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|Title: ||Quantum Cryptography in Rreal-life Applications: Assumptions and Security|
|Authors: ||Zhao, Yi|
|Advisor: ||Lo, Hoi-Kwong|
|Keywords: ||quantum information|
|Issue Date: ||3-Mar-2010|
|Abstract: ||Quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution (QKD), provides a means of unconditionally secure communication. The security is in principle based on the fundamental laws of physics. Security proofs show that if quantum cryptography is appropriately implemented, even the most
powerful eavesdropper cannot decrypt the message from a cipher.
The implementations of quantum crypto-systems in real life may not fully comply with the assumptions made in the security proofs. Such discrepancy between the experiment and the theory can be fatal to the
security of a QKD system. In this thesis we address a number of these discrepancies.
A perfect single-photon source is often assumed in many security proofs. However, a weak coherent source is widely used in a real-life QKD implementation. Decoy state protocols have been proposed as a novel
approach to dramatically improve the performance of a weak coherent source based QKD implementation without jeopardizing its security. Here, we present the first experimental demonstrations of decoy state
protocols. Our experimental scheme was later adopted by most decoy state QKD implementations.
In the security proof of decoy state protocols as well as many other QKD protocols, it is widely assumed that a sender generates a phase-randomized coherent state. This assumption has been enforced in few implementations. We close this gap in two steps: First, we implement and verify the phase randomization experimentally;
second, we prove the security of a QKD implementation without the coherent state assumption.
In many security proofs of QKD, it is assumed that all the detectors on the receiver's side have identical detection efficiencies. We show experimentally that this assumption may be violated in a
commercial QKD implementation due to an eavesdropper's malicious manipulation. Moreover, we show that the eavesdropper can learn part of the final key shared by the legitimate users as a consequence of this violation of the assumptions.|
|Appears in Collections:||Doctoral|
Department of Physics - Doctoral theses
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