T-Space Collection:http://hdl.handle.net/1807/271712014-04-23T12:07:19Z2014-04-23T12:07:19ZAgreeing to agreeEhud Lehrer; School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv UniversityDov Samet; Faculty of Management, Tel Aviv Universityhttp://hdl.handle.net/1807/271842012-11-01T07:51:28Z2011-05-03T00:00:00ZTitle: Agreeing to agree
Authors: Ehud Lehrer; School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University; Dov Samet; Faculty of Management, Tel Aviv University
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/]
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot
have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these
posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents
have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common
knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show
that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the
existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following
two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the
agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still
holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge.2011-05-03T00:00:00ZRevenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problemDeniz Dizdar; Department of Economics, Bonn UniversityAlex Gershkov; Department of Economics, Hebrew University of JerusalemBenny Moldovanu; Department of Economics, Bonn Universityhttp://hdl.handle.net/1807/271832012-11-01T07:50:57Z2011-05-03T00:00:00ZTitle: Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem
Authors: Deniz Dizdar; Department of Economics, Bonn University; Alex Gershkov; Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Benny Moldovanu; Department of Economics, Bonn University
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/]
We analyze maximization of revenue in the dynamic and stochastic knapsack problem where a given capacity needs to be allocated by a given deadline to sequentially arriving agents. Each agent is described by a two-dimensional type that reflects his capacity requirement and his willingness to pay per unit of capacity. Types are private information. We first characterize implementable policies. Then we solve the revenue maximization problem for the special case where there is private information about per-unit values, but capacity needs are observable. After that we derive two sets of additional conditions on the joint distribution of values and weights under which the revenue maximizing policy for the case with observable weights is implementable, and thus optimal also for the case with two-dimensional private information. In particular, we investigate the role of concave continuation revenues for implementation. We also construct a simple policy for which per-unit prices vary with requested weight but not with time, and prove that it is asymptotically revenue maximizing when available capacity/ time to the deadline both go to infinity. This highlights the importance of nonlinear as opposed to dynamic pricing.2011-05-03T00:00:00ZContributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economyTaiji Furusawa; Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi UniversityHideo Konishi; Department of Economics, Boston Collegehttp://hdl.handle.net/1807/271822012-11-01T07:50:26Z2011-05-03T00:00:00ZTitle: Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
Authors: Taiji Furusawa; Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi University; Hideo Konishi; Department of Economics, Boston College
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/]
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public goods economies but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) of a dynamic game with players' participation decisions followed by a common agency game of public goods provision. We illustrate various properties of the FRP-Core with an example. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.2011-05-03T00:00:00ZJudicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theoryMarc Fleurbaey; CNRS and Université Paris DescartesJohn E. Roemer; Departments of Political Science and Economics, Yale Universityhttp://hdl.handle.net/1807/271812012-11-01T07:49:55Z2011-05-03T00:00:00ZTitle: Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory
Authors: Marc Fleurbaey; CNRS and Université Paris Descartes; John E. Roemer; Departments of Political Science and Economics, Yale University
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/]
Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set in the nonnegative orthant in two-dimensional Euclidean space. He/she must choose an allocation in the set, constrained only by Nash's axioms, in the sense that a penalty is paid if and only if a utility allocation is chosen at date T which is inconsistent, according to one of the axioms, with a utility allocation chosen at some earlier date. Penalties are discounted with t, and the Judge chooses any allocation, at a given date, that minimizes the penalty he/she pays at that date. Under what conditions will the Judge's chosen allocations converge to the Nash allocation over time? We answer this question for three canonical axiomatic bargaining solutions: Nash's, Kalai-Smorodinsky's, and the 'egalitarian' solution, and generalize the analysis to a broad class of axiomatic models.2011-05-03T00:00:00Z