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 Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9412

 Title: Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring Authors: George J. Mailath; University of PennsylvaniaStephen Morris; Princeton University Keywords: Repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recallC72, C73, D82 Issue Date: 7-Sep-2006 Publisher: Theoretical Economics Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 1, No 3 (2006); 311-340 Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9412 Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060311 Rights: Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. Appears in Collections: Volume 1, Number 3 (September 2006)

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