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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 5, Number 1 (January 2010) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/18349

Title: Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
Authors: William H. Sandholm; Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin
Keywords: Evolutionary game dynamics, ESS
C73
Issue Date: 26-Jan-2010
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 5, No 1 (2010)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/18349
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20100027
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 5, Number 1 (January 2010)

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