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 Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17408

 Title: Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship Authors: Mihai Manea; Department of Economics, Harvard University Keywords: Allocation problem, ex-post efficiency, ordinal efficiency, probabilistic serial, random serial dictatorshipD6 Issue Date: 9-Jun-2009 Publisher: Theoretical Economics Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 4, No 2 (2009) Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We establish that the fraction of preference profiles for which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally efficient vanishes for allocation problems with many object types. We consider also a probabilistic setting where in expectation agents have moderately similar preferences reflecting varying popularity across objects. In this setting we show that the probability that the random serial dictatorship mechanism is ordinally efficient converges to zero as the number of object types becomes large. We provide results with similarly negative content for allocation problems with many objects of each type. One corollary is that ordinal efficiency is a strict refinement of ex-post efficiency at most preference profiles. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17408 Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20090165 Rights: Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. Appears in Collections: Volume 4, Number 2 (June 2009)

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