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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 6, Number 1 (January 2011) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27174

Title: Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
Authors: Parag A. Pathak; Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jay Sethuraman; Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University,
Keywords: Matching, random assignment
C78, D63
Issue Date: 23-Jan-2011
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 6, No 1 (2011)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms---Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment---are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27174
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20110001
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 6, Number 1 (January 2011)

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