test Browse by Author Names Browse by Titles of Works Browse by Subjects of Works Browse by Issue Dates of Works

Advanced Search
& Collections
Issue Date   
Sign on to:   
Receive email
My Account
authorized users
Edit Profile   
About T-Space   

T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
School of Graduate Studies - Theses >
Master >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/31351

Title: No to Rawlsian Public Reason and Yes to the Enlarged Mentality: An Affirmative Role for Moral and Religious Arguments in Canadian Public Discourse in light of Charter Values
Authors: Morrison, Andrew
Advisor: Emon, Anver
Department: Law
Keywords: law, religion and public discourse
Issue Date: 15-Dec-2011
Abstract: This paper examines two different theories in relation to the optimal modes of public deliberation about constitutional values and the public good in the context of democratic pluralism: Rawlsian Public Reason and Nedelsky’s Enlarged Mentality. I challenge Rawlsian public reason’s claim to epistemic abstinence, autonomy and its claim to reflect a political conception of justice by examining certain contradictory aspects of its theoretical rendition. I argue that significant aspects of the picture of democracy that Rawlsian public reason reflects are unempirical. I argue that Rawlsian public reason’s concept of bracketing moral and religious argumentation from public deliberation is unjustifiable, unattainable and derogates from Canadian constitutional values. I proffer that Nedelsky’s enlarged mentality is preferable as it is more realistic and consonant with Canadian constitutional values. I argue that Nedelsky’s enlarged mentality is facilitative of genuine and meaningful dialogic exchange in spite of difference whilst managing the risk of democratic instability.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/31351
Appears in Collections:Master

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
Morrison_Andrew_R_201111_LLM_thesis.pdf854.34 kBAdobe PDF

Items in T-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.