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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 4, Number 2 (June 2009) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17409

Title: Strategy-proofness and single-crossing
Authors: Alejandro Saporiti; School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester
Keywords: Single-crossing, strategy-proofness, tops-only, peak rules
C72, D71, D78
Issue Date: 9-Jun-2009
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 4, No 2 (2009)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n-1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals' most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. It also offers a strategic foundation for the so-called "single-crossing version" of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/17409
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20090127
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 4, Number 2 (June 2009)

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