T-Space Collection:
http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9409
2014-04-24T19:06:27ZTopologies on types
http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9415
Title: Topologies on types
Authors: Eddie Dekel; Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University; Drew Fudenberg; Harvard University; Stephen Morris; Princeton University
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the
Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference between the smallest epsilon for which the action is epsilon interim correlated rationalizable. We define a strategic topology in which a sequence of types converges if and only if this distance tends to zero for any action and game. Thus a sequence of types converges in the strategic topology if that smallest epsilon
does not jump either up or down in the limit. As applied to sequences, the upper-semicontinuity property is equivalent to convergence in the product topology, but the lower-semicontinuity property is a strictly stronger requirement, as shown by the electronic mail game. In the
strategic topology, the set of "finite types'' (types describable by finite type spaces) is dense but the set of finite common-prior types is not.2006-09-07T00:00:00ZRegret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9414
Title: Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
Authors: Dean P. Foster; Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; H. Peyton Young; Johns Hopkins University and University of Oxford
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.2006-09-07T00:00:00ZEx post implementation in environments with private goods
http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9413
Title: Ex post implementation in environments with private goods
Authors: Sushil Bikhchandani; University of California, Los Angeless
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.2006-09-07T00:00:00ZCoordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9412
Title: Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Authors: George J. Mailath; University of Pennsylvania; Stephen Morris; Princeton University
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.2006-09-07T00:00:00Z