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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 1, Number 2 (June 2006) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9411

Title: A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets
Authors: Federico Echenique; California Institute of Technology
Jorge Oviedo; Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina
Keywords: 
Two-sided matching, cooperative game theory, core
C78
Issue Date: 1-Jun-2006
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 1, No 2 (2006); 233-273
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9411
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/2006233
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 1, Number 2 (June 2006)

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