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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 4, Number 2 (June 2009) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17407

Title: A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Authors: Yukio Koriyama; Dértement d'Éonomie, Éole Polytechnique, Palaiseau
Balazs Szentes; Department of Economics, University College London
Keywords: Voting, information aggregation, costly information
D72, D81
Issue Date: 9-Jun-2009
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 4, No 2 (2009)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17407
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20090227
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 4, Number 2 (June 2009)

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