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 Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27181

 Title: Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory Authors: Marc Fleurbaey; CNRS and Université Paris DescartesJohn E. Roemer; Departments of Political Science and Economics, Yale University Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining theory, judicial precedent, dynamic foundations, Nash's bargaining solutionC70, C78, K4 Issue Date: 3-May-2011 Publisher: Theoretical Economics Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 6, No 2 (2011) Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set in the nonnegative orthant in two-dimensional Euclidean space. He/she must choose an allocation in the set, constrained only by Nash's axioms, in the sense that a penalty is paid if and only if a utility allocation is chosen at date T which is inconsistent, according to one of the axioms, with a utility allocation chosen at some earlier date. Penalties are discounted with t, and the Judge chooses any allocation, at a given date, that minimizes the penalty he/she pays at that date. Under what conditions will the Judge's chosen allocations converge to the Nash allocation over time? We answer this question for three canonical axiomatic bargaining solutions: Nash's, Kalai-Smorodinsky's, and the 'egalitarian' solution, and generalize the analysis to a broad class of axiomatic models. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27181 Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20110289 Rights: Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. Appears in Collections: Volume 6, Number 2 (May 2011)

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