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 Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16628

 Title: Many inspections are manipulable Authors: Eran Shmaya; Information Science and Technology, California Institute of Technology Keywords: Forecasting, calibration, zero-sum gamesC72, C73 Issue Date: 1-Sep-2008 Publisher: Theoretical Economics Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 3, No 3 (2008) Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the expert's reliability. If the test function is Borel and the inspection is such that a true expert always passes it, then it is also manipulable by an ignorant expert. The proof uses Martin's theorem about the determinacy of Blackwell games. Under the axiom of choice, there exist non-Borel test functions that are not manipulable. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16628 Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20080367 Rights: Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. Appears in Collections: Volume 3, Number 3 (September 2008)

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