Home

Browse
Communities
& Collections

Issue Date
Author
Title
Subject

Sign on to:

My Account
authorized users

Edit Profile

Help
 Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9515

 Title: A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach Authors: Jacob Glazer; Tel Aviv University and Boston UniversityAriel Rubinstein; Tel Aviv University and New York University Keywords: Persuasion, mechanism design, hard evidence, pragmaticsC61, D82, D83 Issue Date: 6-Dec-2006 Publisher: Theoretical Economics Citation: Theoretical Economics; Vol 1, No 4 (2006); 395-410 Abstract: [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener.s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the speaker chooses. A persuasion rule specifies which statements the listener finds persuasive. We study persuasion rules that maximize the probability that the listener accepts the request if and only if it is justified, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that his request is accepted. We prove that there always exists a persuasion rule involving no randomization and that all optimal persuasion rules are ex-post optimal. We relate our analysis to the field of pragmatics. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/9515 Other Identifiers: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20060395 Rights: Authors who publish in Theoretical Economics will release their articles under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial license. This license allows anyone to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes provided that appropriate attribution is given. Appears in Collections: Volume 1, Number 4 (December 2006)

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat