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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 4, Number 1 (March 2009) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17330

Title: Coalition formation under power relations
Authors: Michele Piccione; Department of Economics, London School of Economics
Ronny Razin; Department of Economics, London School of Economics
Keywords: Power, coalition formation, stability
D0, D7
Issue Date: 1-Mar-2009
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 4, No 1 (2009)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which exists and includes the core. We investigate a refinement, the strongly stable social order, which incorporates a notion of robustness to variable power relations. We provide a complete characterization of strongly stable social orders.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17330
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20090001
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 4, Number 1 (March 2009)

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