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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 6, Number 2 (May 2011) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27180

Title: Manipulative auction design
Authors: Philippe Jehiel; Department of Economics, Paris School of Economics and Department of Economics, University College London
Keywords: Auction design, feedback equilibrium, manipulation
C72, D82, D84
Issue Date: 3-May-2011
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 6, No 2 (2011)
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bidders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several auction formats are being used and the distribution of bids but not the associated formats are disclosed. I employ the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) to model such situations. First-price auction in which past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way generates more revenues than the second-price auction while achieving an efficient outcome in the asymmetric private values two-bidder case with independent distributions. Besides, by using several auction formats with coarse feedback a designer can always extract more revenues than in Myerson's optimal auction, and yet less revenues than in the full information case whenever bidders enjoy ex-post quitting rights and the assignment and payment rules are monotonic in bids. These results suggest an important role of feedback disclosure as a novel instrument in mechanism design.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27180
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20110185
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 6, Number 2 (May 2011)

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