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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 3, Number 2 (June 2008) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/10420

Title: Caller Number Five and related timing games
Authors: Andreas Park; Department of Economics, University of Toronto
Lones Smith; Department of Economics, University of Michigan
Keywords: Games of timing, war of attrition, preemption game
C73, D81
Issue Date: 1-Jun-2008
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 3, No 2 (2008)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] There are two varieties of timing games in economics: wars of attrition, in which having more predecessors helps, and pre-emption games, in which having more predecessors hurts. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoffs that subsumes both varieties as special cases. We assume time is continuous, actions are unobserved, and information is complete, and explore how equilibria of the games, in which there is shifting between phases of slow and explosive (positive probability) stopping, capture many economic and social timing phenomena. Inspired by auction theory, we first show how each symmetric Nash equilibria is equivalent to a different "potential function.'' By using this function, we straightforwardly obtain existence and characterization results. Descartes' Rule of Signs bounds the number of phase transitions. We describe how adjacent timing game phases interact: war of attrition phases are not played out as long as they would be in isolation, but instead are cut short by pre-emptive atoms. We bound the number of equilibria, and compute the payoff and duration of each equilibrium.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/10420
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20080231
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 3, Number 2 (June 2008)

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