversal politics

While marginalized due to dispossession, depletion, and state and corporate abandonment, indigenous people of Chamaca are actively rejecting coloniality through collective mobilizations. The historic 2016 *toma de mina*, in which all ten communities of Chamaca came together, was such a case.

On the one hand, through the protest, people were responding to the state abandonment by articulating a different sense of the nation. If, following Perreault (2006), resource protests can be about what a nation is and should be, in Chamaca, people were putting forth a vision for a nation that puts indigenous rights front and center of the national agenda, critiquing the contemporary nation-state that situates modernity with transnational firms. As Isaac put it, “As comuneros, we simply organize…because there is no other thing [option], knowing the Peruvian state, the laws are in favor of transnational companies” (interview 18). Echoing this sentiment, Jacobo said, “The population always has to organize and [that is] the only way in this country, there is no law that protects the inhabitants…it’s a country that totally favors the transnationals, no?” (interview 5).

On the other hand, the communities were contesting the colonial condition imposed by the mining firm. As previously discussed, in 2016, the mining company, after “forty meetings without results” (interview 5), denied the communities of the projects the parties had previously agreed on by negating its jurisdiction. The communities, however, rejected the unfair conditions and treatment: “it was there that the biggest conflict, the indefinite strike, was born,” recalled Paulo (interview 17). People understand HudBay’s jurisdictional maneuvers to circumvent responsibilities to be *incumplimientos*, or acts of non-compliance against indigenous rights. As Isaac put it, the firm’s rejection of the Municipality’s demands amounted to “non-compliance (*incumplimiento*) of the responsibilities that they [HudBay] had to assume, in agreement with the law…that demands that they need to assume responsibilities before indigenous peoples (*pueblos indígenas*)” (interview 18). Challenging the current exploitative relationship and highlighting the potential for a relationship based on reciprocity—however unlikely—Maria said:
Since our resources from our territory are being taken and it [HudBay] is going to leave our territory, our mountain practically barren, we are never going to [be able to] produce anything in this place, it’s going to be practically empty, so, it [HudBay] has to be conscious, put a hand on its heart and give what it must give to the people and support what my comunidades campesinas need. And we don’t want them [HudBay] to make us lose time dialogue after dialogue...as if we were practically taking [the benefits] by force… (Interview 6)

Maria’s poignant statement reveals how indigenous assertion of resource ownership is rooted in profound concern for, and connection to, place; Maria is worried about the mountain becoming “barren,” and not being able to (re)produce their livelihoods. Her sincere request to HudBay to “be conscious, put a hand on its heart” reflects her wish that the company recognize the humanity of the people and the communities as a place; her statement refutes coloniality that reduces indigenous people to mere stakeholders to be managed. Seen in that light, her expression of territorial and resource ownership is not just about financial benefits, but also about having indigenous ways of life being respected.

In a similar vein, several people, when asked about their ideas about potential solution to the ongoing conflicts between the communities and HudBay, suggested that “the owner” himself be present during negotiations. Joaquin told me that although his community of Uchuccarcco has demanded the presence of the “owner”; sometimes, he said, “…in two or three helicopters, all of a sudden, the big fish [senior staff from Canada] come to the country…to simply have that direct relationship with senior staff. But with the community, no. That is the problem” (interview 26). Such dissociation, in Gloria’s view, was also the cause of the ongoing conflicts: “I would like [the owner] himself to come to talk, no? But…his representatives come …[they say] ‘no more than this, there is no more budget,’ like this years have passed. So, [the owner] himself has to come…to understand us” (interview 24). In asking for the “owner,” Joaquin and Gloria point out the dissociative nature of capital; they are demanding that people with power recognize their communities and the reality on the ground rather than simply flying over them in helicopters. Therefore, like Maria, Joaquin and Gloria are putting into question the coloniality and the dissociative nature of capital by asserting place.

To be sure, by reading protests as a rejection of coloniality, I am not arguing that indigenous mobilization is unrelated to the financial element of CSR projects; after all, it was the mining firm’s unwillingness to increase its contributions and accept the proposed projects that started the 2016 protest. However, livelihoods and coloniality are inextricably linked, just as Bebbington et al. (2008: 2891) show that social movements are a response to two different types of
dispossession: that of material livelihoods, and the “colonization of lifeworlds,” the cultural and psychological losses resulting from threats to a way of life. Further, in Chamaca, the desire for—or the necessity of—CSR contributions cannot be understood outside of postcolonial legacies, just as Anthias (2017; 2018) reminds us that indigenous attempts at gas-funded autonomy in Bolivia must be understood alongside the state’s failed native community territory (TCO) titling process. Therefore, just as characterizing indigenous people’s engagement with extraction as “selling-out” would be too simplistic, so too would calling the protests in Chamaca “rent-seeking.” These growing protests are about the ability to reproduce a way of life, which has been jeopardized due to state and corporate neglect. That people’s three main demands are about improvements to health, education, and agriculture further show people’s desire to be able to reproduce life meaningfully, in place. As de la Cadena observes insightfully:

Grassroots’ political assertion of place disputes the right of the state to decide the access of capital to territory, and they oppose the topographic reclassification, the re-territorialization of their place in neutral geo-political economic terms. If extractive technologies have now the capacity to translate former ‘empty land’ into repositories of mineral, local movements dispute that translation and assert their own. This is a powerful moment: local populations not only challenge bio-political identity categories, their place-based movements also challenge geo-political territorial categories. If the old state racism wanted to transform Indians into mestizos through medicine and education, the new state racism adds the will to improve life through an exacerbated rhetoric of economic growth. In so doing, it does not only classify bodies, it wants to re-classify lands. This power threatens once again to usurp what local populations consider their place, and once again let die their ways of being.
(2008: 347)

Chamaca’s protests represent a powerful moment indeed. In July 2018, various leaders of communities and social organizations of Chamaca decided on three new district-wide strategies in a multisectoral assembly: 1) to sign a document self-identifying as indigena/originario to fight on a district level so that all communities may receive the status; 2) to close off the communities from outsiders (e.g. mining agents from community assemblies) and 3) to agree that none of the communities negotiates by itself in order to preserve “unity and strength” (interview 25). If people had previously avoided the indígena label due to state racism (de la Cadena, 2000), people are now coming together through shared histories and reclaiming state-given terms for national and international recognition to reject the colonial condition. While beyond the scope of this thesis, this important moment deserves our full attention—so that we may give way to pluriversal politics, a space in which multiple overlapping worlds are acknowledged and the different value systems and ways of being outside of the modern/colonial world, finally rendered valid.
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# Appendix A: List of Interview Participants

* * * All names are pseudonyms * * *

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Reference #</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Community name</th>
<th>Role(s) in the Community</th>
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Table 2 List of interview participants