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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 2, Number 3 (September 2007) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/10107

Title: Secure implementation
Authors: Tatsuyoshi Saijo; Osaka University
Tomas Sjostrom; Rutgers University
Takehiko Yamato; Tokyo Institute of Technology
Keywords: Nash implementation, robust implementation, secure implementation, strategy-proofness
C92, D71, D78, H41
Issue Date: 5-Sep-2007
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 2, No 3 (2007)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in standard quasi-linear environments with divisible private or public goods, there exist surplus-maximizing (non-dictatorial) social choice functions that can be securely implemented.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/10107
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20070203
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 2, Number 3 (September 2007)

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