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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 1, Number 4 (December 2006) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9512

Title: Group formation and voter participation
Authors: Herrera, Helios
Martinelli, Cesar
Keywords: 
Voter mobilization, endogenous leaders, turnout, winning margin
D72
Issue Date: 6-Dec-2006
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 1, No 4 (2006); 461-487
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We present a model of participation in large elections in which the formation of voter groups is endogenous. Partisan citizens decide whether to become leaders (activists) and try to persuade impressionable citizens to vote for the leaders' preferred party. In the (unique) pure strategy equilibrium, the number of leaders favoring each party depends on the cost of activism and the importance of the election. In turn, the expected turnout and the winning margin in an election depend on the number of leaders and the strength of social interactions. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the expected turnout and the winning margin in large elections.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9512
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060461
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 1, Number 4 (December 2006)

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