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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 1, Number 3 (September 2006) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9414

Title: Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
Authors: Dean P. Foster; Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
H. Peyton Young; Johns Hopkins University and University of Oxford
Learning, Nash equilibrium, regret, bounded rationality
C72, D83
Issue Date: 7-Sep-2006
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 1, No 3 (2006); 341-367
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9414
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060341
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 1, Number 3 (September 2006)

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