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T-Space at The University of Toronto Libraries >
Theoretical Economics >
Volume 1, Number 4 (December 2006) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9515

Title: A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
Authors: Jacob Glazer; Tel Aviv University and Boston University
Ariel Rubinstein; Tel Aviv University and New York University
Keywords: 
Persuasion, mechanism design, hard evidence, pragmatics
C61, D82, D83
Issue Date: 6-Dec-2006
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 1, No 4 (2006); 395-410
Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener.s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the speaker chooses. A persuasion rule specifies which statements the listener finds persuasive. We study persuasion rules that maximize the probability that the listener accepts the request if and only if it is justified, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that his request is accepted. We prove that there always exists a persuasion rule involving no randomization and that all optimal persuasion rules are ex-post optimal. We relate our analysis to the field of pragmatics.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9515
Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060395
Rights: Authors who publish in <i>Theoretical Economics</i> will release their articles under the <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license</a>. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given.
Appears in Collections:Volume 1, Number 4 (December 2006)

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