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|Title: ||No to Rawlsian Public Reason and Yes to the Enlarged Mentality: An Affirmative Role for Moral and Religious Arguments in Canadian Public Discourse in light of Charter Values|
|Authors: ||Morrison, Andrew|
|Advisor: ||Emon, Anver|
|Keywords: ||law, religion and public discourse|
|Issue Date: ||15-Dec-2011|
|Abstract: ||This paper examines two different theories in relation to the optimal modes of public deliberation about constitutional values and the public good in the context of democratic pluralism: Rawlsian Public Reason and Nedelsky’s Enlarged Mentality.
I challenge Rawlsian public reason’s claim to epistemic abstinence, autonomy and its claim to reflect a political conception of justice by examining certain contradictory aspects of its theoretical rendition. I argue that significant aspects of the picture of democracy that Rawlsian public reason reflects are unempirical. I argue that Rawlsian public reason’s concept of bracketing moral and religious argumentation from public deliberation is unjustifiable, unattainable and derogates from Canadian constitutional values.
I proffer that Nedelsky’s enlarged mentality is preferable as it is more realistic and consonant with Canadian constitutional values. I argue that Nedelsky’s enlarged mentality is facilitative of genuine and meaningful dialogic exchange in spite of difference whilst managing the risk of democratic instability.|
|Appears in Collections:||Master|
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