test Browse by Author Names Browse by Titles of Works Browse by Subjects of Works Browse by Issue Dates of Works
       

Advanced Search
Home   
 
Browse   
Communities
& Collections
  
Issue Date   
Author   
Title   
Subject   
 
Sign on to:   
Receive email
updates
  
My Account
authorized users
  
Edit Profile   
 
Help   
About T-Space   

T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 6, Number 2 (May 2011) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27179

Title: Robust stability in matching markets
Authors: Fuhito Kojima; Department of Economics, Stanford University
Keywords: Matching, stability, strategy-proofness, robust stability, acyclicity
C71, C78, D71, D78, J44
Issue Date: 3-May-2011
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 6, No 2 (2011)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even when school priorities are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there is a priority structure for which no robustly stable mechanism exists. Our main result shows that there exists a robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic (Ergin, 2002), and in that case, the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique robustly stable mechanism.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27179
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20110257
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 6, Number 2 (May 2011)

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
184.pdf149.76 kBAdobe PDF
View/Open

Items in T-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

uoft