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 Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27184
 Title: Agreeing to agree Authors: Ehud Lehrer; School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv UniversityDov Samet; Faculty of Management, Tel Aviv University Keywords: Agreeing theorem, common knowledge, common prior, no trade theoremC70, D82 Issue Date: 3-May-2011 Publisher: Theoretical Economics Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 6, No 2 (2011) Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/27184 Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20110269 Rights: Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. Appears in Collections: Volume 6, Number 2 (May 2011)